How Can I Optimize The MV Power of A Cement Plant - V3 - 2013

How can I
Optimize the MV power of a cement plant?

System Technical Note Cement Industry
2013 Schneider Electric All Rights Reserved
Important Information
People responsible for the application, implementation and use of this document must make sure that all necessary design considerations have been taken into account and that all laws, safety and performance requirements, regulations, codes, and applicable standards have been obeyed to their full extent.
Schneider Electric provides the resources specified in this document. These resources can be used to minimize engineering efforts, but the use, integration, configuration, and validation of the system is the users sole responsibility. Said user must ensure the safety of the system as a whole, including the resources provided by Schneider Electric through procedures that the user deems appropriate.
Notice
This document is not comprehensive for any systems using the given architecture and does not absolve users of their duty to uphold the safety requirements for the equipment used in their systems, or compliance with both national or international safety laws and regulations. Readers are considered to already know how to use the products described in this document. This document does not replace any specific product documentation. The following special messages may appear throughout this documentation or on the equipment to warn of potential hazards or to call attention to information that clarifies or simplifies a procedure. The addition of this symbol to a Danger or Warning safety label indicates that an electrical hazard exists, which will result in personal injury if the instructions are not followed. This is the safety alert symbol. It is used to alert you to potential personal injury hazards. Obey all safety messages that follow this symbol to avoid possible injury or death.
DANGER
DANGER indicates an imminently hazardous situation which, if not avoided, will result in death or serious injury. Failure to follow these instructions will result in death or serious injury.
WARNING
WARNING indicates a potentially hazardous situation which, if not avoided, can result in death or serious injury. Failure to follow these instructions can cause death, serious injury or equipment damage.
CAUTION
CAUTION indicates a potentially hazardous situation which, if not avoided, can result in minor or moderate injury. Failure to follow these instructions can result in injury or equipment damage. CAUTION, used without the safety alert symbol, indicates a potentially hazardous situation which, if not avoided, can result in equipment damage. Failure to follow these instructions can result in injury or equipment damage.
NOTICE
NOTICE is used to address practices not related to physical injury. Failure to follow these instructions can result in equipment damage. Note: Electrical equipment should be installed, operated, serviced, and maintained only by qualified personnel. No responsibility is assumed by Schneider Electric for any consequences arising out of the use of this material.
A qualified person is one who has skills and knowledge related to the construction, operation and installation of electrical equipment, and has received safety training to recognize and avoid the hazards involved.
Before You Begin

These equipments and related software are used to control a variety of electrical processes. The type or model of equipment suitable for each electrical application will vary depending on factors such as the voltage level, the control function required, degree of protection and safety required standards and government regulations etc. In some applications more than one equipment may be required when redundancy is needed.
Only the user can be aware of all the conditions and factors present during setup, operation and maintenance of the solution. Therefore only the user can determine the equipments, the software and the related safeties which can be properly used. When selecting automation and control equipment and related software for a particular application, the user should refer to the applicable local and national standards and regulations. The National Safety Councils Accident Prevention Manual also provides much useful information.
Ensure that appropriate safeties and mechanical/electrical protection have been installed and are operational before placing the equipment into service. All mechanical/electrical safeties protection must be coordinated with the related equipment and software.
Note: Coordination of safeties and mechanical/electrical protection is outside the scope of this document.
START UP AND TEST Following installation but before using electrical control and automation equipment for regular operation, the system should be given a start up test by qualified personnel to verify the correct operation of the equipment. It is important that arrangements for such a check be made and that enough time is allowed to perform complete and satisfactory testing. Note: Coordination of safeties and mechanical/electrical interlocks protection is outside the scope of this document.
EQUIPMENT OPERATION HAZARD o o o Follow all start up tests as recommended in the equipment documentation. Store all equipment documentation for future reference. Software testing must be done in both simulated and real environments.
Failure to follow these instructions can cause death, serious injury or equipment damage. Verify that the completed system is free from all short circuits and grounds, except those grounds installed according to local regulations (according to the National Electrical Code in the USA, for example).
If high-potential voltage testing is necessary, follow recommendations in the equipment documentation to prevent accidental equipment damage. Before energizing equipment: Remove tools, meters, and debris from equipment Close the equipment enclosure door Remove ground from incoming power lines Perform all start-up tests recommended by the manufacturer
example). If high-potential voltage testing is necessary, follow recommendations in the equipment documentation to prevent accidental equipment damage. Before energizing equipment: Remove tools, meters, and debris from equipment Close the equipment enclosure door Remove ground from incoming power lines Perform all start-up tests recommended by the manufacturer
OPERATION AND ADJUSTMENTS

The following precautions are from NEMA Standards Publication ICS 7.1-1995 (English version prevails): o Regardless of the care exercised in the design and manufacture of equipment or in the selection and rating of components; there are hazards that can be encountered if such equipment is improperly operated. It is sometimes possible to misadjust the equipment and thus produce unsatisfactory or unsafe operation. Always use the manufacturers instructions as a guide for functional adjustments. Personnel who have access to these adjustments should be familiar with the equipment manufacturers instructions and the machinery used with the electrical equipment.
Only those operational adjustments actually required by the operator should be accessible to the operator. Access to other controls should be restricted to prevent unauthorized changes in operating characteristics. The following precautions are from NEMA Standards Publication ICS 7.1-1995 (English version prevails): o Regardless of the care exercised in the design and manufacture of equipment or in the selection and rating of components; there are hazards that can be encountered if such equipment is improperly operated. It is sometimes possible to misadjust the equipment and thus produce unsatisfactory or unsafe operation. Always use the manufacturers instructions as a guide for functional adjustments. Personnel who have access to these adjustments should be familiar with the equipment manufacturers instructions and the machinery used with the electrical equipment. Only those operational adjustments actually required by the operator should be accessible to the operator. Access to other controls should be restricted to prevent unauthorized changes in operating characteristics.
WARNING
UNEXPECTED EQUIPMENT OPERATION Only use software tools approved by Schneider Electric for use with this equipment. Update your application program every time you change the physical hardware configuration.
Failure to follow these instructions can cause death, serious injury or equipment damage.
INTENTION
This document is intended to provide a quick introduction to the described system. It is not intended to replace any specific product documentation, nor any of your own design documentation. On the contrary, it offers information additional to the product documentation on installation, configuration and implementing the system. The architecture described in this document is not a specific product in the normal commercial sense. It describes an example of how Schneider Electric and third-party components may be integrated to fulfill an industrial application. A detailed functional description or the specifications for a specific user application is not part of this document. Nevertheless, the document outlines some typical applications where the system might be implemented. The architecture described in this document has been fully tested in our laboratories using all the specific references you will find in the component list near the end of this document. Of course, your specific application requirements may be different and will require additional and/or different components. In this case, you will have to adapt the information provided in this document to your particular needs. To do so, you will need to consult the specific product documentation of the components that you are substituting in this architecture. Pay particular attention in conforming to any safety information, different electrical requirements and normative standards that would apply to your adaptation. It should be noted that there are some major components in the architecture described in this document that cannot be substituted without completely invalidating the architecture, descriptions, instructions, wiring diagrams and compatibility between the various software and hardware components specified herein. You must be aware of the consequences of component substitution in the architecture described in this document as substitutions may impair the compatibility and interoperability of software and hardware.
CAUTION
EQUIPMENT INCOMPATIBILITY OR INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT Read and thoroughly understand all hardware and software documentation before attempting any component substitutions. Failure to follow these instructions can result in injury or equipment damage.
DANGER
HAZARD OF ELECTRIC SHOCK, BURN OR EXPLOSION Only qualified personnel familiar with low and medium voltage equipment are to perform work described in this set of instructions. Workers must understand the hazards involved in working with or near low and medium voltage circuits. Perform such work only after reading and understanding all of the instructions contained in this bulletin. Turn off all power before working on or inside equipment. Use a properly rated voltage sensing device to confirm that the power is off. Before performing visual inspections, tests, or maintenance on the equipment, disconnect all sources of electric power. Assume that all circuits are live until they have been completely de-energized, tested, grounded, and tagged. Pay particular attention to the design of the power system. Consider all sources of power, including the possibility of back feeding. Handle this equipment carefully and install, operate, and maintain it correctly in order for it to function properly. Neglecting fundamental installation and maintenance requirements may lead to personal injury, as well as damage to electrical equipment or other property. Beware of potential hazards, wear personal protective equipment and take adequate safety precautions. Do not make any modifications to the equipment or operate the system with the interlocks removed. Contact your local field sales representative for additional instruction if the equipment does not function as described in this manual. Carefully inspect your work area and remove any tools and objects left inside the equipment. Replace all devices, doors and covers before turning on power to this equipment. All instructions in this manual are written with the assumption that the customer has taken these measures before performing maintenance or testing.
Failure to follow these instructions will result in death or serious injury.
The STN Collection

The implementation of an automation project includes five main phases: Selection, Design, Configuration, Implementation Operation.
To help you develop a project based on these phases, Schneider Electric has created the Tested, Validated, Documented Architecture and System Technical Note. A System Technical Note (STN) provides a more theoretical approach by focusing on a particular system technology. A Tested, Validated, Documented Architecture (TVDA) provides technical guidelines and recommendations for implementing technologies to address your needs and requirements, This guide covers the entire scope of the project life cycle, from the Selection to the Operation phase, providing design methodologies and source code examples for all system components.
These notes describe complete solution offers for a system, and therefore support you in the Selection phase of a project. The TVDAs and STNs are related and complementary. In short, you will find technology fundamentals in an STN and their corresponding applications in one or several TVDAs. Development Environment
Each STN has been developed in one of our solution centers using the Infrastructure BU equipment and software catalogues, the Infrastructure PACiS solution and the project management process from Infrastructure complemented by the equipments, software and processes from the other Schneider Electric Bus PACiS, the Electrical Management system from Schneider Electric, is a collaborative architecture that allows Utilities, Industries and Building companies to meet their electrical Management needs while at the same time addressing their growing energy efficiency requirements.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
11
2. Selection
39
3. Design
45
4. Power management
84
5. Appendix
105
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1 - Introduction
1 1.1
Introduction Purpose
For Cement industries maintain of the electrical power is a key feature of their process. Any short or long power interruption may impose a long and costly process stop directly impacting the Cement plant profitability. During the last years, the increase of electrical energy needed for Cement industry has modified the plant industrial grid especially in three main directions: Migration from Low Voltage to Medium or High Voltage of the internal plant network Need to have on site local generation capabilities able to cover partially or fully the plant electrical need in case of a Utility black-out New intelligent Power Management system to optimize the Energy Efficiency Management
Figure 1: Cement plant
The Power Management System is one of cement industry targeted application. The present document describes the major function required by Cement industry for the Power Management of a MV plant micro-grid:
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The Fast Self-Healing solution (FSH), The Automatic Transfer Switch (ATS), The MV cadenced load shedding & load restore.
The Schneider Electric FSH solution (PACiS) is made of IEDs to acquire information (measures, position, status) from the micro-grid, control electrical equipment and run the FSH automation scheme, Ethernet communication network to transfer all information and to survey and control the application Software applications o to configure and set the applications in line with the industrial plan o to transfer and display information to the Plant operators
The purpose of this document is to describe and explain:
The various electrical grid architecture and the reason of the choice The functional description of the PACiS Fast Self-Healing elements part of the Cement Power Management System, How to define the PACiS architecture and how the key elements are configured, integrated and interfaced
1.2
Cement electrical Micro-grid architecture

In Cement Industry depending of the Electrical Power required by the plant, the architectures and sizes of the Electrical grid are based on 2 main families: The Cement plants with non secured electrical network The Cement plant with secured electrical network
We have considered in this document, the cement application with a site power greater than 2 MW.
1.2.1
Non secure MV/LV micro-grid architecture

The non-secured MV/LV micro-grids are based on a non-redundant architecture, which consider that the interruption of the Energy delivery to the site on inside the site to the local MV or LV equipments is acceptable for the Plant process. The most common and simple architectures for non-secured MV/LV Cement micro-grids is the Simple radial architecture. MV Radial architecture
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Any fault occurring at the Grid connection level (MV or HV Utility incomers) or on any point of the internal MV lines/cables generates a black-out (total or partial) and the repower can only be achieved after the fault repair. With these architectures, the availability of the Process is fully depending of all elements part of the micro-grid (Circuit breaker, Transformers, Cable, Control Units, etc).
Figure 2: MV Simple Radial architecture
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1.2.2 Secure MV/LV micro-grid architecture
Various structures of the MV micro-grids are possible to secure the power the cement plant. The complexity and the architecture of the micro-grid mainly depend upon: The process constraints (interruption level, time to repair, etc...) The level of availability and safety required by the application. The size of the site The potential evolution of the process and of the electrical micro-grid.
Security is given by: The redundancy of the physical support to transfer energy to the load (MV or LV), cable, transformer, etc... The potential availability of multiple energy sources (independent Utility connection, local generation capability, energy storage units, etc) Manual or Automation management of the grid to redirect the energy flow on the available path with care of the electrical network stability
The most common electrical micro-grid architectures of secured HV/MV/LV architectures for Cement applications are: Dual Power Supply architecture Open or Closed loop architecture
MV Dual power architecture The MV/LV Dual power architecture is recommended when continuous power supply must be maintained. This architecture is well adapted for simple network (less than 3 x MV/LV substations) due to the cost of the lines/cables to inter-connect the different nodes of the network. If any fault on the Grid connection or on the internal MV lines/cables occurs, the power is transfer on the alternative incoming utility feeder on the back line/cable. The associated Automation scheme for this transfer management is the ATS (Automatic Transfer Switch)
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Figure 3: MV Dual Power architecture
The MV electrical power supply safety may be ensured using two Utility MV lines or a single MV Utility line and a local MV generator.
Note: Depending of the electrical needs of the site and the required availability sub-process per sub-process, a Cement plant micro-grid may combine some Dual Power Architecture schemes (for sensitive process elements) and some Simple Radial Architecture parts. This choice is define based on the site specificities and the cement customer requirements
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MV Loop architecture The MV Loop architecture is recommended for medium and large MV/LV network (equal or greater than 3 MV/LV substations) where a high level of availability of the electrical power is required by the industrial process. This architecture provides at a reasonable cost a redundancy solution (open loop or close loop), ensuring that in case of fault on the internal MV lines/cables or substation, the Power is redirected on a safe part of the network.
Usually this architecture also integrates at substation levels (Utility grid connection and internal MV/LV) the capability to have Automatic Transfer Switch (ATS) scheme to increase power supply availability. This architecture is also adapted to potential extension (new MV/LV substations) at limited cost.
Figure 4: MV loop architecture
The MV electrical power plant safety may be done using two independent Utility MV lines or a single MV Utility line and local MV generation capability.
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1.3
Cement PMS functional elements

