Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990 ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts: 1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation. 2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143, wherein Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said case being terminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490; 3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, which properties are the subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-15143, while the case was still pending; 4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City; 5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified documents purporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land Development Agreement dated August 30, 1971" and submitting the same document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection with the complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant designated as I.S. No. 7512936; 6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his client;

7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City; 8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office by making false assertion of facts in his pleadings; 9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not intentionally tell a he, he does not tell the truth either." Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November 18, 1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent's answer on December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent filed a rejoinder. In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, complainant presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while respondent appeared both as witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to "11". The parties were required to submit their respective memoranda. On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming that the long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor General filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining that the delay in the investigation of the case was due to the numerous requests for postponement of scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to file their respective memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent filed a reply to the Solicitor General's comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court required the Solicitor General to submit his report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice. On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that respondent committed the following acts of misconduct: a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency of the case where the properties were involved; b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land development agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to the execution of said agreement; and c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where two signatories who had not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were made to appear as having fixed their signatures [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404]. Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit more evidence before the IBP. Finally, on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion to refer this case to the IBP, containing additional arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings. I.

Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is respondent's contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General was limited to the determination of whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed with the case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an administrative complaint against him. Respondent claims that the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that: This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139 entitled DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation has been substantially completed. The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent's claim, reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court. In such a case, the report and recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. The Court shall base its final action on the case on the report and recommendation submitted by the investigating official and the evidence presented by the parties during the investigation. Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of Rule 139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion to dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986, the date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353]. Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in duplication of the proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of the present case which has lasted for more than thirteen (13) years. Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral of the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce additional evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural due process. The record shows that respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no less than eleven (11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the complainant who appeared as a witness against him. II. The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the acts of misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista. After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power.

The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half (1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the time the document was executed, respondent knew that the abovementioned properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)]. However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting," does not appear anymore in the new Code of Professional Responsibility. He therefore concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary action under the new Code of Professional Responsibility. This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process" (Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his client and to society. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to emphasize the nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought against him. Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented, because the land development agreement on which the transfer depended was later rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer of Rights that the assignment of the properties of the Fortunados to respondent was subject to the implementation of the land development agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that: ... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City, rendered to our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by these presents, do transfer and convey to the said ATTY.

RAMON A. GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights and interests in the abovedescribed property, together with all the improvements found therein [Annex D of the Complaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis supplied]. It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to respondent to be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land development agreement was implemented. Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at the time the land development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The land development agreement was executed on August 31, 1977 while the public auction was held on June 30, 1971. Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for the complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the request of complainant and was understood to be only provisional. Respondent claims that since complainant was not his client, he had no duty to warn complainant of the fact that the land involved in their land development agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover, the sale was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves as constructive notice to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part. The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna during the negotiations for the land development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a party to the land development agreement, respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land at a public auction so that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the project they were jointly undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517]. Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents purporting to be true copies of an addendum to the land development agreement. Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the document filed by respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the addendum to the land development agreement namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautistawere made to appear as having signed the original document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters (SGD.) before each of their names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signed the original and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent wrote them on May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox copyattached to the letter and to send it back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover, respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed, the alleged true copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly misled the Court into believing that the original addendum was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law

[Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was committed by respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados [Report and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that: We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees. is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions. The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the Fortunados against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after considering the record, agrees with the Solicitor General's findings on the matter. The evidence presented by respondent shows that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge and consent of the Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave their consent when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized exceptions to the rule against representation of conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly consent to the dual representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of harassing him. The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case, Civil Case No. Q18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while the complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed by the City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest, respectively [Report and Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for holding that the complaints for libel and perjury were used by respondent to harass complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060, considering that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor General made no finding on complainants claim that it was a mere ploy by respondent to harass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-18060 was left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was pending resolution. The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds that there is no basis for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the aforementioned cases was to harass complainant. Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the above discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds.

