ThePovertyoftheRegent: NietzschesCritiqueoftheSubject

WILLIAMMCNEILL
DePaulUniversity

ABSTRACT: Thisessayseekstoaccomplishthreethings:First,toexamineNietzsches critiqueofthesubjectinmodernphilosophy,withparticularreferencetoDescartes. Second,topresentaninterpretationofNietzschesalternativeconceptionofthesubject asmultiplicity.Andthird,toarguethat,forNietzsche,thisaccountofthesubject asmultiplicitydoesnotleadtoakindofatomisticoranarchicviewofthesubject, contrarytowhatisoftensupposed.Theessayfocusesinparticularonanumberof aphorismsfromTheWilltoPowerthatarticulatemostforcefullyNietzschescritique ofCartesiansubjectivityanditsaftermath.Thinking,asinterpretation,Nietzschesuggests,isanactivityundertakennotbyaunitarysubjectthatisconsciousofitself,but byamuchmoresubtle,largelyconcealed,andcomplexinterplayofdrivesasforcesof dominationthattogetherconstitutethephenomenonofthelivingbody.

popularconstrualoftheradicalityofNietzschescritiqueofthesubjectruns somethinglikethefollowing:Instarkoppositiontomodernphilosophyfrom DescartestoHegelthataccordsprimacytothethinkingsubject,toconsciousness, astheunitaryseatandsubstratumofidealitythatdeterminesandgroundsthe beingoftheworld,thesubjectforNietzscheisbutaction,abeliefthatmay indeedbeusefulforlife,butthatremainsactionnevertheless,aninterpretation, butnotanultimatefactortruth.Thecentralityoftheideaofthesubjectfor modernthoughtissymptomaticofthenihilismofWesternthoughtingeneral, which,beginningwithPlato,positsthetrueworldintherealmofaneternal andquasi-divineidealityaccessibleonlytopurethought,therebydevaluingthe realmofthesensuous,ofmateriality,oftheuxoflivedappearances.Inkeeping withthetaskofoverturningPlatonism,Nietzschesthinking,bycontrast,would abolishanyconceptionofthesubjectasanunderlyingunityorsubstratum, positing instead the notion ofthe subject as multiplicity1 and interpreting

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thismultiplicityintermsofthephenomenonofthebodyasanultimatelymore certain,moreindispensabletruth.Inplaceofanypermanentorenduringself transcendingandoutlastingalltemporalexperiences,thesubjectwouldthereby becomereconceivedasbutamomentaryction,atransitorymomentofbeing positedbythewilltopoweronlytobeovercomeinfavorofthelife-enhancing dynamismofsensuousbodying-forth,givingwaytoanothermoment,another ction,anotherperspective,anothersubject.Suchaconceptionabolishesany beliefinanenduringselfthatwouldtranscendthemomentofbecoming;the assuranceofself-identitythroughtimenowgiveswaytoanatomisticviewofthe subject:thesubjectisnothingotherthanthemoment,itsbeingisradically temporal,nite,anddestinedinevitablytooblivioninthenextmoment.The subjectasmultiplicityinstallsaviewofthesubjectaspunctualitythatleaves noroomforanymetaphysicalconsolationorcomfort,exposingusinsteadtothe DionysianexcessoflifeitselfthatshredsustopiecesevenasitcreatestheconditionsforitsownrebirththroughtheemergenceoftheApollonian.2 ThispopularconstrualofNietzscheisundoubtedlycorrectincertainrespects: WhatreaderofNietzscheandhereImean,aboveall,thelaterNietzscheofThe WilltoPowerwhatreaderofNietzschewoulddenythatNietzscheseeksto rethinkthesubjectintermsofthebody,restoringittotherealmofthesensuous andreinterpretingitasmultiplicity,abolishingthectionalsubjectofmodern philosophywhoserootsstretchbacktoPlato?Andyet,Ishallarguehere,this popularconstrualofNietzschescritiqueofthesubjectisalsoincertainrespects aromanticizedreadingthatremainsatthelevelofanincompletenihilism,ofan overlyreactiveinversionofPlatonismthatfailstoaccomplishthetwistingfree ofPlatonismthatNietzschesphilosophyseesasitspropertask.3Initspretended radicality,itoverlooksthewayinwhichtheunityofthesubjectisnotsomuch abolishedbyNietzsche,butdislocatedandreinscribedwithinthedominionof thebodyanditsbecoming. Tobeginwith,letusrecallsomeofthoseaphorismsfromTheWilltoPower thatarticulatemostforcefullyNietzschescritiqueofCartesiansubjectivityand its aftermath. It is important to note that this is for the most part a blanket critiqueofthesubjectwhosescopeismeanttoencompasssubjectivityinall itstransformationsfromDescartes cogito,ergosumtoHegelsabsolutespirit (Geist).Indeed,itsscopeextendsevenbeyondmodernsubjectivity,incertain respects stretching back to the concept of the soul (psuche) that emerged in Greekphilosophy.Anindicationoftheintendedscopeofthissweepingcritique isevidentbythefactthatinanumberofaphorismsin TheWilltoPowerwe seeNietzschestraightforwardlyequatethetermssoul,spirit,consciousness, andsubject,atleastinsofarastheyaresusceptibletothesamecriticisms.In 659,forexample,contraDescarteswholocatesultimatecertaintyinthepresenceofthe egocogito,Nietzschearguesthatwehavealwaysbelievedmorein

