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The impact of international and industrial diversication strategies on the cash ow sensitivity of cash
Mussie Teclezion
Austin E. Cofrin School of Business, University of Wisconsin-Green Bay, Green Bay, Wisconsin, USA
Abstract
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the two diversication strategies on rms propensity to save cash out of cash ow. Design/methodology/approach The author examines the quarterly data of Compustats active and research rms from the rst quarter of 1999 to the last quarter of 2005, with a sample size of more than 79,000 rm quarters. A two-step GMM Instrumental Variable regression of change in cash holdings, on variables that measure the degree of industrial as well as international diversication strategies, is employed to investigate whether each diversication strategy alleviates or exacerbates rms propensity to save cash out of its cash ows. Findings Evidence is found that industrial diversication mitigates the propensity of rms to save cash out of their cash ows. When the sample is partitioned into nancially constrained and nancially non-constrained rms, industrial diversication reduces propensity of rms to save cash out of cash ows for nancially constrained rms but not for nancially non-constrained rms. On the other hand, the results do not indicate any impact of international diversication on the sensitivity of cash to cash ows. Originality/value The paper tests, empirically, whether international and industrial diversication strategies affect the propensity of rms to save cash out of their cash ow. Keywords Organizations, Cash ow, Savings, International diversication, Global diversication, Industrial diversication, Financial constraint Paper type Research paper

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Received April 2011 Revised February 2012 Accepted April 2012

1. Introduction Firms use internal as well as external sources of funds to nance their investment undertakings. Although the choice between the two sources of capital should not affect rms cost of capital, information asymmetry and capital market imperfections may make internal source of capital cheaper. Firms that encounter higher information asymmetry and that have difculty accessing capital markets are nancially constrained; therefore, will have higher inclination to rely on their internal sources of capital to fund their investment projects. Al least, they will nance some portion of their investment spending using internal source of capital before going to the capital markets for additional capital. Compared to nancially non-constrained, nancially
This paper is based on the authors dissertation completed at Southern Illinois University-Carbondale. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Ike Mathur, his dissertation chair, and other members of his dissertation committee.
Managerial Finance Vol. 38 No. 10, 2012 pp. 977-992 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 0307-4358 DOI 10.1108/03074351211255173

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constrained rms will save a bigger portion of their cash ows in order to have enough liquidity to fund future investment projects. This propensity to save cash out of cash ows is more exaggerated among rms that were pre-determined to be nancially constrained (Almeida et al., 2004). In this paper, we will address the question of whether industrial and international diversication strategies reduce or increase the propensity of rms to save cash out of their cash ows. The nding highlights some characteristics of industrially diversied rms that may reduce the need to hoard cash out of cash ows. This has implication in comparing two important characteristics of diversied rms: the severity of information asymmetry of diversied rms (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000) versus the ease with which they can access external capital markets. We nd industrial diversication strategy to reduce the propensity of rms to save cash out of cash ows. Our ndings imply the characteristics of industrially diversied rms that make it easier and cheaper to access the capital markets outweigh their other characteristics such as: information asymmetry and agency cost. The question of whether international diversication and industrial diversication strategies create or destroy value has been extensively researched in the nancial economics literature. The outcome of the research in the area is conicting; with no clear consensus on whether the two diversication strategies create or destroy value. Even in the absence of consensus on the value-creation/value-destruction frontier, some characteristics of diversied rms have been attributed to value created and others to value destroyed by diversication. The characteristics of diversied rms that are associated with value creation may also be linked with lower propensity of rms to save cash out of cash ows. On the other hand, characteristics that are associated with value destruction could be linked with increasing the propensity of diversied rms to save cash out of cash ows. Among the characteristics of diversied rms that underlie the value destruction impact of diversication are: agency cost (Denis et al., 1997), information asymmetry (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000), over-investment (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Blanchard et al., 1994), and inefcient capital markets (Lamont, 1997; Lamont and Polk, 2002). These same characteristics of diversied rms could also reduce the competitiveness of diversied rms in raising external capital compared to non-diversied. On the other hand, studies that nd value creation from diversication have associated the value created with the following characteristics of diversied rms: market completion (Errunza and Senbet, 1981, 1984), internalizing the market for intangible assets (Morck and Yeung, 1991), and increased debt capacity (Lewellens, 1971). Diversied rms have wider internal capital markets (Lamont, 1997; Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003), lower cost of capital (Singh and Nejadmalayeri, 2004; Hann et al., 2009), low correlation among the earnings of their subsidiaries (Hughes et al., 1975), and subsidiaries that could be divested when funds are needed (Fluck and Lynch, 1999). Again, these characteristics could be linked with reducing the propensity of diversied rms to save cash out of cash ows. Although, several characteristics of diversied rms associated with valuation, information asymmetry, and cost of capital have been examined in the literature, we think it is important to directly look at the propensity of internationally and industrially diversied rms to save cash out of cash ow. Our ndings shade more light on whether the two diversication strategies reduce the reliance of rms on internal sources of capital.

