The Mathematics of Social Choice:

Is Democracy Mathematically Unsound?

Jose Maria P. Balmaceda

Professor
Institute of Mathematics
University of the Philippines Diliman
joey@math.upd.edu.ph

Science, Technology and Society

Prelude

Order and Mathematics

1
Order in Mathematics

 Concept of order appears everywhere

in mathematics
 Order theory studies various binary
relations that capture the intuitive
notion of mathematical ordering
Examples:
 Usual order, ≤, on natural numbers
 Lexicographic ordering of words

Pictorial Representation of
Order (Lattices)

Example:
Example: Subsets of
Subsets of a 4-element
a set {a,b} set

{a,b}

{a} {b}

2
 Ordering the divisors of an integer:
“x ≤ y” , if x is a divisor of y

Example: divisors of 60

6 is the LCM of 5 is the GCD of

2 and 3 20 and 15

3 Diagrams of the Lattice of

Subsets of a 4-Element Set

3
Lattices are studied in many areas
of math and computer science

 Crystallography
 Number theory
 Cryptography
 Coding theory
 Sphere packing

Order and Society

• Social Choice and Voting

• Paradoxes of Democracy
• Ideal Voting Systems and Arrow’s
Theorem

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 ice
ho
Social Choice Theory and l C
cia and al
So idu
Voting Systems In div lues
Va By h
et
nn
 Social Choice Theory: Ke rrow
A 52
deals with process by 19
which varied and
conflicting choices are
consolidated into a
single choice of the
group (or society)  Underlying
principle is that of
 Voting: vehicle by ordering or
which decisions are ranking
made in a democratic (of preferences
society or choices)

Voting Systems

 Voting system: a way for a group to select one

(winner) from among several candidates

 If there are only two alternatives, choosing is easy:

the one preferred by the majority wins

 If there is only one person doing the choosing, things

are again easy (but this option is probably
undesirable)

 When several people choose from among three or

more alternatives, the process is trickier

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Some assumptions on our voting
system:
 Individual preferences are assumed to be
transitive: if a voter prefers X to Y and Y to Z,
it is reasonable to assume that the voter
prefers X to Z

 Relative preferences are not altered by the

elimination of one or more candidates

 These are so-called “fairness” assumptions.

Later, we shall impose other fairness
principles on our voting system

Non-transitivity can cause problems

Situation : Choosing a Suitor

• 3 suitors: ALEX , BUDDY , CALOY

• Girl ranks the 3 men according to : intelligence, physical

attractiveness, income

Intelligence Physical Income

Rank 1 A B C
Rank 2 B C A
Rank 3 C A B

!Taken in pairs, she prefers: A to B

B to C
C to A

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 Situation : Choosing a Candidate

• 3 candidates: A, B, C, ranked by all voter s

1/3 of 1/3 of 1/3 of

voters voters voters
Rank 1 A B C

Rank 2 B C A

Rank 3 C A B

!Taken in pairs: 2/3 prefer A to B

2/3 prefer B to C
2/3 prefer C to A

Choosing a fastfood place

Tito Vic Joey
1st Choice McDo Wendy’s Jollibee
2nd Choice Jollibee McDo Wendy’s
3rd Choice Wendy’s Jollibee McDo

Choose first between McDo and Wendy’s

 McDo vs Wendy’s → Wendy’s
 Then, Wendy’s vs Jollibee → Jollibee (winner)

 But Vic is unhappy. 

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Insincere or Strategic Voting
Tito Vic Joey
1st Choice McDo Wendy’s Jollibee

2nd Choice Jollibee McDo Wendy’s

3rd Choice Wendy’s Jollibee McDo

 Suppose Vic is insincere. He votes for McDo

(instead of his real 1st choice, Wendy’s).

Insincere or Strategic Voting

Tito Vic Joey
1st Choice McDo McDo Jollibee

2nd Choice Jollibee Wendy’s Wendy’s

3rd Choice Wendy’s Jollibee McDo

 Suppose Vic is insincere. He votes for McDo

(instead of his real 1st choice, Wendy’s).
 McDo vs Wendy’s → McDo
 McDo vs Jollibee → McDo

 Vic is satisfied (he gets his 2nd choice) 

8
Voting Methods

 The most popular method of voting is

plurality voting.
 A candidate with the most number of
votes, or most 1st-place votes wins.
 This seems like a very reasonable
method, right? Yes, but…

Example: Plurality isn’t always the

best method

• 100 residents elect their barangay leader.

