October 22, 2009

Name, Title and Address

Subject: Finances of the City of Houston

Dear :

Enclosed is our partial analysis of the very serious financial situation at the City of Houston.

We would be derelict if we failed to share this financial analysis with you. This financial heads
up will assist you in meeting your fiduciary responsibilities to Houston voters, taxpayers,
readers, viewers or investors---as the case may be.

We feel a public discussion of the City’s financial situation is necessary and firmly believe that
addressing the City’s financial condition is in the best interest of the Houston economy and
Houston taxpayers. We believe the sooner the City of Houston addresses the financial shortfall
the better.

Please bear in mind that the Houston City elections are on November 3, 2009, with early voting
having commenced on October 19, 2009. Recent history has shown a large portion of voting
occurs during early voting.

We trust that the attached article is of significant assistance to you.

We may be reached at boblemer@sbcglobal.net.

Respectfully,

Bob Lemer, CPA Aubrey M. Farb,CPA Tom Roberts, CPA

Retired Partner Retired Partner Retired Partner
Ernst & Young Grant Thornton Fitts Roberts

CC:
City of Houston---Incumbent Mayor, City Controller, and City Council Members
City of Houston—Non-Incumbent City Candidates
Greater Houston Partnership---Board Members
Houston Chronicle---Editorial Board Members
Houston TV Stations---CEOs
Houston Business Journal---Editor
Houston Community Newspapers-Editor
Houston Press-Editor
Municipal Bond Rating Agencies---CEOs
Wall Street Journal---Editor
Barron’s-Editor
Investor’s Business Daily-Editor
USA Today-Editor
Texas Monthly---Executive Editor
Deloitte & Touche LLP---Houston and New York

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 City Of Houston
Disturbing Financial Facts---October 2009
By: Bob Lemer, Aubrey M. Farb and Tom Roberts

Executive Summary

The City of Houston is financially broke and it appears that the mayor who takes office in
January 2010 may have to captain the City through bankruptcy procedures.

The City’s unrestricted assets were $1.2 billion short of the already recorded
corresponding liabilities these assets were needed to pay as of fiscal year end June 30, 2008,
according to the City’s latest publicly available audited Comprehensive Annual Financial Report
(CAFR). The $1.2 billion shortfall was a result of operating losses totaling $1.5 billion
for fiscal years 2004-2008, applying the full accrual basis of accounting used in the private sector.

Apparently the City has no idea as to what has transpired financially since June 30, 2008 or will
transpire this fiscal year ending June 30, 2010, on the full accrual basis of accounting.

But even on the modified accrual basis of accounting (essentially cash basis) followed by the City
and all other municipalities, the $236.8 million fund balance in the City’s general fund as of July
1, 2009 (the beginning of this current fiscal year) would not exist except for the City having
deposited the proceeds of pension obligation bonds into the City’s general fund instead of
depositing them in their legally required immediate destination, the pension plans’ bank
accounts.

The City is in this dangerous financial position because its total spending since fiscal year 2003
has greatly outstripped its total revenues in that period. And the rate of growth in the City’s
total revenues since 2003 has, in turn, greatly outstripped the City’s rate of growth in population
plus inflation.

Thus the City’s problems are a result of greatly overspending and not a result of
insufficient revenues.

All of this occurred before the current severe recession. Now the City has the added burden of
the recession.

The City is in a real financial dilemma, because now its two principal sources of general fund
revenues are in trouble---sales taxes and property taxes. Sales tax revenues already are
dropping significantly and property tax revenues will commence dropping at an even more rapid
rate after the next annual appraisal and assessment process. And the City will have to go to the
voters for any contemplated rate increases in either the sales tax rate or the portion of the
property tax rate allocable to operations.

It appears to us that there may be no viable alternative to bankruptcy proceedings and

thereby positioning the City to regain control over its overspending, through addressing
structural spending problems such as overstaffing and overly generous employee benefits.

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Following are our detailed findings and observations.

1. The City incurred operating losses (“Change In Net Assets”) totaling approximately $1.5
billion for the five fiscal years ended 6/30/08--- per the latest (fiscal year 2008) publicly
available audited Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR), page 199:
Thousands
a. (312,790)
b. (531,465)
c. (131,893)
d. (221,452)
e. (281,556)
TOTAL (1,479,156) ---or--- $1.5 BILLION

2. The City’s deficiency in unrestricted assets [“Unrestricted (deficit)”] was $1.2 BILLION
($1,174,429 thousands) at June 30, 2008--- per 2008 CAFR, page 15. In other words, the
City’s unrestricted assets were approximately $1.2 billion less than the already recorded
liabilities that they will be required to satisfy.