We examine quarterly data of Compustats all active and research rms from the rst quarter of 1999 to the last quarter of 2005, with a sample size of more than 79,000 rm quarters. We nd evidence that industrial diversication mitigates the propensity of rms to save cash out of their cash ow. In an instrumental variable regression of change in cash holdings on cash ow and other determinants of change in cash holdings, the interaction variable between industrial diversication and free cash ow is negative for rms classied as nancially constrained. As rms diversify industrially, they are less inclined to save cash out of cash ows. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 presents our empirical ndings, and Section 5 is conclusion. 2. Literature review and hypotheses 2.1 Diversication strategy and rms propensity to save cash out of cash ow Under the assumption of perfect capital markets, the nancing choices of a rm should not affect its value, and rms invest to a level where the marginal cost of invested capital is equal to marginal return on additional dollar invested (Hubbard, 1998). However, the interplay of capital market imperfection and asymmetric information between providers of capital and rm insiders may account for the discrepancy between internal cost and external cost of capital. Firms with sufciently high asymmetric information, incentive problems, and limited internal resources will have to pay signicantly higher cost of capital to raise external funds (Hubbard, 1998; Stein, 2003). There is vast documented evidence that nancially constrained rms investment expenditures to a large extent are determined by the availability of internal resources and not just by their investment opportunity (Fazzari et al., 1988; Whited, 1992; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Hubbard et al., 1995; Lang et al., 1996). Many of these studies examine the sensitivity of investment to cash ow for group of rms that are initially identied as nancially constrained using criteria such as: size, payout ratio, commercial paper rating, and bond rating. The consensus among these studies has been that nancially constrained rms exhibit signicant sensitivity of investment to cash ows while nancially non-constrained rms do not. Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) and Cleary (1999) have challenged the robustness of the investment cash ow sensitivity as an indicator of nancial constraint. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) selected a sample of rms categorized as nancially constrained by Fazzari et al. (1988), and nd no indication of nancing constraints from reading the rms annual reports. Several other studies have criticized the robustness of investment cash-ow sensitivity as an indicator of rms nancial constraints (Cleary, 1999; Kaplan and Zingales, 2000; Erickson and Whited, 2000; Alti, 2003; Moyen, 2004). Other criticisms of the cash ow sensitivity of investment as an indicator of nancial constraint comes from the quality of Tobins q as a measure of investment opportunity. Tobins q ratio is a worse proxy for investment opportunities of younger, smaller, and high-growth rms (Alti, 2003). Alti (2003) claims investment cash ow sensitivity would obtain and would be higher for younger, smaller, and high-growth rms, even in a frictionless market environment because cash ow realizations provide information about investment opportunities. Almeida et al. (2004) develop a theoretical model of cash-ow sensitivity of cash and propose cash ow sensitivity of cash is positive for nancially constrained rms and indeterminate for nancially

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non-constrained rms. Their measure of cash ow sensitivity of cash is signicantly higher for rms that are nancially constrained. To avert the correlation of investment opportunities in the investment-cash ow sensitivity models, other studies have resorted to identifying the sensitivity of investment to exogenous shocks to cash ow that are independent of investment opportunities, such as: legal-settlement cash windfalls (Blanchard et al., 1994), cash-ow shocks from oil related business to non-oil lines of business investment (Lamont, 1997), cash ow from pension funding requirements (Rauh, 2006), and foreign cash ow (Fee et al., 2006). More recent papers have examined impact of diversication on cash holdings (Duchin, 2009), on the marginal value of a dollar (Tong, 2009), and on the value of the rm during the nancial crisis of 2007-2009 (Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010). Duchin (2010) nds diversication to reduce the cash holdings of rms. Tong (2009) nds diversication to reduce the marginal value of a dollar, while Kuppuswamy and Villalong (2010) nd diversication to increase the value of rms during the nancial crisis of 2007-2009, especially the value of nancially constrained rms. Although the literature has examined the various rm characteristics that are associated with nancial constraints, no study to our knowledge has explored the impact of the two diversication strategies in alleviating or exasperating the propensity of rms to save cash out of cash ows. This is relevant to rms deciding to expand industrially and internationally. If diversication alleviates the need to save cash out of cash ows, rms may nd it easier to access external sources of capital and thus take advantage of their growth opportunities as they increase their industrial as well as international expansion. On the other hand, high sensitivity of cash to cash ow may indicate high reliance of rms to their internal capital markets. This paper addresses the issue of whether the two diversication strategies in and by themselves reduce or increase the propensity of rms to save cash out of cash ow using a method developed by Almeida et al. (2004). 2.2 Hypotheses The operation of internationally diversied rms in different parts or the globe and high growth opportunity they enjoy could require investment of nancial resources. Internationally diversied rms could also face higher level of business risk, country risk, exchange rate risk, political risk, and macroeconomic risk. In addition, the opaque nature of multinational operations could increase the agency cost of debt (Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003), making an internationally diversied rm less likely to turn to the debt market. Agency cost between divisional and headquarter management (Gautier and Heider, 2001) may also bump up the optimal level of cash rms hold. Just as headquarter management would like to have signicant cushion of cash holding at their disposal, the division managers of MNCs across different product and factor markets may increase the level of cash holdings of multinational rms. These factors may increase the propensity of internationally diversied rms to retain more cash out of their cash ows. On the other hand, internationally diversied rms operate in different product and capital markets and thus may have access to external sources of funds in several capital markets. As a result, international diversication may mitigate the propensity of rms to save cash out of their cash ows. Therefore, we empirically test the following hypothesis: H1. International diversication has no effect on the propensity of rms to save cash out of cash ows.

