Ontological Innovation in Art Author(s): AMIE L. THOMASSON Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.

68, No. 2 (SPRING 2010), pp. 119130 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40793231 . Accessed: 01/04/2014 03:13
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AMIE L. THOMASSON

inArt Innovation Ontological

ofart?Whendoes is a work ofa thing What sort when is itdama work ofartcomeinto existence, and whenis it deaged,whendoes it survive, to it and are essential features Which stroyed? can that sort of Is it the which thing expendable? and Los Angeles, be seenbypeopleinCleveland, or do you have to at thesame time, Singapore tosee it? location to a unique travel theontology Theseareall questions regarding ithere, ofart.As I shallunderstand ofthework ofartis fundaofa work status" the"ontological andpersisfixed identity, mentally byitsexistence, ofobject fix what these tence conditions; category as be facts other it is. In fixing these, may fixed is observa work where when and well, including or areessential ofthework able,what properties with its interfere ofchange sorts what accidental, andso on. preservation, to havebeenproposed answers different Many ofthe status is theontological 'What thequestion a work that from claims Theserange work ofart?' must be is a physical ofart (which, perhaps, object and at a particular seen"inperson" particplace itsvisible with andpreserved ulartime properties itisnota physical that toclaims tosurvive), intact ora anaction atall,butrather (ofan artist) object who those to Sartre) (with type ofaction, general distinct ofartas imaginary ofworks think objects oractivities.1 from anyrealobjects is Othershave doubtedthata singleanswer diftheanswer seemthat Itmight available.2 may which a painting, art(say, ofvisual for a work fer at thesametime, all see "intheflesh" we cannot and which if we are in different cities, maybe of forms other fire or suffer in a burnt physiup we can anda symphony cal degeneration) (which cities at thesame in different all hearperformed does notreburnup,which which cannot time,

still seem itmight Nonetheless, restoration). quire are fairly thattheanswers easy to comeby for of art-separating branches thesedifferent out, from say, paintings symphonies. we difficult more become Butthey againwhen evenifwe forms ofart-for, lookat morerecent it seemsthat to thevisualarts, limit ourinterest to of diverse is an evermore there range answers with. Some we like those works, began questions weredelikeLiz Magor'sTimeand Mrs.Tiber, itsdegenerative to decayto be left prosigned ofthework is part (ina wayitis notwith gression Simhowever traditional destructible).3 paintings, in Walead that cracks and the appear chips ilarly, do Fed Ex LargeBox during shipping Beshty's toit. areintegral butinstead thework notdamage arepermitwalldrawings, likeSol LeWitt Others, in differdifferent tedto be installed painters by so that visualformswith entmuseums, varying is inessential. features surface again preserving likeFelixGonzalez-Torres's works Forother still, basisat no continuous there is Untitled, physical that thecandies tosurvive: thework for allneeded tobe eatenbyviewaremeant makeup thework while thework be replaced andmay ers, persists.4 these can shakeus out like cases Considering at leastif thatin thinking of our complacency of art, branches to particular we limit ourfocus ofart abouttheontology artvisual questions say, instead answers. haveeasyorobvious They might what is it question: pushus backtoaskthedeeper as count what that determines does,anddoesnot, doesanddoes when a work ofart, ofa work part as damage, whatcounts notsurvive, destruction, restoration? preservation, view forthegeneral I haveargued Elsewhere conand persistence thattheexistence, identity, and of paintings, ditions symphonies, sculptures,

2010 68:2Spring andArtCriticism ofAesthetics TheJournal for Aesthetics 2010TheAmerican Society

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120 otherfamiliar kindsof art are, at bottom,establishedstipulatively by the beliefsand practicesof those who groundand regroundthe reference of the relevantsortalterms.5 I willbeginby givinga briefoverviewof the generalkindof answerI've argued for.But the purpose of this articleis to discuss an interesting consequence thatfalls out of thatview,namely, thatthereis no set answer to thequestionof theontologicalstatusof a work of art; instead,it may varyover place and time, and worksof art of ontologically new kindsmay be introduced. Showinghow worksof art of onnew kinds can be introducedis itself tologically as revealing, it once again willgive supportto the generalidea thatsuchfactsas thereare about the ontologicalstatusof worksof art are, at bottom, determined and practices.6 by humanintentions
I. THE ONTOLOGY OF ART KINDS

The Journal of Aestheticsand Art Criticism tionof thecanvas,whether worksofmusicshould be understoodas being created and so as coming into existenceat a certaintime,or ratheras Platonistic and so on. abstracta, I do not have the space to argue again Though forthatview here,the basic idea is thatwhenwe ask questionsabout theontology ofartlike 'when does a paintingsurvive?' and 'must a novel be created?' we are using termslike 'painting'and 'novel.' So we can rephrasethequestionas asking what (ontological) sortof thingthe terms'painting' and 'novel' pick out. But giventhe qua probto referto a great lem,we could at least attempt different sorts of things with many (ontological) we could intendour term any termwe introduce; to referto the physicalmarkson the surfaceof the canvas, to the three-dimensional object with a certainweight, to the (replicable) visualpattern on its surface, to the kind of techniqueor action used to produce it,to the space on the wall, and so on.8The question'whatsortof thing is a painting?' forexample,is onlyanswerableto theextent thatthewaythereference ofthetermis grounded the ontologyby (and regrounded)disambiguates thegeneralkindor category ofentity determining thatthe termis to refer to ifit refers at all. The needed disambiguation, I have argued,is as as the terms in provided long question('painting,''novel,'and thelike) are genuinesortalterms. A sortaltermis a termthatcomes withsome basic rulesofuse oftwokinds:first, basic application out relevantconconditions, laying conceptually ditionsin which'painting'maybe successfully apexistence conditions forpaintplied (thusyielding conditions ings),and second,basic co-application thatgiverulesfordetermining whentheterm may be reapplied to one and the same thing(yielding conditionsfor paintings).9 The applicaidentity tion conditionsand co-applicationconditionstoconditions forpaintings.10 gether yieldpersistence on thisviewthemostbasic factsabout So, in short, theontology ofpaintings (theirexistence, identity, and persistence conditions)are determined bythe and conditions associapplication co-application ated withthesortalterm'painting.'11 One consequence of this view is that debates about the ontological status of even traditional sortsof art-worksof music,painting, literature, and so on- mustin some sense be resolvedby analyzingthe conceptsof thosewho groundand reof the term.But the sense groundthe reference of "conceptual analysis" at issue here has to be