3. The $1.2 billion deficiency in unrestricted assets as of June 30, 2008 (which was created
essentially during fiscal years 2004-2008-see item 1) was basically financed, per page 15 of the
2008 CAFR, by: (a) the $347,728,000 collateralized note payable to the municipal employees’
pension trust; (b) the $643,413,000 combined accrued liabilities to the employees’ pension
trusts (municipal-$285,462,000, police officers’-$318,567,000, and firefighters’-$39,384,000);
(c) the $219,755,000 pension obligation bonds payable; and (d) the $272,941,000 accrued
liability for other post employment benefits-----less, per pages 17 and 74 of the 2003 CAFR,
(d) the $54,395,000 net accrued liabilities to the employees’ pension trusts at June 30, 2003
(municipal-$92,386,000, police officers’-$19,221,000, and firefighters’-asset of $57,212,000).

4. Thus, as of June 30, 2008, the City’s elected officials essentially had transferred financial
ownership of the City from the taxpayers to the City’s employees, about 43.7% of who do not
live in the City, according to documentation we have received from the City’s human
resources department. Very troubling, 63.3% of first responders (police officers and
firefighters) do not live in the City, versus just 30.0% of civilian employees, according to the
City’s human resources department.

5. The City’s deficiency in unrestricted assets is so severe that in their yet to be completed audit
for fiscal year 2009 the City’s independent auditors apparently will have to address the audit
reporting issue as to whether the City was a “going concern” as of June 30, 2009.

6. Apparently the City has no idea yet as to what its operating loss (“change in net assets”)
was for the fiscal year just ended June 30, 2009 or what its deficiency in unrestricted assets
was at June 30, 2009, and has no idea as to what is in store fiscally for fiscal year 2010. That
is because the City does not keep its books on the full accrual basis of accounting (fully
accruing its assets and liabilities) but once a year, via the audited Comprehensive Annual
Financial Report (CAFR). And the CAFR cannot be completed until the (nearly always very
substantial) annual audit adjustments are booked.

7. In recent years, the City has been taking up to almost a year to issue its annual CAFR.
See Exhibit A. In comparison, the SEC requires that large publicly-held companies, who
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 normally have worldwide operations and much more complex operating and financial
reporting problems than the City, to file their annual complex SEC reports within 75 days
after fiscal year end.

8. The annual delays in issuing the CAFR are due to material weaknesses in internal control
(over the City’s financial accounting and reporting system) that are so severe that the City’s
independent auditors have been issuing professionally required special warning letters
thereon for the last few years. See Exhibit A. The auditors finally discontinued even
bothering to test the City’s system of internal control relative to the last completed annual
audit (fiscal year 2008). This inability to test and thereby partially rely upon the City’s
system of internal control during their audit undeniably causes the City’s outside audit firm
to expand their other “substantive” type audit procedures, at untold extra expense to the
taxpayers.

9. The city controller advised city council in an open meeting in January 2007 that the
internal control weaknesses delaying completion of the fiscal year 2006 CAFR “appear to be
due to a lack of basic accounting knowledge at the departmental level---.” In a meeting Mr.
Lemer had with her, the city controller advised him that City civil service requirements
prohibited terminating those inadequate employees and thus they would have to be retrained.
It seems obvious that one or more of the following situations exist: (a) the existing job
specifications were inadequate; (b) the employees in question did not meet the job
specifications when hired; (c) the employees in question did not tell the truth on their
applications, in which case they should be fired; (d) incompetent management and
supervision exists at the departmental level and perhaps all the way to the mayoral level. The
controller’s comments pertained to the fiscal year 2006 CAFR. Yet the City still continued to
receive annual “material weaknesses in internal control” letters through the latest (fiscal year
2008) completed and publicly reported upon audit.

10. Neither the mayor nor the city controller have revealed to the public the extremely serious
matters set forth in items 1 through 9. These issues are not addressed in the city controller’s
cover letter in the 2008 CAFR (pages vii-xiii). Nor are they actually addressed in the
“Management’s Discussion and Analysis” section of the 2008 CAFR (pages 3-13).

