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How Important for Philosophers is the History of Philosophy? Author(s): Roy Mash Reviewed work(s): Source: History and Theory, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Oct., 1987), pp. 287-299 Published by: Wiley for Wesleyan University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2505064 . Accessed: 26/02/2013 07:46
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HOW IMPORTANT FOR PHILOSOPHERS IS THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY?

ROY MASH

Two questions motivate this paper: what is the relation between philosophy and the history of philosophy? and: what is the value of studying the history of philosophy for those pursuing philosophy? Widely divergent answers are possible. Quine, for instance, writing about science but thinking of philosophy, says: Scienceandthe historyof scienceappealto verydifferent An advancein science tempers. resolvesan obscurity, a tangle,a complexity, an inelegance, that the scientistthen gratefully dismissesand forgets.The historianof sciencetries to recapture the verytangles, confusions,and obscuritiesfrom which the scientistis so eagerto free himself.' If Quine is right, then to the extent that philosophy and science bear the same relation to their histories, the historian of philosophy must be an inadvertent obscurantist, reconfusing that which is now clear. Opposed to Quine is an outlook of a far different sort, which we may in general associate with the doctrine of historicism, and which I shall refer to as "the historical point of view."2This position is expressed by the Spanish historian of philosophy, Julian Marias: Philosophy's relationship to its historyis unlikethat of science,for example,to its own history.In the lattercase, the two things are distinct;science,on the one hand, and on the other,whatsciencewas,that is, its history.The two areindependent of one another, andsciencecan existandbe understood and cultivated fromthe historyof what separate it has been ... In philosophythe problemis philosophyitself; . . . The entirepast is includedin everyact of philosophizing.... [Alll philosophyincludesthe entirehistory of philosophy;if it did not, it wouldnot be intelligible, and, what is more,it could not exist.... Thereis, then, an inseparable connectionbetweenphilosophyand the history of philosophy.Philosophyis historical,and its historyis an essentialpart of it.3 I must say at the outset that my sympathies are with Quine. Though I grant the history of philosophy more relevance than he perhaps does, I believe that the importance of doing the history of philosophy for doing philosophy has been exaggerated. On my view the value of the history of philosophy for philosophy

(Cambridge, Mass., 1985), 194. 1. The Timeof My Life: An Autobiography excellent article,"TheIdeaof a Historyof Philos2. Thisphraseis lifted fromJohn Passmore's (1965),1-32. of theHistoryof Philosophy ophy," Historyand Theory, Beiheft5, TheHistoriography (NewYork, and Clarence C. Strowbridge 3. Historyof Philosophy,transl.StanleyAppelbaum 1967),4-5.

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is, or should be, conceived as more or less like that of logic. Each has greatheuristic value for every branch of philosophy, but neither is indispensable. Nevertheless,it is evident that the history of philosophy has enjoyed a peculiarly central place with respect to philosophy as a whole, at least as the discipline is practiced today in the West. In university curricula, from introductory courses to Ph.D. exams, the ubiquity of the history of philosophy is characteristic of no other branchof philosophy. Other areassuch as logic, epistemology, and ethics, though stressed, are not so nearly omnipresent, and with the exception of logic, are frequently themselves approached in an historical vein. In this way their training insures that few philosophers are without at least a generous smattering of the history of their subject. And since most academic philosophers are expected, at least some of the time, to teach historically oriented courses, the tradition perpetuates itself. The trend is carried beyond academia, where the main institutions for philosophical expression, journals and books, are ones in which prefatory nods to one's predecessors are de rigueur, and in which "placing"one's views in historical perspective is commonplace, if not downright required. But does the history of philosophy rate this treatment? Just how basic is it to philosophy? Wherein does its value consist and wherein does it not? It is with these normative issues that the following discussion will be concerned.4 I begin by trying to pin down the historicist claim that philosophy is "inherentlyhistorical." This is followed by a positive account of the relation and value of the history of philosophy to philosophy. I shall, in particular, distinguish three sorts of reasons for studying the history of philosophy: the pragmatic, the homely, and the far-fetched, and argue that only the second sort stands up.
I

