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ITALY
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BY
W. K.
M C CLURE
LONDON
CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LTD
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1913
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PREFACE
This book
is
full
and
fair
my own
experiences
the
It
public
on April
1,
1912
all
weeks of
my
stay I
was given
move-
ment and investigation within the area occupied by the Italians, and that I availed myself fully of the freedom
permitted.
In describing
those
operations
of
which took
experience
official
and period
place,
my own
have
relied, in
the
first
of
participants, given to
me
in writing or in conversation.
is
;
That
all errors
in detail
but
substan-
The three large maps are reproduced from maps compiled by the military authorities in Tripolitania during the war, and my thanks are due to General Spingardi, the Italian Minister of War, and to General Caneva, late Governor and Commander-in-Chief in Tripolitania, for their kindness in supplying me with copies of these maps and allowing me to make use of them. The maps are sketch
maps, and only approximately accurate
:
new
series,
a2
vi
recently
These
errors,
from the
maps.
maps
of Benghazi
face pp. 56
and 204
respectively, I
am
Ambassador
make
use of the
official
war.
To
my
friends,
W.
F. Riley, I
am much
and
my
am
the
specially indebted to
of
bombardment
and
to Captain
Scelsi, of
Army,
by name,
of
the warmestmemory.
May
1913.
CONTENTS
PAGE
PREFACE
I.
V
1
A RETROSPECT
II.
19
III.
THE OCCUPATION OF
38
ITS
IV.
THE REVOLT OF OCTOBER 23 AND THE SECOND PHASE THE THIRD PHASE
: :
SEQUEL
60
90
V.
VI.
110
131
VII.
VIII.
149
189
IX.
X.
XI.
XII.
XIII.
209 233
263
AND TURK
283
305
321
XIV. ITALY
POSTSCRIPT
INDEX
323
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Old Tripoli
~ _ Old Tripoli
:
in
(
Frontispiece.
\ I
_ r Perfume-Sellers
,
To
,_
face p.
18
A
A
Saint's
\
!-
Old Tripoli
-[
Road Mosque
:
30
the Oasis
.J
The Bombardment
48
58
)
An Arab Well
The Bread-Market, with the Konak
GROUND
in
60
the back-
L
.
.
64
A A
of
Djemal
68
J-
Feschlum
Sharashat
72
\
78
/
^
J
.
86
Reconnaissance
94
November
17,
1911
....
To face
p.
96
106
HO
112
I 20
Zara
....
18,
124
128
1912
20, 1912
Amruss
Amruss
A
.
:
Hamura
A Very Hot
138
5)
144
The Landing of the First Locomotive Work on the Ain Zara Railway
zuara, taken from an alrship
in Tripoli
)
156
172
))
from an Airship
188 192
Derna
the
'
Port
'
The Foyat
near Benghazi
.
J)
200
234
254
to Ain
Zara
258
in Tripoli
260 264
266
A A
Group of
'
Arabs' at Tajura
.
Tripolitan Types
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
An Arab Woman
)
XI
Tripolitan Jewess
To face p. 272
Beduin Children
1 r
J
280
282
:}
284
Soil,
A
:}
294
Derna
General View
MAPS
Benghazi and
its
Environs
To face
p.
56
Derna and
its
Environs
204
The Tripolitan Coastal Plains and the Northern Rim of the Great Plateau .At end
.
....
of booh
A RETROSPECT
It was scarcely to be expected that the sudden accomplishment of Italy's long-threatened descent upon Tripolitania should meet with a warm welcome from the public opinion of Europe. To Italy, as far as can be ascertained, the moment of her action seemed specially opportune and in a sense it was so. For, if she had not seized the chance that seemed to present itself, there is more than a probability that it would never have recurred. On the other hand, the declaration of war came at a time when the nerves of Europe were still stretched and quivering with the tension of a crisis barely overpast and this fact
; ;
rendered
Italian
all
move.
press
for
weeks had
And
the
is
when Turkey
concerned) to open up further complications, and to disturb the hardly preserved adjustment of various delicate
questions.
In the circumstances,
it is
many
A
of the organs
which form,
The
2
accusation
of
brigandage/
so
widely
levelled
against
and anxiety.
For
it
is
would lead us
to infer.
The presumption is legitimate that the factors of the Tripolitan problem had passed temporarily out of mind under the stress of other and more clamorous interests.
Otherwise
it
would be
difficult to
account
satis-
tone of
tion
comment upon
convenient.
Italian action.
The
true explanais
may
short
and
When
Italy
stretched
out her
hand
to pluck
an
and circumstance
why
this
basis
of
To do more than
indicate these
book
pose.
pur-
outlined
the tense
Morocco
fear of
ful
was the
first effective
cause of European
ill-humour.
the
less
natural
Balkan complications
first,
and a
third,
not
power-
involved.
The
famous sentence in
reproaches
gesticulating stage-figures
he
A RETROSPECT
Attacking Turkey, Italy laid a desecratweaken Turkey. ing hand upon the most sacred treasure-house of international finance. The nicely balanced complex of financial interests may remain stable under the threat, or even the
shock, of a struggle between
But Turkey
has been the Ark of the Covenant, that might not be touched.
was
understand
It
must
by unavoidable circumstance, partly by her own action. The Italian Government was at pains to justify the declaration of war by the publication of a brief which did not, and could not, set forth its whole case. It was rewarded by the assumption, on the part of a large section of public opinion, that no further justification was possible and, is there excuse assumption, for an unsympagranting the While the list of grievances thetic and critical attitude. published in October 1911 was sufficient indication of an intolerable position, that list, taken by itself, scarcely
;
difficulties between Italy and Turkey might reasonably have been adjusted other-
by the occupation
of Tripolitania.
We
have to
belli
remarkable feature of
is
much
situation
enterprise
hunger
greed for
colonies
'
and
'
empire
'
which
has
4
of the mark,
to understand, or to regard
demands in regard to Tripoli is a new question, suddenly sprung upon a startled and unsuspecting Europe. Such a contention rests upon a complete disregard of recent Nor is recent a wholly suitable adjective, for history.
'
'
Italian aspirations in
of a century.
North Africa for not yet in was being Italy and ever since the idea has lain at the back of every Italian statesman's mind. At first it was no more than an idea, a mighty
It
was
dream
re-born
Italy
Rome.
Yet even
already curtailed
at Florence.
obvious
at the time,
clear as daylight
and the
fact
is
Mazzini' s
discussed,
early
political
dream had crystallised into a definite, aim. The aim persisted, though no
was found able or
willing to translate
Italian statesman
it
into action,
till
awoke
littoral
was
hands.
Egypt had
tion,
though
A RETROSPECT
hopes.
but Tunis had been for years the definite centre of Italian
The informed opinion of Italy, if not the Italian Government, had come to regard Tunis as a legitimate sphere of influence, and the lesson of French action in 1881 has never been forgotten. The dream was shattered, and the sentiment which had gone to its making concentrated slowly into a determination that the last remnant of Roman
Africa open to Italian ambition (Morocco lay outside the radius of Italian aim) should be assured to Italy.
The strength
seizure of Tunis,
indicated by the fact that the French and the prospect of further French activity,
it is
argued
still,
is
unnatural.
But
Italy
saw
clearly
that
the
bound
to assure herself
Yet
in all pro-
more than thirty years ago, if at that time her attention had not been specially fixed upon Tunis. The publication of Crispi's Memoirs throws a clear light upon
various points which have been the subject of debate,
In the
first
place, it
An
account of these
6
discussions
May
1881,
the
Congress.
Questions
followed
in
responded in the
official
manner which
:
may
ment
in a position to furnish
contained in the
of
am
drawn
by answering
my
On
he was
documents
Office in
of
denial,
as proofs or
there
had been
and that no
official
his
Govern-
left
me
Memoirs
Id. ibid.
ii.
p. 116.
Id. ibid.
A RETROSPECT
cession of Tripoli to Italy as a compensation
in the course of conversation at the Berlin Congress.'
1
was ventilated
further quotation
from
:
Crispi's
'
The
on August
11,
official
?
:
'
my
I mentioned to had had with Lord Salisbury during the last days of the Congress, and said that I had expressed my regret to him that the English
Government should
convention
not, at least,
regarding
the Island of
The
head
me
to enter
1
upon a discussion on this point." therefore, an indisputable fact that Lord Salisbury felt that compensation was due to Italy, and if his opinion was expressed in such a manner as parIt
is,
tially to
De Launay
ii.
naturally
Memoirs
p. 117.
it
In point of
Powers
Italy's attention
direction.
Though the
of
is
distrust of
was deliberately guided in that France which followed Tunis drove Italy into Germany's
fears of
if,
at that
had been
'
It had been compensation offered. by England that the acquisition of Tripoli would be favourably regarded, and it was obviously to France's interest that the friction inevitably consequent upon her actions in Tunis should be minimised by the offer of a quid pro quo. The suggestion made by Freycinet to the Italian Ambassador, in July 1880, must have been perfectly sincere. Why will you persist in thinking of Tunis, where your rivalry may one day cause a breach in our friendly rela-
accepting the
indicated
tions
Why
?
to
is
interesting
'
:
These
me
of a similar phrase
Due
permanent and
do
tradi-
their best
and
develop.'
in Berlin,
ii.
Id., p. 107.
A RETROSPECT
Nor did Freycinet
out the suggestion.
rest content with
merely throwing
indi-
During
this
same interview he
and
of time,
offered to support
The future
led,
is
in God's hands,
and
it is
not impossible
still
far off,
France might
by the force of circumstances, to occupy and annex Tunis. ... I can assure you that France has no intenbe
tion whatsoever of occupying Tunis, but, as the future
is
in God's hands,
and as
it
you
hand as
possible,
and would
receive
Here was a
fair
warning and a
fair offer.
Neither the
They
preferred to accept
of events.
come
compen-
sation,
The
its
lines
two
seem
two
facts
The
reaction
1
Memoirs
p. 108.
10
two opportunities
Mediterranean
:
first,
when
by both France and England when she declined to co-operate with England in Egypt. The refusal to proceed to the acquisition of Tripoli
was no doubt due, in part, to the inertia of the Cabinet, and to a reluctance to engage in commitments for which
the country might not be ready, but another operative
French promises of
in
any
Regency was
Other
that Italy
position
felt herself
by the
alliance with
Germany and
Austria.
considerations were
made
safeguarding
herself
against
of
French
hostility,
and the
was
Bardo the
Lord
same
distrust of
England's
action
:
in
Egypt.
In view of the
restless
ambition displayed at
Government
It
in
is
in
Egypt
have
appears at
first
sight strange.
power, could
A RETROSPECT
attached
11
much importance
to Turkish promises,
or
Turkish assistance.
Italian inaction
desire
to
spare
the Porte. 1
at a map of the Mediterranean makes it why no Power looked with favour upon Italian aspirations in Tunis why France felt it imperative to forestall Italian action, and why England lent support to a
One glance
evident
French occupation.
The possession of Tunis and Sicily by the same Power would have severed too abruptly and completely the eastern and western halves of the
Mediterranean.
clearly
further
look
at
the
map shows
as
why
more
especially after
was well
The occupation
and
2
European demand
for
Modem
Egypt, vol.
i.
pp. 308-309.
12
by
in
Italy was,
politics,
speaking,
an axiom
of
Mediterranean
men
and only the resolve of the leading Italy to devote the energies and resources of their
off till
yesterday an
event which had been foreseen and reckoned with for more
Even before the events in Tunis and Egypt which narrowed the scope of Italian ambition, there had been a section of opinion which centred upon Tripolithan a generation.
tania the hope of territorial acquisition which was stirring
The widely quoted letter of Rohlfs, the famous explorer, which was published in the journal L'Esploratore at the beginning of 1880, had a profound effect upon the comparatively few men who had begun to translate vague
in Italy.
dreams into
Tripolitania
'
definite aims.
Italy,
since I
am
more "
Italian.
The expression
Romans and
Northward
of
might be in Italy
conquer.
set
it
is
re-
It is incomprehensible to
me
more value upon her rights over Tripoli. Later, I shall take it upon myself to prove that he who possesses that country will be the master of the Sudan. For me, the
possession of Tunis has not a tenth part the value of Tripoli.'
of Rohlfs
is
to
cumstances of to-day.
But
publication in UEsploratore,
A RETROSPECT
merciale,
is
13
This Milanese
Society
made
and
in
and
report.
by Signor Camperio, the leader of the main expedition, and Signor Pietro Mamoli, who devoted himself specially
to
agricultural
possibilities.
An
extract
from one of
iv.)
may
'
be
:
taken
as
exemplifying
the
trend
of
Italian
opinion
Our departure
to
;
for Cyrenaica,
attention
aspirations
that country,
created
and strong
To put
it
shortly,
or constitute
its
it
moves always before it. I left Italy it was still disputable whether or no was opportune for us to adopt the so-called " Colonial
When
policy."
'
To-day,
now
that
all
European Powers,
of
Tripoli
was
fully
and in Tripolitania itself the arrival of an Italian expedition was expected. But no action was taken, and the colonial
party, not yet strong or influential, reproached the Govern-
14
ment
'
neglect.
Brunialti,
:
one of
their
But the
Italian
Government
let
The
occupation of Tunis,
it is
and defence.
'
we refused the offer when acceptance involved no danger we declined to take it when we had the strongest pretexts for doing so and we returned to Berlin in 1884-85, as we went in 1878,
dominating influence in Tripolitania
of it
;
The danger
grave warning
'
of being forestalled
is
is
accentuated, and a
:
Who
will
between an
Distrust
infinite risk
and an
infinite humiliation
of
France continued,
friction, while it
would
'
the position of Italy in the alliance was wholly unsatis1 Ultalia e la Questione Coloniale, A. Brunialti, Deputato 2 Id. ibid. Published in 1885.
al
Parlamento,
A RETROSPECT
factory.
15
the object for which she had deliberately turned her back
In
Crispi's words,
interests.'
still
own
The natural
encouraged by
From
acted
perfect
accord
over Mediterranean
questions,
were still more clearly defined by the formal agreement which recognised the Tripolitan
until in 1902 the positions
Tunis was to be
still
Twelve years rumour that France's grip upon further tightened by the conversion
fully
by Lord
Salisbury,
who committed
'
opinion that
quo in the
whatsoever,
Mediterranean
Italy's
any
alteration
occupation
x
of
Tripoli
will
become an absolute
necessity.'
On
He
be
but for which neither the Great Powers nor public opinion
in
England
is
at present prepared.'
not, or
ally in Mediter-
p. 451.
Id., p. 452.
16
policy.
it
England, but
the desired
necessary.
fruit, an understanding with France was also While England could give a general support to
many points
at which French
and English
In 1900
Italy a free
hand
in Tripolitania in return
upon
Tripolitania.
Upon
this recognition
by
Not
Government held
eyes
is
sufficiently indicated
and
its results.
For
this
agreement pledged
by a
by a
policy of
'
peaceful penetration.'
Numerous
office
diffi-
culties
the Italian
A RETROSPECT
17
Foreign Ministry vied with the Turkish authorities in discouraging the development of Italian enterprise in Tripoli
final action
presented
itself
when Austria
Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and in so doing tore up more than one As far as can be judged, this would have been the treaty.
most favourable moment
pation of Tripolitania.
Italy
for Italy to proceed to the occu-
The
and
Tripoli,
the Italian
and report goes so far as to allege that Government was only restrained by the urgent and dominant, member
of the Triple
of Italy
adven-
politicians,
of Tripolitania to the
Greek
falsified,
a matter of history
now
rife
Italy to go to Tripoli in
for so
an obvious hurry
after holding
many
years,
step at
more
suitable.
make the move, in spite of a hint that the Power which had said No three years before would be happy to support her. It is certain that half-way through
unwilling to
the
summer
of the
same
was grave
friction
18
shadowed.
By
map
England made
it
clear
Morocco would be
finally regularised.
was now at
last
about to
strike.
The
an alteration. Moreover, the relations between Italy and Turkey had become severely strained, owing to the attitude
of
the latter
and the
impossibility
of
obtaining any
demanded
the step which had been the subject of diplomatic discussion for
more than
thirty years.
its
On
bettered,
WALLi:
19
CHAPTER
II
Throughout
rose rapidly,
the
summer
of the
it
Government slowly
ebbed.
The note
made
were
still
Only the
tration
was inevitably doomed to failure could have won over Signor Giolitti to the move which he had consistently
The
policy he
cessful,
and
it
became increasingly
had acquiesced
in
'
peaceful penetration
as a provisional
the
By
first
week
in
September
it
became
obvious to
Negotiations
20
class
no longer seemed
moment
passed,
there seemed
little
The comity
of nations entertains
it
vexed
flag.
probable interval
slip,
some years was indicated, if Italy let the present moment and during that interval it was impossible to say what
challenge her historic lien
new claims might crop up to upon the Tripolitan provinces. been reinforced by the lesson
offer
The
lesson of Tunis
had
safe-
of Morocco,
of
From
Italy's point of
demanded the immediate recognition of her political predominance in the two provinces, and this recognition Turkey was naturally unwilling to accord. Nor
could Turkey believe that the diplomatic and material
support, which had so often propped her weakness, would
The 1889
class
3,
was
on November
21
September
it
became
European
inhabitants of Tripoli
became a matter
of
of
some concern.
On September
nople,
Italian subjects,
and
On September
were recalled to the colours, and on the same day the news
was made public that the Turkish steamer Derna, laden with arms and ammunition, was on its way to Tripoli.
On September
<T Affaires
at Con-
most emphatic terms, pointing out the danger run by Italian subjects in Tripoli, and warning Turkey that the
despatch of transports or munitions of war to Tripoli at
this juncture
act.
On
German
flag,
Minister, Marchese
and on the same day the Italian Foreign Di San Giuliano, telegraphed Italy's
on September 28.
are characteristic
cir-
reasonableness displayed
by Turkey.
may
1
Throughout a long series of years the Royal Government has not ceased to impress upon the Sublime Porte
22
have been
by Turkey, and
Such a transformation,
exigencies of civilisation,
which
is
is
In spite of the
line of
some
moderation and
its
intentions in regard
ment
but,
what
is
more
serious,
hitherto, in this
way, displayed
recently,
and sovereign
But the Royal Governany ment does not now feel negotiations of the kind. Past experience has shown that such negotiations are futile, and that instead of constituting
interests of Turkey.
itself
a guarantee for the future they could only give cause for
permanent
'
friction
and
conflict.
On
Government
from
its
23
an agitation which has been provoked, in the clearest manner, by officers and other mouthpieces of Turkish
authority.
and
'
and preoccupied
The
arrival at Tripoli of
Ottoman military
is
transports,
bound
to aggravate
the situation, and to impose upon the Italian Government the duty and obligation of taking measures against the
resultant dangers.
'
The
Italian
Government, seeing
proceed
to
itself
forced in this
way
of
to consider
how
to
and
its interests,
has
decided
military
occupation
Tripolitania
*
and Cyrenaica.
is
This solution
Italian Government depends upon the Imperial Government to give such orders as may prevent any opposition on the part of the Ottoman representatives, in order
and the
that
all
necessary
measures
may
be
effected
without
difficulty.
'
arise
definite
The Embassy at Constantinople has orders to request a and final answer from the Ottoman Government
document to the Sublime Porte. Failing which, Government will be under the necessity of
the Italian
may be
required
24
It
is
a satisfactory reply to
temporise, for
till
demand.
the last
moment
and that if the bluff were seen,' the support of the other European Powers furnished her with a hand strong enough to win the stakes. The answer of the Porte is a model of what such an answer should be. Its tone of
bluffing,
was
demands that could honourably be granted, reflects the highest credit upon the official responsible for the document
ness to consider
all
:
is
aware
An
is
indeed sufficient
Ottoman Government cannot be charged with the responsibility for a situation which is the work of the old regime.
to demonstrate that the constitutional
'
events of the past three years, has searched in vain for the
occasions on which
it
is
itself
and Cyrenaica.
it
On
under-
standable and rational that Italy should co-operate with her capital and her industrial activity in the economic
revival of this part of the Empire.
'
is
conscious of having
it
shown
itself
itself
has found
faced
lines.
It has like-
most amicable
Royal Embassy.
complaints
presented
by the
25
Is it necessary to
add that
in so doing
it
obeyed
its
to
cultivate
and mainItalian
Government
'
Moreover,
it
was inspired
by
this
sentiment
when
it
its
and sovereign
already
interests of the
existing,
its
the
measure of
by the
will of
one
party only.
1
As
and security
of Tripolitania
and
what
it
and other
foreigners settled
of agitation observable
incitement,
Not only is there at this moment no sort and still less any propaganda of but the officers and other instruments of Ottoout
their
man
of
order,
instructions.
1
As
ports, to
necessary
is
in
26
Note
vessel,
September
27.
Reduced
Government regarding the expansion of its economic interests in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The Royal Government, if it will refrain from so serious an act as a military occupation, will find the Sublime Porte
'
firmly resolved to
'
smooth out
this difficulty.
therefore,
requests
the
which
it will
end
in view,
it
pledges
itself
With way
and Cyrenaica, particularly from the military standpoint, and it expresses the hope that the Royal
Government
The
Italian response
the
short
As the Ottoman Government has not accepted the demands contained in the Italian Ultimatum, Italy and Turkey are from this date, September 29, 2.30 p.m., in a
state of war.
'
will provide,
with
all
the means
all
and
other
Cyrenaica.
The vessel in question was the Derna. It is not clear why her cargo arms and ammunition, destined for distribution among the Arabs, should have had the reassuring influence claimed by the Porte.
1
'
of
'
27
The blockade
will
of the
Cyrenaica
Powers.'
The following note was added in the newspapers At 5.40 p.m. to-day the Ministry of Foreign
*
Affairs
made
'
the press
Ultimatum
did not give the definite and final answer requested, but
of the
King
of Italy
would
fully
it
be desirable, for
by means
case cannot be
official
summed up
ultimatum
Turkey,
claims
of
it
much
In point of
long-suffering in
and to her
prestige.
interfered
with in the
Red
and
28
actual,
if
no other
European Power would have tolerated attitude adopted by Turkey towards Italy.
especially,
so long the
In Tripolitania,
Italian enterprise
subjects ill-treated,
obtained no satisfaction.
Some critics of Italy's action have displayed their illhumour by blaming the Italian Government for the causes
which led to the war as well as
for the
war
itself.
Beginning
with a condemnation of the war as being without excuse, they shift their ground when faced with a
grievances,
list
of Italy's
Italy
was
clearly at fault in
it is
the
its
prestige without
is
The argument
surely faulty.
may
ments had
may
be pursued by
all
who favour
of Tripolitania.
But the
criticise
have characterised as
It
is
all
and
is
Such an argument
at
has proved that they are able and ready to back words
by deeds,
demands.
they
all
at different times
less
made
it
clear that
if
had yet to show that she was prepared to follow the same path.
will
Italy
29
the case of
in
Turkey the ordinary rules scarcely apply. jealousy has more than once made it difficult
International
for a
European
Power
It
book
for its
methods.
may
that Italian
To deny
the truth
of
this
forecast
would be absurd
later, to
Tripolitania
be
In
first
all
made by
off
finally
Turk.
Still,
On
the other
full right
hand, those
For long
an
and Turkish
fact.
rulers knew how to take full advantage of the They played upon these jealousies often enough,
With
Young Turkish
party, all
in
an honest
hand.
chance.
Excesses
30
In the circumstances,
it was not too much to Young Turkish party should attempt to deal
and squarely with the civilised Powers of Europe. But Young Turkey, so far, has been simply Old Turkey writ large. To the bluffing and temporising which had its origin in a realisation of European jealousy the new government added an arrogance born of the knowledge that Europe welcomed a new parliament. Believing itself secure of support from the strongest Powers, Young Turkey
made
with impunity.
if
we
are to
The shown
how
it
for
Italy
had watched
day when
her
should
make good
Honesty
The
blessings
of
civilisation
may
frequently
civilisation.
now
to
Explorers
in
Tripolitania
from
story
Richardson
Vischer
have
recorded
the
same
how
Turkish
^ra&"
J#^
,
8P>
Ml
/
1
jtfm
31
and misgovernment have crushed the subject upon the fields and
abandon.
Modern
the
and
duties.
The problem is not one which has mind in the Ottoman Empire the
;
a Government
function
is
is
way
of
the negation of
all
performance,
and the
No
fact that
no improvements
Hamidian regime would clearly be unjust. The party or parties of reform had their hands full with other more pressing problems. The Tripolitan provinces appeared, no
doubt, to
lie
upon the Ottoman would naturally those problems which had long attracted
and
first efforts
unwelcome notice and threatened European intervention. Albania, Macedonia, and Armenia furnish the test by which the Committee of Union and Progress must accept judgment.
of civilisation
all
government and
32
Lord
a bewildered ruler,
who
of
his
warlike
when they planted their horse-tails on the banks Bosphoras.' * The Young Turks have acquired a
'
greater fluency in
it
The condition
clearly
of affairs in Tripolitania
demanded, and as
clearly foreshadowed,
European intervention.
trade in Cyrenaica, the
The continuance
general
the slaveof
insecurity
and neglect
and
prosperity.
Italy
had to
if
she
and
inevitable
grounds
But a general apprehension of forestalment 2 and rumour has obstinately supplied an added reason
;
Modem
This
'
Egypt, vol.
i.
p. 129.
'
is evidenced by frequent references in the Italian press to possible frontier encroachments by the French and
general apprehension
and Egypt.
casting a longing eye upon Ghadames, while credited with designs upon Tobruk.
33
more
been
satisfactorily
the
obvious
haste
with
has
widely
maintained,
if
and
Italy
in
spite
of
to-morrow.
Two
and
it
The
denied
first
;
has been
officially
frequently
The
story
is
it is
widely
believed in Italy
public opinion.
and has undoubtedly influenced Italian It was stated, and the statement originally
is
known
as
'
in return for
The
power
in the Mediterranean
wind of the matter. The contradictions of German diplomacy are well known and understood, and a quite feasible explanation is offered
for the different attitudes
by Germany
While
it is
in the spring
and
in the late
summer
facts
of 1911.
sponsible for
German
policy,
the
known
If
it
is
and the
a reasonable deduction.
Germany encouraged
it
34
ment might make out a case for compensation/ or, to put it more bluntly, payment for services rendered. Perhaps it was expected that Italy would be willing to surrender Tobruk to her ally, or even a larger slice of territory, in
return for support in her occupation of the Turkish provinces.
By
summer the
situation
had changed,
aspirations.
and a more favourable opportunity was offered to German Italy had declined the friendly hints of the
and it was possible to break fresh ground altogether by coming to an arrangement with France. Although the story is circumstantial, and fits very well
spring,
Italy's case, it
can
When
But
the weather
is
may
susceptible of proof
there are
;
many
circumstances which
Government did fear that Italy's position might be prejudiced by German action, though in a less The second story is not only direct and violent manner.
reasonable
truth.
;
it
may
in Tripoli
by Germany,
in a sphere
upon as mainly reserved for herself, so far as fresh enterHer uneasiness was increased by the appointment of a regular German Consul in Tripoli, by the establishment of a steamer service by the Deutsche Levant Linie,
prise went.
and by the
fact that
German
interests
35
way
of Italian
commercial
effort.
of 1911
a very
difficult
situation.
Turkish authorities,
efforts
who had
were prepared
and immense
political
The example
of
and she perceived that in the present case a special danger lurked. It might have been well worth while for Turkey to cede a part or even the whole of her African provinces to Germany, in exchange for support and assistance elsewhere.
lien
and
The
tions.
had
different propor-
was
all
when there was no one to deal with but Turkey, when Turkey merely declared herself opposed to Italian enterprise in Tripoli.
There
is
little
least, to
from the
had refused to
It
upon
persist in a policy
36
Turkey could not with plausibility maintain that in the Germany she had no need to fear ulterior political aims. Germany's methods are too well known to admit
case of
of such a contention.
She
is
legitimately ambitious of
making her
evitably
wherever possible.
Com-
mercial concessions to
Germany
bound
For
this reason, in
it
Constantinople,
was
*
by
hold
it
(the Turkish
Government) pledged
in regard to
other Powers.'
Italy
was bound to
act,
and to secure
readily appreciated
by the rest of Europe, that the Italian case does not rest upon any flagrant casus belli, but upon broader grounds, upon a general attitude on the part of Turkey, and upon the necessity of ensuring that the political
equilibrium in the Mediterranean should not be altered to
Italy's
disadvantage.
practically re-
was an
After
all,
The excuses
piled
;
adjusted
is
37
spirit.
if
She had
she was to
38
CHAPTER
III
THE FIRST PHASE OF THE WAR THE OCCUPATION OF THE COAST TOWNS
:
of
some third party was well known in Italy that the expeditionary corps would not be ready to start until the end of the first week in October, and the belief had been general
game.
It
in Tripoli
on September
to witness
the passing of
days.
its last
Most
them were
present
be
at
an
fell
troops.
Events
other
and that they would by Italian out differently, and the unexpected
unopposed
occupation
Tripoli, along
Italian
subjects,
forty-eight
hours after
their arrival.
On
appeared
Ferruccio
and Giuseppe Garibaldi), and six The procession of ships made a brave spec-
39
blown out square by the wind and showing very clear in A profound impression was created in the strong light.
Tripoli.
At
last, it
Mixed feelings prevailed in the town, but conviction at even the German Consul ceased to had dawned calm anxious inquirers by the assurance that his Government would never permit an Italian occupation of Tripoli.
least
:
flag.
An
and that at
Porte, a state of
and at
2 o'clock the
on the Italian Consulate was lowered, and replaced by the German flag. The hours dragged on without any sign from the fleet. Lamenting fugitives, or rather would-be
fugitives, besieged all the Consulates,
tection or for
Castlegarth,
means
filled
of
escape.
the
was
shadow
of war,
but
In
many
the
unable to escape or
unwilling to
abandon
of
their
small
hours
the
morning
his
Consul
received
telegram
from
Government,
informing
him
of
the demands of
Most
left
had already
40
many of these had collected in the Consulate for protection. On the morning of September 30,
Dr. Tilger, the
German
Governor
for a safe
The Consulate and the inn which sheltered the correspondents had been closely guarded for two days, for the Turkish authorities had feared that the strained situation might result in violence, and troops were now ordered to
line the
narrow
port.
violence,
Thanks to these precautions there was no hint of and the only insult came, very unfortunately,
ex-officer of the
from an
who had bought a property on the outskirts of Tripoli, and had more than once hinted mysteriously that his Government was behind him. As the correspondents passed, he allowed himself to fling an unworthy jeer Here come the heroes who are running away. 1 11 telegraph the
'
:
news
for you.'
The overcrowded
and
left
on board
per-
the harbour
to
transferred
Italian
The
rest
were shipped
off to
Syracuse
The main Italian fleet by a bombardment. cruised up and down the narrow seas between Sicily and the Tripolitan coast, while the Pisa and Amalfi, sister ships,
followed
41
modern armoured
eastward
to
cruisers of
ceeded
Derna, where
on October
pieces.
they
the
On
so that direct
communi-
now
and the following day the bombarding squadron, under Admiral Faravelli, rendezOctober
1
On
vous'd
off Tripoli.
The
is
no claim
to
modernity.