11. The annual audit reports since fiscal year 2003 by the City’s independent audit firm make
no mention whatsoever of: (a) the City’s serious financial condition; (b) the City’s material
weaknesses in internal control; or (c) the exceptionally long delays in the City’s issuance of its
annual CAFR.

12. The municipal bond rating agencies appear to be unaware of, or at least unwilling to
acknowledge and react to accordingly, regarding the serious matters raised in items 1
through 9. According to page i of the 2008 CAFR, both Standard and Poors and Moody’s
Investor’s Services maintained their AA ratings for the City.

13. Although the current mayor, city controller, and each city council member have been advised
by Mr. Lemer of the City’s very serious financial situation, including most of the preceding
information, apparently not one of these individuals has taken steps to advise Houstonians of
the seriousness of the situation, let alone what they intend to do about it.

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14. There is no excuse for the mayor and the city controller not to be fully aware of and fully
comprehend the entire information in this article. They both sign off on the CAFR and the
city controller’s department prepares the CAFR.

15. Giving the other current elected City officials the benefit of possible lack of knowledge of the
existence of the audited annual CAFR, or at least a lack of ability to understand the CAFR,
one can see where their focus has been upon the annual budget and the monthly financial and
operations report (MFOR).

16. The financial picture presented by the 2008 CAFR is greatly more severe than the picture
painted by the City’s annual budgets and the MFOR. That is because the annual budgets
and the MFOR are prepared based upon the modified accrual basis of accounting (essentially
cash basis) prescribed by the accounting oversight body for governmental entities, while the
CAFR is prepared on the full accrual basis of accounting used in the private sector, wherein
all incurred assets and liabilities are accrued and recorded.

17. For example, Exhibit B demonstrates how it was possible for the City to actually show an
audited surplus of $19,891,000 from operations in the general fund (which is the focus of the
annual budget and the MFOR) for fiscal year 2008 when, in reality, the City had an audited
Citywide operations deficit of $281,556,000 for fiscal year 2008.

18. Exhibit B is difficult to comprehend for a person not trained in governmental accounting,
even for a CPA. But the two most significant reasons for the difference between the
$19,891,000 general fund surplus from 2008 operations and the $281,556,000 deficit from
2008 Citywide operations are: (a) the ever-growing accrued liabilities to employees for
pension plans and other post retirement benefits; and (b) the commenced practice of
financing current pension plan expenses with backend loaded pension obligation long-term
bonds.

19. Once one understands Exhibit B, or at least items 18(a) and 18(b), it becomes obvious that the
City’s fiscal 2010 general fund budget is an illusion, for two reasons. First, it is calculated on
the modified accrual basis of accounting (essentially cash basis) and therefore ignores the
ever-growing and enormous accrued liabilities for employee pensions and other post
retirement benefits. Secondly, it is dependent upon continued payment of some of the
pension expenses with issuance of long-term backend loaded pension obligation bonds.

20. In fact, the $236.8 million beginning fund balance of the general fund for fiscal year 2010 is
wholly the result of the $587.5 million of pension bond debt issued for fiscal years 2004-2009
and deposited into the City’s general fund to meet current operating expenses.

21. The whole pension bond situation is very disturbing, for a number of reasons:
a. In late 2003, the Texas state legislature amended the Texas Local Government
Code in order to permit municipalities to reduce unfunded pension liabilities through
issuing pension obligation bonds. This timing basically coincided with the redrawing of
considerably more liberal pension plans approved by the City’s previous mayoral
administration and the City’s three pension plans’ boards, which at that time totally
consisted of City employees.
b. The Texas Local Government Code (Title 4. Finances. Section 107.003.a) now
provides that “A municipality may issue obligations to fund all or any part of an
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 unfunded liability.” There appears to be no cap on the amount of bonds that can be
issued, other than the preexisting total unfunded liability, nor any apparent
requirement for voter approval.
c. Section 107.004 of the Code now states “The municipality shall deposit the net
proceeds of obligations issued under Section 107.003 to the credit of the public pension
fund. The amount deposited under this section becomes part of the public pension
fund’s assets.” However, the City has been depositing proceeds of pension bonds
directly into the City’s general fund and commingling the bond proceeds with other
general fund receipts. Apparently the City is then using the pension bond proceeds to
pay current, rather than past, service costs owed to the pension plans.
d. About 91% of the $587,525,000 principal on the City’s pension bond debt will not
come due until 2021 or later. This backend loading will cause the interest expense to be
$678,568,690 (an exceptionally large 115% of the principal amount) over the life of the
bonds.