• The candidates are R, H, C, O, and S.

• The results (given by a preference schedule):

No. of voters 49 48 3

1st choice R H C
2nd choice H S H
3rd choice C O S
4th choice O C O
5th choice S R R

• Using plurality, the choice is R, despite being the last

choice of a majority (51).

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Consider H : Number of vot ers:
• H is the first choice of 48 (only 1
less than R) and also has 52 second 49 48 3
place votes.
1 st R H C
• Under any reasonable interpretation, 2 nd H S H
H is more representat ive of the 3 rd C O S
town’s choice than R, but plurality 4 th O C O
method fails to choose H. 5 th S R R

Consider H : Number of vot ers:

• H is the first choice of 48 (only 1
less than R) and also has 52 second 49 48 3
place votes.
1 st R H C
• Under any reasonable interpretation, 2 nd H S H
H is more representat ive of the 3 rd C O S
town’s choice than R, but plurality 4 th O C O
method fails to choose H. 5 th S R R

In a one-to-one comparison H would always get a majority of

the votes.

• Compare H and R: H would get 51 votes (48 from the

second column and 3 from the third) versus 49 for R.
• Comparing H and C would result in 97 votes for H and only
3 for C.

• Finally H is preferred to both O and S by all 100 voters.

10
Fairness Criteria

 In the language of voting theory, we say

that the plurality method fails to satisfy
a basic principle of fairness called the
Condorcet criterion.

Condorcet’s Criterion:
Marquis de Condorcet, 1743-1794

 If there is a
candidate who wins
in a one-to-one
comparison with
any other
alternative, then
that candidate
should be the
winner of the
election.

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 We shall examine several voting
methods and discuss other fairness
criteria.

Common Voting Methods

(preferential voting)

The STS Club Election

There are four candidate s for the position of President:

Alice (A) Ben (B) Cris (C) Dina (D)

37 members of the club each submit a ballot indicating his or h er

1st , 2 nd , 3 rd , 4 th choices.

No. of voters 14 10 8 4 1

1 st choice A C D B C
2 nd choice B B C D D
3 rd choice C D B C B
4 th choice D A A A A

We shall use several voting methods to pick the winner.

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Plurality Method: candidate with most
1st place votes wins

STSC election results:

No. of voters 14 10 8 4 1
1st A C D B C
2nd B B C D D
3rd C D B C B
4th D A A A A

A : 14 first-place votes C : 11 first-place votes

B : 4 first-place votes D : 8 first-place votes

 A (Alice) wins using plurality.

Borda Count Method :

weighted voting method
Jean-Charles de Borda, 1733 -1799

No. of voters 14 10 8 4 1

1 st choice A C D B C
2nd choice B B C D D
3 rd choice C D B C B
4 th choice D A A A A

• Each place on a ballot is assi gned points . In there are

N candidates, give N points for first place, N -1 points for
second, and so on, until the last place, to be given 1
point.

• The points are tallied for each candidate, and the

candidate with the highest total wins.

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 Borda count for the STS Club election :

Rank \ # Vote 14 10 8 4 1
st
1 : 4 pts A: 56 C: 40 D: 32 B: 16 C: 4
2nd : 3 pts B: 42 B: 30 C: 24 D: 12 D: 3
rd
3 : 2 pts C: 28 D:20 B: 16 C: 8 B: 2
4th : 1 pt D: 14 A: 10 A: 8 A: 4 A: 1

A gets 56 + 10 + 8 + 4 + 1 = 79 points
B gets 42 + 30 + 16 + 16 + 2 = 106 points
C gets 28 + 40 + 24 + 8 + 4 = 104 points
D gets 14 + 20 + 32 + 12 + 3 = 81 points

The winner is Ben (B) !

Method of Pairwise Comparisons :

Head-to-head match -ups

• Every candidate is matched on a one -to-one basis with

every other candidate.

• Each of these one -to-one pairings is called a pairwise

comparison .

• When pairing two candidates (say X or Y) one on one ,

each vote is assigned to either X or Y by the order of
preference indicated by the voter. (X gets the votes of
all voters ranking X higher than Y.)

• Who will win the STS Club election using this method?