Admiral Faravelli's
flagship,
the Bene-
detto
may
slightly faster,
armament.
were launched in
They
armour
of
is
negligible
figure in tables
fifth
comparative
naval
The
battleship
Filiberto,
bombarding
fleet
was
old-fashioned, slab-
and
Garibaldi,
7000 tons.
squadron
but
1 The Pisa and Amalfi are 23-knot cruisers of 9832 tons. They carry four 10-inch, eight 7.5-inch, and sixteen 3-inch guns, and are well armoured, with an 8-inch belt of Krupp steel tapering to 3 inches, while their
42
Prevesa, where, on
September 29 and
torpedo-boats.
these waters
A veto was put upon further action in by the desire to avoid trenching upon Austrian susceptibilities, and this self-denying ordinance remained in force till the end of the war. Eyes began to turn further east. On October 1 Admiral Aubry left Augusta with the two battleships Roma and Vittorio Emanuele, and the torpedo-cruiser Agordat, to pick up the Napoli, Pisa and Amalfi, and go in search of the Turkish fleet, which was
uncomfortably placed at Beyrout.
There
was keen to
offer
The German
Consul entered an urgent protest against the policy of defending the town.
He
it
that
it
extinction of the
European colony.
On
Thaon De Revel,
commanding the cruiser squadron, landed in Tripoli under a white flag and renewed the demand for the surrender of the town. At the interview which took place the German Consul was present, but no satisfactory issue was reached. The Turkish authorities were anxious to await orders from
Constantinople, but
it
was
finally
43
The
Italians offered
all
moment
valent that no
bombardment would
on the evening
of
began.
But
late
October 2
ment
retire
Sur-
render, therefore,
was out
of the question,
and military
retire in face
an actual display
of force, not at
The acting Governor informed Dr. Tilger of the decision taken, and it was left to the Consular Corps to choose whether they would risk remaining in the town or take
advantage of the chance to place themselves in safety.
sulate,
nately,
and lasted a great part of the night. Unfortuno official reporter was present to record the prowhich seem to have been marked by various
incidents.
ceedings,
entertaining
wholly exasperating.
more loquacious
a natural
;
nationalities
with
whom
Zungefertiglceit is
gift,
talked round
more
in
silent
them broke
44
tion
You
of the
clearly,
and try to
force a decision.
'
What
I stay also.'
'
And you
1 stay.'
'
'
'
And you
'
set,
and
in less
The others agreed to support the decision, though with obvious misgiving, and the conference dissolved. Apparent agreement had been reached, and the decision was communicated to the Governor
intention of sticking to their posts.
felt
impelled to
in a small
He embarked
for safety,
make a push
He
many Arabs and Jews fled blindly from rumour spread that the Italians were going
town, and a wild terror resulted.
Tripoli.
The
to destroy the
The
streets
were deserted,
and people huddled in cellars to escape the destruction that threatened. Though the flags flying from the Consulates
in point of fact
some
of
bad markmanship would have rendered them actual danger-points, for the British and
office of
45
two
first,
and the
Italian fire
was naturally
Any
shot
was not fired until half an hour later. The Italian fleet was ranged in three divisions. The Re Umberto, Sardegna and Sicilia cruised slowly backwards and forwards to the
upon the three forts, Sultanieh, B. and C, which lie between Tripoli and Gargaresh. The Benedetto Brin, Emanuele Filiberto, and
fire
harbour
fortifications
while
by the Giuseppe Garibaldi and the Francesco Ferruccio. The Varese cruised ten miles out to sea, and took no part
of
in the silencing of the forts.
The
and and
it
first
by the
A
and
answer was
useless.
The Emanuele
Filiberto
came within
forts
hailing distance of
an Italian
in
ship,
and
after half
Meanwhile the
Tripoli
Fort
and stubbornly,
for nearly
an
past four the last Turkish shell plunged into the sea, pathetically ineffective like those
46
ment slackened about five o'clock. The last shot was fired at Sultanieh by the Re Umberto, less than two miles from
the shore, at six o'clock.
in
for
in the forts
were unable to cause the smallest damage, or even inconvenience, to the Italian ships.
ment
no
sort of
was made by the Turkish gunners, and several between the forts and
the ships.
to lack of
skill,
but the
Turkish
of skill
was too ridiculous to be accounted for by lack The Turks may be poor artillerymen, but alone.
fire
way
to handle a gun.
In point of
fact,
no
real
Most
of
them
of
Tripoli
was
practically
empty
The way
for
satisfac-
torily prepared,
and
it
occupy the town were not yet on the spot. Landing parties from the ships were organised and ready, but it was realised
that sixteen hundred
men were
if
speed,
and
F. Riley
Hi*
3
-qnui*m.
47
upon
Italian resources.
It
would appear
had
left
In any case,
sailed east-
who had
ward
it
fleet,
On
October
4,
Tobruk was occupied by a landing party from the Viltorio Emanuele, and the first detachment of the expeditionary corps, which left Naples on the evening of October 5, was
sent to
Tobruk instead
of to Tripoli.
till
The
October
On
the one hand, he had to face the fact that the landing which
of the
bombardment
an
Arab
auxiliaries.
On
retreat of
On
was
fired
on from Fort
Hamidieh.
The
cruiser
the destruction of the fort, and for half an hour the three
cruisers rained shells
of ruins.
upon it, reducing it to a mere heap There was no answering shot, and no sign of an enemy, but a small landing party was sent on shore, under cover of fire from the Varese and the torpedo boat Albatros, to put out of action any guns that might still be capable of
48
inflicting
successfully accomplished,
fire
without
of the
loss, in spite of
a scattered
from a detachment
of the
Karamanli,
and the
pletely dismantled.
At noon a boat put out from the harbour under a white flag, and was towed to the Benedetto Br in by a torpedo boat. It contained the German Consul, who came to request the
protection of Italian arms.
garrison
He
begun to
sible.
had evacuated the town, and that the Arabs had pillage. He feared that disturbances might ensue, and asked that the town might be occupied as soon as pos-
No
on the afternoon
of October 5 sixteen
hundred
sailors
command of
on the KonaTc.
An
arms.
sum
sum
is
offered
rifle
is
generally considered to be an
its
value
so con-
make
it
The
and the
price offered
ridiculous.
Per-
haps a napoleon apiece might have induced the commercially-minded Arab to accept a substantial certainty in
place of the greater, but dangerous and
more
speculative,
In any case,
it
Italy's while
Pliot o
Captain Mola
TROOPS LANDING
49
pay the
larger
sum
thousand
and about
five
hundred the
some days following weapons continued But many of the rifles which were given up were old and inferior, while there were many Arab muskets of the ornamental gas-pipe brand. A very large number of Mausers remained in the hands of those to whom the Turks had distributed a part It was hardly possible for Captain of the Derna's cargo.
to be received in lessening quantities.
' '
but
it
was an unfortunate
error that
when the
sailors,
military
from the
no system-
disarmament
The
soldiers
and the
was
in fact critical.
men to the last breath in his endeavour to make their numbers appear greater than the reality. The sailors
who were marched through
the streets to impress the
native population were used like the
members
of a stage
army, passing the same point two or three times, and each
time posing as fresh troops
;
and
as
aim to show themselves in and as often as possible. Ordinary reliefs were an impossibility when each man had to do the work of three and look as though he were six. Men who patrolled the town by day watched out on the edge of the desert all night. In the town or at the trenches
in the oasis
it
made
as
their
many
places
possible
common
period of sentry-go
food
little
and
sleep
the
task
which the
50
sibility.
attack from an
at
of
came
off.
On
his
7,
sailors
Tripoli,
recep-
was held at the Konak, at which the most interesting feature was the introduction, by Hassuna Pasha Karamanli,
of
Karamanli,
Tripoli
before declared himself in favour of an Italian occupation, at the time of the Crispi-Salisbury correspondence already
cited.
by the Turkish conquest of 1835 was no old story to this vigorous Arab of seventy, and throughout his long life he had seen his race oppressed and his country despoiled by the usurping government. Nor had the Turkish authorities possessed the wit to hold him faithful by a reasonable delegation of place and power. The son of a line of powerful princes was titular Mayor of Tripoli, and lived on a pension which did not come within reasonable distance of satisfying his Oriental tastes. Personal reasons could only make him hate the Turks, and racial reasons tended in the same
dispossession of his family
direction.
The
In
common
with
many
51
and
failing
welcomed
an alternative domination.
He
an arch-traitor by one or two hasty writers. The term seems misapplied. Hassuna Pasha was not a Turk, and
he owed nothing to the Turks.
Receptions took place
shops were
all
On
the the
and confidently, and the band of the Benedetto Brin pla,yed opposite the Konak. The illusion of peace and safety was
all
but complete.
;
troops arrived
their paucity of
But as the days went on and no when the sailors could no longer disguise numbers when it was realised that Turkish
;
and out
and
make no
pretence of pro-
and the authorities realised that somethingThe something,' of course, had been foreseen from the first. As soon as the Turks obtained news of
was
the
afoot.
'
slender
force
which garrisoned
Tripoli,
they were
bound
to return
before
'
dawn on October
'
enemy tried a feeler at the Bu Meliana position, and on the day following informers brought word that an attack in greater force was planned for the next night. The
waterworks of
for
Bu
men
in the neighbourhood of
The expected attack came at 1.15, but it was only a reconnaissance. Firing went on briskly for forty
52
The
Italians suffered
The wounded man reported that the attack had been made by an advance guard of five hundred men, and that the main Turkish force had concentrated at Azizia and was moving on Tripoli. Further reinforcements, consisting of four hundred men and eight 3 -inch guns, were landed from the ships, and a detachment was posted on the eastern lines, where rumour foretold the possibility of an attack in the early morning, between moonset and sunrise. But the anxious night passed quietly, and at dawn the first transports appeared off Tripoli. The landing of the troops began in the afternoon, and by the evening all had been disembarked and hurried out to the edge of
the trenches.
On the
following
of transports arrived,
The
sailors
had done
and that afternoon they re-embarked, after being reviewed and thanked by Admiral Borea Ricci. All honour is due to Captain Cagni and his men for the qualities
which they displayed during the
tion.
first
They had no hard fighting and gained no bloody victories. But their high spirit and unwearying vigilance throughout a long and critical week, the cheerfulness and
zest with
of
The majority of the sailors returned to the fleet, but two detachments which had landed with the guns were
left
on shore
until
53
operations,
and
was not
until
October 15 that
it
and
artillery.
For
were
Bu
at the end of the road which leads past the Cavalry Barracks
into
sailors
one
of October 14 a small more chance. body of Turks, probably the detachment which had attacked before, came up over the dunes towards Bu Meliana. They
rifle
and
artillery fire,
and
retired
Two
wounded.
Meanwhile, on October
13,
Lieutenant-General Caneva,
of Tripoli, replacing
Admiral
the guns
of the
his squadron.
all
Bad weather
stores
continued, but
by October 16
and
materiel.
By
October 20 the
fleet of
transports
was
With Tripoli and Tobruk safe in Italian hands, the other main positions included in the plan of occupation were
quickly attacked and taken.
On
October 16 an Italian
Pisa,
Amalfi,
San
Marco and Agordat, with two destroyers, escorting a number of transports, appeared off Derna. A deputation
of
was
small,
An armoured
54
any show
the
it
refused
bombardment which
feelings
embittering the
of
the
Arabs.
The bombard-
16th, but a
of engineers
had
been disembarked.
the
for
days following.
went on
during these days, and the taking of Derna cost the Italians
On
Horns, having
of Bersaglieri, eighteen
hundred
The expedition arrived at Horns on the morning The Turks refused to surrender, and a short bombardment followed. Heavy weather prevented a landing,
On
Turks
had evacuated the town, and that the population requested Italian protection, but it was not until the following day
that a landing could be effected.
Two
serious encounters
hundred
killed.
effect,
and no further
for
a considerable time.
The occupation
of Tripoli,
55
on a
different
scale,
difficulties
and
considerable
loss.
On
body
off
command
of General Briccola.
was met by the usual refusal, but the further procedure differed widely from that adopted in the case of the other coast towns. The
for surrender
by preparations for landing, and on the following morning the bombardment and the landing operations were simultaneously begun. The day had dawned rough and threatening, and soon rain was falling heavily. At 7.30 the ships opened fire. Their aim was directed upon
coast and
the port
of Benghazi, which
;
had been
selected
as
Berka barracks
;
town and the precincts of the Governor's residence. The fire of the ships was specially arranged to cover the landing of the troops, and to inflict as little damage as possible upon the town.
detachment
of sailors, as usual,
They speedily occupied the dunes which faced the beach, and two 3-inch
unopposed, a
little
before nine
o'clock.
left,
near the
little
Christian
An
detachment
fire.
and landed
first line
under
Major-General Ameglio,
56
more effecand permit the troops to form up under cover. The advance of the sailors was met by a hot fire from the enemy, who were strongly posted on the narrow neck of
of dunes, so as to cover the landing operations
tively,
salt
marsh which
to
to the south of
firing
it.
their
line
extended
almost
Point
landing - place.
The
sailors
were
soon
heavily
fire.
The Turks
ought to have
They had occupied the north-eastern shore of the promontory, and from this point they attacked the two guns posted by the cemetery, and were only driven back by fire from the ships. At 11.30 the sailors were reinforced by two companies of the 63rd, and a similar detachment of the 4th was sent to Point Buscaiba, to cover the By noon two mountain batteries Italian right flank. had been disembarked, without their mules, and the guns had been conveyed by hand to commanding positions on the dunes. At 12.30 p.m., when General Briccola landed,
beach.
official report,
was as follows
'
:
sailors
beach on the
rising
facing south
and
east.
Between the
57
Between
this
Giuliana were
of the 4th
and
high
63rd,
On
the
ground
the 63rd.'
The
two
batteries,
The weather had grown steadily worse, and the landing of the troops was becoming increasingly difficult. Ammunition was running short, but a fresh supply was on the
point
of
being landed.
any further advance till 3.30, was anticipated that the rest of the infantry, proper medical services, and an ample supply of ammuniBriccola decided to delay
it
when
tion,
During
this period
fire
as
much
The
of
column,
main body of the sailors and a mixed battalion of the 4th and 63rd, was to advance direct upon Berka by way of the strip of marshy land which separates
the Sibbah from the salt pools, a strip which narrows to
by way of a wider tract of dry ground which cuts it in two, and to swing in upon Berka from the south. The advance was to be supported by the mountain batteries, which could not, however,
58
had not
the neck of land between the Sibbah and the salt marsh.
Berka was occupied as the sun was setting, and before darkness fell the Italians had pushed on past Sidi Daud to
Sidi
Hussein,
on the outskirts
of
Benghazi
itself.
An
Search-
were directed upon the town, and for a short time the
till
a white flag
was run up on the Governor's residence. During this second bombardment both the Italian and British Consulates were hit and severely damaged, and a number of
neutrals
and non-combatants
it is
The
fact of
by was
made
in the
House of Commons. It should not be hard for all but the most acid critics to realise the difficulties of the situation. The British Consulate was in line with one of the Turkish positions, and bombardment by searchlight must naturally
increase the margin of error.
On
was occupied. The Italian casualties were one officer and twenty -two men killed, and nine officers and seventy-seven men wounded. The enemy's loss was estimated at nearly two hundred killed, but the figure is only an estimate. It is probable, however, that the Turks and Arabs suffered
59
In
Tripoli,
of serious fighting.
The
had been
rifles
1
successfully disembarked,
had been landed by October and rumour began to speak of an advance towards the
as
interior
The
situation
of October 21
and
Ben-
interest.
line battalions.
60
CHAPTER IV
THE REVOLT OF OCTOBER 23 AND
ITS
SEQUEL
The
they gave
rise.
In the
first
home by
certain
critical
days
it
impos-
in
other
conflict is essential,
and
it is
of Tripoli
and
its
environs will
make
may
be obscure.
all
by sandy
are
The roads
walls,
and the gardens are divided, by sun-baked earthen or huge hedges of prickly pear. Low Arab houses and there by the roadside, occasionally form;
cluster here
and every-
tall
23
AND
ITS
SEQUEL
find
61
mark an Arab
well.
It
would be hard to
an
an unexpected fight, or one more easy for an insidious and desperate enemy, who knew the ground, This network of gardens to employ to the best advantage.
uglier terrain for
little
more than a
mile, to
the edge of the wide steppe that people call the desert
and on the west and south the Italian lines looked out upon open ground, broken and undulating, that gives good cover
here and there, but does not lend
itself
to a surprise.
To
On
this side
main attack
of October 23
was
than
developed
number
of killed
engagements
months.
westward,
The
force,
The
right, or
Bu
40th regiments.
The centre
position from
Bu
Meliana to
five battalions
at Tripoli.
held
far
The important Bu Meliana position was strongly by the 84th regiment, who occupied the trenches as as the villa which had belonged to Djemal Bey, chief
staff-officer in
Turkish
Fort
by the
1st
and
2nd battalions
of the 82nd.
From
by the
62
held
by the
1st
and 3rd
between El Hanni
its
headquarters at Sharashat.
The El
left
Hanni
position
and
practically
was
It
and
was
from
and southern fronts. The oasis had been perfectly quiet, and a sense of false security had arisen. On the morning of October 23 the Bersaglieri were dison the right, the 3rd, 7th, and 9th composed as follows panies held the lines, with the rest of the 1st and 3rd on the battalions in reserve, some distance in the rear left the 4th and 5th companies were disposed in two lines, advanced posts and main body, while the 6th company
:
was in reserve. The Turco-Arab attack began at 8 a.m., all along the line from west to east. But the advances upon the western and southern fronts were only feints, containing movements which were not pushed home. By ten o'clock the attacking forces, many of them Arab horsemen, had retired, and were lost sight of in the undulating ground of the desert. But heavy firing continued on the eastern front, and before long alarming rumours began to reach Tripoli. It was reported that the Turks and the desert Arabs had crumpled
the Italian
1
left,
23
AND
ITS
SEQUEL
of the
63
The Jews
Harm
narrow
down towards the harbour with some wild hope of escape by sea. In the Bread Market, among the crowd of Arabs who swarm there every morning, the excitement was intense. Shots were fired from one or two fonduks the knots of lounging men at the doors of the Arab
who
pressed
cafes
scattered.
A
'
clamour of
for there
?
'
arms, crying,
Death to the
Why
fight
Some
was
fear of the
Turk that
fire upon Italian soldiers in the street, or them with sticks and knives. Some soldiers were killed, some wounded, and it was one of the latter who was knifed by a havass of the German Consulate. 1 The panic and confusion were extreme while they lasted, but in a comparatively short time some measure of calm was restored. Every one was driven out of the streets into the first house that could serve as a refuge, and during this hurried clearing of the town there was some wild firing on
nature of a threat.
with which some correspondents thought man's execution was The evidence given at the trial conclusively proved his questioned. guilt, and there were others who witnessed the murder, who saw him
1
fit
soldier,
saw him
return and thrust the dripping blade of his knife into a brazier of charcoal. Some people's susceptibilities appear to have been offended by the hurry
of his trial
and execution. It seems useless to insist that, under martial law in an Eastern city, procedure is not to be judged by those rigid standards which rightly govern the exaction of the death penalty in England.
64
who were
who had
drawn a
selves.
just, or at least
ing
Some
of these
were
In a large
number
fully justified
and never actually threatened to do so in any numbers, yet they had in fact cleared a way, and could have come straight in by the Sharashat Road. For the 4th and 5th companies of the
on the point
of entering the city,
Bersaglieri
had been
and the 6th company had moved up to support the line Between the Amruss Road just to the left of El Hanni. and the sea the way lay open to the outskirts of the town,
the Imperial Barracks, and the Tuesday Market.
oasis, as
In the
on the other
began at 8 a.m.
when they found themselves The three companies occupying the plateau of El Hanni were comparatively well placed. They were entrenched, and the force of the attack on their rear was greatly diminished by the fact that their reserve companies, and later a battalion of the 82nd, which was
and
effectively,
from behind.
The 4th and 5th companies were in a very different position. They were more scattered, and less strongly posted and their reserve company, the
;
Hf
'!
fc^tf
IN
THE BACKGROUND
ROOF
23
AND
ITS
SEQUEL
65
fire of
the irruption of
lines,
many who had broken through the advance was fighting its way slowly towards El Hanni. The
;
4th and 5th companies stood their ground bravely the odds were too heavy.
four hundred
call.
but
At the end
men
fifty-seven
killed,
first
The
rest
were
Arab
the casualties
siderable.
The 6th and 8th companies also lost heavily, and among the other five companies were conall,
In
its
But the gallant defence of El Hanni had saved the situation. The leaders of the attacking forces had felt the necessity of capturing
number,
killed,
wounded, or missing.
this
city.
men
of the
Turks and
way
of Shara Zauiet or
and at an immense
in the oasis,
fierce street-fighting
of Colonel
all
by
who were
and the coolness and steadiness displayed. The words of the Times special correspondent, an experienced and competent eyewitness, are sufficient testimony
of the position,
to the truth
'
:
in the danger
zone on
Monday coped
66
with
a
which
would have
tried
the
oldest
soldiers.'
All
rein-
way
The
by
degrees in reaching the main firing line, but the half -battalion
of the
less fortunate.
Two companies
all
their
way farther.
had held
their
retreat.
oasis to
by the
practical destruction of
Shots were
It
still
was
realised
that both attack and revolt had failed. On the day following the revolt there began the systematic
clearing
of
the oasis,
reprisals,
But before
commenting on the orders given, or the methods of carrying them out, or the legends which have grown up round
the doings of those days,
it
down
to the draw-
On
inhabitants,
and
in
who
resisted, or
But it must be remembered that the work they had to do was no mere house-to-house visitation, varied by frequent
1
28, 1911.
23
AND
ITS
SEQUEL
67
was a piece
of patrol work,
marked by a
number
soldiers
of sharp little
upon by desperate, hunted on men. Before the oasis was October 26 gave an opportunity to a number of stragglers But by the to try and repeat the programme of the 23rd. evening of October 27 the task was practically completed.
were continually
fully cleared, the attack
had been brought into Tripoli, and five hundred were deported to
The Turco-Arab attack on October 26 resolved itself another vigorous attempt to into two main operations
:
Bu
from El Hanni to
six hours.
Bu
was
fierce
on the Italian
left,
Groups
of
But the
Bersaglieri, reinSicilia,
forced
of sailors
from the
field
diffi-
of fortress artillery,
inflicting
had no
loss
own, and
heavy
upon
At half -past eight the bulk of the enemy withdrew, leaving only a few snipers.' Along the
'
line
The ground
The
fact that
deliberately ignored
thousands of Arabs were brought into Tripoli was by Italy's critics. The public was informed that
by massacre.
68
is
and
less
undulating than
it is
farther west
of the
less well
with the
They were occupying a long line of more than two kilometres. .Two companies had been detached on the 24th, to strengthen the eastern front, and special attention was necessarily concentrated on Bu Meliana, where the waterworks presented an important objective to the enemy. Between the Cavalry Barracks and Bu Meliana the line was not very strongly held, and a specially weak point was the salient angle formed by an olive grove
which projected from the oasis into the open ground, just
by the
Villa of
Djemal Bey.
At
was
by the defenders. They took cover immediately and opened a flanking fire on the troops in the trenches, who suffered considerably, and were hard put to it to prevent
numbers
of the
larger
in
their lines.
up
critical
point in time.
took place at the trenches, but by half -past ten the enemy
were driven
Though the
and
it
position
had been
successfully
in four days,
Photo A. Malvezzi
26th, 1911
Photo A. Malvezzi
FESCHLUM
23
AND
sea.
ITS
SEQUEL
69
side
line of defence
on the eastern
revolt which
it
had
to
made
way
and Arabs
outside.
Some
effort
has been
made
to ridicule
it
all,
or at least to
is
deny that
was
premeditated.
certain,
The evidence
contradictory
and un-
may
be
the
first place,
The
Bersaglieri
had scarcely
settled
down
to defend
;
and
in
first
shots fired on
Red
Cross
encampments
The
personnel of the
Red
who were
sitting astride
encampment.
There are
unnecessary to
interest.
During the
captain in
Bersaglieri
command
of
who had
been
At the moment,
70
some food
ill.
Another
Italian soldiers
on the
Bu
the morning,
when the
feigned attack on
Bu
Meliana was
in progress, a time
all firing
more
Turks
of the
and
revolt.
Three days
mood
may be
said
The
i's
Mohammed
my
arrival in Tripoli.
23, in
in the oasis
on October
very
suspicious circumstances.
He
realised,
perhaps, that he
for
he
made a
visited
clear
and detailed
as
confession.
He
stated that on
by a man dressed
an Arab,
officer.
whom
This
he knew to be
a Turkish non-commissioned
man
supplied
him and others with Mausers, which had been hidden in the fonduh, and explained their mechanism, for the Arabs knew only the use of their own native muskets. So far the story was perfectly straightforward, but he faltered when he was asked to explain his presence in the oasis, and said
he had not wished to
fire
Why
23
AND
ITS
SEQUEL
71
owned.
who were
the
rifle.
firing,
the Turk
These compelled
him to join them, and for his life's sake he had consented. But he knew that a revolt in the oasis was planned for
the 23rd
1
Yes.
in his
Yes.
rifle
And
with him
well,
Yes.
it is
Hassan gave
very
and
probable
when he
said that he
Italians,
but
From
the
the mass of
evidence
which
obscures
clearly.
question,
first is
two
The
that the
Tripoli
The second
is
that
though
it is
would
freely in
and
They
represented,
of fear, or
In point of fact
Tripoli revolt
it
in the
main the
who
72
is
a floating popuinterior, or
from the
lesser
known
coast villages.
much
better
of fanaticism
much
better material,
less of
had
suffered less
the Italian.
larly
Among
among
But
in the remoter
community
wholesome
over
less
all
obvious considerations.
times there
is
At
in the
month
its
Arabs
is
reaches
full of
highest point.
oasis
desert Arabs
who come
favoured oases,
the unkindly
Italian
steppes.
Some had
front,
occupation.
eastern
and unmolested.
For
it
was the
little
as
Arab trade and Arab movement. At that date they believed that Arab hatred of the Turk would outweigh Arab distrust of the Roum. The position reveals itself clearly the Italians unsus:
Turk
fear-
the wild
and
W&rZJ
23
73
women. They had only to prepare the stranger Arabs in Tripoli and the oasis, those immediately in contact with them, and one or two chiefs of the oasis whom the Turks had placed in a specially privileged position. The rest could safely be left to the constraining power of example and fear. The Arabs who desired nothing better than peace and quiet would be swept
the Christians, afraid for their religion and their
And
this is exactly
what happened.
The
revolt
many took
part in
it
who were
was most
It
that part which was least strongly held, where the Arab
population, temporary
thickest,
and
But
all
day long
firing
neighbourhood of the
Bu
main outbreak
rising.
The case
of
Hassan ben
Mohammed
those Arabs
who were
in
rising
behind the
lines at
Bu
The animating
that end
it
idea
was
be
left,
To
may
fairly
74
presumed that
the Arabs
who were
'
in the
know were
'
and on the
for
October 23
it
The
it
essential to
have
and
to
show
first
duty
of a
The
is
well understood
by
all
soldiers,
Government
first
Armies
of the
United States
body of law the spirit of same time our legislator remains fully aware that in time of war it is absolutely necessary to provide for the safety of armies and for the that, to those engaged successful conduct of a campaign
Everywhere reigns
.
in this
humanity.
But
at
the
in
it,
here
all
23
AND
ITS
SEQUEL
75
law and
In an examina-
methods
of repression adopted,
we have
to con-
transgressed in any
way
warfare
a
in
wholesale
effect,
innocent
These
are,
the
which
I believe
them
to
be demonstrably
Two
sets of charges
First, that
who
if
could claim
simply fighting
the Arabs were
rebels he
justify
that
Both these charges may be dismissed very shortly. All the local Arabs within the Italian lines had made formal
submission,
either
personally,
or
through
fed
their
chiefs.
Many
of
and medically
More-
never
Italian
made
lines,
technical
are covered
by the
occupied
territory.'
All of these
against the
Italians
were technically
explicitly
by
at least one
76
that
it
the charge has never given any authority for his assertion,
and
I think
we may take
no foundation in
It
may have
The
:
been
orders
that the
against
should
be
shot.
Obviously,
such
orders left
room
but these are the orders that were given, orders that were
both natural and necessary.
lished
on October
23,
proclaiming that
arms
in the of
demand
to
most determined
pacificists
And
to these
will
it
For they
in all
not
recognise that
war
war
and that
war certain
conduct
is
universally,
and
punishment.
It
it
is
were
or
excess,
where individual
soldiers
made mistakes
These
dis-
cases of excess
torted,
that while
and blamable, were not unnatural or altogether unpardonable. I have not found that any
however regrettable
23
AND
ITS
SEQUEL
77
whom
may
furnish explanation
and
excuse
firing,
seen
of
enemy
maze
and
sides,
on by stray parties which had and pushed forward in hope of loot. bodies main left the And the scene of this critical situation a network of orchards and gardens, split up by narrow roads and winding paths, where the radius of vision varies from a hundred yards to five a district closely populated in parts, where
of the Arabs, actually fired
: ;
and had come into the town with their families, in order to be out of the way, but others had stayed, unbelieving
or uncaring, or, in
many
It
would be
idle to
ordinary limits of
The circumstances of the case, the human judgment and control, absolutely
of
to
what may well have happened me by an officer the 82nd regiment. His company was one of those sent the relief of the eastern front, and as he and his men
an example
their
made
fired
way through
At a bend
The
Some had
rifles,
Italians fired
back and
78
of a
woman. 1
blame the
or of
Is there
officer or his
men
woman,
stances
half a dozen,
women were killed (I have heard of and probably there were more), some by mistake, some because they were actually taking an active the demands of self-defence made it part in the fighting
Several
;
women. The case already recounted, of the twelve-yearold boy who attacked the Bersaglieri officer, may explain how some children were found among the dead, in addition to those who were killed by mistake, in the conas
' '
fusion of bush-fighting.
now
come and
be
failed to distinguish,
will
number
soldiers
and
it
of control, provocation
of other nations,
soldiers,
to see red.
natural
whom
whom
putting
asserted that the dress of the women is totally different from that of the men. This is true of nomad Beduins and Jews, but not of the Arabs
who
A GROUP OF ARABS, SHOWING DRESS. There are both men and women in the group.
p^iyTwv
23
AND
ITS
SEQUEL
79
all
that
it
connotes
'
The phrase is Mr. Kipling's, put in Mulvaney's mouth, and readers of Soldiers Three will remember how the Black Tyrone went into action mad with rage because on the morning of the fight they had seen their dead the poor, mutilated dead whom the fortunes of a previous fight had
left in
will
remember,
well-known
When you 're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains, And the ivomen come out to cut up what remains,
Just
roll to
your
rifle
And go
to your
God
like a soldier.
By the night of October 23 it was known only too well what had happened to some of the wounded and dead who had fallen into the hands of the Arabs. An English correspondent has committed himself to the statement
that the Arabs did mutilate corpses, but only after the
massacres
(sic).
In the
first
ABC
Arab warfare.
One may
the Indian
On
will
of
Baker's El
many
And
1 Mulvaney's words are worth quoting Seeing that ut was the first time the Tyrone had iver seen their dead, I do not wonder they were on When I first saw ut I wud niver ha' the sharp. 'Tis a shameful sight given quarter to any man north of the Khaibar no, nor women either, for the women used to come out after dark Augghr
!
