Rome Perseus Mediation PDF

Rome, the War with Perseus, and Third Party Mediation Author(s): A. M.
Eckstein Reviewed work(s): Source: Historia: Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte, Bd. 37, H. 4 (4th Qtr., 1988), pp. 414-444 Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436072 . Accessed: 14/12/2012 11:00
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ROME, THE WAR WITH PERSEUS, AND THIRD PARTY MEDIATION In the early winter of 167/166 B.C., King Prusias II of Bithynia paid a state visit to Rome. Polybius in a famous passage (30.18) depicts Prusias as humbling himself abjectly before the Roman senate: performing proskynesis, hailing the assembled senators as gods, delivering a "servile" oration.' In a stimulating recent article, A. C. Scafuro has argued that King Prusias was forced to abase himself in this fashion because of senatorial anger at an earlier attempt of his to mediate Rome's war with Perseus of Macedon (the Third Macedonian War).2 Further, Scafuro places Roman anger at Prusias within a wider historical context: Rome's inveterate hostility toward, and rejection of, attempts by neutral states to use their good offices to bring Rome's wars in the Greek East to an end. As Scafuroputs it: "Rome was not preparedto allow any other nation to serve as a negotiator when Rome was involved as a principal adversaryin a major war". Desperate fear of Roman punishment, therefore, lies behind the demeaning behavior of Prusias II in winter 167/166.3 The purpose of the present paper is to offer a different interpretation of Prusias' behavior at Rome, within a different understanding of Rome's general attitude toward third party diplomatic interventions in on-going conflicts. A close examination of the evidence suggests that Prusias' behavior was fostered not by desperate fear but (on the contrary) by greed: greed for territorial expansion. Indeed, Prusias often attempted to gain solid advantagesfor himself by means of abject flattery: that was quite his diplomatic style. As for Rome's attitude toward third party diplomatic interventions: a close examination of the evidence suggests that while Rome rejected binding arbitration of her wars and quarrels (and did not often act as an arbitrator herself), Rome did not automatically reject third party mediation of her wars and quarrels, often did act as a mediator herself - and certainly did not, by tradition, punish those who offered such mediation.
For the date of Prusias' visit to Rome, see F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius III (Oxford, 1979) 41 and 441. Besides the Polybius passage, the sources for Prusias' visit are Livy 45.44.-21; Diod. 31.15; Val. Max. 5.1. 1e; Plut. Mor. 336 DE; App. Mithr. 2; Dio frg. 69 (cf. Zon. 9.24); Eutrop. 4.8.4. 2 A. C. Scafuro, "Prusias II of Bithynia and Third Party Arbitration", Histonia 36 (1987) 28-37. Scafuro, "Prusias II" (above, n. 2) 29-30, 36-37 (the quote is from 37). Scafuro is writing in particular response to work by E. E. Gruen on Roman attitudes toward third party mediation: "Rome and Rhodes in the Second Century B.C.: A Historiographical Inquiry", CQ 69 (1975) 78-80; The Hellenistic Worldand the Coming of Rome I (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1984) 117-119.
Historia, Band XXXVII/4 (1988) (D T:ranzSteiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart I
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This generaldiplomaticbackground must be established first. It forms the historicalcontext within which the actionsof the Greek statesthat attempted to mediateRome's war with Perseustook place; it forms the context within which those actionsmust be understood. A crucialpoint to keep in mind is the distinctionbetween arbitration and mediation.This is a distinctionnot always carefullymaintainedby modern scholars.Arbitrationwas the submissionof a dispute to a neutralperson or body, whose verdictthe disputants engagedthemselvesin advanceto accept.4 In interstate conflicts, the statesagreeingto such arbitration thereforeleft the final decision to such a third party, a neutralwho acted in a quasi-judicial fashion, decidingwho was right, who was wrong, and/or assessingdamages and concessions.By contrast,mediationwas the practiceof encouraging and facilitating the reconciliation of contendingpartiesby variousmeansshortof bindingverdicts:for instance,by offeringone's good offices as quasi-judicial, a go-betweento open negotiations,or by offeringone's city as a neutralsite for suchnegotiations,or even by offeringcompromise solutionsto the specific issuesin question.Statesthatallowedsuch mediationeffortsdid not give up in advanceto someone else the final decision regarding the outstandingissues; they always retainedtheir right to rejectany compromisesand continue the war.5 Bindinginterstatearbitration had a long and honorablehistory amongthe Greeks.6Indeed, the use of binding arbitrationwas apparentlyeven more in the Hellenisticage thanearlier,in the Classicalperiod.I However, prevalent as Badianhas recentlypointed out, such bindingarbitration was by and large restrictedto interactionsamong the lesser states. That is, even among the Greeksthe greathegemonial powersrefusedto give up to the verdictof neutral third partiesthe final resolutionof outstandingissues. Hellenistickings, for instance, were often willing to act as international arbiters.But submittingto arbitrationthemselveswas anothermatter: "no dispute between kings was ever successfullytakento arbitration".8
The definition is that of M. N. Tod, Oxford Classical Dictionary2 (Oxford, 1970), s.v. "Arbitration, Greek". 5 On the distinction between arbitration and mediation, see L. E. Matthaei, "The Place of Arbitration and Mediation in Ancient Systems of International Ethics", CQ 2 (1908) 241ff. (still a classic treatment). Also: M. N. Tod: International Arbitration amongst the Greeks (Oxford, 1913); D. J. Mosley, Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece (Wiesbaden, 1973), Appendix One (,,Third Parties"). The most frequent issues brought before arbitrators were disputes over territory: see Gruen, Coming of Rome I (above, n. 3) 97 and n. 3 (with bibliography). 6 For comprehensive discussion of known cases down to 338, see L. Piccirilli, Gli arbitrati interstatali greCiI (Pisa, 1973). 7 See Gruen, Coming of Rome 1 97. 8 E. Badian, "Hegemony and Independence: Prolegomena to a Study of the Relations of Rome and the Hellenistic States in the Second Century B.C.", Actes du Vjie Congres de la F. I. E. C.
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If Rome refused to allow the devolution of her decision making power inherent in submitting to arbitration, she was therefore hardly alone. But it also seems that the idea of international binding arbitrationwas itself originally foreign to Roman political culture (and to Italic political culture in general): it was a Greek idea. References to Roman involvement in arbitration with other Italic states early in the city's history are very rare, and seem to belong to the realm of legend (perhaps invented long afterward).9 The earliest Roman exposure to the idea of binding arbitration most probably came via offers by Greek powers (in 320 and 280) to arbitrate on-going Roman conflicts; these offers were refused. 10 If King Ptolemy II Philadelphus did actually offer to arbitrate the First Punic War (ca. 250), the Romans refused that offer too. " It is true that in 200 and in 198 the Romans demanded that Philip V of Macedon submit to an impartial tribunal which would assess the damages he owed to Pergamum and/or Rhodes; but most likely these demands originated, precisely, with Pergamum and Rhodes, not with Rome.'2 The Aetolian idea that Antiochus III should act as arbiter of the Aetolian disputes with Rome forms part of the background to Rome's war with both powers.'3 After the defeat of Antiochus and the Peace of Apamea (188), Rome seemed predominant throughout the Mediterranean; naturally, in this new situation no state felt it possessed the status to offer itself as a binding arbiter of Rome's conflicts with others. What is more striking is that despite frequent Greek appeals, the Romans themselves rarely took on arbitraltasks. Our information is of course incomplete, but only nine cases of binding arbitration by Rome can be found in the Greek East in the half century after Apamea. Moreover, of these only a total of four cases are actual examples of interstate arbitration by Rome (the
(Budapest, 1983) 401-403 (the quote is from 403). On the lack of a Hellenistic "community of nations" among the great states, and the existence instead of unregulated clashes of power, see the comments appended to H. H. Schmitt, "Polybios und das Gleichgewicht der Machte", Fond. Hardt 20 (1974) 94ff. For Hellenistic kings as arbiters, see the examples in Gruen, Coming of Rome 1 98-99. It seems that for reasons of propaganda, some kings occasionally made offers to submit to arbitration; but these offers always came to nothing (see the comments of Badian 403-404). 9 See the discussion in Gruen, Coming of Rome 1 99-100, with references to the earlier scholarship. 10 For discussion, see Gruen, Coming of Rome 1 100. 11 Gruen, Coming of Rome I 100, thinks of Ptolemy II as a binding arbiter, but the actual language of App. Sic. 2, our only source for this incident, certainly allows the possibility that Ptolemy only offered to try to mediate the conflict: Tr 6"v iq TE 'PTwaCoouxai KaetXTbovfous op&; tRe-Xe(QyqaEvtkkXkot;("he sought to bring them to terms with each PLXCt, xai ouvcXaUACtLt other . . 12 So Gruen, Coming of Rome 1 101-102. 13 See Livy 35.33.5 and 33.8, with the comments of Gruen, Coming of Rome 1 104 and n. 35.
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others deal with internal disputes, not internationalones.)'4 Far more of the Roman attitudewas the frequentsenatorialdecision to characteristic 15Gruen'sconclusion turnproblemsamongthe Greeksover to Greekarbiters. was arbitration the use of bindinginternational here seems unexceptionable: outsidetheirdiplomatic essentiallyforeignto the Romans,and long remained tradition- despite the opportunitieswhich actingas a binding arbitermight her power in the East.16 have seemedto offer Rome in termsof increasing But the Romans were far more willing to engage in mediation than in binding arbitration- both as subjects of mediation, and as mediators themselves. Sometimesthese mediation efforts were successful, sometimes they were not. But the Roman attitude toward states that attemptedsuch mediationwas generallybenevolent.That is, Scafuro'scontention- against Gruen- thatRome was harshlyaverseto Greekmediationof her warsamong the Hellenes is simply not borne out by the historicalevidence. The major cases of Greek mediation,and the consequencesfor the mediatingstates, are relatedbelow.II To begin with a rather startling example: in Sicily in 212, the Roman commanderM. Claudius Marcellusnot only negotiateda peace agreement directlywith variousrebelSiceliotestates, but also allowedthem, as a group, with Syracuse.What occurredwas that the ex-rebels to act as intermediaries siege of offeredon their own initiativea compromisepeaceto end Marcellus'
