NOTICE: To request limited oral argument on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Court at (916)

874-7848 (Department 54) by 4:00 p.m. the court day before this hearing and advise opposing counsel. If no call is made, the tentative ruling becomes the order of the court. Local Rule 1.06.
Parties requesting services of a court reporter shall advise the court at the number stated above no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing. Please be advised there is a $30.00 fee for court reporting services, which must be paid in Room 102 prior to the hearing unless otherwise ordered, for each civil proceeding lasting less than one hour. Govt. Code 68086(a)(1)(A). The Court Reporter will not report any proceeding unless a request is made and the requisite fees are paid in advance of the hearing.

Department 54 Superior Court of California 800 Ninth Street, 3rd Floor Raymond M. Cadei, Judge Diane Ahee, Clerk C. Chambers/J. Green, Bailiff Wednesday, March 19, 2014, 9:00 AM Item 1 2009-00036948-CU-PN Hammer Lane RV & Mini-Storage LP vs. Jack S Johal Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Compel Compliance with Janury 16, 2014 Court Order Filed By: Alves, Suzanne M.

This matter is continued to 3/26/2014 at 09:00AM in this department.

Item 2 2009-00042196-CU-MC Cooper Crane & Rigging Inc vs. Pavex-Myers Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Summary Adjudication Filed By: Pierce, Timothy L.

Defendants Pavex-Myers (Pavex) and Safeco Insurance Company of America, Inc.s (collectively Defendants) motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiff Cooper Crane & Rigging, Inc./West Cost Welding, Inc.s, (Plaintiff) claims for prompt payment penalties and attorneys fees is ruled upon as follows. This motion is brought pursuant to CCP 437c(s)(1). The parties have stipulated that the Court hear the motion and that resolution of this motion will either further the interests of judicial economy by reducing the time to be consumed in trial or significantly increase the ability of the parties to resolve the case by settlement. Pavex is admonished as its separate statement does not comply with CRC 3.1342(h). Defendant separately identifies 16 undisputed material facts. Defendant also moves for summary adjudication on 3 issues. However, Defendant did not repeat verbatim the undisputed material facts below each issue. Rather, Defendant simply identifies the number of the undisputed fact in support of the issue.

This is an action arising out of a construction contract for the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). Pavex was the general contractor on the project. Plaintiff was a subcontractor hired to install cast-in-drilled-hole piling, among others items. Problems arose with the project which resulted in Plaintiff conducting additional work on contract items 97, 98 and 99. Plaintiff submitted a claim to Pavex for the additional work, which Pavex passed through to Caltrans per the subcontract agreement. The matter then proceeded to an Office of Administrative Hearings. Pavex was the Petitioner, Caltrans was the Respondent, and Plaintiff was an interested party. The arbitrator found in favor of Pavex and awarded $1,950,853.00, of which $92,898 was for Pavexs 5% mark-up on the claim. Plaintiff alleges that pursuant to the force account payment terms, Pavex failed to timely pay Plaintiff. (FAC, 13.) Plaintiff alleges that as determined by the arbitrator, Plaintiff was forced to self-finance work performed to the tune of $1,857,956.00 due to defendant Pavex/Myers failure to pay Plaintiff in accordance with the terms of the Subcontract, its incorporated force account provisions and its implied terms. (FAC, 15.) Prompt Payment Penalties Pavex argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover prompt payment penalties because: (1) the amount claimed by Plaintiff as the basis for the penalties is not retention or progress payments, (2) the amount that Plaintiff claims Pavex withheld was never due under the subcontract, and (3) Pavex promptly paid Plaintiff after Caltrans paid Pavex the pass-through amount pursuant to the arbitrators decision. Public Contracts Code 10262 requires a general contractor to pay its subcontractor, within seven days of receipt, of each progress payment. (Pub. Contracts Code 10262.) Public Contracts Code 7017 requires a general contractor to pay its subcontractor, within seven days of receipt, its share of retention proceeds. (Pub. Contracts Code 7107.) Pavex contends that Plaintiffs verified discovery responses indicate that the underlying amount on which Plaintiffs prompt penalties is based ($1,249,000) is neither a progress payment nor retention proceeds. Plaintiffs discovery responses state that the $1,249,000 is the value that [Pavex-Myers] was paid by Caltrans for Items 97, 98, and 99 in the amount of $2,422,728 and subtracting the amount [PavexMyers] paid to Plaintiff . . . $1,173,684. (Defendants separate statement, UMF 1213.) According to Pavex, this amount represents Pavexs profit and payment for work beyond the work done by Plaintiff. Pavex also contends that Plaintiff did not bill for these amounts (Defendants separate statement, UMF 14) which is necessary for them to qualify as progress or retention payments. Pavex has failed to satisfy its initial burden to demonstrate no triable issue of material fact. Here, there is no dispute that Caltrans paid Pavex for contract items 97, 98, and 99 in the amount of $2,422,728. Despite Pavexs contention that this amount represents Pavexs profit and payment for work beyond the work done by Plaintiff, Pavex has failed to proffer evidence to support this purported fact. As noted in Plaintiffs opposition, Pavex has not proffered any evidence that the payments Pavex received for contract items 97-99 during the project were payments for something other than the work that Plaintiff performed on those contract items. Indeed, Pavexs