To perform the Power Management of the Cement micro-grid the following functions are considered: Protection of the MV & LV electrical networks Instrumentation of the Electrical network Monitoring and control of the Cement plant primary equipments (MV and LV) including all Fast Self-Healing automatic schemes Operator interface to display, set, configure and perform any real-time and post-mortem analysis of the electrical network (optional) Gateway to send and received data, measures and command from the cement plant Digital Control System
1.3.1
Protection devices
MV Utility delivery protection The protection implemented on the Utility feeder incomes are usually defined by the Utility grid code specific to each utility. This mainly applies to the protection setting and tripping characteristics which impose in case of internal Cement plan micro-grid electrical fault an immediate disconnection of the plant electrical network from the Utility grid (opening of the associated CBs). The typical protections required by Utility to protect this Utility incoming feeder are: Over-current protection phase & earth(I>, Ie>) Directional Over-current protection (Dir I>, Dir Ie>) Over and/or Under Voltage protection (U>; U<) Over and/or Under Frequency protection (f>; f<) if the plant generation can export energy to the Utility grid
Traditionally these protection relays are sealed and the setting can not be modified by the Cement plant owner.
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MV feeder protection The protection devices for the different substations are of the following types: Non Direction Over-current digital protection (I>, Ie>) Directional Over-current digital protection (Dir I>, Dir Ie>)
The choice between the two types of protection is mainly linked to the MV earthing system (isolated, direct, resistant or compensated) and to the presence and physical localization of Generator if any.
All protection devices have two groups of settings which can be switched on operator command or by electromechanical changeover switch. The different loop cells and switch are fitted with current transformers (Protection class CT) and for the Voltage Transformer (VT).
Note: Given the earth grounding by UTILITY (resonant earthed neutral system) the selectivity study may impose the replacement of the Over-current (Ie>) digital protection devices and Directional Over-current digital protection (Dir Ie>) with Sensitive Earth Fault protection devices. A voltage reference (VT) must therefore be integrated into each MV/MV substation.
Due to the reduced short circuit power in the event of autonomous operation on generator sets, the MV/LV transformer substation fuse switch cells are all been fitted with protection relays, current transformers (CT) and a trip coil to be able to: Ensure Earth protection of the transformers and between the cell and the transformer Compensate for the fuse operating for too long in the event of reduced short circuit power (operation on generator sets) which would not allow total selectivity with the corresponding loop circuit-breaker
1.3.1.1.1
Phase Over-current protection (50/51, 67)

The phase over-current protection function is three-phased current protection operating at independent time. For each threshold the instantaneous and time delay information is assign to the tripping of the CB based on external security automation schemes.
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1.3.1.1.2 Earth fault protection (50N/51N/67N)
The earth over-current protection function is based on the measurement of the zero-sequence quantities of the protected line. It is selectable between the directional and non-directional earthfault current protection function. The earth over-current protection time delay is selectable between the definite-time and all standardized time dependent characteristics (IEC curves).
MV motor protection The protection devices for the MV motors are of the following types: Over-current digital protection (I>, Ie>) Negative sequence digital protection (I2> Thermal Overload digital protection (Ith>)
All protection devices have two groups of settings which can be switched on operator command or by electromechanical changeover switch. The different MV motor Circuit-Breaker cells are fitted with current transformers (Protection class CT).
1.3.1.1.3
Phase Over-current protection (50/51)

The phase over-current protection function is three-phased current protection operating at independent time. For each threshold the instantaneous and time delay information is assign to the tripping of the CB based on external security automation schemes.
1.3.1.1.4
Earth fault protection (50N/51N)

The earth over-current protection function is based on the measurement of the zero-sequence quantities of the protected line. It is selectable between the directional and non-directional earthfault current protection function. The earth over-current protection time delay is selectable between the definite-time and all standardized time dependent characteristics (IEC curves).
1.3.1.1.5
Negative sequence (46)

2013 Schneider Electric All Rights Reserved 19
1 - Introduction
The Negative Sequence protection is based on the detection of negative sequence current to protection the MV motor against phase unbalance. This may result from unbalanced power supply, phase inversion or loss of phase or phase current unbalance. The protection threshold is assign to the tripping of the CB based on external MV motor security scheme.
1.3.1.1.6
Thermal Overload (49)

The Thermal Overload Protection protects the MV motor against thermal damage caused by overloads on machines. The thermal capacity used is calculated based on: Negative sequence current current RMS values ambient temperature (acquire by temperature sensors) The protection threshold is assign to the tripping of the CB based on external MV motor security scheme.
MV Generator protection The protection devices for the Generator and their connection on the micro-grid are of the following types: Directional Over-current digital protection (Dir I>, Dir Ie>) Under and Over Voltage protection (U>, U0>, U<, U0<) Under Frequency protection (f<)
Note: We do not describe bellow the internal Generator protection such as Active & Reactive Overpower, Neutral Voltage Displacement, Thermal Overload, etc...
All protection devices have two groups of settings which can be switched on operator command or by electromechanical changeover switch. The Generator Circuit-breakers are fitted with current transformers (Protection class CT) and for the Voltage Transformer (VT).
1.3.1.1.7
Phase Over-current protection (67)
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The Directional phase over-current protection function is three-phased current protection operating at independent time. For each threshold the instantaneous and time delay information is assign to the tripping of the CB based on external security automation schemes.
1.3.1.1.8
Earth fault protection (67N)

The Directional earth over-current protection function is based on the measurement of the zerosequence quantities of the protected line. It is selectable between the directional and nondirectional earth-fault current protection function. The earth over-current protection time delay is selectable between the definite-time and all standardized time dependent characteristics (IEC curves).
1.3.1.1.9
Under-voltage (27)
The under-voltage protection function is three-phased and associated to each MV incoming feeder. It detects the lack of voltage to enable the shedding of loads supplied by the associated MV incoming feeder (and HV/MV transformer). This protection function has two different under-voltage thresholds freely and independently settable. In order to prevent any fault in the LV circuit of the VTs impacting the under -voltage protection function or any other protection function dependant on the voltage values supp lied by the VTs, integrate the capacity to detect that type of faults and the inhibition of the associated protection functions is warranted.
1.3.1.1.10
Over-voltage (59)
The overvoltage protection function is three-phased, with two thresholds freely and independently settable, operating at independent time. This function has the purpose of detecting situations of abnormal voltage increase in the MV bus, triggering the timed trip of the incoming MV feeder circuit breaker. Overvoltage is taken into account for the inhibition of the orders to raise the automatic voltage regulator.
1.3.1.1.11
Under-frequency (81U)
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The under-frequency protection function has four to six thresholds operating at independent time, with both Instantaneous and time delay information to be available This protection level detects frequency decreases in the grid, later reporting the automation function load shedding due to lack of voltage/restoration due to voltage recovery so that selective disconnection of the substation loads can be performed.
Protection device selectivity The protection devices implemented at all levels of the MV distribution, from the MV delivery substation and GENERATOR SET MV substation to the Low voltage master distribution panels, will be chosen and set such as to ensure total selectivity.
This selectivity will be ensured irrespective of the source used: Utility delivery substation Generator sets connected to the grid (transient coupling) Generator sets in autonomous production
All types of selectivity may be used, including a combination: Current selectivity, Chronometric selectivity, Logic selectivity, Directional selectivity and differential selectivity.
The protection device relays are digital and communicating to be able to report all the information necessary to running the installations to the instrumentation and control system.
The CBs and SWs positions and control are in parallel hard wired to the Automatic control equipment (PLC) to accelerate the command and avoid any communication failure dependency.
The protection device relays have several trip thresholds, each corresponding to an available power supply mode and short circuit power. There is at least one threshold corresponding to operation on the MV network and one threshold corresponding to operation on generator sets.
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The threshold and delay time setting for each protection device depends on the protection drawing resulting from the execution studies and the characteristics of the equipment selected to conduct the work (MV cells, transformers, generator sets, cable laying methods, etc.).
The selectivity study is based on the characteristics of the UTILITY earthing arrangement and the Cement facility standard protection device performance selectivity requirements.
1.3.2
Fault Passage Indicator

The Fault Passage Indicator may be used over the Cement Plant micro-grid to provide an indication of the electrical fault localization. Due to their characteristics, the FPI do not control Circuit Breaker (tripping action on fault), they just give indication of the fault (local signal or remote information) and the fault isolation action has to be done manually by an Operator action or by the nearest protection + Circuit breaker.
The Cement plant design will define if the use of FPI is compatible with the expected Outage management
1.3.3
Measurement & Power meter devices

All needed measures and quality data can be acquired by dedicated devices (measurement units or power meters) or via the protection relays as long as the precision reaches the application expectations.
Measurement devices The measure units provide true rms metered values. Information provided include frequency, temperature, current, demand current, voltage, real power, reactive power, apparent power, demand power, predicted demand power, power factor, accumulated energy, accumulated reactive energy, total harmonic distortion (THD) of each current and voltage, and K-factor of each current.
The Circuit Monitors shall accept inputs from industry standard instrument transformers (120 VAC secondary PTs and 5 A secondary CTs). Connection to 480Y/277 VAC circuits shall be possible without use of PTs
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Power meters The category of the metering device generally depends on where it is installed in the electrical network: Metering devices installed at the MV substations allow: o o o Analysis of cement plant power demand (load profile) and peak demand (value and duration) Verification of energy bills and penalties (reactive consumption and overload) Analysis of power quality such as harmonic distortion.
Metering devices installed LV switchboard feeder (or on MV side of MV/LV transformer) allow: o o Sub-metering (consumption monitoring of plant areas or processes) for cost allocation Consumption monitoring for plant utilities such as Air Handling Units, boilers, chillers or other major energy usages for: Energy usage analysis Plant benchmarking Standards or certifications Plant control optimization
Metering devices installed closest to the point of consumption allow: o o Energy use breakdowns Energy consumption monitoring for: o Energy usage analysis Building management optimization The number of operating hours of a machine or motor.
1.3.3.1
Primary equipment control & monitoring

Circuit breaker monitoring The Cement Power Management System shall: Count the number of Circuit Breaker operation, Evaluate the electrical wear based on I t
2
Evaluate an excessive operating time.
Each of the measurement shall trigger an alarm on the Operator local HMI/SCADA.
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Trip circuit supervision A trip circuit supervision per circuit breaker is needed to continuously monitor the trip circuit wiring continuity whatever the position of the circuit breaker poles. Instrument transformer supervision Supervision of CT and VT is necessary done in order to detect the failure of one or more phases. The CT supervision shall use the zero sequence current. The VT supervision shall discriminate between the fuse failure and the circuit being dead. It shall be based on the negative phase sequence voltage.
MV Switchgear management
1.3.3.1.1
Circuit breakers
The following information is issued from the HV and MV circuit breakers for the control functions and interlock management: Status of the On / Off / Unknown/Invalid component; SF6 gas pressure control (SF6 Gas Leak Alarm level 1, and SF6 Gas Leak Alarm level 2); Rearming of the spring of the circuit breakers mechanical control; Supervision of switching at the command circuits; Failure in the open command circuit.
1.3.3.1.2
Circuit breaker positions

The position of the HV or MV CB (OPEN/CLOSE) is provided directly by auxiliary connections of the CB. If the circuit breaker switched to the Tripped position and has opening or closure permission, it will be possible to operate it by a voluntary order (issued locally or remotely). In this case, automatic closure orders generated by the automation functions will be inhibited.
1.3.3.1.3
SF6 gas pressure control

When SF6 Circuit breakers are used, the amount of SF6 gas contained in the circuit breakers must be controlled based on the information provided by the SF6 gas leak detection system: SF6 Gas Leak Alarm, Level 1 all the operating characteristic of the circuit breaker must also be ensured and an alarm signal must be generated and logged; SF6 Gas Leak Alarm, Level 2 must immediately trip the circuit breaker and interlock the closure orders.
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1.3.3.1.4 Vacuum pressure control
When Vacuum Circuit breaker are used, the vacuumness must be controlled based on the information provided by the Vacuum Leak detection system: Vacuum Leak Alarm, Level 1 all the operating characteristic of the circuit breaker must also be ensured and an alarm signal must be generated and logged; Vacuum Leak Alarm, Level 2 must immediately trip the circuit breaker and interlock the closure orders.
1.3.3.1.5
Switching device control

The operation of a CB is supervised after an Open or Close command has been ordered. If the new position information is received after a pre-defined time, it can be consider as an indication of a potential degradation of the switching device performance. For each switching device (HV or MV) based on the manufacturer characteristics, a maximum time delay between the order acknowledgment and new position is defined by the user. If this time delay is crossed an Alarm is generated to inform the operator.
1.3.3.1.6
MV CB Internal arc fault

The Armored Metallic Switchboard of the MV circuit breakers and switches is designed to avoid that any electric arc in a given compartment (due to the presence of faults in the materials composing it, anomalous operating conditions and also as a result of false switching operations) do not spread to other MV CB or SW compartments and do not compromise the safety of any person present at the site. To ensure these characteristics, Each MV CB or SW integrates a Protection System that monitors the Internal Arc Flash, consisting of light-detecting optical sensors and default current measurement control units. These protection systems will eliminate in less than 10ms the internal arc fault by tripping the faulty CB(s) and informed all equipments directly or indirectly to the faulty CB or SW.
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1.3.4 Control devices
The control of the micro-grid MV primary equipment is done via dedicated IED (RTU/PLC). This RTU/PLC ensures the following functions: Communication on the Power Management System Concentration of data received via the local communication from the various protection, measurement devices and power meters Execution of the primary devices (CB, SW) order (Open or Close) Distributed Automatic schemes (MV micro-grid Self-healing, MV generator management) IEC61131-3 based. Operational mode management.
The RTU/PLC must have the capability to integrate: All needed type of Logic Input boards (DIs), Logic Output boards (DOs), Analogue Input boards (AIs), Analogue Output boards (AOs) to be connected to the Electrical process Legacy & Ethernet communication for upstream and downstream communications Local display and management capabilities for the controlled substation and primary equipment Local recording and archiving (Event, Measure, Alarm) Fully comply with Environmental conditions of MV electrical application (IEC standards)
Note: the control of MV primary equipment is traditionally done using double point control (wired or via communication) with 1 signal for Open control and 1 signal for Close control). In this case the associated position is defined suing Double point status (wired or via communication).
1.3.5
Communication network
ETHERNET architectures Ethernet network can be over Optical Fiber and/or Twisted pair. With or without Redundancy solutions, Ethernet Network Redundancy is managed through Ring architecture or Redundant Star architecture. The redundancy management standard selected must be in line with the expected performances and standard constraint; typically the use of RSTP with IEC61850 GOOSE is not possible as the IEC standard requires no interruption greater than 4 ms (RSTP is always greater than 200ms).
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Ethernet IEC 61850 IEC 61850 is the IEC standard for Electrical applications based on Ethernet and provides fast peer-to-peer and self-descriptive communication between IEDs... It includes general aspects (project management, substation functions, etc.), detailed data model, configuration language and conformance tests. The ETHERNET IEC 61850 communication can be single or fully redundant to match the project required availability level.
1.3.6
Operator control & monitoring HMI/SCADA