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thebodyasourmostproperpossession,asourmostcertainbeing,asego,than inthespirit(orthesoulorthesubject,asthelanguageoftheschoolsnowsays insteadofsoul).Thesameequationofsoulandsubjectoccursin485;and 480openswiththestillmoresweepingstatementThereisneitherspirit,nor reason,northinking,norconsciousness,norsoul,norwill,nortruth:allunusable ctions.ImentionthisaspectofthescopeofNietzschesapparentcritiquehere becausedespitehisevidentaversiontothetermsoul,orperhapstowhatthat termhascometosignifyinthecourseofthehistoryofphilosophyonemight question whether Nietzsches own understanding of the body as the ultimate subjectdoesnotinfactcomeveryclose,atleastincertainrespects,toacertain Greekunderstandingofthesoul.4 YetwhatexactlyisNietzschescritiqueofthesubject?HowcanNietzsche,in onesweepingstatement,simplydismissanentirechainofsigniersdesignating everythingthatphilosophersfortwothousandyearshavetakentobemostsacred,theverygroundandfoundationoftheworldanditsexistence?Theforceof Nietzschescritiquecanbeneatlyexpressedinjustafewaphorisms(letusrecall hereNietzschesidenticationofoneofhisvirtuesasbeingabletosayinafew lineswhatotherstakeanentirebooknottosay).5In477hewrites:
Thinking, as epistemologists conceive it, simply does not occur: it is an altogetherarbitraryction,arrivedatbyselectingoneelementfromtheprocessandsubtractingalltherest:anarticialarrangementforthepurposes ofintelligibility.... Thespirit, something that thinks, where possible evenabsolute, pure spiritthis conception is a second derivative of that false introspection [Selbstbeobachtung]thatbelievesinthinking:rstanactisimaginedthat simplydoesnotoccur,namely,thinking,andsecondlyasubject-substratum inwhicheveryactofthisthinking,andnothingelse,hasitsorigin.Thatis, boththedoingandthedoerarections.

Nietzschescritiquehereisnotonlyarefutationoftheconceptofthesubjectas substance,thatis,asasubstratumconceivedasathingthatdoesthethinkingwhenwethink;itsradicalityliesinthewayinwhichNietzscheseesthatthis conceptionofasubjectisintimatelyinterwovenwith,andindeedpresupposes,a certainconceptionofthinking.Wewouldneverarriveatthethoughtofourselves asthinkingsubjects,Nietzscheisclaiming,unlesswealreadyconceivedofthinkingasaprocessemanatingfromadeterminatecenterororigin,anoriginthat governeditandcoincidedwiththepresenceofthoughtitself.Theconceptofthe subjectasathinkingthing(theresoftherescogitans)isindeednotprimary, butderivativeuponacertaininterpretation(orself-interpretation)ofthinking. ThisisevidentalreadyinDescartes,whoinstitutesthemostradicalattemptat aseparationandpuricationofthemindfromthebody.InDiscourseFourof theDiscourseonMethod,Descarteswrites:

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[I]fIhadonlyceasedtothink...Iwouldhavehadnoreasontobelievethat Iexisted;IthereforeconcludedthatIwasasubstance,ofwhichthewhole essenceornatureconsistsinthinking[penser],andwhich,inordertoexist, needsnoplaceanddependsonnomaterialthing;sothatthisI[cemoi], thatistosay,themind[lme],bywhichIamwhatIam,isentirelydistinct fromthebody,andeventhatitiseasiertoknowthanthebody,andmoreover, thatevenifthebodywerenot,itwouldnotceasetobeallthatitis.

Theessenceofthesubjectwhatthesubjectis,itsessentialbeingor essentiaisinseparablefrom,andindeednothingotherthan,theactivityofthinking, thewayofitsbeing.TheCartesiansubjectisthusnotprimarilyathing,butthe beingorpresenceofthoughtconceivedinacertainway.Thispointismademore emphaticallybyDescarteshimselfinthe SecondMeditation.Intheattribute ofthinking,Descarteswrites,

Idiscoveranattributethatbelongstome;thisalonecannotbedetached fromme. Iam,Iexist [Egosum,egoexisto]:thisiscertain,butforhow long?ForaslongasIthink[Nempequandiucogito],foritmightperhaps happen,ifIceasedtothink,thatIwouldatthesametimeceasetobeorto exist....Iam,therefore,preciselyspeaking,onlyathingwhichthinks[res cogitans],thatistosayamind,orsoul,orunderstanding,orreason[mens, sive animus, sive intellectus, sive ratio],termswhosesignicancewas hithertounknowntome.

DescarteshimselfisonlytooawarethatthesubjectastheIoftherescogitans isnotreallyasubstanceatallinthestrictsensedenedinthe Principles of Philosophy,namely,ashavingindependentexistence.6Itsexistenceisalltoo dependentonthinking.Itisstriking,indeed,thatthebeingofthesubjectishere seenbyDescartesasaltogethertemporal:itis,ashesays,nothingotherthanthe presenceofthinking,andnotathinginthesenseofanindependent,material entity.TheCartesiansubject,wemightsay,hastobringitself(temporally)into beinginandasacertainself-interpretationofthinking:itisnotatallagiven prior to or independent of thinking. How does thinking come to understand itself inthisway?Isthinkingitself conceivedinthiswayaction,as Nietzschewouldhaveit? Itisimportanttonote,inthiscontext,thatwhenNietzscheidentiestheactof thinkingasaction,heisnotdenyingeitherthatthereissuchaphenomenon asthinking,orthatthinkingisaprocess,atemporaleventinanasyetundeterminedsense;rather,whatheisrefutingisaparticularinterpretationofthisprocess asanactivityundertakenbyandgroundedinasubject.Thisbecomesclearin aphorism484ofTheWilltoPower,whereNietzschewrites:
Thereisthinking:thereforethereissomethingthatthinks:thisistheupshot ofallDescartesargumentation.Butthatmeanspositingastrueaprioriour beliefintheconceptofsubstancethatwhenthereisthinking,therehasto

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besomethingthatthinksissimplyaformulationofourgrammaticalcustom thataddsadoertoeverydeed[Tun].... If one reduces the proposition toThere is thinking, therefore there are thoughts,onehasproducedameretautology:andpreciselythatwhichisin question,therealityofthought,isnottoucheduponthatis,inthisform theapparentrealityofthoughtcannotbedenied.ButwhatDescarteswanted wasthatthoughtshouldhave,notmerelyan apparentreality[scheinbare Realitt],butarealityinitself.