separate statement does not include the fact that the $2,242,728 was paid to Pavex solely for work done by Pavex. Thus, Pavex has not shown, on the undisputed facts, that the payment Caltrans made to Pavex does not fall within Public Contracts Code 10262. Accordingly, the motion for summary adjudication on Plaintiffs entitlement to prompt payment penalties is DENIED. Attorneys Fees based on Prompt Payment Statutes Pavex argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys fees pursuant to Pub. Contracts Code 10262.5 because Plaintiff is not entitled to prompt payment penalties. The motion for summary adjudication is DENIED. The Court has denied Pavexs motion for summary adjudication on Plaintiffs entitlement to prompt payment penalties. Cooper Crane's Attorneys Fees Incurred during Arbitration Plaintiff is seeking $320,000 in attorneys fees based on the actual amounts invoiced. Pavex argues that given the limited activity in this action, presumably most of these fees related to the arbitration. Pavex argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys fees incurred in the arbitration because: (1) the arbitration was not an action for collection of funds wrongfully withheld (Pub. Contracts Code 10262.5(a)), and (2) Plaintiff did not prevail in the arbitration because the arbitration was between Pavex and Caltrans. Public Contracts Code 10262.5(a) provides [i]n any action for the collection of funds wrongfully withheld, the prevailing party shall be entitled to his or her attorney's fees and costs. (Pub. Contracts Code 10262.5(a).) Pavex argues that the arbitration was not for the collection of funds wrongfully withheld because the arbitration was designed to determine the merit, and if merit was found, the amount due to Pavex for Plaintiffs pass-through claim for additional work related to item nos. 97-99. (Defendants separate statement, UMF, 7.) There is no dispute that the subcontract has a prevailing party provision entitling a prevailing party to recover its attorneys fees. The subcontract provides either party shall be entitled to all remedies afforded by law to enforce their respective rights under this Subcontract. In the event legal proceedings are commenced by either party against the other to enforce the provision of this subcontract, or for breach thereof, the prevailing party shall be entitled to the payment of reasonable attorneys fee. In opposition to the motion, Plaintiff argues the motion is premature because Plaintiff may prevail in this case and that the determination of entitlement to and amount of attorneys fees should be made post-judgment and pursuant to a motion for attorneys fees. Plaintiff further argues that Pavex has failed to analyze the various contractual and statutory fee-shifting vehicles available to Plaintiff. The Court disagrees with Plaintiff that the motion is premature. Indeed, Plaintiff stipulated to summary adjudication of its entitlement to attorneys fees. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact. Here, Plaintiff does

not substantively dispute that the arbitration was not an action for the collection of funds wrongfully withheld. Plaintiffs fact in response Pavexs UMF 7 is not responsive and does not substantively dispute Pavexs fact. Plaintiff also does not dispute that Pavex was the prevailing party in the arbitration. (Defendants UMF 8.) Additionally, the prevailing party in the subcontract agreement only applies to legal proceedings commenced by either party against the other (i.e. Pavex and Plaintiff). Here, the arbitration was not a legal proceeding commenced by Pavex/Plaintiff against the other. Lastly, the Court is not persuaded that Pavexs failure to analyze the various contractual and statutory fee-shifting vehicles available to Plaintiff requires the Court to deny the motion. Indeed, Plaintiff has not identified any of the various vehicles, if any, that it contends Pavex should have addressed. Accordingly, Pavex's motion for summary adjudication Plaitniff's claim for attorneys fees incurred in the arbitration is GRANTED. Pavexs objections to the Declaration of Anthony Will are OVERRULED. Pavexs objections to the Declaration of John Gladych are ruled upon as follows: Sustained: 5 Overruled: 1, 2, 3, 4 The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.