'
80
when they
living Italians
who
fell
The statement
the night of the 23rd and morning of the 24th has been
Some
and 5th
was
still
repression,
left
when
was
still
was going to be completely overwhelmed. One soldier, who escaped death by hiding in a well, declares that he saw his wounded comrades fall victims to the fury of Arab women, who dashed out their brains with large stones,
stripped the dead bodies and proceeded to mutilate them.
On
have thought
it
critics,
special interest attaches to the fact that the earliest report of the
October 23 which reached Scutari (Albania) from Turkish sources, stated that the Turks had crucified fifty Christians. The news gave great satisfaction to the local Mohammedans, who taunted their Christian neighbours with this fresh proof of Turkish power. The report said
fight of
23
AND
ITS
SEQUEL
81
surprising or extraordinary,
really a
control
and been guilty of cruelty, or of undiscriminating they give slaughter ? Such acts are ugly, and worse
;
they
but
fairly
quoted as
it
up to massacre, whether
desire to
kill.
an insensate
and seem,
sitates a
by
certain corre-
spondents
in the press.
Their deof
some
seem so
supported by any
evidence I
unpleasant impression
Obviously, the
first
step in
subsequent days.
to
The accusers
of Italy
'
:
commit themselves to a figure 4000 men, of whom not 100 were guilty, and 100 women and children.' It is all
1 It is noteworthy that the correspondents with the greatest experience and reputation, while criticising such excesses as did take place, held strictly aloof from participation in the charges brought by some of their
colleagues.
82
cut and dried
little
innocent
by
than a hunthe
Italian
dred
ubiquitous
the fury
of
of
!
No
may
told,
Photographs have
Immediately upon
inquiries as to the
killed
my
arrival in Tripoli I
of local
its
began to
make
been
number
suppression.
The
fifty.
Italian accounts
varying
The
figure
it
puts a different
complexion upon
many independent
but
it
at the impression
find out
if
made upon
people killed. 1
The
first
Arab
he was
1 In this search I was greatly helped by Mr. W. F. Riley, Lloyd's agent in Tripoli, who has lived there for twenty-five years. His knowledge of the Arabs of the oasis (especially those of Sharashat, where he had a summer house), and the confidence felt in him by the Arab community, made it easy for me to secure expressions of opinion which I might otherwise have been unable to reach.
23
;
83
my
questions
his
and we talked
about
about
damaged by the
him
*
:
tide of
war
suppose very
many
1
of
'
killed, after
little,
the revolt
He
few.'
'
looked surprised a
and answered
'
'
:
How
No
;
was that
'
asked.
thought
many were
killed.'
'
the town.'
His version of
for a considerable
affairs
was corroborated by
others, but
figures.
It
had been
more
made
the acquaint-
ance of an Arab
'
who was
able to give
precise information.
Italian
occupation,
oasis,
forcibly
on the subject.
desert Arabs,
of
and that
people)
in the repression
many
?
innocent
people (his
own
How
many
'
local
Oh, many.
Some hundreds.
though
it
five.'
But
I
his reply,
too vague.
84
figures
were available.
He had
fifty
and
been
killed,
and
either buried
drew in
all,
their lines
on October
28.
He
calculated that, in
fifty
had
and
it
One would like to think that two had crept into the printed reports, making four thousand instead of four hundred and one hundred instead of ten. But these figures would scarcely have sustained the charge of a wholesale massacre, and this happy
campaign.
additional O's
solution of the problem
figures surely
must be
of
rejected. I
The
correct
what
gested
we reckon
together those
who
had compromised themselves by carrying arms and those who were shot by mistake,
on the subsequent days,
left for
or resisting search,
there
is
victims of
massacre.'
of wholesale massacre
The charge
sufficiently
would seem to be
of the stateall
but
it is
desirable to
Nearly
'
the
1 Many other Arabs were killed during the four days, October 23-27, but the figures that matter are those which refer to the oasis Arabs. It will hardly be suggested that the Italians did wrong in defending themselves against attack from outside.
'
23
85 the
against
behaviour
of
of a cross-
go some
that witnesses
are involved,
way towards proving the point I wish to make who give such evidence, where such issues
must be regarded with profound
'
distrust.
The
taken
first
is
piece of
evidence
'
to which exception
may
be
number of dead bodies were piled a heap, and proceeds to generalise as follows
:
all
we may
sum
of massacre.
The
That
is
undeniably shocking.
it is
an unwarrantable deduc-
The heaps of dead, so graphically described, were to be seen in two places, at There was one mass of one hundred and least, in the oasis. seven bodies, another of seventy. 1 But they were not the sign of executions en masse, in the manner suggested.
tion from a perfectly simple fact.
According to
all
my
fact
which puts
spots in the oasis which were used for carrying out formal
executions.
there to be shot,
and bodies
It
false
that
and upon
that false deduction, and others, the most fantastic erections were founded.
1
who
This information comes from the Arab notable already mentioned, buried the dead.
86
But a worse suggestio falsi is contained in the following I saw scores of women and children brought into the house, 1 but I never saw one of them leave again. I can only imagine what happened to them.' In view of the fact that the Italian troops collected the women and children in houses and kept them under guard till they
sentence
:
What
reports the
of
butchered
map
Mercato
Suk-el-Juma
lies
lines occupied
by the
zone of their
activities.
The heaps
of
dead reported to
;
The majority of the dwellers in the Jewish village of Amruss (a few minutes from Suk-el-Juma) had migrated to Tripoli after the Italian occupation. But many families, especially the more well-to-do, had remained in their homes,
unwilling to sever themselves from the property which
They buried
their
of poverty
protect
their
lives.
Their expectations
were disap-
pointed. The Turks and Arabs descended upon the village and demanded the money and trinkets which they knew Where the answer was unsatisfactory they slew, existed.
taken refuge.
2
what
it is
worth.
It
was
told
by some
of the
few inhabitants who were found at Amruss, when the Italian victory at Ain-Zara had cleared the oasis of Arabs. The correspondent who reported the discovery of murdered women at Suk-el-Juma insisted that the dissimilarity of dress made it impossible that they should have been
'.'-L
23
AXD
ITS
SEQUEL
87
may
October
27. a correspondent.,
that morning
Xo
passage in
that
all
its
The
all
corre-
nearly
the men,
age.,
were
shot.'"
Xo
was given
had
fled, or
And no
was near
this
one could
have guessed that the locality described had been the scene
of
Yet
it
this point.
lines
on October
and
was along
road and
dismounted squadron
of
the Lodi
had
to fight their
It is
;
way
pressed 84th.
number
of
dead
and
:
for
sight of
dead Arabs on a
induce a shriek of
battlefield
to
massacre/
There are
many
killed
men.
is
_ to It is note that while the Arab the baracan, are almost mdistmgiiishable at
i
there
foot.
Much
burial.
has been
made
The Tripolitans
the
first
way
before
It is practically
thing done w:
extinct.
88
by means
of
photography.
Two
photographs
underneath was the extrawas seated on the ground Dying woman on the ground. The ordinary legend
'
:
soldier is
off
wondering whether
rifle.'
it is
worth while to
finish
her
(This photograph
one dead body. The photograph is The women were being brought into the town in the manner already described, and it was inevitable that they should pass some corpses on the way. But the label attached is an offence against common Arab women and children brought in from the honesty
perfectly harmless.
'
:
dead bodies
of their
own
kinsfolk.'
It is not
same purveyor
of information should
on the outskirts
of the
of Tripoli town.
this
moment, and
have
has
and ordinary
justice
When
really bear
when
when hasty
deductions from
insufficient evidence
and a whole nation are slandered by such methods, the net result is a heavy blow, not at the good name of Italy's
army, but at the reputation
of British journalism.
23
AND
ITS
SEQUEL
89
and
it
should be
made
modern war-
of elementary accuracy, in
order that
it
may
with a sufficiently
after
sensational story.
It has recently
happened again,
seriously
For
moment
is
not inoppor-
campaign
of
soldiers.
90
CHAPTER V
THE SECOND PHASE
:
With
new
upon a
phase.
first
During the
it
had been
Tripoli neighbourhood.
assumption.
One
fact alone
is
sufficient
evidence
known
of
work
was too
late.
by a certain and over-confidence, grounded upon the supposithat the Turkish cause would find no real support
among the Arabs of the littoral. The inevitable reaction followed. An attitude marked by an excess of trustfulness was transformed into a mood
replaced
the confidence of the early days was by a persistent caution which would hear of no The first fruits of the crisis of October 23 were the risks. severe reprisals in the oasis and the withdrawal of the troops on the eastern front the aftermath was found in
of
undue suspicion
91
between
Italian
and
Arab,
The abandonment
front,
of the
advanced
line
The moral effect of and though the Italian lines were not too strongly held, they had in fact proved strong enough to repel two fierce attacks, one of them sustained in circumstances of great difficulty.
By
special
fresh troops
On
and
number of had broken out on the eastern front. The epidemic had started in the Sokra district, before the Italian occupation, and in
And
cholera
due time
lations of
it
had to be reckoned with in the calcuthey had to provide a wider the authorities
;
deeply infected.
negligible.
The material
loss
caused by the
move was
ment meant nothing. It is true that the Turks gained El Hanni, which had been called the key to Tripoli correctly enough in one sense, for its occupation by the
Turks seemed a necessary prelude to successful action
against the city.
Italian,
Italians
92
evacuated
the
key proved
useless.
The
was
artillery,
and because
shells,
it
commanded from
the sea.
The only
which
fell
harmlessly,
The moral
effect of the
serious.
To
rise
after
no doubt
as a confession of weakness,
have been
quarters that Tripoli was on the The visit of the United States cruiser Chester, with orders to embark the American Consul and any American subjects, 1 is sufficient proof of the success attained by the purveyors of false news. But the effect upon the civilised world could only be temporary of greater significance was the effect upon the Arabs. The retirement dealt the first blow at Italian prestige, and gave
many
many
which
wavering Arabs.
withdrawal
Regarded from
;
was unfortunate
yet
the
motives
two
evils
was chosen.
1 The American Consul, Mr. John Q. Wood, declined to leave Tripoli, and the incident was of service in exposing the unreliability of certain
news-factories.
93
The blow which was dealt to Italian hopes by the Arab and the attack of October 26 had only a hardening On November effect on the attitude of the Government.
5 the Turkish provinces were solemnly annexed to Italy,
Two
battalions
of
Grenadiers
The 93rd
1,
November
6 the 93rd,
was not
until three
month
after they
had
During
all
But only in a sense for the enemy were concentrated upon a single flank, the western and southern fronts being practically undisturbed and it was evident that when the Italian authorities chose to make a
beleaguered town.
;
free
number
absolute security,
against the
and to move
of the
overwhelming force
main body
enemy.
By
94
seven batteries of
and nine
batteries of
mountain guns.
night, at
an uneasy
life.
any hour,
And
force,
on November
'
go
'
and where the Italian artillery could not be used with much effect. The attack was easily repulsed, and no real further attempt was made to test the Italian defence. The frequent little rushes were probably the work of newly-arrived Arabs, who had been enticed by glowing Turkish promises and
were anxious to try a round with the
they could not win a
infidel, to see
whether
Small
way
by the
Cavalry
and
the
enemy
From
may
have arisen the accounts of Italian nervousness, or even pusillanimity, which have been sent through Europe by
various correspondents in the Turkish
their
news second-hand
1
accounts
by a
The
double
companies
battalions in Tripoli have never been up to war strength, the containing from one hundred and fifty to two
of
fifty.
by most
95
To
the extent that such stories were true, and not merely the
enemy.
Perhaps caution
while
by the
hand,
is
strict
ing general.
it
That
is
an arguable point.
to
On
the other
it
was
essential
enemy's hands
had
if
allowed themselves
be engaged in the
oasis,
or
among the
firing
went on practically
Italians
and
starts
when the
who
Many
of
result.
Arab
of Tripoli is a
very wild shot, and the dangerous zone lay well behind the
trenches.
It
was
interesting
to
note
how
the Italians
gradually
sniping.
A
of
newly
amount
ammunian
them
to distinguish between
fire
which
96
had
by picked
to fire only
locate
an enemy.
down
at one time,
and on one
nearly one
In
all,
And
The desperate
it
a
in
But the
and
streets
and markets,
pre-
for
Further
difficulties
much
On November
17 the dry bed of the Wady Mejnin, which runs from the Tarhuna range to the west of Ain Zara, filled and overflowed. Lakes formed in the desert and remained all through the winter, while the main torrents burst through
1
The number
been
officially
a semi-official sanction, puts the total at one thousand. quoted were given me by the medical authorities.
The other
figures
^zfcw
97
Bu
damaging
the
waterworks,
Meliana road
till
swift-running water.
visions
and other merchandise were ruined, while one pretentious modern building had its porch swept away, and its walls cracked from top to bottom. Most of the harm done was
either
unimportant or
destruction of the
Bu
who had
to
repair,
and in
month there was a feeling of tension in The revulsion of sentiment on the part of the For a time there was Italians was naturally very strong. a widespread feeling that Arab and traitor were nearly synonymous terms, and it must be admitted that suspicion on the part of the authorities was well enough grounded. Though the city was now under the strictest military law,
During
all this
the town.
there were
many
sometimes
most nights stray shots were fired from the housetops at the groups of Carabinieri and soldiers who patrolled the
streets.
it
No Arabs
p.m.,
but
was
very
many
sleep in
arcades that line the Shara Azizia or the narrow street that
lies
between
it
and the
sea.
and the
98
patrols
natives
who
grounds.
of the
was a time
of difficulty
town as well as for the Italians it and strain. They were bewildered
of the Italians,
still
and
afraid.
but at
of
and
they
felt
threatening
of
them
again.
rattle
When
who seems
to be
new
order of things.
afraid to
commit
himself.
As the
down, and put themselves to the work of consolidating and developing their base, work and riches came to the lowerclass Arabs, inducing
new
dispensation.
But
uneasi-
and removed a lurking and insistent fear, or hope ever form the vague emotion clothed itself.
diffidence prevailed, until the
Italian
advance
what-
in
Two
Tripoli.
cloud of uneasiness
lifted,
and the
illusion of
On November
Messri, advancing
along the
driving the
99
who had
and
for
Hanni.
The column was prepared for all emerand consisted of three regiments of infantry, the 23rd and 52nd (6th Brigade) and 50th, two batteries field artillery, two batteries mountain guns, and two squadrons The whole of the 1st division (ten battalions) of cavalry.
Italian
front.
was held
The attacking
two days
taken,
before,
By
was
and a
little
who had
colonel of
The
men
in a specified
and to act
strictly
on the defensive.
When
he
came
back
he was only to do so
if
The answer came back that he could guarantee that there was
no
risk.
down
his effort at
initiative
rifle-pits
and remained
day
till
order, keeping
up a desultory
and
suffering occasional
100
casualties
killed
the Turks.
They
lost
over
fifty
was the
line.
advance
all
The Bersaglieri and the Grenadiers advanced from Hamura and Feschlum, with a battalion of the 37th and
93rd, with the 18th in support,
Zauiet.
Owing
on
who
the trenches, correspondents were prevented from reaching the front during the
first
all
civilians.
The
correction
until nearly
midday, and
Three
filter
story
how
'
ploughing their
way through a
solid
mass
fact,
of seven
thousand
In point of
relatively easy.'
No
risks
the
systematically
points,
fire
101
in upon El Hanni from the right. became untenable, and the enemywere finally driven helter-skelter from the plateau. They did not await the last bayonet-rush of the Bersaglieri and
The
position rapidly
down
and were
Small
a time,
on
their right
on
their left.
New
and
repaired.
were
full of rejoicing
They had been very unhappy over the abandonment of their old position, and now they felt they had squared matters. They had advanced coolly and carefully through
the treacherous labyrinth of the oasis,
climbing walls,
way by narrow
others to do
waiting under
fire for
be kept.
But the
The behaviour
advance
October 23 and 26, and the anxious days and nights in the
and dash, and they and men alike were justly proud of the good work done, and they looked forward with eagerness and confidence to the next move. A few days were spent in strengthening the positions on
trenches.
discipline
Officers
102
and loop-holing walls. But the work of securing the lines was interrupted and saddened by ghastly discoveries, by
the finding of those
October 23.
a
little
in a garden
and Near them lay the unburied corpse of an Arab boy, and he too had been crucified. The cross had been removed, no doubt to do duty again elsewhere,
to the north-west of El Hanni, three crucified
mutilated bodies.
but his pierced hands and feet told their own story.
he had been taken as a servant by a Bersaglieri
faithful to his salt,
Perhaps
been
officer,
On
fifty
November
27,
about
more bodies were discovered, indescribably mutilated, and some of them bearing obvious traces of torture. Early
on the morning
of
November
28, I visited
an Arab house
and garden, which had been used as a posto di medicazione (advance field hospital) by the 2nd battalion of the 11th Bersaglieri, up to and during the fight of October 23. In
the house there were five bodies, in the garden nine, and
in a hollow at the
back
of twenty-seven bodies.
was stated
officially,
that practically
all
the
men found
was found
bottom
members
of the
Corpo Sanitario,
or else
wounded
soldiers.
disinfecting dish
and
No human
by
the crucifixion,
practised
upon
living
and dead.
One
means
of a
pouch as that
the 6th
company
of the Bersaglieri.
103
crucified.
his
arms extended
his feet,
but
his
thick,
way
shamefully mutilated.
torture
came
as a surprise even to
week
During those
on the eastern
and the Agricultural The soldiers had already learned College, with no result. to laugh at Turkish shrapnel, and paid little attention to the scream of a shell. But the rifle-fire was very persistent, and rather more accurate than it had been. There were several specially hot corners in the oasis, and the curious spectator had reason to bless those cheerful diggers who anxiously besought him to take shelter. It was comfortable enough in the trenches the difficulty was to select
modically, at El Hanni, Fort Messri,
;
the right
moment
this
to start for
home.
guns were landed
During
guns
week heavy
siege
6-inch
4,
and 8-inch mortars. These were placed at Sidi Messri and Bu Meliana, commanding all the desert to the
south,
and made
their
1 Any further description of what I saw that morning would simply bo an offence. I have only written as much as I have in the belief that it is well for a non-Italian eyewitness to place on record something of
own experiences, in view of the remarkable defences which have been put forward on behalf of the innocent Arab and the chivalrous Turk. In this connection I would note that one body was treated in a manner which is more familiar to those who have seen Turkish handiwork in
his
Armenia and Bulgaria than to those whose experience has been confined to Arab practices.
104
when the long-expected advance upon the Turkish headquarters at Ain Zara took place. The Italian plan was
framed with the idea of outflanking and enveloping the
right,
wing fought
The
Italian right-hand
the
Bersa-
Alpine battalion,
and Major-General Giardina's infantry brigade, consisting of two battalions of the 6th and two of the 40th. Attached to this column were four batteries of mountain guns, and two squadrons of the Lodi regiment, sole representatives of the cavalry arm in Tripoli. The centre column consisted of four battalions of Major-General Rainaldi's brigade,
two
of the
of the 84th,
left at
mountain guns.
serious
On
the
to
two battalions
52nd
under Colonel Amari, while the 93rd were to make a demonstration towards Amruss, in the heart of the oasis.
In
all,
siege guns,
which
The
moment have
been in doubt
enemy would
take.
and
it
105
The
first
move took
The column
left
the trenches
near Djemal Bey's house and spread out to the sand dunes
that lay to the right, beyond the
Wady
Mejnin.
An
hour
debouched from
the Messri road, and the Italian guns began the battle.
Rainaldi's brigade advanced in a direct line
fire.
The
Italian
smoke and sand But the Turkish gunners stuck tenaciously to their work. They fired slowly, but persistently, concentrating their efforts upon
big guns dotted the desert with columns of
Rainaldi's
steadiness
brigade, which advanced with the utmost and precision of movement. It had difficult
for the inundations
ground to cover,
the way.
had
filled
all
the
The brigade
up the
rising
and pressed ground beyond, and came to a halt. Watchdivided, skirted the lake
it
was
difficult to see
a reason for
The undulating ground afforded plenty and they were not yet at grips with the enemy.
enemy among the dunes, and for the time being had got hung up. For the success of the movement it was necessary to halt
General Pecori's column had come in touch with the
the centre until the right wing could overcome the opposition
and continue
its
course.
106
little
air was full of hung low above the sand-hills, and then blew away. The infantry lay down and waited the guns poured shrapnel on to the enemy, and at intervals the big guns from the trenches roared deafeningly. The mountain guns, under Colonel Besozzi, were making beauti-
of their positions.
ful practice,
still
and anxiety spread through the troops. The men were eager to be on the move, and the officers realised what the delay might involve. Meanwhile, the 52nd had advanced from the trenches to attack the mosque of Bu-Said, which was situated near
feeling of impatience
tion,
Their attack was supported by and unfortunately, owing to a miscalculathe advancing troops came under the fire of their own
guns.
One company was badly knocked about, and the attack was checked until word could be conveyed to the
trenches at Fort Messri.
stiff fight,
(or rather
were
oasis.
Their objective was really attained by detaching and containing, during the
column.
The
error of
by
their
it
own guns
is
not a matter
official
war-
fare,
and
As
early as
the oasis
midday one could see groups of Arabs leaving and making for Ain Zara. Ain Zara itself lies
low
ridge,
in a hollow, behind a
and on the
MOUNTAIN GUNS
IN ACTION
107
But
right.
Though the
was in movement again by one o'clock, there still to go, and the enemy had gained some
fired desperately,
and
who
while
Rainaldi's
brigade
remnant
of resistance,
on the north-western
side.
As the troops
great
But the main body of the enemy, above all, the Turkish nucleus, had got clear away. It looked as though the turning movement had been made too soon in point of place, too late in point of time. Though the Italian troops had done all that was asked of them, and had gained an important victory, the fruits of that victory were not what they might have been.
behind.
It
At the same
time, to
and
Ain Zara an
be that the
of the battle.
may
108
the enemy's
force.
If the objec-
work was simply the occupation of Ain and the consequent automatic clearing of the oasis, then the work was admirably carried out and at a very small cost. But such a plan would indicate too shortsighted a view. If, on the other hand, the objective was
Zara,
failure.
It
may
of the
Turk
two objectives
sur-
that the
were
left
on
my mind
was all-important that he should press on and that his column made its circling movement too soon, turning in upon Ain Zara
instead of pressing on to the enemy's line of retreat.
for Rainaldi's brigade to find
when
itself
It
itself
Zara.
clear
by the Bersaglieri at the approaches to Ain was in this way that the Turks were able to get
'
say
Turks
'
advisedly, for
it
would be
all
but
full
situation
is
slow
of
moving masses
fleet-footed
enemy
of Parthian inclinations.
Certain critics
more unfortunately
Two
squadrons, reduced
109
Rome
had been anxious to send out more cavalry, but that General offer. The mind jumped back a
'
:
Unmounted men
110
CHAPTER VI
THE THIRD PHASE
:
PREPARATION
With
matically
Tripoli
of
an
The
was no longer an insidious peril, but a wonderful succession of gardens and glades, where fruit hung overripe,
and
flowers bloomed,
and
tall grasses
waved.
And
When
the year
The
tently, Jebel
The mountains
called,
and
call
would be answered.
it
of the
was
an advance would take time (though some asked why preparations had not already been made). It was felt that
the occupation of Ain Zara had definitely closed one phase
of the war,
it
first
The end
of
January
was, perhaps, the popular fancy for the date on which the
99
who had
and
for
Hanni.
for
all
emer-
and consisted of three regiments of infantry, the 23rd and 52nd (6th Brigade) and 50th, two batteries field artillery, two batteries mountain guns, and two squadrons
of cavalry.
The whole
was held
The attacking
two days
taken,
before,
By
was
and a
little
who had
colonel of
of
Ain Zara.
The
men
in a specified
and to act
strictly
on the defensive.
When
he
came
The answer came back that he was only to do so if he could guarantee that there was no risk. This damping condition shut down his effort at initiative the 50th dug themselves rifle-pits and remained
;
day
till
order, keeping
up a desultory
and
suffering occasional
100
casualties
killed
the Turks.
They
and wounded.
was the
line.
advance
all
The Bersaglieri and the Grenadiers advanced from Hamura and Feschlum, with a battalion of the 37th and
93rd, with the 18th in support, advanced
Owing
to a misunderstanding
who
the trenches, correspondents were prevented from reaching the front during the
first
all
civilians.
The
correction
until nearly
midday, and
Three
filter
story
how
'
ploughing their
way through
In point of
relatively easy.'
No
risks
the
systematically
points,
where parties
the El Hanni
1
in a house, to
make a
by three
o'clock.
Towards four o'clock an ambulance train was sent out to bring in It was immediately made the target for a heavy the wounded of the 50th.
fire
109
The lack of cavalry was, of course, a serious misfortune, and it certainly seemed as though the presence of two or three cavalry regiments, well-handled, would have meant the
capture or destruction of the Turkish nucleus instead of
its rout.
Rome
had been anxious to send out more cavalry, but that General Caneva had refused the offer. The mind jumped back a
dozen years, to a famous telegram
preferred/
'
:
Unmounted men
110
CHAPTER VI
THE THIRD PHASE
I
PREPARATION
With
was freed from the near presence enemy, and from the immediate reminder of war.
matically
Tripoli
oasis
of
an
The
was no longer an insidious peril, but a wonderful succession of gardens and glades, where fruit hung overripe,
and
flowers bloomed,
and
tall grasses
waved.
And
When
the year
The
tently, Jebel
The mountains
called,
and
Tripoli
call
would be answered.
it
of the
was
an advance would take time (though some asked why preparations had not already been made).
It
was
felt
that
it
first
The end
of
January
was, perhaps, the popular fancy for the date on which the
PREPARATION?
desert expedition would start, though
Ill
some put
it
a fort-
much
confi-
month
later.
It
was
dence was
felt
Some pinned
all
their faith
felt
justified
Italy,
been ordered and was on the way. In the town a change of mood was immediately notice-
The suspense was at an end the population seemed to have made up its mind that for good or ill the Italians were in Tripoli to stay. With the object of impressing the victory of Ain Zara upon the natives (though the silence after weeks of firing was proof enough) the seven guns captured from the Turks were brought in with pomp and parade, decked out with palm branches. In front of the Konak the artillery horses were unharnessed, and the guns were run up the steep paved entrance-way by sturdy grinning soldiers. The streets were packed with natives. Arab women shrilled their weird ululations, black men shouted exuberantly, and the thin -voiced Jews were The Arab men watched silently, specially vociferous. critically but it seemed that they saw in those lumbering guns a sign that the Turkish domination had passed away. A number of rifles were given up, or their hiding-places indicated, and their possessors seemed thankful to be rid of them. Waves of anxiety and uneasiness came over the people from time to time, when wild rumours filtered
able.
;
;
in
from the desert, but the whole aspect of the town was
subtly changed.
112
For a fortnight
was occupied without resistance, except for a few stray Meanwhile there were daily reconnaissances from shots.
Ain Zara, where General Pecori's division was busily
engaged in constructing a huge entrenched camp.
or ten miles, was searched
The
by
flying columns,
who came
enemy.
But
it
seemed
had
retired
to Azizia,
supposition.
On December
battalions,
two batteries, and a regiment of lancers (which had arrived a week after Ain Zara) was sent westward to Zanzur, with the object of exploring the country and deThe small Turkish garrison stroying the telegraph station.
retired in anticipation of their arrival,
who first entered the oasis. Those remained in Zanzur (the bulk of the inhad who sheikhs habitants had removed inland) made submission to the
were
fired at the lancers
to this step was reported by spies a couple of days later. inquired into the The Turkish garrison had returned absence of the sheikhs and refused to accept the explanation that they had been made prisoners. A deadly logic the Italian column had informed the Turkish argument
; :
The source
makes
it
suspect.
Yet
it fits
entirely
w~
1
~iv'
~*A\
^^m tm
PREPARATION ?
Such treachery could not be
were duly executed.
113
The
and
it is
clear
on broad
principles, the
the reconnaissance to
an
error.
to
any
mere
raid,
followed
;
by
in view
sequel,
cannot escape
first,
condemnation.
These
make submission
their experience
to the Italians.
The precedent
set
by
of further defections
The
laid
and P
3.
The
it
airships were to
until ten
was not
made
their first
flight in
Libya.
The
and
make up
for
these
Two
114
a regrettable incident
to
On December
18
five
who appealed
for protection.
own
regiment,
brought the news were sent as guides, and two were detained as hostages at Ain Zara.
orders were very precise.
He was
light,
off
and
was sent
lies
ground that
whether
way
in
In
any
from
case,
dawn found
way
its objective.
track, but
speed,
little
bodies of the
enemy
into the
oasis.
much
larger
number of the enemy than had been reported, and sent back word that he was engaged with a considerable force,
but could deal with
reached Ain Zara
it.
till
of Turkish regulars,
and
on taking stock
of his position
Fara
PREPARATION?
dence of further offensive action.
115
short
The
day was
if
half
done
he was a long
Zara, in time
not in
distance,
and
day's reconnaissance.
column had only been equipped for a Food was lacking, and, a much matter, ammunition was running short. machine-guns had been rendered useless by
his
their
mechanism.
At midday
for
his
steps,
and make
home,
ments.
The rearward movement was the signal for immediate attack upon the part of the enemy, and in a short time the retreating column found itself heavily attacked from three sides. As they got among the sand dunes, the men floundered badly, and the retreat became very difficult
so difficult that Colonel Fara resolved to entrench himself
and send
to
Ain Zara
for reinforcements.
Picking out an
vigorously,
and got very near the Italian square, but they were always repulsed. A good many of the Arabs had little stomach
for the fight, in spite of the exhortations of a
number
of
It
was fortunate
was
so.
If
might have
For ammunition
attack was
fierce
made
and then there was a lull. Another attack o'clock, and another at eleven, but the
me
kicking Arabs
who were
reluctant to
make
a rush.
116
and
and
it
cover of darkness.
An
attack at
dawn seemed
and there was little ammunition left. No news had come from Ain Zara, and it was at least possible that Colonel Fara's messengers had been cut off. An attack in the
morning,
if
down
the enemy's
fire.
At
an alarm.
They stumbled
off
completely in the
had resolved
The united
Zara,
The Bir Tobras affair gave rise to a great deal of discusand was responsible for the return of General Pecori to Italy, early in January. The reason first given for his supersession was that of ill-health, and it is true that General Pecori, besides suffering from deafness, was not But reasons really fit enough for a colonial campaign.
sion,
of fitness
may
be,
upon
indis-
His own
memorandum
official
correspondence on the
PREPARATION?
subject, took
his
117
facts,
away
all
doubt as to the
list.
and caused
column unknown to
movement
fault
it
too
weak
and
indicating,
among
other
In
and reminded General Pecori that in planning the attack on Ain Zara he had declined to conhis sider an advance from the trenches before dawn opinion, therefore, on the subject of night-marches was well known, and ought to have been respected. He promarch
in the desert,
;
when news
engagement
munication with
emergency.
it,
but
he defended
himself
against
certain
charges.
He
the
He
claimed
column was more than strong enough for any opposition he had reason to expect, and that if he had
118
He
maintained that
had a detachment
fault with
his
and found
him
for
on the scene.