There is thinking, but wherein the being of thinking consists, the being and groundofitstruththis,farfrombeingagiven,isamatterforthinkingitself.7 ThegroundofwhatNietzschecallsDescartesverystrongbelief inthetruth ofthecogito,farfrombeinganimmediatelyintuitablecertainty,provestobea historicalproduct,orby-product,ofthoughtitself:anotherbelief,thebeliefin theaprioritruthofsubstance,ofanunderlyingsubstratumorhupokeimenon behindorbeyondappearances:alogical-metaphysicalpostulate,asNietzsche callsit.In483,Nietzschewrites:
Throughthoughttheegoisposited;buthithertoonebelieved,asmostpeople do,thatintheIthinktherewassomethingofimmediatecertainty,andthat thisIwasthegivencauseofthought,fromwhichbyanalogyweunderstood allothercausalrelationships.Howeverhabitualandindispensiblethisction mayhavebecomebynowthatinitselfprovesnothingagainstitsimaginary origin[Erdichtheit]:abeliefcanbeaconditionoflifeand nonethelessbe false.[Emphasisadded]

NoticethathereNietzscheemphasizeshowtheegoorI,assubject,farfrom being priortothought,issomethingrstposited throughthought,aproduct of thinking, neither somethinggiven, nor its a priori condition of possibility.Nietzschehereappearstoreversetheclaimhehasjustmaderegardingthe subjectsdependenceonapriorbeliefinsubstance,whenhewritesofother causalrelationsbeingunderstoodbyanalogywiththesubject,butthisapparent reversalmerelycorrespondstotheascendancyofthesubjectwithinthemodern Cartesian-Kantianerawherethetruthoftheexternalworldhastobegrounded inandthroughthesubjectivityofhumanknowledge.ItisinthissensethatNietzscheexplicitlyinvokesthisreversalinaphorism485:
Theconceptofsubstanceisaconsequenceoftheconceptofthesubject,notthe reverse!Ifwerelinquishthesoul,thesubject,thepreconditionforsubstance ingeneraldisappears.Oneacquiresgradationsofbeings,notbeingsthemselves[ManbekommtGradedesSeienden,manverliertdasSeiende].

Again,thisgenealogicalreversalmakessenseonlywithintheepochofmodernity: ItwouldnotmakesensewithintheClassicalageofGreekphilosophy.Nietzsches earlier point, identifying the origin of the concept of thesubject in that of

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substanceremainsvalid,foritisthisgenealogythatitselfrstenablestheepoch ofCartesianmodernity. Thesubject,then,asNietzscheindicatesintheseaphorisms,isnotafactora given,butsomethingimaginedorctioned,aproductofthoughtitself,butnever thatwhichthinks.Thatthesubjectisactionhavingnoultimatetruthdoesnot preclude,however,asNietzschehasalsopointedout,thatthisctionmaybe,or inacertainepochmayhavebeen,necessaryasaconditionoflifesomething neededbylifeitself.YetifthinkingisforNietzschenottheactivityofasubject, whatisit?Howarewetoconceiveofthoughtitself,ifwewishneithertosimplify itasanisolatedactivityofthemindorspirit,nortoseattheeventofthinkingin ahypostatizedsubjectasitsgroundandorigin?Whatisitthatthinks,accordingtoNietzsche,whenhewrites:NotIthink,butitthinksinme?Nietzsches answer,inshort,is:lifeitself,conceivedastheunitary,perspectivalappropriation ofwilltopowerandeternalreturnofthesame. Toconceiveofthoughtasintrinsicallyctiveorpoietic,inthesenseofproducingapparenttruthsornecessaryctionssuchasthatofthesubject,isfor Nietzscheequivalenttoclaimingthatallthoughtisinterpretation.Andwecan inthissenselegitimatelycharacterizeNietzscheasahermeneuticphilosopher: Nietzscheangenealogyisintrinsicallyhermeneutic.Inaphorism481of The WilltoPowerNietzschewrites:
Againstpositivism,whichhaltsatphenomenaThereareonlyfactsI wouldsay:No,factsiswhattherepreciselyarenot,onlyinterpretations.Wecannotestablishanyfactinitself :perhapsitisfollytowishtodosuchathing. Everything is subjective, you say; but even this is interpretation. The subjectisnotsomethinggiven,itissomethingaddedandinvented[HinzuErdichtetes]andprojectedbehindwhatthereis.Isitultimatelynecessary to posit an interpreter behind the interpretation? Even this is invention [Dichtung],hypothesis.