Item 3

2010-00073570-CU-CL NCCS Inc vs. Theresa L McWilliams Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Set Aside Filed By: Shalaby, Andrew W.

Defendants' motion to set aside default is UNOPPOSED, but is DROPPED. The proof of service of the moving papers is not signed. The court notes that moving party has indicated the incorrect address in its notice of motion. The correct address for Department 54 of the Sacramento County Superior Court is 800 9th Street, Sacramento California 95814. Moving party shall notify responding party(ies) immediately. The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Courts tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06(A). Defendants counsel is directed to contact Plaintiffs counsel forthwith and advise counsel of Local Rule 1.06 and the Courts tentative ruling procedure. If Defendants counsel is unable to contact Plaintiffs counsel prior to hearing, Defendants counsel shall be available at the hearing, in person or by telephone, in the event opposing party appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(A).

Item 4

2010-00087740-CU-CD George F Bell vs. Beck Properties Inc Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Amend Complaint Filed By: Smith, Clinton L.

Plaintiffs' motion to file amended complaint is UNOPPOSED and is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall serve and file the proposed third amended complaint on or before April 1, 2014. The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.

Item 5

2010-00093976-CU-PO Walter Ernesto Pineda vs. Hurley Construction Inc Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Dismiss Filed By: Pimentel, Lauren O.

Defendant Hurley Construction, Inc.s (Hurley) motion to dismiss defendant Joseph Tarwater (Tarwater) for failure to serve within the three-year, sixty day statutory period as required by CCP 583.210 is ruled upon as follows. This is an action for personal injuries. Plaintiff Walter Pineda was working at a construction city as an employee of CC Utility. Tarwater, a former employee of Hurley allegedly shot a pellet gun at or near Plaintiff, causing a pellet to strike Plaintiff in the face. The complaint was filed on December 21, 2010. On November 18, 2011, the Court granted Plaintiffs ex parte application to serve Tarwater by publication in the Sacramento Bee. No proof of service of the summons and complaint on Tarwater is in the Courts file. According to Hurley, the deadline to serve Tarwater expired on December 10, 2013. (CCP 583.210(a).) Hurley further argues that even if Plaintiff served Tarwater via publication, the deadline to file the proof of service of the summons expired on February 10, 2013. (CCP 583.210(b) [proof of service of summons shall be filed within 60 days after the time the summons and complaint must be served upon a defendant.].) CCP 583.250 provides that if service of the action is not made within the time required, the action shall be dismissed by the court on its own motion or on motion of any person interested in the action, whether named as a party or not, after notice to the parties. (CCP 583.250(a)(2).) The requirements are mandatory and are not subject to extension, excuse, or exceptions except as expressly provided by statute." (CCP 583.250(b).)

In opposition to the motion, Plaintiff argues that Hurley is estopped from or waived its right to seek dismissal of Tarwater. (CCP 583.140 [Nothing in this chapter abrogates or otherwise affects the principals of waiver or estoppel.].) A defendant may be estopped from seeking dismissal where the defendants acts during the statutory period lulled plaintiff into a false sense of security or which cause him to forbear to do something which he would otherwise have done. (Busching v. Superior Court of Ventura County (1974) 12 Cal. 3d 44, 53.) Plaintiff contends that the following actions demonstrate estoppel: (1) Hurleys June 22, 2011 case management conference indicates that the parties are deferring discovery until they can mediate; (2) in March 2012, the parties began settlement discussions. Hurleys counsel indicated that its insurance carrier would be more motivated to settle the case if it could do so before being obligated to retain counsel for Tarwater, and it was agreed to defer serving Tarwater until February 1, 2013 to allow Plaintiffs medical treatment and disability to be clarified; and (3) Hurleys July 23, 2012 CMC statement stated that service has been deferred until the parties have had a change to explore mediation. In reply to the opposition, Hurley argues that these discussions all took place prior to the courts August 9, 2012 case management order. The August 9, 2012 case management order directed that all answers/responsive pleadings or defaults must be on file by April 11, 2013. Hurley argues that although there were early discussions regarding deferring service on Tarwater, given the August 9, 2012 case management order, Plaintiff cannot reasonably argue that he was lulled into a false sense of security because Plaintiff was ordered to effect service by at least April 11, 2013. Given the above, the Court agrees with Hurley that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Hurley is estopped from seeking to dismiss the action. The Court also disagrees with Plaintiff that Hurleys actions constituted a wavier of its right to seek dismissal. Plaintiff failed to serve Tarwater within the time perid perscribed. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED. Defendants shall submit a formal order and judgment for the Courts signature pursuant to CRC 3.1312.