The
object of the
body of Arabs reported, and with the failure to accomplish this end Colonel Fara ought to have returned to Ain Zara,
or, if
sent back
General
when
Fara's
first
;
message arrived,
first,
because he
itself,
and
march
its
in the dark,
losing
way
in the sandhills.
He
did not
preparation of supplies,
General Frugoni was unable to accept the explanation and defence offered, and General Caneva concurred in recommending General Pecori's supersession. The Bir Tobras story has been given in some detail because the event and its sequel are illustrative of interesting points in the story of the campaign. The action By an unlucky itself does not call for very much comment. combination of circumstances Colonel Fara's column found itself in a tight place, and while most of the troops behaved
with gallantry and coolness, something like a panic occurred
among some
of the
men.
The
officers,
PREPARATION?
failed at a pinch, rallied
119
and steadied the wavering troops, and Colonel Fara's own example of courage and confidence may be said to have saved the situation. He had already earned the admiration and thanks of his country by the
way he had handled his regiment in earlier actions. His men had learned to believe in him implicitly, but it is scarcely too much to say that after the Bir Tobras action,
their enthusiasm for their leader
had
in
it
something of
little
veneration.
to
do
for a long
command
of a brigade,
and
rumoured that an
inclination to rash-
ness
and a
requisites in a military
the
and the
will to
If it is necessary to
may be
held to
and
standing.
But
it
he had done
so.
When
ordinary feature
cism
news
120
that Fara was engaged with a large number of the enemy and had begun to retreat, he took no steps to be ready for an
preparations
were
still
to
make.
General
and then ceased to have troubled himself about it any Yet at the same time he seems to have denied to Fara the right of initiative.
further.
On
Fara had
and
any
situation that
The
critical
column found
Arab
ammunition, to the
and
to tackle
was
of course too
weak.
As a
flying
belonged,
it
The most
avoid
view,
all
by the
affair are
command
to
its
requisite
1
given
is
operations.
General
Pecori
argued
The
Italian estimate
three thousand.
side claim that the entire force in action against the Italians consisted of
five
In view of the
to
accept this
cw
v
A\b#
9c
<#M<
PREPARATION
risky
121
that
its
;
success
commendation
ordinate,
was reduced was due partly to the imprudence and partly to sheer bad
hardly be entertained, and the interest of
less in
its
The plan
as
itself,
of the
column detailed
fully as
much emphasis
of
any remiss-
out.
The condemnation
first
afterwards revealed
itself
more
openly avowed
involving the
minimum
that
down,
taken
required
no
operation
of
be
under-
without
the
assurance
numerical
The adoption
for
gives ground
surprise
After
the
fight
at
Bir Tobras
reconnaissances
were
The
by means
of supporting troops,
Selim.
The two
122
from Bir
Azizia
Adam. After the battle of Ain Zara the Turks had retired upon Azizia, and, in anticipation of an early advance, had moved
Garden
the bulk of their reserve stores from there to Gharian
;
the
but as the conviction grew that the Italians did not intend
at once to follow
them
moved forward
from Tripoli
of
far
if
close
The days already seemed long past when the news from the trenches was all that mattered a new life stirred and flowed. The tide of commerce that the war had brought rose higher, and there were added the beginnings of activities that would persist after peace came the work for the port, long talked of by the Turks and always relegated to a more convenient season, and the roots of other enterprises that should flourish in the future. But the railway was the chief object of interest, and there was a good deal of discussion as to the delay in getting on with a work upon which so much seemed to depend. At first, it appears, there was talk of a Decauville line, and when this idea was
;
made pari passu with the conNews came that sixty kilometres of rails were on their way from Italy, and this figure seemed to promise an advanced base at Azizia. The line
the railway.
if
PREPARATION ?
Messri,
123
soldiers
of
January
were busy
making the road-bed for a metre-gauge line. The delay had been puzzling. It was difficult to avoid
the conclusion that
all
may be found
December it was fought, did not deal the blow that had been cipated, and calculations based on the expectation
battle of
But the
4,
as
anti-
of a
more
on
fruitful victory
were unhappily
falsified.
Yet even
and
possible work.
Rumours
of peace persisted,
became
specially definite
marked the
it
on
its
western
side.
by the The
of
existing,
was a matter
had
Wooden
jetties
army
124
way
had to wait
for
many days
it is
In the circumstances
as Tripoli's
Commendatore
Luiggi,
had to be the laying of a narrow-gauge line to Gargaresh from the mole, to bring in material for the main breakwater.
struction of the port
Hitherto interest had lain to the south and east of Tripoli. The names which had become most familiar El Hanni, Amruss, Tajura, Ain Zara, Bir Tobras, Fonduk Ben Gashir all were marked in the south-eastern segment of the half-
circle
activity
empty and
it.
lifeless,
and the enemy had shown Zanzur seemed and Italy had only to stretch a hand
side,
in
that direction.
Corre-
'
avamposti
'
at Gargaresh,
B., the
part of Tripoli.
But the
the Turks
For
was
communications with
army was
X m B W o & a
PREPARATION
including the chain of
border.
hills
125
The establishment
not only put them astride the main caravan to the Jebel,
it
the strongest of the coast tribes, and from this centre their
influence radiated over all the field strategically necessary
to them.
The
first
of outlook
in a
sudden raid
upon the inhabitants of Gargaresh. On January 4 a band Arabs swooped upon the oasis, and carried off all the supplies they could lay hands on. The performance was repeated with added emphasis on the following day,
of desert
villagers^
raiders, others
But the
which
of
January
18,
a stronger column than would have been considered necessary three weeks earlier, before the reports of the enemy's
Adem had
been confirmed,
of Tripoli
had been
startled
by the news
of
The column
consisted of the
1st battalion of
field
Grena-
in
all
126
men.
more trustworthy information than that which was available for their critics. In any case, when prudence cost nothing, and troops were in actual need of exercise and
change,
of
was hardly fair to condemn the employment many where few might have been sufficient.
it
The advancing column, commanded by Colonel Amari edge of the oasis about 9 a.m. and
fire
but after
enemy
Fonduk El
same
direction.
and most
home
was over
But
shortly after
midday a
force of about
two thousand 1
boldness,
and a number
flank of the Italian protecting line, and to cut in between them and the sea. To prevent this manoeuvre the Grenadiers were swung round till their right rested on the shore, while all the troops fell back a little on the oasis and the forts,
1
An
PREPARATION
and the
Italian guns fired rapidly
127
and accurately upon the Turks and Arabs advanced in exThe advancing line. tended order with the utmost resolution, and before three
o'clock they were engaging the whole Italian line very
them got within a hundred yards of the Italian position, and the Grenadiers were obliged to fall back in order to keep in touch with the 52nd and protect the guns, leaving their rough trenches to be occupied by
closely.
number
of
The
fighting
for
Italian fire
as usual,
much
too high.
retreat
Fara
(late Colonel of
By
Arabs were in
full retreat
and the
Italians
were
left in
un-
and the men began to dig their trenches preparatory to the arrival of a much-needed meal.
Night
fell,
ments were
wounded.
of
men
returned
sixty
killed
and
all next day the town and the trenches were buzzing with questions. Every one was mystified. The enemy had been soundly drubbed,
is
That
as
Yet the
Italian troops
had
been ordered to retire without completing the work they had set out to do, and they had not been allowed to encamp
128
and
advantage
to its possessors.
The reason
as follows.
was only a
draw the Italians out of the town, perhaps to lead them on to Zanzur, and that an attack in much greater force was designed. It was decided that the occupation of Gargaresh by General Fara's troops would mask the fire of the guns from Forts Sultanieh, B. and C., and that in any case it would be better not to allow them to be out of touch with the supreme command. Apparently the information was wrong. Probably the Turco-Arab forces had suffered much more severely than they had expected, and did not care to renew the fight. In any case, a reconnaissance by the lancers, carried out on the afternoon of the 19th, found no trace of hostile movement within a wide radius to the west of Tripoli. Many bodies were found, and many arms which had been abandoned
in the
enemy's retreat
or sign.
was occupied, on the following day, by a strong force under General De Chaurand, consisting of the 82nd and 84th
regiments, one battery field artillery and one battery of
mountain guns,
of
six
sappers.
The
infantry
and
artillery
took
and south
of Gargaresh,
by
and the quarries from further and to dominate the approaches to Zanzur,
force with
The whole
the exception of
the
Photo W. F. Riley
1912
PREPARATION
quartered at Gargaresh.
129
By
moral
effect
which
1
;
it
was feared
so far
that
is,
hard to
should have outweighed the clear moral reasons for remaining on the spot.
The
oasis of
Gargaresh
is
in such close
their fire
upon the
Bu
enemy
in the flank,
upon General Frugoni, but he would not countenance the move. Such an attack could not have failed, at the worst,
to
of the
it
might
Moreover,
No doubt
movement were
The
flanking
column might
large force of
itself
an
antici-
danger.
Given the
number
and
Mr. Alan Ostler's book, The Arabs in Tripoli, shows that this was not the case. Although the Arabs retired at sunset, they considered they had won a notable victory, and the return of the Italians to Tripoli was apparent confirmation of a view which had no other basis in fact.
I
130
from Bu
that was so
much more
The very
adopted.
lined
deserved acceptance
every successful blow dealt at the enemy counted something in the game.
The conclusion forced itself upon the mind that prudence was being overdone, and that a greater measure of self-confidence would be more fruitful of result.
INACTION
131
CHAPTER
THE THIRD PHASE
:
VII
INACTION
it
Looking back,
became
there
is
battle of
that,
if
decisive
had subsequently been rejected. At the end of January there still seemed to be good prospect of an advance towards the mountains, though signs were not wanting to
idea
cast a
shadow
of
and
its
Moreover, while
was
still
when the
line
to the south of
who had
by way
Zanzur-Azizia road.
It is interesting, in retrospect, to note
how
who began
to doubt whether,
immediate programme.
known
caution
132
successful
On
the
refusal
to
employ troops
in operations
move
that the
same
direction.
seemed evident
that these must have been brought for some other purpose
weak
and
Suk-el-Tlata,
Italian firms
or
it
On
observers calculated on a
move
army kicked
allowed to do
its
its
heels
would be
duty.
at Gargaresh,
20,
The engagement
was the
of Tripoli until
morning
rifles
went
off
prematurely,
and what appeared to be the main attack developed much too late. The object of this movement, in which it was computed that some three thousand men took part, 1 must
be a matter of doubt, as there was no real attempt to press 1 An account from the Turkish side says 1000.
INACTION
home any
desultory
attack,
133
and none
for
of the
six
was kept up
some time,
at about 9 a.m.
little
damage 1
camp,
effort
An
Italian
of the entrenched
no very vigorous
quick-moving enemy,
were de-
who
artillery.
as though
it
Rome,
and
his departure
gave
rise to
Some saw
hoped
immediate action
now
wisdom
of
On
the
in
be taken, and
General
Upon
home,
and
programme he favoured
The
Italian loss
was two
134
If
seemed
clear that
itself differently,
and that
To
was noticeable
in
the
succeeded in inspiring
his policy
Army of Occupation. Without may be said that he had not his command with confidence that
manifested
in all ranks.
On
there
in
good time,
there
even
if
was a
more forward
Towards the end of February General Caneva returned to Tripoli, and it soon became evident, even if his return were
not sufficient proof, that the views of
'
the
had prevailed.
When
the
first
was
The idea of a desert expedition receded into the background, and speculation was confined to the possibility of
other, less ambitious undertakings.
Two
due
:
at Zuara, or
INACTION
for operations directed against the
135
enemy's main
line of
The occupation of Zanzur seemed a necessary prelude and if all attempts at peneany forward movement tration were to be postponed, it seemed the more desirable to establish as firmly as possible that position upon the
to
;
But the period of inaction was to be doubled before another move was made in the neighimmediate ambitions.
bourhood
by the rumour
of
still
harassed by Turkish
that
hill
lies
The town of Horns is dominated by a hill, the Mergheb, about two miles to the south-west. From this
it
town, and
With
many Arabs
as possible from
landing was made at some thirty miles to the eastward, on February 26. The feint had the desired effect, and large numbers of Arabs
the neighbourhood a pretence of
Sliten,
The Italians had advanced before dawn, in three columns, and had practically rushed the position before the Turks and Arabs could collect for its defence. After a brief struggle the enemy were turned out at the point of the bayonet, and though they were reinforced in the afternoon, and made a determined attempt to regain the heavv loss.
hill,
136
Six days later, on the night of March 5, a fierce attack was made upon the Mergheb. The Turks and Arabs advanced
light of a full
fight con-
night.
attacking forces,
who fought
their
way up
to the Italian
heavy
was spreading in Italy, that if Italian arms were receiving no checks, they were certainly making no headway. The
absolute lack of
movement
was generally
felt
and the news of successes elsewhere was doubly welcome on that account. As week after week went past it became increasingly difficult to realise that Tripoli was the base of an invading army whose most advanced posts were well within the
range of gun-fire from the sea.
In the town
itself
there
of peaceful activity,
and the
of
who had
began to
by the middle of January the sheikhs of the Sahel district had sent in a list containing the names of two thousand three hundred Arabs who had returned to take up their occupations again. About the same time those inhabitants of the oasis who had been living in the town since the revolt were allowed to go out to their gardens by day, and work
under surveillance, returning at
nightfall.
little
later
3
...
Vife
AMRUSS
(from
a
roof)
INACTION
Jews
of
137
least, rejoined
The
inhabitants
of
and other-
by Turkish soldiers and desert Arabs. Even after the oasis had been cleared, they lived in mortal fear of stray raiders, for Amruss lay well outside the Italian line of trenches, and it was not until a Carabinieri station had been established at Suk-el-Juma, within two minutes'
run, that the Amrussis felt themselves fairly secure.
On
little
Here and
there, in the
by the
shell-fire
For a
At El Hanni, Amruss, and the Agricultural College, Italian shells had left their mark and all through the oasis, but especially at Amruss, Feschlum, and Hamura, the houses were pocked with bullet-marks. Most of the Arabs had removed their poor household goods, and their homes presented a melancholy spectacle, especially where the Berbers and desert tribesmen had plundered. The cumbrous Arab chests remained, except where, as at Shara Zauiet, they had been used as barricades, but for the most
enemy.
;
part the houses, uninjured save where the shells had fallen,
No
138
lines
was commendably small. and deserted gardens, the rotten fruit and the wells, told their tale and cast their shadow. When
;
when dusty
when houses no longer stared mute and blind, their doorways open and empty, but woke and sounded with their old life, the cloud of war lifted, and let in dreams of a new wellbeing for this neglected land, so lately moribund.
and the following days had ceased to dominate the relations between Italian and Arab. Some suspicion and resentment still lingered, and will long linger, in the minds of both peoples, but a certain measure of confidence had begun to be established, that promised well for the future. The Arab notables in Tripoli saw
of October 23
The events
would be permanent,
They saw,
meant money a general prosperity to which Turkish rule had made them strangers. The signs of Italian energy and Italian wealth which were transforming Tripoli were not lost upon them, or upon the populace, which found itself supplied with steady employment at good wages. While Italian military effort had come to an absolute standstill, while the campaign, as far as Tripoli was concerned, appeared to be
marked by a blank
inertia,
the
civil
command.
By
the
civil authorities,
should be said,
civil
is
meant those
officers of
with the
INACTION
both, the
139
The appearance of the town changed marvellously during the first six months of and if much of the bustle and stir was the occupation due to the presence of forty thousand soldiers, and the necessity of keeping this force supplied, these months witnessed the beginnings of permanent improvements and developments, which should outlast the war period and prove the foundations of a new prosperity. The Italians have great faith in the commercial prospects of Tripoli, and it has already been said that the construction of a sheltered port, available for large vessels, was
Government
in
Rome.
In the
fruit,
though,
rumour speaks
true, a contract
known
had
As soon
as Tripoli
been relieved of the immediate presence of the Turcoforces, the question of the port
Arab
all
Italian authorities.
The scheme
will
is
be under-
The task
Italians
is
greatly facilitated
by the existence
of the reef
or, as
the
now
call
it,
The dimen-
sions of the
fifteen
harbour
seventeen hundred by
will
be constructed
as occasion
140
will
will
be necessary to blast
some rocks
difficulty in
but there
will
be no
largest ships.
making a wide area of water accessible to the The completed plan of the undertaking is
it
may
work will probably not be long delayed. Meanwhile, the most necessary part of the undertaking has been put in hand, and hopes are entertained that the early spring will
see the completion of a large breakwater
hundred metres
town, and by
lies
of old
The
less
of a railway
of improve-
From
the
set itself to
of the
special sanitary
committee
In
INACTION
The municipal
services were
141
civil
Two
The
civil hospital
was enlarged
the
town,
ophthalmia, and in
tion of Tripoli.
At
first
and too great to be refused. By the beginning of March the most frequented of these dispensaries was treating eight hundred
benefits offered were too evident to be overlooked
patients a day.
and
Captain
Castoldi,
in
an
ex-officer
of
the
International
Salsa
Gendarmerie
Turkey.
Though
Major-General
all
ordinary municipal
additional problems
settling of
many
The
erection of lighthouses to
Bu
Meliana water-
works, the lighting of the city and of the main roads within
the lines, the development of the postal service,
and the
142
many
And
there
was no lack
of private
enterprise.
from
all
come
to Tripoli
and
The town
six
filled
with commercial
men
and
of all types,
on making a fortune in
of a big firm
months by
selling chocolate
in the
who came to report on the possibilities of trade new colony. Many of the smaller men arrived with
committed to the doubtful
wiser,
which prevailed.
Others,
came
into the
sleeping accommodation.
commissions
influx
agricultural
and commercial.
of
it
Nearly
all this
was
unfortunate.
For no
that
many
failures
were bound to
which
colony.
may
The
new
and did
all in their
power to
home
The
INACTION
of a
143
lost
;
busy commerce
selling
pro-
there was
buying and
and building. Laden ships waited in days and weeks, or steamed away without
Further
landing accommodation became urgently necessary, and The use of rails and jetties of a temporary kind were built.
sleepers in their construction, rails
and
the military railway, was clear token of the situation. the end of March every peaceful activity was in
full
By
;
sway,
itself insistently
when would
The bounds
of Tripoli Ilaliana
tion of Gargaresh
on January
20.
March did any of the invading troops come into real contact with an enemy. Early in February a battalion of native Askaris and a detachment of camelry, both officered by Italians, had arrived from Eritrea, and the reconnaissance work was shared by these troops and the Italian cavalry. The Askaris are very alert and soldierly-looking men, tall and spare, with a splendid carriage, some straight-featured and copper-coloured, others of the black Sudanese type. They brought a good reputation from Eritrea, and they were to show themselves useful scouts and staunch fighters. Their mobility is remarkable. Running bare-footed in the sand, they are able to operate with cavalry, and their
occasion during February and
endurance
is
not
less
On March
3 the Askaris
had
144
Arabs.
They came
one
on a wasp's
nest.
They
swung westwards towards Ain Zara, and for five hours they seem to have fought a pretty running fight among the sand dunes, driving the enemy, who had outflanked them, from ridge to ridge. When they came within touch of Ain Zara the Arabs melted into the desert, and the
Askaris reached the Italian
camp
them ten dead and thirty-eight wounded. Two more men had been killed, belonging to a detached section, and these had been buried where they fell, as nearly all the others in this small party had been wounded. After burying their dead, and depositing their wounded, the battalion set out for Tripoli, and reached their quarters about
10.30 p.m., after a fifteen-hours day, a forty-miles march,
and
five
They arrived
the
at a run,
chanting a war-song
fine piece of
bravado
When
men
got to their
of fatigue.
out, they
They moved briskly, and their smart, cheerful demeanour had suffered no change. Their officers were very proud of their behaviour, and to the observer it seemed that Italy
might well be congratulated on the troops of her Red Sea
colony.
On March
broken up.
10 the huge entrenched camp at Ain Zara was The division commanded by General Camerana,
who had
became
REVIEW OF THE
ASKARI<=
INACTION
securely held
145
by a strong fort, garrisoned by a regiment 1 and a mountain battery. For three months the Ain Zara division had believed itself to be at the starting-point for the expedition towards the interior. Ain Zara had been and regarded as the advance base for the desert column
;
if it
so intended, there
is little
likelihood that
established
effective occupation of
the position only a small garrison was needed, and the with-
fact.
The return
abandonment
of the troops
of General
Camerana's division
of
signified the
of
for
direction.
seemed to be imminent.
the latter days of
intended.
There
is
March a movement of some sort was The climax came early in April, when march-
starting.
The moral
effect
may
be imagined.
left in
The
officers
a state
of
March
without a
move
of
any
sort.
made their first ascent on March 4, dropped a few bombs during their reconnaissances and
;
and Suani
Beni Adem.
1
effort to
146
of.
any movement
round
impregnable
lines
Tripoli.
half-hearted attack
upon the small garrison occupying the Fort of Santa Barbara at Ain Zara, after the withdrawal of General Camerana's division, was scarcely an exception to the general inaction. 1 The delay to initiate any further offensive movement after the battle of Ain Zara, coupled with the
retreat
number of Arabs in the field. Whereas at the beginning of December the Arab forces in arms against the Italians in Tripoli totalled no more than five or six thousand men, this number had been quadrupled by the end of March. 2
Moreover, while the Turkish nucleus of three thousand
to
and
influence
From
it
drummed
side.
good deal was made of this incident by accounts from the Turkish It was reported that the Arabs entered the Italian trenches and drove the Italians back a mile to the northward. In point of fact the Arabs did pass the lines of unoccupied trenches which had been evacuated by General Camerana's division, but they made no impression at all on the Italians in the fort. They advanced to within about five hundred yards, making a good deal of noise, but they were quickly repulsed by the Italian sharpshooters and a few rounds of shrapnel. The Italians had no casualties and did not think they had done much damage. An account from the Turkish side gives the Arab loss as ten killed, including a sheikh, and nineteen wounded. 2 This estimate is based upon figures given me by an Arab notable, who was in a position to know the facts. He argued strongly that a greater initiative on the part of the Italians would have prevented the Arabs, or most of them, from throwing in their lot with the Turks.
INACTION
147
to leave the coast and come out to give battle in the desert. The Arabs were doubtful at first, and some Tripoli sheikhs,
who
Adem
in the early
days
mind that was not uncommon. Let the Italians come out and fight us in the open. Then if they win, we shall know that they are the stronger, and fight no more against them.' The Italians were slow to make any move at all, and the Turks were able to employ the delay to good advantage. The advance upon Ain Zara shook Arab faith a little, but the Turks
of the occupation, voiced a frame of
'
were quick to point out that the big guns could not be
brought farther into the desert, and that the Ain Zara fight
was
in reality
no
fair test.
hesitation,
The
The
Italian expedi-
and mountain
artillery,
and eight
Tripoli,
many
weeks.
ward
Zanzur
oasis.
and
fortify Zanzur.
Adem, a
large force
was concentrated,
and
was reported that in all some twenty thousand men had collected to the south and south-west of Tripoli,
it
148
But immeIt
on a large
scale
was out
of the question.
months for which they had originally been called up and the raw soldiers of the '91 class could scarcely be sent
;
into
new surroundings. At the end of six months' campaigning the sum of success attained by Italian arms fell far short of expectation fell short, too, of what might reasonably have been hoped. Perhaps Italian expectation had run too high the diffi-
by Government
or
people.
On
is
way
of a successful issue.
For
Europe the
Italians
themselves
are
largely
responsible.
of the year,
tion, there
When
four
coolest
months
occupato the
without an
who came
RENEWED ACTIVITY
149
CHAPTER
THE FOURTH PHASE
I
VIII
RENEWED ACTIVITY
With
a
stir of
genelies
about sixty miles west of Tripoli and about forty from the
Tunis border, was included in the original plan of campaign,
were diverted
when
It
is
certain
Zuara, but
ports lay off Tripoli or cruised along the coast, but there
was no break
finally forced to
return to Augusta.
for
some of
1
its
Two
squadrons of the Guides Cavalry were sent to Tripoli, raising mounted arm with General Caneva to eight squadrons.
150
It
is
By
waiting for
;
The difficulty of landing stores, even in the port of Tripoli, had been the cause of much anxiety to those responsible for supplies, and it was realised that on the shallow and treacherous coast to the west there would be lengthy periods when the disembarkation of stores and ammunition would be all but
'
impossible.
is
obviously debatable,
it
would
In
risks of a landing
difficult to believe
left
without
sufficient
them
advantages.
some point near the western frontier, if such occupation were in any way possible. The Turkish headquarters depended largely upon Tunis
called for the occupation of
for its necessaries, almost wholly for its comforts.
More-
over, Turkish
officers
and Turkish gold, both essential to came over the Tunis border or landed
on the
much
Zuara seems
contraband
main landing-place
for such
as was run
by
sea,
and the main caravan routes from Ben striking distance of the town. That a strip of land on the coast would not
RENEWED ACTIVITY
blockade the whole Tunis border was obvious
equally clear that
;
151
point west of
it,
but it was by effecting a landing at Zuara, or some and sending out flying columns to watch
much
longer,
more
frontier
of Tripoli,
1
was
of
carefully inspected,
with the
the
conditions.
sailors
had
strict orders to
Although
The
failure of
and they
by the expected
landing.
The
navy was devoted to finding another point on the coast where an expedition could be more
readily disembarked.
1
coast,
open as
it
Turks succeeded in overcoming these difficulties, which were less formidable than had been expected. The communications with Tunis were hampered by the Italian landing at Bu Kamesh, but less so than had been hoped.
It appears that the
152
is
Information commonly available seemed Ras Makabes, a headland near the Tunis border which runs parallel with the coast and forms a long narrow lagoon, as the most promising landing-place and this headland was in fact finally chosen by the Italian authorities. But the selection of a landing-place was far from leading to immediate action, and the occupation of a point on the coast west of Tripoli was delayed until the approach of
great difficulties.
to point to
;
summer should
In
all
facilitate
probability the
rumour
which
by headquarters.
Clearly something
was
afoot.
embarked a battalion of Bersaglieri, a battalion of the 37th, a machine gun section and a detachment of Askaris.
Later two battalions of Grenadiers were embarked, and
these actually
made a
feint of
movement
On
off
close in-
shore,
and to
all
On
number
of transports, escorted
by warships, appeared on the scene. The positions occupied by the enemy were at once bombarded and firing continued most of the day. At dawn on the 10th the troops were put into boats, but no attempt was made to land, the rough
weather affording
sufficient
up
RENEWED ACTIVITY
Division of the Expeditionary Force) had
153
left Italy early
on the morning
(Bersaglieri
of April 7.
More than
Tripoli to complete
The
by warships, rendezvous'd
land,
on the afternoon
of April 9,
and set out for the headland while They reached the extremity of the headland at daybreak, disembarked, and began to throw up trenches. They were followed at eight o'clock by the first boatload of infantry, and by eleven the bulk of the troops were disembarked, in spite of the difficulties occasioned by a heavy wind and lumpy sea. A strong detachment pushed eastward along the peninsula for about four miles and
it
embarked
was
still
dark.
There were no
speed.
On
force consisting of a
sailors and one company each of Askaris, and Customs Guards, crossed the bay in boats and
Bu Kamesh.
was not
There
was
still
no sign
of
an enemy and
it
A considerable
by General Garioni at about a thousand, occupied the dunes round the fort and kept up an annoying fire upon the boats crossing the bay. It was necessary to dislodge these groups, the more so as the
of Arabs, estimated
number
154
company
of
The sandstill
of the
bay and take the Arabs in the flank. The movement was successful and the Arabs were driven off. Next day the
60th regiment crossed the bay, and the
Bu Kamesh position
line of
ment took
place.
naissances in force,
and as a
result of
one of these, on
May
3,
put to
of
flight
with heavy
loss.
no strategical
significance,
The
retire.
On
May
and were only saved from total discomfiture by their heavy guns. Such conflicting accounts naturally puzzled public
opinion,
and helped
of
side will
it
in a later chapter.
Meanwhile,
make
in
with
my
personal experience.
RENEWED ACTIVITY
155
The next move on the Italian side took place at Horns. The occupation of the Mergheb on February 27 had relieved the town from the constant sniping and occasional artillery fire which had harassed it throughout many weeks, but
the Turks
still
bourhood,
their
being
about
three
miles
Lebda
of the
the
Leptis
Emperor Septimius Severus. General Reisoli determined to extend his lines, and put an end to the annoyance created by the proximity of the enemy, and early on the morning of May 2 an Italian force divided into two columns
marched out to the south-east, while a third column took
up a
flank
and rear
The
first
column,
consisting of
two
battalions,
was sent
The
movement was entirely successful. were taken by surprise, and when the
on their
bravely,
left
and
fighting
but
in
complete
confusion.
Towards
enemy
alties
killed.
The
Italian casu-
were
and
fifty-nine
May
of
of
156
of
regulars,
salved the
The
forces in Tripoli
and
tion to Rhodes,
and the
feeling
summer
till
September at
earliest,
and the
soldiers
had long
settled
down
Chief
among
main
and the laying of railway lines to Tajura and Gargaresh. The announcement that a sort of Chinese wall was
be built round Tripoli gave
rise to
ment
in the town,
both in
civilian
and
in military circles.
well-
that
it
was designed as a
climatic, the wall
purpose of
afforded a
its
erection
was military or
much needed
occupation to troops
The workmen who had been engaged since the beginning of February on the leisurely beginnings of the Tripolitan
railway system expressed a desire to return to their homes.
They were immediately shipped back to Italy, and the work was handed over to the soldiers, who tackled it with
a
will.
To
all
appearance
Tripoli
had
settled
down
for
the
if r/ a
Iffc J|
/ /
/
i
RENEWED ACTIVITY
summer, and the attention
the Aegean,
of Italy
157
when the
startling
made a move
heavy
upon
make
this
move
last
moment.
left for
An
officer
of
General
own
staff
had
number of Red Cross surgeons, moreover, left at the same time, and these would hardly have been sent home on the eve of a big engagement, if the engagement had been already planned by the
as no early
move was
intended.
commander-in-chief.
rife
as to the
six
months.
It
was reported
by
officers
in force,
and that
Whether
this explana-
movement was
entirely success-
effect of
occupation of a
new
position
On June
8,
Gargaresh in two columns. The objective of the movement was the small hill, or rather hillock, which lies between the sea and the eastern extremity of the Zanzur oasis, and
158
is
The two
On
the
and in advance, between the Zanzur road and the sea, was General Giardina's brigade, consisting of the 6th and
40th regiments, a
company
of
mountain
batteries.
On
the
left
field artillery.
At 5
a.m. General
came
body
by
were practically
out by
rifle fire
and an attempt
was not
successful.
At
Supported by the
fire
of the
moun-
and
men advanced by
They
;
short rushes
across
was no check
the
of the
full retreat,
The
fighting
off
bayonet charges.
By
this
back on to the
oasis of Zanzur,
RENEWED ACTIVITY
a
little later,
159
dunes
A
and
strong body of
rallied
and here
took place.
the
from the
position
field batteries,
enemy
until the
them out
By
along
to protect
But
phase,
scale
than the
first.
