What Gregory of Nyssa owes to Platos ideas and practices of the self?

Convergences and divergences between Platos Alcibiades and Gregory of Nyssas Treatise on Virginity. By Guilherme Rodrigues Ferreira INTRODUCTION

The concept of the self, what it is and how it constitutes itself is a central topic of research inquiry across many scientific and philosophic domains varying from more scholarlybased accounts to pseudo-philosophical ones found at the non-fiction or popular culture bestsellers list of a Sundays newspaper. The diversity of historical and philosophical speculation is immense which makes the task of forming a non-erratic point-of-view as difficult and controversial as pinpointing the location of an electron in the fabric of spacetime. The question of this essay comes from the curiosity of understanding the concept of the self not only as an idea but also as a praxis from which the self constitutes itself and is constituted by various external agents. Inspired by the extensive works from Pierre Hadot to Michel Foucault, I will attempt to defining and understanding convergences and divergences of the devising of the idea of care of the self in Plato and the early church father Gregory of Nyssa. As primary sources I have chosen the dialogue Alcibiades by Plato and the Treatise on Virginity by Gregory of Nyssa from where I will draw some leads into understanding to what extent the ideas of Gregory of Nyssa with regards to the care of the self owe to the ideas and the hermeneutics of the self in Plato. Moreover, one may ask why such a question is relevant? Historical curiosity and academic pragmatism is not the only driver behind it, but a genuine longing for understanding how the self is positioned, qualified, constituted in the contemporary society through the lenses of these ancient thinkers. Hopefully by the end of this attempt not only the author but perhaps the reader will be able to shed some light into the role of oneself and its positioning in the present time. This essay wont attain itself to the theoretical exercise of analysing these ideas but, most importantly, by approaching philosophy or history of philosophies not as theoretical

discourses and philosophers systems but as philosophical modes of life (Hadot & Chase, 2004). Hadot presents an enlightening definition of what is a philosophical school: [C]orresponds, above all, to the choice of a certain way of life and existential option which demands from the individual a total change of lifestyle, a conversion of ones entire being, and ultimately a certain desire to be and to live in a certain way.(Hadot & Chase, 2004) This perspective sets up the framework from which both primary texts will be scrutinized. More than solely having an aseptic analytical comparison between both discourses found in Plato and Gregory of Nyssa, this exercise will try to investigate the modes of life and existential options that led those individuals, their schools and their disciples to live the way they lived. This essay wont try to alienate the philosophical discourses from the philosophers who developed them because as Hadot puts it very well: [P]hilosophical discourse is a part of this way of life. It must be admitted, however, that the philosophers choice of life determines his discourse. This is to say that philosophical discourses cannot be considered realities which exist in and for themselves, so their structure could be studied independently of the philosopher who developed them. Can Socrates discourse be separated from the life and death of Socrates? (Hadot & Chase, 2004) Hadot frequently uses the notion of spiritual exercises to define the practices from which the self gets to know itself and constitutes itself: [I] mean practices which could be physical, as dietary regimes, or discursive, as in dialogue and meditation, or intuitive, as in contemplation, but which were all intended to effect a modification and a transformation in the subject who practiced them. The philosophy teachers discourse could also assume the form of a spiritual exercise, if the discourse were presented in such a way that the disciple, as auditor, reader, or interlocutor, could make spiritual progress and transform himself within. (Hadot & Chase, 2004) Inspired by Hadot, Foucault takes a similar trajectory: [P] erhaps Ive insisted too much on the technology of domination and power. I am more and more interested in the interaction between oneself and others and in the technologies of individual domination, the history of how an individual acts upon himself, in the technology of self (Foucault & Rabinow, 2000). For what Foucault calls ethics means the relation to ourselves which led him to investigate the different modalities of care of the self in ancient Greece and Rome but also comparing it to other modes of being in late Antiquity. According to James Wong (Wong, 2008) Foucault outlines three different modalities of care of the self: [T]he Platonic, the Hellenistic, and the Christian. He notes the importance of selfknowledge in the different modes. Under the Platonic model, one must tend to oneself first, specifically one must know what one is ontologically first, in order that one can properly care for others. What one is ontologically is the soul in the Platonic