14 The nine cases of Roman arbitration in the Greek East after Apamea: (1). Valerius Antias held that L. Cornelius Scipio (cos. 190) arbitrated conflicting Pergamene and Seleucid territorial claims in Asia Minor ca. 186 (Livy 39.22.10); if true, this would be the most important Roman arbitral decision of the second century, but the source is suspect and Livy does not vouch for the story (see Gruen, Coming of Rome 1 105); (2). A Roman commission arbitrated territorial claims between Cnossus and Gortyn on Crete in 184 (Polyb. 22.15); (3). A Roman commission attempted to arbitrateinternal strife in Aetolia in 174, but failed (Livy 41.25.5-6 and 27.4); (4). Q. Minucius settled strife on Crete in 174 (Livy 41.25.7); (5). Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 185) settled strife among the Thessaiians and Perrhaebians in 173 (Livy 42.5.8-10); (6). A Roman commissioner arbitrated the internal strife in Aetolia, where the previous commission had failed, in 173 (Livy 42.5.10-12); (7). The senate itself acted as an arbiter in 167/166, granting Athens various territorial awards (including the island of Delos) - and setting off a long string of quarrels (on which, see Gruen, Coming of Rome I 106-107); (8). A Roman embassy, in the East on other business, apparently arbitratedfactional disputes at Phoenice in Epirus in 157/156, because of an urgent Epirote request (Polyb. 32.14); (9). The senate itself acted as an arbiter in a dispute between Narthacium and Melitea, in Achaea Phthiotis, ca. 140: Syll.3 674 = R. K. Sherk, Roman Documents from the Greek East (Baltimore, 1969) no. 9. Since strong doubts can be had concerning L. Scipio's arbitration of the Pergamene-Seleucid dispute (no. 1, above), the actual number of Roman arbitrations of Greek interstate disputes in this period may well reduce to three (nos. 2, 7, and 9). 15 See Gruen, Coming of Rome 1 107-110. 16 Ibid. 11i.-i. 17 No Roman aversion to Greek mediation: Gruen, Coming of Rome I 117. Contra: Scafuro, "Prusias II" (above, n. 2) 35-37, especially 36 n. 23.
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that city. Marcellushimself acceptedthe compromise,and would surely not havehad any troublegettingit ratifiedlaterby the Romansenate;however,a coup insideSyracuse itselfrendered the peacesettlement abortive."8 Moreover, not only did M. Claudius Marcellusallow diplomaticmediationregarding Syracuseby Greek states that had very recently been at war with Rome themselves,but he laterfavoredthese ex-rebelsas sociifideles(!) - for they fit the very broaddefinitionof "loyalallies"appliedby Marcellus in Sicilyin 211, followingthe actualfallof Syracuse to his forces. Marcellus' actain Sicilywere ratifiedby the senatein the springof 210.19 Thereis not the slightestindication here, of course, eitherof Romanaversionto allowingGreekmediation,or of Romanhostility towardthose statesthat desiredto be mediators.20 During the First Macedonian War(212/11-205), Greekstatesseveraltimes attemptedmediation of the conflict. In 209, mediationwas attemptedby Ptolemaic of Athamania; Egypt,Rhodes,Athens,Chios, andKingAmynander in 208 Egyptianand Rhodianenvoys tried again;and in 207 mediatorsfrom triedyet a thirdtime.2' Rhodes, Byzantium,Chios, Mitylene,and Athamania All these diplomaticinterventionsfailed, either becauseof the reluctance of Philip V, or the reluctanceof the Romansand/or the Aetolians,to come to terms. But for our purposes, the real point is the deep involvementof P. SulpiciusGalba, the Roman commander in Greece, in the peaceprocess: in 207.22 both in 208 and(farmoreprominently) Indeed,in 207 the diplomatic processmay have gone as far as a referalof compromisetermsto the senatein
'8 Livy 25.28.1-29.10. Livy's source for these Sicilian events, as Klotz has shown, is in all probability Polybius: A. Klotz, "Die Benutzung des Polybios bei romischen Schriftstellern", StItal 25 (1951) 243ff. On Marcellus' Sicilian negotiations of 212, see now A. M. Eckstein, Senate and General: Individual Decision-Making and Roman Foreign Relations, 264-194 B.C. (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1987) 159. 19 For Marcellus' soci fideles, and the ratification of his Sicilian acta by the senate, see now the discussion of Eckstein, Senate and General (above, n. 18) 166-179. 20 Marcellus' negotiations with Syracuse via the Siceliotes in 212 is not a case cited by Gruen in his discussion of third party mediation - but his interests lie farther to the east. cf. Polyb. 10.25. The attempted 21 The attempted mediation of 209: Livy 27.30.4-15, mediation of 208: Livy 28.5.13 and 28.7.13-15. The attempted mediation of 207: App. Mac. 3, cf. Polyb. 11.4-6. 22 There is no mention of Roman involvement in the attempted mediation of 209, which failed because of the recalcitrance of both the Aetolians and King Philip. Scafuro argues that it is also uncertain whether P. Sulcipius Galba participated in the mediation of 208 ("Prusias II" 36 n. 23). But Livy 28.5.13 and 7.14 make it clear that Galba and the Aetolians met with the envoys of the mediating states before those envoys went on to see King Philip. The Roman-Aetolian response in 208 may not have been very encouraging, but if the envoys had received an outright rejection of mediation on principle, it is difficult to see what they hoped to gain by an interview with Philip which they did want - or why so many states were willing to offer mediation again the next year.
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Rome.23 That is, the Romans did not reject third party mediation of their war with Philip out of hand; nor did they find mediation by Greek neutrals unacceptable in principle. On the contrary: mediation, especially that of 207, was taken seriously. Did the persistent attempts at diplomatic intervention in the First Macedonian War sour Rome's relations with the mediating states? Far from it. Not much later, in 200, we find Rome in a position of defending Athens diplomatically against outside aggression: this is part of the origin of the Second Macedonian War (200-196). 4 As for Ptolemaic Egypt, whatever one wishes to make of the stories of Egyptian complaints to Rome ca. 200 about the aggressions of Philip V and Antiochus III, it is clear that Roman relations with the Ptolemies remained excellent in this period - for Roman ambassadors worked energetically to prevent Seleucid aggression against Egpyt in 196.25 Roman relations with Byzantium and with Chios - two other persistent mediators (209 and 207) - were also good throughout this period. The same seems to hold true of Mitylene as well.26 Another persistent mediator was Amynander of Athamania (209 and 207), while Rhodes was the most persistent of all (Rhodian ambassadors participating in all three mediation efforts): yet we find both states as firm military allies of Rome in 200-196.27 In fact, the First Macedonian War was brought to an end precisely by means
23 So App. Mac. 3.1 (who adds that Sulpicius himself advised the senate to continue the war). On the mediation effort of 207, see now the discussion of J. W. Rich, "Roman Aims in the First Macedonian War", PCPS N.S. 30 (1984) 146. 24 Polyb. 16.27.1-3 (the "Nicanor Declaration"); cf. 16.34.3-5. Our sources mention three separate Athenian embassies to Rome, complaining about aggression on the part of King Philip; there was at least one such embassy, that of Cephisodorus: ISE no. 33 (cf. Paus. 1.36.6). 2t The young Ptolemy V clearly sent an embassy to Rome in 200, to report his accession to the throne, and to seek Roman assurances against possible aggression by Antiochus III (Polyb. 15.25.13-15). There is a story that a Ptolemaic embassy warned Rome at this time of a rumor concerning a secret pact between Philip V and Antiochus (Justin 30.2.8; cf. App. Mac. 4.2, which attributes this warning to the Rhodians). The Roman diplomacy of 196 (the Lysimacheia conference): Polyb. 18.49.3; Livy 33.39.1; App. Syr. 2. 26 Tac. Ann. 12.62 is clear enough on the Byzantine support of Rome against Antiochus III. On the possibility that the reference in that passage to Byzantine help to Rome against "PseudoPhilip" (i.e., in the Fourth Macedonian War) should really be taken to mean Byzantine help against Philip V (i.e., in the Second Macedonian War), see E. Grzybek, "Roms Bundnis mit Byzanz (Tac. Ann. 12.62)", MusHelv 37 (1980) 50-59 (an interesting argument). On the good relations between Rome and Chios in the late third and early second century, see the discussion in J. Briscoe, A Commentary on Livy Books XXXIV-XXXVII (Oxford, 1981), 284, on Livy 36.43.11 (with references to earlier bibliography, including an important new inscription). On Mitylene, note Livy 37.12.5 (help to Rome in the Antiochene War). Both Chios and Mitylene were independent allies of Pergamum. 27 Note also the tradition that Rhodian complaints about Philip V (and Antiochus) helped involve Rome in this new war with Philip in the first place: Livy 31.1.10-2.2; App. Mac. 4; cf. Polyb. 16.34.3-5.
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of athirdpartydiplomatic intervention. As Romelanded newforcesinnorthwest Greece in 20528 the neutral government in Epirus sounded the Roman commander P. Sempronius Tuditanus aboutthepossibilityof apeaceconference. The EpiroteenvoysfoundSempronius agreeable to the idea,so an embassywas dispatchedto King Philipas well. These envoys convincedthe king to join in negotiations,whichthe Epirotesofferedto host at Phoenice,theircapital(Livy 29.12.8-11). At the conferenceitself, muchpreparatory diplomatic work was done, it seems, by three Epirote magistrates(29.12.11). These men were important enoughto the proceedings thatwe even havetheirnames:Aeropus, Derdas,and Philip(ibid.). The finalnegotiations betweenSempronius andthe Macedonian kingweresuccessful,andthe resultwas the compromise "Peaceof Phoenice".Laterratifiedby the Romansenate, it ended the war.29 Obviously, this is a case of highly successfuldiplomaticintervention,by a neutral state,inawarinwhichRomewasone of thechiefprotagonists. Obviously as well, the Epirotesdid not sufferfromthe hostilityof Romeas a resultof their diplomaticintervention: why shoulda successfulmediation,of a warin which Rome'sgoalshadalwaysbeenlimited,andinwhichshehadjustlosthermajor ally (Aetolia),havebeenacauseforRomanhostility?30 TheEpirotes wereincluded as thetreaty(Livy29.12.14),andin 198,whena newwarhadbroken adscriptito out betweenRome andPhilipV, we find the Epirotegovernment againattempting diplomaticintervention.The Epirotes were instrumental in bringingPhilip together withtheRomancommander T. QuinctiusFlamininus, ataconference at the Aous River;and Epirotemagistrates (theirnames,once again,areknown) wereprominent attheconference itself(Livy32.10.1-2). Successful negotiations at the Aous could have been a majordevelopmentin the history of Greece, in the Eastfor manyyears. But the negotiations delayingRomaninvolvement on both sides.3'As for Flamininus' laterattitude failed,becauseof recalcitrance towardthe Epirotes,we havesome evidencethathe suspectedmost of themof Macedon actually whenhisarmymarched favoring (Livy32.14.4);nevertheless, throughEpiruson its way to centralGreece,Flamininus was carefulto respect Epirote neutrality, and to act in such a manner as to win Rome a good reputation. 32
The traditionaldate. Rich, "Roman Aims in the First MacedonianWar"(above, n. 23) 136-143, has recently argued that the correct date is 206. 29 The Aetolians had made a separatepeace with Philip somewhat earlier. G ruen, Coming of Rome 117-119, in a broad overview of Greek diplomatic interventions, mentions this important Epirote mediation only very briefly; Scafuro, "Prusias II", ignores it altogether. 30 On the Roman situation toward the end of this war, see Rich, "Roman Aims in the First Macedonian War" 136-150. 31 Livy 32.10.3-8, cf. Diod. 28.11. 1 fail to see the basis for Scafuro's statement ("Prusias 1I"36 n. 23) that mediation such as this was "insignificant". 32 Livy 32.14.5-6; cf. Plut. Flam. 5.1.
28