Whatis itthatdetermines whatdoes and does not countas partof a workof art,whena workcomes into existence,when it does and does not survive,whatcountsas damage,destruction, preserWe can ask this question in vation,restoration? two ways: usinga familiar art-kind termsuch as we 'novel,' or 'symphony,' 'painting,''sculpture,' can ask what the ontologicalstatus of paintings (say) is, what theiressential properties, identity, and survival and so on, are. Or we can conditions, use a name or singulartermfor a work of art, asking:whatis theontologicalstatusof Guernica, of Haystacks, or of Timeand Mrs. Tiber,Fed Ex Large Box, and so forth. Most of thediscussionin the literature thusfar has concernedart kinds.Here I will begin with thatquestion,and thenmove on to the more difficultsecond question. I have argued elsewhere thattheontological statusofpaintings, sculptures, and otherfamiliar kindsof art is, at symphonies, established and bottom, stipulatively bythebeliefs practicesof those who groundand regroundthe reference of the relevantsortalterms.7 Establishingtheontologicalstatusof worksof a givenhind is a matterof determining the most basic conditionsunderwhich worksofthat kindcome intoexor are istence, These,ofcourse, persist, destroyed. are the sortsof featuresthatenterinto common debates about, for example, whetherworks of paintingare physicalobjects or abstractpattern typesor actiontypesthatcan survivethe destruc-

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Thomasson Innovation inArt Ontological

121

Theuseof orthelike. of orabstract For the determination understood structures, types, carefully. notlead us to sup'art'should term terms seemsto be esthecommon reference of ourcommon kind must be a single there or phrases pose that notbylittle tablished ontological pictures mostly works of art.14 to all in the heads of common entertained competent explicitly concluto theinteresting who Thatleads,in turn, ofthose butrather bythepractices speakers, be moreontoanddealwith theobjects, usetheterms including sion thattheremayin principle of artthanare recognized to weconsider a work under which theconditions byus as logicalkinds artkinds andnamedbyourfamiliar be ourfamiliar a painting be observable may (as,for example, have differIf different cultures terms. of art-kind a performance at themuseum, month seenthis anddifferart-kind terms ent while be heard work a musical category-specifying only, tonight may that andevaluative inany ofthree be heard itself thework go practices major entindividuative may there it when we consider this cities these, maybe correspondingly alongwith month), anynight of art.15 It also leaves kindsof works different a fire to be destroyed mayde(as, forexample, kinds new works of the idea that what we not a but a ontological open symphony), stroy painting tradition. within an artistic to be saleableand moveable consider (thework maybe introduced works toitorcopiesofit),andso on.These But whatmakesit possibleto introduce versus rights deterandwhat newkinds, ofartofontologically with theuse co-evolve which naturally practices, status of theseinnovative minestheontological and terms like'painting' art ofcategory-specifying playthecorerolein disambiguating works? 'symphony,' ofart ofworks ofthekinds status theontological and in refer to (bothin language we commonly andso (I havear- II. THE ONTOLOGY OF THE INDIVIDUAL WORK with ourother them), dealings ofworks status the out ontological figuring gued), needto answer we first thisquestion, must kinds ofartofthese go bywayofanalyzing To answer theontological of whatdetermines aboutand deal- thequestion in talking involved thepractices workof artbelongs So we havehere kindan individual ofthesekinds.12 works to,since ingwith be there could show how to we couldthen of status ofthings theontological onwhich a view hope I think kind. new work of a a first intenhuman kindis determined therelevant ontological by from be madeifwestart kind ofa certain tions andpractices again may (understand- someprogress canshedon casesandsee what states familiar mental notas private they light ingthoseintentions cases. our normative theunfamiliar availablethrough butas publicly status of an about theontological To in terms and in and inquire practices applying refusing of must have some of art we work individual or the same works as different, way buyable, treating orelsewecannot toit, andso on). posethequestion moveable, sellable, referring terms ofgeneral at all. Butjustas thereference and nouns aresortal Butnotall general terms, mustbe disand 'symphony' status suchas 'painting' abouttheontological so notall questions in to engage so similarly of Gs (whereG is a general byspeakers, noun)are answer- ambiguated about its toa work reference forexample, able.A nounsuchas 'gift,' (andinquire mayfail singular itis whois referring whoever to youmight ontological as mygift to be category status), specifying, ofthing sort what establish to itmust or a newhaircut, to thebeach, a trip be a T-shirt, ontological to bythename(or other the is to be referred foryou.It seemsthat a poemI havewritten singustatus abouttheontological in larterm). of art'is like'gift' term 'art'or 'work Questions generic work 'workof art'appearsnotto be cat- ofan individual thisregard: (likethoseaboutartkinds) that to theextent answers havedeterminate sinceit is appliedindifferentlyonly specifying, egory of the reference and who those to physical individuals, reground ground performances, processes, in determining theanswers determine and so on. It is perhaps theterm works ofmusic, abstract refers iftheterm istobe named ofthing what sort DavidDavieshas that hasledtowhat this feature at all. ofontological calledthe"orthodoxy pluralism."13 term So ifweusea singular thenit If 'art'is indeednotcategory (a namelike'Guerspecifying, like'thatwork nica' or 'David,' or an indexical must be that there toassume be misguided would sort of what establishes ofart-that ofart'),what kind for all works a single ontological ontological thread In least one central to? at it refers or actionbe must all,say, thing objects, really physical