model. He adds that self-knowledge under the Platonic model is an ontological and not a psychological form of contemplation [It is] independent of what one could call an exercise of the self upon the self. However, under the Hellenistic model, Foucault tells us the recognition of oneself, as a soul is no longer paramount. Rather the objects of attention are the representations that appear in thought, the opinions and judgments which accompany representations, and the passions which act on the body and soul. Under the Hellenistic model, contemplating the soul is replaced by spiritual exercises, which employs reason to observe, check and evaluate what is taking place in the flow of representations and the flow of passions. The Hellenistic model of psychological contemplation has one significant advantage over the other models: its goal of self-formation requires neither the transcendence into the realm of Forms in the Platonic model nor the sacrifice of the self in the Christian model. Foucault tells us that the goal of care of the self in the Imperial period is to constitute oneself as a morally valid subject. In order to accomplish that, one must strive to constitute the self as the object capable of orientating the will through various spiritual exercises. For Foucault theres plenty of evidence on the care of the self as the concern with oneself throughout the culture of Antiquity and for him eight centuries later the same notion appears with an equal importance in Gregory of Nyssa: [H]e applies this term to the impulse that moves one to renounce marriage, detach oneself from the flesh, and, through virginity of ones heart and body, regain the immortality from which one had fallen. In another passage of the Treatise on Virginity he makes the parable of the lost drachma the model of the care of the self: for a lost drachma one must light the lamp, ransack the house, explore every nook, until one sees the metal of the coin shining in the darkness; in the same way, in order to rediscover the effigy that God imprinted on our soul and that the body has covered with grime, one must take care of oneself, lighting the map of the reason and exploring all the recesses of the soul. So it is clear that Christian asceticism, like ancient philosophy, places itself under the sign of the care of the self and makes the obligation to know oneself one of the elements of essential care. (Foucault & Rabinow, 2000) It may seem that Socrates, from Platos account, and Gregory of Nyssa are two very extreme references that wouldnt have similarities to one another. According to Foucault, however, the care of the self was not only an idea or principle that guided the existence of someone but it constituted, although with practices of different natures, a constant practice in both discourses, the Classic and the early Christian: The very term epimeleia does not merely designate an attitude of awareness or a form of attention that one would focus on oneself; it designates a regulated occupation, a work with its methods and objectives. Xenophon, for example, employs the word epimeleia to designate the work of the master of the household who supervises its farming. (Foucault & Rabinow, 2000) Foucault concludes that in all of the ancient philosophy the care of the self was regarded in two inextricable ways: as a duty and as a technique. A basic obligation and a set of carefully worked-out procedures. Evidence of that is found across many of the dialogues written by Plato where Socrates is the main character. Foucault highlights the Apology where

one sees Socrates presenting himself to his judges as the teacher of self-concern, but also at the Alcibiades where according to Foucault three questions appear in it. The question related to the connection of the care of the self with politics, the care of the self and pedagogy and care of the self and self-knowledge. Inspired by these questions I will propose the following framework, which I will use to answer the question of this essay by tracing parallels between the ideas of Plato and Gregory of Nyssa to establish the overlaps and departures from one another anchored on Alcibiades and Treatise on Virginity.

This model takes as an assumption that every self of individual has got an ethos which is a set of guiding values, beliefs, ideas and practices that drives the relationship of one with oneself and external agents. This ethos construction or constitution happens in three different dimensions. The intimate dimension, which is concerned to the relationship that one has with oneself. The social dimension which is concerned to the relationship that one has with the society one is inserted, and finally, the epistemological or pedagogical dimension which is the relationship of oneself with the systems of knowledge or discourses which is operated broadly by Education and Culture which gives the means for someone to create signification by oneself or based on external role models. For each of those dimensions there are techniques that are created and passed from generation to generation as ways to bringing these relationships into life. These all constitute the techniques of the self which according to Foucault are techniques which:

[P]ermit individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on their own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform themselves, modify themselves, and to attain a certain state of perfection, of happiness, of purity, of supernatural power, and so on. Let's call this kind of techniques a techniques or technology of the self. (Carrette, 1999) This is of particular interest of Foucault because to analyse the genealogy of the subject in Western civilisation he believes we need to take into account all techniques of the self the techniques of care for oneself, techniques of domination and techniques of signification: [O]ne has to take into account not only techniques of domination but also techniques of the self. Let's say: one has to take into account the interaction between those two types of the self - techniques of domination and techniques of the self. One has to take into account the points where the technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recluse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself. And conversely, one has to take into account the points where the techniques of the self are integrated into structure of coercion or domination. The contact point, where the individuals are driven by others is tied to the way they in the broad meaning of the word, governing people is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self in constructed or modified by oneself.(Carrette, 1999) THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE SELF WITH ONESELF

When analysing both texts, Alcibiades and Treatise on Virginity, its very clear that both thinkers establish a very important role of the relationship of the self with oneself although the perspectives are slightly different. Whilst for Socrates, based on the hidden perspective from Plato, the self is inherently free; the self in Gregory of Nyssa is fragmented, alienated from itself and attached to a bigger Self, represented by a higher-order deity. This can be clearly spotted on the primary texts. For Socrates the self is constituted by soul, body and both constituting a whole. Theres no space or void, which is occupied by an external entity. The self, hence, is meant to be free and unique as long as one is able to know oneself and constitute ones own ethos and individuality: SOCRATES: That man is one of three things. ALCIBIADES: What are they? SOCRATES: Soul, body, or both together forming a whole. ALCIBIADES: Certainly. ()

And are you, Alcibiades, a freeman? 'I feel that I am not; but I hope, Socrates, that by your aid I may become free, and from this day forward I will never leave you.(Plato) For Gregory of Nyssa the self only exists in relation to the divine. The self is gods creation to whom the self abides: [I]n fact this likeness to the divine is not our work at all; it is not the achievement of any faculty of man; it is the great gift of God bestowed upon our nature at the very moment of our birth; human efforts can only go so far as to clear away the filth of sin, and so cause the buried beauty of the soul to shine forth again that we should wean ourselves from this life in the flesh, which has an inevitable follower, death; and that we should search for a manner of life which does not bring death in its train. Now the life of Virginity is such a life. () [H]e became himself the discoverer of evil, but he did not therein discover what God had made; for God did not make death. Man became, in fact, himself the fabricator, to a certain extent, and the craftsman of evil.(Nyssa) In Gregory of Nyssa, the self is not necessarily autonomous and its likeness to the divine, or the capacity to achieve virtue, is something given as a gift or bestowed upon the selfs nature on the moment of birth. This way, man is naturally sinful as its nature is buried in the filth of the flesh where the soul is imprisoned. Gregory of Nyssa argues that man is not capable of crafting virtue if he doesnt detach himself from flesh and from the secular life. Naturally, the virtuous self can only constitute itself as such with the discovery of god and the salvation conferred by this deity. Although the pre-occupation with oneself is common in Plato and Gregory of Nyssa, they part ways on how that self is constituted. For Plato the self is constituted by oneself in the search of autonomy whilst for Nyssa the self reports to a bigger self above itself. Carrette describes the transformation of the Delphic precept of know yourself from the platonic tradition towards Christianity very well: [I] would like to underline a transformation of those practices, a transformation which took place at the beginning of the Christian era, of the Christian period, when the accent obligation of the knowing oneself became the monastic precept 'confess, to your spiritual guide, each of your thoughts'. This transformation is, I think, of some importance in the genealogy of modern subjectivity. With this transformation starts what we would call the hermeneutics of the self.(Carrette, 1999) For Carrette, anchored by Foucaults account, the self in the Christian technologies of the self is hidden, something to be discovered and deciphered something that has influenced all the way through history the constitution of the modern self:

[I]n the Christian technologies of the self, the problem is to discover what is hidden inside the self; the self is like a text of like a book that we have to decipher, and not something which has to be constructed by the superimposition, of the will and the truth. This organisation, this Christian organisation, so different from the pagan one, is something which is I think quite decisive for the genealogy of the modern self.(Carrette, 1999) Moreover, the askesis, or the practices of the self, in Platos philosophy constitutes as means for the self to be free. Its a practice of freedom as long as the self gets to know itself. Its a practice like art where the self is at the same time subject and object of its craftsmanship: SOCRATES: For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to be the same as that which takes care of ourselves? ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. SOCRATES: And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care of ourselves? ALCIBIADES: I cannot say. SOCRATES: At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is not one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselves better? ALCIBIADES: True. SOCRATES: But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we did not know a shoe? ALCIBIADES: Impossible. SOCRATES: Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not know a ring? ALCIBIADES: That is true. SOCRATES: And can we ever know what art makes a man better, if we do not know what we are ourselves? ALCIBIADES: Impossible. SOCRATES: And is self-knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi? Or is self-knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain? (Plato) Unlike Platos philosophy and practices of the self where the self is free as long as it knows itself, Gregory of Nyssa asserts the only way for the self to be free, amongst other means, it to detach itself from the secular life where the body and its bodily pleasures seize the soul away from virtue and the divine life. In this context, virginity is one of the practices of the self, or askesis, through which the individual achieve redemption from the sins: [N]ow we declare that Virginity is man's fellow-worker and helper in achieving the aim of this lofty passion. In other sciences men have devised certain practical methods for cultivating the particular subject; and so, I take it, virginity is the practical method in the science of the Divine life, furnishing men with the power of assimilating themselves with spiritual natures. () Now the details of the life of him who has chosen to live in such a philosophy as this, the things to be avoided, the exercises to be engaged in, the rules of temperance, the whole method of the training, and all the daily regimen which contributes towards

this great end, has been dealt with in certain written manuals of instruction for the benefit of those who love details. Yet there is a plainer guide to be found than verbal instruction; and that is practice: and there is nothing vexatious in the maxim that when we are undertaking a long journey or voyage we should get an instructor.(Nyssa) Besides abiding to the rules or principles of such practices, which both Plato and Nyssa describe on these texts, they also clearly call for the need of a role model or an external agent that works as guide, a master, an instructor.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE SELF WITH A ROLE MODEL

In Alcibiades, as in many of the dialogues written by Plato, Socrates plays the role of a guide, or instructor. A humble one, that claims to know only one thing that he does not know anything. It, therefore, presupposes that knowledge cannot be ready-made or easily acquired as material good but something that must be engendered by the individual himself. Hadot confirms: [S]ocratess questions and interrogations help his interlocutors to give birth to their truth. Such an image shows that knowledge is found within the soul itself and it is up to the individual to discover it, once he has discovered, thanks to Socrates, that his own knowledge is found within the soul itself and it is up to the individual to discover it, once he has discovered, thanks to Socrates, that his own knowledge was empty. (Hadot & Chase, 2004) This dialogical relationship the individual has with the master, in the case of Alcibiades and Socrates is easily detected on the following excerpt from the dialogue in the Alcibiades: SOCRATES: And are you now conscious of your own state? And do you know whether you are a freeman or not? ALCIBIADES: I think that I am very conscious indeed of my own state. SOCRATES: And do you know how to escape out of a state which I do not even like to name to my beauty? ALCIBIADES: Yes, I do. SOCRATES: How? ALCIBIADES: By your help, Socrates. SOCRATES: That is not well said, Alcibiades. ALCIBIADES: What ought I to have said? SOCRATES: By the help of God. ALCIBIADES: I agree; and I further say, that our relations are likely to be reversed. From this day forward, I must and will follow you as you have followed me; I will be the disciple, and you shall be my master. SOCRATES: The reason was that I loved you for your own sake, whereas other men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you, is fading away, just as your true self is beginning to bloom. And I will never desert you, if you are not

spoiled and deformed by the Athenian people; for the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover of the people and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian has been ruined in this way. For the demus of the great-hearted Erechteus is of a fair countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observe the caution which I give you. ALCIBIADES: What caution? SOCRATES: Practise yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought to know, before you enter on politics; and then you will have an antidote which will keep you out of harm's way. ALCIBIADES: Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to me in what way I am to take care of myself.(Plato) The role of Socrates is to inspire the practice of the self on his disciple as the means to avoid a mistaken understanding of oneself and therefore misguided praxis of oneself with others, as in politics. Socrates by his method of questioning puts himself at the same level as the interlocutor, as both share the same goal: realizing your own ignorance puts you at the best position to take care of yourself, to learn and to take care of others. Education, therefore, is not something imposed into the self but extracted from within the self by the constant practice of the self on itself: by constantly questioning, enquiring oneselfs thoughts and actions. Nevertheless, in a contradictory way to we has been said, Socrates mentions God as the inspiration of his knowledge and therefore of Education:

ALCIBIADES: I entirely believe you; but what are the sort of pains which are required, Socrates, can you tell me? SOCRATES: Yes, I can; but we must take counsel together concerning the manner in which both of us may be most improved. For what I am telling you of the necessity of education applies to myself as well as to you; and there is only one point in which I have an advantage over you. ALCIBIADES: What is that? SOCRATES: I have a guardian who is better and wiser than your guardian, Pericles. ALCIBIADES: Who is he, Socrates? SOCRATES: God, Alcibiades, who up to this day has not allowed me to converse with you; and he inspires in me the faith that I am especially designed to bring you to honour. ALCIBIADES: You are jesting, Socrates.(Plato) Unlike Plato, through the figure of Socrates, for Gregory of Nyssa theres only one ultimate role model, which is Jesus Christ as God incarnated and imparted by his teachings found at the scriptures. Moreover, Gregory of Nyssa also paves the way for a different kind of relationship where the individual is necessarily hierarchically inferior to the pastoral authority, which represents God in Earth. Theres no dialogical relationship but one of submission: One who wants to learn a foreign language is not a competent instructor of himself; he gets himself taught by experts, and can then talk with foreigners. So, for this high

life, which does not advance in nature's groove, but is estranged from her by the novelty of its course, a man cannot be instructed thoroughly unless he puts himself into the hands of one who has himself led it in perfection; and indeed in all the other professions of life the candidate is more likely to achieve success if he gets from tutors a scientific knowledge of each part of the subject of his choice, than if he undertook to study it by himself; and this particular profession is not one where everything is so clear that judgment as to our best course in it is necessarily left to ourselves; it is one where to hazard a step into the unknown at once brings us into danger.(Nyssa) The concept of Education praised by Gregory of Nyssa, therefore, is markedly a departure from the Hellenistic conception where the dialogical relationship between disciple and master is a fundamental principle. However, looking further at the Treatise on Virginity, Nyssa touches on points in common with the principles of the classic Education where the praxis is as important, if not more important, than the contemplation of ideas: [A]ny theory divorced from living examples, however admirably it may be dressed out, is like the unbreathing statue, with its show of a blooming complexion impressed in tints and colours; but the man who acts as well as teaches, as the Gospel tells us, he is the man who is truly living, and has the bloom of beauty, and is efficient and stirring.(Nyssa) RELATIONSHIP OF THE SELF WITH SOCIETY

Lastly, the third dimension proposed by the framework proposed is about the relationship the self has with others or with the society the individual is inserted. In Platos Alcibiades, Socrates is a man that is a citizen of the city and truly believes that philosophy, as long as its lived as a way of life, its intrinsically a political practice. The subject of selfknowledge and self-improvement does so it becomes an individual better prepared to be a citizen of the polis. Hadots research corroborates with this conclusion: [C]are for the self is thus, indissolubly, care for the city and care for others. We can see this from the example of Socrates himself, whose entire reason for living was to concern himself with others. Socrates had both a missionary and a popular aspect, which we will encounter again in some philosophies of the Hellenistic period I am available both to the poor and to the rich, without distinctionthat I happen to be like a being that the deity has given to the city, you might conclude from the following consideration. After all, it does not seem human for me to have neglected all my own affairs and to have kept neglecting my own affairs for so many years now, and always to concern myself with your interests, going up to each one of you individually like a father or an elder brother and persuading you to care for virtue.(Hadot & Chase, 2004)