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In winter 197/196 another Greek attempt at mediation of a war involving Flamininus was more successful. Blundering interference by the Roman commander in the internal politics of the Boeotian League had roused Boeotian ire against Rome; the result was the murder of many Romans, followed by harsh demands by Flamininus on the Boeotian government, and in the end outright Roman invasion of Boeotia. But embassies from Athens and from the Achaean League intervened, pleading for moderation on Flamininus' part, and arranging a peace conference where a compromise was worked out. Flamininus greatly reduced his demands on the Boeotians (especially for monetary compensation), and peace was restored.33 Did the Achaean mediation of the Boeotian war injure Achaean relations with Rome? On the contrary: Roman-Achean relations were probably never better than in 195, when T. Quinctius Flamininus went to war with Nabis of Sparta at least partly in Achaea's interest.34 A few years later we find Greek states displaying a persistent interest in reconciling the division between Rome and the Aetolians. The first initiative, from Athens in 192, was welcomed by T. Quinctius Flamininus as part of his diplomatic mission in Greece in that year; but the Athenian effort with the Aetolians came to nothing (Livy 35.32). By 190 Rome was actually at war with Aetolia, and the Athenians (again on their own initiative) approached L. Cornelius Scipio, the new Roman commander in Greece, with an offer to mediate the conflict. The Athenian embassy, headed by the statesman Echedemus, found L. Scipio agreeable (both he and his brother, the famous Africanus, wanted an early end to fighting with Aetolia so that they could go to confront Antiochus III in Asia). The Athenians were therefore able to use their good offices to set up a peace conference. No agreement came of this conference, because the Aetolians found the Roman terms too harsh; but Echedemus played a crucial role in arranging a six-month truce, during which the Aetolians were allowed to appeal L. Scipio's terms to the senate in Rome. But this recourse failed as well.35 Yet that is not the end of the story: the next year, 189, a new mediation effort was made by both Athens and Rhodes, and this one was more successful. Athenian and Rhodian emissaries helped
33 Livy 33.28-29; cf. Polyb. 18.43. On Flamininus' Boeotian war of 197/196, see now Eckstein, Senate and General 297-298. 34 On the Achaean contribution to the origin of the Nabian War of 195, see now A. M. Eckstein, "Nabis and Flamininus on the Argive Revolutions of 198 and 197 B.C.", forthcoming in GRBS. Note the later dedication by the Achaean statesman Aristaenus (strategos in 195), honoring Flamininus and his &QcET: see J. Bousquet, "Inscriptions grecques concernant des Romains", BCH 88 (1964) 607-609. 35 Polyb. 21.4-5; 21.25.9; Livy 37.6.4-6. Once again, I fail to see how this very serious attempt to resolve the Roman-Aetolian conflict can be called "insignificant" by Scafuro ("Prusias II" 36 n. 23).
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convince the new Roman commander in Greece, M. Fulvius Nobilior, to conclude peace with Aetolia on terms significantly more lenient than those that had been offered by L. Scipio. Further, when this preliminary agreement was referred to Rome, the Athenian and Rhodian ambassadors were instrumental in convincing the senate that the new peace terms should actually be approved. Thus, a third party mediation effort was crucial in bringing the Aetolian war to an end.36 As for the Roman attitude toward the Greek mediators of the Aetolian war: we are explicitly told that the senate found the ambassadors from Athens and Rhodes impressive (Polyb. 21.29.9). And of course the Rhodians were shortly to be handsomely rewarded for their role as Roman allies in the war against
37 Antiochus.
To the latter war as well belongs a notice in the historian Memnon (second century A. D.) that the city of Heraclea Pontica attempted to mediate between Rome and the Seleucid king.38 The historicity of the story has been hotly debated.39 But for our purposes, we need only note that such stories are unlikely to have come into existence if they were known to be totally ridiculous - if, that is, it was well-known in the Greek East that Rome was unalterably and violently hostile to third party mediation of her quarrels and wars with Greek states. In the immediate aftermath of the Syrian War, we also find envoys from the city of Ilium attempting diplomatic intervention with Rome on behalf of the region of Lycia (Polyb. 22.5). The Ilian envoys urged the senatorial Commission of Ten, then engaged at Apamea in settling Asian affairs (ca. 188), "to pardon the offenses of the Lycians", who had sided with Antiochus III during the war (22.5.3). The Ilian diplomats faced a difficult task, since they had to deal not only with the anger of Rome against the Lycians (22.5.6), but also with a rival embassy from Rhodes, which urged that Lycia should be directly turned over to Rhodes as a reward for Rhodian assistance to Rome during the war (22.5.2). But the Roman commissioners were certainly not angry with Ilium for her interference here. On the contrary: we are explicitly told that the commissioners now sought to please both sides
36 Polyb. 21.29-32 (note especially 21.29.9 and 31.5); Livy 38.3.7-8; 38.9-10; with the comments of Gruen, Coming of Rome 1 118 (somewhat briefer in detail than the discussion above). 37 On Rhodian gains under the Peace of Apamea, see now R. M. Berthold, Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age (Ithaca, 1984) 167-168. 38 Memnon FGrH 434 F 18. 39 Against historicity: F. Jacoby in FGrH IlIb Text, 269f.; E. S. Gruen, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome II (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1984) 736; Scafuro, "Prusias II", 35. Favoring historicity: F. Desideri, "Studi di storia eracleota, II. La guerra con Antioco il Grande", StudClassOrient 19/20 (1970/1971) 487-537.
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(22.5.4). The result was a Roman assurance to Ilium that the Lycians would suffer nothing totally ruinous (ibid.), and also (it would seem) a vaguely worded statement concerning Lycian kXvEh&Qfa.The Ilian ambassadors were either misled by the ambiguity here, or else (this is perhaps less likely) they intentionally exaggerated the extent of their diplomatic success. At any rate, while the Rhodians came away from Apamea convinced that the Commission had now given them Lycia &v6WQEq' (ibid.), the Lycians were convinced that they could now have the status of free Rhodian allies (see 5.8 and 10). The consequence of this misunderstanding was an eventual war between Rhodes and the Lycians. My point is that this diplomatic fiasco arose at least in part from the desire of the senatorial Commission to please both Rhodes and the intervening Ilians.40 It should be added that Roman willingness to allow third party mediation of her own quarrels and wars in this period is paralleled by Roman willingness to act herself as a conciliator among the Greeks. Sometimes such Roman mediation was successful, sometimes it was not (just as Greek diplomatic intervention in Rome's conflicts was sometimes successful and sometimes not). But in the half-century after 200, the Roman embassies sent into the Greek East to attempt the mediation of disputes are very numerous. It is enough here merely to cite some examples. Rome sought at least four times to heal quarrels between the Seleucids and the Ptolemies (200; 196; 169; 168; in 169/168 the Romans also encouraged the Achaeans to attempt an independent mediation); three separate Roman embassies sought (without success) to mediate the Pontic War of 183-180; three separate Roman embassies sought (without success) to resolve differences between Pergamum and the Galatians in the 160s; two Roman embassies sought to heal internal dynastic quarrels among the Ptolemies in 164/163-162; three Roman attempts were made to
40 The ambiguity of the commissioners' statements in 188 seems confirmed by the senate's interpretation of those statements ten years later - in a manner very close to the way the Ilian envoys had taken them (Polyb. 25.4.5; cf 22.5.2, 5.8, and 5.10). On the complicated story of Ilium, Rome, Rhodes and the Lycians, see the slightly differing reconstructions offered by Walbank, Commentary III (above, n. 1) 183, and by Berthold, Rhodes (above, n. 37) 168-171. For this same period, note as well the successful diplomatic intervention of the Stymphalians and Achaeans with M'. Acilius Glabrio, the Roman commander in Greece in 191, on behalf of the exiled people of Elateia in Phocis: the Stymphalian-Achaean diplomacy led to the restoration of the Elateians to their city (ISE no. 55). Some scholars suggest that the Elateian refugees of 191 resulted from Aetolian action against Elateia after 196, but it is equally likely (and perhaps more likely) that the Elateian refugees of 191 resulted from the destruction of the city by T. Quinctius Flamininus in 198; see the discussion in Briscoe, Commentary (above, n. 26) 214. If the latter reconstruction is the correct one, then we can see how the Greek diplomacy of 191 effected a reconciliation of sorts between Rome and the Elateians (whom we later find supporting the Roman cause against Perseus: cf. Polyb. 27.18.1).
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A. M. ECKSTEIN
reconcile Bithynia and Pergamum in 156-154; effort after effort was made by Rome to reconcile Sparta and the Achaean League.4' It would therefore seem that at least for the conflicts of the late third and early second centuries, Scafuro's attack on Gruen must fail. Mediation (unlike binding arbitration) had a definite place in the Roman diplomatic tradition. In particular, third party mediation of her wars and quarrels among the Greeks seems to have been perfectly acceptable to Rome: there is abundant evidence on this, as we have now seen. Not that such mediation efforts were always successful; but they were never rejected out of hand, as violating some sacred Roman principle. And Greek states attempting such diplomatic intervention did not have to face Roman anger. On the contrary: we often soon find them as friends and/or allies of Rome. One may very well wish to attribute some of this Roman behavior to sheer political expediency.42 But that is just the point: for what else but political expediency of one kind or another motivated the acceptance or rejection of mediation efforts (even Roman mediation efforts) among the Greek states themselves? Roman behavior in this respect was not much different from the behavior of any other Hellenistic polity - just as Rome's consistent refusal to submit to binding arbitration hardly distinguishes her from any of the great Greek powers. Of course, it is possible that between 189 and the period of the Third Macedonian War (171-168) the Roman attitude toward neutral diplomatic interventions underwent a fundamental change and became highly negative. Presumably, the change will have resulted from the growth of Roman arrogance, itself attendant upon the expansion of Rome's power. But this hypothesis remains to be proved.43And certain facts speak strongly against the idea. For not only do we find that third party mediation was a perfectly acceptable diplomatic practice to Rome in the period before the Third Macedonian War, but even in the century or so after that war, when Roman power was truly overwhelming, we still find occasional examples of neutral parties using their good offices to try to facilitate diplomatic breakthroughs between Rome and other states. Thus in 146 a Thessalian intermediary tried to bring the Achaean War to an end. An Achaean embassy seeking peace had been well-received by the Roman commander Q. Caecilius Metellus, who had opened up to them the prospect of a lenient settlement of the war. The Achaean envoys returned to Corinth and were followed by Philo of Thessaly, a neutral with strong ties to Achaea, who worked strenuously with them to persuade the Achaeans to accept
For discussion, see Gruen, Coming of Rome I 111-1 16. So Scafuro, "Prusias II" 36 n. 23. 43 It should be noted that such a hypothesis would be distinct from that of Scafuro, "Prusias II", 35-37, especially 36 n. 23, according to whom Rome was traditionally hostile to all third party mediation.
41 42
425