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122 artif actual of usage, we use 'art' as an essentially artif actual termis one wherean essentially term, for whichany memberof the kind must be the to create thatverysortof productof an intention in to refer to thatworkof So object.16 attempting art, or to Guernica,we generallymean to refer to the artistintentionally to the entity created,17 to. In short, referto whateverthe artistreferred the public use of names for works of art (such as 'Guernica' or 'David') generallydefersto the and so outthework, artist's original wayofpicking the artist is aptlyconsideredthe grounderof the name's reference.18 (Even if the artistdoes not her work a clearly give proper name, she fairly refers to her workin considering it, it,reworking it, and so on. Issues of referencein presenting thought parallelthoseforlanguage.)19 But how does the artistestablishwhat sort of to (singularly) thingshe refersto, in attempting the reference refer to her workof art? Normally, of names is ontologically disambiguated by treatingthename as a name fora certainsort(or more ofthing (forexample,fora perbroadly, category) and so on). As I have son,place,holiday, highway, suggestedabove, however,'art' and 'artwork'are so treating a name not category-specifying terms, as a name fortheworkof artherewillnot disamto which ofentity biguatetheontological category the name refers. Instead,artists normally disambiguatethe reference of our names forworksof art by treating these as names forcertainsortsof works-forex'Guernica' to be a painting name, ample,intending 'David' to be a sculpture name,and so on. In that of case theartist mayrelyon thegeneralpractices the community thatestablishwhat (ontologically is and dance, or symphony speaking) a painting, and perthusset up the broad existence, identity, sistenceconditionsforthe work she creates and establishessingular reference to.
III. UNFAMILIAR KINDS OF ART

The Journal of Aestheticsand Art Criticism ical formof the Internet(as itselfnot spatially aclocated,but created,changeable,and multiply ofnew ontological cessible) makestheemergence ina waythatotheradvances ofartlikely categories in technology (forexample,the adventof acrylic paints) did not. Given the newnessof the matesome examples, rial,perhapsitis bestto beginwith willnotprovidean exhausthecases surely though tive list of kinds (or potentialkinds) of Internet art. Thomsonand Craighead's(1998) Triggerhappy sets up a traditionalgame of Space Invaders, where the invadingforce,however,is not aliens but rather thewordsof Foucault'sessay "What Is an Author?"-wordswhichmay be shot to oblivion one by one, ifyou can get thembeforetheir Anotherwork,Jane squiggly"bombs" get you.20 Prophet,Gordon Selley,and Mark Hurry'sTechnosphere,allowed users to design virtualcreaand tures,which inhabit a virtualenvironment over the compete for survivaland reproduction in terms While therewas consistency long term.21 of the ofthevisualstyle, and rules, goals game,the actual content of whatappeared on users'screens was vastlyvariable based on the strategiesand skillsof the participants. Other works of Internetart seem to have no but ratherare apconsistent contentwhatsoever, plied to do thingsto other Websites (chosen by the vieweror arbitrarily selected). Mark Napier's Web page forexample,takesanyextant Shredder, a shreddedverand virtually "shreds"it,yielding A workbyMark Daggett,Carsion of thepage.22 nivoreIs Sorry(2001), tracksa user's visitswhile thenemails himor her a "postcard" Web surfing, withan imagecomposedbycompressing and blurlines versions of all the Websites into vertical ring he or she has visited.23 In cases like these,thereseems to be no great how worksof thesenew typesmaycome mystery of intoexistence. In traditional cases,thegrounder a name's reference maytreatthe name as a name kindo art(painting, fora member ofa recognized the forthat and on dance) rely practices sculpture, artkindto providetheontological disambiguation to. Whatseems of thekindof thing to be referred in thesortofcases justoutlinedis to be happening work thatthename used to refer to theindividual is associated with a different ontologicalkindThus,for familiar, thoughnot fromthe artworld. and 'Technoexample,the names 'Triggerhappy' sphere'seem to be names forvideogames (which

But what about cases in which the name is not artkind,with used to refer to a workof a familiar establishedindividuative practicesin thecommuthe onthatcan be appealed to disambiguate nity to? A wontologicalstatusof the work referred derfulrange of examples arises in the area of Internetart,since here the practicesare just in the process of emerging, and the very ontolog-

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Thomasson O ntological Innovation in Art are art),so thattheindividuative suitable practices for intoplayto computer gamesare tacitly brought the reference help disambiguate (just as thosefor are invokedforthe name 'Guernica'). paintings 'CarnivoreIs Sorry'and 'Shredder'seem to be namesfora certainkindofprogrampresumably, like othercomputerprogramssuch as Microsoft Word and Adobe Photoshop,at least in part individuated in terms of their functionalcapacities and origin.By usingthese as names forproappeal to grams(whichare art), thereis implicit theindividuative conditions suitableforcomputer and these conditionscan tacitlysupprograms, and persistenceconditionssuitable ply identity forthese worksof art. In cases like these,then, whatwe have is new ontologicalkindsof art beingcreated,butnotnewontologicalkindsofthing kind simpliciter beingcreated.Instead,a familiar or is introof entity (a computergame program) duced as art.

123

the Internet surfer's highlights experienceof time in a workthatscrollsphrasesacrossthescreenexwithcomments like 'You, you slowly, cruciatingly must be bored?' or only visuals, as in the case of a work by Jodi (Joan Heemskerk and Dirk Paesmans) entitled "Index.html" (1996), which providesscreensof unstableimages of code and color, seeminglyturningthe Web "inside out" to bringthe base-structural code to the surface and suppress any user-friendly recognizableimlinks(linksmaystillbe found, ages or signposted but clickingon themjust reveals more pages of odd visual displays).25 of readymades, Drawingon the tradition using found objects as art, other Internetartistshave made works based on linking, or othframing, erwise highlighting extantmaterialon the Web. Alexei Shulgin'sArtMedal (1995-1997) selectsa rangeof externalWebsites, presentsthese virtual themin gold,listing "prizes"as foundart,framing "grounds"forthe award (for example,"For correctuse ofpinkcolors,""For sincerity") and someIV. NEW KINDS OF ART timesappendingpieces of "foundcriticism" from other sites.26 most of the links are bronow, By on themyieldsonlya framed But thereare othercases where such easy soluken,so thatclicking version of the "This page cannot be displayed" tions are not available- where it does not seem that the name is a name for somethingof any message. and What determinesthe existence,identity, familiar ontologicalkind. Below are some other art where the termsdo not persistenceconditionsfor works such as these? examples of Internet If we employ a name such as 'Index.html'and familiar art to worksofeither seem to be referring ask what the ontological status of this work is, kindsor familiar kindssuchas computer gamesor in treating that as a name for a work of art,we programs. artclearlydrawon exSome worksof Internet normallywould mean to referto the work the but artistreferred to with the name. But the artist of visual art and narrative, istingtraditions (or whoever groundsthe use of the name) canposexploit the nonlinearlinks and interactive the name not disambiguatereference sibilitiesof the Internetto create works with a by treating as a name for a work of a familiarart kind,or distinct structure. Olia Lialina's (1996) work My of another extant kind such as games or proCame Back fromtheWar,forexample, Boyfriend of textand images,the first grams,to provide tacit frame-levelcriteriafor consistsof a mixture and persistencefor the work set of whichappears as a black page witha single existence,identity, came back from created. link line saying,"My boyfriend We could say that withoutsuch background theWar.Afterdinnertheyleftus alone."24Clickone to a page oftwoimagelinks, practicesforan extantkindto relyon, the names ingthelinkbrings on one of thoserevealsfurther are just ontologicallyambiguous,and there are and clicking links, of some no facts of the matter,for example, about the inincreasingly frames, arrays fine-grained and persistenceconditionsof the works of whichreveal images and some text,makinga identity disorienting assemblageof snatchesof conversatheyreferto. But theredoes not seem to be any it as a genuine name fora work tion and views untilat last all are exhausted in way of treating whileconsidering theontologicalstatusoftherefdarkness. Even simerentto be completely indeterminate. Similar works use only text, as in Now Here/Nowhere, by Brighid Lowe (http://www.e- ple discussionof and criticaldiscourseabout the which work relies on some tacitviews about when two 2.org/c-ship/projects/nowhere/apbl.html),

