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Oliver Mujica

Professor Frazier

LBSU 402

21 May 2009

The United States Embargo on Cuba

In their book The Cuban Embargo, Patrick Haney and Walt Vanderbush provide a

comprehensive examination of economic relations by the United States towards Cuba from the

historical prospective of the trade embargo policy to the current changes in attitudes, in which

they summarize as follows:

“The United States and Cuba share a complex, fractious, interconnected history.

Before 1959, the United States was Cuba’s largest trading partner, but in reaction to

Cuba's communist revolution lead by Fidel Castro, the United States severed all

economic ties between the two nations. This action initiated the longest trade embargo in

modern history, one that continues to this present day. Over the course of the past five

decades since the Cuban revolution, there has been changing politics of United States

policy toward Cuba. While the United States embargo policy has remained relatively

stable since its origins during the heart of the Cold War, the dynamics that produce and

govern that policy have changed dramatically. “Although originally dominated by the

executive branch, the president's tight grip over the Cuban embargo policy has gradually

surrendered to the influence of interest groups, specific members of Congress, and

electoral campaigns goals.” Ultimately, what has been demonstrated by the political

battles over the Cuban embargo policy is that it’s much more to do with who controls the

policy as opposed to the shape of that policy itself.

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The real dividing line in the Unites States embargo policy towards Cuba is how

best to undermine the Castro regime and hasten the country’s day of liberation. For

almost half a century, the United States government has tried to isolate Cuba

economically in an effort to undermine the regime and deprive it of resources. Since

1960, Americans have been barred from trading with, investing in, or traveling to Cuba.

Even worst, Cuban Americans have been prevented by the Unites States to freely travel

to and from Cuba to visit relatives, even if their health may be dire, and limited in the

amount of their financial support that they may send back home” (Haney, Vanderbush 1).

In Human, All-Too-Human, Friedrich Nietzsche addressed the question of whether

“human beings are motivated by the desire for power and by fear of the power of others”

(Bizzell, Herzberg 1168). The premise is all too clear that, upon the outset, the United States was

fearful of Cuba’s communist alliances with the Soviet Union and its socialistic governmental

practices. As such, the embargo on Cuba was simply a tactic and political maneuver to gain

power over Cuba by controlling it and thereby attempting to lessen its own fears. In fact, the

issue surrounding the United States’ defenses against short-range missiles was one of the driving

campaign points of the Kennedy presidential candidacy platform (Hersh 156).

Haney and Vanderbush further substantiate that:

“The embargo had a national security rationale before 1991, when Castro

served as the Soviet Union's proxy in the Western Hemisphere. But all that

changed with the fall of Soviet communism. Today, more than a decade after

losing billions in annual economic aid from its former sponsor, Cuba is only a

poor and dysfunctional nation of 11 million people that poses no threat to

American or regional security. If the goal of the United States embargo policy

towards Cuba is to help its people achieve freedom and a better life, the economic
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embargo has completely failed. Its economic effect is to make the people of Cuba

worse off by depriving them of lower-cost food and other goods that could be

bought from the United States. It means less independence for Cuban workers and

entrepreneurs, who could be earning dollars from American tourists and fueling

private-sector growth. Meanwhile, Castro and his ruling elite enjoy a comfortable,

insulated lifestyle by extracting any meager surplus produced by their captive

subjects” (Haney, Vanderbush 1).

As with his predecessors, President Obama will be contemplating the fate of the Cuban

embargo. Along with this decision will come either a new era in American diplomacy or

“business as usual” with our Caribbean neighbor. As recently as April 13, 2009, President

Obama took a first step by loosening certain restriction of the Cuban embargo. However,

criticism has been raised by Cuba, as well as a few Latin American countries, as to whether or

not these first actions serve as adequate measures to resolve the embargo. The Cuban

government has recently expressed its desire to work in collaboration with the Obama

administration to dissolve the embargo once and for all. But, for whatever reason, the United

States remains rather reluctant.