There are few factors that could lead industrially diversied rms to have high propensity of saving cash out of their cash ows. First, industrially diversied rms may utilize internal capital market as source of internal funds for their investments (Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002). They may use cash ows from one segment to nance the expenditure of other subsidiaries (Rajan et al., 2000). Second, industrially diversied rms are more prone to agency problems (Denis et al., 1997), hence may have the tendency to over-invest, resulting in retention of more cash out of their cash ows. On the other hand, efcient operation of capital market coupled with lower cost of raising capital on the debt and equity markets may lead industrially diversied rms to have lower propensity to save cash out of cash ows. Therefore, we put forth the following hypothesis: H2. Industrial diversication has no effect on the propensity of rms to save cash out of cash ows. 3. Data and methodology 3.1 Data The sample is compiled from Compustat quarterly data from Q1Y1999 to Q4Y2005. We choose quarterly data for two reasons. First, to be able to get more data points per rm as we control for rm xed-effects in our regression models. Second, cash is the most liquid asset in a rm thus we track its very short-term nature using quarterly data. We started our sample with all active and research rms in the Compustat database. Firms with SIC codes from 6000 to 6999 and 4000 to 4999 are excluded from our sample. American Depository Receipts (ADRs) are also excluded from the sample. We use Compustat Industrial Segment les (CIS) to nd segment-related information for industrially diversied rms and Compustat Geographic Segment les (CGS) to nd segment information for internationally diversied rms. Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 14 requires rms with more than 10 percent of their consolidated sales to report income or assets from operations outside of the USA, and data on unafliated sales, income and identiable assets for non-domestic operations. SFAS No. 14 requires rms to report data for any activity segment making up more than 10 percent of the rms consolidated revenues, operating income, or identiable assets. Following Kim and Mathur (2005), we limit our sample period to the period after the adoption of SFAS No. 131, the rule that supersedes SFAS No. 14. This will avoid the effect of the SFAS 131 in our ndings (Kim and Mathur, 2005). Firms with total sales of $20 million or less are eliminated from the sample. The sample screening criteria is similar to that of Denis et al. (2002). We remove the impact of outliers by winsorizing the sample on the bottom 1 percent for Cash Holdings, Cash Flow, NWC, and Market-To-Book variables, and on the top 1 percent for Cash Holdings, Cash Flow, NWC, and Market-To-Book, Capital Expenditure, Acquisition, and Short-term debt. After deleting observations with missing data, our sample size for the sample period includes 79,040 rm quarters. 3.2 Methodology Following a vanguard of attack on the investment cash ow sensitivity, Almeida et al. (2004) have developed a sensitivity of cash to cash ow model that avoids some of the problems associated with the investment-cash ow sensitivity literature. The authors show, theoretically and empirically, that cash-ow sensitivity

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of cash is positive for nancially constrained rms and is indeterminate for nancially non-constrained rms. To test our two hypotheses, we use model developed by Almeida et al. (2004): DCash Holdingsi;t a0 a1 Total Foreign Salesi;t a2 HR_INDEX i;t a3 Cash Flowi;t a4 Market -To-Booki;t a5 Real Sizei;t a6 Capital Expi;t a7 Acquisitioni;t a8 DNWC i;t a9 DShort _Term_Debti;t a10 Total Foreign Salesi;t *Cash Flowi;t a11 HR_INDEX i;t *Cash Flowi;t 1i;t The regression model is run in the spirit of Almeida et al. (2004) for the entire sample as well as for two groups of rms nancially constrained and nancially non-constrained. We classify our sample into two groups using four different classication criteria of nancial constraint: asset size, sales size, payout ratio, and bond rating. 3.3 Measures of international diversication and industrial divesication We use the percentage of foreign sales of a company from CGS as a measure of international diversication. To measure the degree of industrial diversication we use (1 2 Herfendeil index) coded as HR_INDEX. HR_INDEX is measured between 0 and 1 and is directly related with the degree of industrial diversication. We compute sales based Herfendeil index as the sum of squared segment sales divided by the square of total rm sales. Segment related information is obtained from CIS. 3.4 Financial constraint classication criteria The nancial constraint literature classies rms into nancially constrained and nancially non-constrained using different classication criteria such as debt rating (Whited, 1992; Kashyap et al., 1994; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995), payout ratio (Fazzari et al., 1988), size (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995), KZ index (Lamont et al., 2001; Almeida et al., 2004; Gomes et al., 2004; Whited and Wu, 2006), and commercial paper rating (Almeida et al., 2004). The consensus in the literature has been that investment policies of nancially constrained rms tend to be more prone to cash ows. Thus, we use four methods of classifying rms into nancially constrained and nancially non-constrained. Debt rating. We classify rms into nancially constrained and nancially non-constrained depending on whether the rms had their public debt rated during the sample period, and the rating of their public debt. For each quarter during the sample period, rms are classied as nancially non-constrained if rms have public debt with a rating of investment grade, otherwise they are classied as nancially constrained. Using public debt rating criterion, our sample is classied into 71,904 rm quarters that are nancially constrained and 7,136 rm quarters that are nancially non-constrained. Payout ratio. All rm quarters are classied into a group with positive payout ratio and a group with no payout. Firms with positive payout ratio are classied into nancially non-constrained group, while rm quarters with no dividend payout or stock repurchase are classied as nancially constrained. Our sample includes 45,012 rm quarters that are nancially constrained and 34,028 rms that are nancially non-constrained.