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124 individualsare talkingabout (and perhaps disor interpretation about themerits of) the agreeing and Intersame work.Moreover, museums, artists, netartsitesmustmake decisionsabout thecondior pretionsunderwhichthey can claimto exhibit servethework, whichrequiressome assumptions underwhichtheworkwould and about conditions would not be observableand would or would not persist.In short,if the ontological status of the were reallyleftcompletely referent ontologically as a the termcould not function indeterminate, standardworkname at all. As a result, thereis a need forontologicaldisand insofaras the reference of the ambiguation, name cannot be disambiguatedby associatingit witha familiar conkind,boundariesand survival ditionsfortheworkmustbe establishedby other means. This may be done more or less explicforexample,the artist stipulate itly; mayexplicitly her work. the relevantconditionsforpreserving cuThus,forexample,one of the mostimportant ratedWebsitesof Internet includes art,Rhizome, a lengthy "Artist's Intent"questionnaire forartists theirwork-askingartistsabout what submitting theysee as the essential featuresof theirwork and how it is to be preserved.In it, theyoutline diversestrategies forpreserving worksofInternet artinspiteofanticipated changesin hardwareand software:

The Journal of Aestheticsand Art Criticism

may not) be essential to a work of Internetart, visual (or auditory)appearance,timing, including interactivand motion(as inNow Here/Nowhere), in and methods (as Index.html), itypotentialities links to other sites (context) (as in ArtAwards), use of hardware or software basis (some works exploit bugs of familiarprograms),and so on. I thinkit is clear that at least many of these works are thingsof different ontological kinds fromthose of traditionalworks-differing from (for example) paintingsin lacking an essential connection to a single physical basis, differing fromnarratives and video in havinga linear order inessential(thoughlinking structures may be like means of interactivessential)whilefeatures Web) ityand context(as partof a fully linked-up may be essential,and so on. It is also interestkinds ingjust how variedthepotentialontological are which may be developed under the general rubricof Internetart- 'Internetart,'like 'art' itterm, self,seems not to be a category-specifying as workswithmanyincompatible sets of identity and persistenceconditionscould fall under this heading.29 But whatI think is particularly here interesting is thatwherewe cannot(tacitly) in participate and kinds) to appeal to extantpractices(forfamiliar a name'sreference, we ontologically disambiguate have to findotherways to specify whichfeatures are to be consideredessentialto the workof art. 1. documentation screen shots) (e.g., In this respect,these cases are in clear contrast 2. migration code) (e.g., updating with cases oftraditional artforms suchas painting, 3. emulation on newplat- where (a wayto runold software practicesmaybe reliedon to make it clear forms) are relevant that,for example,surfacepigments 4. reinterpretation work ordocumen- to thework's (re-creating your and stretcher are preservation strips tation ina newtechnological environment)27 not (at least unlessexplicitly otherwise). specified to cases of other They are,however, quite similar innovative worksof art,suchas Torontologically They thenlay out a series of features, askingthe res's Untitled, whichcomes withexplicitinstrucin artist howimportant itis thateach be preserved tionsallowingthe consumption and replacement or reinterpreting thework: migrating, emulating, of theconstitutive candies. So farI have dealt withthe extremecases on 1. How important is itthat looksthesame your project each end: in cases of traditional itseems, color size, hues, saturation, contrast, painting, (display depth, nothingneeds to be said; our backgroundpraccomposition, etc.)? tices do all the work in fixingwhich features 2. Howimportant isitthat moves thesame your project are and are not part of the work (the front but frames rate, (frame etc.)? persecond, 3. How important is it that your interactivity not the back is to be viewed, the paintingdeproject's thesame(rollovers, userinput, remains links, etc.)?28 grades to the extent that the visible markings on its frontsurface do, and so forth).In cases Thisbeginsto givesome idea oftheapparently of ontologically novel formsof art,it seems that forwhatsortsoffeature the essentialand inessential features and survival open parameters may(or

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in Art Thomasson OntologicalInnovation conditions fortheworkoftenhave to be explicitly stipulated. SherriIrvin'sveryusefulnotionof the "artist's sanction"may,however,enable us to see a unity across these varied cases. The artist'ssanction, on Irvin'sview,involvesthe artist's"publiclyacas delivcessible actions and communications," certain conventions.30 contexts with eredincertain as mundaneas preThese mayinvolvesomething a to a gallery or as novel as senting painting and preserving for instructions installing giving a work. The sanctions,however delivered,"fix the boundaries of [the artist's]work, . . . determine whethera particularfeatureis relevantto . . . establish in what the work's interpretation, genre the work belongs,and, in some cases, . . . has a particuwhether determine it,qua artwork, lar featureor not."31This suggestsa global approach that can cover both the traditionaland cases: thatwhat establishesthe ontoinnovative logical statusof an individualworkis the artist's sanction. worksof art,the artist In cases of traditional to not need explicit:"by presay anything may set of sentinga painted canvas witha particular for instance,the artisttypically visible features, set of visible features sanctionsa corresponding in forthe artwork."32 So, forexample,ifan artist Western of traditional a context presents painting a canvas, framed,withpaint on the frontto an we can (in the absence art galleryforexhibition, fromthe artist)take of any counter-indications the artistto have sanctioned treatingthis as a features whose relevant traditional (qua painting, whichare work of art) are on the front surface, to be preserved(as far as possible) in the state she estabin whichtheyarrive.Put in myterms, lishesthathername forthework, say 'JonesNo. 5' intendedto refer terms (along withothersingular to thatverywork of art), is to referto a painting,where the ontologicalstatus of paintingsis determined practicesof those by the background in usingthe termand dealingwiththe competent objects. In more innovative cases, where thereare not to relyon (or where conventions suchbackground these are being violated), the artistmay need to moreto make itclearwhatdoes and do something ofherwork, under does notcountas an exhibition and so on. This may what conditionsit survives, forexample,by filling be done ratherexplicitly, in an artist'sintentformlike that on Rhizome