22. The commencement of the use of pension bond debt in fiscal 2004 and its rapid increase in
amount has caused the City’s total tax-supported debt to increase 55% from January 1, 2004
until August 31, 2009, date of the City’s last monthly financial report.

23. At June 30, 2008 (date of the City’s last audited financial statements), the City’s total
Citywide debt per capita of $5,338 was over twice the $2,528 debt per capita of the now
bankrupt State of California.

24. An enormous swelling in annual pension costs has caused a like swelling in the accrued
unfunded pension liabilities since June 30, 2003. See Exhibit C. Exhibit C shows that the
pension plans were basically fully funded at June 30, 2002 and still were underfunded less
than $55 million at June 30, 2003, before the financial effect of the rewritten pension plans
kicked in.

25. As shown by Exhibit D, the City has not decreased its rate of actual contributions (as a per
cent of payroll). The City has maintained about the same rate of actual funding for the police
officers’ plan, while greatly increasing the rates of actual contributions for the firefighters’
and municipal employees’ plans. Thus the very significant increases in the plan benefits are
the obvious cause of the enormous increase in the accrued pension liabilities shown in Exhibit
C. The accrued pension plan liabilities would be even greater had not funding been
accomplished in part by issuance of pension obligation bonds (thereby making the debt
permanent, since it is now owed to outsiders and thus no longer possibly negotiable with the
employees).

26. Pension expenses have been a very major cause of the increase in the City’s total expenses
even after the pension plans were revised under the current mayoral administration.

27. During the fiscal years 2004-2008 period, when the City incurred the $1.5 billion of operating
losses, the City’s total operating expenses increased 44.9% from $2,708,668,000 in fiscal 2003
to $3,923,811,000 in fiscal 2008, according to 2008 CAFR page 198.

28. When evaluating the appropriateness of the 44.9% increase in operating expenses, one should
take into account that the City is essentially a service organization. Thus the increase should
be viewed in the context of the 29.4% increase in population plus inflation, the two principal
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 drivers in need for increased City services. See item 29. Obviously, total operating expenses
increased at a rate greatly in excess of the rate of growth in population plus inflation.

29. The below increase in population for fiscal years 2004-2008 was computed based upon
population numbers on 2008 CAFR page 223. The inflation for fiscal years 2004-2008 was
computed based upon the CPI for the Houston SMSA from June 2003-2008.
10.3% Population, including Katrina influx
19.1% Inflation
29.4% Population plus inflation
37.7% Total revenues (See item 30)
44.9% Total expenditures (See items 27 and 28)

30. The City’s revenues (program plus general) increased a very generous 37.7% from
$2,645,899,000 in fiscal 2003 to $3,642,255,000 in fiscal 2008 according to 2008 CAFR pages
198 and 199. The 37.7% was well in excess of the 29.4% increase in population plus inflation.

31. Thus it is apparent that the problem lies with excessive operating expenses rather than
insufficient revenues.

32. The following conditions make the future of continuing operating deficits exceedingly more
serious:
a. The City already had accumulated a $1.2 billion deficiency in unrestricted assets at
June 30, 2008.
b. Apparently the City does not know what its deficiency in unrestricted assets was at
June 30, 2009 or what it is now or what it will be at June 30, 2010.
c. The City’s financial accounting and reporting system has such material
weaknesses in internal control that it cannot be relied upon to produce either accurate
or timely financial statements using full accrual accounting, as followed in the private
sector.
d. The City already has the second largest workforce in Harris County, governmental
or private. Yet, in the face of the current deep economic recession, the City increased its
civilian workforce by 7.1% in fiscal year 2009 and expects to increase that another 3.6%
in fiscal year 2010. Meanwhile the City increased its police officer and firefighter
workforces just a combined 3.7% in fiscal 2009 and expects to increase that just 1.2%
more in fiscal year 2010. See 2010 budget pages 14-15.
e. Incidentally, page 198 of the 2008 CAFR indicates that public safety expenses
increased about 75% from 2003 to 2008. That is contradictory to the 9.2% decrease in
the combined number of police officers and cadets and the 1.2% decrease in the number
of firefighters and cadets from 2003 to 2008, per 2008 CAFR pages 228-229. Certainly
overtime pay cannot account for the disparity from these two fact sources in the same
CAFR.
f. The City has the following liabilities that were not yet recorded on the City’s
June 30, 2008 balance sheet:
• Unfunded pension liabilities, $2 billion as of July 1, 2007, per 2008 CAFR page
123.
• Unfunded health and other post-retirement benefit liabilities to employees, $3.2
billion as of September 30, 2008, per 2008 CAFR page xii.