Metellus' offer (Philo may even have come with additional proposals: the of Polyb. 38.17.3). Despite some support within Achaea nokkXa iXa6vOQwna (cf. 38.17.4), Philo failed, and the war continued. Surely Philo was not punished for using his good offices to effect a compromise peace, for he was working not only with the peace party in Achaea, but with Q. Metellus himself.4 Again, in the late 90s when Euphenes the son of Execestus proclaimed himself king of Macedon and raised a large military force against Rome, the Thracian dynast Cotys persuaded Euphenes to give up, and turned him over to his father (reLiocCt Tfg <I4loXkfii actooPvat: Diod. 37.5a). Cotys was certainly not punished by Rome for his diplomatic intervention in Euphenes' revolt, since even Euphenes himself somehow escaped punishment (ibid.). Indeed, this Cotys may well have been the founder of a powerful Thracian him with territory at And it is also possiblethat Rome rewarded monarchy.45 the expence of the Greek city of Abdera.46 Yet again: Mithridates VI used the good offices of Archelaus of Delos to open peace negotiations with L. Cornelius Sulla in 85 (Plut. Sulla 22). Though Archelaus may have been taking something of a risk by coming to Sulla here, he certainly did not suffer for his diplomatic intervention, for Sulla warmly welcomed the prospects for peace talks which Archelaus held forth (ibid.).4' Finally, we may note the action of a more famous figure: how King Herod of Judaea intervened successfully with the formidable M. Agrippa on behalf of the city of Ilium, when Agrippa was furious with Ilium for what he perceived as its mistreatment of his wife Julia. Herod, we are told, "took up the protection of Ilium", and obtained from Agrippa complete remission of the devastating fine which Agrippa had imposed.48 In some of the above cases the Roman interlocutor in the diplomatic
44 Cf. Paus. 7.5.11. For discussion of this incident, see B. Niese, Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chaeronea III (Gotha, 1903) 348-349; J. Deininger, Der politische Widerstand gegen Rom in Griechenland, 217-86 v. Chr. (Berlin/New York, 1971) 236-237; U. Hackl, Senat und Magistratur in Rom von der Mitte des 2. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. bis zur Diktatur Sullas (Kallmunz, 1982) 47-48. 45 On the probable descendants of the Cotys of Diod. 37.5a, see B. Lenk, RE 6a, s.v. "Thrake", col. 438. Also: U. Kahrstedt, RE 11, s.v. "Kotys" no. 3, col. 1553. 46 So G. Chiranky, "Rome and Cotys, Two Problems: I. The Diplomacy of 167 B.C. II. The Date of Sylloge3 656", Athenaeum 60 (1982) 480. Whether or not SIG3 656 should be dated to this period, or significantly earlier (to the end of the Third Macedonian War, in fact), the inscription is interesting in itself, since it records and praises a very vigorous diplomatic intervention with Rome by the city of Teos, on behalf of Abdera (see especially lines 14-27 for the Tean energy at Rome in Abdera's cause). 47 On the protracted negotiations which resulted from Archelaus' initiative, see A. N. SherwinWhite, Roman Foreign Policy in the East, 168 B.C. to A.D. 1 (Norman, Oklahoma, 1983) 143-148. 4X Nicolaus of Damascus, FGrH 90 F 134 (16/13 B.C.).
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A. M. ECKSTEIN
interaction mayhavebeenmotivated by sheerpolitical expediency: indeed,it was preciselythisfactorwhichoftengavetheneutral mediator his chance. 49Butonce
again, this merely points up the lack of any Roman diplomatic tradition opposed inprincipleto thirdpartymediation. Roman diplomacy was aworld in which, to a great extent, expediency reigned. What we have thus established, with a multitude of examples, is that- at least in the right circumstances- the Romans were not at all averse to neutraldiplomatic interventions which facilitated the peaceful (or compromise) resolution of ongoing quarrels, disputes, disturbances, or wars. Moreover, this seems to be the case not only for the period before the Third Macedonian War, but also for the period afterit. One should therefore not assume that Roman behavior toward the putative mediators of thatwar-Prusias II of Bithynia, for example-was the result of a tradition of Roman rejection of Greek mediation on principle, and deep hostility toward any and all mediators. Such a hypothesis would seem to conflict with Roman behavior both before and after the period with which we are concerned. Having outlined the broader diplomatic background, we can now proceed to the subject of the Greek mediation efforts in the Third Macedonian War (and in particular the effort of Prusias and its diplomatic consequences). Our sources indicate a total of five efforts (or intended efforts) by Greek states toward mediation of Rome's war with Perseus. One of these stories, however, is clearly a false tradition. Livy has it that in 169 a Rhodian embassy appeared in Rome and urged, with considerable arroganceof demeanor, that the Romans end the war (allegedly, the Rhodians sent a similar embassy to Macedon). The Rhodians were angrily rejectedby the senate (44.14.7-15.8). This account should not be accepted: Polybius indicates that an embassy from Rhodes did indeed go to Rome in 169, but merely to confirm existing friendly relations, and it was received with considerable cordiality.50 The Livian notice is evidently contaminated - a retrojection back into 169 of the well-attested disastrous Rhodian diplomacy of 168.51 This leaves us, therefore, with four efforts (or intended efforts) at Greek mediation. The very number of such efforts, of course, indicates a contemporary Greek impression that Rome did not automatically view such diplomatic interventions with deep hostility. Given the previous history of Greek mediation involving Rome (see above, pp. 417-422), this makes sense.
49 Q. Caecilius Metellus in 146 wanted to end the Achaean War before the arrivalof his successor L. Mummius (Paus. 7.15.1 1); Sulla wished to end the MithridaticWar so that he could deal with the problems he faced in Italy (Plut. Sula 22.1-2), or perhaps he truly sought a permanent settlement in the East acceptable to all sides: so Sherwin-White (above, n. 47) 147-148. 50 Polyb. 28.2.1-5; 28.16.5-9. 51 Cf. H. H. Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (Munich, 1957) 214-215; Gruen "Rome and Rhodes" (above, n. 3) 59-60; Scafuro, "Prusias II" 28-29. For an additional possible source of "contamination", see below, p. 435.
427
The earliest Greek attempt to resolve the Third Macedonian War occurred in 170. Envoys arrived in Rome from Ptolemaic Egypt, to renew friendly relations, to defend Egypt from charges of aggression brought by Antiochus IV of Syria, and also to offer mediation of Rome's war with Macedon. However, the princeps senatus M. Aemilius Lepidus, a man whose relations with the Ptolemies were good, advised the envoys not to bring the matter of the Macedonian War up before the patres, and the envoys took his advice.52 On the face of it, Scafuro has a case that this incident might indicate Roman hostility to mediation (at least in 170); similarly, Gruen's contention that the incident reveals Roman acceptance of mediation seems at first sight paradoxical.53 But this is true only on the surface. While M. Aemilius Lepidus may have kept the Ptolemaic ambassadors from broaching the subject of mediation in a formal, public session of the senate - with Roman pride injured by recent defeats,this was clearlynot the righttime to bringthe matterUp54 - it iS most unlikely that he was able to keep the Egyptian intention a total secret. Polybius knows about it: and if Polybius does, why should not prominent men in the senate have known about it as well? One thinks especially of M. Lepidus' many political friends and allies.55Note also that the Egyptian idea did not deeply anger the princeps senatus himself: on the contrary, he simply thought it impolitic, and went on to help engineer what turned out to be in all other respects an eminently successful diplomatic mission for Egypt (Polyb. 28.1.8-9). During the two years following this Egyptian embassy, we find the Romans working assiduously to prevent Seleucid aggression against Egypt. In 169 a Roman embassy headed by T. Numisius tried (and failed) to bring peace between the two Greek powers (Polyb. 29.25.3-4); in winter 169/168 Q. Marcus Philippus successfully urged the Achaean League to send an embassy to mediate the conflict (Polyb. 29.25.2 and 5-6); finally, in the summer of 168 P. Popilius Laenas, in a famous scene outside Alexandria, presented Antiochus IV with a senatus consultum ordering him to cease war against the Ptolemies immediately.56 In other words, in these years the Romans did a significant
52 Polyb. 28.1 .6-8; cf. Diod. 30.2. On Lepidus' ties with Egypt (which later tradition evidently exaggerated, however), see the sensible remarks of Walbank, Commentary III 326-327. 53 Gruen, "Rome and Rhodes" 79, and Coming of Rome I 118 n. 117; so, too, Berthold, Rhodes (above, n. 37) 204 and n. 22. Contra: Scafuro, "Prusias II" 36 and n. 24. 54 Cf. Walbank Commentary III 326. 55 As censor in 170, Lepidus had dealt mildly with the patres, saving men whom his colleague M. Fulvius Nobilior had wished to expel: Livy 40.51. 1. He was a central figure in Roman politics. 56 On P. Popilius Laenas and the famous "Day of Eleusis", see Polyb. 29.27.1-10; Livy 42.12.3-8; Diod. 31.2; App. Syr. 66; Justin 34.3.1-4; Cic. Phil. 8.23; Vell. Pat. 1.10.1; Val. Max. 6.4.3; Porphyry FGrH 260 F 50; Plin. NH 34.24; Plut. Mor. 202 F; and J. D. Ray, The Archive of Hor (London, 1976) 127-128.
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A. M. ECKSTEIN
series of diplomatic favors for the Ptolemies; it is no exaggeration to say that Rome in this period preserved Ptolemaic Egypt as a fully independent state. One should certainly see the hand of M. Aemilius Lepidus behind some of this Roman diplomacy - which again returns us to the point that he had not been angered by the Egyptian offer to mediate in 170. And unless one assumes that Lepidus chose to keep the Ptolemaic offer a total secret (which, again, we may doubt), it is reasonable to conclude that in general the offer had no negative impact on Roman policy in regard to Egypt.57 Another state which may have considered the possibility of mediation was Pergamum. We are told that Eumenes II entered into secret negotiations with Perseus: for a large sum of money he offered to stop aiding Rome in the war, and for a far larger sum he offered to use his good offices to negotiate a compromise peace settlement. There certainly seem to have been non-public exchanges between Perseus and Eumenes during the war. But whether the later story of Eumenes' proposed monetary arrangementwith Macedon has a basis in reality is extremely difficult to say.58 Polybius himself is uncertain whether to accept the rumors about Eumenes. But for our purposes, what is important is that among Polybius' arguments against accepting the rumors, there is not the slightest hint that the story is ridiculous because Eumenes could never have negotiated a compromise peace (i.e., because Rome invariably rejected third party mediation), or because Eumenes would never have made such an offer to Perseus in the first place (i.e., because he knew that such mediation efforts invariably backfired in violent Roman hostility toward the mediator). On the contrary, Polybius presents his readers with a detailed exposition of why Eumenes might well have thought that an effort at mediation, in the winter of 169/168, had a good chance of succeeding. The passage (29.7.4-7) is worth quoting: Eumenes saw that Perseus was in difficult straits, hemmed in on all sides, and ready to accept any terms in order to get peace . . While the Romans were likewise in difficulties, having made no
progress in the war
. . .
and because the Aetolians were in a state
of unrest. He therefore thought it by no means impossible that the Romans would consent to peace and an end to the war; and he also
57 In view of Lepidus' advice to the Egyptian envoys that they not present their proposal publicly (a point rightly emphasized by Scafuro), the implications of the Egyptian embassy as presented by Gruen and Berthold need to be bolstered by further argumentation. This is offered above. See also below, n. 67. 58 See Livy 44.24.7 for Eumenes' official explanation of these exchanges. On the PerseusEumenes diplomacy, see especially B. Schleussner "Zur Frage der geheimen pergamenischmakedonischen Kontakte im 3. Makedonischen Krieg", Historia 22 (1973) 119-123; Gruen, Coming of Rome 1I 558-563.
429
thought himself to be the person best able to mediatethe matter