The historical point of view accommodates many arguments leading to the same conclusion, namely that philosophy is (in some way or other) inherently or intrinsically historical.5 But it is not easy to reduce this thought to a thesis that is neither vague, nor innocuous, nor obviously false. In section III I shall come back to some of the arguments associated with this conclusion. For now, however, I want to turn attention to the thesis itself. Charles Taylorwrites, "Philosophy and the history of philosophy are one. You cannot do the first without also doing the second."6 But it is not clear whether
-is one 4. Theconverse question-what is the valueof philosophy forthe historyof philosophy? in its ownright,is beyondthe scopeof myconcern,and so will be ignored. that, thoughfascinating 5. A convenient locus for recentexpressions of the historical point of viewmaybe foundin the volume,Philosophyin History,ed. Richard Rorty,J. B. Schneewind, and QuentinSkinner(Cambridge,Eng., 1984).The presentpaperis in parta reactionto a numberof articlescollectedthere. 6. "Philosophy and Its History," in Philosophyin History,17.Taylor immediately goes on to say of certainproblems,questions,issues,that one that "it is essentialto an adequateunderstanding understand themgenetically" (emphasis added).Thisseemsto commithimonly to the weaker and, I think,uncontroversial thesisthatsome areasof philosophy mustbe pursued historically. (Seemy remarks on criticalphilosophyin sectionII.) But if this is his point, Taylorgivesus no clue as to which areasescapethe historicalapproach,nor as to how and why they escapeit.

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the propositionis that philosophyand the historyof philosophyare identical (as the firstsentencesuggests);or whetherthe latteris merelyessentialfor the former(as the secondsentencesuggests.)The strongeridentitythesisseemspatentlyfalse if it impliesthat one cannottell the two apart.Not all philosophers arehistorians of philosophy, nor does all philosophizing takehistorical material for its subjectmatter.It takes no subtle exerciseof the fancy to determineof two books such as Kripke's Naming and Necessity and Popkin'sThe History of Scepticism: From Erasmusto Spinoza, which is more properlycategorized as philosophyand which as history of philosophy. Thealternative claimis a bit (butonly a bit) moremodest.Taking the business of philosophyto be the promulgation of "creative redescriptions" of the world, of our awareness of it, and placewithinit, Taylorholds that, in orderto achieve it is indispensable suchreformulations, that one approach the problemsof philosophy genetically.7 This theme is echoed by LorenzKruger:
of philosophy [Mlyattempt at connecting thehistoricity withthenatural primarily sciences will look misdirected. I think, however, that a moreconventional and moreplausibleapproachcould not succeedin demonstrating, as I wish to, that philosophyis essentially of an historicalnature." (Kruger's emphasis.)

The gist is essentialist,but what sort of essentialismmight be intendedthat is not obviouslyfalse?If the idea is that one cannot do philosophyat all without kindsof counterexample delvinginto origins,several come immediately to mind. The earliestphilosopherssimplyhad no historyof philosophyto appealto, or none to speak of. Then again, what of children? When I was nine yearsold it occurred to me (independently so faras I know)that I mighthavebeendreaming all the while I thought I was awake.If Tayloris to be credited,either (on the essentialistthesis) I was not philosophizingat all, or (on the identitythesis) I was doing the historyof philosophy.Neitherchoice seemsplausible.Yetagain, the worldis full of "sidewalk" who spendno smalltimeprofoundly philosophers kibitzingaboutthe meaningof life, the basis for morality, the possibilityof cerin theseproblems. tainty,and so on, yet withoutthe least historicalbackground Their untutoredspeculationmay sufferfrom an ignoranceof the history of thought,but it is hardlythe less to be consideredas philosophybecauseof it. Anotherthoughthas to do with the allegedillusionthat philosophyis "timeless."Thus it is sometimesurgedthat philosopherswho neglectthe historyof philosophyareguiltyof a Platonichubrisby supposingthat theycould philosophize ahistorically, "out of time"as it were,treatingtheir problemsas though histhey had no history.Hence,it may be said, philosophy's being intrinsically toricalmerely meansthatphilosophical havehistories, thatphilosophers problems - imbibethis hisof whatever stripe- ancient,adolescent,sidewalk, professional tory with the rest of their culture,and that they could not pose the questions they do, or in the way they do, if the questionshad no history.
7. Taylor,18-19. 8. "WhyDo We Studythe Historyof Philosophy?" in Philosophyin History,78-79.