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 • Investment losses by the City employees’ pension plans since the start of the
current recession, which apparently will have to be made up for by the City and
may be in the range of $2 billion.
g. The City is just now beginning to really feel the deep financial recession. Sales tax
revenues are dropping and property tax revenues will probably drop significantly more
after the next annual appraisals.
h. The City’s property tax rate already is more than 90% of the $0.50/$100 cap set by
the City charter relative to property tax revenues that may be used to cover general
fund operations. And the City cannot increase its current sales tax rate without a state
constitution amendment. So there is little leeway to cover the current excessive
expenses, let alone increases in or new expenses.

33. Therefore, it appears to us that the next City administration may have to deal very soon
with the very real specter of financial bankruptcy.

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 Exhibit A

Evaluating The Financial Reporting Stewardship Of Houston's Mayors, City Controllers, And City Council
Members

Historical Data Regarding Timeliness Of Completing The City's Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) And City's
Receipt Of "Control Deficiency" Letters From The City's Independent Audit Firm
By: Bob Lemer

Per Correspomdence From Audit Firm

Type Of Year End Letter From Audit Firm
Per City's Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (See Definitions Below)
Fiscal Year Date Of Audit Office Holder At FYE Control Significant Material
Ended 6/30 Auditor's Report Firm Mayor Controller Deficiency Deficiency Weakness
2009 Not Yet Issued Deloitte White Parker ?
2008 12/19/08 Deloitte White Parker Yes
2007 6/30/08 Deloitte White Parker Yes
2006 6/6/07 Deloitte White Parker Yes
2005 3/6/06 Deloitte White Parker Yes
2004 12/23/04 Deloitte White Parker Yes
2003 12/23/03 Deloitte Brown Gray-Johnson
2002 12/17/02 KPMG Brown Garcia
2001 11/30/01 KPMG Brown Garcia
2000 11/14/00 KPMG Brown Garcia
1999 11/30/99 KPMG Brown Garcia
1998 10/30/98 KPMG Brown Garcia
1997 11/14/97 KPMG Lanier Kelly
1996 10/31/96 KPMG Lanier Kelly
1995 11/17/95 KPMG Lanier Greanias
1994 10/28/94 KPMG Lanier Greanias
1993 11/15/93 Coopers Lybrand Lanier Greanias
1992 11/18/92 Coopers Lybrand Lanier Greanias
1991 12/12/91 Coopers Lybrand Whitmire Greanias
1990 12/03/98 Coopers Lybrand Whitmire Greanias
1989 12/05/89 Coopers Lybrand Whitmire Greanias

Key: Only years that the (then state legally required) 4 month due date was met.

Definitions , per US Auditing Standards Board:

Control deficiency---A control deficiency exists when the design or operation of a control does not allow management or
employees, in the normal course of performing their assigned functions, to prevent or detect misstatements on a timely basis.

Significant deficiency---A significant deficiency is a control deficiency, or combination of control deficiencies, that adversely
affects the entity's ability to initiate, authorize, record, process, or report financial data reliably in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles such that there is more than a remote likelihood that a misstatement of the entity's financial
statements that is more than inconsequential will not be prevented or detected.

Material weakness---A material weakness is a significant deficiency, or combination of significant deficiencies, that results in
more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the financial statements will not be prevented or detected.