Item 6

2012-00137694-CU-PT Bob Pellegrini vs. Louis B Garcia Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Attorney Fees Filed By: Goudy, Mark F.

Petitioner Bob Pellegrini's Motion for Attorney Fees after Order Releasing of Property from Deign Professional's Lien (Civ. Code 8488(c)) is UNOPPOSED but is DROPPED. The proof of service indicates that it was mailed to "2575 Valley Rd. Sacramento, CA." The proof of service fails to include the zip code or the person being served.

Item 7

2013-00147034-CU-BC Kevin T. Toon vs. Anthony Wallace Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Compel Form Interrogatories Filed By: Tweedy, Charles A.

Plaintiff's motion to compel answers to form interrogatories is DROPPED. Pursuant to CCP section 2030.020(b), a plaintiff may propound interrogatories to a party without leave of court "at any time that is 10 days after the service of the summons on, or appearance by, that party, whichever occurs first." Here, however, the Court does not have in its records a copy of the proof of service of when the summons was served on Defendant. Thus, the Court cannot determine whether the interrogatories were propounded 10 days after service. Moreover, the Court notes that Defendant's answer was rejected. Therefore, Defendant has not made an appearance. Given the above, the Court cannot determine whether Plaintiff propounded the form interrogatories in compliance with CCP section 2030.020(b).
Item 8 2014-00156358-CU-EI City of Sacramento vs. State of California PERS Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Order for Prejudgment Possession Filed By: Skinner, David W.

Plaintiff City of Sacramentos (City) Motion for Order for Prejudgment Possession and for Certification of Taxes is GRANTED on condition the proof of service of the summons is filed prior to or at the hearing. Specially appearing Defendant U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee, successorin-interest to Bank of America National Association, as Trustee, successor by merger to LaSalle Bank National Association, as Trustee, for the Certificate Holders of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-TOP8s (Trustee) opposes the motion. Although Defendant C-III Asset Management LLC also filed an opposition, the City has dismissed it from the complaint. The Court considered the Trustees surreply and the Citys response to the surreply. This is an eminent domain action. The City seeks an order allowing it to obtain prejudgment possession of the 600 K Street property (Property) for a sports and events arena at which the Sacramento Kings will play (Project). (CCP 1255.410.) According to the City, time is of the essence. Pursuant to a non-binding term sheet with Sacramento Basketball Holdings (SBH), project completion is preliminarily set for September 2016. (See Declaration of John Dangberg, (Dangberg Decl.) 9.) In order to meet this preliminary project completion date, the City asserts that it must commence demolition in May/June 2014. (Id.) Thus, it must obtain immediate possession of the Property by April 2014. (Id. 13.) The City argues that failure to