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But this is a red herring.For even grantingthese points, nothing of deep As is often aboutthe studyof the historyof philosophy. is intimated significance maybe used to referto actions,ideas,and so on, that noted, the term"history" about in the past;or it mayusedto referto the bodyof writings actuallyoccurred those occurrences.But the objection before us confuses these two senses. to philosophy in the same history(in the firstsense)maybe essential Philosophy's familiarway that the historyof any disciplineis necessaryfor thinkingabout in thewaytheyarethoughtabout.Butso farnothing of the discipline the problems has been said. Nothinghas been offeredto convinceus that purextraordinary suingthe history(in the secondsense)of philosophyis, or oughtto be, anymore essentialto philosophythan pursuingthe historyof medicineis to the practice of medicine,or than pursuingthe historyof educationis to teaching.It is the pursuitof, not just the immersionin, historythat is at stake here. thesisto the effectthat doingthe history Considernexta modifiedessentialist of philosophyis necessary for doinggood philosophy- not to be confusedwith for doingphilosophy the claimthat doingthe historyof philosophyis necessary Eventhis weakenedessentialism, "asit ought to be done,"namelyhistorically! of an emstandsas somewhat is too strong.Wittgenstein, in particular, however, to it. The historyof philosophyhad only minimaldirectinfluence barrassment to deal with problems on his work;he seemed, for the most part, determined of the past deeplyinto whatthe greatphilosophers directly, withoutresearching had to sayaboutthem.Advocatesof the historicalpoint of view,facedwiththis in variousways.J. H. Randallbites the bulletparhaveresponded discrepancy, ticularlyhard:
with which Thereare classic criticismsof certainassumptionsand certainarguments, them only at his peril. It was any thinkertoday must come to terms;he can disregard his almosttotal lack of interestin and ignoranceof his "field," in this sense,that made the insightsof Wittgenstein so muchless fruitfulthantheymightotherwisehavebeen.9

the lengthsto which some historians As well as any,this remarkdemonstrates account are willingto go to enshrinetheir discipline.Surelyon any reasonable Infruitfulness. a paradigm of work(earlyand/or late) has been Wittgenstein's the courseof philosophysincehis death,it is hardto see how deed, considering his insightscould havebeenmorefruitfulthantheyhavebeen. It is equallyhard to see how Randallmightsupportsucha dubiouscounterfactual as he proposes, or whatmighthavemotivatedit otherthan a doggedallegianceto the centrality mood is upon one, one might, of the historyof philosophy.If the conjecturing with at least as fine a plausibility, supposethat a greaternotice of the history thanenriched rather of philosophy wouldhavestifledWittgenstein's imagination, it. the historicalpoint of view is to see the question Yetanotherwayto interpret but "howmuchhistoryof philosnot as, "whystudythe historyof philosophy?" answernow being, "the ophy ought philosophersto study?"-the historicist's
9. How Philosophy Uses Its Past (New York, 1963), 79.

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like Quineand Wittgenmorethe better." But again, thinkingof philosophers stein, this is surelytoo strong.Thereare no data that I know of that support the generalization that the best philosophersare (let alone must be) those who of howmuchbettera given knowthe mosthistory. And intrapersonal evaluations philosopher mighthavebeen had she only studiedmorehistoryareof a notoriously unverifiable sort, beg all the importantquestionsat issue, and reducethe level of argumentto petulantassertion. thesisneed not be thoughtto applyonly, or primarily, But the more-is-better to individuals.For perhapsit will be arguedthat the benefitsconveyedby the secondhand.Wittgenstein studyof the historyof philosophycan be contracted maynot havestudiedLeibniz,but he rubbedelbowswith those who did. Hence in the historyof the questionnow becomes,"howmuchcommunityinvestment is desirable?" labor,whatproportion philosophy Givena divisionof intellectual of historians of philosophy or of historical papers to philosophical to philosophers, the rightanswermaybe, hereagainthe wrong papers,is optimal?But whatever answeris "themorethe better." Between1790and 1810Europewas inundated with historiesof philosophy;but it is far from clearthat the generalcaliberof work duringthis period was greatlyimprovedover that of previousrelatively ahistoricaleras. How much historyof philosophyis desirablefor an individualphilosopher or for a communityof philosophers? Put in this fashion, there is almost certo phitainlyno straight answer: the amountis boundto varyfromphilosopher losopher.The only generalanswerI wish to urgeis: less than is presentlysupposed. Clearlysome history of philosophy is helpful and useful for doing philosophy.Some philosophers benefitfrom it morethan others,some generanothing much of tions more than others. Otherthan these banal generalities, a positive naturecan be said. Certainlythe inflatedclaims of the historicist (whetherthey be couched in terms of identification,necessity,more-is-better, and so on) do little to help us understand the relationand value of the history of philosophy to bear. for philosophy, norhowthisrelation andvaluearebrought
II