The local Operator HMI/SCADA application (local operator HMI) provides the local operator all necessary views and tools to Supervise, Control, Archive and Maintain the entire HV, MV & LV Cement plant micro-grid.
Main functions The local HMI/SCADA application shall provide the operator supervision, control, archive and maintenance functions.
1.3.6.1.1
Supervision
Display of the topological view of single line diagrams: general overview, voltage level view, detailed bay view. This shall include the position of the switchgear, the measurement values, operation counters, graphical alarm representation, etc... Spontaneous changes of a state, typically opening of a circuit breaker from a protection, shall have a specific color code. Display in dedicated view the various load shedding prioritization table Display the alarm list and enable acknowledgement and clearance. Display the sequence of event list. Display curves, either real time or based on archived. Invalid information shall be clearly marked. Curves shall manage the time shifts. Display disturbance and power quality files. Printing of sequence of event list, hardcopy and reports. The reports shall be freely configurable.
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1.3.6.1.2
Control
Control of the primary devices, with dedicated pop-up windows enabling select before execute and direct execute sequences, the use of synchro-check for circuit breaker and interlocking forcing for switchgear (see below). Forcing, substitution or suppression of information in order to cope with incorrect sensor delivery. Control of the IED status: maintenance or run mode.
1.3.6.1.3

Archive
Storage of events, measurements, disturbance and power quality events. Storage of all the system databases and component documentation. The local archiving function is associated to a local printer to perform the legal Sequence Of Event (SOE) recording with for each event data the complete information including the event status, the time stamped at 1ms.
1.3.6.1.4

Maintenance
System database design and modification. IED setting & database download. Display of the system status, including the state of each high level component (RTU, HMI/SCADA, GTW, IED) and detail of it Fast Self Healing application communication Ethernet network status and fault localization
HMI/SCADA General look and feel The local HMI/SCADA application displays: Single line diagrams, busbar or line sections between all switching devices could be colored. To distinguish the different states of a busbar or line section the following characteristic are used: o o o o energized section de-energized section undefined section earthen section background and edge in primary color background empty, edge in primary color background crosshatched, edge in primary color background yellow, edge green
The application alarms classified by importance and time The event list classified by time and origin
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Control procedure A control shall be executed in Select Before Operate (SBO) or Direct Execute (DE). A control acknowledgement pop-up is used to display negative control acknowledgement and to allow users with appropriate rights to by-pass the interlocking or manual lock control verification. In this case, the user can visualize the interlocking equation and get the reason of the control rejection.
Several parameters, defined during the configuration process of the substation, shall filter the control: Inter-control delay (time between two sequence in the same device) Automation running for the micro-grid, a dedicated substation or a device Synchro-check Uniqueness control : only one control at a time for the device
Alarm management Alarms shall be generated by a change of state of a digital point, a measurement threshold violation or a system internal fault (e.g.: loss of communication, IED faulty). Alarms shall be defined as immediate or differed (with an associated user-selectable delay) and can have an associated audible alarm. The audible alarm could also being immediate or differed. Alarms shall be associated to each state of event (open, close, jammed...) or to each a measurement threshold (in case of violation) and may have a different gravity level (0 to 5).
Three types of alarm management shall be available and are user-selectable during configuration process: State basis alarm management: one alarm for each state is displayed Gravity level basis alarm management: only one alarm for each gravity level is displayed. The previous one is replaced by the current one with same gravity level Data basis alarm management: only the last alarm is displayed: the previous one is replaced by the current one
The alarms shall be displayed via the local substation HMI using dedicated windows displaying: the chronologically sorted list of the alarms (with additional sorting criteria as geographic or functional)
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the last N alarms (N being user-selectable during configuration phase) with different colors for each line of the previous lists, depending on the alarm state graphic pictures defined during configuration phase, displayed in the different views, which can be associated to the presence and the states of alarms for a device, for a bay, for a voltage area, for the whole substation, etc.
An alarm shall be acknowledged by an operator, Independently of the alarm acknowledgement, the audible annunciation shall be acknowledged by an operator or automatically after a userselectable delay An alarm shall be cleared only if the reason of its apparition disappear (becomes inactive) and was acknowledged by an operator. An alarm shall also be configured as to be cleared automatically when it becomes inactive and is acknowledged.
Sequence of events The sequence of events is printed and archived on the PC hard disk. It contains the following information: TimeStamp and synchronization status (the synchronized / not synchronized) Origin - substation name, voltage level name, bay name, module name ObjectName - Information name
Object Message - Information resulting state.
Archiving The measures and associated mean values are archived in the local substation HMI database in the following tables: Daily table for the mean values of the day. Monthly table for the minimum, maximum, mean and sum values, computed at a reference time (configurable) of a day. Yearly table for the minimum, maximum, mean and sum values, computed at a reference time (configurable) of a month.
User rights management Each local HMI/SCADA application user is defined with a log-in, a password and a profile. A profile is an ensemble of user rights which define permission for all kind actions. User rights are the rights related to a kind action. User rights and user profiles are defined during database configuration and cant be modified online. Users are defined on line and can be modified.
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The following user rights are available: General rights including Administrator rights, View rights: up to 32 levels for access to a specific mimic. These rights are defined on a per mimic basis, Control rights: up to 32 levels for controlling & locking devices, Acknowledgement rights: up to 32 levels for individual alarm acknowledgement and clearing.
These user rights are assigned to user profiles. Up to 20 user profiles can be defined during the configuration phase.
1.3.7
Gateway for the Cement Plant DCS

All necessary information related to the MV micro-grid status and management must be communicate to the Cement plant DCS. The choice of these information is defined by each Cement plant manager based on it
1.4
Cement plant Power Management

To optimize the Power Management in the Cement plant various elements may be implemented but the two simplest able to reduce in case of MV Electrical fault the impact and consequences on the Cement production are: The MV Fast Self Healing Automatic Scheme, The MV Automatic Transfer Switch The MV Load Shedding and Load Restore cadenced Scheme
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1.4.1 Cement plant microgrid
For this project the Cement plant microgrid considered is has mention before a MV ring network with 1 Main Utility grid MV substation (1 MV incomer) 1 MV Generator substation (1 MV incomer) 1 MV/LV Substation (Grinding SS) 1 MV/LV Substation (Kiln SS) 1 MV/LV Substation (Cooler SS) 1 MV/LV Substation (Mill SS)
Figure 5: Cement plant MV ring network
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1.4.2 MV Fast Self-Healing
The aim of the Fast Self-Healing automatic scheme is to isolate any faulty part of a ring micro-grid and repower the rest of the valid elements in the shortest time without any operator action. The MV ring network is based on Utility delivery substation with one or more MV incomers (alternative could be the use of a local generation power capability) and an MV ring network with various MV/LV substations. In normal condition the ring is open at a predefined point (in the figure below on A6). The different MV switching devices can be Circuit Breakers (CB) or Motorized Disconnectors (SW).
The Utility incomer(s) is equipped with Protection relays (as define by the local Utility grid-code). The other micro-grid CB or SW are detecting electrical fault using Protection relay or Fault Passage Indicators (FPI).
Self-healing sequence As stated, in normal condition the MV ring is open on B6. All other CBs/SWs are closed. MV Grid incomer & MV generator CBs are equipped with protection relays (typically Overcurrent I>)
1. If a fault appears on the Cement plan internal MV network (between Substation 1 and 2), the MV Grid incomer protection will detect it and trip the associated CB. All Substations and associated LV networks no longer powered. 2. The protection relays/Fault Passage Indicators on A0, A2 & A3 detected the fault while A4, A5 and A6 dont. 3. The Self-healing Automatic scheme defined based on the Normal condition topology that the fault is between A3 and A4 (electrical topology is known by all substation MiCOM C264 RTUs/PLCs. These two CBs/SWs are opened by the FSH automatic scheme (the faulty section is now isolated). 4. Then the FSH automatic scheme will close MV Grid incomer to repower Grinding, Cooler and Mill substations. 5. Finally, the FSH will close A6 to repower Kiln substation.
Depending of the used technology (primary switch devices), the complete cycle may be executed in less than 500ms (CB opening time included) After repair of the faulty element, manually or automatically, the Normal scheme is rebuild with the open point on A6 (reclosing of A3 & A4 and opening of A6)
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Note: Depending of the Utility Grid code, the initial fault may force the opening of the MV Utility incomer CB. This imposes an action on MV Generator also to repower substations 4 and 5. This is a typical adjustment of the FSH Automatic scheme
Self-healing sequence Generator connection If the electrical fault occurs at the Utility Grid connection (Busbar or Incomer) the connection to the grid could not be rebuild. The use of an alternative local power source (MV Generator or MV Power storage unit) is needed to maintain the Cement plant running. The sequence is similar to the one describe previously except that the complete Cement plant micro-grid will be isolated from the grid and act as an Islanded micro-grid.
Note: Depending of the Utility and National laws and registration, this mode may impose to have in complement a internal dedicated MV Earth point to maintain the safety and security.
1.4.3
MV Automatic Transfer Switch

The Automatic Transfer Switch function is essential for all critical MV or LV applications when the power can not be cut off for a certain time (> 5s). To avoid this risk, the solution is to have at least 2 potential sources available to be connected to the sensitive part of the network and be able on a confirmed voltage drop to switch from one source to the other. Two types of ATS exist: The ATS with a short black-out. During the ATS sequence, for a short time a black-out is create between the 2 source switches (no parallel management) The ATS without black-out. During the ATS sequence, for a short time the 2 sources run in parallel. This imposes a perfect synchronism (voltage & phase) between the two sources
The ATS Automatic scheme permanently considers the following information before starting any switch: The availability and the position of all involved switching devices (CB, IS or SW), The different voltage and frequency levels and values The voltage phases of each power sources (in case of parallel management)
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1.4.3.1.1 ATS for substation without busbar coupling
The MV substation is based on two incoming feeder connected to two independent power sources (could be grid connection or Generation plant) and the MV busbar is without isolator (no capability to separate the busbar in two half sections). This scheme imposes that in Normal condition only one incomer powers the MV busbar and the outgoing feeders.
Figure 6: MV substation with 1 Busbar
1. If a power failure is detected on the main source (A source) via a confirmed voltage drop, the associated CB or SW is open by the ATS (or by the protection relay if any) 2. The ATS check the coherency of the needed data (CB and SW position, availability of the B source voltage, completion of the voltage and frequency ranges, no fault on the outgoing feeders and associated networks) 3. The ATS send an order to all Outgoing Feeders CB or SW to open them one by one. 4. The ATS close the CB or SW associated to B source to repower the busbar 5. The outgoing feeder CBs/SWs that were before the transfer closed are reclosed, the one that were open remains open. This reclosing action is done one by one based on a pre-defined sequence.
Note: If MV motors or large number of LV motors are connected on the MV busbar, a fast reconnection may create motor destruction. This comes from phase non-synchronization between the motors and the power source which potentially create transitory or sub-transitory electrical and mechanical events. To avoid such problem, the ATS will imposed a pre-define black-out time (between 200ms and 1s depending of the motor size and number) to ensure that the remaining busbar voltage value is bellow 25% of the nominal value. Alternative is to have a Minimum Voltage protection relay (27R) which will block the ATS.
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1.4.3.1.2 ATS for substation with busbar isolator
The MV substation is based on two incoming feeder connected to two independent power sources (could be grid connection or Generation plant) and the MV busbar is sectionalized in two half parts by an isolator.
Figure 7: MV substation with 2 x Busbar

In Normal condition, the isolator is open and each busbar section is connected to each A or B sources. 1. If a power failure is detected on the one of the sources (A source or B source) via a confirmed voltage drop, the associated CB or SW is open by the ATS (or by the protection relay if any). 2. The ATS check the coherency of the needed data (CB and SW position, availability of the B source voltage, completion of the voltage and frequency ranges, no fault on the outgoing feeders and associated networks) 3. The ATS send an order to all Outgoing Feeders CB or SW of the busbar section to open them one by one. 4. The ATS close the busbar isolator to repower the busbar section 5. The outgoing feeder CBs/SWs that were before the transfer closed are reclosed, the one that were open remains open. This reclosing action is done one by one based on a pre-defined sequence. The ATS can run between: 2 Utility grid feeders connected in the same MV substation, 2 Utility grid feeders connected in two independent MV substations, 1 Utility grid feeder and 1 local MV Generator (connected on not in the same MV substations
Note: If MV motors or large number of LV motors are connected on the busbar section, a fast reconnection may create motor destruction. This comes from phase non-synchronization between the motors and the power source which potentially create transitory or sub-transitory electrical and mechanical events. To avoid such problem, the ATS will impose a pre-define black-out time (between200ms and 1s depending of the motor size and number) to ensure that the remaining busbar voltage value is below 25% of the nominal value. Alternative is to have a Minimum Voltage protection relay (27R) which will block the ATS.
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1.4.4
MV cadenced Load Shedding & Load Restore