As was
all
up
Fonduk El Tokar, Fonduk Maggusa and Suani Beni Adem. At 7.30 a large force appeared to the south, advancing with great rapidity. Groups of Arabs had already threatened the left of General Rainaldi's brigade, but the main body, which now appeared on the scene, directed its attack upon
the Italian reserve south of Gargaresh.
two regiments and a battery of mountain guns. The Askaris and the cavalry were sent out to meet the
Turco-Arab attack on Gargaresh, while the
General Rainaldi's brigade found
east of the green dune.
difficulty in rolling
itself
left
wing of
heavily engaged
much
but the
movement on Gargaresh was carried out in the most determined manner. The Askaris and the cavalry were rein-
160
forced
of field artillery,
The Askaris were ordered to fall back upon the supporting battalions, and as they retired, slowly and in good order, the enemy came on in triumph. The moment must have been a happy one for the attacking forces. At last the Italians were fairly in the open, their main body far from the fortified lines behind which they had lain for so long. To those who had hurried up from the south the result of the first phase of the fight was not yet fully clear, and no doubt they believed that in the while in front of them desert the Italians stood no chance the enemy was falling back on Gargaresh, hard-pressed, to The small numbers of all appearance, by the Arab fire. the Italian force opposed to them perhaps led to the conclusion that General Caneva had weakened his defensive
;
lines
forces straight in
upon
Tripoli.
and
At the same moment the attacking forces found themselves taken in the flank by a provisional brigade of Italian troops commanded by General Montuori, 1 which
bayonet.
had
1
left
the oasis at
Bu
In
The brigade was formed out of the reserve battalions of General De Chaurand's division. General Montuori acted as brigadier, but the column, which included a mountain battery and was joined later by the cavalry brigade, was under the command of General De Chaurand.
RENEWED ACTIVITY
161
The Turco-Arab forces retreated in disorder, only extricating themselves by means of their extreme mobility. It was now noon, and the Turks and Arabs were in full
retreat all along the lines, except at the edge of the
Zanzur
regulars,
Italian advance.
General Rainaldi
and pursued them for some miles. By one o'clock the was practically over, as far as the Italian right was concerned, and the afternoon was spent in throwing up
battle
The left wing, on the other hand, was comparatively busy up till five o'clock. Fresh bodies of the enemy came up from the south-east, from the direction of Fonduk Ben Gashir and Bir Tobras, and joined with those already in
the
One
They
until
strong
They fought
;
bravely and recklessly, but the odds were far too heavy
the
fire
by the cavalry
them completely. A last attempt to turn the fortunes of the day was easily repulsed, and by five o'clock the battle was definitely over. General Giardina's
brigade, routed brigade, with the field artillery, remained at Sidi Abd-elJelil.
Tripoli
their
quarters
at
162
Although the
importance,
it
June 8
had a
value,
points of view.
In the
first
was
close
upon a thousand, a
number
of
many
important than
losses
its
The heaviest
of regulars
84th.
The
one
officer
and
thirty-
eight
seventy-eight
and two hundred and The main losses were sustained by the 6th and 40th regiments, in their attack upon the trenches north of the Zanzur road, and by the Askaris, who bore the brunt of the attack from the south, previous to the arrival of General De Chaurand's troops. The three companies of Askaris lost ten killed and seventy-five
thirteen officers
men
men wounded.
wounded.
It
is
official
accounts
thousand
killed,
own
loss
fifty killed
The
latter figures
may
among
their
Arab
purely
allies.
imaginative.
1
The estimate of the Italian loss must be The Turks and Arabs were comknown
as the battle of Zanzur.
Officially
RENEWED ACTIVITY
pletely routed,
ties suffered
163
and had no means of computing the casualby the victors. The Italians, on the other hand, remained in full possession of the battlefield, and the number of bodies actually counted during the next
few days
fell little
short of a thousand. 1
would
numbers
and backed by
Arab
bound
to inflict
upon
re-
many
been
marked that the Tripolitan Arab is a wild shot, and all his mobility and bravery cannot avail against the superior fire and superior numbers of his adversary. Moreover, the experience at the Arab trenches showed that when it
came
them.
made
light of
have
lost
much
arme
blanche.
Their method of
has changed.
They
The
field
total
number
of
of Italian troops
and three
mountain
artillery.
field
came
into
De Chaurand
The Turco-
1 Five hundred and forty-five bodies were found in the limited area covered by the advance of General Giardina's brigade alone,
164
Arab
puts
is
them
at twelve thousand
men
in
all,
on the spot.
thousand men.
for
it is
me
to a
minimum
estimate of ten
man
within reach of
of battle.
camp have
described the
movement was
Jelil
by every Arab
hand,
various
within
distance.
On
the
other
number engaged
The
given,
battle has
it will
at
some
From
the account
The nearest approach to a thoughtout movement seems to have been the attack upon the Italian reserve south of Gargaresh. The attack was delayed until a sufficiently large force had collected, and
the attempt to strike a blow at the Italian base gave indication of a controlling mind.
foiled
by the
arrival of General
Bu
nature.
camps in the neighbourhood, and dashed independently at what they judged were the most likely spots Outnumbered, outranged and outin the Italian line. manoeuvred, they had no chance of crowning their brave attempts with any measure of success.
various
RENEWED ACTIVITY
On
battle
165
It
De Chaurand, commanding
Meliana.
at
Bu
The timely
arrival
of
these
five
battalions,
De
Some
critics
oasis of
They have
oasis, that
had succeeded.
An
effective occupa-
interests
better
more than
arguments in
To
pose,
and
in Tripoli there
had
successfully employed. 1
The height
of Sidi Abd-el-Jelil
sufficiently
to
prevent
its
1 It was not until May that a line of blockhouses was built along the southern margin of the oasis, from Tajura to Fornaci (between Tripoli
and Ain
Zara).
166
this,
was
much
clear gain.
The
battle
me by an
oasis of
Italian staff-
officer in
The
Zanzur
'
!
is
not
it
frequently.
So does the
seems
The echoes of the Zanzur fight had barely died away when news arrived of a sharp encounter at Horns. At
four o'clock on the morning of June 12 a large force of
and the attack developed all along the line held by the 89th regiment. The Arabs succeeded in getting
through the wire entanglements round the blockhouse,
officers
and
forty-six
men
way
of the
They
and
less
than half
to the
The rest, including the two officers, were either killed by the Arabs or burnt. The attack was made by a much more numerous force than had showed
next blockhouse.
itself in
of the
but
blow.
march and
suc-
ceeded in cutting
off
a detachment of Arabs.
These were
hemmed
escaped.
in
At
The
two
The Turco-Arab
round
Homs
reinforced by a large
number
of tribesmen
RENEWED ACTIVITY
house),
167
and two
officers
and
fifty-seven
men wounded.
and
this
district
By
in full retreat,
was the
last occasion
was
The
spell of inaction
now seemed to be
thoroughly broken,
Italians
On
by Admiral Borea Ricci's school division of obsolete warships, and at dawn on the following morning a landing was effected under the protecting fire of the Re Umberto. The troops which made up the expeditionary force came from Derna, Benghazi, Rhodes, Tripoli, and Italy and
'
'
;
spell in
command
of the
The landing was accomplished without much difficulty, of the 16th a base was securely established at Marsa Bu Sheifa. The headland Ras Zurug, the highest point on the whole Tripolitan coast, was also occupied by the troops, and the sailors were re-embarked the same night. Scattered attacks were made by the Arabs during the day from the direction of Misurata, which lies some eight miles from the Italian landing-place, and in the afternoon a brisk skirmish took place on the Italian right. The Italians lost two men killed and nine wounded, but at six o'clock the Arabs drew off, leaving, according to General
Camerana's report, about
fifty
men
killed,
together with a
and ammunition.
no great force in the neighthey were, they showed no
in
if
come
Perhaps
168
had
some perhaps
Accounts from
insisted
farther afield
camp have
on the was
for
Arab
from every
district of Tripolitania.
Possibly
it
this reason, and not from any lack of will to oppose the
week which followed the first skirmish passed quietly, while the usual work of preparing an adequate base was completed by the Italians at leisure. Reconnaissances showed that the oasis was empty, and it was not until June 23 that a squadron of cavalry reported the presence of an Arab force to the eastward. The next move came from General Garioni at Bu Kamesh. At dawn on June 27 the Italians attacked the Arab positions
invader, that the
known
lies
at the base
of the peninsula of
Ras Makabes.
left,
from the
front, a flying
six thousand,
were thrown
their
and abandoned
camp.
four-
left
by
his troops.
But the odds were too great. The Italians attacked with two strong columns, one from the peninsula, the other from the position gained the day before, and by nine o'clock the enemy were rolled back
ance was offered.
RENEWED ACTIVITY
from
Sicli
169
Arabs
to
sustain
the
final
attacks.
The
Turco-Arab
loss in killed
of
wounded were
arms,
with
ammunition, and
officer,
The
Italians
lost
By
neighbourhood of
Bu Kamesh was
On
to descend
his
He came down
Leaving
his
in a long glide
machine he
set
out on
Bu
Kamesh, and was eventually met by a column of Italian troops who went on and brought back the aeroplane in
safety.
and
had
retired
upon
Italians.
movement was
followed shortly
Bu
the
characteristic
to,
of
and it was not until Camerana left his base expedition. The advance seems
difficult terrain,
and
it is
that the Arabs did not resist with the whole-hearted tenacity
of
that the line of the Italian advance lay through the eastern
part of the Misurata oasis, the Arabs entirely failed to hold
170
their
upon the
might
force
was estimated at
thousand
rifles.
A
set
battalion
them on
the run.
oasis,
flight,
In any case, the Arabs were swept through the and upon reaching Misurata they continued their
without making any attempt to hold the town.
than three hundred bodies were buried, and during the days
many
more.
The
Italian losses,
comparatively slight
twenty-three
and a hundred
most
in a sense the
Next to
is
the most
commerce and of population. The district is and comparatively well cultivated, while the town manufactures woollen and silk baracans, a tough matting
which find a ready market
in
Egypt.
The population
of
Obviously,
of the
campaign.
Within a few days the town took on some appearance of Considerable numbers of Arabs who its normal activity.
had
resume
their occupations, when they found that the invaders were not the devils that their fancy, and Turkish ingenuity,
RENEWED ACTIVITY
had painted.
the
first
171
inclined to
make submission
had been on
those
who had
inspired resistance
it.
For nearly a fortnight scattered bodies of Arabs hung upon the western margin of the oasis, making no attempt upon the Italian positions, but harassing the dwellers in the district and carrying off provisions and cattle. The
inhabitants appealed to the Italians for protection, and at
Fara's brigade
moved
out,
swept
some
force.
The
the
Italian
leaving
many dead on
;
reports
three hundred
teen
killed
An
and
excessively
hot day tried the Italian troops severely, but they marched
usual
steadiness
precision,
an arduous day.
this
General Fara
is
generally thought
to
have pushed
advance too
far,
considering
the
and General Camerana. On July 14 he pushed forward from Sidi Said to Sidi Ali, which was occupied by an inconsiderable
detachment
without difficulty,
The position was taken and an attempt on the part of the Turcoof Arabs.
fight in the
172
inevitable failure.
by General
upon the and in a
readily repulsed,
home with
full retreat,
the bayonet.
pursued by a
heavy
artillery fire.
and a considerable
number
of
The
Italian
losses
are
given as
Some
ance,
critics
and
Sidi Ali
had no importcampaign.
way to
Regdaline,
The
Turco-Arab combination,
and the doubtful relations between Arab and Turk, gave an added force to every blow struck by the Italians a force
engagement.
The
clearer three
weeks
later,
Ali
became
effected at
Zuara, and the town and oasis were occupied almost without
resistance.
enemy from the threatened quarter. Demonstrations were made in the Tripoli neighbourhood, to the south of Ain Zara and towards Fonduk El Tokar,
<
c
CO
<
JT
'5
^1;
*
RENEWED ACTIVITY
which had the
the enemy.
effect of
173
These, however,
made no attempt
in
to attack
who bivouacked
felt
the open.
The
the
by the Arabs.
On
morning
of
their
brigade under
of the
town
brigade set out in the early hours of the morning from Sidi
and reached the western margin of the Zuara oasis march of twelve miles over very bad ground. Only the slightest resistance was
encountered, from scattered groups of Arabs
a long range
fire
who opened
The
Italians
Tassoni 's brigade, which reached the town about one o'clock.
oasis
Most
of the
to Regdaline,
and now
it
reconnaissance on August
vicinity of
Zuara
free
enemy, and on
on both
The
Sidi
actual objec-
Abd-es-Samad,
174
some
line,
dominating the caravan route and the three oases of RegdaMenshia, and Jemil.
much
advanced
The
Italians
opened an
artillery
fire
upon the
swiftly
oasis of Regdaline,
from the
oasis of Menshia,
lies
to the east of to
the
Italian
position.
strong
endeavoured
left,
to the
houses and gardens on the edge of the oasis, and the fight
positions they
had
so gallantly defended,
and on the
follow-
were
all
empty.
The
As a matter
The
do
positions, unable to
advance
and
it
is
positions.
RENEWED ACTIVITY
report
is
175
which commend
the working
perfectly.
All services
worked
The motors permitted the conveyance of an ample supply of water and ice to the troops, and the rapid removal of the wounded from the firing line.' Hce on a It is improbable battlefield, in August, in North Africa that troops on active service have ever been fed and cared
!
Even
moved
far
from their
been remarkable.
stomach
During
month of August and the first fortnight of September more than four thousand inhabitants of the Tripoli neighbourhood made their way from the Turkish side to the
Italian
and
hitting
whenever a
its effect.
The extreme
had combined
The month of August wore to an end without any further movement on the Italian side, and only one sign of activity
on the part of the enemy.
On
made a demonstration
munication with
Bu
on the
coast.
The
176
Arabs were easily driven off, and no further encounter of any importance took place in this district. On September 2 the Government took a step which had
long been indicated as desirable, dividing the
of the troops in Libya.
command
had to some extent exercised an independent command in Cyrenaica, he had nominally been subordinate to General Caneva, who had been entrusted with the functions of governor and commander-in-chief in both provinces. It had not
Briccola
Though General
been
sufficiently realised
mander-in-chief
of four
at a distance
of
hundred
eastern province.
The
feeling
was
practically
universal
commands
Caneva gave
this
identified with
tania
suc-
command
of the Tripoli
Army
and that the defence made by her troops, but still more the ability shown in organising the Arab resistance, had done enough for honour.
provinces were irretrievably
lost,
RENEWED ACTIVITY
For the sake of
Italy to the
prestige,
177
desire to
put
maximum
and
had
let
they
The dilemma was serious enough, but realisation was dawning that a continuance of the war might lead to embarrassments greater than any which would be caused by a tardy acquiescence in an inevitable loss. had been initiated at Lausanne between Prince Said Halim and an Italian Commission of three Signor Bertolini, Signor Fusinato, and Signor Volpi. The fall of Said Pasha's ministry put an end to these conversations, but on August 12 they were
12
secret
On July
pourparlers
The
earlier
discussions
Turkish
methods
many
weeks.
rumour
proved correct.
may
The anticipation
upon the division
of
two com-
mands was not disappointed. Though rumours of peace were persistent, the generals commanding realised that the
surest
way
of translating these
178
reality
Libya
would
sufficiently
to prevent
enemy
in
while for
many weeks
scribed, a
of
on both
sides of
the
Wady
Hira.
Perhaps
it
was
in the
minds
of Turkish
upon
Tripoli
The
Italian Intelligence
of such
an
of
Neshat Bey,
his projected
movement was
and
if
by a severe blow
from
his
adversary,
it
influenced,
was
On
the
General
enemy from
by perma-
manner, but
It
it
was
lines
battle
two
phases
first,
second, an
of
RENEWED ACTIVITY
arrive towards
179
to the southward.
command
own
under the
command
of
General
Tommasoni.
of
was accompanied by four batteries tain guns, a battery of field guns, an engineer
The
division
moun-
battalion,
two squadrons
battalion.
of the
and two
General
field batteries.
the
11th
Bersaglieri
and a battalion
of Tripolitan levies,
south of Gargaresh.
The whole
rifles,
force
five
and
lances,
and
General
De Chaurand's
dawn.
division
little
after
along the line of the road between the oasis and the sea,
divided near the
tomb
on towards the
little hill
of Sidi Bilal,
Wady
swung
to the
oasis.
General
De Chaurand's
line
advance in
1 Eight companies of the 18th, eight companies of the 52nd, four companies of the 23rd and six companies of tho 93rd.
180
had proved
oasis
on November
arisen.
have
while
Meanthe
General
brigade
was
skirting
Wady
towards the
little
eminence known as
Mohammed
and
their
(The
official
thousand seven
hundred.)
By
of
ten o'clock the 84th had occupied Sidi Bilal, and the
82nd had met the 18th, who formed the right-hand column
General Tommasoni's brigade, near Sidi
Mohammed
52nd
regi-
Erbei.
line of
enemy
Soon
after,
and before
Adem
RENEWED ACTIVITY
men, including some seven hundred Turkish regulars
with this formidable body of righting
last stroke in Tripoli tania.
line,
;
181
and
men he
delivered his
in second
envelop
Advancing
ground with
admirable
skill,
The battalion
mountain
guns
of the
masked the
fire
it
of the
the
The
silence of the
further,
hand-to-
hand struggle ensued, and the Italian gunners were forced to leave their guns and go forward with the bayonet. Two
guns
fell
recovered
by a
The 93rd and the Askaris had been retained by General De Chaurand as a divisional reserve, and their arrival first checked the Arab attack, and finally flung it
nick of time.
back in disorder.
couple of miles
Askaris.
left
the 52nd
By one o'clock the fight had slackened, and had a short breathing-space before they were
182
The retreating Arabs were by a numerous fresh contingent from Fonduk Ben Gashir and a determined attack was made on the
;
apex
of
the
Italian
position,
facing west.
The
82nd on their
right,
two outlying oases of Mishasta and Saiad but the new attack from the south soon required greater attention.
While the 52nd bore the brunt of the onslaught, a battalion
of the 18th
was detached to
their support,
and
after a fierce
by a counter-attack, At this
in retreat.
The withdrawal
had weakened
For
As a result, a wide gap was left on the right of the 82nd, and the regiment found itself outflanked by Arabs who had
gained the
critical.
shelter
of
the
oasis.
The
position
became
Though
fall
fighting
stubbornly,
obliged to
As the Arabs on the south retired, those on the west first paused, and then followed the example set them. By four o'clock the Arabs' fury was spent, and they were in
RENEWED ACTIVITY
retreat all along the line.
field until
183
The
Italians
remained on the
the oasis.
was
left
won
positions,
and the
Jelil.
camps near
Sidi Abd-el-
When
down upon
they had been under arms for sixteen hours, of which about
eight were passed in hard fighting.
in
particular distinguished
'
itself,
al valor militare'
won by the 11th Bersaglieri at the fight round El Hanni and Sharashat, and by the 84th regiment three days later,
at Sidi Messri.
The
struggle
but
it
through.
The artillery did remarkable work, and the unhesitating manner in which the guns were pushed forward, and the dash with which the gunners
Arabs.
critical
e
moment,
Ovunque
Sempre. 1
The
and
losses
on both
killed
sides
were heavy.
The
Italians lost
men
it
The Arab
the battle
killed.
loss
was much
officially
after
was
but
it
an exaggeration.
The
of the
some parts
The
parallel to the
furnishes
an interesting
184
field.
and
fifty-four bodies
by
shells
in a
all
victims of artillery
fire.
all
those
They were
word
stiffened
by
fifteen
hundred Turkish
'
regulars (though
right
it is
doubtful whether
stiffened
'
is
the
to use),
Turkish
officers in
and thanks to the influence of the command, the Arabs who came from
fight,
the south did not hasten hot foot to the scene of the
and
fling
enemy.
They attacked
this side
were
Running low,
fire,
and
got within a short distance of the Italian positions. the last fatal, fire-swept zone could seldom be crossed,
But and
grey
in getting
home, the
little
desert warrior.
The
terrain
tactics.
palm
groves,
afforded admir-
able cover.
ous.
Long-range
crests of the
rifle -fire
The
ground.
devastating
On no
other occasion
RENEWED ACTIVITY
taken as a whole, display such reckless courage. 1
185
There
was no Parthian
20,
2
finesse
fight
on September
and
little
of the
marked preference
grips.
them
they
In point of
of the
Comment
made on
manner intended, the operations assigned to it. The initial error was made when the 82nd and 84th became detached from one another early in the advance, but the
consequences of this mistake might have been repaired
if
a part of the 84th, after the taking of Sidi Bilal, had carried out the precise orders given before the battle, and advanced
along the
Wady
at
left,
at one time,
in
to escape
officers
killed,
seven
officers
and
eighty-five
men
From
1
it will
have been
and it was noticed that most of the Arabs, instead of the usual baracan, wore their festal garb shirt and drawers of white linen, and brightly coloured vest. Perhaps the festival mood was still upon them, urging them to destroy the infidel. 2 The fight of September 20 is officially known as the battle of Sidi Bilal a misleading title. But the name Zanzur had already been appropriated for the earlier fight on June 8.
just over,
The Ramadan
was
186
evident that
use was
made
of the reserves
under
by General De Chaurand
battle of
June
8,
the scene at
all.
upon General Tommasoni's brigade would have been greatly relieved, and the Arabs on the west might have been dealt with in a more decisive manner. It would seem that General Ragni was preoccupied with the safety of Tripoli. The Intelligence Department had been insistent that an attack was meditated by the enemy, and General Ragni had had the courage to collect his strength for a
decisive blow, instead of distributing
it
in defensive lines.
The defence of Tripoli and the outlying posts, from Tajura and Ain Zara to Fort B., was left to seven weak regular battalions and a battalion of Askaris. With this preoccupation weighing upon him, it would appear that General Ragni hesitated to employ his reserve
too far to the west, preferring to hold
case of an attack
it
at his disposal in
upon
but
Tripoli.
on the Italian
left,
this
was not
until comparatively
an exceedingly
it
by the
insistence of the
Intelligence Department.
Even
progress,
Tripoli
was urged upon him that the situation of was critical, that an attack was expected, and that
In the circum-
with his
was very difficult for him to fight the battle eye solely upon Zanzur, and a hesitation to commit
RENEWED ACTIVITY
his reserve too deeply
187
was almost
inevitable.
While the
upon General De Chaurand's division, the troops took came out of the ordeal with flying colours.
their
The exaggerated diffidence of the Intelligence Department was typical of their attitude throughout the whole war, subsequent to the revolt in the Tripoli oasis. The reaction from the undue optimism that preceded the revolt was fatally complete, and upon various occasions military action was paralysed or prejudiced by a failure to gauge
the true inwardness of alarmist rumours.
effect on the situation. Broken, wornand dispirited, the Turco-Arab forces, or at least their main body, did not reach the camps at Suani Beni Adem and Fonduk Ben Gashir till nearly midnight. Neshat Bey had remained at Suani Beni Adem all day, and the sight of his disordered followers streaming into the camp must
He had
struck his
and tempting the invaders to an assault upon the steep and rocky approaches to Gharian.
Rumour
says that he
own country.
his
mean the submission of the Urshefana and other tribes, who would make their peace with the Italians as soon as
they were relieved of the strong moral pressure exercised
by the Turks.
given two
fight in the
had asked
for
indeed, they
had been
188
beaten.
their
to
commend
itself
to
logical
Faced with
It
was expected at
first
Adem
at least
further
movement.
cluded, on the terms which Italy thought fit to demand, and though some sections of the European press endeavoured to spur the flagging Turk by tendancieux suggestions
outcome
of the deliberations
was assured
It is generally
by
Italian
demands.
hostilities
made
it
for the
much-
should
be
undergone.
On
Treaty of Lausanne.
<
)
o
.a 0-
<!
>
'
189
CHAPTER IX
THE OPERATIONS IN CYRENAICA
For two
it
necessary to separate
any description
tania proper.
from the
place, the
itself in Tripoli.
which
have been already indicated, the course of the war in Cyrenaica does not
admit
of the
same
in
clearly
marked
divisions.
While the
the
first
subsequent
Cyrenaica
seem to have
An added
may
be found
of
any
of the events
first-
hand knowledge
here given
is
The
brief
resume
more or
less
Some explanation may be necessary of the statement that the problems in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were not of the same nature. The first important difference lies
190
effect
upon the
to the Italians.
possible excep-
but
it
can
is
really important,
In Tripoli -
definite centres
many
This
first
difference
the
much more
peacefully inclined,
much
more ready
inhabitants of Cyrenaica.
Among them
Moslem tribesmen in various parts of the world. The inhabitants of Sliten and of the Orfella district have an evil reputation for treachery and brigandage, but they form exceptions to the general rule. In Cyrenaica, on the other hand, the tribesmen are proudly and fiercely independent. The Turks, who occupied and administered, in rough and
primitive
191
an
effective occupa-
change under
and such
owed
to
any
it is
clear that
an apparently important
little.
strategic point
would
in fact
accomplish
sented
itself
and
final objective
enemy's
force.
in
it
would
scarcely explicable,
it
to
The anticipated
off
and acquiesce
Tripoli,
cause.
Turkish
way
to the
theatre of war,
by the whole-hearted
192
The
first
sign of a
new
influence at
in the middle of
attacks were made upon the Italian outposts at Derna, and on the 17th some of the Arabs of the town attempted to raise a revolt. During the following week it was obvious that the enemy were massing in considerable
bank
broken nature of
little
that forms the bed of the river and extricated their comrades from a very difficult situation.
Alpini, in descending
of the gorge,
is
worthy
of special remark.
first
An
repairing
attacked
fiercely,
and
Owing
to the nature
one on the
a direct
and one in the gorge itself, to prevent attack upon the engineers. Once again the preright,
ready co-operation
of Alpini
193
The
Italian right
wing
was hard pressed by the enemy, who fought magnificently, and directed their main attack against the mountain
battery which had accompanied the column.
occasions
On
several
up
to
the
guns, which
were only saved by hard hand-to-hand fighting, and the situation looked bad when the attack threatened
to
right.
reserve
battalion
was
in-
and succeeded
arrived,
in hurling the
and with
On
this
left,
The
fighting
finally
They
fell
slowly
field.
fell
possession of the
positions,
They did not, however, remain in their back upon the outskirts of the town.
but
In
retiring,
the
toiling along
body
of Arabs.
men
cliff,
body
of their regiment.
and fought their way to the main Nor was this the only interference
The
left
on
of
its
way
to the town,
and had
to win through
by means
it
bayonet charges.
Both
for
and
fill
would
of battle,
made no
and the
interval
194
lying redoubts,
two miles distance from the town, Wady, and two to the west.
which had collected large
in front of
influences
numbers
terrain
of fierce
Derna had
The
very
much
and
difficult
than at
Inland from
a considerable stretch
For
Derna
it
and deliberate
making any attack on the invaders. On November 28 a flying column under General Ameglio marched six miles northwards to Koefia and fought a sharp but indecisive
action, losing
twenty-two
killed
and
fifty
wounded.
collecting,
tentative
attacks
upon the
Italian
quiet which
No
made
an
isolated
blockhouse
by storm.
was not
For many
At Derna, on the other hand, the Turks and Arabs continued to press hard upon the town. A spirited attack
was made upon the eastern
lines at
dawn on January
17,
195
The work
on the night
delivered
of
upon the
much
difficulty,
The initial moveand were repulsed but the main onslaught came later,
left,
known
road
'
as the
'
Lombardia,' which
to the interior.
Edolo
all.
battalion of Alpini
in over-
They held the Arabs at bay until supports arrived, losing twenty-three men and exhausting all their ammunition. In the nick of time they were reinforced by two more companies of their regiment, and, after a prolonged struggle in
off.
The
fight
this position.
lodge the Alpini were useless, but the reckless bravery of the Arabs
ciently indicated
by the
fact that
fort.
little
more or a
196
at
Derna throughout
The
was kept
it
seems to
have been realised by the Turks and Arabs that, in attempting to capture the Italian positions round Derna, they were
accustomed outposts
a strong body
in front of the
'
Lombardia
'
redoubt,
fire
from
more than
half
tactics
were pursued by the Arabs, and the Italians ran some risk
of being cut off, until three fresh battalions
But
in
after
much
greater force
six thousand),
Their continued
attempts to outflank the Italian right had led to a considerable extension of the Italian front, which
weakened
The
The
197
company
of the
and attacked
again.
was still hard pressed, and the steady body of Turkish regulars did considerable execution, until a counter-attack by two fresh Italian columns settled the day in favour of the defenders. A mixed column of Alpini and infantry of the line advanced along the main caravan road and drove a wedge into the
The
Italian line
fire
of a strong
enemy's position.
fell
back, but
of Turkish
who occupied a
first line,
stood
Alpine troops.
and though
in person,
made a
last
was repulsed, and he himself was wounded, so the report goes, by an Italian shell.
After nine hours' hard fighting the Italians succeeded
in
At times the
struggle
fierce,
and
and a subsequent counter-attack, no less gallant. The nature of the ground favoured the Arabs, and the
Italians,
who fought
in the open,
198
capped by the
their rear,
matters of considerable
difficulty.
all,
Italians
men
to the enemy's
was not
hour
The brunt of the Arab onslaughts was borne by four battalions two of the 35th, one of the 26th, and an Alpine battalion supported by the mountain battery which escaped capture so
action, in the final counter-attack.
narrowly.
it is
why
force
was available
and
centre
had been
practically pierced
No
difficulty
up
largely
responsible
for
the
predicament
;
which the
it is difficult
but
for,
of the
During the
close
fight
on March
killed,
upon
five
hundred
this cause,
199
by reason of Enver Bey's disablement, the Derna garrison left for months unmolested by any serious attack. The repulse suffered by the Turks and Arabs at Derna was almost immediately followed by a heavier blow on the outskirts of Benghazi. It would seem as though an attack upon the Italian lines had been intended, for large numbers of the enemy had been sighted in the near neighbourhood
was
of the town,
March 12 a
force of nearly a
known
Two
Palms, which
lies less
The Arabs made for the redoubt, presumed, of taking it by surprise for,
;
it
as soon as the
Italians
oasis.
opened
fire,
at long range,
and
it
to develop.
effort
lines,
clear,
no serious
was made to drive home an attack on the Italian and after some disjointed firing, and a half-hearted attempt to cut in upon the Italian left, the bulk of the Turks and Arabs withdrew out of range, followed by the
fire
of a six-inch battery at
The Arabs who had been observed at dawn remained in Two Palms and were joined there by those of the main force who had pushed forward nearest to the
the oasis of the
Italian lines
200
No doubt they conceived themselves safe from an attack, and calculated on getting away safely in the darkness, or, possibly, they hoped to use the oasis as a base for a night rush upon the Foyat redoubt. But the opportunity they
offered to the Italians
let slip.
thousand
men under
it
in
and two
its
field batteries
rained
The advance of the column was further supported by heavy fire from the 6-inch battery and the guns of
As the
Italian
column deployed
realised the
for
plight of their
by
artillery fire,
by artillery fire from the 'Roma redoubt. The Italian attacking force quickly assumed a crescentshaped formation and, as it converged upon the oasis, the
cavalry, supported
'
danger of a
cross-fire
became apparent.
General Ameglio
line
swept into
As they pushed through the gardens, the Arabs retired upon two shallow quarries and made a last stand. Many gave way and fled across the desert towards their main body, pursued by artillery fire, but most of them
stood firm until
it
was too
late.
others were
to escape.
mowed down by
Hardly one
rifle -fire
of those
who
201
got
away.