Asopposedtothectionofthesubjectasthesecureandcertaingroundofa rationalknowledgeoftheworldthatcouldbeascertainedasasystemofultimate facts, Nietzsche, then, offers us the alternative hypothesis of interpretation as intrinsicallyperspectivalandgroundedintheneedsanddrivesoflifeitself:
Insofarasthewordknowledge[Erkenntnis]hasanymeaning,theworldis knowable:butitcanbeinterpretedotherwise,ithasnoonemeaningbehind it,butcountlessmeanings.Perspectivism. Itisourneedsthatinterprettheworld;ourdrivesandtheirForandAgainst. Everydriveisakindofdesiretorule;eachonehasitsperspectivethatitwould liketoimposeuponalltheotherdrivesasanorm.[Emphasisadded]

Thinking,interpretation,isanactivityundertakennotbyaunitarysubjectthat isconsciousofitself,butbyamuchmoresubtle,largelyconcealed,andincredibly

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complexinterplayofdrivesasforcesofdominationthattogetherconstitutethe phenomenonofthelivingbody.Thebodyitself,Nietzscheproposes,shouldbe takenastheguidingthreadofanyinterpretationofthesubjectortheworld.As hewritesinaphorism489:

Everything that enters consciousness asunity is already tremendously complex:weonlyeverhaveasemblanceofunity. Thephenomenonofthebodyisthericher,clearer,moretangiblephenomenon: itistobeplacedrstmethodologically,withoutcomingtoanydecisionasto itsultimatesignicance.[Emphasisadded]

WhenNietzscheherewritesofthephenomenonofthebodybeingclearerand moretangibleormoregraspable,hemeansthisonlyinthesensethatthedrives andforcesofthebodyassertthemselvesirrespectiveoftheinterpretationsor ctionstowhichtheygiverise.Inthissensethebodyis,aswehavealreadyheard himindicatein659,ourmostproperpossession,ourmostcertainbeing,in short,ourego,morecertainthanthe cogito.AsNietzschenotes,whilewecan verywellconceiveofourthoughtsasemanatingfromGodorourjudgmentsas inspiredbyagod,itwouldneveroccurtoanyonetounderstandhisstomach asanalienordivinestomach.Yetinanotherrespectthebodyisanythingbut clear:NietzschewouldcertainlyagreewithDescartesthattheIthinkiseasier toknowthanthebody.Granted,Nietzschenotes,thattheoldideaofthesoul wasanattractiveandmysteriousidea,thebodyisperhapssomethingstillmore seductiveandmysterious:
Thehumanbody,inwhichthemostremoteandmostrecentpastofallorganic development[Werden]comestolifeandbecomesbodyonceagain,through whichandoutbeyondwhichatremendous[ungeheurer],inaudiblestreamappearstoow:thebodyisamoreastonishingthoughtthantheformersoul.

Thebecomingofthebody,Nietzscheindicateshere,isaunitarybecoming:itis thatofonetremendous,inaudiblestreamwhathewillotherwiseidentifyasthe singularwillofthewilltopowerwhich,astheverybeingoflife,mustcomeagain inonesingular,tremendousmoment[Augenblick]astheeternalreturnofthe same.8Yettheunityofthisbecoming,astheunifyingstruggleofembodiedlife, isaltogetherotherthanthesupposedunityofthesubject.Subjectinthelatter senseis,asNietzscheputsit(485),thectionthatmany similarstatesinus aretheeffectofOnesubstratum:butitiswewhorstcreatedthesimilarityof thesestates;ouradjustingthemandmakingthemsimilaristhepoint,nottheir similarity(whichoughtrathertobedenied).9Suchmaking-similarisan essentialaccomplishmentofthinking,forNietzsche,asamodeofincorporation and assimilation.10All thought and interpretation, as ctioning, for Nietzsche entailssuchassimilation,theinsertionandorderingofnewmaterialintoold schematathatgivethesemblanceofunity(499).