The findings of an expertly researched probing expose’ of the United States policy and

the future of Cuba are contained in the book Dateline Havana: The Real Story of U.S. Policy and

Future of Cuba by Reese Erlich in which he provides the following information regarding public

opinion:

“Recent reputable polls demonstrate that the general public is changing vis-à-vis

its political opinions on Cuba policy. In 2007, a Florida International University poll

showed that 64% of Cuban Americans wanted President Bush’s 2004 policies on family

travel and remittances rescinded. More recent polls corroborate this finding and go
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further, to the point of reaching a majority of Cuban Americans who support removal of

travel restrictions for all U.S. citizens, not just families. A new policy toward Cuba in

2009 would have an impact beyond Cuba; it would send a strong signal to our South and

Central American neighbors that a new day has dawned in the United States in relation to

Latin America as a whole. This is a change that Latin American leaders have been

promoting to President-elect Obama” (Erlich 1).

At this juncture, one must wonder if the American public fully understands why, after

half a century and ten Presidential administrations, does the Cuban embargo still exist, or if

Americans really care. Therefore, a thorough examination and understanding of the economic

relations of the United States with Cuba must be conducted, as it relates to the history of the

embargo policy and current changes in attitudes, as well as the serious effects that such domestic

politics can have on foreign policy, in order to determine whether or not the embargo on Cuba

should be lifted.

In a comprehensive study Why Cuba? Why Now? that was prepared by the International

Institute for the Study of Cuban Policy, the following issues were raised and analyzed:

1. “The Cuban 'social experience' is approaching a major change with a

generational shift at the top. There is enormous speculation in the West,

indeed worldwide, as to how this change will develop and what forces will

be brought to bear, both internally and externally.

2. In the wider global context, Cuba also presents critical questions

concerning globalization, especially but not only in Latin America.

3. The Cuban revolution has largely been viewed in the West as a mixture of

old style Communism and totalitarian dictatorship, but neither of these

views adequately describe it complexities nor explain its exceptionalism.

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4. Following the demise of the Soviet Union and the fall of at least old-style

communism as an alternative political and economic system, there has

been an assumption that free market capitalism has to be the only game in

town. However, many are asking whether the survival, recovery and

successes of the Cuban system, despite considerable external pressures,

might present an alternative model of development.

5. The Cuban authorities have been criticized for excessive pressures on

citizens, private companies, non-governmental institutions and the

domestic and international media. This is an issue upon which there are

polarized views and which requires rigorous study to provide evidence on

which an objective debate can be furthered.

6. Whatever the realities of the political system that has developed in often

embattled Cuba, the outcomes - in terms of health care, education, welfare

service, technological advances, sports prowess and sustainable

development - are remarkable and far too little recognized in the wider

world. They outstrip many of the achievements in these dimensions in

countries that have adopted either the free market or the communist

systems” (International Institute for the Study of Cuban Policy).

To address these issues, the International Institute for the Study of Cuban Policy has

asserted the following:

“Currently, governmental policies towards Cuba on both sides of the Atlantic

seem to be, to differing degrees, predicated on the assumption that the Cuban Revolution

will be transformed dramatically and move further towards free market capitalism once

its chief architect, Fidel Castro, is no longer on the scene. There is apparently no planning
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for the possibility that the Cuban regime might not essentially change - or that it might

become more radically socialist.

Persisting U.S. antagonism towards socialism in Cuba and other parts of Latin

America is potentially a source of instability and even conflict in the region. Cuba

demands attention in its own right as a key element in this context. With Cuba now

enjoying the benefits of a close alliance with oil-rich Venezuela and a deepening trade

and investment relationship with a booming China, there is every prospect that the Cuban

economy might continue its fast growth of recent years, possibly making a political

change towards liberalism in the island less, rather than more, likely” (International

Institute for the Study of Cuban Policy).

In another comprehensive study Globalization and Cuba that was prepared by the

International Institute for the Study of Cuban Policy, the following analysis was presented in

order to understand how the embargo has affected Cuba’s economic conditions:

“Although we are now experiencing a global financial crisis, which most

informed observers believe will result in a long recession or worse, it would be premature

to claim that Castro has been absolved; and yet unwise not to acknowledge that the

corpse of history is stirring. Most importantly, today's crisis brings into sharper focus the

contest of ideologies that the two momentous predictions made above infer. With global

capitalism in difficulty and its future uncertain, the world's last remaining socialist

experiment gains a renewed relevance.