The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the law and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the nature of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Gonzales.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 3216 March 16, 1992 DOMINGA VELASCO ORDONIO, petitioner, vs. ATTY. JOSEPHINE PALOGAN EDUARTE, respondent. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: This is a complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. Josephine Palogan-Eduarte originally filed with this Court on April 18, 1988. On August 10, 1989, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which the case was referred for investigation, submitted a report confirming in substance the charge of violation of Art. 1491 of the Civil Code and part of the Oath of Office of a lawyer and recommending the suspension of herein respondent. The evidence discloses that on July 18, 1983, Antonia Ulibari filed with the RTC, Branch XXII, Cabagan, Isabela, Civil Case No. 391 for annulment of a document (known as Affidavit of Adjudication of the Estate of Felicisimo Velasco and Quitclaim Thereof) against her children. The case was handled by Atty. Henedino Eduarte, herein respondent's husband, until his appointment as RTC judge on October 26, 1984. His wife, Atty. Josephine Palogan-Eduarte, took over. On August 22, 1985, decision in Civil Case No. 391 was rendered in favor of Antonia Ulibari. Except for Dominga Velasco-Ordonio, one of the children of Antonia Ulibari and complainant in the instant case, the rest of the defendants did not appeal. On June 13, 1987, while Civil Case No. 391 was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Ulibari conveyed some parcels of her land to her children in the form of deeds of absolute sale, prepared and notarized by herein respondent. Significantly, on the same day, Antonia Ulibari also conveyed 20 hectares of land to herein respondent and her husband as their Attorney's fees for legal services rendered. All the titles of the lands subject of the deeds of absolute sale and the deed of conveyance however remained in the name of Antonia Ulibari. On April 4, 1988, Dominga Velasco-Ordonio filed this complaint for disbarment against herein respondent on the basis of an affidavit executed by her mother Antonia Ulibari on March 2, 1988 stating that affiant never conveyed the subject parcel of land to respondent as her attorney's fees and that the deeds of absolute sale executed in favor of her children were not known to her (and that she received no consideration therefor). On August 10, 1989, the Investigation Commissioner submitted a report finding the charges to be true and recommending a one-year suspension of the respondent from the practice of law. The first issue to be resolved is whether Antonia Ulibari was defrauded into signing the Deed of Conveyance transferring to her lawyer (herein respondent) the subject parcel of land containing 298,420 square meters as the latter's attorney's fees. It is clear from Antonia Ulibari's affidavit and deposition that she never conveyed the said land to her lawyer as attorney's fees.