125 to the work (for statement or adding a clarifying be example, Sol Le Witt insiststhat instructions exhibited alongsidehismurals).Or itmaybe done throughactions ratherthan words,as the artist orreject correct displayherself, maysetup thefirst various galleries,make it attempteddisplaysby clear how manyinstitutions maydisplaythework at one time,and so on. In any case, whetherverballyor nonverbally, the artistmay make it clear under what conditions she will accept that her work is (properly) curators about how herwork displayedor instruct is to be displayed(and under what conditionsa displaywould count as the workat all), whether, herworkis to be preserved and ifso,in whatways, and whichneed mustbe preserved (whichfeatures and so on. All notor even mustnotbe preserved), of the ontologiof thisamountsto a specification cal statusoftheworkcreated-whatdoes and does ofit,qua workofart; notcountas a partor feature it is damaged; underwhat underwhatconditions whatcountsas an exhibition conditions itsurvives; of thisverywork;and so on- is all, on thisview, Of course, determined by the artist'ssanction.33 some questionsmay remainunansweredand, as a result,the ontologicalstatus of the work may but that remainin certainregardsindeterminatefromwhat happens in otherareas is no different of ontology.34 of the One aspect of Irvin's understanding however:her artist'ssanctionmay raise worries, be made that the artist'sintentions requirement publiclyaccessible.For suppose (to develop a line of objectionaptlyraised by LindseyFiorelli) that like Liz Magor suddenlydies an innovative artist in her studio. Is it not conceivable that she had just completed a work of art,but she had done so withoutleaving a sanctionthat makes public what was and was not supposed to count as the work,whenitwould and would notsurvive?(Perhaps she writesin herjournal: "I've just finished workto date," and then Static, mymostimportant passes away.) On Irvin's view, withouta public in certain communication (eitherby participating or bymaking conventions established stipexplicit ulations),no sanctionhas been established.For, to estabis not sufficient Irvininsists, "intention lish a sanction"; endowing a work with certain it via a sanctionis like makinga contract: features thatmatis public actions,not privateintentions, ter.35 Yet it does seem naturalto say that there is such work as Static,whichhas certain(even if

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126 and persistence conditions, though vague) identity we maybe unable to tell(from themessleftin the studio) what does and does not count as part of and persistence condithe work,whatitsidentity tions were supposed to be, and so on. Irvincan, of course, allow thatsome works of art may be completed:an artistmay leave behind privately in traditional that(by her participation paintings the conventions of canvas wall paintings)clearly even ifthey have a sanctionedontologicalstatus, itseems neverleave thestudio.But on Irvin'sview, innovativeworkscannot thatmore ontologically existwithout havinga public sanction. One naturaloption is to allow that an actual sanctionis not necessary-that instead it is what the artistsanctionedor (given minimalopportuanotherweek) would have nities,like surviving the ontologicalstatus sanctionedthatdetermines withhow of her work.This,at least,seems fitting case: one we would behave in the hypothetical to figure out whatis and is not can imaginetrying supposed to be part of the work Staticand what to figure out its survivalconditionsare by trying with what is in the studio the on (based along knownhistory, and conartist's communications, would have sanctioned text) what Magor herself regardingit. What the artistwould have sanctionedas counting as partof the work,preserving what she inthe work,and so on, is presumably tobe partofthework, a continuation ofthe tended work. As a result, thisproposal does allow thatnonto fixthe actualized intentions may be sufficient to ontologicalstatusof a work created,contrary Irvin'sinsistence that"intentions thathave never been acted on have no effect on the work's features,"so it is worthexamining whyIrvininsists that the relevantintentions be part of a public sanction.36 One important reason is that she is to distanceherselffromthe probclearlytrying in aestheticslematic formsof intentionalism those thatwould treatan artist'sinparticularly as fixing themeaningor value of a work. tentions theinShe does thisintwoways:first, byrequiring tentions to be public,second,byinsisting (rightly) that her view only entails that the artist'sintentions make a difference to whatfeaturesa work has or does nothave and whenitdoes or does not m short, surviveto whatis the object to be interor value. preted,not to its correctinterpretation But thelatter observation seems sufficient to save her view fromaccusationsof fallinginto unten-

of Aestheticsand Art Criticism The Journal so whyadd the intentionalismable interpretive insistence on publicity? One motivation maybe thatwe do notwantto is relhave to allow thatan artist's mereintention evant to the work'sontologicalstatusifit is kept withpublicpractices. entirely privateand conflicts to us, Thus,we might imaginethat,unbeknownst Mary Cassatt submittedThe Boating Partyto a in theusual way,in thenineteenth-century gallery no artisticcontext,with no special instructions, and complaintsabout its manner of exhibition, but secretlyintending the back of the so forth, canvas to count as partof the workand relevant to its appraisal. In this case it does seem that (despite the supposed intention)the name 'The to a traditional (one-sided) Boating Party'refers painting. But the above proposal- that what the artist sanctioned or (given minimal opportunities) would have sanctioned determinesthe ontological status of the work-does not tell us otherwise. Cassatt,by her actions,sanctionedtreating Nor The Boating Partyas a traditional painting. she mustwe saythat, minimal given opportunities, for would have sanctionedtreating it differently, she had them and did not. In fact,givenher actions in the relevantcontext, we may even deny that she really intendedto sanctiontreating the back as part of the work (just as- regardlessof his avowal- we would denythatJonesdid not intend to insultSmithwhen he called hima sniveling maggot). An idle thoughtor wish does not an intention make,nor are our intentions always revealedto us byintrospection or to othsecurely a perers by avowal. Instead,as in legal contexts, son's intentions must be interpreted against the to backgroundof her behavior (and dispositions behave) withina culturaland conventionalcontext. In short,provided we employ a plausible of intentions, we and sophisticated understanding need notworry about allowingthatwhatan artist intended to sanction or would have sanctioned the ontologicalstatusof may play a role in fixing certainworks,where a publicizedsanctionis not available. In any case, regardlessof whether we say it is actual sanctionor allow thatit is onlythe artist's whattheartist sanctioned or (givenherintentions, that understood)would have sanctioned properly is relevant to determining theontologicalstatusof thekeypointforpresent herwork, purposesis that it is the artist who determines what (ontological)