Cuba continues to be seen by mainstream academia as either a socialist

anachronism in a global capitalist system or a tenacious little nation whose history and

revolutionary tradition have given it the strength to continue to chart its own course. Both

of these perspectives are valid in the context of their separate ideologies and are
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represented by strong academic arguments. However, Cuba has a grander vision of its

destiny. To give a foundation to this third perspective it is necessary to critically assess

both globalization and Cuba's approach to socialism from within the intellectual

framework of each.

The Cuban revolution becomes more than an anachronism in the global capitalist

system and instead, a possible catalyst of necessary historical change.” Globalization is a

complex and elusive process that has invited a multitude of definitions and interpretations

and is the subject of much controversy. Most analysts would agree, however, that it has a

historical background and, in economic terms, it is principally associated with the

deregulation of international finance; a technological revolution; and a transformation of

production processes. It is also generally accepted that such developments are

complemented and facilitated by ideological and political changes that have taken place

during the last two decades of the twentieth century, principally the rise of neo-liberalism

and the collapse of the Soviet-style communism. While it is pointless to claim one correct

interpretation of globalization, as divergence itself is mainly the product of ideology

rather than empirical fact, it is perhaps useful for the purposes of juxtaposition with Cuba

to view it from a political economy perspective” (International Institute for the Study of

Cuban Policy).

In the most recent analysis Whose America? that was prepared by the International

Institute for the Study of Cuban Policy, the following is provided regarding capitalist

globalization:

“Nothing could have prepared Cuba for the collapse of Soviet communism as the

island suffered a greater economic contraction in peacetime than perhaps any country in

the 20th century. In the 1990’s survival became the only a revolutionary objective. In
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2004, 14 years after the Soviet debacle, Fidel Castro claimed: "Cuba's ability to hold its

revolutionary course with some success has been the people, who have contributed

tremendous sacrifices and immense trust. Our survival has been the result of justice and

of the ideas planted over 40 years of revolution. This genuine miracle would have been

impossible without unity and without socialism."

Although Castro's comment is valid in general, since Cuba lost its Soviet

protector and entered a world in which capitalist globalization rules, it has experimented

with market mechanisms and many Cubans have adopted non-socialist views as to how

they might build a future. This option is now less likely as the core nations in the

capitalist world are facing a deep economic reversal and the prospects for any small

developing country moving closer to the core are inauspicious, let alone for Cuba with its

tradition.

The Cuban revolution has only partly attained the idealistic revolutionary and

socialist goals that some of its leaders and intellectuals have articulated, but it can count

itself among some of the most progressive socialist experiments in history, alongside

such articulations of popular power as the Paris Commune, the early Russian Soviets and

the revolution within the Spanish Civil War. It also still represents not just a socialist

alternative to neo-liberal capitalism as embodied in globalization, but a distinct ontology.

While neo-liberals believe in individualism, competition, markets, procedural democracy

and the survival of the fittest, Cuban socialism champions encouragement of the social

individual, co-operation, distribution according to need, participatory democracy and

protection of the weak. In practice these ideals have resulted in some impressive

achievements in health care, local decision-making, popular consultation and the ability

to survive crisis while maintaining a respectable degree of social equity.

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There is no certainty that Cuba can overcome its own internal problems, or that

what is happening in Latin America will consolidate its socialist orientation. But, as

globalization is in meltdown, it is now incumbent on academics to consider the

possibility of alternatives, especially in the so-called developing world. In this context the

Cuban revolution becomes more than an anachronism in a global capitalist system and

instead, a possible catalyst of necessary historical change” (International Institute for the

Study of Cuban Policy).

A thorough report The United States Embargo Against Cuba: A Counterproductive

Policy in Dire Need of Reform prepared by Eric McLoughlin for the Glenn Institute provides the

following comprehensive analysis of the overall factors associated with the Cuban embargo:

“Despite the failure of the embargo to remove the Castro government from power,

many individuals continue to favor the policy for its moral qualities. There is no question

that Castro commits human rights abuses, including the imprisonment of his political

opposition. Freedom of speech is not a right that is guaranteed to the Cuban population

and many Americans refuse to back policies that aid in such repression. Thus, regardless

of whether the embargo will fall Castro, they back it because they refuse to financially

contribute to a dictator who oppresses his population.

Many supporters of the U.S. embargo against Cuba still believe that the policy

will lead to Castro’s downfall. They point to the success of the embargo against South

Africa as an example of how economic sanctions can serve to fall a repressive regime.