Even granting for the sake argument that Antonia Ulibari knowingly and voluntarily conveyed the subject property in favor of the respondent and her husband, the respondent, in causing the execution of the Deed of Conveyance during the pendency of the appeal of the case involving the said property, has violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code which prohibits lawyers from "acquiring by assignment property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession." In the case at bar, the property (which includes the more than 20 hectares of land allegedly conveyed to the respondent) was already in actual litigation first in the lower court and then in the Court of Appeals. Whether the deed of conveyance was executed at the instance of the client driven by financial necessity or of the lawyers is of no moment (In re: Atty. Melchor E. Ruste, 70 Phil. 243). "In either case, an attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate his terms to a harrased client, in breach of the rule so amply protective of the confidential relations, which must necessarily exist between attorney and client, and of the rights of both." The act constitutes malpractice, even if the lawyer had purchased the property in litigation. (Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775; In re: Calderon, 7 Phil. 427). We agree with the Investigating Commissioner's opinion that the prohibition applies when the lawyer has not paid money for it and the property was merely assigned to him in consideration of legal services rendered at a time when the property is still the subject of a pending case. For having improperly acquired the subject property, under the foregoing circumstances, respondent has violated not only Art. 1491 of the Civil Code but also Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that "the lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting." The last issue to be resolved is whether respondent violated any law in preparing and notarizing the deeds of absolute sale in making it appear that there were considerations therefor, when in truth there were none so received by the seller. In her answer, respondent admitted that Antonia Ulibari did not actually sell the parcels of land to her children for the considerations stated in the deeds of sale and that she (respondent) "utilized the form of deed of sale as the most convenient and appropriate document to effect the transfer of the parcels of land to Antonia Ulibari's children in accordance with her wish that said parcels of land be given to them. In so doing, respondent has manifestly violated that part of her oath as a lawyer that she shall not do any falsehood. Not only that. In preparing the documents which do not reflect the true transaction, respondent has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 10.01. A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall be mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice. ACCORDINGLY, for having violated Article 1491 of the Civil Code, respondent is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, and, for having stated falsehoods in the four (4) deeds of absolute sale she prepared and notarized, in violation of the lawyer's oath and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent is also ordered suspended from the practice or law for a period of another six (6) months, resulting in a total period on one year, effective from the date this judgment becomes final. SUSPENSION ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A.C. No. 3745 October 2, 1995 CYNTHIA B. ROSACIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN B. BULALACAO, respondent. RESOLUTION FRANCISCO, J.: Complainant Cynthia B. Rosacia, president of Tacma, Phils., Inc., a duly registered corporation, filed a complaint for disbarment dated October 25, 1991, against herein respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao. Acting on the complaint, the Court in a resolution dated February 24, 1992, resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, the IBP investigating commissioner, found that respondent breached his oath of office and accordingly recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) 1 months. In a resolution dated July 30, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve 2 the commissioner's report and recommendation. As found by the IBP, the undisputed facts are as follows: On June 1, 1990, by virtue of a written Agreement (Exh. "3-a"), respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao was hired as retained counsel of a corporation by the name of Tacma Phils., Inc. On October 31, 1990, the lawyer-client relationship between the respondent and Tacma Phils., Inc. was severed as shown by another agreement of even date (Exh. "3-b"). On July, 1991, or after almost nine (9) months from the date respondent's retainer agreement with Tacma, Phils., Inc. was terminated, several employees of the corporation consulted the respondent for the purpose of filing an action for illegal dismissal. Thereafter, he agreed to handle the case for the said employees as against Tacma, Phils., Inc. by filing a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission, and 3 appearing in their behalf. The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not respondent breached his oath of office for representing the employees of his former client, Tacma, Phils., Inc., after the termination of their attorney-client relationship. We agree with the findings of the IBP that respondent breached his oath of office. Respondent does not now dispute this. In fact, in his motion for reconsideration, respondent admitted that he "did commit an act bordering on grave misconduct, if not outright violation of his attorney's 4 oath". However, respondent is pleading for the Court's compassion and leniency to reduce the IBP recommended three months suspension to either fine or admonition with the following proffered grounds: that he is relatively new in the profession having been admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990 at the age of 46 when the complained conduct was committed on August 1991; that he is of humble beginnings and his suspension will deprive his family of its only source of livelihood he being the sole bread winner in the family; that he has fully realized his mistake and the gravity of his offense for which he is fully repentant; that he has severed his attorney-client relationship with the employees of Tacma, Phils.,

Inc. by inhibiting himself and withdrawing his appearance as counsel in the labor case against Tacma, Phils., Inc.; and that he pledges not to commit the same mistake and to henceforth strictly adhere to the professional standards set forth by the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated as it is not good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other person against his former client under the 5 pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the former case. It behooves respondent not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of 6 paramount importance in the administration of justice. The relation of attorney and client is one of 7 confidence and trust in the highest degree. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he ought 8 to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. An attorney not only becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's cause, but also learns from his client the weak and strong points of the case. No opportunity must be given attorneys to take advantage of the secrets of clients obtained while the confidential relation of attorney and client exists. Otherwise, the legal profession will suffer by 9 the loss of the confidence of the people. Respondent's plea for leniency cannot be granted. We note that respondent is new in the profession as he was just admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990, when the breach of his oath of office occurred more than a year after. Having just hurdled the bar examinations which included an examination in legal ethics, surely the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility to keep inviolate the client's 10 trust and confidence even after the attorney-client relation is terminated must have been still fresh in his mind. A lawyer starting to establish his stature in the legal profession must start right and dutifully abide by the norms of conduct of the profession. This will ineluctably redound to his benefit and to the upliftment of the legal profession as well. ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three months. Let this resolution be attached to respondent's record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof furnished to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