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 No. of voters 14 10 8 4 1
1 st choice A C D B C
2 nd choice B B C D D
3rd choice C D B C B
4th choice D A A A A

1. Compare A versus B
• A is preferred by 14 over B
• B is preferred by 23 ove r A ! B gets 1 point.
2. Compare all other p airs
A vs C (14 to 23) ! C gets 1 pt
A vs D (14 to 23) ! D gets 1 pt
B vs C (18 to 19) ! C gets 1 pt
B vs D (28 to 9) ! B gets 1 pt
C vs D (25 to 12) ! C gets 1 pt

!C has the most (3 pts), so Cris is the winner!

Plurality-with-Elimination
Method:
• a sophisticated version of plurality met hod and is carried out
in round s

• eliminate candidates with fewest number of 1 st place votes

one at a time, until a candidate with a majority of 1 stplace
votes emerges.

Example: Math Lovers Club election

# of voters 14 10 8 4 1
1st choice A C D B C A has 14 first places
2nd choice B B C D D B has 4 first places
3rd choice C D B C B C has 11 first places
4th choice D A A A A D has 8 first places

Round 1: Eliminate B

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 Plurality with elimination, round 2 :
st
In round 1, B got fewest 1 place votes and was eliminated.

# 14 10 8 4 1 Round 2
1 st A C D B C # 14 10 8 4 1
2 nd B B C D D ! 1st A C D D C
rd nd
3 C D B C B 2 C D C C D
th rd
4 D A A A A 3 D A A A A

Round 2
# 14 11 12 A: 14 first places
C: 11 first places
1st A C D
D: 12 first places
2nd C D C
rd Therefore, eliminate C
3 D A A

Round 3: 14 23 A: 14 first places

1 st A D D: 23 first places
2 nd D A

Therefore Dave (D) wins, using plurality with

elimination!

Summary: STS Club Election

Voting Method Winner

Plurality Alice
Borda count Ben
Pairwise comparison Cris
Plurality with elimination Dave

 4 methods, 4 different winners!

 Which method is best?

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Problems with the Different Voting
Methods

 Earlier, we saw that the plurality

method violates the Condorcet
criterion

 Are the other voting methods better?

Problems with the Borda method:

4 candidates, 11 voters

# voters 6 2 3
A gets 29 pts
1st: 4 pts A B C (4x6 + 1x2 + 1x3)
2nd: 3 pts B C D
B gets 32 pts
3rd: 2 pts C D B
C gets 30 pts
4th: 1 pt D A A D gets 19 pts

B wins under the Borda method, even if A has the

majority of first place votes (6 of 11).
This violates the Majority Criterion.

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Majority Criterion:

 If there is a candidate that is the first

choice of the majority of the voters,
then that candidate should be the
winner.

Problems with Plurality with Elimination method:

Example: 3 candidates : A, B, C

# of votes 7 8 10 4
1st choice A B C A
2nd choice B C A C B has fewest 1 st places.
3rd choice C A B B Therefore, eliminate B.

# of votes 11 18
1st choice
st
A C C has majority of 1 place
2nd choice C A Therefore, C wins.

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Problems with Plurality with Elimination method:

Example: 3 candidates : A, B, C

# of votes 7 8 10 4
1st choice A B C A
2nd choice B C A C B has fewest 1 st places.
3rd choice C A B B Therefore, eliminate B.

# of votes 11 18
1st choice A C C has majority of 1 st
place
nd
2 choice C A Therefore, C wins.

Suppose the election was declared null and void (due to

irregularities).
A second election is held. The 4 voters (in the last column) change
their vote and switch their 1 st and 2 nd choice s (between A and C)

Since C won the first election, and the new votes only
increased C’s votes, we expect C to win again.

New election:

# of votes 7 8 10 4 Voters in last column

1st choice A B C C switch A and C.
2nd choice B C A A
3rd choice C A B B

Since A has fewest first places (7) eliminate A.

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New election:

# of votes 7 8 10 4 Voters in last column

1st choice A B C C switch A and C.
2nd choice B C A A
3rd choice C A B B

Since A has fewest first places (7) , eliminate A.

# of votes 15 14
1st choice B C
2nd choice C B B wins this time!

This violates another fairness principle called the

Monotonicity Criterion .

Monotonicity Criterion

 If a candidate X is the winner of an

election, and in a re-election, all
voters who change their preferences
do so in a way that is favorable only
to X, then X should still be the
winner.