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Asset size. For each quarter we classify rms into two groups based on the median of quarterly asset size. Firms with above quarterly median of asset size are classied as nancially non-constrained while rms with less than quarterly median of asset size are classied as nancially constrained. The classication of bigger rms into nancially non-constrained follows the logic that large rms tend to be followed by more analysts and are more active in the debt and equity markets; therefore, they could nd it easier to raise funds from the capital markets to nance their projects than small rms could. Using book value of assets criterion, the sample includes 39,514 rm quarters that are nancially constrained and 39,526 rm quarters that are nancially non-constrained. Sales size. Firms with quarterly sales greater than the median sales for that quarter are classied as large rms, thus nancially non-constrained rms. While rms with quarterly sales less than the median sales for the quarter are classied as small rms, and thus as nancially constrained rms. The sample includes 39,528 rm quarters that are nancially constrained and 39,512 rm quarters that are nancially non-constrained. 4. Empirical results 4.1 Descriptive statistics Table I shows the descriptive statistics of the variables in the data set. The average quarterly cash ow is around 1.4 percent of total assets throughout the sample period and the average quarterly increase in cash holdings for the entire period has been about 1/10th of a percent of the total assets. However, the variable has a minimum of 2 1.35 percent and a maximum of 1.437 percent with a standard deviation of 5.128 percent. The rms in the sample have market value of assets around twice the book value of their assets.

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Variable Change in Cash Holdings HR_INDEX Total_Foreign_Sales Real Size Market-To-Book Cash_Flow Capital_Exp Acquisition change in short-term-debt Change in NWC

n 75,343 79,040 79,040 79,040 79,040 79,040 79040 79,040 75,028 75,314

Mean 0.0009 0.1954 0.1705 5.8662 1.9113 0.0135 0.0130 0.0041 2 0.0013 0.0000

Lower quartile 2 0.0135 0.0000 0.0000 4.5649 1.1077 0.0061 0.0041 0.0000 2 0.0016 2 0.0187

Median 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 5.7239 1.4741 0.0189 0.0088 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Upper quartile 0.01437 0.44501 0.29687 6.98425 2.19981 0.03151 0.01737 0.00000 0.00118 0.01820

SD 0.05128 0.25801 0.25856 1.74937 1.32333 0.03660 0.01828 0.01767 0.04596 0.06053

Notes: The sample includes a quarterly data of active and research rms in Compustat from Q1Y1999 to Q4Y2005; Cash Holdings is dened as quarterly cash and cash equivalent divided by total assets; Change in Cash Holdings is a quarterly change in cash holdings; HR_INDEX is (1 2 Herndahl index), and is used as proxy for industrial diversication; Total Foreign Sales is percentage of foreign sales to total rm sales and is used as a measure of international diversication; Real Size is the log of total rm assets in Q1Y1999 dollars, Market-To-Book is (Book Value of Total Assets 2 Book Value of Equity Market Value of Equity)/Book Value of Total Asset, Cash Flow is (Income Before Extraordinary Items Depreciation-Dividend Payout)/Total Assets, Capital Exp is Capital Expenditure net of sale of xed assets divided by Total Assets, Acquisition is total acquisition reported by a rm divided by its assets, Short-term-debt is Short Term Debt/Total Assets, and NWC is non-cash current assets less current liabilities

Table I. Descriptive statistics

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4.2 Univarite tests of the level of cash holdings of nancially constrained and nancially non-constrained groups Table II shows the level of cash holdings of the two groups of our sample, nancially constrained and nancially non-constrained. Generally, it is more costly to raise external capital for nancially constrained than nancially non-constrained rms. Therefore, they tend to hoard higher levels of cash as a percentage of their total assets. We conduct a univariate test of the level of cash holdings between the two groups using the four methods of classifying rms into nancially constrained and nancially non-constrained. The test is similar in spirit to that of Almeida et al. (2004). Table II shows that nancially constrained rms tend to hoard more cash as a percentage of their assets. We conduct the t-tests as well as the wilcoxon z-score tests, and the results show that the average cash holdings of nancially constrained rms are signicantly higher than that of the nancially non-constrained rms. The median cash holdings for nancially constrained rms is also signicantly higher than that of the nancially non-constrained rms. Results in Table II are consistent with nancial constraint literature. 4.3 Multivariate tests To test whether the two diversication strategies mitigate or exacerbate the propensity of rms to save cash out of their cash ows, we run instrumental variable regression on the data. The results of the regression model are shown in Tables III-V. The basic model in all regressions is an instrumental variable regression similar in sprit to that of Almeida et al. (2004) and Fazzari and Petersen (1993). The instrumental variable model takes into account the endogeneity of nancial and investment decisions (Almeida et al., 2004) in the regression equation. We use the xtivreg2 function
Constraint classication Debt-rating Group-const/non-const Constrained Non-constrained p-value (t-test) p-value (Wilcoxon) Constrained Non-constrained p-value (t-test) p-value (Wilcoxon) Constrained Non-constrained p-value (t-test) p-value (Wilcoxon) Constrained Non-constrained p-value (t-test) p-value (Wilcoxon) Mean 0.1721 0.0715 , 0.001 , 0.001 0.1901 0.1273 , 0.001 , 0.001 0.2115 0.1146 , 0.001 , 0.001 0.2227 0.1034 , 0.001 , 0.001 Median 0.088532 0.037245 , 0.001 0.109083 0.055145 , 0.001 0.135168 0.050568 , 0.001 0.147373 0.048037 , 0.001 SD 0.19401 0.08668 0.20238 0.16317 0.21097 0.04451 0.2166 0.1321 Nobs 71,904 7,136 45,012 34,028 39,514 39,526 39,528 39,512