and reconcile them.59
Polybius believes these considerations to be reasonable calculations on

Eumenes' part, and not some insane fantasy: JVXXoytolLo0 (cf. 29.7.8), not dXoyia. It follows thatPolybiusbelievesthe Romanswere open to thirdparty
This is Greek mediationin this period, at least undercertaincircumstances. weighty evidenceindeed - for Polybius was a sophisticatedthinker, and an of the events he is here describing. exact contemporary What finally convinces Polybius that the rumors about Eumenes and Perseusought to be acceptedis that after the war the senate began to treat Eumeneswith distinctcoolness (29.6.2-5). The argument,though obviously not decisive, has some cogency.60But does the historian'sreasoninghere constitutePolybianevidencefor Romanhostility towardGreekmediationin ?61 Not at all. As Polybius conceives it, the reason for senatorial general hostilitytowardEumeneswas the beliefthathe hadbeenwillingto dropout of the war, and attemptto mediateit, merelyfor the sakeof money- a bribe.62 If that is what thepatresbelieved,no wonderthat they now beganto takea sour view of Eumenes(especiallysince the king himselfhad been one of the prime moversof the war!), and that the story of his monetarydealingswith Perseus had a negativeimpacton Romanpolicy towardhim.'3 One Greek state that went beyond a mere intentionto offer mediationto Rome was Rhodes. Here Polybiushas a story that alreadyin 169 Q. Marcius Philippus, the Roman commanderin Greece, privately suggested to the Rhodiansthat they open a diplomaticinitiative(28.17.4-15). This is a story hedged about with difficulties. First: because of (perceived)ambiguitiesin
59 fteowv xai ruuyxXexL6oEvov6v nepofa azwaX6oEv xai (y&() Ei'vr;g b1.v(JTaftOOvTa Jl&v 16 (aQayyeXX6Rsevov) L ... ToO; & MbwEX61tEVoV X6QLVTOV T6V n6XERov btaavoao 'PwOLaCov;WGaOTwg bUa XsaoTovovg TOig 6Xoo; bt6 Te Tb [T&Nv jtox67tTELv &vTnoAXlw... xaci ba To Tob; xatds trv ALTWX(aV RETCE6OVO {Ot6ieXELV, JntXcatEV OVX &&6vaTOV EtVal Tb tUyXaTaf~VaL 'PwRsaCoUg et; daYWyhV TOO J2okt0Lo0U xai bL6XkUOV nQ6g &t T6 TEOOLEa(Jal TacTCaxCa oivayayedv &v6RLCEv cavT6V MLT'1&6OTaMoV Elvat . . .
60 That is, the senate was not likely to have reversed a long-standing pro-Attalid policy on the basis of mere rumors lacking the slightest good substantiation. This need not mean that those rumors (with whatever substantiation was provided to the senate) were actually true, however. 61 Cf. Scafuro, "Prusias II" 37 n. 27. 62 See especially Polyb. 29.9.3-5; 7-9; and 12 (where Polybius himself finds the idea that a king would take such a bribe - which he believes Eumenes intended to do - disgusting). 63 Scafuro, "Prusias Il" 37 n. 27, argues that the large sum of money Eumenes demanded from Perseus for negotiating an end to the war indicates a realization on Eumenes' part of how dangerous such diplomatic intervention with Rome was. But it is more likely that the sum demanded is larger than the amount needed to get Eumenes to drop out of the war simply because a compromise peace of the entire conflict was a far larger favor to do for Perseus than mere Pergamene withdrawal from the fighting.
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A. M. ECKSTEIN
Polybius' language, scholars have divided over whether Polybius means Marcius suggested Rhodian mediation of Rome's war with Macedon, or Rhodian mediation of Antiochus IV's war with Egypt (an effort which certainly did occur: Polyb. 28.17.15). On balance, it is more likely that Polybius does indeed mean that Marcius suggested Rhodian mediation of the Macedonian War.64Second: if the reference is to Rhodian mediation of the Macedonian War, this raises doubts about whether the story itself is true. For the point of the story is that the Rhodian mediation effort of 168 ultimately derived from a suggestion by a Roman statesman in 169, and one can easily see why the Rhodians might have invented (or distorted) an incident so that their disastrous diplomacy of 168 was given this powerful justification post hoc.65 But for our purposes, again, the historicity of the tale is not so important. What is important are the motives Polybius ascribes to Q. Marcius Philippus in his dealings with the Rhodians: either he really hoped to end the war, which he feared was undermining Rome's general strategic position in the East (28.17.5-6), or else he wished the Rhodians to compromise themselves in Roman eyes, so that later the Romans could do with them whatever they wished (17.7). Polybius in the end puts the latter reconstruction on the incident (17.9). Scafuro, for one, sees that conclusion as more Polybian evidence for Rome's pervasive hostility toward mediation.6' But Polybius bases his final interpretation of Marcius' action merely on what later happened to the Rhodians (28.17.9); he makes not other argument. And what is striking is that (1) Polybius accepts the possibility that Marcius really did want Rhodian diplomatic intervention to end the Macedonian War (which in turn means that Polybius thought such intervention could have ended the war), and that (2) he finds it somewhat difficult to decide between this first possibility and the other one, that Marcius merely wanted to compromise the Rhodians . . . - 17.8). Given Polybius'willingness to M6LOV Etiv (T6 ?&V &XQLPEg 06 entertain at last the strong possibility that Q. Marcius Philippus honestly wished Rhodian diplomatic intervention, we arrive at the same conclusion that we did with regard to Polybius' analysis of Eumenes' manoeuvers: third party mediation of Rome's war with Perseus was a perfectly conceivable political outcome to all sides concerned with the conflict. The Rhodians certainly demonstrated such a belief in the summer of 168: for they sent to Rome an embassy composed of distinguished men whose task
64 Gruen, "Rome and Rhodes" 72ff., makes the best case for the hypothesis that the mediation proposed by Marcius in Polyb. 28.17.4-15 has to do with the war between Syria and Egypt. Nevertheless, the arguments of Walbank, Commentary III 350-351 (on 28.17.4) and 352 (on 17.15) seem decisive in favor of the idea that Polybius means a mediation of Rome's war with Macedon. See also Berthold, Rhodes 240-241. 65 See the comments of Berthold, Rhodes 242-243. 66 Scafuro, "Prusias II" 36-37.
431
was, precisely, to offer mediation of the war. Moreover, although this embassy did not appear before the senate until after the news of Rome's victory at Pydna, the Rhodian ambassadors were perfectly candid in revealing to the senate the reason for their mission.67 The Roman response was harshly negative - but that was a shock to the Rhodians (cf. Polyb. 30.4.2).6i Yet even here it is important to stress that the public position taken by the senate held no implication that the Romans viewed mediation efforts per se with deep hostility. The senatorial response attacked the Rhodians for organizing an effort at mediation at a time when Rome had virtually won the war; this proved to the patres that the Rhodians were actually on Perseus' side (Polyb. 29.19.6-9). An earlier time would have been more suitable (oLxeu6TQovEaLVCL TIV XtLQO'V . . .) if the Rhodian goal had actually been to prevent further suffering among the Greeks and to bring the war to a close, and not merely to save Perseus.69The public position taken by the senate was therefore that the fault of Rhodes lay not in the mediation itself but merely in its highly tactless (even suspect) timing. This was not a declaration that mediation had always been and would always be unacceptable to Rome.70 Indeed, there is an implication that if the patres had believed the Rhodians' motive had actually been to prevent further Greek suffering because of the war, then the Rhodian mission - even if ultimately unsuccessful - would still have been viewed at Rome with considerable understanding. It is worth noting that the senatorial position on the pro-Macedonian motives behind the Rhodian embassy is Polybius' opinion as well. Thus at 29.10.3 Polybius indicates that the Rhodian decision to send the embassy in fact represented the victory of the pro-Macedonian faction on the island
I oL Tai TOf O'XVOVTh-g HeQoEw atpO'U EVOL . . .).
PerhapsPolybius is wrong
in his analysis here, as Gruen has argued." But modern scholars remain divided on the question, and when we combine this situation with Polybius' own remarks, we can see that the senatorial perception of the Rhodians (even if ultimately incorrect) was not totally unreasonable."2
67 Polyb. 29.29.13; cf. Livy 45.3.4-5; Diod. 30.24. See the comments of Gruen, "Rome and Rhodes" 78-79; Coming of Rome II 566. Bertold, Rhodes 193, remarks that the senate must have been well aware of the purpose of the Rhodian mission before its public exposition by the ambassador Hagepolis. Perhaps so: and if so, there is something of a parallel with the Egyptian mission of 170 (see above, pp. 427-428). 68 Cf. Gruen, "Rome and Rhodes" 79. 69 Note especially Polyb. 29.29.6 and 9; cf. Livy 45.3.6-8. 70 Cf. the comments of Gruen, Coming of Rome I 118; II 566 (surely correct). 7' So Gruen, "Rome and Rhodes" 74-76. Note the presence of the pro-Roman Hagesilochus (Polyb. 27.3.3-5; Livy 42.45.3-7) among the Rhodian envoys sent out to make peace (Polyb. 29.10.4). 72 Thus Walbank continues to see Rhodes as riven by the rivalry between pro-Roman and antiRoman factions, with the latter coming out on top in 168: Commentary III 182; 297; 303; 352.
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A. M. ECKSTEIN
The Rhodians were punished by Rome after the end of the war: the Rhodian empire on the mainland of Asia Minor (Lycia and Caria) was taken from them; the island of Delos was set up as a free port under Athenian authority, in inevitable competition with them.73Indeed, in 167 a Roman war with Rhodes - advocated especially by those senators who had served as commanders against Perseus - was narrowly avoided.74 The punishment of the Rhodians has seemed so out of proportion to their actions during the war (first neutrality, then the attempt at mediation) that most scholars see the mediation of 168, insofar as it enters the picture at all, as a mere pretext. It is suggested that behind the punishment of Rhodes - as well as the new Roman coolness toward Eumenes of Pergamum - there lay a considered senatorial desire to cripple any remaining centers of power in the Greek Mediterranean.'7 Yet it was not unknown for the patres to be moved simply by sudden large changes in opinion and emotion, the result being radical changes in policy. That had happened, for instance, in the winter of 219/218, when news of the fall of Saguntum to Hannibal had suddenly precipitated Roman action leading to the Second Punic war.76 And just in 167, specific events - the behavior of the praetor M'. Juventius Thalna and an important speech by M. Porcius Cato - may have helped swing senatorial opinion suddenly away from war against Rhodes.77 The idea that the senatorial punishment of Rhodes formed part of a considered plan to destroy all Greek power in the Mediterranean can find no support in the sources. As for Pergamum, there should be no doubt of postwar senatorial hostility toward Eumenes II personally. But the adoption of a consistent and coherent policy of destroying Attalid power is quite a different matter: after 167/166 the patres rejected many opportunities to diminish the position of Pergamum in Asia Minor, opting most often for the maintenance of the status quo. This was
Berthold, too (Rhodes 190-191), basically follows Polybius' analysis, although with some modification. 73 For discussion of the postwar punishment of Rhodes, see now Berthold, Rhodes 201-208. 74 For discussion of these events, see now Berthold, Rhodes 196-199. Advocacy of war by the former Roman commanders against Perseus: Livy 45.25.1-2; cf. Gell. 6.3.6-7. 75 On Rhodian mediation as a mere pretext for a deeper Roman policy against the Greek states, see G. De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani IV:I (Turin, 1923) 344; Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 51) 166-167; Gruen, "Rome and Rhodes" 79-80, cf. Coming of Rome 1 118; Berthold, Rhodes 204-205. On Eumenes' intended mediation as a mere pretext for a deeper Roman policy against Pergamum, see E. V. Hansen, The Attalids of Pergamum (Ithaca, 1947) 122-127; R. B. McShane, The Foreign Policy of the Attalids of Pergamum (Urbana, 11., 1964) 182-186. 76 See the persuasive reconstruction of the crisis of 219-218 by A. E. Astin, "Saguntum and the Origins of the Second Punic War", Latomus 26 (1967) 577-596. 77 For discussion of the Roman-Rhodian crisis of 167, and the roles played in it by M'. Juventius Thalna and M. Porcius Cato, see now Berthold, Rhodes 196-199. Also: A. E. Astin, Cato the Censor (Oxford, 1978) 273-283.
433
partly thanks to the diplomatic intervention of Eumenes' brother Attalus,