However, the embargo against South Africa was multilateral, drawing support from many

nations in the international community, a quality that the embargo against Cuba does not

possess. They contend that trade fundamentally supports the Castro regime, allowing him

to retain his stronghold on power. From this perspective, the sanctions will eventually
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weaken Castro to the point that the Cuban population will be able to mount sufficient

opposition to his rule to force a transition of government. In this manner, they contend

the embargo will achieve the U.S. objective of promoting a transition to democracy in

Cuba.

International support for a policy of engagement towards Cuba has increased

considerably over the past decade. Fifty years of economic sanctions have not forced

Castro out of power; therefore, there is no reason to believe that the continuation of the

sanctions will lead to his demise. Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, Cuba was the

recipient of $4.5 billion a year in direct subsidies from the Soviet Union which allowed

the Cuban economy to stay afloat despite the economic sanctions that Washington

imposed on the island. As a result, the U.S. embargo did not have an effect on the Cuban

economy until after 1991. Between 1989 and 1993, the country’s gross domestic product

fell by 35% and exports declined by 75%, as a consequence of the loss of Soviet

subsidies. However, even with the drastic contraction of the Cuban economy, Castro’s

rule was never seriously challenged. He adopted a series of economic reforms including

the active promotion of foreign direct investment and other types of financing, export

promotion in services, particularly tourism, the decentralization of foreign trade, and the

implementation of a legal and monetary framework to allow for the circulation of hard

currency to avoid an economic catastrophe. On March 15, 1999, the United States

reported that an estimated total of $1.7 billion had been invested in the Republic of Cuba

since 1990, which partly offset the loss of Soviet subsidies, allowing the Cuban economy

to survive independently. By 1995, Cuba was registering a 2.5% growth rate, and by

1996 it was 7.6%. The economic progress achieved by Cuba in the absence of Soviet aid

contradicts the notion that Castro can be toppled through economic sanctions. If Castro
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did not tumble when his economy was in crisis, it follows that the effects of the U.S.

embargo will not serve this end now that the Cuban economy is recovering.

Opponents of the embargo argue that the sanctions imposed by the U.S. against

Cuba have worsened the conditions the Cuban population is forced to cope with and not

weakened Fidel Castro. Prominent Human Rights groups, including Amnesty

International and Human Rights Watch, argue that “the United States is acting

inhumanely by denying the Cuban people essentials like food and medicine.” As a result

of the contraction in the Cuban economy caused by the loss of Soviet subsidies and the

strengthening of the embargo, “undernourishment increased from 4% of the population

during 1990-1992 to 19% during 1996-1998. Over the same period of time, the average

daily food intake declined by approximately 500 calories per person.” Consequently,

Cubans appear thinner than other impoverished peoples throughout Latin America. The

embargo also negatively impacts the Cuban health care system, especially in terms of

“the lack of access to inputs and drugs in the North American market or from subsidiary

companies in other countries.” Thus, the Cuban people are hurt by the embargo, which is

contrary to the U.S. objective of supporting the Cuban people.

Critics also contend that the Cuban people would benefit from trade with the U.S.,

even if the majority of the economic gains are concentrated in the hands of the Castro

government. “Giving money to the Castro budget still creates more jobs” and “much of

what goes to the government ends up benefiting the people, for the government provides

free health care, education and other social services to all.” Also, the economic reforms

Castro undertook in response to the loss of Soviet subsidies created a small market

economy in Cuba. Farmers are required to sell 80% of their crops to the Cuban

government at an artificially low price, but are allowed to sell the remaining 20% at
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markets that operate on supply and demand in Cuba’s dollar economy. Families are

permitted to operate home restaurants that operate on a market basis as well. Removing

the restrictions on travel associated with the embargo would greatly increase the number

of dollars flowing into these sectors of the Cuban economy, not to mention the amount of

tips – which go straight into the hands of the people – that would be generated in the

tourism industry as a result of increased travel. Ending the embargo would improve the

lives of the Cuban people and given the fact that Castro has not fallen to five decades of

economic sanctions, it is not justifiable to deny Cubans the benefits of economic relations

with the U.S.