Payout ratio

AssetQ

SalesQ

Table II. Univarite tests of quarterly cash holdings for the two constraint groups using four nancial constraint classication criteria

Notes: Univariate test of the difference between the mean of the two nancial constraint groups classied on the basis of debt-rating, payout ratio, quarterly book value of assets, and quarterly sales; for each quarter during the sample period, rms are classied as nancially non-constrained if rms have public debt with a rating of investment grade, have positive payout ratio, have above quarterly median of the asset size, or have quarterly sales greater than the median for that quarter; otherwise they are classied a nancially constrained rms

Variable Capital Exp Change_in_Short_ Term_Debt Change_in_NWC Total Foreign Sales HR_INDEX CashFlow Market-To-Book Total Foreign Sales * CashFlow HR_INDEX * CashFlow Real Size Acquisition Observations Number of groups R2 J J ( p-value)

Model A 0.0767 2 0.571 * * * 2 0.629 * * *

Model B

Model C (0.524) (2 16.25)

(0.599) 0.0701 (2 16.65) 2 0.572 * * * (2 19.15)

(0.527) 0.0699 (2 16.25) 2 0.572 * * *

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2 0.631 * * * (2 18.70) 2 0.631 * * * (2 18.69) 2 0.0039 (2 1.629) 2 0.00364 (2 1.473) 0.00285 (1.305) 0.00440 * (1.928) 0.224 * * * (18.53) 0.225 * * * (18.1) 0.247 * * * (16.16) 2 0.00181 * * * (2 4.515) 2 0.00184 * * * (2 4.371) 2 0.00188 * * * (2 4.457) 2 0.00399 (2 0.115) 2 0.144 * * * (2 3.633)

2 0.00247 * * * (2 2.786) 2 0.00277 * * * (2 2.987) 2 0.00275 * * * (2 2.963) 2 0.521 * * * (2 27.85) 2 0.551 * * * (2 27.06) 2 0.551 * * * (2 27.04) 65,205 58,937 58,937 4,517 4,228 4,228 0.215 0.216 0.216 6.108 6.503 6.444 0.191 0.165 0.168

Notes: Signicant at: *p , 0.1, * *p , 0.05, * * *p , 0.01; dependent variable is change in quarterly cash holdings; the models are two-stage instrumental variable regressions of quarterly Change in Cash Holdings on Percentage of Foreign Sales, HR_INDEX, Cash Flow, and other rm specic factors; the sample includes a quarterly data from active and research les of Compustat from Q1Y1999 to Q4Y2005; CashHoldings is dened as quarterly cash and cash equivalent divided by total assets; Capital Exp is Capital Expenditure net of sale of xed assets divided by Total Assets, Short-term Debt is Short Term Debt/Total Assets, NWC is non-cash current assets less current liabilities, Total Foreign Sales is percentage of foreign sales to total rm sales and is used as a measure of international diversication, HR_INDEX is (1 2 Herndahl index), and is used as proxy for industrial diversication, Cash Flow is (Income Before Extraordinary Items Depreciation-Dividend Payout)/ Total Assets, Market-To-Book is (Book Value of Total Assets 2 Book Value of Equity Market Value of Equity)/Book Value of Total Asset, Real Size is the log of total rm assets in Q1Y1999 dollars, Acquisition is total acquisition reported by a rm divided by its assets, and Payout Ratio is (Total Cash Dividends Stock Repurchases)/Total Assets; Robust t statistics in parentheses

Table III. Two-step GMM IV regression of change in cash holdings

of Stata developed by Baum et al. (2003) to estimate all varieties of our model. The instruments used in our model include rst-order lags of cash ow, Market-To-Book Value ratio, quarterly change in working capital, and quarterly change in short-term debt, as well as second-order lags of change in working capital and change in short-term debt. Capital Expenditure, change in NWC, and change in short-term debt enter the model as endogenous regressors. The J-stat as well as the signicance of the J-stat is reported in the regressions. None of the J-stats are signicant, signifying the validity of over-identifying restrictions of the instruments in the regressions. The models are estimated using two-step GMM and robust t-statistics for the regression coefcients are reported. The cash ow coefcient is positive and signicant across all three models in Table III. Firms in our sample have positive propensity to save cash out of cash ows. In the second model, we add the two diversication variables; however, the results of the model do not change much. We include the interaction of each of the two diversication

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Variable 0.201 (0.979) 2 0.587 * * * (2 5.366) 2 0.583 * * * (2 9.018) 0.225 * * * (5.068) 2 0.000958 (2 1.145) 0.00580 * * (2.554) 2 0.239 * * * (2 6.581) 6,464 291 0.227 3.869 0.276 0.102 (0.545) 2 0.529 * * * (2 11.18) 2 0.587 * * * (2 12.24) 0.229 * * * (13.35) 2 0.00194 * * * (2 3.715) 2 0.00314 * * (2 2.573) 2 0.600 * * * (2 21.28) 36,530 3,537 0.189 4.604 0.33 0.164 (0.733) 2 0.530 * * * (2 13.89) 2 0.628 * * * (2 23.61) 0.199 * * * (10.59) 2 0.00199 * * * (2 2.764) 2 0.000701 (2 0.477) 2 0.420 * * * (2 18.02) 28,094 2,628 0.303 4.891 0.18 2 0.0465 0.277 * (1.878) (2 0.198) 2 0.485 * * * 2 0.429 * * * (2 7.626) (2 5.661) 2 0.645 * * * 2 0.503 * * * (2 13.91) (2 7.756) 0.256 * * * 0.142 * * * (15.49) (8.241) 2 0.00218 * * * 2 0.00127 * (2 4.065) (2 1.929) 2 0.00277 * 2 0.00104 (2 1.856) (2 0.845) 2 0.704 * * * 2 0.398 * * * (2 22.13) (2 18.60) 34,030 33,543 3,060 2,245 0.242 0.163 3.247 4.564 0.197 0.207