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Againstthesemblanceofunitythatentersandappearstoconsciousnessas thesubjectofmodernphilosophy,Nietzsche,proceedingfromthephenomenon ofthebody,counterposeswhathecallsthesubjectasmultiplicity(490):

Theassumptionof Onesubject[of asinglesubject]isperhapsunnecessary;perhapsitisjustaspermissabletoassumeamultiplicityofsubjects, whoseinterplayandstruggle[ZusammenspielundKampf]isthebasisof ourthoughtandconsciousnessingeneral?Akindofaristocracyofcells,in whichdominion[Herrschaft]resides?Tobesure,anaristocracyofequals, usedtorulingjointlyandunderstandinghowtocommand? Myhypotheses:thesubjectasmultiplicity....

Anaristocracyisnotinitselfasinglesubjectorsubstratum,butitisnevertheless onebodycomprisedofandenabledbyamultiplicityofforcesorsubjects,each strivingfordominion,andwhoseinterplayandstrugglerstconstitutesthefragile unityandharmonyofthepoliticalbody.Atanygivenmoment,oneparticular subjectgainsascendancyovertheothers,takingtheremainingcellsintoitsservice inthenameofsomethinggreater,overandbeyonditself.Inthiswaythesubject thatNietzschecritiquescanbereinterpretedintermsofmultiplicity:Inplaceof one,homogeneoussubjectconceivedasasubstratumunderlyingmanysimilar statesofbeing,wehavemultiplesubjectscorrespondingtomultiplestatesthat mightappearsimilar,yetintruthareanythingbut.In492,Nietzscherenesthis visionofanaristocracyofcellscomprisingmultipleregents:
Ourstartingpointthe bodyanditsphysiology:why?Wegainthecorrect ideaofoursubject-unity,namelyasregentsatthehead[Spitze]ofacommunal body[orcommunality:Gemeinwesen](notassoulsorvitalforces),and likewiseofthedependencyoftheseregentsupontheruled,andofanorder ofrankanddivisionoflaborastheconditionsthatmakepossiblethewhole anditsindividualparts.Inthesameway,howlivingunitiescontinuallyarise anddie,andhowthesubjectisnoteternal;inthesameway,thatthestruggle expressesitselfinobeyingandcommanding,andthatauiddeningofthe limitsofpowerbelongstolife.

Thesubjectasregentisnotapermanent,enduringsubjectthatwouldmaintain itselfassuch,asself-identical,acrossorthroughoutmanydifferentstatesofbeing. Andyeteachofthesesubjectsisaperspectivalunity,eachisalivingunitythat emerges,rulesforatime,anddies,givingwaytoanothersubject,anotherregent. Thesubjectasregentis,moreover,dependentforitsexistenceupontheruled,upon itssubjects(inthepoliticalsense),whichsustainandenableit,deningand situatingitsplace,andtherebylimitingitspower.Indeed,theveritablepoverty oftheregentliesinpreciselythis:that,asthusdependent,itultimatelyhasno poweroveritsownbeing:abandonedtorule,itcannotevenknowitsowntime; itcontrolsneitherthepointofitsownemergence,northemomentofitsown

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demise.Inthissense,Nietzschecontinues,Therelativeignoranceinwhichthe regentiskeptconcerningtheindividualactivitiesandevendisturbanceswithin thecommunalityisamongtheconditionsunderwhichrulecanbeexercised.11 NowthispovertyoftheregentthatunderliesNietzschesconceptionofthe subjectasmultiplicitymightlead,andfrequentlyhasled,readersofNietzsche toregardthissubjectasasubjectinsheerdispersion,asanatomisticsubject that exists in and for the moment, yet arises and disappears without a trace. Yetthis,asIindicatedearlier,isnotatallwhatNietzscheproposes.Quitetothe contrary:Inaphorism488hearguesprecisely againstanatomisticnotionof thesubject,emphasizingoncemorethatthesubjectasmultiplicityisbutpartof amuchgreatersystem:
Notsubjectatoms.Thesphereofasubjectconstantlygrowingordecreasingthecenterofthesystemconstantlyshifting[sich...verschiebend];in caseswhereit[thesystem]cannotorganizetheappropriatedmass,itbreaks intotwo.Ontheotherhand,itcantransformaweakersubjectintoitsfunctionarywithoutdestroyingit,andtoacertaindegreeformanewunitywith it.Notsubstance,rathersomethingthatinitselfstrivesaftergreaterstrength, andthatwantstopreserveitselfonlyindirectly(itwishesto surpass[or exceed]itself).12