The American population also suffers consequences from the U.S. embargo

against Cuba. The embargo draws bi-partisan opposition as a result of its negative

impact on U.S. businesses and farmers. The restrictions on trade seriously disadvantage

U.S. companies, as they allow foreign companies to establish market dominance in the

absence of U.S. competition. Business leaders point to the very honest fact that the

embargo is causing U.S. businesses to lose market share in Cuba to the Europeans and

Canadians. Foreign direct investment in Cuba continues to increase and as foreign

companies further establish themselves in Cuba, American companies fall farther behind

in the race to establish market share. Cuba’s pollution is 11 million and while the

population is poor, it represents an appealing market for U.S. businesses. The United

States and Cuba could do upwards of $3 billion a year in trade as soon as the embargo

was lifted, with the overall figure increasing very quickly to some $7 billion. According

to the Cuba Policy Foundation, the agricultural sector of the U.S. economy alone could

sell $1.24 billion annually in agricultural products to Cuba if the embargo were lifted,

persuading many farm-state republicans to support the normalization of relations. The

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University of Colorado at Boulder estimates that lifting the travel ban alone would

“produce over $1.7 billion in business and create 10,000 jobs for the U.S. travel sector,”

drawing backing from the airline unions and other groups in the tourism sector of the

economy. Thus, it is apparent that American business would benefit from lifting the

embargo, supporting the claim that removing the sanctions serves the interests of the

American population.

Another positive outcome of the normalization of U.S and Cuban relations that is

cited concerns the increase in the flow of ideas between the U.S. and Cuba that would

result from lifting the embargo, undermining Castro’s attempts to control the information

that Cuban’s are exposed to. From this perspective, engagement is the best way to open

the channels of dialogue, ultimately promoting a transition to democracy. However, the

Castro government goes out of its way to isolate the Cuban population from foreign

contact, as it “does not allow Cuban citizens in hotels, in resorts, and on most beaches;”

the places where they are most likely to encounter foreign tourists carrying such ideas.

This demonstrates Castro’s fear of western thought evidences the claim that the spread of

such ideas would aid the transition to democracy. Despite Castro’s efforts to prevent the

phenomenon, lifting the embargo would increase the number of tourists that travel to the

island and would help to stimulate the flow of ideas, as there will inevitably be contact

between the foreign travelers and the Cuban people.

The international community plays a vital role in undermining the impact of the

U.S. embargo. As mentioned earlier, Cuba largely avoided economic catastrophe

following the loss of subsides from the Soviet Union as a result of increased foreign

investment in its economy. Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Great Britain,

Israel, Italy, Mexico, and Spain have all entered into joint ventures with the Castro
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government, making the embargo “wholly unilateral in nature – and no unilateral

embargo in history has ever worked.” By investing in the Cuban economy, the

international community lessons the impact of the U.S. embargo. As long as it continues

to engage in trade with Cuba, there is no hope in falling Castro with economic sanctions.

The U.S. must move beyond its anti-Castro policy and look towards the future. If it

aligns its policies with those of the international community the prospects for a transition

to democracy will be furthered, as Castro no longer will be able to attribute Cuba’s

problems to the U.S. embargo.

While the U.S. embargo against Cuba was fairly successful in preventing Cuba

from spreading communism in the Western Hemisphere and thus was useful in achieving

the goal of containment, it is a failed policy in terms of promoting a transition to

democracy. When the embargo was imposed the international environment was very

different than it is today and as a result the policy is an ineffective means of achieving

Washington’s current goals. The war on communism is over, yet the U.S. still follows a

policy that is dictated by Cold War politics. The policy no longer serves the interests of

the U.S. Instead of destabilizing Castro and promoting a transition to democracy, the

embargo empowers him to instill nationalism in the Cuban population, legitimizing his

rule. The policy is such a failure Senator Baucus stated, “our effort to isolate Cuba

through the trade embargo … has failed to bring about human rights improvement, has

provided a pretext for Castro’s continued repression, makes the United States the

scapegoat of Castro’s failed economic policies, and hurts the Cuban people.” It is thus

evident that the policy neither achieves the objectives of the U.S. nor contributes to a

positive outcome. The embargo has weakened the Cuban economy, which limits

Castro’s ability to pose a military threat. But Castro is not in danger of being
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overthrown. Castro was forced to adopt market reforms as a consequence of the Cuban

economic crisis; however, the changes in economic policy were the result of the loss of

Soviet subsidies, not the embargo. The hard-line U.S. policy harms both U.S. and Cuban

citizens, while allowing Castro to retain his monopoly on power. It is time for reform;

the U.S. embargo against Cuba is a failure and Washington must embark upon a

proactive policy and seek to remove the present day restrictions on doing business with

the Cuban people” if it hopes to see a transition to democracy and respect for human

rights in Cuba” (McLoughlin 13-22).