This excerpt from the Alcibiades, reinforces this particular emphasis of the Socratic philosophy which calls the individuals for their duty with the other and the well being of the collective body: SOCRATES: For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, has the power to do what he likes, but has no understanding, what is likely to be the result, either to him as an individual or to the statefor example, if he be sick and is able to do what he likes, not having the mind of a physicianhaving moreover tyrannical power, and no one daring to reprove him, what will happen to him? Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined? ALCIBIADES: That is true. () SOCRATES: Or again, in a ship, if a man having the power to do what he likes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what will happen to him and to his fellow-sailors? ALCIBIADES: Yes; I see that they will all perish.(Plato) On the other hand, when looking at the Treatise on Virginity, Gregory of Nyssa proposes a completely different recommendation for the self he actually urges the individuals to completely detach themselves from the secular life as the only path for redemption. By doing so, the individual has no role to play whatsoever in the political life. Marriage, as one of the attachments to the worldly life, impedes the self as it distracts it from the heavenly life: [T]his: that the man who longs for union with God must, like those saints, detach his mind from all worldly business. It is impossible for the mind which is poured into many channels to win its way to the knowledge and the love of God. () Happy they who have still the power of choosing the better way, and have not debarred themselves from it by engagements of the secular life, as we have, whom a gulf now divides from glorious virginity: no one can climb up to that who has once planted his foot upon the secular life. () One way of escape is open: it is, to be attached to none of these things, and to get as far away as possible from the society of this emotional and sensual world; or rather, for a man to go outside the feelings which his own body gives rise to. Then, as he does not live for the flesh, he will not be subject to the troubles of the flesh. But this amounts to living for the spirit only, and imitating all we can the employment of the world of spirits. There they neither marry, nor are given in marriage. Their work and their excellence is to contemplate the Father of all purity, and to beautify the lines of their own character from the Source of all beauty, so far as imitation of It is possible.(Nyssa)

CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly Gregory of Nyssas thinking has a lot to owe to Platos philosophy. It converges at the thematic of the concern with oneself as the means for self-knowledge and self-improvement. It diverges at the thematic of how virtue is achieved or, in other words, on the technologies that the self uses upon itself. The means are different but the aims seem to overlap in principle. The model below attempts to visualize the overlaps and departures of Nyssas and Platos conception of ethos.

Whilst Nyssas technologies of the self calls for the alienation from the secular life and submission of the self to another entity, for instance to the pastoral authority, Platos technologies of the self calls for the emancipation of the self from the life of ignorance where the individual works upon itself to construct his own ethos and project this ethos with a clear responsibility towards the life in society. While Nyssas ethos is based on a heteronomous nature where the self is submissive to a deity to achieve freedom or virtue, the Platonic ethos is bound to autonomy as it seeks self-rule as the means of emancipation. This parallel evokes reflection upon the relevance of such an analysis for understanding how the self would be characterized in the contemporary society by using the same framework. To what extent the secularization of life has promoted autonomy? To what

extent, in less secular societies, the force imprinted by religious institutions has hampered the development of autonomous individuals? It seems, at the first sight, that the existence or nonexistence of institutions are not necessarily the only fundamental reason why individuals construct themselves the way they do although they can massively influence it. It actually seems that the mode of life advocated by Plato and the Hellenistic tradition in Antiquity and late Antiquity call for a mode of living which assumes independence from any institution. Regardless ones philosophical or religious inclinations, Philosophy as preached and exemplified by Socrates calls everyone to build itself with the aim not only of being someone better but also a better citizen. Recurring to these ancient precepts could be one of the ways of resurrecting a way of living which both men in modernity and post-modernity is longing for.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Carrette, J. R. (1999). Religion and Culture: Michel Foucault. Manchester: Manchester. Foucault, M., & Rabinow, P. (2000). Ethics: essential works of Foucault 1954-1984. London: Penguin. Hadot, P., & Chase, M. H. (2004). What is ancient philosophy? : Harvard University Press. Nyssa, G. o. Collections of Writings (Kindle edition ed.): Fig (14 Mar 2013). Plato. Alcibiades I. Wong, J. (2008). Foucault and Autonomous Agency. Paper presented at the Paper delivered at the Canadian Political Science Association Conference, Vancouver. Retrieved February.