The MV cadenced load shedding & load restore Function is typically provided in Cement plant electrical power systems to overcome transient instability conditions due to unbalance condition between the load consumptions and the local generation or power line capabilities after a Fast Self-Healing scheme. A Loss of generation or grid fault creates an immediate instability condition which has a direct impact to process rotating equipment (such as turbines/generators, pumps, fans, compressors and motors, etc.). After the Fast Self Healing sequence, the brutal reconnection of all loads may create instability over the network and inrush currents when all rotating machines try to reaccelerate. The various motors (MV or LV) due to the loss of their power may create on the various MV busbar voltages which blocked the voltage based protection functions. When the Fast Self Healing sequence is initiated, the Load Shedding module will memorized the position of the various MV CBs and automatically open all MV CBs to force the MV busbar value to zero.
The operator can manually via the local HMI/SCADA dedicate view, enable or disable the Load Shedding function.
After the Load Shedding module execution, the Load Restore Automatic Scheme will automatically reclose the various load CBs based on their position before the fault (memorized status before the LS trigger condition). This reconnection is done as soon as the Power source value is available and stable. The repower order is based on the priority table defined by the Operator.
The operator can manually via the local HMI/SCADA dedicated view, modify the Load Restore priorities based on the Cement plant process after the Load Shedding.
The Operator may also using the local HMI/SCADA dedicated view, do manually the Load Restore program based on the Cement plant process after the Load Shedding.
Note: The Load Restore module integrates a protection against the Motor Starting inrush and ensures that any new connection will not create instability of the micro-grid.
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2.
Selection
This chapter presents the choices made for the hardware and software of the project developed for this document.
The PACiS Cement PMS solution integrated all necessary elements (IEDs, Software, Engineering) to achieve an optimized management of the cement plant HV/MV & LV micro-grid. This includes as main features: MV & LV protection relays or MV fault detector located in the various substation of the micro-grid (measurement values can also been acquired by the relays with their sensor precision), Automation and control units located in the main substations of the micro-grid, A communication network inside each substation and between them, Gateway(s) to Cement plant Digital Control System or Process Control System, A dedicated HMI/SCADA application(option), for local display, control, monitoring and setting of the
The Configuration and setting tools needed.
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Figure 8: Cement plant MV Power Management Solution
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2
2.1.1
Hardware
The MV protection relays
The choice of the MV protection relay to be used in the PACiS Fast Self Healing application has to be defined between the two main ranges of the Schneider Electric catalogue: Sepam relays MiCOM P relays
Based on the typical Cement Plant required protection function, for the micro-grid the selected protection models are:
MiCOM P relays o o o MiCOM P111 (MV feeder) MiCOM P211 (MV Motor) MiCOM P123 (Utility incomer)
Sepam relays o o o Sepam S24(MV feeder) Sepam M24 (MV Motor) Sepam S42 (Utility incomer)
2.1.2
Fault Position Indicator

For the present project, the choice of the project is not to propose a solution using FPI. This will be part of a later evolution
2.1.3
RTU/PLC
MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC with highly integrated design and multiple capabilities is envisioned to meet the changing supervisory control and digital substation control system needs in the power process environment. It provides flexible, scalable and reliable integration of control, monitoring; metering, power quality, fault recording and automation functions.
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MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC acquires and processes digital and analogue inputs and outputs; it performs local automation and also works as a distributed I/O module taking part of the global automation. It retrieves data from legacy and third party devices such as MV & LV relays, IEDs and act as a gateway between the LAN upper and lower networks between multiple standards communication protocols. It permits reduce system management costs.
MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC is natively design to be fully IEC61850 compatible in the communication aspect (Ethernet port) and also regarding it configuration and management. All Setting and configuration of the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC are based on the IEC61850 SCL description and format
Figure 9: MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC

A serial printer can be directly connected to one of the four serial port and print following the configuration of the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC all change of states with their time stamped at 1ms information.
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2.1.4
Metering units
For the present project, the choice of the project is to use for the MV element directly the measurement and disturbance elements issued by the MiCOM or Sepam protection relays. Integration of Power Meter units will be part of a future solution upgrade using the Ethernet or Legacy communication network.
2.1.5
Ethernet switches
The choice of the project is to maximize the integration of Ethernet switches embedded in the MiCOM C264 (SWR board). For the Gateway and local HMI/SCADA PC, a PCI board is available with the same characteristics (MiCOM H115). If necessary to connect any external Ethernet tool, free Ethernet port will be provide at MiCOM C264 level and HMI/SCADA PC level.
2.2
Software
This section describes the software selected for this project and the minimum recommended system requirements.
2.2.1
PACiS System
The global solution describes in this project is based on PACiS System. To ensure coherency and consistency of the various elements part of PACiS, a global version is defined
Data Version Operating system PACiS V4.x Microsoft XP/7
Description
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2.2.2
PACiS System Configuration Editor

PACiS SCE is used for the configuration of the PACiS application and all elements part of the application as defined by the IEC61850. The table below shows the data for this software.
Data Version Operating system
Description PACiS SCE V4.x Microsoft XP/7
2.2.3
PACiS System Maintenance Tool

PACiS SMT is used for the Maintenance of the PACiS application and all elements part of the application as defined by the IEC61850. The table below shows the data for this software.
Data Version Operating system
Description PACiS SMT V4.x Microsoft XP/7
2.2.4
Local HMI/SCADA
The Local HMI/SCADA used in this project is based on the one validated with the referenced PACiS System version. The table below shows the data for this software.
Data Version Operating system PACiS HMI Microsoft XP/7
Description
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Design
This chapter describes how the architecture and application are designed for the purpose of this document.
3.1
Architecture of the solution

PACiS offers a flexible answer for electrical micro-grid Protection, Automation, Control and Monitoring requirements. PACiS is designed for new and retrofit application cases with dedicated features enabling an easy system extension. PACiS is based on a unique configurable architecture, in term of functions, performances and physical distribution within one or several substations.
The PACiS System architecture is based on a micro-grid IEC61850 communication Bus to which is connected equipments used for the customer solution. These equipments are: the Computers MiCOM C264, the local HMI/SCADA Operator Workstation.
The Communication network is based on the IEC61850 protocol, over an Ethernet / TCP-IP network. Additional busses (called legacy busses) are also available in the PACiS System architectures.
The standard PACiS solution is based on Schneider Electric range elements: MiCOM : o o o rack-based for MiCOM C264 rack-based for all MiCOM Px10 MiCOM A for PC-based GTW
Sepam : o Rack-based for all Sepam
And third party devices: PC for the local HMI/SCADA: Printer for the SOE PC or laptop for the Engineering tools
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The typical PACiS architecture based on Schneider Electric elements ensures: Maximize the functional integration through fast exchanges between devices (10/100 Mbps) Allow a flexible distribution inside or between substations integrate third party devices within the Digital Control System of the substation
PACiS offers connection with legacy communication networks (RS485, optical) in order to fully reuse past investments with the new generation.
A full set of engineering tools used for the configuration, installation commissioning and maintenance of PACiS complement the solution.
The purpose of the Cement plant Fast Self-Healing solution is to propose a high level of safety. The distributed architecture is the one which ensures the high flexibility and combines with a redundant ring Ethernet network provides the Cement plant the highest Power supply availability.
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Figure 11: System architecture for Cement plant Power Management (Example)
3.2
The Power supply

All IEDs (Sepam and MiCOM) part of this application is powered by a secured DC power supply. Voltage range can be chosen between the standard values: 24 Vdc, 30Vdc, 48Vdc, 60Vdc.
The Local HMI/SCADA PC and the Gateway are powered by a secured AC power supply. Voltage range can be chosen between the standard values: 110 Vac 50 or 60Hz 220 Vac 50 or 60Hz
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3.3
The communication network

The Cement plant Fast Self-Healing application network is based on two layers: The Physical support for the communication The protocol used to exchange data between the IED and perform the project functions
The main constraints considered to choose the Communication protocol for the Cement Plant Fast Self-Healing applications are: Standardized protocol (IEEE or IEC) and fully supported world-wide Structured model for all application data Dedicated for Electrical application Long-term stability and back-compatibility Standard communication link redundancy management
The PACiS system is based on a standard Ethernet communication network and the IEC 61850 standard. All devices are connected onto this network (SBUS) using Switches.
3.3.1
IEC61850 network
IEC61850 is an object-oriented communication language centered around automation and protection aspects inside high and medium voltage substations; the standards guiding principle of using modeling and common services to reduce technical functions into logical pieces (logical nodes) has facilitated its branching out into many electrical infrastructure areas and introducing a common language which can be used to exchange information which is manufacturer independent.
IEC61850 seeks a unified approach, presenting a suite of protocols that are designed to multitask efficiently and provide support for modern engineering workflows in the design, deployment and operation of electrical utility systems
IEC61850 also provides other unique technical benefits which are superior to traditional communication protocols. These include: File based setup to allow archiving, maintenance and the potential for high-level engineering tools to enable repeatability and ease of deployment
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Unified modeling of functions and a common dictionary of terms to provide vendor neutrality and support a strong basis for extension and expansion of the standard in the future Self-description services for automated discovery and potential for system validation at the time of commissioning
IEC61850 standardized abstract services to exchange data between the IEDs Read: reading data such as the value of an attribute Write: for example writing the value of a configuration attribute Control: controlling switching devices and other controllable objects using standardized methods such as select before operate or direct operate Reporting: for example, event driven reporting after value changes Logging: the local storage of time-stamped events or other historical data Get directory: in other words, to read out the data model (important part of self-description) File transfer: for configuration, disturbance recording or historical data GOOSE: GOOSE is the acronym for Generic Object Oriented System Event and is used for fast sending of time critical information. A single GOOSE message can be sent by an IED and then read and used by several IEDs. GOOSE can be used for several purposes including: Tripping of switchgear Starting of disturbance recorder Providing position indication for interlocking
3.3.2
Optical Multi-mode Fiber for Ethernet network communication

The optical fiber must complain the following characteristics: Multi-mode fiber, 62.5/125m (50/125m could be used); Glass fiber ST male connectors at each end.
The global optical attenuation must be equal or bellow 8dB. Typical values: 0,8dB per connection 1dB per km In complement the maximal distance between two switches must be equal or lower than 2 km.
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3.3.3
Ethernet redundancy management

As the classical Ethernet basic redundancy standard (RSTP) is not compatible with the IEC61850 standard and the expected performances (RSTP redundancy time is always greater than 200ms), the redundancy of the Ethernet network is based on a proprietary Schneider solution using a ring network topology with optical multi-mode links and switches providing a complete and secure solution against any failure of the Ethernet network elements.
With the SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Automation redundant ring without or with ring default the all switch on the ring sees no difference in the advance of the frame; no reset switch, no relearning for the MAC address.
Primary fiber
10
11
switch RP A ES
switch EP B RS
switch
switch
switch
Secondary fiber
Figure 12: Nominal redundant Ethernet ring architecture

The typical redundancy time of the SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC solution is 22 s with an Ethernet 100Mbps FO network, fully compatible with the no-data-lost principle which requires less than 1 ms.
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Primary fiber
10
11
switch RP A ES
switch EP B RS
switch
switch
switch
Secondary fiber
Figure 13: Ethernet ring architecture after failure
Schneider-Electric Ethernet switches fully fit with the IEC/ANSI standards applicable for Electrical installation environment.
The failure of the Ethernet network is managed using watch-dog contact in any of the embedded switch and these are wired on the associated IED mainly MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC for Alarming and Archiving in the Sequence Of Event database.
3.4
3.4.1
The Time Management

The Time Synchronization
For maximum time accuracy (1ms), all project devices connected with the Ethernet network are be synchronized from a dedicated SNTP server connected on the Ethernet IEC61850 network. The IED connected on MODBUS legacy network are synchronized by the MiCOM C264RTU/PLC they are connected on.
3.4.2
The Time-Synchronization device

The System time-synchronization is done by a GPS clock connected one of the MiCOM C264 acting as a SNTP server for all Ethernet IEDs. The GPS clock used in the Cement Plant project is a HOPF 6870 with an external antenna. The Power supply of the HOPF clock is 220 Vac.
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3.4.3
The Time Distribution

PACiS solution uses time stamping at source in order to achieve the required accuracy. This means that a reference time is dispatched to any IED on Ethernet. Changes in state are then directly time-stamped by the different IEDs. Consequently the system uses its communications networks to synchronize the different system devices to a reference time source thus eliminating the need for a dedicated time distribution system.
3.5
3.5.1
The IEDs
MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC
MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC is available in three types of panel or rack mounting (40TE /60 TE, 84TE) with graphical detachable display. Height: 4 U (177mm), Depth: 190mm, Width: 40/60/82 TE ( 200, 300, 409mm), Metallic Case, degree of protection: IP52 in standard
The MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC can be equipped with a simple LED front panel or with a graphical display front panel which allows supervision, control and maintenance of the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC and the managed primary equipments. For the present Cement Plant MV power Management project, the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC chosen is based on: Model MiCOM C264 C o o o o Height: 4 U (177mm), Depth: 190mm, Width: 40 TE ( 200mm), Metallic Case, degree of protection: IP52 in standard
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Figure 14: MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC front and rear views
The Power supply of the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC and I/O boards is 48 Vdc
MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC Boards The following boards can be integrated inside the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC rack based on the customer application needs and the configuration elements The MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC modularity depends of the case size (40, 60 or 82TE): MiCOM C264 40TE : 6 available slots for I/O boards (DIU, AIU, DOU or CCU200) or Ethernet switch boards (SWR or SWD), MiCOM C264 60TE : 10 available slots for I/O boards (DIU200, DIU210, DIU220, AIU201, AIU210, AIU211, DOU200 or CCU200) or switch boards (SWU20x or SWR2xx or SWD2xx), MiCOM C264 82TE: 15 available slots for I/O boards (DIU200, DIU210, DIU220, AIU201, AIU210, AIU211, DOU200 or CCU200) or switch boards (SWU20x or SWR2xx or SWD2xx).
The available Inputs and Outputs board for the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC are: BIU: Basic Interface Unit. This board includes the auxiliary power supply converter, the watchdog relay, 2 digital outputs/2 digital inputs for computer redundancy and 2 insulated RS485/RS232 interface, DIU: Digital Inputs Unit each with 16 digital inputs, DOU: Digital Outputs Unit each with 10 digital outputs for alarms, CCU: Circuit breaker Control Unit each with 8 digital inputs and 4 digital outputs, AIU: Analogue Input Unit each with 8 analogue inputs direct current, AOU: Analogue Output Unit each with 8 analogue outputs, SWR: Ethernet SWitch board for Redundant Ethernet ring with 4 electrical links and 2 optical links for the redundant ring,
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TMU: Transducerless Measurements Unit board for direct CT/VT measuring acquisition with 4 CT and 5 VT
For the present Cement Plant MV Power Management project, the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC chosen boards are: BIU 48Vdc SWR Ethernet redundant ring switch (4 optical fibers) + 4 copper ports DIU 48Vdc (16 Logic Inputs) DOU 48 Vdc (10 Logic outputs) AIU (8 Analogue inputs)
MiCOM C264 WEB server The MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC includes a WEB server able to provide all monitoring and maintenance data using a standard WEB tool (such Internet Explorer or Firefox). This access is password protected.
Figure 15: MiCOM C264 WEB page 3.5.2 Protection relays