An insightful discussion “Why on Earth – Doesn’t the U.S. End the Cuban Embargo?

prepared by Bradley Doucet for The Atlas Society provides the following psychological factors:

“Why do the Cuban people suffer so? The short answer is: they suffer because

they live under a communist regime that has largely outlawed free enterprise, not to

mention the free movement of people and the freedoms of speech, assembly, and the

press. The real mystery, though, is why the Cuban people’s misery continues to this day,

fully two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when communism around the world

has almost completely collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions. Part of the

explanation can be found in the cults of personality surrounding the long-lived Fidel

Castro. Massive amounts of aid from the Soviet Union, and more recently from Hugo

Chavez in Venezuela riding high the spike in oil prices, have also helped to prop up the

Castro regime. In addition to these factors, the American government, however noble its

intentions may have been, must shoulder some of the blame for the longevity of Cuban

communism. Why? Because of its ongoing embargo of Cuba.

The notion that the embargo is the main cause of the misery of the Cuban people

also does not stand up under scrutiny. Yes, the embargo hurts, but Cuba is free to trade
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with other countries around the world, and as noted above, it has benefited from

enormous amounts of assistance from the Soviet Union and Venezuela. In spite of these

plentiful opportunities for trade, and in spite of all of this foreign aid, communism in

Cuba is a colossal failure in providing for its people. The main source of the misery is

clear: lack of freedom” (Doucet 1).

In a debate conducted by Business Week, Jose Azel from the Institute for Cuban and

Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, presented the following in support of

maintaining the Cuban embargo:

“Critics of the U.S. embargo note that economic sanctions have failed to change

the nature of the Cuban government and have allowed the country to use the embargo for

propaganda purposes. Abandoning U.S. trade restrictions, they argue, would expose Cuba

to the “American way of life” and help foment social pressures for economic reforms and

political liberalization. Regrettably, this outlook stems from a U.S.-centric vantage point

extrapolated to the Cuban government. Embargo opponents make the flawed assumption

that the current Cuban government is earnestly interested in close relations with its

northern neighbor, and willing to jeopardize its total control and 50-year legacy of

opposition to American imperialism in exchange for an improvement in the economic

well-being of Cubans. The embargo is not the cause of the catastrophic state of Cuba’s

economy. Mismanagement and the fact that “command economy” models don’t work lie

at the root of Cuba’s economic misery. Despite the existence of the embargo, the U.S. is

Cuba’s sixth-largest trading partner and biggest food supplier. Moreover, U.S. tourism

will not bring democracy to Cuba. For years, hundreds of thousands of tourists from

Canada, Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere have visited the island. Cuba is no more

democratic today. On what mystical grounds do opponents of the embargo offer that
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American tourists will do the trick? There are many negative unintended consequences to

unilaterally lifting the embargo without meaningful changes in Cuba’s political and

economic model. Most important of all, it would ensure the continuation of the current

totalitarian regime by strengthening state enterprises that would be the main beneficiaries

of currency inflows into business owned by the Cuban government” (Business Week,

Azel).

As with the comments presents by Azel above, it appears that most American supporters

of the Cuban embargo utilize the red herring fallacy tactic by diverting attention away from the

real issue at hand. It was, and still is, believed that the embargo would remove Fidel Castro from

power, eliminate any potential communist threats onto the United States, and thereby liberate the

Cuban people. After half a century, what is evident is that this strategy has failed miserably.

However, after outlasting nearly a dozen presidential administrations, the Castro regime remains,

and after the exodus of the Soviet Union nearly two decades ago any remote communist threats

have dissipated. Now, what about the liberation of 11 million Cubans? In his book, Dateline

Havana, Reese Erlich discusses the contrast the radically different versions of history studied by

Cubans and U.S. citizens. “The U.S. citizens are taught that we initially liberated Cuba from

Spanish colonial rule in 1898, and Cubans are taught that one form of domination replaced

another” (Erlich 5).