with aredistinctactivities Doing philosophy and doingthe historyof philosophy or distinctgoals (whichis not to denythat they areoften carriedon alternately Eachof theseactivitiescan be thoughtof as havinga reacevensimultaneously). tive and a creativemode. In the reactivemode the historyof philosophyis exegetic,whilephilosophyis critical;in the creativemode,the historianof philoswhile the philosopherconstructsdirecttheories. ophy constructsnarratives, Historiansarereactive to exposethe conwhenthey areconcernedprimarily tent of a philosopher's (and I think correct)account, thought.On the standard the historianof philosophyin this aspect of her work is concernedwith ideas of a philosopher's claims only as artifacts. Herownassessment of the correctness is beside the point. Her problemsare those of the interpreter; her task is that of understanding. Of courseinterpretation is often a preliminary to evaluation.

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The abundantliterature on the "Cartesian circle," for example,is of morethan merehistoricalsignificance. If Descartesdoes play off clear and distinctideas againstGod'sveracityin a circularfashion,then his foundationfor knowledge is put in seriousjeopardy.But to make this shift to evaluationis to move over to philosophy.Philosophy,in its reactivephase,takes up whereexegesisleaves off. Having ascertainedwhat another philosopher said (and meant), the philosopher's aim as criticis to decidewhether,and to what extent,it is correct or justified.Hencephilosophy,like the historyof philosophy,incorporates exegesis,but unlikethe historyof philosophy, nevercountsinterpretation as an end in itself. The roleof criticismsin philosophyis especiallypredominant relative, for example,to its role in art. Evaluatingpoetry is not the same thing as writingit; criticizingpaintingis not painting;judgingmusic is not playingor composing it. Philosophy,on the other hand, drawsno strong distinctionbetweendoing philosophyandcriticizing it. Hencethe dearthof philosophicalcreative writing courses.In writingcriticalpapersstudentsare alreadyphilosophizing.1I Criticalphilosophymaybe subdivided into historicalandcontemporary criticism, dependingupon the immediacyof the object of criticism.Thereneed be no preciseline drawnbetweenthe contemporary and the historical.Whendoes a philosopher's workbecomehistory?Whenshe is dead?Whenherworkis out of vogue?Shall we drawthe line at Frege,the logical positivists,the ordinary languagetheorists?Presumably some combinationof temporalproximity, relevance, and availability is at work here.Bradleyand Greenare clearlyhistory; Russellless so; Fodor, at the time of this writing,not at all. The point to be emphasizedis that the more historicalone's explicitobject of criticismis, the more one will need to dependon the historyof philosophy. This is nearlytrivial.If one fanciesoneself a Cartesian, or if one sees it as one's duty to set Descartesright, one is well-advised to have read Descartes.But to the extentthat a philosopherconcentrates on flesh-and-blood rivals,rivalswho can answerof their own accord,to that extentshe will haveless directuse for the historyof philosophy. This fact is importantwith respectto anotherred herring:call it the "hermeneuticherring." This has to do withthe possibilityof objectivephilosophical interpretation, the degreeto which interpretation and assessmentare independent of one anotherand the associatedmethodologicaldilemmaof antiquari12 Nevertheanismversusanachronism. Muchhas beenwrittenon thesematters.
10. "Criticism," as I am usingthe term,can cut two ways.It may attackanother's position,or defendit. Somephilosophers arealmostexclusively counter-punchers, and somealmostexclusively disciples.Both areprimarily reactive, takingtheircues fromthe workof others.A simple,though notinfallible, indication of critical philosophy canbe foundin thenumber of references an author uses. 11. Insofaras literary criticismmay itself be takenas a form of literature, and madethe object of furthercriticism,it beginsto take on the self-obsessive aspectof philosophical criticism. 12. E.g.,fullyhalfthearticles in Philosophy in History wrestle withtheseproblems. SeealsoMichael Ayers,"Analytic Philosophy and the Historyof Philosophy," in PhilosophyandIts Past, ed. Jonathan RWe, MichaelAyers,and Adam Westoby (Brighton,1978);John Dunn, "TheIdentityof the