0.0716 (0.538) Change_in_Short_Term_ 2 0.572 * * * (2 16.25) Debt Change_in_NWC 2 0.631 * * * (2 18.69) CashFlow 0.224 * * * (18.10) Market-To-Book 2 0.00183 * * * (2 4.350) Real Size 2 0.00271 * * * (2 2.928) Acquisition 2 0.551 * * * (2 27.05) Observations 58,937 Number of groups 4,228 0.216 R2 J 6.506 J ( p-value) 0.164

Capital Exp

Notes: Signicant at: *p , 0.1, * *p , 0.05, * * *p , 0.01; dependent variable is change in quarterly cash holdings; models (A and B) are two-stage instrumental variable regressions of quarterly Change in Cash Holdings on Cash Flow and other rm specic factors; the sample includes a quarterly data from active and research les of Compustat from Q1Y1999 to Q4Y2005; model (A) is two-step IV regression on nancially constrained sample based on each the four nancial constraint classication criteria, namely, debt rating, payout ratio, assets, and sales; model (B) is two-step GMM IV regression on the nancially non-constrained sample; CashHoldings is dened as quarterly cash and cash equivalent divided by total assets; Capital Exp is Capital Expenditure net of sale of xed assets divided by Total Assets, Short-term Debt is Short Term Debt/Total Assets, NWC is non-cash current assets less current liabilities, Cash Flow is (Income Before Extraordinary Items Depreciation-Dividend Payout)/Total Assets, Market-To-Book is (Book Value of Total Assets 2 Book Value of Equity Market Value of Equity)/Book value of Total Asset, Real Size is the log of total rm assets in Q1Y1999 dollars, Acquisition is total acquisition reported by a rm divided by its assets, and Payout Ratio is (Total Cash Dividends Stock Repurchases)/Total Assets; Robust t statistics in parentheses

Table IV. Two-step GMM IV regression of change in cash holdings for the two groups of rms
Debt rating Model (A) Model (B) Const No-const Payout Ratio Model (A) Model (B) Const No-const Assets Model (A) Model (B) Const No-const Sales Model (A) Const 0.0691 (0.315) 2 0.543 * * * (2 11.63) 2 0.603 * * * (2 13.34) 0.240 * * * (13.83) 2 0.00228 * * * (2 3.953) 2 0.00300 * * (2 2.057) 2 0.688 * * * (2 20.35) 31,626 2,815 0.202 5.257 0.262 Model (B) No-const 0.191 (1.335) 2 0.592 * * * (2 15.03) 2 0.647 * * * (2 17.91) 0.163 * * * (10.12) 2 0.000583 (2 1.062) 2 0.000296 (2 0.277) 2 0.389 * * * (2 19.62) 33,375 2,179 0.243 3.125 0.537

Sales Model (A) Const Model (B) No-const

Variable

Debt rating Model (A) Model (B) Const No-const

Payout ratio Model (A) Model (B) Const No-const

Assets Model (A) Model (B) Const No-const

Capital Exp

Change_in_Short_Term_Debt

Change_in_NWC

Total Foreign Sales

HR_INDEX

CashFlow

Market-To-Book

Total Foreign Sales * CashFlow

HR_INDEX * CashFlow

Real Size

Acquisition

Observations Number of groups R2 J J ( p-value)

0.0699 (0.524) 2 0.572 * * * (2 16.25) 2 0.631 * * * (2 18.69) 2 0.00364 (2 1.473) 0.00440 * (1.928) 0.247 * * * (16.16) 2 0.00188 * * * (2 4.457) 2 0.00399 (2 0.115) 2 0.144 * * * (2 3.633) 2 0.00275 * * * (2 2.963) 2 0.551 * * * (2 27.04) 58937 4228 0.216 6.444 0.168 0.0695 (0.317) 2 0.543 * * * (2 11.63) 2 0.603 * * * (2 13.34) 2 0.00462 (2 1.305) 0.00619 (1.617) 0.257 * * * (12.66) 2 0.00231 * * * (2 4.001) 2 0.00319 (2 0.0706) 2 0.135 * * (2 2.247) 2 0.00307 * * (2 2.097) 2 0.687 * * * (2 20.33) 31626 2815 0.202 5.102 0.277

0.152 (0.751) 2 0.580 * * * (2 5.349) 2 0.582 * * * (2 9.104) 0.0155 * * * (3.312) 0.00745 (2 1.610) 0.292 * * * (3.935) 2 0.00071 (2 0.862) 2 0.511 * * * (2 4.556) 0.289 * * (2.312) 0.00618 * * * (2.674) 0.236 * * * (2 6.534) 6464 291 0.243 4.037 0.257