whom the patres favored."8
In other words, Roman anger at Eumenes II over his rumored corrupt mediation, and Roman anger at Rhodes over her horribly ill-timed mediation, may not be mere "pretexts" hiding a deeper and more long-range policy.79 But "pretexts" or not, what we must keep in mind is that the position of the senate regarding both Pergamum and Rhodes did not by any means imply Roman hostility, on principle, to any and all Greek mediation. That is shown not only by the favorable Roman policy toward Ptolemaic Egypt after her mediation effort of 170, but - even more clearly - by the warm reception Prusias II of Bithynia received in Rome in winter 167/166, and the positive consequences of
his visit.
For Prusias, we are told, attempted diplomatic intervention himself in the Third Macedonian War, in 169. The account is found in Livy 44.14.5-7:
Next the envoys from King Prusias . . . were heard . . . concern-
ing the restoration of peace with King Perseus. Prusias begged rather than requested peace, pointing out that up to the present time he had taken the side of the Romans, and would continue to do so as long as the war continued; but since envoys had come to him from Perseus concerning ending the war with Rome, he had promised to plead for Perseus before the senate. He entreated them, if they could bring themselves to do it, to end their wrath, and accord him thanks for restoring peace.80 It is clear, then, that according to Roman tradition Prusias had used his good offices in 169 in an attempt to open serious peace negotiations between Rome and Macedon: in word, he had acted as a mediator.8"
'8 The hostility of the senate to Eumenes personally: Polyb. 29.6.4; 30.19.1-13; Livy Per. 46; Justin 38.6.3ff (the senatorial rebuff of Eumenes in 167). Few will follow the alternative reconstruction of this famous incident offered now by Gruen, Coming of Rome II 573-576. But Gruen's general interpretation of postwar Roman policy in northern Asia Minor, as aiming at the maintenance of the territorial status quo among the states and peoples of the region, is strongly argued: Coming of Rome II 576-578. On the influence at Rome of Eumenes' brother Attalus, see the comments of C. Habicht, RE 23:1, s.v. "Prusias 11 (2)", coll. 1113-1115 (on Attalus' successful defensive diplomacy against the maneuvers of Prusias). 79 On Roman relations with Eumenes, see in this respect the comments of J. Hopp, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der letzten Attaliden (Munich, 1977), 57-58. R0 tum ab rege Prusia . . . legati auditi sunt ... de pace reconcilianda cum rege Perseo egit. Prusiae preces magis quam postulatio fuere, profitentis et ad id tempus se cum Romanis stetisse et, quoad bellum foret, staturum; ceterum cum ad se a Perseo legati venissent de finiendo cum Romanis bello, eis pollicitum deprecatorem apud senatum futurum; petere, si possent inducere in animum ut finiant iras, se quoque in gratia reconciliatae pacis ponerent. Rl Hence the title of Scafuro's article, with its reference to Prusias and arbitration, is something of a misnomer.
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One merit of Scafuro's study is the recognition that the historicity of this Livian notice must be explicitly defended. For the story of Prusias' embassy of 169 is closely wedded to the annalistic account of the Rhodian "mediation" embassy of the same year (they are both part of the same Livian passage), and the story about the Rhodians has evidently been greatly distorted.82 Moreover, the rather obsequious tone of Prusias' message to the senate seems in suspiciously apposite contrast to the arrogant tone of the (false) Rhodian mediation message which accompanies it. This might indicate "rhetorical schematization" in Livy's source(s), or even outright annalistic falsification. There are, therefore, significant problems with the passage.83 Of course, if the passage is dismissed, then we have no evidence for a Bithynian mediation embassy in 169, and Prusias' behavior in Rome two years later can have no connection with the Roman attitude toward third party mediation. Scafuro is unwilling to dismiss the passage totally. This is surely correct: the accompanying Livian depiction of the Rhodian embassy to Rome in 169 may be greatly distorted, but (as Polybius' references to this Rhodian embassy prove) it is not made up out of whole cloth. We should therefore assume that an embassy from Prusias did visit Rome in 169.84The question seems to be: how much has the Livian-annalistic tradition distorted the content and the consequences of this embassy, as it certainly has distorted the content and the consequences of the Rhodian one? Scafuro notes that in Livy there is no direct Roman response to the Bithynian mediation offer, but there is the implication that relations were not damaged, for the obsequious tone of the Bithynians is in enormous, perhaps schematic contrast to the "arrogant" tone of the Rhodians, who do receive a very negative Roman response (cf. 44.14.8-15.8). Perhaps, then, the Roman response to Prusias was in reality as harshly negative as the (alleged) Roman response to the Rhodians. Later Roman writers, however, in their endeavor to blacken the Rhodians - and/or out of their embarrassment at the earlier Roman record of pervasive hostility to Greek mediation - then suppressed the hostile Roman response to Prusias. This, according to Scafuro, is the tradition Livy is following. But in fact the harsh senatorial reply given to the Bithynian mediation effort in 169 forms the essential background for Prusias' "unkingly" behavior in Rome in 167/166, which was a desperate attempt to defuse Roman anger.85
Scafuro, "Prusias II" 28-29. For the details, see above, p. 426. The problem of the historicity of Livy 44.14.5-7 is passed over too quickly by P. Meloni, Perseo e la fine della monarchia macedone (Rome, 1953) 347, followed by Gruen, "Rome and Rhodes" 79 n. 6. Contra (correctly): Scafuro, "Prusias II" 29. See also Habicht, "Prusias I1" (above, n. 78) col. 1111. "4 Cf. Habicht, "Prusias II" col. 1111. 85 Scafuro, "Prusias II" 29-30.
82
83
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that we do not have Polybius as a guide here to check the It is unfortunate accuracy of the Livian description of Prusias' embassy of 169 and its as we do with Livy'sdescription of the Rhodianembassyof the consequences, traditions sameyear. Nevertheless,it is strikingthatnone of the severalvariant concerningthe motivesfor Prusias'visit to Rome in 167/166indicatethat the was feargenerated behavior causeof Prusias' by the Bithynianmediationeffort of 169. In fact, only two sources, late and confused (see below, pp. 436/7), indicatethat Prusias'visit was motivatedby fear of Rome at all. But while willing to attributePrusias'motive to fear, even these sources have nothing to Prusiasa aboutPrusias'mediation.In any case, the bettersourcesattribute motivequite differentfrom fear, as we will see. Here it is enoughto point out that in Livy, in a passagebasedon Polybianmaterial,the Bithynianking can alreadybe describedas a favoriteof Rome in 168 (44.24.5). And this passage follows the Livian reference to Prusias' mediation effort by only ten chapters86 There is thus no warrantin the ancientsourcesfor the hypothesisthat the Romanresponseto Prusias'embassyof 169 was harsh,and inspiredhim with fear. Of course, one must face at least the possibility that the Bithynian embassyof 169 actuallyhad nothingto do with mediationof the Macedonian Warat all, but was (like the Rhodianembassy)simply a renewalof friendly But such a solution is probably an example of source hyperrelations.87 criticism.After all, at the heartof Livy's depictionof the eventsof 169 is not only an authentic Rhodian embassy to Rome but also the fact that the Rhodiansdid (the next year) attempta mediation.Why should not such an attemptedmediation lie at the heart of Livy's depiction of the Bithynian embassyas well? Mediationwas a Hellenistictradition;severalGreek states did intend mediation of the war, or actually attemptedit; and Prusias Perseus'royal brother-in-lawwho was (at the same time) a militaryally of Rome - was surely and excellentcandidatefor mediator.88 In the Romanhistoriographical tradition,perhapswhat happenedwas that this authenticBithynianmediationeffort of 169 eventually"contaminated" the Rhodian embassy of the same year. That is, the authentic Bithynian mediationembassy- which did no damageto Roman-Bithynian relationswas eventuallybroughtinto edifying(andfalse)contrastwith an arrogant (and false) Rhodianmediationembassy, an embassywhich itself had a historical
86 Livy 44.24.5: iam Prusiam Eumeni honore praeferri. . . On the Polybian basis of this passage, see Walbank, Commentary IllI 365. On its historicity, cf. Habicht, "Prusias 11"col. 1113 87 Thus Habicht, "Prusias 11" col. 1111 is undecided whether the embassy actually dealt witl mediation between Rome and Macedon, or came to Rome for some other purpose. 8X In Livy, this double relationship is obviously the reason why Perseus approaches Prusi. with his request to be a mediator (44.14.5). For Prusias' marriage to Perseus' sister Apama, s Livy 41.12.3 and 29.3.
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basis in the Rhodian embassy of 169 that had merely renewed friendly traditionmighthave by the Romanannalistic relations.Such"contamination" been greatly facilitated by retrojectionof the memory of the disastrous Rhodianmediationembassyof 168 back onto the Rhodianembassyof 169. Or there is another, radical(but quite attractive)possibility: that Livy's account of Prusias'embassy of 169 comes not from the Roman annalistic traditionat all, but is actually based on Polybian material.T. J. Luce has shown thatLivy did not alwayswork by simplystitchingtogetherlargeblocks his use in this periodfirst from Polybius, then from the annalists: of material
of sources for events at Rome was especially complex.89To cite one example: in Book 45, Livy first uses a Roman source to describe the dispatch to the East of the decemviral commission of 167 (45.17-18); then comes the appearanceof a Pergamene embassy before the senate (45.19.1-20.3), which comes from Polybius (cf. Polyb. 30.1-3); then comes a Roman version of the Rhodian embassy of 167, attractive to Livy because of its dramatic detail (45.20.4-25.6).90 A very similar employment of sources, for very similar reasons, could have occurred a book earlier. That is, perhaps Livy, in discussing events at Rome in 169, began with a Roman source (on embassies from Gaul and Pamphylia - 44.14.1-4), then relied on Polybian material for his account of Prusias' embassy of mediation (44.14.5-7; cf. the Attalid embassy in 45.19-20), and then switched back to Roman sources because they offered dramatic details on the Rhodian "embassy of mediation" (44.14.8-15.8; cf. the Roman version of the Rhodian embassy used in 45.20-25). In support of this hypothesis is not merely the parallel with Livy 45.18ff. There is also the language of 44.14.5-7 itself. Here we find a reference to Prusias' preces (14.5; cf. deprecator and petere at 14.7). At Livy 42.12.3 we have a similar reference to Prusias'preces: how he gained the hand of Perseus' sister precanti atque oranti. And this passage, as has long been recognized, is Polybian material.9' Indeed, even in the surviving Polybian text we can find Polybius himself depicting Prusias as a persistent, determined "beggar"; it was obviously one of his major Polybian characteristics (&e6iievog - 32.15.5; xat XLJnE(oibvT1x- 15.7) The evidence here fLXkaoxEOYcraL.. 7tQooxivvoi1vaTC is (at the least) intriguing. Either one of the above hypotheses, it seems to me, satisfactorily explains Prusias' mediation embassy of 169 as authentic. The rest of the paper will
89 T. J. Luce, Livy: The Composition of his History (Princeton, 1977) 185ff., especially 193-205. 90 On this striking passage, see the discussion in Luce, Livy (above, n. 89) 196-197. 91 See H. Nissen, Kritische Untersuchungen uber die Quellen der vierten und funften Dekade des Livius (Berlin, 1865) 245.
437