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in Art Thomasson OntologicalInnovation she has created.Accordingthe artist sortof thing the thisrole does not,however,mean neglecting in determining theonkeyrole ofpublicpractices cases, tologicalstatusofworksofart:intraditional mereparticipation as discussedabove, the artist's in the relevantpracticesof,say,canvas painting to markher workas havingthe idenis sufficient Even of paintings. conditions and persistence tity is in innovativecases, if the artist'sintroduction others may successfuland the work influential, latch onto the new rules (for example,fortreatas perishablesculptures, repeatableand ingthings and the like), and a new variable wall paintings, public practicemay emerge that enables future in it and deferto the to simply artists participate relevantrules of that practice,much as one can traditional deferto the practicesof individuating on canvas. paintings In any case, the veryidea that an artistmay (throughher sanction) determinethe ontological statusof her work and introducean ontologicallynew kind of work of art reemphasizesthe general point I have made elsewhere:that such factsas thereare about the ontologyof worksof or unfamiliar art (whetherof familiar kinds) are, and at bottom,determined by human intentions

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mine the ontologicalstatusof the work without having to investigatewhat the artistsanctioned (or would have sanctioned). what we are doing when we engage But first, in judging that,for example, timingis essential seems to be making a to Now Here/Nowhere would have sancjudgmentabout whatthe artist that tioned,given a certainprincipleof charity: the artistwould have wanted to create the best was workpossible,and thata workwheretiming essentialto it (ratherthan an accidentbased on the speed of my computer) would have greater aesthetic value. So this does not show that an artist's(actual or intended)sanctionis irrelevant to what countsas part of a work,but onlythata thatmay be by way of good routeto determining whatwould make the best charitably interpreting work. also seem to showthatalThese considerations crithoughtheremay not be category-specifying forworksofartas or preservation teriaofidentity frame-level such,theremay be a cross-categorial as a to something invokedwhenwe refer criterion conthatat least a necessary workof art,namely, of the same workof art ditionforthe persistence all or mostof the featureson which is preserving its artisticand aestheticpropertiessupervene.40 practices.37 maybe variousin ontolog(Since theseproperties ical kind,thisis nota category-specific persistence V. ONTOLOGY, INTERPRETATION, AND EVALUATION condition.) But thisapproach does not provide a general the solution to the problem of what determines a to face central is The above view, however, likely to of art. For of a work status inthe artist's consult we need not that interpret ontological objection: of some understanding we mustbeginwith a work, of a publicsanction in theform tentions (whether whatis,and is not,partof thework-or we maygo the ontologicalstatusof the or not) to determine For example,itdoes notseem thatwe outthe workofart;we canjusttellor at leastfigure badlyastray. a worklikeArtMedal independently can interpret of worksof art-even modal and kindproperties linked pages the work,figuring of knowingwhetherthe externally in novel cases- by interpreting be imare partofthework;iftheyare,theworkmight and interpretively out what its aesthetically on theshallow, as a commentary thatthose are tacky interpreted portantfeaturesare, and inferring and materialpresented, of theparticular For example,whatwe are itsessentialfeatures.38 triviality survive the work not that if are the essential for might in, (so they judging timing example, doing selected pages come seems to be determining even when all the originally to Now Here/Nowhere, the are essentialby interpreting what properties up as "This page cannot be displayed"),it might and unstable thetransitory be emphasizing rather those propertiesessential work,and considering in whichcase the bronature of the Web itself, the work's thatare mostcentralto underpinning ken linksreemphasizethis.41 or aestheticvalues- or perhaps to realizartistic (Stallabrass reports articthat the creator of Art Medal, Alexei Shulgin, statement ingwhatDavies calls "the artistic "claims not to mind [about the broken links], This mightbe thoughtto ulated" in the work.39 in the the idea thatthe artist's undermine saying that it reflectswider dysfunction (actual or insanction. . . status theontological determines Net.")42As Irvinputsit,"The artist's tended)sanction featuresof the be said) we can deterof her work-for(it might plays an ontologicalrole in fixing

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128 . . . Insofaras interpretation mustbe reartwork. the artist's sanction to the work's nature, sponsive willplace some indirect constraints on interpretation."43 As a result, we cannotrelyon interpretaforproperinterpretationto determine ontology, tion (and evaluation) of a workof art relies on a ofwhatis and is notpartof properunderstanding thework.44 The Thisleads to a final observation: interesting in the artist's or (actual intended)sanction, fixing boundariesof a workof art(and thusitsontologfacts ical status),does not merelyfixdescriptive about whatis and is not part of the work:it also has modal and normative import. Fixingtheontoof a work of art status goes hand in hand logical its modal features(what featuresare withfixing what sorts of change it essentialand inessential, could and could not survive).Perhaps more inwhat is and is not part of still,fixing terestingly normative features: esthe workalso determines how the workis to be displayed,to be tablishing conserved,and what is and is not to be considand evaluation, ,45 ered relevant for interpretation this is of course not to that the say (Although in any way determines what the properinartist or evaluationofherworkis,onlythat terpretation what counts as the object to-beshe determines interpreted.)46 In sum, then,I have argued thatthe ontological statusof worksof art is, at bottom,fixedby human intentions and practices.The ontological statusof suchgeneral,familiar artkindsas paintand is established ings symphonies by the beliefs and practicesof those who groundand reground the referenceof these general terms.The ontological statusof an individualwork of art is deat bottom, termined, by the artist's(actual or intended) sanction,thoughthere may be quite a wide rangeof cases,from thosein whichthe artist in a rangeofbackground simply participates prackind(as someonejust ticesforworksof a familiar to novel makesa painting and presents it) through and percases whereat least some of the identity sancsistenceconditions mustbe more explicitly But thesevariations should tionedby the artist.47 not obscure the general point that the ontological statusof a work of art is, at bottom,determinedby humanintentions and practices;where leave off,explicitstipulabackgroundpractices tionmusttake over,ifthereare to be ontological factsofthematter at all. And wherenovel criteria forpreservation and identification are sanctioned,