The Protection relays used in this Cement plant Fast self-healing project are from 3 types:
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MiCOM P111 or Sepam S24 as MV feeder OC protection relay install in all MV feeders of the site MiCOM P123 or Sepam S42 as MV feeder OC protection installed in the Utility MV feeder incomer and in the Generator feeder MiCOM P211 or Sepam M20 as MV Motor protection associated to the MV motors (Grinding & Cooler SS)
All protection relays key-information are hard-wired on their relevant Substation MiCOM C264RTU to reduce Self-healing time.
MiCOM P 111 The MiCOM P 111 is a universal MV protection - three phase and earth overcurrent protection relay (50,50N, 51, 51N, 38), control and monitoring IED for industrial application. The MiCOM P 111 is housed in a 35mm DIN case for rail mounting (panel) or rack mounting.
The MiCOM P 111 provides the following functions:
1, 2, or 3-phase operation arrangement Protection functions

o o o o o Phase and earth overcurrent (50/51/50N/51N) Breaker failure detection (50BF) Negative phase sequence overcurrent (46) Autorecloser (79) Output relay latching (86)
2 setting groups, selected from the relay menu, binary input or system True RMS phase current value measurement within a frequency range from 10Hz to 1000Hz Earth fault current value measurement within a frequency range from 40Hz to 70Hz 4 digit LED display 5 button keypad to input settings and configure the relay Fault record for the 3 most recent trips
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Figure 16: MiCOM P111 Universal protection

The Power supply of the MiCOM P111 and I/O boards in the Cement plant project is 48 Vdc. MiCOM P211 The MiCOM P211 relay is designed for MV & LV motor supervision, protection and control applications. The MiCOM P 211 is housed in a 35mm DIN case for rail mounting (panel) or rack mounting. The MiCOM P 211 provides the following functions:
1, 2, or 3-phase operation arrangement Protection functions

o Phase and earth overcurrent (50/51/50N/51N)
o o
o o o o o o o
Breaker failure detection (50BF)

Number of starts limitation (66) Lost of Load/Undercurrent (37) Unbalance (46) Thermal overload (49) Start/Stalled protection (48) Speed switch (14) PTC input (38) Output relay latching (86)
2 setting groups, selected from the relay menu, binary input or system True RMS phase current value measurement within a frequency range from 10Hz to 1000Hz Earth fault current value measurement within a frequency range from 40Hz to 70Hz 4 digit LED display 5 button keypad to input settings and configure the relay
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Fault record for the 3 most recent trips
Figure 17: MiCOM P211 Universal protection
The Power supply of the MiCOM P211 and I/O boards in the Cement plant project is 48 Vdc. MiCOM P123 The MiCOM P123 is a Utility protection - three phase and earth over-current protection relay (50,50N, 51, 51N), control and monitoring IED compliant with various Utility Grid codes. The MiCOM P123 is housed in a 4U Metal case, 20TE large for rack mounting and can be sealed with a restricted access to protection function to cope with the Utility security and safety requirements.
The MiCOM P123 provides the following functions:

Universal power supply (24-250Vdc; 48-240Vac) 8 output contacts + 1 watchdog (NC) 5 logic inputs Protection functions
o o o o o o o 3-phase undercurrent (37) Negative phase sequence overcurrent (46) Broken conductor protection (46BC) Thermal protection (49) Phase and earth overcurrent (50/51/50N/51N) Breaker failure detection (50BF) Restricted earth fault (64N)
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o o
Autorecloser (79) Output relay latching (86)
2 setting groups, selected from the relay menu, binary input or system True RMS phase current value measurement within a frequency range from 10Hz to 1000Hz Earth fault current value measurement within a frequency range from 40Hz to 70Hz Disturbance recording (5 records), Event recording (up to 250 events time stamped); Fault recording (Up to 25 faults) LCD display with 14 languages available 8 alarm and warning LEDs 7 button keypad for relay navigation and setting
Figure 18 MiCOM P123 Over-current Grid connection protection relay

The Power supply of the MiCOM P123 and I/O boards in the Cement plant project is 48 Vdc. Sepam S24 The Sepam S24 is a usual MV protection with three phase and earth overcurrent protection relay (50,50N, 51, 51N, 38). The Sepam S24 is housed in a plastic case for rack mounting. Characteristics:
Universal power supply (24-250Vdc; 110-240Vac) 10 logic inputs 8 relay outputs Protection functions
o o o o Phase and earth overcurrent (50/51/50N/51N) Breaker failure detection (50BF) Negative phase sequence overcurrent (46) Autorecloser (79)
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Two 86-cycle records of fault recording, last trip fault values and 64 time-stamped alarms LCD display with 8 languages available 3 types of UMI (Integrated advanced UMI, remote advanced UMI & basic UMI) 11 alarm and warning LEDs 9 button keypad for relay navigation and settings
Figure 19 Sepam S24 usual overcurrent MV protection relay
The Power supply of the Sepam S24 and I/O boards in the Cement plant project is 48 Vdc. Sepam M20 The Sepam M20 is a usual MV protection relay. The Sepam M20 is housed in a plastic case for rack mounting. Characteristics:
Universal power supply (24-250Vdc; 110-240Vac) 10 logic inputs 8 relay outputs Protection functions
o o o o o o Phase and earth overcurrent (50/51/50N/51N) Negative phase sequence overcurrent (46) Thermal overload (49) Start/Stalled protection (48) Number of starts limitation (66) Lost of Load/Undercurrent (37)
Two 86-cycle records of fault recording, last trip fault values and 64 time-stamped alarms
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LCD display with 8 languages available 3 types of UMI (Integrated advanced UMI, remote advanced UMI & basic UMI) 11 alarm and warning LEDs 9 button keypad for relay navigation and settings
Figure 20 Sepam M20 usual overcurrent MV protection relay
The Power supply of the Sepam M20 and I/O boards in the Cement plant project is 48 Vdc.
Sepam S42 The Sepam S42 is a digital protection relays for current and voltage protection, control and monitoring IED for Distribution Utility. The Sepam S42 is housed in a plastic case reduced depth for rack mounting and can be sealed with a restricted access to protection function to cope with the Utility security and safety requirements.
Characteristics:
Universal power supply (24-250Vdc; 110-240Vac) 10 logic inputs 8 relay outputs Logic equation editor Protection functions
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o o o o o o o o o o
Phase and earth overcurrent (50/51/50N/51N) Breaker failure detection (50BF) Negative phase sequence overcurrent (46) Directional phase and earth overcurrent (67/67N/67NC) Directional active power (32P) Under & Overvoltage (27/59) Negative sequence overvoltage (47) Under & Overfrequency (81) Autorecloser (79) Broken conductor protection (46BC)
2 protection setting groups True RMS phase current value measurement within a frequency range from 10Hz to 800Hz Earth fault current value measurement within a frequency range from 40Hz to 70Hz Detailed log of the last 5 trips and recording of the last 200 time-stamped alarms LCD display with 8 languages available 3 types of UMI (Integrated advanced UMI, remote advanced UMI & basic UMI) 11 alarm and warning LEDs 9 button keypad for relay navigation and settings
Figure 21: Sepam S42 Utility MV protection

The Power supply of the Sepam S42 and I/O boards in the Cement plant project is 48 Vdc.
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3.6
3.6.1
The local HMI/SCADA Operator Interface

The HMI/SCADA Hardware
The HMI/SCADA application for the Cement Plant Power Management project will run a Standard Office PC compatible with the required performances:

Processor type Intel Core i5 4 Mo memory Memory SDRAM DDR 1 Go or more Hard Disk : Serial ATA 500 Go or more Graphical card integrated with VGA, DVI-D and HDMI connectors Screen Flat 20 or more with VGA, DVI-D and HDMI connectors
Keyboard and mouse
The Power supply of the HMI/SCADA PC and the screen s one is 220 Vac
3.6.2
The graphical symbols

The following graphical symbols are issued from the IEC standards, documents and recommendations.
The back ground color of all graphical view will be Blue Grey (RGB code: 162, 197, 205).
System icons & colors The System icons and colors are used to present to the Operator the drawing of the Cement Plant System including all IED and communication links using static and dynamic icons (animation based on the IED status).
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3.6.2.1.1
Communication Network link status

The table bellow presents the color code used for the various communication links used in the Cement plant present project. Link type Optical fiber IEC 61850 ModBus Ethernet RJ45 Coaxial Color Orange Black Blue Purple
Figure 22 : Communication line colour codes
3.6.2.1.2
IED, Gateway and HMI/SCADA PC

The table bellow presents the various icons and associated colors used fro each IED, PC or Gateway of the project. Display is based on the status information received from each device.
Figure 23: IED icons and colour codes
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Micro-grid primary equipment and cables icons and colors The various graphical views of the HMI/SCADA application presents to the operator all primary equipments based on Icons and color animations; in a static or dynamic icons (animation based on the IED status).
3.6.2.1.3
Single line diagram colors

Based on the IEC standard the following colors are used in this project for the single line drawing presented on the Local/HMI views.
VOLTAGE LEVEL Energized 20kV De-energized 20kV Default Unknown Red Green Yellow Grey
COLOR
RGB 255.0.0 0.128.0 255.255.0 192.192.192
Figure 24: Electrical line colour codes
The color of each line is dynamically managed upon the real value of the voltage on the line.
Note: the color is a convention and can be easily adapted to each country and customer uses and regulations.
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3.6.2.1.4
Primary connection devices

The MV Circuit-breaker, Switchgear and Disconnector icons are given in the bellow table with the three main statuses (Open, Closed, Unknown)
Figure 25: MV switches icons and colour codes
3.6.2.1.5
Static icons
The other various primary equipment icons (Generator, Earthing, transformers, etc...) are presented on the various HMI/SCADA graphical views using the symbols presented in the table bellow; their status is animated based on the voltage level they are connected to
Figure 26: Primary equipment icons
3.6.3
Operator HMI/SCADA screen
3.6.3.1 General presentation The operator screens are divided into 2 sections and 5 parts:
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The HMI/SCADA information and control section (pre-defined) o o The Title banner The Control banner
The Application section (design flexible per configuration) o o o The Alarm banner The Navigation banner The Display screen
Note: The relative position of each banner is flexible and defines with the customer for each application; in the present project we will use the standard order from top to bottom (Title, Control, Display, Alarm). The navigation banner is positioned on the right of the screen
Figure 27: Generic example of the Operator HMI/SCADA screen
Title banner
The title banner presents the main generic information listed bellow
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Schneider logo
Shows the substation name, the workstation control mode and the name of active server
Shows the time and the date of the system
Security information regarding the user and the associated profile
Customer logo
Figure 28: Title banner
Command banner
Figure 29: Command banner
Log In / Log Off button
Snapshot : Print full screen
Add/change password. This service is subject to access right profiles.
States : display the states viewer
User profile access
Alarms : display the alarm viewer
Define the language
Access to log files About : SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC copyrights and license text
Associated engineering tool access
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System Management Tool access
General HMI/SCADA stop
Figure 30: Command icons
Alarm banner
This banner present in chronological order the most recent and highest important alarms. This banner does not allow acknowledging or clearing alarm. This has to be done in the Alarm page. The number of displayed alarms is configurable from 3 to 7. For the present project we will use the per-default value 5 Alarms.
Date 15/ 02/ 2011 15/ 02/ 2011 15/ 02/ 2011 15/ 02/ 2011 15/ 02/ 2011 15/ 02/ 2011
09:52:22:274 09:11:58:781 09:11:58:781 09:11:58:781 09:11:58:781 09:11:58:781
Origine Site/ Systme/ Rseau Site/ Systme/ Rseau Site/ Systme/ Rseau Site/ Systme/ Rseau Site/ Systme/ Rseau Site/ Systme/ Rseau
Ethernet/ Client OI Ethernet/ C264_HTA_ERDF Ethernet/ C264_PME Ethernet/ C264_BMT Ethernet/ C264_GE Ethernet/ C264_SCALPEL
N om Lien client OI Lien quipement Lien quipement Lien quipement Lien quipement Lien quipement
Statut Dconnect Dconnect Dconnect Dconnect Dconnect Dconnect
N iveau 1 1 1 1 1 1
Figure 31: Alarm banner
Each alarm is based on an event collected from the application via the IED or the system. An Alarm line presents the following information:
Date and Time
Origin
Name
Status
Level
Date and Time: Date and Time of the Alarm appearance Per-default format "dd/mm/yy hh:mm:ss.ccc". Origin : Describe the position of the data that have generated the alarm per default <Site Name/Substation name/Voltage level/Bay name/Equipment name) Name : Long name of the datapoint Status : Status of the event source of the alarm
Navigation banner
The Navigation banner allows the operator to access to any application screen by a simple click on the chosen page.
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The main pages are: Electrical pages (could be multiple) System pages Alarm page Event page Status page General information page
3.6.4
Application views and pages