In The History of Madness, Michel Foucault describes a movement across Europe in the

seventeenth century which saw the establishment of institutions which locked up people who

were deemed to be 'unreasonable'. This included anyone who was deemed to be socially

disruptive. He labels this movement the 'Great Confinement'. He continues his study of

confinement in his history of the birth of the prison Discipline and Punish, in which discipline is

defined as a mechanism of power which regulates the behavior of individuals in the social body.
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This is done by regulating the organization of space, of time, and people's activity and behavior.

It is enforced with the aid of complex systems of surveillance. Foucault emphasizes that power is

not discipline; rather discipline is simply one way in which power can be exercised (O’ Farrell).

Such a comparison may also be concluded by the Cuban embargo in which the United States has

regulated the organization of Cuba’s space by confining them to their tiny Caribbean island only

90 miles away, regulating the time of freedom for Cubans by in a sense allowing them to be

confined over a 50 year period, and regulating the activity and behavior of Cubans as a result of

their necessity to survive under such regime: both that of Castro’s and the United States.

In conclusion, beyond the rhetoric as to whether, or not, the Cuban embargo has been

effective or should be maintained or lifted, it appears that this issue is surrounded more by the

hesitation by the United States to consider abandoning an archaic foreign policy. Cold War

strategies and propaganda methods are clearly not effective today. As presented in the paper, the

original intention of the Cuban embargo has failed miserably due to the fact that the United

States has not been able, after half a century to eliminate the Castro regime in order to establish

democracy in Cuba. While some will claim that the embargo is necessary for the sake of the

Cubans, it is false for the United States to presume that the citizens of Cuba want “our” change.

Isn’t it rather best to truly grant the Cubans with “complete” freedom by allowing their

government to flourish within the current global economy, while at the same time allow U.S.

companies with the ability expand their market place? Doing away with the embargo would

achieve this.

At this juncture, how does the United States, by lifting the Cuban embargo, gracefully

admit that it has treated the Cuban people wrongly through its stubbornness? Or in fact, does it

really need to do so? What the United States should not do is presume that Americans today fully

support the Cuban embargo, let alone understand its need. Rather, President Obama should
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utilize this opportunity to demonstrate to the rest of the world the true importance of “change”

and by a single action of lifting the Cuban embargo send a positive message to all involved. You

are left with this quote,

“For the thing we should never do in dealing with revolutionary countries, in which the

world abounds, is to push them behind an iron curtain raised by ourselves. On the

contrary, even when they have been seduced and subverted and are drawn across the line,

the right thing to do is to keep the way open for their return.” Walter Lippmann, 1959

(Sierra)
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Works Cited

AlterNet. 7 April 2009. Scahill, Jeremy. “Obama’s Cuba Moves Do Little to End the Economic

War on Havana.” 9 April 2009.

<http://www.alternet.org/audits/135366/obama’s_cuba_moves_do_little_to_end_the_eco

nomic_war_on_havana.htm>.

Bizzell, Patricia and Herzberg, Bruce. The Rhetorical Readings from Classical Times to the

Present. Boston, MA: Bedford Books, 1990.

Business Week. 28 February 2008. “The Debate Room – Cuba: Snuff Out the Embargo.” 9 April

2009.

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About the Author

Oliver Mujica utilizes his 20 years of experience as an appointed government official to

advise local municipalities on matters relating to land use and redevelopment in order to

formulate creative and innovative solutions with the goal of enhancing the economic vitality of

the communities. During his tenure, Mr. Mujica served as a member of the California Trade and

Commerce Agency under the Governor Pete Wilson administration, and the Los Angeles County

Economic Development Commission under the Mayor Richard Riordan administration. Mr.

Mujica also served as an Economic Development & Planning Commissioner for the City of

Mission Viejo.

Because of his Basque heritage, Mr. Mujica has become intrigued by the history of Cuba.

As a colony of Spain, the Caribbean island of Cuba flourished under Spanish traditions, and

became a safe haven for the Basque community at the end of the Spanish revolution. After the

Spanish-American War, Basques were left with the notion of having no place to safely call

“home,” and as a result migrated to various Latin American countries. Having researched various

aspects of Cuba’s history, Mr. Mujica has developed a curiosity on why the United States has

been so insistent to maintain its embargo on Cuba.