of Aestheticsand Art Criticism The Journal novel kindsmay be worksof art of ontologically introduced.48
AMIE L. THOMASSON Departmentof Philosophy of Miami University Coral Gables, Florida 33124-4670 internet:thomasson@miami.edu 1. David Davies defends theaction viewinhisArt as Per2004). For the actionformance (Maiden,MA: Blackwell, An Ontology see Gregory Currie, of Art typehypothesis, (New York: St. Martin'sPress,1989); for the view that worksof art are imaginary Sartre, objects,see Jean-Paul The Psychology trans. BernardFechtman of Imagination, (New York:Washington 1966). SquarePress, 2. Those others Artand Its includeRichardWollheim, Press, 1980);NelsonGoodObjects(Cambridge University Hackett, man, Languages ofArt(Indianapolis: 1976);Sherri in "The Ontological of Visual Artworks," Irvin, Diversity New Waves inAesthetics, ed. Kathleen Stockand Katherine UK: PalgraveThomson-Jones (Basingstoke, Hampshire, in "The Ontology Macmillan, 2008), pp. 1-19; and myself in TheBlackwell ed. PeterKivy ofArt," GuidetoAesthetics, (Maiden,MA: Blackwell, 2004),pp.78-92. "The Artist's 3. See Sherri Sanctionin ContemIrvin, and ArtCriticism 63 Art,"TheJournal ofAesthetics porary (2005):315-326. in Contempo4. See also Irvin's "The Artist's Sanction Art." rary 5. See my"TheOntology ofArt," and"TheOntology of inAesthetics," ArtandKnowledge TheJournal ofAesthetics and ArtCriticism 63 (2005):221-229. "TheOntology 6. Forfurther defense ofthis idea,see my ofArtand Knowledge in Aesthetics." ofArtand 7. "TheOntology ofArt"and "TheOntology in Aesthetics." Knowledge 8. Fordiscussion ofthequa problem, see MichaelDevitt andKimSterelny, andReality, 2nded. (MIT Press, Language 1999), pp. 79-81, 90-93; and my Ordinary Objects(New York:Oxford Press, 2007),pp.38^4. University 9. See Ordinary Objects, pp.39-42. 10. Forfurther oftherelation between discussion appliandco-application for terms andexistence, cation conditions see Ordinary andpersistence conditions for identity, objects, Objects, pp.55-59. 11. Sortalterms elsewhere [Ordimay(as I haveargued in hierarchies, naryObjects, pp.41-42]) be arranged groupthatall sharethe same ing themintodifferent categories for theapplication conditions conditions (andwhere identity those thecategory are guaranteed to be fulfilled provided of any of the sortaisof thatcategory are)- so, forexamand 'fish'mayall be of suchas 'rat,''kangaroo,' ple,terms and thecategory and terms like'cup,''typewriter,' 'animal,' 'concrete artifact.' Sortais 'house'mayall be ofthecategory conditions thatcome withmutually incompatible identity (as, forexample, 'place,''person,'and 'explosion'do) canto things ofthesamecategory. notrefer 12. Another ofthis kind ofview interesting consequence is thatontological about the existence, questions identity,

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inArt Innovation Thomasson Ontological