In the present project the proposed standard application pages in line with the Cement plant power management system are: Electrical views o o Cement plant MV Electrical view (single line diagram) Detailed view of the Electrical substations (Utility Substation, Generator Substation, Grinding Substation, Kiln Substation, Cooler Substation, Mill Substation)
GIS Cement plant view System view Automation view Alarm page Event page Status page General information page
3.6.4.1 Electrical views These views present the Electrical MV micro-grid of the Cement plant. They will allow with the appropriate rights the operator to visualize and command any equipment of the MV micro-grid and visualize any measure or status.
Note: for security and safety reason, the control of the various switching equipment (CB, SW, IS) is only possible in the detail views.
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Some examples of the Electrical views are given bellow
Figure 32: Cement Plant Micro-grid General view
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Figure 33: Utility substation detailed view
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Figure 34: Kiln substation detailed view
Figure 35: Generator substation detailed view
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3.6.4.2 Geographical view The purpose of the Geographical Information System view is to facilitate the localization of any fault, alarm or event occurring in the Cement plant.
Figure 36: Cement plant GIS view
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3.6.4.3 System view The System view displays the drawing of the Cement Plant System including IEDs and communication links.
Figure 37: Cement plant System view
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3.6.4.4 Automation page The Automation allows the Operator to directly enable/Disable the Electrical Automation Scheme and when it is possible modify their setting and timers.
Figure 38: Automation page
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3.6.4.5 Alarm Page This page presents in an ergonomic way all Alarms of the application. The Alarm is classified by date and time of appearance. Color code defined during configuration help simple user identification. With the appropriate rights, the operator can acknowledge and clear the alarm or group of Alarm. Navigation in the Alarm list is easy using the tree view organization on the right of the screen. Filters can be applied to simplify the Alarm identification and treatment.
Figure 39: Alarm page
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3.6.4.6 Legend Page The Legend page presents to the Operator all Icons and Color code in a clear and simple manner.
Figure 40: Example of General Information page
3.6.5 3.6.6
The HMI/SCADA Management functions Alarms

3.6.6.1.Alarm generation Any alarm is issued from an Event, it can be consider as an event specific quality. The event can come from: A logical Input single or double that state in a given alarming status. A measurement threshold crossed.
Alarm can be automatically filtered upon external condition (Substation Mode management e.g.) To each alarm per configuration, could be apply a configuration timer to ensure the stability of the event. In this case the alarm is active only if after the given time the status of the data has not change. All alarm condition, attributes, qualities and treatments are define during System configuration
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3.6.6.2 Alarm parameters Any alarm can be generated: When the event appears When the Event disappears When the Event status is unknown or in any define status (incoherent position for a double position e.g.)
To each alarm different treatments can be assigned: Display or not on the Local/HMI, Sound or Silent, Immediate or delayed, Automatic or Operator acknowledgment, Automatic or Operator cleaning
3.6.6.3 Alarm color codes For the Cement Plant Power Management project, the following colors have been assigning to the Alarm status display on the HMI/SCADA Alarm page:
Figure 41: Alarm text & back-ground colours
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3.6.6.4 Alarm acknowledgement and cleaning The following scheme describes the Operator acknowledgment and cleaning actions and the various alarm resulting states.
All acknowledgement and cleaning actions can be executed from the HMI/SCADA with the appropriate operator rights individually or for a group of alarms.
Unactive & Cleaned Alarm 0 AL+ Active Alarm not taken in account 1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Active Alarm taken in account 2 ALALUnactive Alarm not taken in account 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Unactive Alarm taken in account CLEANING 4 AL+ AL+
AL+ : Alarm condition appears AL- : Alarm condition disappears
Figure 42: Alarm Acknowledgement and Cleaning Cycle
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3.6.7
The HMI/SCADA Communication functions
3.6.7.1. IEC61850 The local HMI/SCADA application id directly connected on the IEC 61850 network and act as a Client for MiCOM C264 servers. The link to the Cement Plant Power Management System is done via an embedded switch compatible with the Ethernet redundant network (MiCOM H152 PCI board) on Optical fibers 3.6.7.2 Cement plant DCS gateway The local HMI/SCADA will interface the IEC61850 network to the Cement Plant DCS based on MODBUS protocol with the needed information; These information are defined by the Cement plant DCS. The link to the Cement Plant DCS is done via a RS 232 port on the PC.
3.7
Control management
The control of the primary equipment (CB, SW or IS) or any controllable equipment part of the Cement plant micro-grid can be done with two methods: A manual control done by the Operator using the HMI/SCADA interface, An automatic control performed by one the Cement Plant Power Management Automatic Schemes
3.7.1
Manual control
Any manual control is always issued by an Operator action on the HMI/SCADA interface and has full priority upon all Automatic controls.
Manual control can take place in all HMI/SCADA views where it is useful and configured. A control pop-up can always be opened, assuming the operator has the view right on the mimic which contains the pop-up. The Operator manual control can be executed either in Select Before Operate (SBO) or Direct Execute Mode. This mode is defined during the configuration process. Furthermore, in Direct Execute mode different control pop-up can be used and even no control pop-up but only a button.
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The control pop-up can be closed during a control sequence: the sequence is not cancelled. So, if the operator re-opens the pop-up during the control sequence, he will retrieve the current context of the sequence. Only one control pop-up can be opened on an operator station at one time. The unauthorized commands will be grayed in the control pop-up. A control acknowledgement pop-up is used to display negative control acknowledgement and to allow users with appropriate rights to by-pass the interlocking control verification. In this case, the user can get the reason of the control rejection. Some control conditions verifications are handled by the HMI/SCADA application; others are verified at MiCOM C264 level
The control conditions verifications handled by the HMI/SCADA application are: the operator user rights the local / remote plant mode the local / remote substation mode
3.7.1.1 Direct Execute Control Direct Execute Control action is done by send from the HMI/SCADA application directly a command to the IED without preliminary check of the IED and equipment availabilities. The command can or not been completed by a command acknowledgement. The DE Control can also be crossed upon a pre-define timer with the equipment or IED associated status to check if the command has been correctly executed. An alarm can be associated to it.
Figure 43: Direct Execute Control pop-up
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Select Before Operate Control Select Before Operate Control mode is a control action based on two complementary phases: A Select service A Control/Operate Service
The Select service arms the SBO Control process and check the availability of the targeted equipment. It also locks the device capability to receive any command from any other control point during a pre-define time. The Control service is only executed after a successful Select service on the same manner as the pure DE Control.
The SBO control process is mainly used to control sensitive CB (Utility grid connection, Generator connection, etc...) to secure the control process.
Any unsuccessful service generates an Operator message and usually an alarm, and cancelled the SBO control command.
In addition the SBO pop-up allows the operator to abort the process if needed between Selection and Control phase.
Figure 44: Select Before Operate Control pop-up
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3.7.1.3 CB position discrepancy If during any of the Cement plant Power management automatic scheme, an operator modifies the position of any primary equipment involve in the Automation scheme, the position of the equipment is consider as in Discrepancy. The equipment management is automatically excluded from the Automatic scheme and control sequence until an Operator control acknowledgement or return to the original position.
This security function is implemented in all MV CBs part of the Cement Plant Power Management present project.
Interlocking conditions The Interlocking equations are logical schemes that may block a control if the topological conditions are not compatible with the control (e.g. Closing command of an MV CB if the earthing switch is closed). All these interlocking equations are part of the Cement plant micro-grid safety and security. In the present project all CB part of the MV network management are with Interlocking conditions which check before closing any CB on the MV micro-grid that the MV line and MV busbar voltage are compatible.
3.7.2 Automatic control

Automatic controls are the result of the Power Management Automatic schemes and are executed directly by the involved MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC. These controls have less priority than the Manual ones issued by the Operator via the HMI/SCADA Interface. They are mainly coming from: The Fast Self-Healing scheme, The Automatic Transfer Switch function, The MV/LV Transformer Load management, The Protection setting group changes.
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4 Power Mgt auto. Schemes
4 4.1
Power Management automatic schemes Introduction

The Power Management Automatic schemes are architecture in a distributed manner. This means that the equations are split in all the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC of the Cement plant Power Management application. This architecture improves the performances of the Power Management functions and also strongly the global availability of the application. The different automatic schemes are initiated by information coming from: Logic Inputs hardwired on the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC, Logic Inputs and Analogue Values calculated inside the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC using the known micro-grid elements (topology, voltage, current, active & reactive power, load, etc...), Logic Inputs and Analogue Values received using the Ethernet IEC61850 communication network (GOOSE messages)
The three Power Management functions part of this Cement plant project are: The MV Fast Self Healing Automatic Scheme, The MV Automatic Transfer Switch The MV Load Shedding and Load Restore Automatic Scheme
4.2
4.2.1
Operating modes
IED operating modes
The following operating modes could be applied to the IEDs (MiCOM C264, GTW, HMI/SCADA, Protections) part of the Cement plant Power Management application: On-Line Mode Off-Line Mode Special Modes
4.4.1.1 On-line Modes: Normal This is the nominal operating mode of the IEDs. In this mode the IED watchdog relay is activated and all the functionalities of the IED are available. Nevertheless, detection of an error can lead to the Downgraded mode, to the Faulty mode or to the Halt mode, depending on the nature and the gravity of the failure.
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From this mode a transition to the Maintenance mode can be requested by an operator from HMI/SCDA (maintenance request). From this mode a transition to the Test mode can be requested by an operator from HMI/SCADA (simulation request). In this mode, the operations that can be done on system configuration databases are the following: Download a standby database, Swap the databases: then the IED automatically restarts, Modify a database, Display database information This mode is display for each IED on HMI/SCADA screen. Test In Test mode, the IED works normally but output relays are not activated. This mode is entered on operator request in order to simulate the functioning of distributed automatisms such as interlocking. Instead of activating the output relays, the IED sends a test OK message to the HMI/SCADA if the command is valid otherwise a test NOK message. Note: to realize the tests, the operator has to manually create the testing conditions by forcing BI or Measurements on different IED. Once the conditions are realized, he can generate a command and see at the HMI/SCADA if the result corresponds to the expected one. This mode is displayed on the IED and on the HMI/SCADA. From this mode a transition to the operational mode can be requested by an operator from HMI/SCADA (end of simulation). Downgraded This mode is entered in case of an anomaly. In this mode the general working of the IED is not very disturbed because it involves the degradation of only few functions. The watchdog relay is activated. The downgraded mode depends on the hardware configuration of the IED, but we can define the different kinds of downgraded modes that can happen: Operation without DO on a board Operation without DI on a board Operation without AI on a board Operation without communication with some IEDs
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A combination of two, or more, of these previous items When the cause(s) of the transition into Downgraded mode disappears, the IED returns to the Normal mode.
4.2.1.2 Off-line Modes: Maintenance In Maintenance mode, communication on the Ethernet network between the IEDs is operational. This mode is displayed on the local IED and on the HMI/SCADA. The watchdog relay is de-activated. In this mode the operator can manage the database: Download a database Swap the databases Modify a database Display database information From this mode a transition to the operational mode can be requested by an operator from the HMI/SCADA (active request).
Faulty The Faulty mode is entered when a fault, that prevents the exploitation, happens. This mode can be entered from any mode described above. This mode is also entered when a failure is detected on DO boards and if the configuration allows this mode on DO faults. The only way to leave this mode is an automatic reset or a transition to the Halt mode.
4.2.1.3 Special modes Initialization After power on or manual reset the IED enters the initialization mode and performs different types of checks: 1 Vital hardware tests Non-volatile memory test: in case of a problem the IED tries to repair this non-volatile memory. If a vital hardware test fails, the initialization is stopped and the IED enters the Halt mode.
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2 Non vital hardware tests Non-vital hardware tests are only performed on present boards:
Inputs and outputs boards: o To determinate the number and the type of the present input and output boards o o To check the presence of the previously input and output boards and to be informed if a board is absent To check the good working order of the present input and output boards and to be informed if a board is out of order
Communication boards: this test is performed within the communication protocol. Display (LCD, LEDs): the single test that can be done is the presence of the HMI board. Peripheral devices (printer, external clock ...). Check of the presence of the devices by use of timeouts.
If any of these non-vital hardware tests fails the IED enters the operational/downgraded mode depending on the type of the fault. 3 Software tests (database coherency tests) These tests are performed at each restart of the IED. The checks of the database guarantees that the database is compatible with the hardware and the software of the IED and that it does not contain incoherent data of configuration. The following checks are performed: Check of the presence of a database and check of the DB/ software compatibility Check of the DB/ equipment compatibility Check of the validity of the data of the database If any of these checks fails, the computer enters the Maintenance mode. The initialization of the computer does not exceed one minute.
Halt In this mode the IED doesnt operate anymore. The watchdog relay and all the outputs relays are deactivated. The only way to get out of this mode is to operate a manual reset. The following diagram summarizes the different operating modes:
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Power ON / Starting INITIALISATION
Tests OK and no setting elements
Tests OK and setting elements available.
Hardware major fault or inconsistant settings
MAINTENANCE
Operator Request
OPERATIONAL
Hardware major fault
FAULTY
Operator Request
TEST
Software major fault HALT Automatic restart
Figure 45: Mode logic management
4.3
4.3.1
MV Fast Self Healing Automation Scheme - FSH

Introduction
For the present project, the Fast Self-Healing scheme considers the Cement plant MV micro-grid with the following substations: Main Utility Substation Generator Substation Grinding Substation Kiln Substation Cooler Substation Mill Substation
The principle of the Fast Self-healing applied to the Cement Plant micro-grid is described in the following chapters. The Single Line Diagram (SLD) describe the MV micro-grid of the present project
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Figure 46: Cement plant micro-grid with Fast healing Management
The standard Cement plant micro-grid is with the Utility connection closed (MV connection), an open point on the loop (in Cooler SS) and the Generator not connected on the micro-grid. Note: The choice of the open point of micro-grid has no major importance.
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4.3.2
Automation Scheme modes

Four different Automation scheme modes have to consider offering the Cement plant a full and efficient Power management function:
Normal: The normal mode is active when: The Automation scheme is Enable (via the HMI/SCADA control) AND at least one open point is identified on the micro-grid AND all IED are in Normal mode
Any fault detection will launch the Fast Self Healing automation scheme, generate a micro-grid reconfiguration with open and close cycles of the MV Circuit breakers and isolation of the faulty section; the complete repower of the micro-grid will be done in less than 200 ms.
Safe: The safe mode is active when: The Automation scheme is Enable (via the HMI/SCADA control) AND at least one fault has not been acknowledged (open or close of any CB impossible)
Faulty: The safe mode is active when: One of the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC is Off-line or Special mode OR One of the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC is managed on Local OR One of the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC is not detected (missing) OR one of the Protection relays is not detected (missing) or Off-line or Special mode
In Faulty mode, any electrical fault will launch a micro-grid self Healing process but the Automation scheme will consider that the part supervised by the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC does not exist and the associated substation is consider as a static element of the micro-grid.
Note: If faulty MiCOM C264 RTU/PC controls the standard opening point of the micro-grid, the Fast Self Healing scheme is automatically switch on OFF.
Off: The Off mode is active when:
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The Automation scheme is Disable (via the HMI/SCADA control) OR the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC in the Utility SS is Off-line or Special mode OR the MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC in the Micro-grid open point SS is Off-line or Special mode
In Off mode, the Fast Self Healing automation scheme is inactive for any type of fault.
4.3.3
Simulation mode
In order to help the Operator micro-grid management, the Cement Plant Power Management solution embedded a Simulator function. The FSH Simulator function allows simulating the impact of any MV cable, MV substation or MV busbar fault.
4.3.4
Cable fault FSH scheme (Normal mode)