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less, I havenot much to say about them. If meaningand truth are twin halves of a benigncircle,and if the task of evaluationrequires theirsimultaneous pursuit, then those who are concernedto criticizehistoricalfigureswill have that much more use for the historyof philosophy.(Equally,those who are not so will havethat muchless use for it.) But since,as I havenoted, critical concerned philosophyaimedat historical subjectsobviouslydependson the historyof philosophy,this emphasison the interdependence of truthand meaningdoes not add muchof importance to the discussionat hand. It certainlygivesus no clue as to whatvaluethe historyof philosophyhas for those philosophers who criticize their contemporaries, or who offertheir own positive theories. In its creative,as opposedto its reactive, mode the historyof philosophyattemptsto weavevariousthinkersand their ideas into a coherentsequence,to explainwhy and how the sequenceoccurredas it did, leadingup to our most recentforebears, andfinallyto ourselves. But constructive historyof philosophy is not merelyexegesisaimed at a large chunk of time. Though it is no doubt possibleto be a meredoxographer, to go from one age to anotherreadingoff what various philosophersthought about various subjects, the constructive historian wantsto do more.She wantsto tell a story:"TheStoryof Philosophy." But storiesneed structure and plot to bringan otherwisehaphazard jumbleof eventsandideasinto a meaningful series.As narrators historians attemptto capture the flow of ideas in a net of explanation.The explanationsmay waverin theiremphasis on internal versus (philosophical) external (sociopolitical) factors, but the endpointis alwaysthe same.Like ongoing memoirs,the finalchanging chapteris alwaysthe present. Justas the historyof philosophyis not solelyexegetic, so of coursephilosophy is not entirelycritical,not whollyconsistingin defensesand rebuttals of others' work.Positivetheoryis occasionallyattempted.This marksphilosophy's creative or constructive phase. It may rangefrom grandKantian-sized projects,to ones more narrowlyconceived(for example,Russell'stheory of descriptions). Nor need it alwaystry to produceanswers.Discovering a new puzzlecan be as instructiveas solving an old one. Tobe sure,constructive philosophyis almostalwaysset againsta background of dissatisfactionwith prior theories. Hence the common practiceof "stagesetting": runningthroughpreviousattemptsto addressa problemwith an eye to displayingtheir deficiencies before proceedingto one's own answer.But alwith thoughthe motivationfor constructive philosophyis often a dissatisfaction earlierwork, the relevance of the historyof philosophyis at its low ebb as far as makingone's own peace with a problemis concerned.What mattersmost for the constructive philosopheris the problemitself. Whatothershavehad to Problemswill of coursealmostalways say about it is of secondaryimportance. to the imporhavea history,but the importanceof that historyis subordinate tance of the problem.
History of Ideas," Philosophy 43 (1968), 85-104; and E. D. Hirsch Jr., The Aims of Interpretation (Chicago, 1976).