0.0965 (0.514) 2 0.528 * * * (2 11.17) 2 0.585 * * * (2 12.22) 2 0.00604 * (2 1.874) 0.00524 (1.594) 0.259 * * * (12.74) 2 0.00200 * * * (2 3.816) 2 0.006 (2 0.148) 2 0.207 * * * (2 4.206) 2 0.00315 * * * (2 2.577) 2 0.599 * * * (2 21.27) 36530 3537 0.191 4.821 0.306

0.161 2 0.0434 (0.721) (2 0.184) 2 0.529 * * * 2 0.485 * * * (2 13.85) (2 7.636) 2 0.626 * * * 2 0.645 * * * (2 23.56) (2 13.90) 0.00122 2 0.00719 * (0.369) (2 1.949) 2 0.00125 0.00269 (2 0.455) (0.728) * * * 0.201 0.271 * * * (7.531) (14.08) 2 0.00194 * * * 2 0.00223 * * * (2 2.707) (2 4.156) 2 0.101 * 0.0276 (2 1.655) 0.0729 2 0.162 * * * (2 2.804) 2 0.000622 2 0.00279 * (2 0.418) (2 1.866) 2 0.420 * * * 2 0.703 * * * (2 18.02) (2 22.12) 28094 34030 2628 3060 0.304 0.242 4.892 3.025 0.18 0.22

0.272 * (1.838) 2 0.429 * * * (2 5.650) 2 0.503 * * * (2 7.736) 0.00165 (0.565) 0.00194 (0.765) 0.167 * * * (6.665) 2 0.00123 * (2 1.871) 2 0.0746 (2 1.433) 2 0.0257 (2 0.473) 2 0.00104 (2 0.837) 2 0.398 * * * (2 18.61) 33543 2245 0.163 4.601 0.203

0.188 (1.311) 2 0.592 * * * (2 15.06) 2 0.647 * * * (2 17.92) 2 0.00103 (2 0.338) 0.00135 (0.586) 0.179 * * * (7.499) 2 0.000592 (2 1.080) 2 0.0299 (2 0.556) 2 0.0387 (2 0.761) 2 0.000287 (2 0.266) 2 0.389 * * * (2 19.62) 33375 2179 0.244 3.146 0.534

Notes: Signicant at: *p , 0.1, * *p , 0.05, * * *p , 0.01; dependent variable is change in quarterly cash holdings; models (A and B) are two-stage instrumental variable regressions of quarterly Change in Cash Holdings on Percentage of Foreign Sales, HR_INDEX, Cash Flow, and other rm specic factors; the sample includes a quarterly data from active and research les of Compustat from Q1Y1999 to Q4Y2005; model (A) is two-step IV regression on nancially constrained sample based on each the four nancial constraint classication criteria, namely, debt rating, payout ratio, assets, and sales. model (B) is two-step GMM IV regression on the nancially non-constrained sample; CashHoldings is dened as quarterly cash and cash equivalent divided by total assets; Capital Exp is Capital Expenditure net of sale of xed assets divided by Total Assets, Short-term Debt is Short Term Debt/Total Assets, NWC is non-cash current assets less current liabilities, Total Foreign Sales is percentage of foreign sales to total rm sales and is used as a measure of international diversication, HR_INDEX is (1 2 Herndahl index), and is used as proxy for industrial diversication, Cash Flow is (Income Before Extraordinary Items Depreciation 2 Dividend Payout)/Total Assets, MarketTo-Book is (Book Value of Total Assets 2 Book Value of Equity Market Value of Equity)/Book Value of Total Asset, Real Size is the log of total rm assets in Q1Y1999 dollars, Acquisition is total acquisition reported by a rm divided by its assets, and Payout Ratio is (Total Cash Dividends Stock Repurchases)/Total Assets; Robust t statistics in parentheses

Table V. Two-step GMM IV regression of change in cash holdings on diversication and other variables

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variables with cash ows in the third model. The results of our regression show the interaction term between cash ow and industrial diversication is negative and signicant, while the interaction between cash ow and international diversication is negative and insignicant. Thus, we are able to reject the second hypothesis but not the rst one. From our results in Table III, we nd that industrial diversication reduces the propensity of rms to save cash out of their cash ows. In Table IV, we run a separate regression for the nancially constrained rm quarters as well as for the nancially non-constrained rm quarters based on each of the four grouping methods to see the cash ow sensitivity of cash for each group. The theoretical model of Almeida et al. (2004) predicts the coefcient to be positive and signicant for nancially constrained rms and indeterminate for nancially non-constrained rms. Almeida et al. (2004) also validate their prediction empirically using annual data of only manufacturing rms (SICs 2000 to 3999) from 1971 to 2000. Although the cash ow coefcient is greater for nancially constrained rms using three out of four grouping methods, we still nd positive and signicant value for the cash ow variable for both groups and across all four grouping methods. Some of the reasons why our result for nancially non-constrained rms is different from that of Almeida et al. (2004) could be because of our use of quarterly data and different sample period. Our sample also includes rms in all industries in Compustat except utilities and nancials. In our sample, we nd nancially constrained rms tend to have higher propensity to save cash out of their cash ow. For three out of four regressions, the cash ow coefcient is higher for the nancially constrained group than for the nancially non-constraint group. The only case where the cash ow coefcient is higher for the nancially non-constrained groups is when the grouping is done by public debt rating. The result of the regression using that grouping may not be as reliable as the regressions for the other grouping methods because the grouping generates more than 71,000 rm quarters for the nancially constrained group and only around 7,000 for the nancially non-constrained one. The coefcients of interest for the two hypotheses are: the interaction between total foreign sales and cash ow, a10, as well as the interaction between the HR_INDEX and cash ow, a11. The results of the full model for each nancial constraint group is shown in Table V. The coefcient of the interaction between foreign sales and cash ow for all the groups including the non-constrained groups, using the three grouping criteria except the debt rating grouping, is not signicantly different from zero. Therefore, we could not reject the hypothesis that international diversication does not affect the propensity of rms to save cash out of cash ows. On the other hand, the coefcient of the interaction variable between HR_INDEX and cash ow is negative and signicantly different from zero for the nancially constrained groups across four nancial constraint groupings. However, it is not signicantly different from zero for the nancially non-constrained groups using the four different nancial constraint groupings. Therefore, we can reject H2 for nancially constrained rms. Our results show that industrial diversication reduces the propensity of rms to save cash out of their cash ows if they are nancially constrained. 5. Conclusion We examine the impact of international and industrial diversication strategies on the propensity of rms to save cash out of their cash ow. We test our hypothesis using