They fought
desperately,
with
no
rifles
match The
Italians
lost
two hundred
killed
and six Arabs were buried. With this encounter the fighting near Benghazi practically came to an end. The Turks and Arabs remained concentrated in a large camp some eight miles from the town, but made no further attack, while the Italians refrained from any attempt to force a battle. The months dragged on monotonously, varied only by occasional
following the fight one thousand
skirmishes
raids
between
reconnoitring
parties,
or
frequent
It
Italian lines.
seemed
commended
itself.
The
less
situation
Benghazi,
after
the
thoroughly
successful
action of the
Two
of the town.
At Derna, on the other hand, even less progress was made. Though the failure of the attack on March 3 kept the enemy comparatively quiet for months, they were
never driven so far
away
fact
was
unpleasantly brought
home
to the garrison
and inhabitants.
On
threw a few
damage
effect of this
is
play at bombardment
202
an end
Reisoli,
until General
who had
which the commanders at and Horns were so long content. The extraordinary difficulty of the country round Derna may have been considered by General Trombi to give sufficient
the
of success with
Tripoli, Benghazi,
minimum
have seemed
intolerable,
comment upon
his
and
sufficient
outlined.
following closely
The long period of stasis came to an end on September 14, upon a visit made by General Briccola to
It
is
Derna.
legitimate
to
suppose that
the
recently
commander
at
Derna were
fully agreed
many months.
The
Derna
in
September
strength
arrival of troops
:
had
also landed at
Rhodes, the
Askari
which
had accompanied
Bu Kamesch to
203
commandant
mixed brigade
of Tripoli, of
was
given the
Askaris,
command
of a
Alpini
and
of distin-
slow to accept.
Before
dawn on
column
left
Lombardia
'
redoubt and
extended over a wide front, while, as the day broke, the guns
all
enemy.
had the
fact,
For the
side of the
Wady.
after the despatch of the western
left
About an hour
two columns
lines.
An
infantry
Pisa
'
broken and
difficult
ground to Kasr
Salsa's brigade
till it
known
as
Wady
Bent.
Turn-
ing southwards
pressed up the
Wady and
of a house
reached
its
remnants
occupation of Kasr
el
Leben.
loss,
accomplished
tion,
without
practically
and the
rest of the
positions chosen.
Italian right
had succeeded
but
it is
204
by
in the nature of
They appear
In
all
to have been
by the
stories that
them with a profound contempt for the Italian soldier and a fight more or less in the open must have appeared The to hold out a glorious prospect of victory and loot. Arab of Derna had yet to learn the lesson that was slowly impressed upon his brother of Tripoli that the Italian soldier can fight in the open when his leaders allow him
to do so.
With the
The
left of
first light
on the morning
of
September 17 the
lines.
by General
Salsa 's
commandAlpini,
of
Kasr
el
line. by The first attack was directed upon General Salsa's right, and the rush of the Arabs was supported by the fire of a
Turkish battery.
all
and, simultaneously, a
furious
on the right
the extreme
lines
On
'
^^yfr^m
205
fled,
pursued by a steady
of
and
pitiless fire,
many
them
his
before they
relieved,
could reach
The pressure on
left
move
some
five
hundred
in
his brigade
and the
right wing.
who were
and
they were
all
but exterminated.
was
closing in
upon them.
Very
:
many
were
mowed down by
down
their
rifle-fire
about
By
still
Wady Derna
boomed
The
ground
still
directed a long-range
five o'clock
fire
against the
Italian lines.
of Askaris
Towards
a reconnoitring party
rifle -fire.
for a
sudden storm of
The Eritrean battalion and the native levies were immediately sent out by General Salsa, and these quick-moving troops succeeded in cutting off the retreat of some three hundred Arabs who had ensconced themselves in caves. A savage struggle ensued, and it is unlikely that any quarter was
asked or given.
Nearly
all
The value
been great.
the Italian
showing at
first
all
\
206
The Italian artillery and machineguns did terrible execution, and the total Turco-Arab loss Compared in killed alone approached fifteen hundred.
of the pursuing shrapnel.
casualty
list
and
thirteen wounded.
There
is
wounded men were not included in the official Whether this be so or not, the comparison is suffilist. ciently striking and may perhaps be seized upon by the
of slightly
sceptically inclined.
For these
it
may
be well to emphasise
two
facts
who came
so fear-
lessly to
hope to
were
inflict
much
loss
while,
many
of those entrapped
who ceased
resistance,
When
these two
Arab
as a
and the notorious weakness marksman, the nature of the two casualty
A
'
battle
At
dawn
left
it,
the
an assault upon
the Italian
broke
Harna and fought there till dusk. ... On the Turkish side one hundred and ten soldiers and two officers were killed and about one hundred and forty wounded.'
.
207
The
prisoners
[sic]
.
almost destroyed.
were captured.
This account
About one hundred and fifty rifles The Italians remain on the defensive.'
.
is
fairly typical,
except that
its
claims are
an encounter with the Italians. On the whole, the most interesting thing about it is its source. It came from
Vienna, and was published in the Frankfurter Zeitung
almost the
final effort of
Many
The discomfiture of the Turco-Arab forces round Derna The Italian outpost lines to the east of the Wady Derna were pushed forward nearly two miles, and when an advance was made on the western side, three weeks later, the resistance offered was comparatively weak. The advance was conducted on a similar plan to that
was complete.
adopted for the operations of September
14.
While a
column under General Capello pushed straight forward upon the marabout of Sidi Abdallah, occupying both this
ridge
Verona
The ground was exceedingly difficult and intricate and the Italians had over a hundred casualties, but the enemy was unable to dispute the advance for long, and a number of prisoners
Msafer.
fell
Wady Bu
into Italian
hands
spirit of
the Arabs
had weakened.
Before the long-drawn-out negotiations for peace were
finally
208
a special interest.
on October
1911, a
detachment
is
had
reported to have
excited the envious longing of more than one great Power. The explorer Schweinfurth seems to have been mainly responsible for the unique potentialities attributed in some quarters to the possession of Tobruk, and it may be said that in Germany and Italy in particular his glowing accounts were generally believed. Mention has already been made of the haste made by the Italian authorities to occupy Tobruk, a haste which actually compromised, to some extent, the position in the town of Tripoli. All through the winter and all through the burning heat of summer the shadeless, waterless shore was held in force by the Italian garrison, which made no attempt to move from its established base. The hinterland to Tobruk seems to be true desert, and the value of the place to the Italians was simply that of a potential naval base. At Tobruk, if anywhere,
lie
was nothing to
tempt a
force
objective in taking
base,
and
it
is
some-
Bomba seems
is
The
wry
What
little
many
209
CHAPTER X
A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN
Attention has already been drawn
Italian military authorities, so far
position
to
make
special
break of
hostilities,
tionary force at a
larly
moment when
the
Army was
The
3,
particu-
dismissal of
at the close
colours,
class
and
it
was not
It
till
September
was
to have begun.
by the vigorous note presented to the Porte by the Italian Embassy in Constantinople, and on the same date secret
mobilisation orders were issued
;
but the
political situa-
of
rejection
an awkward problem
arose.
was forced
by one
or
210
There
is
he would
make
'
:
'
una
bella
dimostrazione.'
The answer
Eccellenza, la guerra non e dimostrazione ; came quick The rumour may be only ben trovato, but its e azione.' existence as a story shows the trend of Italian views. The Army and the Navy believed in a war. The politicians and the people were at least inclined to the opinion that a
demonstration would
suffice.
on
Europeans
in the
town was
at stake.
may
fleet,
the direct
war beyond
When
the
summons
to surrender the
met by a
dilemma.
refusal,
Admiral Faravelli
To delay
of Turkish defiance
seemed to threaten a
among
siderable reliance
stration,
was placed.
meant anything at
all,
and
it
211
in the
On
the other
hand
of
it
was
He
sible,
and
it
German
Consul,
who
true
that a good deal of loot was carried off from the houses and
stores
it is
noteworthy that
his
made by him on
own
respon-
There
is
well preserved
by the co-operation
However, the
of the Consuls
Arab notables.
risk
The bom-
bardment had imposed upon Admiral Faravelli a moral obligation which he could not avoid, and after a day's
delay he landed Captain Cagni and his sixteen hundred
sailors, to raise
The
its
step
was
inevitable,
numbers
land
demonstration had
effect
to face a situation
212
numbers
and
was the
lesser
two
evils, in
which was
justified
by
success.
The moral
if
in all
probability,
may
fairly
be
to be found farther
back
The
first
Tripoli,
For the
as the true
far
and
an objective
more
made
the
attainment of that
objective
more
If
difficult
Italian
interests.
military
heels
upon the
the Tripoli coast within twenty-four hours, or even fortyeight, of the declaration of war, there
is
good reason to
of the
many
The
effort of the
Navy
That
to
bluff
was
attempted,
and
failed
and
decision
213
garrison in Tripoli
decisive
till
blow on
land.
But the
position
urgencies
is
more
'
rounding
up
'
it
could escape
to the interior
of
Arab
resistance,
what
of
summons to surrender the town, and the notice bombardment ? The onus is upon the critic to show
;
barren of
any
lesson.
The
alternative,
fully
recognised
in isolating
it
by
declaring a blockade,
in
landing troops
and Zanzur.
it is
By
programme
into
actually required
the
threat of
bombardment,
definite
German
Given
it is
march
Tripoli
of
of
of its garrison.
Report has
come under
214
consideration.
reasons
for
demonstra-
and
for the
were
sufficient to
and
war
it
was not
clear to
at the Turks.
and
in
claims of one alternative should have prevented a recognition of the merits that belonged to the other.
common enough
in history,
in co-ordinating
more
closely the
work
of the diplomatist
and the
soldier
efforts.
The
is
indica-
far
from
man
make
such criticism
it
muddling through
'
we have attained a
position
of lonely pre-eminence.
It is not so
much
as a criticism
as an explanation, that the features which marked the first week of the war are discussed in the light of subse-
quent knowledge.
As
was mainly
handicapped by the delay in despatching the expeditionary force, but other handicaps were added to hamper
be used)
all
215
and a
upon the
immediate employment
Too
little
The
resolve
may have
and
much
treasure
in precious lives.
In
all
was made
heavier than
Beyrout.
It
officially
why
with
fleet,
The
in
decision that
Tobruk had
may have
partially influ-
enced
the
Government
its first
diverting
Admiral
squadron from
doubtless at work.
it
seemed
likely that
would soon
vinces,
to
and safeguard Turkish Both Europe and Italy expected some such
was common
in and
official circles
it
is
hope of
a trans-
would be loth to
loss
216
Turkish
fleet
its
way undisturbed
it,
and
their superior
it
to pieces.
Owing
and the
arrival of the
work of arousing and organising the Arab resistance, a work which they were to perform with astonishing ability and success. The breathing-space
time in which to
initiate the
them
till
and
felt
The
feat performed
by the Turkish
leaders
possible
able one,
and
it
Barouni.
Tripoli town,
and Suleiman
el
own neighbourhood,
found
the
itself
and was
of fighting-men
and
can be seen
now
that
if
the
week
217
and the Turk combined to overcome their A quick inclinations and range them against the invaders. advance upon Azizia, an endeavour to break up the Turkish nucleus, would have cut clean across this resistance, and even if the Turks had carried out their original plan of
tions of Ferhat Bey, the inaction of the Italians
prestige of
long
the
retiring
Italian advance,
it
is
The distance
so short
Tripoli.
But
a sufficiently
formidable distance
and the
Turks would
never retreat towards the interior had limited the transport organisation to
for a
two days'
march
only.
There were
many
circumstances to hinder
rapid action, and there must always rest upon the critic
the obligation to bear in
light
clear in the
of
subsequent knowledge
may have
been obscure
much hasty
Turkish troops.
Some
why
away from
question,
the town of
real
Tripoli at
It is a pertinent
answer to
real
answer
capacity
is
;
and
it
is
this capacity
which
is
sometimes de-
218
nounced
journalists.
soldiers
critic to
but by
bear in
mind
sive
is
What was
moment
It
is idle
sailors
week of the occupation. Captain Cagni and his had enough to do without adventuring forth into
Nor could
arrival of
all
move forward
follow immediately
upon the
rough
horses, and mules. For three days little could be done, and though the guns and the cavalry, together with a great proportion of the stores and material, were disembarked on
October 15 and
16,
The word
'
scratch
'
is
posite battalions
and no The
mule -drawn
Sicilian
carts
required time,
for very
little.
Two
it
Is
it
Even the
light of sub-
219
it
clear that
it
was too
move was
of Ferhat
desirable.
column leaving
on October
joined forces
at
an
earlier
by any
When
information was
Italian occupation.
As
tion
was roughly
But what was true of the Tripoli chiefs was not true of the sheikhs and other Certainly, the Arab had leaders in the country districts. no particular love for the Turk, in any part of Tripolitania but the antipathy for the Turk whom he knew did not at all imply a sympathy for the Italian, whom he did not know. The Tripoli chiefs who were anxious for an Italian
pro -Italian feeling was exaggerated.
;
And
the error
would remain
General Caneva
believed he
his
had plenty
it
of time.
He
set
about securing
base,
confident,
leisure.
The disastrous awakening came on October 23, when the main attack on the Italian lines was conducted for the
most part by Arabs, and the
rising in the oasis
itself
showed that
220
by the
amounted
arose.
to carelessness,
and
it is
intelli-
some reason
and the
The
initial
of the
over-diffidence,
difficulties
many months.
move out
in force before
When
the death-roll
among
it
was hardly
to
moment
it
From day
day
its
was not
month
and a move
221
detail,
and
town
of Tripoli,
Bir
The attitude
diffidence
Some
of General Frugoni's
his surprising order
line
action,
and
of
thought pursued.
But
was
little
expec-
greatly prolonged.
Reviewing as a whole the course of the military operations in 1912, the failure to initiate
any
real offensive in
now than
when
came
to
an end.
During those
Italians
began to
which
November had
in
the
way
rise to
party criticisms.
end
of October,
and the
Italian
Government
has been the target for a good deal of foreign criticism based
222
on
in
who
wisdom.
necessarily involves
many
belligerent nations, and sooner or later the neutral Powers come into play, with a hint, a protest, an offer of mediation, and finally, perhaps with the suggestion of a conference. The decree of annexation put out of court any pressure upon Italy to accept a solution which should be based on
For
upon the Powers the recognition that the declaration of Italian sovereignty was irrevocable. No doubt Italy lengthened the war by proclaiming a formal annexation of
the two Turkish provinces, but she rid herself once for
of the danger she naturally feared
all
the danger of
an
inter-
The
political
atmosphere.
Looked at
all
On
if it
were followed
fulfil this
by
Perhaps at
and breadth
People are
asking themselves
it
Whether
was
really
movement
against
the
for
enemy ? Whether
it
223
less
opinion
is
more or
The plan
which commended
that Italian
check.
fectly,
was based upon one root idea arms must suffer no reverse, not even a slight
itself
it
and
all risk
minimised.
is
justification for
Rome
in
and the
definite
as the
programma minimo.
rumour
is
correct,
we may
take
it
War
Office
and
to the
and a
certain
risk.
He
victories, or the
combination
The problem was intrinsically difficult enough hampered by the conditions which are reported to have been imposed, it became all but insoluble. In all probability, the decisive argument in favour of the programma minimo was founded on the conviction that the war would come to its inevitable end whether a desert campaign was undertaken or not that on this account it was better to run no risks, but to wait upon the natural course of events. The belief that delay would wear out resistance had a certain foundation, but the whole argusoldiers
would not be
sacrificed.
;
ment, as at
first
of Italian strength.
224
Reduced
military authorities
may
be stated as follows
how
to con-
feasible,
and might have brought the war to a speedy conclusion, it was clear that more cautious methods would bring about a
successful result, though at a later date.
fore, that criticism
It follows, there-
should be directed
less against
the adopof
tion of the
out.
Considering
all
the
may
a
legitimate
hesitation
upon
efficient
army
for a period
of Gargaresh
objective of warfare
it
had been to
Italy's
to undertake a difficult
it is
do nothing.
The renewal
of military operations
through
the summer, serves to emphasise more strongly the inaction which preceded,
of
Although the
results
225
that
when
hostilities
the country.
By
sea,
from
from Horns
effectively occupied
by
Italian
garrisons
Barouni
still
held aloof with a large following, the extension of satisfactory relations was proceeding.
make submission
to a Govern-
ment that promised increase of prosperity. In Cyrenaica, on the other hand, the situation remained practically unchanged by the signature of the Treaty of
Lausanne, and at the end of the year the two provinces
presented a marked contrast.
No
step forward
still
had been
exchanged at
hostility of the
Arabs
persisted,
in the country,
birth,
commanded by
signs of carryof peace.
by
showed few
The
comment
half
in Italy,
and various
theories
which
existed
two and a
months
hostile
few hot-
226
intrigues in
the
That a suspicion
some
Italian
The unfriendly
and the virulent hostility of certain newspapers, came as an almost stupefying surprise to
Tripoli
enterprise,
The surprise prompted a search for explanations, and in some quarters these are supposed to
Italian
opinion.
boundaries of Egypt.
Generally speaking, however,
it is
The
by
by the
;
fierce
and independent
gospel of resist-
character of the
nomad tribesmen
by the
officers
and, above
all,
by the
arms
in impressing the
by General
it
General Caneva was holding his troops idle in Tripoli General Briccola fought and
won
Two
Palms, and flung back the enemy from the near neighbour-
hood
of Benghazi, inflicting a
Arab
aggression.
it,
stating
injustice.
The
battle of the
Two Palms
battle of
months
earlier.
227
Arab
death-roll
was
can be judged
was due
to the
oasis of the
Two
and
decisive
movement.
Two
Palms.
policy of waiting
upon events
led
sufficient
answer to those
who
but,
by
The
battle of the
Two Palms
took place at a
make people
and
restive.
his troops,
The dash shown by General Ameglio and the heavy loss sustained by the Arabs,
hood
of
Ain Zara.
enemy
farther back,
and resulted
in a considerably greater
but a review of
228
may
be
Two
advance
to
far
and
As matters stand,
it
is
not impro-
and even
if
tration
likely to
be rendered
much
for
to impose a
due regard
In
criticising the
it is
essential
some tentative suggestions as to possible remissness on the part of the officers in command, Signor Giolitti declared
that in the case of a war where, throughout a whole year,
no
had
to be recorded, the
question.
In the
first
is
too
The action at Bir Tobras was not an Italian broad. success, and on one or two other occasions, notably at Derna, Italian arms came very close to what may reason1 Sheikhs favourable to the Italian occupation have recently urged the despatch of a column to the uplands as the necessary preliminary to a general acceptance of Italian rule.
229
drawn
it
will
The determinaof in
by
by preparation and skill brings about a state things that is not war, and to that state the hostilities
mising
Tripolitania were at one time nearly reduced.
of
The
attitude
for its
ever
classic lines
1
man
of
Hong Kong,
Who
He
With
It is
line of
argument adopted by
by
soldiers
on the spot
in Tripoli.
imposed
and the fact remains that the war to an end by purely defen-
methods was
finally
recognised.
No
one in Italy
and rashness
necessary
make
omelettes
for caution,
The
memory
the
memory
The idea
of
230
pedigree, that
offspring
is
Butthe
The
from
who were
Surprise
as well as admiration
for
surprise
In
November
struggle
1911,
when
war would be no
good deal
affair of
involving unlooked-for
there
'
was a
the people.'
The tide of enthusiasm still ran strongly, and Italian feeling seemed almost solid in favour of the war but in private heads were shaken, and there was much talk of the inevitable reaction.' The reaction, in the sense that was feared, never came. The exultant enthusiasm of the first few weeks did die down, but in its place there became evident a far finer national feeling, the feeling of firm resolve that was ready to face long months of inconclusive warfare, to bear
;
'
upon which
Among
all classes
by
231
arms to
stir
up
Government,
who
add
to her burden,
fighting
those
who were
and none to cast a slur upon and dying on her behalf. There
was not a
who played
treasure,
when the
bill,
with
its
and
Blinded by patriotism
of self-interest, their
national honour.
The
Socialists
refrained
The astonishing
spectacle
was seen
of a Parliament
of the
new demands
which gave to the past acts and Government an approval that was
The
solid support
it
accorded
realised of
was
in
all
was
many
management
to
it
up
gave ample
of criticism were
and unity
interest.
Government
its
232
war which
the
known
Among
made
of the national
failed to realise
and
Abyssinian adventure.
On
if
the other
hand, there
is
the Govern-
ment did not take sufficient advantage of the new national spirit, it was because they dared not risk success upon an untested support. That they and the generals who carried
out their policy erred on the side of caution
is
practically
beyond
It has
may
failure to
why
the popular
was accorded
is
in such full
A common
'
answer has
washed
by the
sea that
some
Italians call
made
people of Italy.
real
These
factors
answer
lies else-
where
in
no longer
of
living
on the an
memory
unprosperous present.
The
recollection
past glories
of
make
up
of a great future
may
not be found
in the
growth
233
CHAPTER XI
THE ITALIAN ARMY AT WORK
Any
men
who compose
it.
of
modern arma-
ments, the growth in the size of armies, and the resulting alterations in tactics, in the ultimate resort success does
still
qualities of
'
the
common
for
soldier.'
War
difficult
is
the general,
more than
demand upon
The improve-
ment
men man
;
the
man who
modern warfare.
artillery against
The
of his
own
the
I\B
his
work undisturbed
i&\
by a return
On
J*&
234
enemy, impose a
special
ponents.
and
An
may
the more so as many hasty criticisms have been passed upon the Italian soldier by writers whose acquaintance with him
by correspondents who have never seen by critics of his mentality who could not even speak to him in his own language. When I landed in Tripoli the town and the neighbourhood had not yet recovered from the effects of the inundation which took place on November 17. Some roads were
is
of the slightest,
fire,
him under
still
impassable,
still
the
were
and
it
had been.
out,'
so recently
drowned
and
spirit.
talked with
of the trenches
monowithout
news
moment
of the
musketry among
for
men
to attention, sometimes to
watch
an
invisible
^'.>>
BERSAGLIERI AT EL HANNI
235
and
wells.
The
of
only breaks in the routine were the occasional limited reconnaissances on the eastern front,
when detachments
left
drawn
into
an engagement.
spirit of
The
the
to
they were eager when the advance would begin get to grips with the enemy who bothered them night
all of
the despond-
is
them by certain writers in the press. They were always cheerful but, after an attribute of the Italian people, and it
;
all, is
cheerfulness
not surprising
among
the
ness
What impressed me more forcibly was the cooland balance displayed by the troops, both in the trenches and in the desert. Memory recalls one instance,
when an attack developed upon the eastern lines in the oasis. The trenches had been freshly thrown up, and there
had not yet been time to clear the ground in front of them. For fifty yards the ground was dotted with fruit-trees beyond that a mud wall ran roughly parallel with the
;
trenches
of the oasis
seemed to merge into an impenetrable screen of cover. Hardly an enemy could be seen, only the occasional glimpse
of a
baracan
thudded against the sand-bags that crowned the trenches. The Arab fire became heavier, and the Italians, who had
displayed a phlegmatic calm to begin with, grew keen.
seemed to promise.
Their return
fire
was well
controlled,
236
and at
(tiratori scelti)
responded
The others waited quietly, without fidgeting, though keenness showed in their look, till a word brought them to their places, and a continuous, withering fire soon checked and silenced the advancing enemy. It was an ugly place to defend, and once or twice the Arabs did gather for a rush for this was before they had really had a taste of the Italian bayonet, when the experiences of October 23 and the memory of two companies of Bersaglieri cut to pieces still inspired confidence. The Italian fire was too hot, and the attack was never pressed
to the enemy's hail of bullets.
;
of
expectation, under a
heavy
cool
fire,
and steady.
An
less satisfactory.
Though they were tried by the extreme deliberation movement insisted upon by their leaders, they advanced
though they were on manoeuvres.
During
'
of
as
dash
it
was rather
was only
in
we
men
that fixed
itself in
my memory,
and mutilated
Bersaglieri
were
discovered.
many
soldiers
by
their controlled
and
dignified behaviour.
The
237
and
it
who looked
feeling,
men were
felt
what any
No
associate with
call
'
a typical Italian,'
no display
It
of
'
seems advisable
to
in
insist
upon these
qualities
of
steadiness
and control
Italian soldier
and
'
funk.'
shameful
libel,
and
the
over Europe, to
perhaps,
own men by
Continental journals.
If
these, they
less inclined to
about the
Italians.
men
War how
:
they
would only
fight
lie
officers' revolvers.
The same
it
crops
it.
public to accept
up every time, and there is always a One may presume that the press finds
a sure draw.
soldier
of the Times,
238
an
earlier chapter.
many
it is
many
In the circumstances,
made by some
writers
in a position
to form a judgment.
Obviously no one
will
That cannot
There come
stress that
when the
fall
way under a
They
lie
break and
psychology of war.
Why
a body of
men suddenly fails to do what it has done before, and will That such do again, may not be readily understood.
failure
will
scarcely be gainsaid
by any
soldier, or
by any student
as
all
of
military history.
The
Italians
furnish
instances in point,
other
men broke up
attempted an independent
to take the shortest
fight of their
way
to
Ain Zara.
confusion,
and
for
situation
was
critical
in the extreme.
rallied,
and came
again,
thanks to the
and
particularly to
Fara called to
his appeal,
men
me, Bersaglieri.
,'
They answered
and the
239
Throughout
the
trying
hours
which
and many rifles jammed by the sand, with a dwindling store of ammunition that at length gave out altogether, the men stood steady. They
waited in the darkness, bayonets fixed, for the last attack
home
and
in
To the
breakdown
it
of order
and
discipline
was only
temporary, that
was
an important
significance.
it is
Something
may
when
Italian
troops,
no response the
officers
When
after,
Such experi-
among
a mild qualifica:
make
that, taken
to do,
and did
it
thoroughly well.
to do
240
them
in
and perseverance.
first
months
of the
by
their writers.
certain type of
brain
is
For
this
reason a brief
to the point.
It
summary
of a
may
be
Italian soldier
might be
capable of a spurt, and might conceivably, though improbably, bring a month's campaign to a triumphant close,
neither his
strain.
mind nor
his
to a prolonged
It
opened up
little
glory, the
heady enthusiasm
was tomed
work or
fatigue,
and that
of colonial warfare.
The second
people.
North Italy
fares
is
an un-
excelled navvy,
hard
all
and most
lazzaroni of Naples
of tourist
Rome
that
The
frugal
under the
241
and the bare idea of an Italian soldier not being accustomed to stern work is ludicrous to any one who has an elementary
acquaintance with the facts.
may
be recommended to
accompany a regiment
of Bersaglieri
on a route march,
The Fenestrelle battalion of Alpini was a magnificent body of men, conspicuous for bone and muscle, broad-shouldered, solid, and sturdy. The Bersaglieri are specially recruited, and their hardiness and activity are, or ought to be, well known to all military critics. But the general level of physique throughout the troops was remarkably high. The men were not big, but they were tough and sound, and even in their thick and ill-fitting uniforms they presented
Tripoli,
as
showed to much better advantage, and it would be hard to find a much higher average of healthy physique
than I noticed in a company of the 84th bathing near
Gargaresh.
To the
was not
and hard
fighting I can
Up
till
still
men were
that
among
In
who
expressed a wonder
families.
all
return to their
242
'
still
obtained,
;
men was
all
when
attitude
became evident that no advance was intended, their was all that could be expected. Grumblers became
to
those
'
much more frequent, and pertinent questions were put who visited the outlying positions. Why are we not fighting ? When are we going to advance ?
' '
'
'
'
the disgusted
to death.
modicum
of
drill,
route marches,
soldiers,
British
in
similar
would have
citizen, 1
an
artillery
reservist,
tried
hard to awake an
efforts
They
of
fell
those
boys
They jumped, and ran, and ragged,' like schoolboys. wrestled, and They laid out gardens, and entrenchments planted decorated their and with designs worked out in stones or cartridge cases or empty tins. They raised memorials over the bodies of
twenty to twenty -four.
'
in Tripoli
The number of Italians from America with the expeditionary force was not less than one thousand. Most of these had returned to do their military training, but many were reservists who had settled for good in the United States, and among these were several full-fledged American citizens, who had come back to their mother-country on the
1
243
regiment
rilled in
by
building
sand-castles.
Modelled from
the
Rome
and
others.
Some
soldiers
realities,
but
amused himself in this way. No doubt his play astonished the Arabs, and perhaps aroused their contempt
that he
may sometimes
To
'
build
'
fought
may have been childish, but those children and died like men when their time came. No doubt
is
is
no
sort of justice in a
method
of criticism
extraordinary handles.
As time went
became weary
well fed
on,
little
of the situation.
and had very little work. They enjoyed excellent and scarcely ever saw an enemy. By all the rules evolved in the minds of Italy's critics for the making of an
health,
Yet
they
were
thoroughly
dissatisfied,
and
They began
to grow,
by comparison,
is
in spirit,
and there
no doubt
244
on the whole
it
was a source
of surprise to non-Italian
discipline
is
was
an
maintained.
officer of
who
also
mutiny under
similar
life
strain
of the trenches
without
deterioration.
Tommies
in a similar posi-
though
manifestations
The
soldiers
is
characteristic of so
many
The
Italian's
;
an unusual plan
or
he
is
excitable, in that he
easily roused,
fret like
a Frenchman,
some Northerners.
willingness
And
and
when the
Whether these
be doubted.
qualities
make
some
into
him a
better soldier
may
is
There
is
who
gets
the
man
to follow
on a
battleit
But
this
is
not here.
The men became weary of the war and sulky faces showed more frequently, but their good-humour was never far
away.
On
asked a correspondent
245
home
to their families.
He had no more
'
films,
'
But when, when ? the men were pressing. There seemed an opening for a joke, and it was promptly
taken
'
:
over.'
The
The witticism was one and they went on their way still
and
for this reason, probably,
Good-humour
discipline
persisted,
was easy.
Stories of
made
it
throughout Europe.
They
it is
are
without foundation.
No
army
in the field,
but
more than
their leaders
would
let
them
do.
Tales
Italian
demoralisation were
common
it
coin in certain
circles,
may
that follows,
and a comparison
writer
alleged that
had
just
and were
sake a repetition
1
may
be permitted.
The
35.
force consisted
is
made
The Holy War in Tripoli, by G. F. Abbott, p. in The Arabs in Tripoli, by Alan Ostler.
similar assertion
246
except the
and
and were actually the first troops to land in Tripoli tania. The Grenadiers were the next to arrive, towards the end of October, and the Alpini battalion was the only unit which had been less than six weeks in the country. The passage quoted is typical, and comment should be
12,
superfluous.
Inevitably
the
words
is
recur,
'
brutal
and
licentious soldiery.'
is
There
any or
of the
more obvious
No doubt
sort
'
:
arguments
of this
knows that
then,
the
brutality towards
natives
brutal
and
licentious soldiery
'
native.
distracted
endeavouring to push
streets.
supply trains
The
favourite expression
was
who know
'
!
exact
Ugly
swine
or
conceivably
something
saw a blow given, or the useful prod with the butt-end of a rifle, and over and over again I was
I never
247
dis-
No doubt
no single
may have
who
for
life
in the
town and
oasis
is
more
free
The reputation for cruelty to animals, which has lent an unenviable fame to Naples in particular, has done much
to mislead English opinion as regards Italian character.