therefore proceed on the supposition that Prusias' mediation of 169 in all probability did occur. We are now in a position to address two crucial questions: (1) why did Prusias come to Rome in winter 167/166? and (2) why did he act in an "ignoble" manner? The answer to the first question seems fairly clear from our sources. Two of these sources do indicate that Prusias' visit was motivated by fear of Rome. Appian (Mithr. 2) implies that Prusias sought Roman pardon for having been neutral during the war; Dio (frg. 69) implies that Prusias sought pardon for having gone to war against Attalus of Pergamum contrary to Roman advice. But both notices are greatly confused. Despite Appian, Prusias was not neutral during the Third Macedonian War: after an initial declaration of neutrality, by 169 he had sided with Rome, providing ships to the Roman fleet.92There are other major problems with the passage as well: Appian has the main scene involving Prusias acted out before Rome's generals in Greece, not before the senate itself (thus creating an account which is basically fictional); also, he has transferred the famous incident of Prusias' "liberty cap" (see below) from an earlier period down to 167/166. Needless to say, Appian here can inspire little confidence.93 As for Prusias' motivation as reported by Dio (i.e., his war with Attalus II of Pergamum), the fact is that this war did not take place until a decade after the Bithynian king's visit to Rome. Therefore, political problems with the Romans arising from this war can hardly have been the reason for his visit. 94 Earlier sources tell a different story, in which fear is simply not involved. The relevant Polybius fragment (30.18) unfortunately contains no information on Prusias' motivation, being merely a description of his behavior and a condemnation of it. But since Livy 44.24.5 (Prusias' letter to Eumenes in 168) is based on Polybian material, and there we find a reference to the favor Prusias has already found in Rome's eyes, this surely suggests that Prusias in Polybius does not come to Rome the very next year motivated by fear. Diodorus gives the official reason for the king's visit as a desire to congratulate the senate, and the Roman commanders who had fought successfully against Perseus (31.15.1); and he seems to view this as the king's real motive as well (ibid.: in other words, sheer servility). Congratulation of the senate is also the official reason for Prusias' visit in the Livian-annalistic tradition.95 But of course the official reason need not be the real reason. And Livy hints at that
Prusias' original declaration of neutrality: Livy 42.29.3 (171 B.C.); sides with Rome militarily by 169: Livy 44.10.12, cf. 44.24.3. 93 On the probable date of the "liberty cap" incident, see Walbank, Commentary III 441. 94 On the date of Prusias' war with Attalus II of Pergamum (156-154 B.C.), see Habicht, "Prusias It" col. 1115. 95 Livy 45.44.5, cf. 44.8; Val. Max. 5.1.le; cf. Eutrop. 4.8.2.
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ECKSTEIN
real reason: Prusias, a favored friend of the Roman People, had come to Rome to ask for his reward for his actions during the war (merita sua in eo bello 45.44.8). In fact, Prusias had a particular reward in mind: a swath of land taken from Antiochus III as part of the Apamea settlement of 188, land which Prusias claimed had never been officially assigned to anyone by the Roman People, and was currently being held by the Galatians (45.44.9). Obviously, desire for territory as a reward is the opposite of coming to Rome out of fear. Yet there seems no reason to doubt the story in Livy 45.44.9. It is embedded in an account which is annalistic, but where the detail seems accurate. Thus Prusias is said to have been greeted at Capua and escorted officially around Rome by the quaestor L. Cornelius Scipio (45.44.7 and 17) - an obscure but quite real member of the Scipionic clan (ILS 5). And there is no doubt that the king had a long-term interest in Galatia, and was in this period constantly seeking to increase his power and influence there. Prusias' father had used the Galatians against Eumenes during the late 180s.96 The Galatian tribes were certainly a live issue in Asia Minor in 168-166, for they had opened new and vigorous attacks on the Attalids.9' Livy indicates that Prusias' intrigues among the Galatians were, in fact, partially responsible for those new attacks on Pergamum (45.44.21). Nor did Prusias' interest in the region end in 167/166. In 165 we find another embassy from Bithynia in Rome, this time complaining of how Eumenes - surely in the course of his Galatian War - had seized certain "Bithynian" places.98 That notice, from Polybius, suggests there was indeed a swath of disputed territory on the borders between Bithynia, Galatia, and the Attalid kingdom. Perhaps what is involved in 165 is a different frontier zone from the one Prusias claims in Livy 45.44.9; perhaps it is even the same.99In any case, the Bithynian complaint of 165 (vouched for by Polybius) shows how well Prusias' request of 167/166 fits into the historical context. Moreover, throughout the 160s Prusias continued the attempt to increase his power and influence in Galatia, by championing the Galatians diplomatically (at Rome) against Pergamum."I In addition we have
'6 For discussion, see McShane, Foreign Policy of the Attalids (above, n. 75) 160; Hopp, Attaliden (above, n. 79) 41. 97 On this war, see McShane, Foreign Policy of the Attalids 183-184; Hopp, Attaliden 51-52. 98 Polyb. 30.30.1-3; cf. Livy Per. 46. For discussion of the background and issues of this embassy, see Habicht, "Prusias II" col. 1113. 99 Note that in this embassy of 165, involving claims about territory, Prusias' envoys make accusations against Antiochus IV as well as against Eumenes (Polyb. 31.1.3; cf. Livy Per. 46) - and it was former Seleucid land that had been at issue in 167/166. 100For Prusias as instigator and supporter of Galatian complaints to Rome about Pergamum, see the discussion in Habicht, "Prusias II" col. 1113-1115. Also: McShane, Foreign Policy of the Attalids 186 and n. 33.
439
the inscriptional "Pessinus Letter" of Attalus 11 (159/156 B.C.), which seems to show Attalid concern about continued anti-Attalid pressure in Galatia pressure that probably came from Prusias. '? There are thus strong arguments for accepting the historicity of Prusias' territorial request to the senate in 167/166. And, as shown above, we should also (in all probability) accept the historicity of Prusias' mediation effort of 169. But if so, then it becomes clear that Prusias in 167/166 expected to suffer no punishment from Rome because of his attempt to mediate the Third Macedonian War. On the contrary: in 167/166 Prusias hoped to be rewarded by Rome for his conduct during the war.'02 Whatever Prusias' hopes in the matter of territory, however, he was destined to be disappointed. The senate agreed to send an embassy to investigate the situation in the lands Prusias claimed. If this territory had not been assigned at Apamea, then it would certainly be given to Prusias, the patres said; but if it had in fact been assigned to the Galatians, or had never belonged to Antiochus III in the first place, then the status quo would be maintained (Livy 45.44.10-12). The implication in Livy is that although the senate was very polite to Prusias, the patres thought the latter outcome to be the more probable, and this is the last we hear of Prusias' request. It is uncertain whether the Bithynian territorial claims were justified. But it is evident that Prusias did not receive the territory.103 Yet Prusias came away from his visit to Rome with substantial diplomatic dividends - and probably a military dividend as well. Besides the Roman promise to investigate his territorial claims, Prusias found his amicitia et societas with Rome renewed, and Roman protection established over his son Nicomedes. He also received a handsome gift of money and silver.'04But in addition, Livy says that 20 large warships from the fleet at Brundisium were assigned Prusias for his use. 105 McShane has suggested that these large warships
'01 OGIS 315 C VI. For this interpretation of the inscription, see Habicht, "Prusias II" col. 1114; Hopp, Attaliden 569. 102 In favor of the historicity of Prusias' request for territory: Habicht, "Prusias II" coll. 1 12-1113. Habicht is also clear that the purpose of Prusias' visit to Rome was to seek reward for his behavior, and advantages for his kingdom, especially against Pergamum (that is: it was not an attempt to escape Roman punishment for anything). This was realized long ago by P. V. M. Benecke: Cambridge Ancient History VIII (Cambridge, 1930) 282. Scafuro, "Prusias II", completely fails to discuss Prusias' territorial request of 167/166. 103 This is another argument in favor of the historicity of Prusias' request: why invent a claim that came to nothing? 104 Livy 45.44.9-10 and 13-14. That the societas renewed at 45.44.9 is not a formal treaty of alliance between Rome and Pergamum is shown by Polybius' reference to the Roman-Bithynian relationship at 33.12.5: merely tptkXit xcti avos[ctXCa. Cf. Gruen, Coming of Rome I 89. '05 Livy 45.44.16: et ut ex classe, quae Brundisi esset, naves longae viginti adsignarentur, quibus uteretur.
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were booty taken from the navy of Macedon, and that they were a permanent addition to the Bithynian fleet. 106 There is much to be said in favor of this hypothesis. The Bithynian navy had been substantially outnumbered by the fleet of Pergamum in the 180s. 107 Yet in 156 a powerful Bithynian fleet raided the island of Lesbos (allied with Pergamum), and coastal cities allied with Pergamum as well.'08 Nor did Attalus II at this point feel safe in confronting the Bithynian navy with the fleet of Pergamum alone (which numbered about 27 large warships - cf. Polyb. 33.13.1). Not until 154, with a fleet of some 80 ships drawn mostly from friends and allies of the Attalids, was Pergamum able to drive Prusias from the sea. '09 Moreover, in the peace treaty of 154, one primary point is that Bithynia has to turn over over to Pergamum 20 largewarships,and immediately ((io(uE 'ATTdXp aeaXQ[ILa REv&iXoolxaxaC QaxTouV vf1ac doboivat HQotoiactv
.
. . -
Polyb. 33.13.6). That number is certainly an interesting coincidence.
It
therefore seems reasonable to suppose that Prusias did indeed receive a gift of 20 large warships from the Romans in 167/166. One need not see here a sinister Roman plot against Pergamum. Perhaps this number of ships simply did not mean that much to the senate: the patres may well have seen the gift merely as a suitable recompense to Prusias for his gesture of naval help (five ships) during the war against Macedon. Yet this Roman addition to the Bithynian fleet seems to have been sufficient to shift the naval balance in the region of northern Asia Minor significantly in Prusias' favor. This brings us to the second question posed above (p. 436): the reason for Prusias' obsequious behavior once he had arrived in Rome. The king's performance of proskynesis to the senate, his salutation of the patres as gods, the servile tone of the oration that followed - all this disgusted Polybius, and provided later writers with much grist for moralizing. 0 Such fawning on the Romans is what has attracted scholars to the idea that Prusias must have come to Rome motivated by deep fear. Has Polybius in fact exaggerated Prusias' behavior?"' Though Polybius' rhetoric here is certainly heightened, one may doubt that he has much exaggerated the facts. Polybius was personally present in Rome by winter 167/166, and had already established close contacts by that time within the highest reaches of the senatorial aristocracy. He must have had good sources of information on Prusias' actions; indeed, it is hard to imagine
06 McShane, Foreign Policy of the Attalids 188 and n. 40.
See Nepos, Hann. 10.4. (Note also the small Bithynian contribution to the Roman fleet in 169, compared with that of Pergamum: Livy 44.10.12). 108 On these operations, see Walbank, Commentary III 556. 109 On the gathering of the Pergamene-allied fleet of 154 (with a list of the contributing states), see Polyb. 33.12.9-13.3. 'I Polyb. 30.18; Diod. 31.15; App. Mithr. 2; Dio frg. 69. I So Benecke, CAH VIII (above, n. 102) 202 (see also Scafuro, "Prusias II" 33-34).