obtain the Property by April 2014 will put the Project at significant risk, including allowing the NBA to acquire the Sacramento Kings and relocate the team to another City. (Id.) On January 7, 2014, the City Council adopted the Resolution of Necessity. The Trustee appeared at the hearing and objected to the Resolution of Necessity. The State of California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) is the owner in fee of the Property, with the exception of the building, structures, and other improvements. The Trustee owns the building and is the successor lessee on a long term ground lease. The building is currently unoccupied. Pursuant to CCP 1255.410(d)(2), if the motion is opposed by a defendant or occupant within 30 days of service, the court may make an order for possession of the property upon consideration of the relevant facts and any opposition, and upon completion of a hearing on the motion, if the court finds each of the following: (a) the plaintiff is entitled to take the property by eminent domain; (b) the plaintiff has deposited probable compensation with the state treasury; (c) there is an overriding need for the plaintiff to possess the property prior to the issuance of final judgment in the case, and the plaintiff will suffer a substantial hardship if the application for possession is denied or limited; and (d) the hardship that the plaintiff will suffer if possession is denied or limited outweighs any hardship on the defendant or occupant that would be caused by the granting of the order of possession. Entitlement to Eminent Domain The Trustee argues that the City is not entitled to eminent domain because the City has purportedly failed to comply with the statutory pre-condemnation requirements. Specifically, the Trustee argues that: (1) the City failed to make its Section 7267.2 Offer to the Trustee and any purported offer was improper and insufficient, (2) the Citys Resolution of Necessity was flawed, and (3) the City failed to serve the summons on the Trustee and failed to provide 60-days notice of the instant motion. 1. Govt Code Section 7267.2 Offer Govt Code 7267.2 (Section 7267.2) provides prior to adopting a resolution of necessity pursuant to Section 1245.230 of the Code of Civil Procedure and initiating negotiations for the acquisition of real property, the public entity shall establish an amount that it believes to be just compensation therefor, and shall make an offer to the owner or owners of record to acquire the property for the full amount so established, unless the owner cannot be located with reasonable diligence. (Gov. Code 7267.2 (emphasis added).) The Trustee first argues the City failed to make it an offer. On September 5, 2013, the City sent an offer (Offer) to U.S. Bank National Association, Michael Walker, Northern California President. The Trustees counsel explains that he is informed and believes that Mr. Walker has no connection to the Trust. (Declaration of George B. Speir (Speir Decl.), 2.)He further states that to my knowledge, the Trust received no direct notice from the City regarding the Citys intent to adopt a Resolution of Necessity in connection with its efforts to acquire my property at 600 K Street. (Id.) Thus, according to the Trustee because the Offer was to U.S. Bank National Association, and not to U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee, the offer was never served on the Trustee.

The Court is not convinced that the City did not make a Section 7267.2 Offer to the Trustee. The Trustees counsels declaration does not support the fact that no offer was made. The Offer was mailed to the Trustees counsels at Miller Starr Regalia and the Trustee appeared at the hearing on the Resolution of Necessity objecting to the Offer on the same grounds. (Speir Decl., Ex. A; Trustees Oppn, at 12:28-3.) The Trustee next argues that the Offer of $4.35 million was improper because the City improperly combined the offer for the Trustees property with an offer for CalPERSs separate property. (Trustees Oppn at 9-10.) The Trustee argues that the Citys offer of $4.35 million was for all interests in the properties and therefore ran afoul of Section 7267.2. The Trustee argues that Section 7267.2 requires an offer to be made to the owner of each parcel to be condemned, and because the Trust does not share ownership of its property with CalPERS or anyone else, the City should have made a separate offer to the Trustee. (Id.) The Trustee argues that the City had an obligation to make an offer to each owner, and that the Citys offer failed to make an offer to the Trustee for the property that it owns, by itself, in fee simple. (Surreply at 4-5.) The Trustee argues that the Citys combined offer to the Trustee and CalPERS, for their separate ownership interests, cannot be accepted by either party, and therefore does not comply with Government Code section 7267.2. (Id. at 5.) In arguing that the Citys lump-sum offer rendered the Citys offer improper (Trustees Oppn at 9-10), the Trustee cites to two cases, City of San Jose v. Great Oaks Water Co. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1011 and People By And Through Dept. of Public Works v. Lynbar, Inc. (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 870, 875. While these authorities confirm that each owner is entitled to just compensation, they do not state that an offer made pursuant to Government Code 7267.2 is rendered improper if it offers one lump-sum amount for an entire property to several different owners. The Trustee also cites Code of Civil Procedure 1260.220(a), which governs Procedures Relating to Determination of Compensation and provides that the value of each property interest must be separately assessed and compensation awarded therefore. (Trustees Oppn at 9-10.) Like the cases of City of San Jose and Lynbar, however, Code of Civil Procedure 1260.220(a) requires each property interest to be separately valued in determining the amounts of compensation to ultimately be paid to each owner of taken property; it does not address whether or when an offer will be proper under Section 7267.2. Here, the Offer complied with the plain text of Section 7267.2. It included an offer to the owners of record for what the City believed to be the full amount of just compensation for the real property to be acquired. (Gov. Code 7267.2(a)(1).) While the Citys lump-sum offer expressly did not separately value each distinct interest in the property, the Trustee has not shown that this renders the offer improper under Section 7267.2. Likewise, while the Offer described the lump-sum offer as being based upon the undivided fee rule, the Trustee has not shown that the Citys reference to this rule renders the offer improper under Section 7267.2, or that such reference means that the property owners just compensation will ultimately be calculated pursuant to such a rule. The Offer also included a written summary of how the City calculated its lump sum offer (i.e., by valuing each of the various property interests at issue) in compliance with Section 7267.2(b), and invited the owners to continue the negotiation process regarding the purchase of the property. The Trustee has not shown that the Citys offer fails to comply with Section 7267.2.