No
one
will
And
incurred in
common
he san-
Whatever
is
sins
may
Nor
is
case of the
'
Sicily.
Sicilian
Army.
To the
stay-at-
home Briton
armoury
picture
it
savage, bloodthirsty,
of slander.
and
it
in the
Therefore
the
the label
;
attached.
was inaccurate mattered little To speak of Sicilian or Southern regiments heightened the impression of mingled funk and
label
'
'
That the
'
'
fury which
it
248
One
He condemned
Southern
'
'
the Bersaglieri,
Alps.'
whom
he called
is
ing the barriers that have lain between the different States,
and
in
especially
With
this
end
from
view,
recruitment
non-territorial.
Recruits
Sicily
vice versa,
Palermo
filled
with
men
Rome.
'
For
this reason,
a Southern regiment
has
less
than no meaning.
The
the
made
where
all
mountain
artillery,
and
Again,
comment upon
It only
the
criticism
cited
should
be
superfluous.
it
had no opportunity
Reviewing the
seeing the
Italian
troops
in
action.
qualities of the Italian soldier as
they
He was
it is
not
tried as highly as he
not alto-
to
249
The Bulgarians have been fighting against the hereditary enemy of their race, to avenge the longdrawn-out oppression of five centuries. The factor of race hatred could hardly be overestimated, and no comsurely inapt.
almost for
its
existence,
of
an expeditionary
Two
first,
very young
For
political
and
this fact,
file,
was
its
peace
by the dismissal of the 1889 class could not fill its ranks, even up to the low war strength * fixed for the occasion, by the incorporation of a single class of its reservists. The gaps were filled by drafts of reservists and colour service men belonging to other regiments. A reinforcing reason for the call upon only one class may have been the wish to draw the troops for the expediestablishment
tion
possible,
but,
in
any
results
were
never
not
wholly
satisfactory.
Composite
units
as
can
units
be
expected
to
give
the
same
results
where
all
officers,
non-commissioned
officers,
and men
have
learned to
know and
trust
one another.
force,
still
to
some
The
battalions
embarked
for Tripoli
250
extent an
making.
Some
of the regiments
still
had hardened
on the raw
and unfortunately, just as they were work that was completing their education came to an abrupt and prolonged pause. But in the later encounters, some of them rendered additionally arduous by excessive heat, the men fought
side,
thoroughly well.
It is
men
who
constitute an
army depends
of late
directly
upon
their officers,
Not
least
among
and men.
factory.
If
this test of
Army, the
altogether satis-
well-known English
politician,
a keen demo-
cratic observer,
whose hobby
is
it is
Europe on manoeuvres,
relations were to be
found between
officers
The
per-
teristics.
not too
much
pany commander's attitude towards his men is very often marked by a real affection that has something of the paternal in it, and the feeling of the men is the natural complement There is a naivete and simplicity about the of this.
relation
that
is
refreshing,
fostered
in
by the
no old
soldiers
the
251
the
company commander
is
over forty. 1
They
set their
men
the examples
their
and
cheerfulness,
In face of the
Yet the
criticism
must
in justice be
made, and
it
Taken
too
There are
many
many
and
company
and vigour
commanders
with
middle-aged
whitening hairs,
and the
There
are, or
were
fifty,
and many
even a good
many
The
The company
and battalion
commanders
exercise.
In a
surely clear
that a
1
man who
One small
Too
little
attention
was paid
men's
Where
upon the officers. This responsibility was inexplicably neglected in Tripoli, and the sandy going caused a good deal of foot trouble which might readily have been avoided.
252
till
or fifty-five
is
much
than
if it
earlier.
On
and
officers
seemed
officers
observable,
and
all
the more
officers to
a battalion was
opportunities
many
and
it is
encies
may
not be altogether
recorded, which
strengthened by inquiry.
To sum
that
if
the Italian
Army
its soldiers
would win
chance
They
are
They are not smart in our free and easy, in a way even
There
is
characteristic of the
seem rather
attained.
lax.
But the
spirit,
out of his
men what
keen
an unquenchable cheerfulness, an
these
qualities
At the beginning
of
of the
nervousness
possibilities of
the troops.
largely due to
253
shown themselves
for the
freedom
spirit
was recognised on
all
and the
training of the
from what
lowered,
still
officers at least
If at
men were
leaders
untried.
men which
As
trial
a general
Army came
out of
its
The delay
The landing
two or
skill
and
celerity.
Some mention
made
cwt., with
A lighter
simultane-
and
less
lying positions,
and to the outby the arrival of the motors. In the earlier days transport and commissariat officers were dependent upon Sicilian and Alpine carts, drawn by mules, and upon the comparatively small number
The question
was greatly
simplified
Tripoli.
trenches, but
when the
254
plodded
way
fed,
An early
and bread was followed by twq submeals, at 10 and 4 macaroni or another pasta,
:
followed
fruit.
well
by meat and vegetables, and sometimes tinned The quality of the food was excellent, and it was prepared. Many a spectator had cause to be thankful
and the savoury stew
much
'
superior
by the so-called hotels in the town. The meat was sometimes fresh and sometimes tinned, and the most palatable dish was the tinned ration of meat and vegetables, that made an excellent ragout.
Thoroughly well
fed, leading
a hard outdoor
life
in a
when the
and a
number
of cases of enteric
warning to be careful
had given them an additional how they quenched their thirst. But
end
authorities,
praise.
December was obviously due to the medical whose work is deserving of the very highest
of of
At the beginning
to
face
November the
lines and into the town from the oasis, and had spread with alarming rapidity among troops and
WAY TO
AIN ZARA
255
Tripoli at
Some
correspondents,
who
left
difficulties of
the posi-
of wretchedness
any stick seemed good enough to beat the Italians with, and the cholera epidemic was frequently adduced as a
further instance of fault on their part.
resolution,
and
met with
gratifying success.
the soldiers
and military
made
pre-
promptly
and
energetically
The
Government
Medical Corps
Army
Cross
volunteers,
and Professor
specially sent
Basile,
well-known
;
physician
who was
from Italy
and the
each
into three
main
districts,
civil doctor,
tomed
To each
of these districts
sisting of
was
allotted a
'
Red
Cross
men
These squads
had occurred.
district
squads,
there
256
mentary
staff
exigencies of the
moment demanded.
attached
was respon-
among
daries.
Lastly, there
was a
was to look
many
of
difficulties
November
the
town
'
squadra
The
streets
it
close
of course very
especially
number of cholera cases occurred. But the methods adopted met In a week the epidemic was with remarkable success. checked in a fortnight it was well in hand, and obviously in a month the number of cases was spending itself reduced to three or four a day. For another month occaand the
desert,
among whom
the greater
January.
form.
was
rerise
markably low
257
to the suspicion that not all the cases were true cholera,
among
very high,
their
it
may
was due to
sanitary
services
work,
and and
made
its
suffered mainly
malaria,
>
But the malarious cases were recidivi,' infected in Italy and had fallen ill again under the stress of exposure. The anopheles does not seem to exist in Tripoli or the near neighbourhood, and in the town there is apparently no mosquito of
any
sort.
from November
till
March.
by a
is
seems more
like
common among
the Arabs,
who
call it
'
Father of the
stick,' in allusion to
the bruised
and aching
feeling
which
is
number
its
any given
the
scattered victims
among
In
March
Red
hundred
beds, which
had seen
full
December.
There were
258
low.
little
This instance
to do,
number had been nearly as was typical. The hospitals had very
practi-
and
its
environs.
troops, both at
disease,'
were
'
decimated by
which was
It is difficult to
certain
amount
fear
of
The
proved
among
victory. 2
No
by the
army
in Tripoli
and coolness
of course,
Photo A. Malvezzi
Photo A. Malvezzi
259
it is
The
various
aeroplane
flights
to the
most
and
serious mishaps.
and the small number of There were a good many narrow escapes.
On
by rifle
bullets
and on three occasions at least a flight might have ended in disaster owing to the stoppage Twice, a long glide from a great height of the motor. brought the airman to the ground in safety within the
;
camp
Italian
outpost
lines.
On
the
third
occasion,
already
was forced to descend nine miles from home, fortunately in an empty stretch of desert.
described, the airman
Another airman
rescued,
fell
was
skilful
first
months
of the
war Captain
flights,
and
leave.
Returning to
his
work,
on a
flight
from
Zuara to
Tripoli,
and Zanzur.
He was
he remained a prisoner
till the end of the war. Luck was with the airmen on various occasions, but luck
260
reward of the
skill
difficulties,
Yet
months
of
made the
two
of his record,
Many
these scouting expeditions the Italian generals were regularly apprised of the
and the
features
its
main
ments
of
tomed
of the
to
and moveBut gradually the became accustroops. eye the task of exploration, and the work done was
existing maps,
dimostrative,
and furnishing
new
carte
One
lesson
expert as
military
and naval
make
observations
and deductions from the military point of view. 1 Owing to the gale which sprang up on the afternoon
of
''
'
- _
^.
^SSbaE^sfca^
<&>
hrh
THE HANGAR FOR THE AIRSHIPS
261
It
came
late
upon the
scene.
was not
airships
P2 and P3 ascended
together and
made a
flight
many
and back.
in a
Bu Kamesh,
a fresh
considered
The
and motors
an hour.
of 1000
is
will
be able to
make a continuous
flight of
metres,
calculated at
1000 kilometres.
a dozen
will
still
P standing for
piccolo,
and
it
is
possibilities of
real
duty of
be
it is
262
handled
the information
At the outbreak of the war in Tripoli the Italian air corps was still in the early stages of its development and for this reason the more credit is due to those who made such a striking success of their work. A few officers had
;
long devoted
of the future
all their
War
Office
and
military
aeroplane
Three
had been
slow,
built
and too
and none
officers
new type
At the beginning
war only
a handful of
tary which,
brevetto mili-
among
airman
shall
ascend to a height of
in Tripoli
an immense increase
To
with him
the record of what has been done in Tripoli, and the prospect
of great
fitting
ITALIAN, ARAB,
AND TURK
263
CHAPTER
ITALIAN, ARAB,
XII
AND TURK
custom, the term
Throughout
'
Arab
'
habitants of Tripolitania.
this
The usage
is
inaccurate, but
if it
would matter
less, in
were
Arab
'
Tripolitan peoples.
It
seems to
call
nomad
warriors,
hooded and
silent, fierce
is
and implacable,
varied only
by joyous
and
rapine.
might
it is
fit
and
is
such as
defy disentanglement.
and
the Berbers the Jebel and the tableland that slopes to the
south, while in the Fezzan the negro influence from the
made itself most strongly felt. But Berbers and Arabs, in certain districts, are quite inextricably mixed, and while from all accounts the mountain
far interior has naturally
264
all
minus
lation.
of
chief
coast.
The bulky,
thick-
lipped negroid,
is
not
uncommon on
they are
It
all in
Arab
may be as a result of his mixed blood that the Tripolitan is not essentially either a warrior or a herd. He is
is
nomad herdsman, he
effort or
underif
The Berbers
of
the
hills
are diligent,
un-
cultivators,
where
tillage
So
it is
that the
peaceful
majority
of
the
Arabs
'
are
comparatively
agriculturists,
who
circumstances,
to lead a
upon those
life
nomad
on the
untilled steppes.
The Berber
ITALIAN, ARAB,
some.
AND TURK
well
265
known
to be un-
warlike,
to be a kindly
and
hospitable people.
is
a deep
and in the subject races of Tripolitania hostility to the Turk is firmly rooted. Everywhere it may be found, and
though in the year of their brave and hopeless struggle
the Turks attached the Arabs to
there are no regrets for their going.
them
as never before,
Some twenty
an Arab
girl of
unusual beauty.
The
for
woman
and prayed
and
gave
Turk
to
was hopeless.
flesh there
He had
If I
should cut
and boil them together, even then they could not mix. For Turk and Arab must always be separate.' The woman feared that he might one day make the test, and the Cadi recognised that their matrimonial differences were essentially incurable. A divorce was
the two pieces in a pot
granted forthwith
people,
the
woman
own
and
illustrated
266
by the foregoing
some ground
for surprise
It
community
united two such dissident elements, and that the war waged
against the Italians was in fact a
against Christian.
Holy War,
of
Moslem
Undoubtedly the
felt,
religious influence
made
and
itself
strongly
and
it
may have
of striking a
blow
mere
loot, that
of Tripolitania proper.
On
does not
was
manifested
It
is
by the
perfectly
if
Tripolitan Arabs
during the
hostilities.
evident that
if
a Holy
War had
religious feeling
Arab
resist-
entertained
Modern Mohammedan
War
in similar circumstances,
No
but, allowing
due weight to
religious influences, it is
necessary to look
with profound
To say that
cient answer
;
Italy
is
not a
suffi-
nor
is it
ITALIAN, ARAB,
AND TURK
267
was no widespread
hostility
among
of their country.
were
how
of Tripoli took
and misgiving.
much
down on
ties
it is
the authori-
a further proof,
if
any
The
Italian
upon
occupation.
Whether the
is little
Italian attitude
it
was
in fact
based
upon
this assumption, or
whether
was the
result of
mere
oversight, there
Mr. Alan Ostler of the Daily Express, Mr. G. F. Abbott, and M. Georges
of
Remond
& Illustration.
268
the
people
'
by means
of a display of goodwill
The
just
assumed to be
guilty.
Arab submission.
During the
ten or twelve days of the occupation
into Tripoli to
make submission
to
new
overlord,
of
as
heads
and to be confirmed in their positions their tribes. They were received with
little
or no
them
as to their positions
failure,
and emoluof
ments.
on the part
should govern
all
dealings
the
seems clear that chiefs who had actually made submisneglect of the authorities to throw in their lot with
by the
the Turks.
by the
upon the
revolt
by the accounts
of this repres-
may have
ITALIAN, ARAB,
there
AND TURK
269
age nor sex, so that hatred and revenge were added to the
rumour did
their
and
it
was only
after peace
had been massacred, came back to find them safe and sound in Tripoli, fed and clothed and doctored by those
of wholesale butchery.
suffi-
Arabs to make
common
first
every reason
Arab and Turk would not have long resisted more vigorous action on the part of the Italians. For if one thing is clear from the various accounts which have come from those on the Turkish side,
to believe that the association of
it is
was
by the Turks, and the failure of the Italian Government to secure any redress for the murder of its nationals had lowered a prestige that had never stood very high. This initial handicap could only have been overcome by a prompt demonstration of Italian strength, and when Italy deliberately refrained from the attempt to strike a convincing
blow, the result was an automatic confirmation of the lowrated esteem in which she was held.
of prestige seems to
have been
in-
by the
Italian authorities.
They may
outbreak of war
in face of the
270
attitude displayed
of a settled
it is
to the war.
Curiously enough,
to
by adequate
political
atti-
preparation.
tudes.
There
is
'
Attempts to
slightness of
might be
fairly
On
the
an Arab policy
of con-
and promises, before Italian prestige had been satisfactorily established by force of arms, would seem to
The various proclamations which were showered upon Arab encampments from airships and aeroplanes might have had an admirable effect
have been an error in
tactics.
if
field.
As
it
was,
And
lies
in order to
it
seems
there
The
a wholesome conviction of Italian strength was the more urgent in view of the fact that one of the chief obstacles
in the
way
of
an acceptance
than
of Italian rule,
an obstacle
more
effective
Turk.
The Turks
and
their
in Tripolitania
their influence
ITALIAN, ARAB,
rule
in
AND TURK
evil
271
to a country already
decay
there,
as
elsewhere, they
had
failed
in the
duties of government.
race,
are a dominant
fact
upon the
man and
a master of men.
many who
any great degree responsible for the Arab resistance, or that the Turks were in any way able to compel the Arabs to join them against the Italians. To
was
in
many
of them, fought
of the
human
nature.
The arguTo
to take
When
promised the
men
tribes,
who formed an
Yet
the extent of
of the
Sudan to
was
so clearly recog-
272
It
is,
and
led
by
their
it
el
Barouni, but
and there
Many Arabs
are emphatic
upon
this point
the
by the instant collapse of the Arab upon the formal ending of the
it
war
and
whom
they were
factor in
new
Turks
it
in Tripolitania expected
was doubtless in this expectation that they hopefully bombarded Europe with false news. Correspondents on the Turkish side seem to have been very unlucky in missing such fighting as did take place, and it is clear that the
authorities were not anxious that they should be in a posi-
The
fact
is
clearly,
Ostler's
November, December but he seems to have 4, and stayed there till known nothing of the fight on November 26, which resulted in the reoccupation of the Fort Messri and El Hanni, for
Turkish
camp
he writes
' :
had been
for
Turks before the Italians ventured out into the open. It .' The constant was on the fourth of December.
.
ITALIAN, ARAB,
AND TURK
'
273
by the Carlo
writers
the
fleet
'
by
on the Turkish
'
day's fighting on
quite rightly,
November
26,
at
first,
another,' which he
successfully
But he was
happening, or
had happened.
The instance is illuminating. All through the winter and the spring correspondence was sent over Europe which
was begotten
nately,
solely of
Oriental imagination.
its
Unfortu-
much
of
it
has found
way
into
removed.
ings,
Italians
course)
suffered
defeat,
legends
of
Italian
all
and disseminated by
correspondent eager
best.
news
prey,
there was little enough to be had was a ready and the Turks made good use of the instruments
name would.
came about that a French correspondent, returning to Tunis, found in his paper, signed by his name, telegrams which he had never written or sent. It is impossible not
So
to admire the resource of the Turkish authorities.
fraud, of course,
Their
was
274
springs at the
Turkish headquarters.
Whose rod
flow,
spondent
It
was a turbid
shall
'
salt,'
served
its
purpose.
experience,
who combined
in
his
But
and
it is
enough to
While certain
others were for
stories were for the European public, and Arab consumption, some were spread abroad
Chief
among
these were
of
an
and France had wished to divide their country, and that Italy had stepped in to save them from this fate. No such proclamation, of course, was ever made by the Italian
authorities, 1
but
if
the story
is
it
can
pamphlet was
Italians.
circulated,
The
1 When the report was published in a London newspaper, I obtained a formal contradiction of it from Signor Giolitti.
ITALIAN, ARAB,
clear
AND TURK
275
enough
in the countries
mentioned
Italian occupation.
was well
pre-
was not,
after
all,
of genius in the
suggestion that but for the arrival of the Italians a preferable alternative might have been forthcoming.
It is
no
provinces, in
many
Italy
was a newcomer
in
North
Africa, handi-
capped by a generation
mercially with the Arab.
will
of hesitating
diplomacy and by
On
as
much
appreciated
Egypt
as
it
littoral
under
first
weeks
war the
had thoughts
Government.
To
new
idea to the
days of
of
276
own
and
by
prejudice
by other circumstances
responsible.
for
In Tripoli town
first,
where
of
all
had seemed
smooth going at
an atmosphere
mutual suspicion
began to estimate
clouded for some time the relations between the two races.
Slowly the cloud dispersed.
the revolt of October 23 at
The
its
Italians
The impression
the
first
of the occupation,
had been
partially
removed
by the
During the
latter half of
still
November
firing
demanded.
probable
retreat of the
is
tried
and condemned,
tried
1
1 I followed the whole of the trial. The hearing of the evidence lasted nearly three hours, and the court took half an hour to consider its verdict. By a fortunate chance I was subsequently able to correct the conclusions of a German correspondent, who had been at the trial for about twenty
minutes.
Knowing
ITALIAN, ARAB,
in the revolt, and, while there
AND TURK
less
277
was
evidence to involve
own
prevari-
hanged before
left
dawn on
The
lesson
suspended
midday.
seemed to be
salutary.
As
by
must have seemed a mystery to them that a man could be condemned to death on circumstantial evidence. They had been
accustomed to the kindly Turkish practice which required
two actual eye-witnesses to establish the crime of murder, and here were men condemned for killing, or trying to kill, whom none had seen to take life. They must inevitably
have wondered at the processes of European law
;
on the
them
to acquiesce in
its
conclusions.
Among
efficient
the
difficulties
position, at
of
and trustworthy interpreters. There was a disfirst, to rely upon the Tripoli Jew as the medium communication between Italian and Arab, and while
drawn did not supply the type of man that was wanted. The whole Jewish community welcomed the Italian occupation,
the class from which the interpreters were largely
but
it is
of its lowlier
members saw
and
in the part
which they
an impression that the accused were prisoners who had been captured in the fighting round Ain Zara on the previous day. In this belief, he was meditating an indignant despatch on Italian methods of dealing with
prisoners of war.
'
facts
'
of
278
The game was easy during the weeks which followed the when a mutual suspicion informed the minds of Italian and Arab. At that time cases of deliberate false
interpreting, calculated to prejudice the authorities against
Fortu-
duty of
translation
officers or to others
it is
much
time the relations between the Italians and the Arab com-
munity were
in
by
have
arisen.
The employment
In the
first place,
of Tripoli
their position as a
some of their own back,' sowing mischief between Italians and Arabs. In the
means
of
'
getting
of authority
which
it
gave
in
For
Jew
is
that the
Moslem women
'
them
on a
links
unveiled.
A Jew
such conditions
it is
and as the connectingbetween the Arabs and the Italians, was a very
unfortunate error.
of the Jews,
ITALIAN, ARAB,
AND TURK
some
279
false transla-
feeling.
The was
fear, at
The question
of interpreters
was
who were
;
qualified were
almost
all
process of superof
and
selection,
those
of
who
things,
and
temporarily resident,
who
for
Blacks
the
Tchad
districts
mere
look only a
list
warm brown
And on
the outskirts of
steppes.
They had to be brought under some sort of surveillance, and the supreme filthiness of their camps could not be tolerated. At first the main
problem
for the Italians.
280
encampment
Anything more noisome could hardly be imagined, and the hand of the sanitary authorities came down heavily. Wooden
barracks were hastily constructed, and
The nomads, unwilling, were established in their new quarters, but when the cardbinieri officer, who was charged with their supervision, came on his rounds next morning, the barracks were empty, and the neighbouring gardens
were
full of
A
a
We
cannot
live in
we must
sleep
was pointed out that the condition of their former encampments had made the move necessary, that for the
nomads must be kept under strict observation, new lodging was a vast improvement upon the precarious shelters of hide and straw that had served them before. The sheikh pondered, and then replied We shall obey your laws, and be no more unclean. And if any of us be unclean, or offend in any way, then let him be put in the house you have built. Upon consideration, the appeal was allowed. An everincreasing encampment grew up near the empty barracks, and thanks to the vigorous efforts of the Red Cross workers As time went on, women and it remained fairly clean. children, and a certain number of men, came into the town and when peace was declared from the hungry plains the population of the encampment was close upon seven thousand. All these people, and every one else in the town who made application and was found to be in want, received a daily ration from the Italian authorities, and as work
present the
and that
their
-J
ITALIAN, ARAB,
was
fed
plentiful for all
AND TURK
281
who could
community that
and grew fat and learned to laugh. Most pitiful of all had been the scared and wasted children, and to watch them after a month or two was a grateful sight plump
;
demands
good
for
omen
of
for the
To the
tion they
last the
had
so consistently pursued.
When
peace was
Tripoli,
he announced
they
left it to
to go.
trouble,
and as such
suspicion.
it
after a
The
rule,
lie
for
little
the
acceptance of Italian
but
upon the Arab mind, and the moment of passed. Every tribute is due to the Turks
A more
Western
The penetration and occupation of Tripolitania is proceeding satisfactorily, and in Cyrenaica the pacification of
the country
is
Un-
toward incidents
a resident was murdered at Tarhuna at the beginning of this yearbut the prophecy
take place
may
282
Italians
revival
and development
country that
now
belongs
to both.
No
of
'
natives,'
and
it is
likely
that the
Arab
'
levies
good
relations.
The Turk has gone from North Africa, and his dominions are parcelled out among European powers. He will never return but with his final going, and with the promise that the good government and prosperity which follow in the wake of European rule will be extended to Tripoli, a breath has blown upon a smouldering spark that glows as yet but faintly, though one day it might fan to a flame. Among the dreamers of the world are some whose dreams, are inspired by a memory of the days when Arab civilisation and Arab military power played great parts in Europe. The very blows that have shaken the Turkish Empire and,
;
an Arab renaissance.
it
possible to think of
of
Arab Nationalism
it will
is
vague and nebulous enough, though some Arabs are prepared to enunciate a programme
course, one
;
but
lead in due
may
Party.
283
CHAPTER
XIII
The
fail
to be struck
by
Italy's
resumption of
Africa.
It
is
territories
Roman
to deny to
modern
Rome which
people
;
enough
Ethnologically,
no
doubt,
the
modern
and
it
may
descendants.
Roman
and
In a sense,
all
Rome, but
infusion
and
now
strengthened,
by the
ancestral land.
The Tripolitan provinces are rich in Roman remains, and history is full of allusions to the productivity of regions
that are
now
desolate.
In
Roman
coast strip
veritable
and the Cyrenaican plateau must have been gardens, and to-day the memorials of a vanished
284
and
in
The
ruins of
cities of
Greek and
Roman
antiquities to
of statuary,
Roman
coins
and
first
Roman
of Sabratha include
2
;
an amphi-
and at Lebda
memory of Septimius Severus, the places of whose and death bear striking witness to the far-reaching sway of Rome. For the emperor who was born so near
recall the
birth
his life at
still
and
ancient
show how the desolate plains Even in Roman days the lack permanent running water imposed upon the possessors
means, and the task of
'
reconstruction
'
(in
the
is
of the
is
no
The land
1
is
The
statues, etc.,
Commander Porcher
La
Tripolitaine d'hier
285
way
to the coast.
the dry months, for more than half the year, there
no
Here and there, especially in Cyrenaica, there are springs and even streams (notably at Derna, where the waters of two streams are united to irrigate the gardens and fields,
water
is
relied
it is
upon
make up
is
rainfall,
and
found comparatively
proper
of
Tripolitania
:
may
be
Ghadames,
Derji,
third zone
is
no
possibility of betterment.
in this
may
strips
and pockets
there
any
vated area.
All hopes of
the coast plain that rises gently to the foot of the escarp-
ment already mentioned, and the broken plateau that slopes very gradually to the south and east. In both these
districts there is soil to
286
abandoned land.
sense of the
are not
'
desert
'
in the popular
and
It
sloth
word they are lands that centuries of ignorance and strife and oppression have allowed to go out
limits of a short
of cultivation.
chapter to cover
More-
and there
of
scientific exploration.
The majority
who have visited the districts under discussion passed through them on their way to more distant goals, on which
their eyes were firmly set,
traveller
(in 1901,
and
1904),
M. de Mathuisieulx succeeded
in exploring (and the difference
in traversis
though not
of
prime
importance), the
plains
more important
and the tableland that lies behind them. and avowedly, limited
His
re-
in scope
and range, and while the two books descriptive of his journeys, A travers la Tripolitaine and La Tripolitaine d'hier et de demain, are full of interest, and afford many
valuable indications regarding the districts traversed, they
are
little
of a hurried passage
through
and Signor
before
The expedition was accompanied by a Turkish escort, and long it became clear that any real freedom of
287
The wishes of the leaders were turned aside with every politeness by the officer in command of the escort. The journey to such and such a place was unsafe owing to the predatory habits of the tribesmen. The officer was desolated/ but he was
cut out of the programme of the expedition.
'
Other
The excuses
varied, but
its its
personal
members
toured along the tracks marked out for them, and the
loitering necessary to exploration
it
passed.
Arabs have
Tripoli.
brought
many
stories
of
mineral
wealth
into
and even
oil in
the unexplored
districts
to
the south
all
;
the
mouth
of
nounced them
and it was hoped that the expedition might be able to gain some particular information about the less fanciful suggestions. Owing to the last desperate
effort of the
European
enterprise,
any attempts
was
When
members
of the expedition
were at Sokna, and for reasons which are not clear the Turks
288
little
than the
gramme
sum
of their impressions.
of the place
effect
of
impressions,' yet
it is
No
of
much
is
known
that the
members
led to the
same conclusion that the application of proper methods would reclaim and develop an immense area of land, which the ignorance and sloth of the inhabitants, coupled with
the extortions of the Turkish government, have
condition of complete or partial abandonment.
left in
In
common
Orfella,
and Msellata
districts
appear to
intelligent enterprise.
the notes and papers belonging to the expedition were destroyed by the Turks, but the recently formed Society Italiana per lo studio della Libia will publish shortly a volume based upon Count Sforza's
Most
of
diary.
289
M. de Mathuisieulx points in
As the
M. de
Mathuisieulx came to
the
From
and, while
he
still
La
Tripolitaine d'hier
de
demain
pas
he
writes
'
je n'ai
moins raison
que
aujourd'hui,
quatre
nouveaux
de
territoires,
digne d'eveiller
M. de Mathuisieulx
is
had
first
His
him
to alter
it.
The
fact
is
instrucpossiIt is
and the
lesson to be
bilities
M. de Mathuisieulx's judgment
his
is
He
founds
favourable
opinion
of
the
possibilities,
upon
qui
la
decouverte
de
traces
romaines
insoupconnees,
and
sustains his
290
La preuve que
la Djeffara n'est
intense partout
ou
il
y avait
la
de
reussir.'
In point of
fact,
Roman
It
of
in-
to demonstrate
the unlikelihood that traces of a mere agricultural occupation should survive aboveground.
cities
scarcely to be
life,
of a
bygone country
how-
Yet they
Tripoli, at
lie
To the south
of
found, and
hills
There are
stories of other
and though these have not yet been confirmed, there seems no good reason to doubt their authenticity. The ruined
barrages which are
known
To labour the point further is unnecessary, for the argument from antiquity is frequently met by the round assertion that the climate and general conditions have changed so much in fifteen centuries that what may once have been
291
Roughly speaking,
while
may
be said
and England, Italy have and leaned the other extreme. Germany to
of hasty generalisation has
The habit
expression
found remarkable
on various
is
occasions,
eminent instance
town of Tripoli, in an area bounded by Fort B, Bu Meliana, and the Italian lines in the oasis, declared that from what he had seen of the country it was worth nothing at all.
What
until
is
worth
will
not be evident
some years
of exploration
and
effort
have passed,
of
facts,
and a number
upon which
it
may
be permitted to hazard
an opinion.
In the
first
is
Perhaps an apology
is
due
upon the
fact,
and
it is
is
The
for the
most part
soil,
not
and the
rainfall is considerable,
and the
I
plains that
lie
behind are
streaked by
similar
and
'
irriga-
tion to
is
make
it
The
soil of
it
the
desert
for the
can be made
292
may
to
the
fact
that
found
everywhere,
close
in
the
narrow
surface.
strip that
cultivated, lying
beneath the
As the
and
solely
intensive
cultivation
ceases,
giving
way
to
the
pastures
crops.
and scattered fields of grain that are dependent upon the rainfall, or to an aridity that bears no As the foot of the escarpment is approached,
is
cultivation
resumed in
places,
carry the winter rains for a few miles before they sink
soil.
Wherever the
plains
itself,
practically
and
utilisation of
an adequate
water-supply.