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III

Of the many Whythen shouldphilosophers studythe historyof philosophy?"3 I shouldlike to distinguish and discussthreegeneralsorts:the reasonsavailable pragmatic, the homely,and the far-fetched. The main pragmatic reasonfor studyingthe historyof philosophyis simply one comesin contactwithwill havestudied thatmostotherseriousphilosophers it. The store of common knowledgebinds professionalphilosopherstogether in a community. into the community with Acceptance tacitlyrequires familiarity its own history,muchas acceptanceinto a civil communityinvolvesknowledge its foundingfathers,its wars,its myths,andits jokes, of the community's history, In this sense, one needs to know its ideals and long-standingpreoccupations. the history of philosophyin orderto belong. But this sort of reasonis not inherentin the natureof the historyof philosophy. It leavesopen the possibilitythat the currentinstitutionalsituationmay The infatuationwith the historchangeif its demandsare found unreasonable. ical mightagainwane,as it did in the seventeenth century;historymightagain drift awayfrom the centertowardthe peripheryof the discipline.Indeed,one purposeof this paper is to agitate for just such a change. Outsideof the pragmatic spurs,thereareplentyof soundand homelyreasons for philosophers to study the historyof philosophy.At a minimum,the great thinkersof the past may serveas role models exemplifyinglives given over to thought. Theirworksand lives can be sourcesof inspiration.Philosophy,like poetry,has its muse, and by way of payinghomage,may gain immenselyfrom studying"monuments of its ownmagnificence," the chiefgain beingthat philosophylearnsfromthe past.Whatsetsprofessional philosophers apartfromcocktail speculators and children,what makesthem especiallyworthlisteningto, is in largepart their knowledgeof what other greatthinkersthroughouthistory havehad to say about a varietyof topics. The primaryvalue of the historyof philosophyfor philosophyis thereforeheuristic.We have much to learn from the past, both from its successesand its failures. A numberof imagesaresuggestive of this heuristic relation.Themorephilosophy is conceivedof as a science,the more appealingwe may find the picture of ourselves looking out fromthe shouldersof giants.As an edifice,old philosOr we may reophy constitutesa foundationon whichwe raisenew structures. storean earlierfacade,keepingit moreor less intact,updatingand refurbishing in a moreconit, paringawayits weakeraspects,but reformulating its strengths temporaryidiom. Thinkingof the historyof philosophyas an endowment,progressive and cuwe mayimagineourselves mulative, as its beneficiaries, enjoyingthe accruedin13. Elsewhere in this paperthe questionhasbeenput moretersely: "whystudythe historyof philosophy?" ratherthan "whyshouldphilosophersstudy ... .?" But in all cases the formershould be readas an abbreviation forthe latter,morespecific query, sinceit is reallythe valueof the history of philosophy for philosophers thatis at issuehere.I certainly haveno wishto denythatthe history of philosophyis a worthwhile pursuitfor its own sake, no less so than is philosophy.

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terest of thousands of years of thought. And among the heirlooms there will certainly be hidden jewels: the forgotten, the overlooked, the out of the way. Obscure passages from Montaigne, Epictetus, Reid, or Aquinas may kindle an association, and indirectly (and occasionally directly) find relevance for some current concern. Against the "shoulders of giants" story we may oppose that of the "shadows of giants." Taken to its extreme, this perspective can lead to despair: What if it has all been said? Or at least everything of consequence? If "nothing can be said which has not been said already,"then is history of philosophy all that is left to us? Are we to be footnoters and nothing more? Does progress in philosophy consist merely in finding new and interesting ways to cross-index the past? Or is the number of original philosophical ideas and systems infinite? (Is the number of tunes infinite?) An antidote to such despair lies in regarding the giants on whose shoulders we perch as object lessons. On this view, we progress not from learning of the successes of the past but by taking its failures to heart. We might imagine the range of philosophical topics as defining a minefield through which we must navigate, and the past giants as minesweepers of a sort. Locke's epistemology is important if only to show us in detail why that road leads to destruction. If he hadn't trod it, someone else would have had to. (But to be accurate we must complicate this picture by conceiving of the mines as retriggerable. It is not as though the giants have opened up paths previously closed, rather their moribund corpuses flag the still present peril.) But these familiar answers only show that studying the history of philosophy has heuristic value for the philosopher, not that it is inescapable. In this we might compare the history of philosophy with logic. While the study of logic has enriched all the other branches of philosophy, yet philosophers can, and sometimes have, gone about their business largely ignorant of it. The benefits to be reaped from either activity are a powerful encouragement for studying them. But neither is indispensable, and the value of each may vary from philosopher to philosopher. The historian who holds that philosophy and the history of philosophy are inseparable ought no more to be credited than the logician who claims that all philosophy is fundamentally logic. The desire to see the history of philosophy as special and grand has encouraged many to look for rather more far-fetched reasons for studying it than those we have been considering, and in the process often to inflate its importance.14 The short answer - that philosophy is inherently historical - we have found

14. As a justification forlookingbeyond thehomelyanswers, it maybe suggested thatthesetruisms neglectcertainkey differences betweenthe historyof philosophyand the historyof science.The too standson the shoulders of herillustrious but she feelsno needto go and physicist predecessors, readthem in the original.She workswithina model, and neitherstudiesoutmodedones nor the of the history the importance originsof herown.Thismove,however, begsthe questionconcerning of philosophy. Somephilosophers such as Quinewouldbe happyto viewphilosophy's past as the scientistviewshers;indeed,would welcomeany releasefrom the burdenof rehashing old news.