Lastly, to the extent the Trustee objects to the Offer and valuation, because the matter will proceed to trial, the issue of just compensation may be adjudicated at that time. 2. Resolution of Necessity CCP 1245.230 provides that a Resolution of Necessity must contain the following: (a) A general statement of the public use for which the property is to be taken and a reference to the statute that authorizes the public entity to acquire the property by eminent domain. (b) A description of the general location and extent of the property to be taken, with sufficient detail for reasonable identification. (c) A declaration that the governing body of the public entity has found and determined each of the following: (1) The public interest and necessity require the proposed project. (2) The proposed project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. (3) The property described in the resolution is necessary for the proposed project. (4) That either the offer required by Section 7267.2 of the Government Code has been made to the owner or owners of record, or the offer has not been made because the owner cannot be located with reasonable diligence. (CCP 1245.230 [emphasis added].) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a resolution of necessity adopted by the governing body of the public entity pursuant to this article conclusively establishes the matters referred to in Section 1240.030. ( 1245.250, subd. (a), italics added.) But [a] resolution of necessity does not have the effect prescribed in Section 1245.250 to the extent that its adoption or contents were influenced or affected by gross abuse of discretion by the governing body. ( 1245.255, subd.(b).) (Council of San Benito County Governments v. Hollister Inn, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal. App. 4th 473, 485 [emphasis added.]) A gross abuse of discretion may be established by showing that adoption of a resolution of necessity by the governing board of a public entity was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, the governing body failed to follow the mandated procedure, or the governing body was irrevocably committed to taking the property regardless of the evidence presented at the resolution of necessity hearing. (Id.) The property owner asserting objections to the agency's right to take has the burden of establishing, by substantial evidence, that the resolution of necessity was adopted in an invalid manner, and because of a gross abuse of discretion is not entitled to its ordinary conclusive effect; if it does so, then the burden of proving the elements for a

particular taking must rest on the agency to do so by the preponderance of the evidence. (Redevelopment Agency v. Norm's Slauson (1985) 173 Cal. App. 3rd 1121, 1127-28.) The Trustee first argues that the Resolution of Necessity (RON) was flawed because the City did not make a Section 7267.2 Offer to the Trustee. The Court disagrees. As noted above, the Court is not convinced that the City did not make a Section 7267.2 Offer on the Trustee. The Trustee further argues that the RON was flawed because it did not identify or seek to take the building or any property of the Trustees because it only identifies CalPERS as the owner. Moreover, although the RON authorizes the City to take the real property more particularly described in Exhibit A and Exhibit B to the RON, the legal description specifically excludes the building, structures, and other improvements located thereon. The Complaint also incorporates the same Exhibit A and Exhibit B. Thus, according to the Trustee, the City is only seeking to take CalPERS interest in the land. The Court disagrees with the Trustee. CCP 1245.230 does not require that the RON identify all the owners of the property. Rather, it requires a declaration by the City Council that is has found and determined that either the offer required by Section 7267.2 of the Government Code has been made to the owner or owners of record, or the offer has not been made because the owner cannot be located with reasonable diligence. (CCP 1245.230(c)(4).) Here, the RON includes such a finding. (Speir Decl. Ex. A.) Additionally, the RON states that the City seeks to acquire fee simple title in the property located at 600 K. Street, Sacramento, California, as more particularly described in Exhibit A and Exhibit B. (Id.) This is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of CCP 1245.230(b). The Court also disagrees with the Trustee that the City is only seeking to take CalPERS interest in the land, and not the Trustees building or structures. Here, the Staff Report accompanying the RON states that the property interests to be acquired include fee simple title in and to the subject property at 600 K Street Sacramento, California. . . . the Citys proposed acquisition of the property will include fee title in and to the property, including any and all leases, improvements or other encumbrances on the property. The Complaint also states that the real property or interests in real property which CITY is authorized to acquire are identified as fee interests in and to property located at 600 K Street in the city of Sacramento and County of Sacramento, State of California, together with all improvements situated thereon and together with all rights appurtenant thereto. The Trustee is also fully aware of and has fought the Citys attempt to take the building and structures. Moreover, such technical issues may be grounds for a demurrer or to challenge the valuation of the Property, but do not affect the standard for a Resolution of Necessity. Given the above, the Trustee has failed to satisfy its burden of establishing, by substantial evidence, that the City Councils adoption of the RON was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, the governing body failed to follow the mandated procedure, or the governing body was irrevocably committed to taking the property regardless of the evidence presented at the resolution of necessity hearing. (Council of San Benito County Governments, supra, 209 Cal. App. 4th at 485.)