The average
rainfall in Tripoli
But
a
had
fallen,
fall
and
than 19 inches).
On
number
of
days
on which a measurable quantity of rain falls is low, averaging fifty-one, and the distribution of the rainfall is unsatisfactory.
Generally speaking,
the
rainfall
is
distributed
EftC
IN
IN
293
November to February. 1 While the actual rainfall is roughly the same as that of Foggia (mm. 446*7) and not very much inferior to that of Girgenti (mm. 460) and Trapani (mm. 502), the period of actual drought in Apulia and Sicily is very much shorter.
It follows that
now
desert
and control
irrigation
by means
of barrages of
and
works,
possibility
supplementing this
is
caravan routes.
posed to
While the
the
tion based
upon
it
wells.
Fortunately
At present the primitive means at the disposal of the Arabs have prevented any adequate utilisation of the watersupply, and the invincible sloth and obstinacy of the Turks was a bar to any enterprise calculated to improve the conditions.
typical
instance
of
is
afforded
by the
fate of a
It
scheme
water from
Ain Zara to
sion, or
Tripoli.
wady, which
finds its
way
to Tripoli
by a
slightly
The
Colonial
facts and figures are taken from a pamphlet published by the Department of the Italian Foreign Office Climatologia di Tripoli e Bengasi,' by Professor Filippo Eredia.
The
'
294
indicated the shortest possible route, and that no modification could be adopted.
direct route traverses
'
some
low ridges
engineers
standstill.
No
rock,
in
Tripoli
with
the
and no
simply
others
were
provided.
The
enterprise
was
dropped,
attempt
to
overcome
the difficulties
of the obvious
any consideration
alternative.
With the
vides, the
facilities for
and
it
may
The subterranean
it
seems to be
M. de Mathuisieulx writes
' :
Le
minime pour
Peut-
qu'on
lui
etre faut-il
provenant
En
tout cas,
les pluies
tombees
sur
Nefoussa et
le
Nord, ne peuvent
une
pareille
quantite
d'eau
souterraine.'
The
is
have
many
adherents,
not only a subterranean deposit, but a subterranean flow, has recently received striking confirmation.
well
on the outskirts
flow.
The
pre-
295
of the
is
an economic development
assuming
for
its
potential fertility.
determinedly
hostile to
human
is
enterprise, the
side of
the plains
pated,
on the
man.
confidently antici-
by those who are acquainted with the conditions, by means of wind-wheels the task of bringing the water to the surface may be easily and cheaply accomplished. Wind is a feature of the Tripolitan climate, and in the dry season the breeze off the sea blows with an almost clockwork regularity during the afternoon hours, except when its cooling breath is replaced by the furnace blast of the
that
ghibli,
it
which
will
atone for
its
extreme unpleasantness
soil.
if
1904
('
II
nell'
anno
is
1902
')
is
estimated
It
may
be that these
modern methods.
and the
vine,
The
which
is little
embargo
placed by the
remarkable
fruit in the
and tended.
kinds of fruit-
296
trees flourish,
in time, but
it
Office
indi-
and
is
Experiments in
drought, and
obtained in Tripolitania.
quantity of
which
paper.
is
Unfortunately
the
methods
employed
by
the
Arabs in harvesting
ously destructive.
this natural
To begin
was
collected
and
still
of
tearing
it
up by the
and
it is
to be
hoped that
wasteful
may
be able to inculcate
less
methods
may
succeed
merely a spoliation.
is
even
known
to the world
The long period which elapses before a datemore than compensated by the eventual yield. Rapporti Coloniali, No. 8, March 1912.
is
297
devastating than
brought so low a
cities of
district
its riches.
The
Cyrene,
Apollonia, Ptole-
mais, Arsinoe
able
townlets.
is
and Berenice are replaced by a few miserThe Garden of the Hesperides, whose
fabled site
hood
have
common
Lethe
the past
is
once flowed.
Cyrenaica
is
it
is
far less
The plateau
Barca
is still
sufficiently clothed
Arab name
of Jebel-el-Akhdar, the
Green Mountain.
Mediterranean
'
in character
and has a
and the
Woods
of
cypress, juniper,
and
ilex lend
sides of the
oleanders.
Even those
travellers
judgment, nearly
all of
who have
traversed
298
de Mathuisieulx and
Italian
travellers,
fertility.
have
On
summer
by the Jewish
In
their
fifteen
days'
journey
the
expedition
of
of
and they came to the conclusion that the scarcity water would prevent the agricultural development which
The
report, written
by Dr.
of
J.
W.
water.
The rain-water drains through the limestone it reaches the sea-level, and it
is
retained.
The report
little
but
it is
permissible
may have
given too
The
tained,
over
generally
figure. 2
important
Report
of the
work
of the
Commission
grafie e
4,
February 1912).
299
much
extended.
It
istic,
may
of
'
dry-farming
who
into a garden.
are
all
undertaken.
Money
be the chief
difficulty,
but
if
many
might find
Skill
and hard work will not be wanting. The Italian is accustomed to dealing with difficulties of drought, and agricultural engineering
is
Morecolonies
new
an ample supply
of the patient
and
many
countries.
certainly
The future prosperity of the new colonies will almost depend upon a hard- won agricultural development, but it is at least conceivable that some mineral wealth
may
lie
to the
The experience
may
known
to exist in
far
from
the shores of the Syrtis (the Arabs call the district the
1
Bay
The
results obtained in
note.
300
by a thorough,
skilled investiga-
mines.'
may
exist,
which have
Some
terior,
Italian writers
have expressed a
but there
that the
fact
lie
altered
the
countries
which
commerce.
tions of
to attribute the
Bornu and
incursions of Rabeh hastened the decay of the trade, but a disabling blow was struck when the most lucrative article
of
commerce, the
;
slave, could
its
in Tripoli
and
doom
which
dependence
enterprise
upon the caravan -routes. The commercial of the Arabs and the existence of the camel
of
animal
and a dense
barrier
compact
of hostile
man and
no
1
Sudanese adventurer, half-negro and half-Arab, ex-slave and who broke loose from the welter of confusion and massacre which followed the downfall of the Egyptian regime, pushed westward, and carved out a kingdom for himself on the shores of Lake Tchad.
follower of Zobeir Pasha,
301
States
Politically
and commercially, they remained for centuries in the hinterland of the Barbary States, and only now, with the opening
up
of the Nigerian railway system,
is
becoming available.
From
Tripoli to
is
Kano
the average
calculated at about
hundred
francs, 1 while
amount
Even the
Kano
is
trade
only
The
interior
may
new
conditions.
first
obstacle which
the
The
first
step towards
the regeneration of
peoples.
possible.
There
it is
gauge some
Stress has
mind.
II
302
and
its effects
are
manifest
now
was the
strictly
war
and they remained the same throughout the protracted pourparlers of the summer. From the beginning Italy postulated, as the essential feature of the settlement, her
complete
and absolute sovereignty over the two This granted, she was willing to recognise the spiritual claims of the Caliphate, and to save Turkish amour propre
Tripolitan provinces.
in
definite sovereignty.
An
able enough
formulated, Turkey's
demands
is
of the Italian
Government.
At the same
time there
refused to bargain
outset,
and
pressure to
all
temptation to
The
Italian
of the Italian
the object for which the war was made, complete Italian
sovereignty over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.
As
far as
;
Europe
is
Europe has recognised the Italian annexation of the two provinces, and nothing appears to be left of the Sultan's
303
On
a considerable
this divorce
body
of Italian opinion
of temporal
and spiritual be justly apprehended by the native populations, and there is reason to fear that
power
will
may put
way
new
colonial administration.
of the Sultan's spiritual power, as evi-
The recognition
nominate
his subordinates,
and
by the
would by
itself
have been
The
stantinople
and
Tripoli
is
it is
rememand
bered that while the Turks are Hanafis, the Tripoli tan Arabs
are
Malikis.
The intimate
association
of
religious
is
political rights
likely to
only partly in
abeyance
a
;
belief
which
will
nominees
and the
situation
is
by the
clause which provides for the appointment of a Representative of the Sultan (Naib-ul-Sultan),
interests
' '
to protect
Ottoman
is
in Tripolitania.
This
official's
salary
to be
Arabs
if
It
may have
been necessary,
This clause seems the more unfortunate, as the religious authorities town had of their own accord decided to discontinue the prayer for the Sultan, as soon as they perceived that the Italians respected their The restoration of the Sultan's name to the official prayers religion. cannot fail to encourage the opinion that he still retains a share of temporal
in Tripoli
sovereignty.
304
or
it
and
strings to the
There
is
difficulties
inherent in the
will eventually
situation created
by the Treaty
it
of
Lausanne
be overcome, but
not a question of
may
and Padishah.
political,
which confront
demand
Italy
is
But
by slow
give of
The nation
will
its
and
it
may
305
CHAPTER XIV
ITALY AND THE POWERS
by
public
upon the
Italians as a people,
and upon
The ultimate
been
effect
upon the
braced them to a
new
During the
earlier
stages of the
war
some quarters to complain and the suggestion was sometimes heard that the Powers ought
of the lack of support given to the Tripoli enterprise,
of
on the part The suggestion was a not unnatural outcome the feeling that Italian action was greatly hampered by
Turkey.
of other people's interests.
of justice, that
if
an enforced consideration
It
the Powers
fairly
upon Turkey
As time went
politicians
still
Some
and
306
'
cold neutrality
but
European
isolation
herself
was
it
tunity.
By
by doing her own work in own way, even at a greatly increased cost in money and lives, than if she had been helped to a solution by the intervention of allies or friends. Even the lack of moral support which had deeply wounded Italian feeling was seen to have had a unifying and stimulating effect upon the nation.
that Italy had gained far more
her
On
inter-
national relations.
many
foreign
criticisms
gave a
to
of
official
opinion,
The transition from just resentment to unfounded suspicion was fatally easy and Italian opinion was further embittered against nations whose friendship had seemed to it already suspect. When Italy made her unexpected descent upon Tripoli, there was a general feeling throughout the country that the sharpest criticisms would be directed against the enterprise by Germany and Austria, and that France, in spite of the formal recognition of Italian interests which had been secured in 1902, might look coldly upon the translation of a remote lien into an actual sovereignty. The opposition Whatof German opinion was fully discounted beforehand.
were never contemplated.
;
307
German
policy
(and there
is little
the immediate future), Tripoli had been the object of powerful private ambitions,
unofficial
Germany
most uncomfortable
of
For years
it
German diplomacy
at
In any case,
was not at
all
of her
own
Everything con-
war upon Turkey was bound to awake extreme ill-humour in Germany, and there is no
sidered, Italy's declaration of
else.
As
from
prise,
far as Austria
illusions.
was concerned,
Italy
was equally
free
It
would be
difficult to
and a war between Italy and Turkey distinctly threatened to ripen problems which Austria was not ready to tackle.
Austria
is
Duke
But
this attitude,
308
came as
cordiality expected
The
acquiescence
It
was
may
cherished
by the French
definite
Another
ground
for
Tripoli
French coolness
may
Latin
sisters.'
In spite of
the gradual rapprochement which had taken place since the beginning of the century, Italian distrust of France and
laid to rest,
and the
of the declara-
when the capture and detention of steamers Carthage and Manouba provoked a
tion of war,
the French
crisis
that
if
potentially,
309
it
by
Italian opinion
but
seems to
Such an
like
England,
the
Europe, was in no
mood
and the
feeling
words again
signal
for
was widespread that to quote Lord Salisbury's an attack on Tripoli by Italy would be the
'
the
dismemberment
of
Turkey.'
The Great
earlier,
Turkey
in
some quarters
some misgiving an
enterprise which
send a
Mohammedan
of Islam
world.
In
than might
reasonably
In Northern Nigeria,
which from
Mohammedan
popula-
In the
Arabs
of
Arab
than
'
Mohammedan
'
in its character.
Egypt
suffered
an agitation similar to
that in Tunis, and Egyptian sympathisers were of considerable assistance to the Turkish resistance in Cyrenaica.
what they
310
unexpectedly
of
is
It
may
who
nominee
by any means
to the
exclusively Moslem,
Ottoman predominance pursued by the Committee of Union and Progress was not calculated to generate enthusiasm among the nonthe Pan-Islamic movement.
policy of
The
Still,
upon
Tripoli
not fully
On
British
sympathy.
England
had
expressly
recognised
European
of
politics.
a recoga per-
nition of certain
common
interests,
and above
all
in a
European war.
much
British
dis-
was a grievous
Italy.
The
summer months
and
311
in
London
It
was besieged by
was to meet
to
know what
common
among
Italian
satisfaction in the
most definite of concrete facts, that the Government published a list of grievances against
;
the Porte
but their
list
of
better understanding of
We
;
broadest of grounds
ainty
'
for
'
suzer-
or
'
we
others
would have
sufficient
and the
opinion.
relation of
dis-
for
jarred
312
for Tripoli
was in a
fair
way
to
become
a second Morocco.
the situation
so lamentably prejudiced
by the wholesale
Some
Was
really
snappy
'
has disfigured
much comment on
Fortunately, British
mind on the subject, has very naturally been misunderstood by Italy. It is not always easy to realise that comments and criticisms in the
the British public had
its
made up
partially deceived
shame
have lent
itself so
own
troops at the
It
is
gave
and
Some
regrettable articles
313
but
it is
a sense of fairness that was almost entirely lacking throughout the rest of Europe, and the overwhelming body of Italian
opinion refused to accept the venomous accounts that
sympathy
Whatever sympathy
for the
Turk existed
the readiness to
press
in England, there was no excuse for condemn which marked a section of the
these should
And
if
Italy's
critics.
made no
appeal, one
interest.
may
ground of national
It is
moment almost
destroyed.
comfort in the
The correctness of attitude maintained by both Governments was not enough by itself to stem the currents of misapprehension upon which the two nations were drifting apart. Public opinion in Italy was too deeply wounded, too strongly exacerbated, and it was on public opinion, on unofficial friendly feelings far more than on official friendship, that the special relations between Italy and England ultimately depended.
any misunderstanding or
bitterness.
down, but a
feeling of disillusion-
of bitterness.
We
were
It is
we
f riendly,
314
eclipse.
went quite as
South Africa.
Nor
is
it
and
regret
For a section
of the
up
to
to the
false
end
light
of
'
news
'
which threw a
always
on
Libya,
Italy's
disadvantage.
came
as
an agreeable
surprise.
During
and
its
attitude taken
of the
French
press,
which published
of the action
press.
Italy
was
rightly grateful
drawn
closer together
by
the
Government responsible
in
spite
for
the
administration
of
some
friction
in Tunis,
imposed a
greater
loosely
tact,
where some Italian tongues wagged too and some French heads displayed a lack of the closer rapprochement between France and
strain,
Italy
emerged as
solitary gain
of
315
months
Italian
in
The
friendly atmosphere
As
made
upon the
effect of
contraband
'
what
Italian journalists
rities do,
of
any
sort
It
Arabs
of Tripoli.
war Turkish
officers
The
on the part of journalists whose patriotic zeal was not curbed by an acquaintance with the usages of international
law, but there
was no
between
On
and conveyed
316
for the Turks.
of stir,
and
a
On January
still
full of tension,
brought to Cagliari.
Unfortunately, the
seizure
of
the
Manouba was
and
Italian Governments.
The
The
Italian authorities
that the
Red
Marseilles in the
its
personnel
Government, through
Conversations
Ambassador
in
Paris,
Government.
between M.
Poincare
and
on the arrival
no one
be
of ensuring that
member
allowed to accompany
and
in the absence
The
seizure of the
have caused
irritation
accounted for by the fact that the telegram from the Italian
its desti-
317
are afloat
Manouba.
Many rumours
regarding the explanation of the undue delay which certainly did occur between the settlement of the question at
Paris
sible
into
and the communication of that settlement to responquarters in Rome, but it is scarcely necessary to enter these speculations. The important point is that an
rise to
very serious
results.
While the
uncertainty,
'
firmer
'
in tone
and the
by M. Poincare and the anger displayed by the French press. On the other hand, Italy was initially in the wrong, and Italian newspapers, and Italian opinion
ing adopted
generally, betrayed too little recognition of the fact.
More-
over, there
strain to
crisis of
seemed
little
summer and
was
strong
'
foreign
hostility
put
it
was
in a
mood
to
To make
stances of the
question
cious, to
still
remains
Was
it
reasonable,
and was
lines
it
judi-
in Italy
on these
'
:
If
318
friend does
was
whether there
is
an explanation.'
it is
The
may
be incomplete, but
hard to
an attitude which
of a friend.
fact, the crisis
In point of
persists
between Italy
and France.
statesmen, the
Thanks to the labours of various far-seeing official relations between the two countries had been greatly improved since the beginning of the
;
century
Manouba incident aroused all the old diffidence. The Manouba incident, and the greatly increased suspicion
French action in Tunis which was a natural
result of the
of
comment
and
sarily conditioned
by the
Powers into
Italy's
and
Italy's friends.
The
allies,
Italy's allies
remain her
As a consequence the whole European situation is definitely, The Mediterranean agreements conif temporarily, altered. cluded with France and England in 1902, the steadily
improving relations with France, but, above
all,
the un-
For
it
special relations
319
and
by a hard and
camps.
them squarely
in different
It
not too
much
was
in a position to
rival groups,
emphasise
the
and to act as a drag upon any tendency to division. Whether Italy had hitherto
importance of her position
may
on
perhaps be doubted
influence
European
situation.
It
is
particularly
unfortunate
of
by the
No
The
In the nego-
tiations
and
Europe since
actually contrary to
interests.
on the Adriatic,
some
towed
'
320.
The
direction of the
wind
is
clearly shown,
and there
is
may
of
an unquiet
may
of
hinder such a
is
the necessity
North Africa.
may
and
it
rests in the
main with
tradition of
suspicion.
The long
confidence will
more
among
England
and we
if
to the old
new understanding.
B,relHaregil
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Vineyards.
INDEX
Abbott, G. F.,
Tripoli,
The Holy
War
in
atrocities at,
245, 267 n. ; quotation criticised, 246. Abruzzi, Duke of, action at Prevesa,
quoted,
307.
Ain Zara, Italian advance on, 104 position of, 106, 107 ; results of
;
occupation
at,
of,
132, 133
battle
of,
Bardo, Treaty of, 10. Barouni, Suleiman el, influence on Arab forces, 216, 219, 225, 267, 272; defeat and flight of 321, 322. Benghazi, fighting at, 55, 58, 322. battle of the Two Palms, 136, 190-201 ; strength of Turkish
,
army
at,
199.
105-107
criticism
of, 107-109, 123. Algeciras Conference, the, 16, 307. Amari, Colonel, at Ain Zara, 104 ; advance to Gargaresh, 126. Ameglio, Major-General, at Benghazi,
Besozzi, Colonel, at
BirTobras, fighting at, 114-116; gallantry of troops, 118; an incident at, described, 238, 239. Bismarck, letter to Mazzini, quoted, 4.
Bluntschli,
brilliant action
authority
on
interna-
terrorised, 137.
Arab warfare,
102, 103.
Boers, 108
Bomba, landing
Briccola,
compared with bravery at Sidi Bilal, 184, 185 ; bravery in Cyrenaica, 193-195, 197, 201, 204-206 ; bad
forces, mobility
;
shooting of, 95, 98, 163. Askaris, native troops, description of, 143, 144. Assaba, Italian victory at, 322.
of troops at, 208. occupation of General, Benghazi, 55-58 ; employment of blockhouse system, 165 appointed governor of Cyrenaica, 176, 202 ; at battle of Two Palms, 200, 201; work compared with that of
;
Brunialti,
15.
la
Questione
Coloniale,
quoted,
14,
Bu
Meliana, fighting
68
at
Kasr-el-
by
aviators,
to,
way
324
Camerana, General, return from Ain Zara, 144, 145 at Zanzur, 157
;
fighting at, 64, 65, 66, 67, 100, 103 ; position abandoned, 68, 91 ; result of retreat from, 92 ;
of,
importance
101.
91, 92
retaken,
Camperio, Signor, 13. Caneva, Lieut. - General, Governor and Commander-in-chief of Tripolitania, v, vi ; appointed gover93, 109, 121, 131 seq., 157, 160 ; at battle of Zanzur, 157-160 ; criticism of, 165,
nor,
;
53
policy
of,
attitude
criticised,
226-228
219,
work
in
Tripolitania,
;
relations 220, 227, 228 with government, 223. Capello, General, 207. Carpeneto, General, at battle of Zanzur, 159. Carthage, s.s., seizure of, 315 effect of seizure, 316, 317. Castoldi, Captain, 141. Caux, peace negotiations at, 177. Chaurand, General De, occupation of Gargaresh, 128 at battle of Zanzur, 160, 165; at battle of Sidi Bilal, 179-181. Cholera. See Sokra and Tripoli. Corti, Count, at the Congress of
; ;
310-313. Enver Bey, influence on war in conduct of Cyrenaica, 191, 192 fighting at Derna, 197, 198 ; disabled at Derna, 199. 225, 226. Eredia, Professor Filippo, Monografie e Rapporti Coloniali, 298 n. Europe, attitude to Italian occupa;
tion
of
Tripoli,
1-4,
8,
11,
14-
302, 305 seq.; influence of hostility to Italy, 305, 306 ; false reports circulated in, by Turkey, 272-275.
18, 92, 215, 222,
Fahreddin Bey,
Berlin, 6.
Crispi, Francesco,
Memoirs of Fran-
177. Fara, Major-General, gallant resistance at El Hanni, 65 ; expedition courage to Bir Tobras, 114-121 of, 119, 238; at Gargaresh, 127;
130
at Misurata, 171.
Faravelli,
Cyrenaica, explorations in, 13, 297; slave trade in, 32 military opera;
tions in,
189
of,
sources
211.
ment
of,
298-301.
of,
;
inhabitants
character
of,
hostility
towards
Derna, bombardment and occupation of, 53, 54 Arab revolt at, 192; fortification of, 193-195; difficulties of country near, 202 fighting round, 192-199, 201-205
;
129, 130.
value of victory at Kasr-el-Leben, 205 great carnage at, 205, 206 Turkish report of fighting, 206, 207. Dilke, Sir Charles, quoted, 6.
;
Gargaresh, construction
line
to,
;
124;
INDEX
ing at, 126, 127, 159, 160
fication of, 129.
;
325
236, 240, 242, 244; physique officers of, 250241, 248
;
forti-
of,
Garioni, General, expedition to Ras Makabes, 152-154 ; at Sidi Said, 168, 169 ; advance to Sidi Ali, 171, 172; advance to Regdaline,
252
organisation,
253
Red
174; report quoted, 175. See Italy, army of, Gavotti, Lieut. work of Aerial Fleet. Germany, policy in North Africa,
33-36, 306, 307.
Cross and medical staff of, 257, 258. European powers, relations with, 305-320.
Government
of,
criticism
of,
Ghadames, occupation
Gheran,
171.
of,
321.
at,
Oasis
of,
fighting
Ain at Giardina, Major-General, Zara, 104 ; at Zanzur, 158. Giolitti, Signor, 19, 228, 274 n. Granville, Lord, quoted, 6. Gregory, Dr. J. W., 298.
Halim, Prince Said, 177. Hamid, Abdul, deposition of, 310. Horns, bombardment and occupation fighting at, 135, 136, 155, of, 54
;
221, 267-270. Navy, ships employed, 41, 42, 45; work of. 209 ; Austrian influence on naval action, 214, 215. People of, attitude to war, 136, 221, 223, 229-232. ,Policy of, criticism of, 210 seq. Prestige of, 147, 223, 224, 269. Tripolitania, reasons for occupation, 4-16, 27, 37 ; formal annexation of, 221, 222 ; unpopularity of Italian occupation, 275. Tunis, attitude towards French occupation of, 4, 5. Turkey, strained relations with, 17-20; ultimatum delivered, 21-
166, 167.
23
war
declared,
26,
27
96
n.
James,
Tripoli,
Major
Lionel,
special
army
of,
disposition of forces
after
landing in
61
after revolt
and
arrival of re-
inforcements,
93,
94
unfair
correspondent, Times, October 28, 1911, quoted, 65, 66, 237-238. Jehad or holy war, 266. Jebel, railway to, 131 ; difficulties of advance to, 224.
238, 240, 241, 245-248 ; fighting capacity of, 65 relations with Arabs, 90, 91, 97, 98, 138, 276 ; charges of brutality refuted, 75-89, 246-248 ; organisation against cholera, 90, Aerial 91, 140, 141, 254-257
; ;
Karamanli,
51, 141.
Hassuna Pasha,
50,
Fleet,
work
of,
and machines
Kasr-el-Leben, occupation of, 203strength of Italian forces 205 at, 204. Kipling, Rudyard, Soldiers Three, quoted, 79. Koefia, fighting at, 194.
;
132, 134, 147, 242-244; commissariat organisation, 175, 253, 254 ; Intelligence Depart-
Launay,
71.
M.
de,
report
quoted,
at,
Lausanne,
177.
secret
negotiations
ment, 186, 187 general character of, 234, 240, 241, 244, cheerfulness and 247, 252 ; bravery under difficulties, 234;
Treaty of, 188, 225, 302. Lebda, birthplace of Emperor Septimus Severus, 155, 284.
326
Lequio,
at
Nalut, 321, 322. Lieber, Dr. Francis, 74. Lombardia Redoubt, construction of,
;
Pecori-Giraldi,
General, at Ain Zara, 104, 105, 107 ; criticism of, 108, 119, 120; expedition to Bir Tobras, 114, 116; cause of recall
to Italy, 116; his defence of Bir Tobras expedition, 116, 118, 121.
195
Luiggi,
See Italy,
army
of,
work
of Aerial Fleet.
Poincare, President,
Italy, 316-318.
relations
with
sunk
s.s.,
off,
42.
Manouba,
effect,
seizure
of
and
its
316-318.
Penetration,' 16.
Marsa Bu Sheifa, landing of troops and occupation of, 167. Mathuisieulx, H.-M. de, La Tripolitaine oVhier et de demain, 284 n., quoted, 289, 290, 294 285 explorations in Tripoli, 286 A
; ;
Ragni, General, assumes command in Tripolitania, 176 ; at battle of Sidi Bilal, 178-187 ; instructed
to cease offensive operations, 188. Rainaldi, Major-General, Ain at
4.
Zara, 104, 105, 107, 108 ; at Zanzur, 158, 159, 161. Ras Makabes, landing of troops and
fighting at, 152-154. Regdaline, advance to, 175. Reisoli, General, 155
fight-
173,
174,
169-171 importance
;
170.
trial of, 70,
See Italy, Moizo, Captain, aviator. army of, work of Aerial Fleet. Montruss, Italian victory at, 322. Montuori, General, at Battle of Zanzur, 160 and ra., 161. Morocco, crisis, 2. Munir Pasha, 42.
vigorous appointed Governor of Derna, 202. Remond, Georges, 267 n. Reval, Admiral Thaon de, demands surrender of Tripoli, 42. Rhodes, occupation of 156. Ricci, Rear-Admiral Borea, assumes
;
work
at
governorship of
53. Riley,
Tripoli,
50, 52,
W.
F.,
82
n.
Nabut, advance
to,
321.
Naby Bey,
177.
;
Neshat Bey, 42
Roberti, Lieut. See Italy, army of, work of Aerial Fleet. Rohlfs, M., famous explorer, UExploratore, quoted, 12.
Said Pasha,
fall of
ministry, 177.
Salisbury,
309.
INDEX
Salsa,
327
38-40
at, 38,
;
Major-General,
at
Tripoli,
Civil
his
Com-
mandant
at
from, ships
arrival
;
of
battleof,
39
of
blockade
;
40;
Signor,
expedition
and
11.
44 bombardment of, 45 evacuated by Turkish troops, 46, 48 occupation by Italian sailors, 48 disarmament of Arabs at, 48, 49 occupation by General Caneva, 54, 55 ; fighting at, 62, 63 position and description of, 60, 61, 123, 124 outbreak of cholera at, 96,
;
42
flight
inhabitants,
Sharashat, position
of,
66, 69.
159
revival of commerce at, 140, 220 122, 138, 139, 142, 143; plans for construction of port, 124, 139; improvement of sanitation at, 140,
;
161
Bilal,
battle
of,
178
seq.
strength of Italian army at, 179 ; strength of Turkish and Arab forces at, 180, 181, 184. construction of Messri, 69 railway to, 123. Said, fighting at, 168, 169; result of action at, 172, 173. Sliten, pretence of landing at, 135.
;
development of city, 139, ; construction of wall at, 141, 142 156. Tripolitania, described by Rohlfs, 12 ; explorations in, 13, 286, 287 ;
141
;
Turkish misgovernment of, 30-32, difficulties 271 of occupation, 277-281 progress of pacification in, 281, 282 Roman remains in,
; ; ;
155, 283, 284, 290 ; description of country, 284, 285, 292 ; possibilities
of
development
in,
285,
Smith, Captain, 284 n. Sokra, outbreak of cholera in, 91. Suk-el-Juma, reported massacre
86.
286
at,
in,
292-295.
Tajura,
conat,
Arab population of, character of, 72, 190, 263-265 rising of, attitude towards 73 69, 70,
; ;
Tarhuna,
murder
of
resident
281. Tassoni, General, at Tuara, 173. Tilger, Dr., German Consul, 40, 43, 48, 211, 213. Times. See James, Major Lionel.
editor
Tittoni,
of, vi.
Signor,
relations
with
151,211, 266-268, attitude towards Turkey, 272 72, 168, 265, 266, 267-269. Trombi, General, 202. Tunis, French occupation of, 4-8 ; importance of, 150. Turkey, fleet of, 215, 216. Germany, reported negotiations
212, 219,
220,
225,
France, 316. Tobruk, occupation of, 46, 47, 208 ; possibilities as naval base, 208. Tommasoni, General, at battle of Sidi Bilal, 180, 181, 186. Tremiti, deportation of Arabs to,
67.
with, 35.
Italy, relations with, 17-21 ; reply to ultimatum, 24-26 ; declaration of war, 39 ; reluctance to end war, 176, 177. policy towards Arabs, 73, 112, 113, 177, 187, 270, 281.
Triple Alliance, 5, 14, 16, 307, 310. Tripoli, departure of Italian subjects
Tripolitania,
misgovernment of,
30-32, 271.
328
Turkish array in Tripoli, defective ammunition of, 46 ; abandonment disposition of forces of Tripoli, 46 at Azizia, 122 ; losses at Zanzur, 160-162 ; lack of co-ordination in,
;
Turk
of ,
Party,
;
power, 19, 29
government
Zanzur, reconnaissance
jected occupation
164; organisation
of,
176, 177.
to, 67.
112 ; pro134, 145 ; Turkish severity at, 147, 148. battle of, 157-161 ; results of,
of,
162
at,
163, 164
;
Italian
losses
losses
at,
at,
de-
162
Turkish
160-
Wady
bank
Derna,
of,
192, 193 ; difficulty of country round, 192, 198. Wady Mejnin, overflow of, 96, 97.
162. Zuara, projected landing at, 134, 145, 152 ; difficulties of landing failure to land at, at, 149, 150 151; reasons for occupation of, 150, 151, 173, 174; reconnaissance at, 151 ; pretended attempt to land at, 152, 153 ; occupation
;
Wood, John
Q., 92.
of,
173.
DT
23*+
Ml6