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 Exhibit B
City of Houston
Reconciliation of Budgeted "General Fund" Results of Operation to City-wide Results of Operation
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2008
Per 2008 Audited "Comprehensive Annual Financial Report" ("CAFR") -- Thousands of Dollars

Actual
Over/(Under)
Budget Budget Actual
Budgeted "General Fund" Performance:
Revenues-page 117 55,493 1,706,244 1,761,737
Other financing sources-page 117 477 49,745 50,222
Expenditures-page 120 12,414 (1,540,885) (1,528,471)
Other financing uses, transfers out-page 120 181 (263,778) (263,597)
Net annual surplus (deficit) of the Budgeted "General Fund" 68,565 (48,674) 19,891

Non-budgeted "General Funds"-Page 121:

Revenues 1,627
Expenditures (71,300)
Interest on pooled investments 1,670
Proceeds from issuance of debt 95,623
Transfers in 5,896

Net annual surplus from all "General Funds"- page 20 53,407

Net annual surplus from other "Governmental Funds":

Debt Service-page 20 21,816
Capital Projects-page 20 18,447
Grants-page 21 164
Non-major-page 21 25,444

Net annual surplus from all "Governmental Funds",

on the "modified accrual basis of accounting"-pages 21 & 22 119,278

Conversion from "modified accrual basis of accounting"

to "full accrual basis of accounting"-page 22:
Add purchase of capital assets, treated as expenditures 363,687
Deduct depreciation expense (167,630)
Revenues that will be collected more than 60 days after FYE 79,546
Previous year 60 day deferred revenues collected this year (97,762)
Net effect of reversing "Governmental Funds" handling of
these items: (a) bond proceeds as "other resources",
(b) repayment of debt principal as expenditures, and (c)
expensing bond issuance costs, premiums and discounts
when incurred (199,406)
Net effect of having deferred non-current liabilities at
beginning and end of year (359,706)
Net non-reimbursed expense of the internal service funds (524)

Net annual operating deficit for the "Governmental Activities"-

pages 22 and 17 (262,517)

Net annual operating deficit for "Business-Type Activities"-page 17 (19,039)

Net City-wide operating deficit-page 17 (281,556)

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 Exhibit C

City Of Houston
Annual Pension Costs, Contributions Made, And Reported Liabilities
Activity For Fiscal Years Ended June 30, 2003-2008
Per Audited Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs)-
For Fiscal Years 2003-2008
Dollars In Thousands

Summary Of Activity For Fiscal Years 2003-2008:

Police
Total Firefighters' Municipal Officers'
Balance at 6/30/02 (1,243) 51,892 (56,320) 3,185
Annual pension costs (1,556,962) (343,372) (609,832) (603,758)
Contributions made 914,791 252,096 380,689 282,006
Balance at 6/30/08 (643,414) (39,384) (285,463) (318,567)

Activity By Fiscal Year 2003-2008:

Police
Total Firefighters' Municipal Officers'
Balance 6/30/02 (1,243) 51,892 (56,320) 3,185
Annual pension cost (156,479) (22,669) (76,688) (57,122)
Contribution made 103,327 27,989 40,622 34,716
Balance 6/30/03 (54,395) 57,212 (92,386) (19,221)
Annual pension cost (243,649) (36,272) (133,456) (73,921)
Contribution made 123,031 28,325 58,061 36,645
Balance 6/30/04 (175,013) 49,265 (167,781) (56,497)
Annual pension cost (287,484) (52,222) (129,369) (105,893)
Contribution made 135,350 32,699 66,006 36,645
Balance 6/30/05 (327,147) 29,742 (231,144) (125,745)
Annual pension cost (259,662) (90,827) (62,169) (106,666)
Contribution made 178,238 56,238 69,000 53,000
Balance 6/30/06 (408,571) (4,847) (224,313) (179,411)
Annual pension cost (316,721) (74,683) (111,405) (130,633)
Contribution made 182,864 52,864 72,000 58,000
Balance 6/30/07 (542,428) (26,666) (263,718) (252,044)
Annual pension cost (292,967) (66,699) (96,745) (129,523)
Contribution made 191,981 53,981 75,000 63,000
Balance 6/30/08 (643,414) (39,384) (285,463) (318,567)

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 Exhibit D

City Of Houston Pension Plans

City's Actual Contribution Rates-
As A Per Cent Of Payroll
Per City's Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports
For Fiscal Years 1998-2008

Fiscal
Year Firefighters Municipal Police
2008 23.9 15.7 16.3
2007 23.7 16.0 15.5
2006 24.8 16.5 15.9
2005 18.0 16.9 11.3
2004 16.4 14.7 12.4
2003 15.4 10.0 12.4
2002 15.4 10.0 16.3
2001 15.4 10.0 16.3
2000 15.4 9.3 16.3
1999 15.4 9.1 16.2
1998 15.4 8.9 16.2

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