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difficult to spell out in a plausible fashion. Let us now look instead to some of the arguments that surround and support it. Philosophy, it is sometimes maintained, is essentially a reflexive activity. To quote Marias again, "In philosophy, the problem is philosophy itself." "The chief contribution history can bring to philosophic understanding," says Randall, "is the light it can shed on the character of philosophy itself."15From these remarks we might reason as follows. A common goal of philosophy is to understand the nature of intellectual activity, asking questions such as "what is science?" "mathematics?""art?""law?""how do these activities work?" "what norms do they employ?" In order to understand these activities the philosopher must study their histories. Just so, in understanding the nature of her own activity she must study its history. It is not true, however, that in order to do good work on the problem of the nature of philosophy one must have any more than a passing acquaintance with its history. Wittgenstein, who certainly did a lot of original work in this area, again stands as a counterexample. For Wittgenstein his own experience in philosophizing was a far more relevant source of inspiration and information than the study of the philosophizing of others. And even if it is granted that in order to understand philosophy one must study its history, it nevertheless is simply false that every philosopher, in order to be a philosopher (and a good one) need address the question "what is philosophy?" any more than every philosopher worth her salt must address the question "what is religion?" or "what is mathematics?" These are relatively narrow questions that demand study only from people especially interestedin those fields. The fact that a philosopher necessarily practices philosophy brings upon her no obligation to be a philosopher of philosophy. Consider then the "FreudianDefense." Studying the history of philosophy is, on this view, like recapturing a lost memory. Richard Rorty remarks, "Just as the patient needs to relive his past to answer his questions, so philosophy needs to relive its past in order to understand its questions."16 Taylor doesn't invoke Freud in so many words, but his idea is similar. He describes the submergence of philosophical theory in social practice as a kind of forgetting.17 Philosophers are stymied by problems because they belong to a society whose institutions and practices embody the effects, but hide the origins, of these problems. (Here it is the culture rather than the individual that has repressed the memory.) And as Freudian blocks are neutralized by calling to consciousness a lost memory, so the prescription for philosophical blocks involves retrieving the past. Now as a rhetorical device the Freudian Defense is an effective collar-grabber, but since it is far from clear that Freudian analysis lives up to its billing in psychology, we should be all the more suspicious in extending its pronouncements to philosophy. And as with the Freudianpsychologist so with the historicist:while
15. Randall, 99.

16. Philosophyand the Mirrorof Nature(Princeton,1979),33.


17. Taylor, 24.

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the speculation may seem enticing, we are entitled to inquire into the rationale. Are any generalizable data in the offing? Are historically oriented philosophers more whole, or "realized,"or philosophically "healthy"than those less steeped in history, or than they themselves would have been had they reallocated more of their time to contemporary studies? And who sets the criterion for a philosophical cure anyway? What kinds of mechanisms account for such cures? Can afalse memory (say a misinterpretationof Pyrrhonian skepticism) nevertheless have salutary, placebo-like effects? Suppose we connect Freud with Socrates. If philosophy has as an essential goal self-understanding,then philosophers will be driven to understandtheir own philosophical activity. The self-awareness that comes of seeing ourselves from the historical point of view is, on this line, incumbent on all who philosophize. Studying the history of philosophy, particularly in its narrative moments, is essential for seeing how we got where we are; and seeing how we got where we are is a necessary condition for understanding where we are. And who would argue with such an admirable goal as self-understanding? Peter Hylton makes it particularly appetizing: is not, primarily, positivedoctrinebutrather Whatone canhopeto gainfromphilosophy a clearermind and a deeperinsightinto one's position in the world. If these Socratic that the philosophical enterprise ideasappealto us at all, then it will seemunsurprising shoulditself be subjectto philosophical examination and criticism.If, indeed,we accept we mightwell find it obvious that philosophyhas to do peculiarlywith self-knowledge, that the historyof philosophyis a part of philosophyitself.18 But what are the mechanisms by which such self-awareness might be brought about? A thorough knowledge of the history of philosophy might be supposed to induce self-awareness in any of several ways. By familiarizing ourselves with an age in which our ideas were nascent, we become aware of assumptions that underlie them. These assumptions, which are now taken for granted but which were once far from obvious, may once more call for argument. By seeing that our own ideas have a history, are extensions of earlier themes, parts of a progression of ideas, we see that if history had taken a different tack our ideas might have been different than they are; hence the "contingency of contemporary belief." By coming to an appreciation of the limitations of another age, by recognizing, for example, that there are ideas which it was historically impossible for Locke to have entertained, we realize that we are in the same boat with respect to the future. Although we cannot say precisely what it is that we are incapable of thinking - only posterity will be able to say that,19- we do know that there are, or will be, such things. The message is clear. In recovering origins we also recover a sense of contingency. It is not so much a substantive doctrine one wants to dredge up, as a feeling
18. "The Nature of the Proposition and the Revolt Against Idealism," in Philosophy in History, 395-396. 19. And maybe not even posterity. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel's The Viewfrom Nowhere (Oxford, 1986), chap. 6.