Step 0: The micro-grid is considered in it standard conditions (Utility connection, micro-grid open point in Cooler SS), the Generator not connected.
Figure 47: Cement plant micro-grid SLD Step 0
Step 1: Fault appears on a cable B (between Grinding and Kiln SS), detected by the protection relay of the Utility and in accordance with the Grid code it opens (green circle). This action is
91
directly done by the protection at Utility grid connection. All involved protections relays have seen the fault (Instantaneous information) All related events and alarms are generated, archived and display on the HMI/SCADA. Note: Depending on Grid Code, the Utility grid connection can be only open partially (faulty section) and the other section maintain powered.
Figure 48: Cement plant micro-grid SLD fault on B cable step 1

Step 2: The faulty section is isolated by opening of the surrounding CBs located in Grinding SS and Kiln SS managed by the FSH automation scheme (green circles).
92
Note: If the fault occurs on the SS Busbar, the FSH automation scheme will open the CB in the nearby substations.
Step 3: Reclosing of the Utility grid CB by the FSH Automation scheme (green circles). The faulty cable is fully isolated. The Mill, Grinding & Cooler substations are repower using cables A, F, E & D. Cable A et C and Kiln Substation are not powered
Step 4: To repower Kiln Substation, the original open point at Cooler SS is closed by the FSH automation Scheme (green circle).
93
4.3.5
Utility Busbar fault FSH scheme (Normal mode)

In case of a fault affecting the Utility SS (e.g. Busbar), the security does not allow the have any reconnection action to the Utility grid. This will impose to start the Generator and use it to power the site. Step 0: The micro-grid is considered in it standard conditions (Utility connection, micro-grid open point in Cooler SS), the Generator not connected (red circles).
94
Step 1: Fault appears In Utility Substation (Busbar fault e.g.), detected by the protection relay of the Utility and in accordance with the Grid code it opens the incomer CB and the two associated CBs (green circles). These actions are directly done by the protection relays at Utility substation. All Cement plant protections relays have seen the fault (Instantaneous information) All related events and alarms are generated, archived and display on the HMI/SCADA.
Figure 53: Cement plant micro-grid SLD fault on Utility SS BB step 1

Step 2: The faulty section is isolated by opening of the surrounding CBs located in Grinding SS and Kiln SS managed by the FSH automation scheme (green circles).
95
Step 3: The Generator is started and as soon it reaches it minimum power and synchronism condition, it is connected to the Cement plant micro-grid by the FSH Automation scheme (green circles). The substations Mill & Cooler are repower using cables E & D. Cable A, F, B & C and Kiln & Grinding Substations are not powered.
96

Step 4: To repower Kiln & Grinding Substations, the original open point at Cooler SS is closed by the FSH automation scheme (green circle).
4.3.6
Degraded modes
If some IEDs of the Fast Self Healing Automation Scheme are for any reason not in Normal mode, some degraded actions are possible to continue to ensure a maximum safety.
4.3.6.1 MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC faulty If a MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC is not in Normal mode, the rest of the Fast Self Healing Automatic scheme will continue to work, only the sub-function where it is involved will be inhibited. If the faulty MICOM C264 RTU/PLC is the one managing the Utility grid connection, all the FSH Automation scheme is switch on Faulty and Disabled. An alarm message is automatically generated to inform the operator.
4.3.6.2 Protection relay faulty If one of the MV protection relay is faulty (watch dog information), a dedicated alarm is generated and the involved substation is switch as Inactive.
97
If the faulty protection is the one associated to the Utility Incomer, the Utility grid connection is automatically open. The Cement plant micro-grid is islanded and can be powered by it own generator.
4.3.6.3 HMI/SCADA faulty If the HMI/SCADA application gets faulty, this does not impacted the Fast Self Healing Automation Scheme. All alarms and events are generated and archived at MiCOM C264 RTU/PLC level (2000 event each). When the HMI/SCADA application is switched back to Normal, the central archiving database is automatically rebuilt using these archived information. The Gateway DCS continues to send information to the DCS as the two applications are fully independent. 4.3.6.4 Gateway to DCS faulty If the Gateway to DCS application gets faulty, this does not impacted the Fast Self Healing Automation Scheme. The HMI/SCADA application will continue to receive and archive data.
4.4
MV Automatic Transfer Switch - ATS

In order to secure the Cement Plant power delivery, an Automatic Transfer Switch function is implemented between the Utility grid feeder and the Cement plant Generator. The ATS scheme uses two main information to initiate the function: Detection of a lack of voltage on the Utility grid feeder or Opening of the Utility MV feeder CB.
An ATS scheme is always based on two parts: The switch between the normal power source and the back-up one, The return to normal condition (site powered by the nominal power source)
4.4.1
ATS scheme (Utility Voltage drop)

Step 0: The micro-grid is considered in it standard conditions (Utility connection, micro-grid open point in Cooler SS), the Generator not connected.
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Step 1: A lack of Voltage is detected on the Utility substation (detection made on the MV Busbar). This measure is confirmed (time delay defined by the Utility Grid to avoid ATS running on Utility feeder auto-recloser cycle e.g.).
The Generator is started and the Utility is disconnected from the Cement plant (Green circles)
Figure 58: Cement plant micro-grid SLD lack of Utility voltage step 1
99
Note: Depending of the Utility grid code, the disconnection with the Utility grid can be done by opening the Utility feeder CB or the two internal Utility SS CBs Step 2: The open point of the Cement plant micro-grid CB is closed (Green circle).
Step 3: The MV Generator reaches it nominal value and the associated CB is closed to repower the entire Cement plant network (Green circle).
100
Note: A similar scheme is valid if the Utility grid feeder is open due to an external order (issued e.g. by the Utility).
4.4.2
ATS scheme (Return to Normal mode)

Step 4: The Generator is stopped and its CB is open (Green circle). The entire Cement plant micro-grid is powered off
Note: Depending of the Utility grid code, the parallel mode (Generator running while the Cement plan is connected to the Utility grid may be accepted)
Figure 61: Cement plant micro-grid SLD Return to Normal step 4
Step 5: While the Cement plant micro-grid is powered off, the Cooler CB is open (Green circle) to recreate the micro-grid open point.
101
Step 6: As the Utility Voltage is at nominal value and no faulty condition is detected, the Utility connections are reclosed (Green circle). The Cement plant micro-grid is repower and back to Normal management
102
4.5
MV cadenced Load Shedding and Load Restore Automatic Scheme

In order to avoid brutal inrush current when Fast Self Healing reconnection, a MV Load Shedding and Load restore function is available.
The Voltage value is calculated based on the measurement mainly issued from the MV and LV local sensors.
4.5.1
Load Shedding
The Transformer Load Shedding Automatic scheme is started systematically each time a MV substation is switch off (no Voltage). The time delay before Load Shedding is defined at 100ms lack of Voltage. A lack of Voltage greater than 100ms in any pre-defined substation generates the load shedding of all associated Transformer. This time delay can be set per configuration.
The operator may Enable or Disable the function globally or per substation based on the Cement plan production needs
4.5.2
Load Restore
The load restore of the MV substation transformers and motors is started as soon as the substation value is back to a pre-defined value (settable per configuration) based typically on the Voltage presence on the MV busbar . The logic restoration scheme and the associated timer are defined based on the Cement plant micro-grid characteristics.
In the present project, the following values are considered to define the cadence of the load reconnections:
Project Load restore Time delay per Substation and Transformer Substation Mill Transformer 1 Transformer Time delay in ms 500
103
Transformer 2 Grinding Transformer 1 Transformer 2 Motor 1 Motor 2 Cooler Transformer 1 Transformer 2 Motor 1 Motor 2 Kiln Transformer 1 Transformer 2
2 500 1 000 3 500 2 750 3 000 1 500 4 500 3 750 4 000 2 000 5 000
Figure 64: Cement plant Project LR timing

The operator may Enable or Disable the function globally or per substation based on the Cement plan production needs.
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5 Appendix 5 Appendix
5.1 Glossary
Acronym AC AccI ADC AI AIS Alarm AO API API ASCII ASDU ASE AVR Alternative Current Accumulator Input Analogue to Digital Converter Analog Input Air Insulated Substation An alarm is any event tagged as an alarm during configuration phase Analogue Output Value corresponding to a desired output current applied to a DAC. Application Programming Interfaces Application program interface American Standard Code for Information Interchange Application Specific Data Unit Name given in OSI protocol for applicative data (T103, T103...) Applied System Engineering Automatic Voltage Regulator Automatism used to regulate secondary voltage by automatic tap changer control (see ATCC). Set of features can be added, see chapter C264 FD Set of LV, MV or HV plants (switches and transformer) and devices (Protective, Measurement) usually around a Circuit Breaker and controlled by a bay computer. Binary Coded Decimal One C264 supported coding on a set of Digital Input that determines a Digital Measurement, then Measurement value (with specific invalid code when coding is not valid). Each decimal digit is coded by 4 binary digit. Binary Input (or Information) Binary Output Computer Aided Design Computer application dedicated to design like wiring, protective setting Circuit Breaker Specific dipole switch with capability to power on and break on fault current. Some has not isolation capability (nominal-earth at each side) Meaning
Bay
BCD
BI BO CAD CB
105
5 Appendix
CDM Conceptual Data Modeling Is the modelization of system/devices data using a hierarchy of structured data (called object of class) with their attributes, method or properties and the relations between themselves. It maps common data to devices or components of devices, with guaranty of interoperability. Cause Of Transmission Change Request Cyclic Redundancy Check Coding result send with packet of transmitted data to guaranty their integrity. Usually result of a division of transmitted data by polynom. Character Separate Values Ascii values separated by predefined character or string like in Excel or ASCII Comtrade. Current Transformer Basically the electric device connected to process and extracting a current measurement. By extension part of a device (C264) that receives this AC value and convert it to numerical measurement value. CT is wired in serial. Current and Voltage transformers Digital to Analogue Converter Used to generate analogue signals (usually DC) from a digital value. Data ACquisition component of the GPT DataBase Tool or set of data that define all configuration of a system or specific device like computer. Opposed to setting or parameter DB has a structure that can not be modified on line. DBs are always versioned. Dont Believe It Term used for undefined state of a double point when input are not complementary. DBI00 is state motion or jammed. DBI11 is undefined. DataBases Identity Brick Double (Point) Control Two digit and/or relays outputs used for device control with complementary meaning (OPEN, CLOSE). Double Control Output Device Control Point Located at device level (electric device or IED). It should have its own Remote/Local switch. Digital Control System Generic name of industrial process system based on numeric communication and devices, to be opposed to traditional electrically wired control. Double CounTer Counter based on 2 DI with complementary states (counting switchgear maneuver for example)
COT CR CRC
CSV
CT
CT/VT (Conventional) DAC DAC DB
DBI
DBID DC, DPC
DCO DCP
DCS
DCT
106
5 Appendix
DELTA Device Phase to phase delta values Term used for one of the following unit: Protective relays, metering units, IED, switchgear (switching device such as CB, disconnector or earthing switch), disturbance or quality recorders. Digital Input Binary information related to the presence or to the absence of an external signal, delivered by a voltage source. Device Identity Brick Diagnostic Brick Digital Measurement Is a measurement value which acquisition is done by DI and a specific coding BCD, Gray, 1 among N DNP 3.0 is open and public protocol for Interoperability between substation computers, RTUs, IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Devices) and master stations (except inter-master station communications) for the electric utility industry. Digital Output Used to apply a voltage to an external device via a relay, in order to execute single or dual, transient or permanent commands. Double Point Information/control derived from 2 digital inputs/output; usually used for position indication of switching devices (OPEN, CLOSE). Double Point Status Position indication of switching devices (OPEN, CLOSE). Design Validation Plan An event is a time tagged change of state/value acquired or transmitted by a digital control system. Factory Acceptance Test Validation procedures execution with the customer at factory.(SAT) Functional Block Diagram One of the IEC61131-3 programming languages (language used to define configurable automation). Fault Passage Indicator Fault Report Level 6 session of OSI, the gateway is any device transferring data between different networks and/or protocol. The RTU function of C264 gives a gateway behavior to upper level. Graphic Human interface Unit Gas Insulated Substation GLOBE Brick Greenwich Meridian Time Absolute time reference
DI
DI DIAG DM
DNP3
DO
DP
DPS DVP Event FAT FBD
FPI FR Gateway
GHU GIS GLOBE GMT
107
5 Appendix
GOOSE GPS Generic Object Oriented Substation Event Global Positioning System Based on triangulation from satellite signal, that transmit also absolute GMT time used to synchronize a master clock Generic Protocol Translator software, supplied by ASE Logical combination of BI (i.e. SP, DP, SI or other groups). Gateway Facility for an operator to set manually the position of a device (acquired by other means) from the HMI at SCP level; e.g. from OPEN to CLOSE (without any impact on the physical position of the electrical switching device). Human Machine Interface High Speed autoRecloser First cycles of AR Hyper Text Mark-up Language Used as standard for formatting web display High Voltage (for example 30kV to 150kV) Inverse Definite Minimum Time Input/Output Interrupter Switch International Electrotechnical Commission Intelligent Electronic Device General expression for a whole range of microprocessor based products for data collection and information processing Inter-Range Instrumentation Group standard format B. This is an international standard for time synchronization based on analog signal. Invalid state of a Double Point: Occurs when the two associated digital inputs are still in state 0 after a user-selectable delay (i.e. when the transient state motion is considered as ended). Legacy Bus Generic name of Legacy or field networks and protocols used to communicate. Networks are based on (RS232,) 422, 485. Protocols are IEC 60850-5-103 (T103 or VDEW), Modbus Schneider or MODICON Liquid Crystal Display Ladder Diagram One of the IEC1131-3 programming languages (language used to define configurable automation). Light Emitting Diode Low Frequency
GPT Group GTW Hand Dressing
HMI HSR HTML HV IDMT I/O IS IEC IED
IRIG-B JAMMED
L-BUS
LCD LD
LED LF
108
5 Appendix
Local / Remote Control Mode LV MC Measurements Metering (non-tariff) Metering (tariff) ModBus MOTION When set to local for a given control point it means that the commands can be issued from this point, else in remote control are issue for upper devices. Low Voltage Modular Computer Values issued from digital inputs or analogue inputs (with value, state and time tag). Values computed depending on the values of digital or analogue inputs during variable periods of time (time integration). Values computed depending on the values of digital or analogue inputs during variable periods and dedicated to the energy tariff. Communication protocol used on secondary networks with IEDs. 2 versions exist with standard MODICON or Schneider one. Transient state of a Double Point Occurs when the two associated digital inputs are momentarily in state 0 (e.g. position indication when an electrical device is switching). The concept of momentarily depends on a user-selectable delay. Protection Module for Computer Medium Voltage Numerical Busbar Protection Normally Closed (for a relay) Normally Open (for a relay) One Box Solution Computer which provides protection and control functions with local HMI. The prime application of this device is intended for use in substations up to distribution voltage levels, although it may also be used as backup protection in transmission substations. Likewise, the OBS may be applied to the MV part of a HV substation which is being controlled by the same substation control system. Object Linking and Embedding OLE is a Microsoft specification and defines standards for interfacing objects. Operating Mode Management OLE for process control OPC is a registered trademark of Microsoft, and is designed to be a method to allow business management access to plant floor data in a consistent manner. Sum of time periods, a primary device is running under carrying energy, e.g. circuit breaker is in Close-state and the current is unequal 0 A. Open System Interconnection Split and define communication in 7 layers : physical, link, network, transport, session, presentation, application Protection Automation and Control Integrated Solution
MPC MV NBB NC NO OBS
OLE OMM OPC
Operation hours OSI
PACiS
109
5 Appendix
PLC Programmable Logic Control Within the PLC-programs are defined the configurable control sequences or automations taken into account by the application Systems. Point On Wave Point on wave switching is the process to control the three poles of an HV-circuit breaker in a way, to minimize the effects of switching. Public Switched Telephone Network Probes of temperatures providing analogue signals (non-linear captor). Remote Control Center Remote Control Computer Remote Control Point Name given to the device or part used to control remotely several bay or substation. Usually associate with Remote/Local sub-station control. It is a remote interface managed by the system through Telecontrol BUS. Several RCPs can be managed with different protocols. Remote Control Point When set for a given control points it means that the commands are issued from an upper level and are not allowed from this point. Remote HMI is a client of the substation HMI server. The client may provide all or part of functions handled by the substation HMI. Read Inhibit This output indicates the availability of an analogue output (e.g. during DAC converting time) Rapid ReClosure Relocatabled Static Var Compensator Remote Terminal Unit : function that correspond to the data acquisition and transmitting to RCP or the local HMI/SCADA . RTU link is the TBUS. Site Acceptance Test Validation procedures executed with the customer on the site. Site Based Maintenance Control mode A bay in SBMC mode does not take into account the commands issued from RCP; moreover, some of its digital points and measurements (defined during the configuration phase) are not sent anymore to the RCP (they are automatically suppressed). Select Before Operate A control made in two steps, selection and execution. Selection phase give a feedback. It can be used to prepare, reserve during time, configure circuit before execution. Controls are done into a protocol, or physical (DO select with DI Select then DO execute). Station Bus
POW
PSTN PT100 RCC RCC RCP
RCP Remote Control Mode Remote HMI RI
RRC RSVC RTU SAT SBMC
SBO
S-BUS
110
5 Appendix
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition Equivalent to RCC in Utility application Equivalent to local HMI application in Industry & Building applications SCE SCS SCT Setpoint (analogue) Setpoint (digital) System Configuration Editor (PACiS software application) Substation Control System Single Counter Analogue setpoints are analogue outputs delivered as current loops. Used to send instruction values to the process or to auxiliary devices. Digital values sent on multiple parallel wired outputs. Each wired output represents a bit of the value. Digital setpoints are used to send instruction values to the electrical process or to auxiliary devices. Sequential Function Chart One of the IEC1131-3 programming languages (language used to define configurable automation). System Indication Binary information that do not come from external interface. It is related to an internal state of the computer (time status, hardware faults). It is the result of all inner function (AR, ), PSL, or ISaGRAF automation. Status Input Single Bit Status Input Group Status Input Double Bit Sequence Of Events Other term for the event list. Single Point Single Point Control Single Point Status Software Specification Document Structured Text One of the IEC1131-3 programming languages (language used to define configurable automation). System Technical Note A binary information can be suppressed by an order issued from an operator. No subsequent change of state on a suppressed information can trigger any action such as display, alarm and transmission. Software Validation Test Folder Switchgear The Switchgear is a combination of electrical disconnect switches, fuses or Circuit Breaker used to control, protect and isolate LV or MV electrical equipment. Term used for IEC60870-5-101 protocol.
SFC
SI
SI SIG SIT SOE SP SPC SPS SSD ST
STN Suppression (Manual) SVTF SW
T101
111
5 Appendix
T103 T104 TBC TBD T-BUS TC TCIP TG TIU TM Topological interlocking TPI TS TVDA UPI UTC VDEW Voltage level Term used for IEC60870-5-103 protocol Term used for IEC60870-5-104 protocol To Be Completed To Be Defined Telecontrol Bus TeleControl Tape Change In Progress Telecontrol Gateway Transformer Input Unit TeleMesure Interlocking algorithm, based on evaluation of topological information of the switchgear arrangement in the HV or MV network, the switchgear kind and position, and defined rules for controlling this kind of switch (e.g. continuity of power supply) Tap Position Indication (for transformers) Frequently acquired via a Digital Measurement Telesignal Tested, Validated, Documented Architecture Unit Per Impulse Parameter of counter to convert number of pulse to Measurement value. Universal Time Coordinates (or Universal Time Code) Naming that replace GMT (but it is the same) Term used for IEC60870-5-103 protocol Set of bays whose plants and devices are dealing with the same voltage (e.g. 275kV, 400 kV). Voltage Transformer Basically the electric device connected to process and extracting a voltage measurement. By extension part of a device (C264) that receives this AC value and convert it to numerical measurement value. VTs are wired in parallel. 3 phases + neutral AI values
VT
WYE
5.2 Bill of materials and software