A.C. No. 2837 October 7, 1994 ESTEBAN M. LIBIT, complainant, vs. ATTYS. EDELSON G. OLIVA and FLORANDO A. UMALI, respondent. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: In civil Case No. 84-24144 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "Pedro Cutingting, plaintiff versus Alfredo Tan, defendant", the Honorable Presiding Judge Domingo Panis issued the following order: The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is hereby ordered to conduct an investigation with the end in view of determining the author of the Sheriff's Return which appears to have been falsified and to institute such criminal action as the evidence will warrant. (p. 1, Final Report.) After conducting the necessary investigation, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), through herein complainant, charged respondents as follows: That sometime in May 1984 in the City of Manila, at the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLI, Manila, Philippines, the above-named Respondents, as Counsels for PEDRO CUTINGTING in Civil Case No. 84-24144, entitled PEDRO CUTINGTING, Plaintiff vs. ALFREDO TAN, Defendant, did then and there, knowingly, willfully introduced/presented in evidence before the aforesaid Regional Trial Court, a falsified Sheriff's Return of Summons during the hearing of the aforesaid Civil Case thereby impending and/or obstructing the speedy administration and/or dispensation of Justice. (p. 2, Final Report, ff. p. 69, Record.) Respondents in their respective answers denied having any hand in the falsification of the said sheriff's return. Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the resolution of the Court En Banc of April 12, 1988, the case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. In view, however, of the report of the National Bureau of Investigation to the effect that the signature above the typewritten name Florando Umali on the last page of the complaint in said civil case is not his signature, complainant, through counsel, agreed to the dismissal of the case with respect to Atty. Umali. With respect to Atty. Edelson G. Oliva, the IBP submitted the following report and recommendation:

There is ample evidence extant in the records to prove that Atty. Oliva has something to do with the falsification of the Sheriff's Return on the Summons in said Civil Case No. 84-24144. The oral and documentary evidence of the complainant strongly tend to show the following: (1) The Sheriff's Return of the Summon in the said civil case was falsified as it was not signed by Deputy Sheriff Rodolfo Torella (Exh. "J" Sworn Statement of Rodolfo Torella dated February 1, 1985, and Exh. "S", which is the falsified Sheriff's Return); (2) The summons was received from the clerk of the Court of the Manila RTC-Branch LXI by Ronaldo Romero, a messenger in the law office of Attys. Umali and Oliva and said messenger brought the summons to the law office of the respondents (Exh. "H" Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Ronaldo Romero, and Exh. "G", Exh. "I" Sworn Statement dated February 28, 1985 of Mariano Villanueva, Chief Staff Asst. 2, RTC, Manila; (3) On the basis of the falsified Sheriff's Return on the Summons, Atty. Oliva, counsel for the defendant [should be plaintiff] in said civil case, filed a typewritten Motion to Declare Defendant in Default (Exh.) "R" Motion to Declare Defendant In Default in said civil case signed and filed by Atty. Oliva); (4) On March 29, 1984, Atty. Oliva, in his capacity as Operations Manager of Judge Pio R. Marcos Law Office, sent a final demand letter on Alfredo Tan, the defendant in said Civil case, for payment of the sum of P70,174.00 (Exh. "T" Demand Letter dated March 28, 1984 of Atty. Oliva addressed to Alfredo Tan); (5) The demand letter of Atty. Oliva (Exh. "T"), the complaint in said civil case (Exh. "Q", "Q-1", and "Q-2"), the falsified Sheriff's Return on the Summons (Exh. "S"), the Motion To Declare Defendant In Default dated October 30, 1984 signed and filed by Atty. Oliva (Exh. "R" and "R-1") were typed on one and the same typewriter, as shown in the Questioned Document Report No. 198-585 dated 19 June 1985 (Exh. "Q", "Q-1" and "Q-2"; Exh. "V", "V-1" and "V-2"). After the careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the IBP, the Court finds that respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary powers. The facts, as supported by the evidence, obtaining in this case indubitably reveal respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party. At this juncture, it is well to stress once again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. It can not be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy the expectation. It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their first duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all court officers sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court (Chavez vs. Viola, 196 SCRA 10 [1991]. In this case, respondent Atty. Edelson Oliva has manifestly violated that part of his oath as a lawyer that he shall not do any falsehood. He has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Accordingly, the Court resolved to impose upon Atty. Edelson Oliva the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. The case is ordered dismissed as against Atty. Florando Umali.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