a two-step GMM instrumental variable regression model that takes into account the endogeneity of nancial and investment decisions of rms. Generally, nancially constrained rms are more inclined to save cash out of their cash ows. We nd evidence that industrial diversication mitigates the propensity of rms to save cash out of their cash ow, while international diversication does not have any impact on the relationship between cash ow and change in the level of cash holdings. The impact of industrial diversication in mitigating the propensity of rms to save cash out of cash ow is especially strong for rms that are nancially constrained. Our nding is consistent with efcient internal capital markets for industrially diversied rms. Our result has two implications on the cost of capital as well as the marginal value of a dollar in the coffers of industrially diversied rms. One implication of the negative impact of the industrial diversication on the sensitivity of cash to cash ow could be: industrial diversication makes it easier to access the capital markets and lowers rms cost of capital. This is consistent with nancial economics literature that argues industrial diversication creates value. The second but contradictory argument is that: industrially diversied rms retain less out of their cash ow because additional dollar is going be worth less once it is in their coffers. The rms that hoard excess cash may do so because of agency related problems. Actually, Tong (2008) nds the marginal value of a dollar is worth around 82 cents to diversied rm shareholders. Whether the lower sensitivity of cash to cash ow among diversied rms is an indication of the lower cost of capital or results from expected loss of value once it is their coffers is left for future research.
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-Requejo, J. (2001), Financial constraints and stock returns, Lamont, O.A., Polk, C. and Saa Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 14, pp. 529-44. Lang, L., Ofek, E. and Stulz, R. (1996), Leverage, investment, and rm growth, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 40, pp. 3-30. Lewellen, W. (1971), A pure nancial rationale for the conglomerate merger, Journal of Finance, Vol. 26, pp. 521-37. Matsusaka, J. and Nanda, V. (2002), Internal capital markets and corporate refocusing, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 11, pp. 176-211. Morck, R. and Yeung, B. (1991), Why investors value multinationality, Journal of Business, Vol. 64, pp. 165-87. Moyen, N. (2004), Investment-cash ow sensitivities: constrained versus unconstrained rms, Journal of Finance, Vol. 59, pp. 2061-92. Rajan, R., Servaes, H. and Zingales, L. (2000), The cost of diversity: the diversication discount and inefcient investment, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, pp. 35-80. Rauh, J. (2006), Investment and nancing constraints: evidence from the funding of corporate pension plans, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 61 No. 1, pp. 33-71. Scharfstein, D. and Stein, J. (2000), The dark side of internal capital markets: divisional rent-seeking and inefcient investment, Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, pp. 2537-64. Singh, M. and Nejadmalayeri, A. (2004), Internationalization, capital structure, and cost of capital: evidence from French corporations, Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Vol. 14, pp. 153-69. Stein, J. (2003), Agency, information, and corporate investment, in Constantinides, G.M., Harris, M. and Stulz, R.M. (Eds), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Vol. 1A, North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 111-65. Tong, Z. (2009), Firm diversication and value of corporate cash holdings, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 17 No. 3, pp. 741-58. Whited, T. (1992), Debt, liquidity constraints, and corporate investment: evidence from panel data, Journal of Finance, Vol. 47, pp. 1425-60.

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Further reading Bodnar, G., Tang, C. and Weintrop, J. (1999), Both sides of corporate diversication: the value impacts of geographic and industrial diversication, working paper, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD. Fama, E. and French, K.R. (1997), Industry costs of equity, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 43, pp. 153-94. Harford, J. (1999), Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions, Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, pp. 1969-97. Harford, J., Mikkelson, W. and Partch, M. (2003), The effect of cash reserves on corporate investment and performance in industry downturns, working paper. Lang, L. and Stulz, R. (1994), Tobins q, corporate diversication and rm performance, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, pp. 1248-80. Low, R. and Chen, K. (2004), Diversication and capital structure: some international evidence, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 55-71. Lundstrum, L. (2003), Firm value, information problems and the internal capital market, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Vol. 21, pp. 141-56.

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Myers, S. and Majluf, N. (1984), Corporate nancing and investment decisions when rms have information that investors do not have, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 187-221. Petersen, M. (2009), Estimating standard errors in nance panel data sets: comparing approaches, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22 No. 1, pp. 436-80. Shin, H. and Stulz, R. (1998), Are internal capital markets efcient?, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, pp. 531-52. Corresponding author Mussie Teclezion can be contacted at: teclezim@uwgb.edu

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