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for the precariousness of one's own doctrines, of their being but a few out of a vast field of competitors each of which, if not true, is at least conceivable. A healthy self-awarenessshakes our complacency.A sober appreciationof the foibles of the past is at once humbling and enriching. By encouraging an attitude of open-mindedness, by overcoming provincial common sense, a study of the history of philosophy enlarges our imaginative scope. But self-awarenessis not an unconditional blessing. History is as liable to stultify as to liberate. Knowledge of our most fundamental, undefended premises can serve merely to induce timidity or, in the extreme case, paralysis. An appreciation of the shakiness of one's foundations is just as apt to dampen strong conviction, to inhibit the advance of bold hypotheses, as it is to stimulate new discovery. Inveterateopen-mindedness is not a feature to be touted if it perpetually deprives one of firmly believing that one is right; that, on occasion, other doctrines are incoherent. For the mere fact that such alternatives were once considered viable does not in itself show that they are, or were, in fact viable. Practically speaking, though this may sound like heresy, some degree of self-ignorance may prove fruitful for philosophy.20 Moreover, the theme of self-awareness tends to undercut our homely reasons for studying the history of philosophy. For on this view we do not learn anything from the giants other than that we are on a par with them insofar as we are all prisoners of one Weltanschauungor another. According to it we derive from the past not knowledge (as the homely answerswould have it) but a lesson. The lesson is: never trust a premise. And the deeper the premise, the more fundamental it is to everything you hold dear, the more unquestionable it seems -the more it is to be questioned. Only then, it is thought, will one be free of the premise's grip, as the Freudian patient is free of her neurosis. But of course this freedom is illusory. Because and here is another moral to be gleaned from this way of looking at the history of philosophy-we will never be without unsubstantiated, and indeed unsubstantiatable, premises. There is no throwing off of chains; there is only an exchange, an awareness (for what that is worth) that one was in chains, and of what those chains were like. I have explored this theme not because I believe self-awareness is never a byproduct of studying the history of philosophy, but to show how difficult it is to adduce it as the basis for an answer to the question, "why study the history of philosophy?" and at the same time retain those good, solid, wholesome, (dare I say "Midwestern"?)answers which are all that should be required.
IV

The burden of this paper has been to show that (1) the history of philosophy
20. Evengranting whyshould thecategorical desirability of combatting intellectual complacency, the appealto historybe an indispensable method for countering the insidiouseffectsof cultural stimulation, myopia?Mightn'ttravel,or a vigorousstudyof anthropology, producethe requisite the wideningof horizonsfor whichthese pursuitsare justly vaunted?

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is, in no revealing sense, intrinsic to philosophy, and (2) what I have called "the homely reasons" alone justify studying the history of philosophy. How widely these propositions are held it is hard to say. It may be that they have the disadvantage of seeming less radical or exciting than the historical point of view they oppose. But a third point, I suspect, will do for provocation: (3) The significance of doing the history of philosophy for doing philosophy has been, and continues to be, exaggerated. This is not to belittle the historian's work. The history of philosophy is not unimportant for philosophy, just overemphasized. But if this is right, the implications for the way philosophy is practiced and taught in academic institutions will not be slight. It is here that we may expect pedestrian ideas to have powerful consequences. San Francisco State University

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