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work is Len Baldwin's mu23. A similarprogram-based of a painting, and persistence conditions symphony, from a convenabstracts which have determinate GoodWorld, or workof literature sical performance, progressively tionalsiteso that [w]hatyou see is a real-time answers phantom onlyto the extentthatthoseanswersare tacitly in magenta sketched oftheoriginal of determined squares. representation practices bycompetent speakers'normative in various situations. Whereno them and refusing Most,if not all, of the remaining imageson the page are applying and the textand linksare intoyellow'wrappers' intoour(often answers arebuilt definitive vague)practices, turned a complacent into '*_*' symbolizing examtransformed toquestions for be no answer there happy about, may simply face"(http://rhizome.org/object.rhiz75635). whilea novel words howmany maybe changed ple,exactly 24. http://www.teleportacia.org/war/ while thepaintcolormaydeteriorate orhowmuch survives Internet 25. Stallabrass, be embarWe shouldneither remains. the same painting Art, pp. 36-41. The link is to thesequestions answers rassedby thelack of definitive http://wwwwwwwww.jodi.org/100cc/hqx/i900.html Internet 26. Stallabrass, where ourpracArt, pp. 27-29. The link is into norbullied answers; arbitrary providing determinate http://www.easylife.org/award/ we shouldnotexpect ticesarenotdeterminate 27. http://www.rhizome.org/artbase/policy.htm of Art and Knowlanswers (comparemy"The Ontology 28. http://www.rhizome.org/artbase/policy.htm and and my"Answerable pp. 227-228, edge in Aesthetics," is notto denythattheremaybe an 29. This,of course, ed. David in Metametaphysics, Unanswerable Questions," art" (as Dominic artformsuch as "computer identifiable and David Manley[Oxford J.Chalmers, RyanWasserman, Art[NewYork: inA Philosophy ofComputer Press, Lopes argues University 2009],pp.448^52). of someor mostworks 13. Davies,Artas Performance, Routledge, 2009]) thatmayinclude p. 76. Amongontologin terms of sharedapartforms Internet art.If we unify Wollheim are Richard ical pluralists {Artand Its Objects), features Nelson Goodman{Languagesof Art),SherriIrvin("The Lopes arguesthathaving (forexample, preciative is whatunifies to its appreciation as relevant andmyself ofArtworks"), interactivity ("The OnDiversity Ontological diof computer works ofArt"). art),thentheremaybe ontological tology and persistence of identity, ruleout theidea thatthere individuation, 14. Thisdoes not,however, (in terms versity artform. a single evenwithin conand persistence on identity conditions) maybe some constraints in Contemporary "The Artist's Sanction 30. Irvin, Art," to all worksof art,even if theseare not common ditions a category sufficient to specify p. 315. and,withit,a singleset of in Contemporary Sanction "The Artist's 31. Irvin, sharedby all worksof conditions Art," and persistence identity of art.I discussone suchpossibleconstraintpp.315-316. preservation in Contemporary Sanction "The Artist's 32. Irvin, Art," below. aesthetic propertiesof kinds whatontological 15. And thewayto determine p. 319. Sanctionin Contem"The Artist's 33. CompareIrvin, must are in a givensociety works ofartthere go at leastin embodtheconceptual Art,"p. 319. As Irvinnicely pointsout in another porary system bywayofunderstanding part Artof Contemporary ofthelocalpeopleinnaming, iedinthepractices ("Museumsand theShaping preserving, article 21 [2006]: and Curatorship MuseumManagement certain treats art.(Ifa tribe with their andotherwise works," dealing and otherartinstitutions a "chiap"onlyin a cereas constituting movements (presumably 143-156),museums bodily she does notuse thisexample)may like Rhizome, out to be mistaken thentheycannotturn monialcontext, though theontological roleinestablishing also playan indirect thus them and showing for a chiap, conditions aboutthesurvival forvarioussorts statusof certain at anytime can be made anywhere works, thatthesame motions by askingartists intent rubrics ofclarification, willnotbe counter-evidence.) (like theartist's byproviding difforsanctioning a rangeofoptions thatgivethem 16. See my"Realismand Human Kinds,"Philosophy form) and so on,all ofwhich their ferent 67 (2003): 580-609,at pp. Research work, and Phenomenological waysofpreserving or a kindof to producea sanctionbe addressed Issuesaboutreadymades 592-593. mayprovokean artist byconmay be absent. that wouldotherwise sanctionI willleave creation. a kindofdegenerate selection sidering andUnanswerable 34. See my"Answerable Questions." ofthesecases to one sidehere. discussion further conforexample,consistency There may also be limits, thatthismaynotbe thesame as theobject 17. Noting an artist on whatsortsof conditions tocreate. intended theartist straints, mayimpose. ofinconsistent ofrelated Fordiscussion has madethesimilar Levinson 18. Jerrold ontologiproblems pointthatan to Ontology," see my"The Easy Approach cal conceptions, herwork what at leastdetermine intentions artist's category 19 (2009): 1-15. A Last Axiomathes and Interpretation: belongsto. See his "Intention in Contemporary Sanction "The Artist's 35. Irvin, Art," ed. GaryIseminger and Interpretation, Look," in Intention Press, p. 321. 1992),pp.232-233. University (Temple in Contemporary Sanction "The Artist's 36. Irvin, Art," 19. Of coursethisdoes not precludethe idea thatwe as things p. 321. objectsor objectsintended may"exapt"natural of Art"and "The Ontology 37. See my"The Ontology works of art,and themas constituting treat ofotherkinds, in Aesthetics." ofArtand Knowledge name theseworks.In thiscase, the exaptergroundsthe ofissue this to David Davies for 38. Thanks this I willmostly forthework. oftheterm reference type raising ignore article. ofthis version on an earlier in hiscomments inwhatfollows. complication 39. Davies,Artas Performance, 20. http^/www.thomson-craighead.net/docs/thap.htm pp. 108-112. while 'gift'is not a category-specifying 40. Similarly, Art: The Online Internet 21. See JulianStallabrass, conditions some necessary Clash of Cultureand Commerce(London: Tate, 2003), term, maybe common identity thatitbe givenbythesame forexample, to all tokengiftsp. 147. on thesameoccasion. 22. http://www.potatoland.org/shredder/ personor persons

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130
theroleof an 41. Theseseemto present cases in which of in specifying thecategory and boundaries artist's intent relevant to thework's a workmayalso makeit indirectly and Interinterpretation (compareLevinson's"Intention A Last Look"). pretation: Internet 42. Stallabrass, Art, p. 42. in Contemporary "TheArtist's Sanction 43. Irvin, Art," p. 320. in ContemSanction 44. CompareIrvin's "The Artist's Art," porary p. 320. ofwhatdetheabove understanding 45. Thismaybring ofartintocloser status ofthework termines theontological . . . for with David Davies's viewthat"whatmatters contact in general, is the set of of ... artworks the individuation normative fortheir ("The properappreciation" properties intheOntology ofArt,"TheJournal ofPractice of Primacy at p. 170). 67 [2009]:159-172, Aesthetics and ArtCriticism thatwe mustrecognize Yet I wouldadd twocaveats:first, fix what human beliefs andpractices, at bottom, that properforthework's tiesare normative and,second, appreciation are onlyone normative forappreciation thatthe features a particularly factor one) in determin(although important also statusof a work;otherpractices ing the ontological in exhibition, thoseinvolved comeintoplay, buyincluding

andArtCriticism ofAesthetics TheJournal

and so on. The idea thatsuch restoration, ingand selling, of whatit is to constitutive are partly normative features be a workof artof a givenkindis in linewith Heidegger's to be a thatpartof whatit is, forexample, observations is forit to have object(such as an artifact) ready-to-hand that itis tobe used normative forexample, certain features, andnormaincertain Thefact that modal, ontological, ways. in thiswayis,I think, one that tivefeatures come together in considering the ontolevident maybe made especially ramifications butwhich mayalso haveinteresting ogyofart, ButI willhaveto leave other areasofmetaphysics. through discussion ofthat forelsewhere. inContempo"TheArtist's Sanction 46. CompareIrvin, rary Art," p. 320. ofother forentities 47. Although background practices kinds(like computer may also congames or programs) so that tribute to theontological purestipdisambiguation, forthe and persistence conditions ulationof the identity workto be referred to is seldomrequired. forthis referee 48. Manythanks to an anonymous jourThomsonKatherine Jones, Irvin, nal,David Davies,Sherri Fiorelli and therest Martin and to Lindsey Thomson-Jones, this waspresented oftheaudience atOberlin College(where in February comments or discussion. 2009) forhelpful

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