The following table summarizes all of the selected hardware: Description Reference Firmware or software version MiCOM P111 MV Feeder protection Function
112
5 Appendix
MiCOM P211 MV motor protection
MiCOM P123
MV Feeder protection
MiCOM C264
RTU/PLC
Sepam S24
SEPAM M20
MV motor protection
SEPAM S42
PACiS SCE
V4
System configuration
PACiS SMT
V4
System Management tool
PACiS HMI/SCADA
Local HMI/SCADA
MiCOM H15x
Ethernet embedded switch in PC (supporting HMI/SCADA)
5.3 Referenced documentations

The following table is a list of documents you might want to refer to if you needs more details. Document title SEPAM Installation Assistance guide (1) SEPAM 20 user manual (1) MiCOM P111 user manual MiCOM P211 user manual SEPED309035EN PCRED301005EN Reference
113
5 Appendix
Document title MiCOM P123 user manual MiCOM C264 user manual PACiS V4. user manual PACiS SCE user manual PACiS SMT user manual PACiS HMI/SCADA user manual MiCOM H15x user manual Reference
5.4
5.4.1
Applicable standards
Environment standards
All these standards are applicable to any elements (local HMI, RTUs, IEDs).
Type Test Name Insulation Resistance Dielectric Withstand
Type Test Standard IEC 60255-5 IEC60255-5 IEEE C37.90
Conditions 100 M at 500 Vdc (CM & DM) 50 Hz, 1mn, 2kV (CM), 1kV (DM) 50 Hz, 1mn, 1kV (CM) G 1.4 & 1.5 500V CM G 6 :1,5 kV CM
High Voltage Impulse Test
IEC 60255-5
5kV (CM), 3kV (DM) 2kV (CM) Groups 1 to 6 :5 kV CM & 3 kV DM(1) Not on 1.4 & 1.5 : 5 kV CM & 3 kV DM(1)
Free Fall Test Free Fall Packaging Test
IEC 60068-2-31 IEC 60068-2-32
Test Ec : 2 falls from 5cm Test Ed : 2 falls from 0,5m 2 falls of 5 cm (IED not powered) 25 falls of 50 cm (1) (2) (Packaging IED)
114
5 Appendix
Vibration Response Powered On IEC 60255-21-1 Class 2 : 1g from 2 to 150Hz Class 2 : Acceleration : 1g from 10 (1) to 150Hz Vibration Response Not Powered On IEC 60255-21-1 Class 2 : 2g from 2 to 500Hz Class 2 : Acceleration : 2g from 10 (1) to 500Hz Vibration Endurance Not Powered On IEC 60068-2-6 Class 2 : 1g from 10 to 150Hz Class 2 : Acceleration : 1g from 10 (1) to 500Hz Shocks Not Powered On IEC 60255-21-2 Class 1 : 15g, 11 ms Shocks Powered On IEC 60255-21-2 Class 2 : 10g, 11 ms Bump Test Not Powered On Seismic Test Powered On IEC 60255-21-3 IEC 60255-21-2 Class 1 : 10g, 16ms, 2000/axis Class 1 : Axis H : 3,5mm 2g Axis V : 3,5mm 1g Class 2 : Acceleration : 2g Displacement : 7,5mm axis H Acceleration : 1g Displacement : 3,5mm axis V Damp Heat Test - Operating IEC 60068-2-3 Test Ca : +40C / 10 days / 93% RH
115
5 Appendix
Cold Test - Operating IEC 60068-2-1 Test Ab : -10C / 96h Test Ab : - 25c / 96 H Cold Test - Storage IEC60068-2-1 Test Ad : -40C / 96h Powered On at 25C (for information) Powered On at 40C (for information) Dry Heat Test Operating IEC 60068-2-2 Test Bd : 55C / 96h 70C / 2h 70c / 24 H Dry Heat Test Storage IEC 60068-2-1 Test Bd : +70C / 96h Powered On at +70C Enclosure Protection Inrush current (start-up) IEC 60529 Front : IP=52 T < 1,5 ms / I < 20 A T < 150 ms / I < 10 A T > 500 ms / I < 1,2 In Supply variation IEC 60255-6 Vn 20% Vn+30% & Vn-25% for information Overvoltage (peak withstand) IEC 60255-6 1,32 Vn max 2 Vn during 10 ms (for information) Supply interruption IEC 60255-11 From 2,5 ms to 1 s at 0,8 Vn 50 ms at Vn, no malfunction (for information) 40 s interruption Ripple (frequency fluctuations) Supply variations IEC 60255-6 IEC 60255-11 IEC 60255-11 12% Vn at f=100Hz or 120Hz 12% Vn at f=200Hz for information Vn 20%
116
5 Appendix
AC Voltage dips & short interruptions EN 61000-4-11 2ms to 20ms & 50ms to 1s 50 ms at Vn, no malfunction (for information
Frequency fluctuations
IEC 60255-6
50 Hz : from 47 to 54 Hz 60 Hz : from 57 to 63 Hz
Voltage withstand High Frequency Disturbance IEC 60255-22-1 IEC 61000-4-12 IEEE C37.90.1 Electrostatic discharge IEC 60255-22-2 IEC 61000-4-2 Radiated Immunity IEC 60255-22-3 IEC 61000-4-3
2 Vn during 10 ms (for information) Class 3 : 2.5kV (CM) / 1kV (DM) Class 2 : 1kV (CM)
Class 4 : 8kV contact / 15 kV air Class 3 : 10 V/m 80 to 1000 MHz & spot tests
IEEE C37.90.2
35 V/m 25 to 1000 MHz
Fast Transient Burst
IEC 60255-22-4 IEC 61000-4-4 IEEE C37.90.1
Class 4 : 4kV 2.5kHz (CM & DM) Class 3 2 kV - 2,5 kHz MC Class 3 : 2kV 5kHz (CM)
Surge immunity
IEC 61000-4-5
Class 4 : 4kV (CM) 2kV (DM) Class 3 : 2kV (CM) on shield Class 4 :
117
5 Appendix
4kV (CM) for information Class 3 : 1 kV MC High frequency conducted immunity Harmonics Immunity Power Frequency Magnetic Field Immunity IEC 61000-4-7 IEC 61000-4-8 IEC 61000-4-6 Class 3 : 10 V, 0.15 80 MHz 5% & 10% de H2 H17 Class 4 : 50 Hz 30 A/m permanent 300 A/m short time Class 5 : 100A/m for 1mn 1000A/m for 3s Power Frequency Conducted emission Radiated emission IEC 61000-4-16 EN 55022 EN 55022 CM 500 V / DM 250 V via 0.1 F Gr. I, class A and B : from 0.15 to 30 MHz Gr. I, class A and B : from 30 to 1000 MHz, 10m
118
5 Appendix
PACiS, MiCOM, Sepam, Easergy and ION are trademarks or registered trademarks of Schneider Electric.
Other trademarks used herein are the property of their respective owners
Schneider Electric Industries SAS Head Office 35, rue Joseph Monier 92506 Rueil-Malmaison Cedex FRANCE
Due to evolution of standards and equipment, characteristics indicated in texts and images in this document are binding only after confirmation by our departments.
www.schneider-electric.com Version 3 - 02/2013 NRJED313442EN
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How Can I Optimize The MV Power of A Cement Plant - V3 - 2013

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Before You Begin

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OPERATION AND ADJUSTMENTS

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Failure to follow these instructions will result in death or serious injury.

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The STN Collection

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Figure 1: Cement plant

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The purpose of this document is to describe and explain:

Cement electrical Micro-grid architecture

Non secure MV/LV micro-grid architecture

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Figure 2: MV Simple Radial architecture

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Figure 3: MV Dual Power architecture

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Figure 4: MV loop architecture

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Cement PMS functional elements

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Phase Over-current protection (50/51, 67)

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Phase Over-current protection (50/51)

Earth fault protection (50N/51N)

Negative sequence (46)

Thermal Overload (49)

Phase Over-current protection (67)

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Earth fault protection (67N)

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Fault Passage Indicator

Measurement & Power meter devices

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Primary equipment control & monitoring

Evaluate an excessive operating time.

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Circuit breaker positions

SF6 gas pressure control

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Switching device control

MV CB Internal arc fault

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Operator control & monitoring HMI/SCADA

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Object Message - Information resulting state.

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Gateway for the Cement Plant DCS

Cement plant Power Management