107
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actions (other than those he personally eye-witnessed) on which Polybius is likely to have been better informed."12 The problem is not that Prusias' behavior as Polybius describes it clashes basically with Livy's annalistic account. The two narratives supplement, rather than contradict, each other."13 But Prusias' fawning behavior toward the senate therefore remains to be explained. The answer here is as clear as the reason for Prusias' visit to Rome in the first place. Such obsequiousness was simply part of Prusias' diplomatic style. That was how, in the mid-170s, Prusias had won the agreement of Perseus to a marriage alliance."4 Similarly, Prusias had greeted the Roman envoys who came to him in 172 by wearing a "liberty cap" and a toga, and proclaiming himself a libertus(freed slave) of the Roman People: a scene that disgusted Polybius as much as the scene in Rome five years later."I5 The tone of Prusias' mediation embassy in 169 was (as we have seen) extremely deferential as well. Polybius even remarks the fawning manner in which Prusias sacrificed to the gods (32.15.7). In other words, Prusias' behavior before the senate was not all that unusual for him - and thus requires no extraordinary explanation (such as desperate fear). The idea that he was simply seeking to increase Bithynian power in Asia Minor (as outlined above) is quite sufficient as a motive for his actions. Prusias' obsequiousness, in and of itself, offended Polybius as being unworthy of the
112 Polybius probably arrived in Rome in September 167: see Walbank, Commentary III 497. By winter 167/166 he had already become a bosom companion of the adult sons of L. Aemilius Paullus, the conqueror of Perseus. This is shown by the fact that Scipio Aemilianus had been 17 at the time of the battle of Pydna in June 168 (Livy 44.44.3), while he was 18 at the time of his famous conversation with Polybius in Rome, establishing their close friendship (Polyb. 31.24.1). Polybius' close relationship with the sons of L. Aemilius Paullus would have opened up to him many sources of information, including Paullus himself, who was obviously a man of great influence in the senate in this period, and - equally obviously - a man much interested in the senate's dealings with the East. Indeed, Polybius himself hints at the role the former Roman commanders in Greece played as opinion-makers during Prusias' visit (18.30.1; cf. Diod. 31.15.1: surely Paullus is prominent among these generals), while Livy is specific about it (45.44.9). Thus the circle of senatorial aristocrats around L. Aemilius Paullus is the most obvious source for Polybius' description of Prusias' conduct before the senate (though not necessarily for Polybius' own rhetoric about it!). For Paullus and his circle as probable Polybian sources, see P. Pdech, La metbode historique de Polybe (Paris, 1964) 367. Polybius could have seen for himself many of the impressive public ceremonies in which Prusias engaged, of course: cf. Livy 45.44.5-6, 8, 15. Habicht, "Prusias II" col. 1112 (cf. 1125) thinks that Polybius has exaggerated Prusias' behavior only a little, and is basically accurate. So, too, K. -W. Welwei, Konige und Konigtum im Urteil des Polybios (Cologne, 1963) 115. Scafuro, "Prusias II" 34, thinks that Polybius' information on Prusias' appearance before the senate may have come from a virulently anti-Prusias/antiMacedonian Greek. 113 Cf. Habicht, "Prusias II" col. 1112. 14 Livy 42.12.3: precanti atque oranti . . . On this passage, see above, p. 436 and n. 91. 115On the probable date of this incident, see Walbank, Commentary III 441.
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dignity of a king."16But not too much should be madeof Prusias'actionsas attitudes towardthose they wereintendedto signifyingdeeply-helddeferential flatter, or as indicationsof long-termBithynianpolicy. Prusias'obsequious in 172 did not preventhim from being a receptionof Rome's ambassadors "7 of self-interest. prominent neutralin 171, on the basisof shrewdcalculations On the other hand, Prusias'humblebeggingfor the handof Perseus'sisterin the mid-170sdid not preventhim from eventuallysiding with Rome in the Nor of self-interest. War- again,surely,out of calculations ThirdMacedonian sacrificesto the gods preventhim from did Prusias'exaggeratedly deferential destroyingtheiraltarsand templeswhen they seemednot to be favoringhim (Polyb. 32.15.3-9). And while Prusiasfawned on the senate in 167/166, a decadelaterhe apparently disruptedby violencea Romanattemptto mediate A readywillingnessto sacrificeroyal dignity for his war with Pergamum."8 politicalgoal (combined,however,with a badtemper)werethe any immediate of guiding factors in Prusias'diplomaticstyle. These generalcharacteristics Prusias'diplomacyare sufficientto explainhis obsequiousbehaviorin Rome in 167/166- behaviorwhich, as we have now seen, carriesno implicationof
fear. 119
To summarize.In this paper we have examinedRoman attitudestoward and mediationof conflicts and quarrels involvingRome in Greek arbitration the third and second centuriesB.C., with specific referenceto the Greek
116 For Polybius' ideas on "kingly behavior" see above all Welwei, Konige und Konigtum (above, n. 112) 123-184. On Polybius' general attitude toward Prusias: ibid. 114-116. 117 See Livy 42.29.3: Prusias, Bithyniae rex, statuerat abstinere armis et eventum expectare; nam neque Romanos posse aequum censere, adversus fratrem uxoris se arma ferre, et apud Persea victorem veniam per sororem impetrabilem fore. This is Polybian material: cf. Nissen, Untersuchungen (above, n. 91) 248-249. "I App. Mithr. 3, confirmed by Polyb. 33.7.1-2. Note the commments of Gruen, Coming of Rome II 587. 119 Regarding the Roman attitude in winter 167/166 toward Greek states that attempted diplomatic intervention in Rome's quarrels, note also the outcome of an Athenian embassy that came to Rome just shortly after Prusias' own visit (Polyb. 30.20.1-3). This embassy came on behalf of the people of Haliartus, destroyed by a Roman army in 171, during the war against Perseus. The Athenians asked - so it seems - for the liberation of the surviving Haliartans from slavery, and the restoration of their city to them (see Polyb. 30.20.1 with Walbank, Commentary III 443). The senate rejected the Athenian effort: the fate of the Haliartans stood (30.20.2). But did the Roman rejection of Athenian diplomacy here also mean a cooling of Rome's attitude toward Athens itself, out of anger at the attempted intervention in the Haliartus affair? Far from it. The Athenians, who had been loyal to Rome during the war, came away from this embassy in possession of Delos, Lemnos, and even Haliartus itself - gifts of the Roman senate (30.20.3-3). The whole incident seems to reveal a generally tolerant attitude on the part of the senate toward third party diplomacy precisely in 167-166: indeed, the Athenians asked for a territorial award from Rome immediately after Roman rejection of their diplomatic effort on behalf of the Haliartans - and they were successful (ibid.).
443
War (171-168). It is clear that the efforts to mediatethe Third Macedonian of their disputesby third binding arbitration Romans rejectedquasi-judicial (and to their diplomatictraditions seems to have been foreign parties.The idea was not unusualfor a Hellenistic great in any case, rejectionof arbitration power). But it is also evidentthat the Romanswere not averseto all sorts of interventions by thirdparties,shortof outrightbindingarbitration, diplomatic which attemptedthe peacefulresolutionof disputes- in a word, mediation. This seemstrue of Rome both in the periodbeforethe war with Perseus,and to use theirgood also in the periodafterit. Those thirdpartieswho attempted offices to facilitatethe peacefulresolutionof conflicts and quarrelstherefore had no reasonto expectRomanrejectionof theireffortson principle,let alone of Roman Roman punishmentfor their actions. That is: the interpretation attitudestoward mediationoffered by Erich Gruen is more consonantwith our ancientevidencethan is the recentstudy by A. C. Scafuro. numberof casesin which Rome was open to We haveadduceda substantial the resolution of conflicts or quarrelsvia third party diplomatic efforts. Examples:in Sicily during the HannibalicWar; in Greece during the First in effortsat mediation,the lastone successful); Macedonian War(fourseparate War(the Aous Conference);in Greece Greeceduringthe SecondMacedonian during the SyrianWar (the Aetolian treaty); in Greece during the Achaean War; and War; in Thracein the 90s; in Greece during the First Mithridatic severallesser cases. This Roman traditionof openness to Greek mediation forms the historicalcontext for the four separateGreek efforts (or intended efforts)to bringRome'swar with Perseusto a close. That is: such diplomacy was nothing out of the ordinary. It is true that afterthe war Rome punishedtwo of these Greekmediators RhodesandEumenesII - for theirattemptsat mediation.But this was because Eumeneswas suspectedof deeplycorruptmotives(briberyby Perseus),while the Rhodianeffort had, unfortunately,been horriblyill-timed (and Rhodian motives were also suspected).In two other instances- Egypt and Bithyniathe thirdpartymediatorssufferedno adverseconsequences.On the contrary. entity in the years Rome actuallysavedthe Ptolemaicstate as an independent immediatelyafter the Ptolemies' intended mediation of 170 (which many prominent men in the senate, besides M. Aemilius Lepidus the princeps senatus, surely knew about). And Prusias II of Bithynia, who apparently attemptedmediationbetween Rome and Perseus in 169, came to Rome in for his behavior winter 167/166not out of fear, but expectingto be rewarded duringthe war (which he was). It has been necessary to discuss these matters in detail (especially the problems surroundingthe actions of Prusias multitudeof historiographical both in 169 and in 167/166) in order to establish that the harsh Roman treatmentof Eumenes II and Rhodes should not be viewed as the typical
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A. M. ECKSTEIN
Roman response to Greek mediation. The cases of Eumenes and Rhodes were in fact aberrations, called forth by very unusual circumstances. By the midsecond century, Rome was certainly the dominant state in the Mediterranean. But the Romans had gotten to that position by diplomacy as well as by military power, and they did not automatically reject (let alone punish) the opportunities for diplomacy occasionally offered them by others. University of Maryland College Park A. M. Eckstein

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Rome, the War with Perseus, and Third Party Mediation Author(s): A. M.

Rome, the War with Perseus, and Third Party Mediation

Rome, the War with Perseus, and Third Party Mediation

Rome, the Warwith Perseus,andThirdPartyMediation

Rome, the War with Perseus, and Third Party Mediation

Rome, the War with Perseus, and Third Party Mediation

Rome, the War with Perseus, and Third Party Mediation

Rome, the Warwith Perseus,andThirdPartyMediation

and because the Aetolians were in a state

Rome, the Warwith Perseus,andThirdPartyMediation

thought himself to be the person best able to mediatethe matter

Polybius believes these considerations to be reasonable calculations on

Rome, the War with Perseus, and Third Party Mediation

Rome, the War with Perseus, and Third Party Mediation

partly thanks to the diplomatic intervention of Eumenes' brother Attalus,

Rome, the War with Perseus, and Third Party Mediation

Rome, the War with Perseus, and Third Party Mediation

Rome, the Warwith Perseus,andThirdPartyMediation

Polyb. 33.13.6). That number is certainly an interesting coincidence.

Rome, the War with Perseus, and Third Party Mediation

Rome, the War with Perseus, and Third Party Mediation

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