Nietzsche here identies the subject as but one, unstable moment that exists onlyasacomponentofamuchgreatersystem,asystemthatstrivesforunity, yetwhosecenterisconstantlyshifting,deferringitself.Thesubjectasregentis notsomethingthatcouldemergeorexistinatomisticisolationfromtheother partsofthesystem.Theregentisnotthecenterofthesystem,butafunction, albeitagoverningfunction,thereof.Thesystemitselfstrivesforunity:itisintrinsicallyunity-formingorsynthetic,althoughitdoesnotofcourseassimilate orappropriateeverything(itisselective,discriminating);theself-preservation ofthesystem,Nietzschesuggests,issecondaryorindirect:itsprimarygoalis self-surpassing,theintensicationandenhancementoflife.Thissystemisof coursethewilltopower,thatinsatiableappropriation,asNietzschecallsit,that organizesthearistocracyofthebody13

CONCLUSION:SYMBOLISMFORTHEEYE
OnNietzschesinterpretation,then,consciousnessandeverythingthatappears toconsciousnessasaunity,includingthatofthesubject,isbutatransitory andsomewhateetingepiphenomenonofthewilltopower.14Asheputsitin aphorism674:
Inthetremendousmultiplicityofeventswithinasingleorganism,thepart thatbecomesconscioustousisamerecorner....

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Ourentire consciouslife,thespiritalongwiththesoul...inwhoseservice doesitlabor?Intheserviceofthegreatestpossibleperfectionofthemeans ...ofbasicanimalfunctions:aboveall,thatoflife-enhancement. Whatoneusedtocallbodyandeshisofsuchunspeakablygreaterimportance:theremainderisbutaminoraccessory.Thetaskofcontinuingto spintheentirechainoflife,andinsuchawaythatthethreadbecomesever morepowerfulthatisthetask.

Thesubjectasregent,asperspectivalunity,isbutthehead(Spitze)ofthevast serpentlife,15themomentwhoseself-samenessisonlyapparent,andwhich servestomaintaintheself-deferring,self-exceeding,self-recuperatingbecoming ofthewilltopowerthat,viatheeternityofthemoment,returnsasthesame throughout all appearances.Yet the poverty of the regent, Nietzsche suggests, therelativeignoranceinwhichtheregentiskept,isnotsomethingthatcould beovercome,butsomethingthatmustbeafrmedasabsolutelyessentialtothe self-maintainingoflifeaswilltopower.Therelativeignoranceoftheregent,he writes,entailsthat(492):
In short, we also come to value not knowing, seeing things broadly and crudely,simplifyingandfalsifying,theperspectival.Themostimportantthing, however,isthis:thatweunderstandtherulerandhissubjects[Untertanen] as thesameinkind[gleicherArt],allfeeling,willing,thinkingandthat whereverweseeorespymovementinabody,welearntoconcludethatthereis asubjective,invisiblelifebelongingtoit.Movementissymbolismfortheeye: itindicatesthatsomethinghasbeenfelt,willed,thought.[Emphasisadded]

Thatwheneverweseethemovementofabodybeforeuswehavetheillusionthat itisthemovementofsomeone; thatweascribetheself-samenessofa subject tothebodyasitappears;thatweconcludethattheremustbesomeonewhois doingthefeeling,willing,orthinkingthisisnotsomearbitrarymistakeonour partthatcouldbecorrected.Rather,suchselectivityandsimplicationispartand parceloftheconditionsunderwhichtherecanberuleatall,underwhichthewill topowercanbe.Thatwedodrawsuchinferencesisindeed,asNietzschesays, themostimportantthing,namely,forthepurposesoflife-enhancement.The semblanceofunityisnecessarytolife,yetitcanalsomisleadusintoseeingin suchsemblanceanultimatetruthorfoundationofknowledge.Therenement ofsuchanappearancecanevenbedangeroustolifeitself.Nietzscheindeedsuggeststhatjustsuchrenementeventuallyledtothenotionofthesubjectasthe doerbehindadeed(547):
Psychologicalhistoryoftheconceptsubject.Thebody,thething,thewhole constructedbytheeye,awakensthedistinctionbetweenadoing[Tun]anda doer;thedoer,thecauseofthedeed,conceivedinanevermorerenedmanner,nallyleftuswiththesubject.