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 Problems with Method of Pairwise
Comparison
A vs B: 13 to 9, A wins
# 5 3 5 3 2 4
A vs C: 12 to 10, A wins
A vs D: 12 to 10, A wins
1st A A C D D B
A vs E: 10 to 12, E wins
2nd B D E C C E
3rd C B D B B A B vs C: B wins
B vs D: D wins
4th D C A E A C
B vs E: B wins
5th E E B A E D C vs D: C wins
C vs E: C wins
D vs E: D wins

Since A has 3 pts, B has 2 pts, C and D have 2 pts, E has 1 pt,
the winner using this method is A.

Now, suppose, that for some reason, the votes have to be

recounted. But before they are, candidates B, C, D become
discouraged and drop out.

# 5 3 5 3 2 4 Eliminating B,C,D
gives:
1st A A
2nd E E
# 10 12
3rd A 1st A E
4th A E A 2nd E A
5th E E A E

The winner is now E ! Originally, the winner was A, but

when some candidates dropped out, and no re-vote was
made, the winner became E. This violates still another
criterion.

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Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives Criterion:

 If a candidate X is the winner of an

election, and one or more candidates
are removed and votes are recounted,
then X should still be the winner.

Other fairness criteria:

 Unanimity : if every individual prefers
a certain option to another, then so
must the resulting societal choice

 Non-dictatorship : the social choice

function should not simply follow the
preference order of a single individual
while ignoring all others

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Summary: STS Club Election

Voting Method Winner

Plurality Alice
Borda count Ben
Pairwise comparison Cris
Plurality with elimination Dave

 4 methods, 4 different winners!

 Each method fails to satisfy some fairness
criterion!
 More precisely, it is possible that in a
particular election, a particular outcome of
votes will violate some fairness criterion.

Which is the best voting method?

There is no ideal voting method!

CHAOTIC ELECTIONS!
A Mathematician Looks at
Voting,
by Donald Saari, 2001
American Math. Soc.

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Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

 There is no consistent method by which a

democratic society can make a choice that
is always fair when that choice must be
made from among several (three or more)
alternatives.

Kenneth Arrow, in 1952 essay “A Difficulty in the Concept of

Social Welfare” and PhD dissertation “Social Choice and
Individual Values”

Kenneth J. Arrow, b. 1921

1972 Nobel Prize, Economics

 Arrow proved that it is

impossible to design a set of
rules for social decision that
would simultaneously obey
all of the fairness criteria
below:
• Transitivity
• Monotonicity
• Independence of irrelevant
alternatives
• Unanimity
• Non-dictatorship

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An Implication of Arrow’s Theorem:

 The only social choice function

that respects, transitivity,
unanimity, monotonicity, and
independence of irrelevant
alternatives is a dictatorship!

Arrow’s mathematical proof uses

concepts of order theory.

Remarks
 Arrow’s theorem applies only to
ranked or preferential voting systems
 It doesn’t prescribe a “best” method;
certainly doesn’t say dictatorship is
better
 It does prove that no voting method
can satisfy at the same time all
reasonable fairness criteria (for all
possible outcomes of votes)

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Are there alternative methods?
• Non-preferential methods - voters are not asked to rank
candidates according to p reference

• Best known method is the Approval Method – given a set of

candidates, voters can give their approval to as many (or as few)
of the choices. No ranking is made.

Features of Approval Voting (according to advocates ):

1. Easy to understand and simple to implement

2. Gives voters flexible options and increases voter turnout
3. Helps elect the strongest candidates
4. Unaffected by the number of candidates
5. Will reduce ne gative campaigning
6. Will give minority candidates their proper due

Conclusion
 The concept of order is ubiquitous and important in
mathematics

 Lattice theory and order theory formalize and systematize the

study of order; lattices are important structures for both theory
and application

 Order is also critical in society, especially in decision-making

 Mathematics allows us to analyze voting systems and other

social issues, but mathematics does not provide all answers

 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem shows that there can be no

perfect voting system; and that fairness and democracy are
inherently incompatible

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End Notes

 The Math Lovers Election example is from P.
Tannembaum and R. Arnold’s book, Excursions
in Modern Mathematics, Prenctice Hall, 1995.
There are various websites on the mathematics
of voting theory and Arrow’s Theorem (easy to
search via Google©) as well as sites devoted to
lattice and order theory.
Many problems in society and government,
such as fair division and apportionment, the
measurement of power, can be helped
analyzed using mathematics.

Hello…

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Hello… hello…

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