A.C. No. 4539 May 14, 1997 ROMANA R. MALIGSA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent. PER CURIAM: ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING is charged by Romana R. Maligsa in a verified affidavit-complaint for disbarment with conduct unbecoming a lawyer for certifying under oath a Deed of Quitclaim dated 5 May 1 1992 over a piece of property subject of a pending civil case before the Regional Trial Court Br. 45, 2 Urdaneta, Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. U-5434. On 11 March 1996 we required respondent to comment on the complaint. He failed to comply despite service upon him of our Resolution together with copy of the complaint. On 22 October 1996 we considered the failure of respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting to file his comment as waiver of his right to do so and directed the case submitted for decision. On the basis of the complaint and the supporting documents, this Court finds sufficient legal basis for disciplinary action against respondent for making it appear in the Acknowledgment of the Deed of Quitclaim a question that the affiant therein signed the document and acknowledged the contents thereof before him as Notary Public on 5 May 1992 when in truth and in fact the affiant did not and could not have done so. The evidence clearly discloses that on 5 May 1992 a Deed of Quitclaim was purportedly executed by one Irene Maliga in favor of Juanito V. Abaoag over a parcel of land located in Cablong, Pozorrubio, 3 Pangasinan. The subject document was notarized by respondent on the same date. The document was apparently used as evidence against complainant in a pending civil case for annulment of OCT No. P31297, quieting of title with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order plus damages. The complainant alleges that the Deed of Quitclaim could not have been executed and notarized on 5 May 1992 because the affiant Irene Maligsa died on 21 April 1992 or sixteen (16) days 4 earlier. Moreover, Irene Maligsa could not have signed the document because she "never knew how to 5 write as she uses the thumb mark in every transaction she entered." Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides (a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledgment
6

that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. Furthermore, the Acknowledgment contained in the questioned 7 document specifically provides "BEFORE ME personally appeared IRENE MALIGSA . . . . ." Clearly, the party acknowledging must personally appear before the Notary Public or any other person authorized to take such acknowledgment of instruments or documents. In the case before us, it would have been physically and legally impossible for the affiant Irene Maligsa to have executed the alleged Deed of Quitclaim on 5 May 1992 and to have personally subscribed to its authenticity and validity before respondent notary public on the same date, affiant having died on 21 April 1992. Also, it behooves respondent as a notary public to require the personal appearance of the person executing a document to enable the former to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant. Quite importantly, this is not the first time that respondent has been involved in an act of malpractice in violation of his oath as a lawyer and the Canons of Professional Ethics. In the consolidated administrative cases of Valencia v. Cabanting, the Court suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting for six (6) months from the practice of law. In those cases respondent purchased his client's property which was still the subject of a pending certiorari proceeding contrary to the prohibition stated in Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code and Art. II of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Under the circumstances, a recollection of the basic principles of professional ethics in the practice of law is apropos. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the court and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal 9 profession. Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and protection of the interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and the administrative offices 10 generally. Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon respondent and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. By his effrontery of notarizing a fictitious or spurious document, he has made a mockery of the legal solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or 11 unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of his prior misconduct hereinbefore mentioned for which he was penalized with a six (6) month suspension from the practice of law, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely, the contumacious behavior of respondent in the instant case which grossly degrades the legal profession indeed warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty.
8

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING guilty of grave misconduct rendering him unworthy of his continued membership in the legal profession; consequently, he is ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all the courts of the land as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded in the personal files of respondent. SO ORDERED.