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Yetsymbolismfortheeye,orinterpretation,doesnotgiveusultimatetruths,but rathermeanings,meaningsthatstandandfallintheserviceoflifeitself.Against theconstructionofthesubject,Nietzschewrites(675):

Mydemandisthatoneshouldtakethedoerbackintothedoing.... [A]llpurposes,ends,andmeaningsareonlyexpressionsandmetamorphosesoftheOnewillthatinheresinalloccurrence:thewilltopower.

The unity of the will to power, however, as One will, is, as we have seen, not thatofastaticunity,butratherthatofastrivingforandcreatingofunityin andthroughthecreationandovercomingormetamorphosisofmeaning.Once again,thecreationofmeaningisnotsomethingundertakenbyusassubjects, butbylifeitselfaswilltopower.Inthissense,theunityofthewilltopoweras aunifyingandorganizingpowerisneverasecureachievementoraccomplishment,butsomethingthatmustrenewitselfcontinually,eternally,astherebirth andself-enhancementofembodiedlife.Meaningsomething,inthesenseofan underlyingstrivingformeaning,Nietzschesuggests,isindeedtheverymeaning ofthebodyaswilltopower(561):
All unity is unity only as organization and interplay [or co-operation: Zusammenspiel]:nodifferentlyfromthewayinwhichahumancommunity isaunity:theopposite,therefore,ofanatomisticanarchy,thus,astructure ofdominion[Herrschafts-Gebilde]thatmeansOne,butisnotone.16

Inconclusion:WehaveheardNietzscheinsistthattheworld,whileknowable,has noonemeaningbehindit,butcountlessmeanings;itcanalwaysbeinterpreted otherwise.Thepossibilityofmultipleinterpretationsisitself,however,onlythe counterpartoftheself-surpassingdynamicofthebodyaswilltopower.The body,asopposedtoconsciousness,Nietzscheargued,istobeplacedrstmethodologically,yetwithoutcomingtoanydecisionasto its ultimate meaning orsignicance.17Indeed,aswenowsee,thebodyhasandcanhavenoultimate meaning,nosinglemeaning,andyetitmeanssomething.Itappearsasastructure ofdominionwhich,givingrisetothesubjectasmultiplicity,asregent,means Onebutisnotone.

NOTES
(Endnotes) 1. TheWilltoPower,490. 2. Cf.ibid.,1067. 3. Onincompletenihilismsee28. 4. Cf.12ofBeyondGoodandEvil,where,rejectingtheconceptofanatomismofthe soul,Nietzscheinsiststhatthisrejectionneednotprecludeacertainrehabilitationof theconceptofsoul,oneofthosemostancientandvenerablehypotheses.Inparticular,

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5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17.

heproposesthenewandrenedconceptsofmortalsoul,soulasmultiplicityof thesubject,andsoulasasocialstructureofdrivesandaffects. TwilightoftheIdols,51. SeethePrinciples,PartI,51and53. Cf.BeyondGoodandEvil,1617. Nietzschespeakselsewhereofatremendousmoment,anungeheurerAugenblick. SeeTheGayScience,341. Cf.BeyondGoodandEvil,16. Cf.499501. Onignorance(Unwissenheit)asaconditionoflifecf.609. Onsplittingintotwo,cf.656. 660. Cf.490. Cf.577:Againstthe valueofwhatremainseternallythesame(Spinozasnaivity, Descartestoo)thevalueoftheshortestandmosttransitory,theseductiveashof goldonthebellyoftheserpentlife. Oncreating,cf.661. 489.

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