3. Summons and Notice of Motion The Court has directed the City to re-serve the Trustee with a code-compliant summons. Moreover, given that the Trustee has opposed the instant motion on the merits, the Trustee has waived any defects or irregularities in the notice of motion. "This rule applies even when no notice was given at all." (Reedy v. Bussell (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1288 [internal citations and quotations omitted].) Additionally, the Trustee has not identified any prejudice based on improper notice. (Id.) Neither will failure to give notice deprive the Trustee of its rights to procedural due process because the Trustee has an opportunity to be heard, and is opposing, the City's motion. (See Israniv. Superior Court (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 621, 633.) Given all of the above, the Court finds that the City is entitled to take the property by eminent domain. Deposit of Probable Compensation The City has deposited $4,350,000, the amount determined by the appraiser as the fair market value of the Property with the State Treasury Condemnation Deposits Fund. Overriding Need for Pre-Judgment Possession There is an overriding need for the City to possess the property prior to the issuance of final judgment in the case, and the City will suffer a substantial hardship if the application for possession is denied or limited. The Trustee does not dispute the Citys overriding need. Nor is it disputed that, if the construction deadlines are not met, the Project will be placed in significant risk, including allowing the NBA to acquire the Sacramento Kings and relocate the team to another City. Balancing of the Harms The hardship that the City will suffer if possession is denied or limited outweighs any hardship on the Trustee would be caused by the granting of the order of possession. The Property is currently unoccupied. Therefore, there is no substantial hardship to the condemnee. Additionally, the Trustees opposition fails to specify any hardship that it will suffer. Certification of Taxes The request for order for certification of taxes (CCP 1260.250) is GRANTED. The Court will sign the orders submitted.

Item 9

2014-00157384-CU-PT In RE: Joseph RP Carrol Nature of Proceeding: Petition for Change of Name and Gender Filed By: Carroll, Joseph RP

The petition for change of name and gender is GRANTED. However, the request for a new birth certificate to issue must be DENIED because petitioner was not born in California and this Court has no authority to direct out-ofstate authorities to issue a new birth certificate. The Court will sign the decree submitted, as modified to omit any order for the issuance of a new birth certificate.
Item 10 2014-00157410-CU-PT In RE: Michael Logan Bentley Nature of Proceeding: Petition for Change of Name Filed By: Iseley, Michael

The petition is GRANTED.

Item 11 2012-00133182-CL-CL NCCS vs. Franklyn E Seabrooks II Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Terminating Sanctions Filed By: LeLievre, Andrew J.

Plaintiff's motion for terminating sanctions is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff seeks a terminating sanction based on Defendant's failure to serve verified responses to Plaintiff's special interrogatories as ordered by this court on September 30, 2013. Plaintiff, however, did not include a copy of the special interrogatories with its moving papers and therefore the court is unable to determine, as it must, that a terminating sanction will not result in a windfall. Plaintiff's request for monetary sanctions is granted in the amount of $320 (1hr x $260/hr reasonable rate + $60 filing fee). If Defendant fails to pay the sanction by such date, then Plaintiff may lodge for the court's signature a formal order awarding sanctions, which may be enforced as a separate judgment. (See Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 615.) This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.