LECTURES ON THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

JAMES MENSCH (JAMES.MENSCH@GMAIL.COM) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Introduction, B1-B30; NKS: 41-62 In these lectures, all page numbers will refer to the Norman Kempt Smith translation. The pages numbers in the original are referred to with the A or B preceding them. A refers to the first or A edition of the Critique. B refers to the B edition, that is, the second edition of the Critique. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason arguably the most important philosophical book of the modern age. Written after a period of ten years reflection set off by reading Humes Enquiries, it attempts to combat Humes skepticism through an inquiry in the nature of reason and its relation to experience. Kant begins with a definition of experience. There is a slight difference between the A and the B editions. In the A, he writes: Experience is, beyond all doubt, the first product (Produkt) to which our understanding gives rise, in working up the raw materials of sensible impressions. (A1) In the B edition, he writes: That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? Note the difference. In the first, experience is called a product of the understanding. There is just a slight suggestion here of Berkeleys idealism. In the second, the understandings working up the raw materials of sensible impressions is described as combining and separating representations. These are activities that will come to be associated with the functions of judgment. In both editions, however, the point is the same. Experience as such requires the activity of the understanding. To have experience is not to have the raw materials of sensible impressions. It is also not to have individual representations (presentations Vorstellungen). Thus, Kant writes it may well be that even our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge supplies from itself (ibid.). This is in fact the case.

The question, then, is: what is it that the understanding does in this working up? What does it supply? The project of the Critique is to answer this question. It is the attempt to specify in detai p!ecise y "hat "e cont!i#$te to o$! e%pe!ience of the "o! d. I will return to this point in a moment. First, we should note with Kant a n$m#e! of c!$cia distinctions. &he fi!st is the distinction between knowledge arising with experience and knowledge arising out of experience. Kant asserts, But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. What arises out of experience are empirical generalizations. They simply sum up what we have learned from experience. In this case, as Kant writes, e%pe!ience te s $s' indeed' "hat is' #$t not that it m$st necessa!i y #e so' and not othe!"ise. It the!efo!e (i)es $s no t!$e $ni)e!sa ity.* +hat a!ises with e%pe!ience does ma,e the c aim of necessity and $ni)e!sa ity. He!e' experience is the occasion for the claim, but does not provide the justification for the claim. Thus, the assertion that every alteration has a cause does not arise from experience, since experience can only give us empirical generalities. It does however arise with experience. In Kants words, its sources is that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion). With this, we also have the distinction, apriori (independent of experience) and a posteriori (posterior to and dependent on experience). Kant writes: By the term "knowledge a priori," therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely independent of all experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only a posteriori, that is, through experience (B2-B3). This independence of experience comes from the fact that such knowledge is based on what the understanding does in combining and separating the representations when it makes experience possible. The knowledge that bases itself on this function of the understanding is apriori in the sense of being prior to experience. But this prior does not have a temporal sense. As Kant reminds us to say that all our knowledge begins with experience implies that, temporally, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it. B1 (NKS:43) Now, empirical knowledge has, insofar, as it is based on experience, apriori elements. The trick is to see what they are. As Kant says, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it (ibid.). 2

This leads Kant to make a further distinction: Knowledge a priori is either pure or impure. Pure knowledge a priori is that with which no empirical element is mixed up. For example, the proposition, Every change has a cause, is a proposition a priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience. (B3) A pure apriori proposition asserts necessity: "Every change must have a cause." Here, as Kant writes, the conception of a cause so plainly involves the conception of a necessity of connection with an effect, and of a strict universality of the law, that the very notion of a cause would entirely disappear, were we to derive it from experience (B5). The difference can be put by saying that the first assertion, Every change has a cause, has the form All A is B, The second assertion does not merely assert that every alteration I experience has a cause. It has the form if there is an A (a change), then it must have a B (cause). Here, I do not even assert that there is an A that I have experienced. The mere notion of a cause involves the notion of effect. It is because of this that I assert that if I do experience an A (a change), I will take it as having a cause. We do, in fact, make assertions of this type. Where do they come from? As Kant writes, Whence could experience derive its certainty if all the rules according which it proceeds were always themselves empirical and therefore contingent? (NKS:45) Kants answer is that the origin lies in what we contribute to experience. Kant in arguing that there are apriori judgments, writes: Whence could experience derive its certainty if all the rules according which it proceeds were always themselves empirical and therefore contingent? At issue here is the stability of experience and, hence, the stability of its rules. The question is: what can account for such stability? The answer of the ancients is that that stability of experience comes from the stability of nature. The origin of this stability is the forms or ideas that act as constraining patterns for the changes that we observe. Thus, Aristotle saw the inherent form of an animal as determining the pattern of its growth. The modern version of this is the view that the DNA of the animali.e., the formal structure of its chemical bondsdetermines this pattern. For Kant, the origin of this stability is to be found our own faculty of experiencing. The forms are forms of the synthesis of our experience. There is,

in other words, a transcendental reinterpretation of the ancient forms. As forms however, they continue to be prior to experience and, hence, apriori. This point of view comes across when Kant writes: if we take away by degrees from our conceptions of a body all that can be referred to mere sensuous experiencecolor, hardness or softness, weight, even impenetrabilitythe body will then vanish; but the space which it occupied still remains, and this it is utterly impossible to annihilate in thought. Again, if we take away, in like manner, from our empirical conception of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties which mere experience has taught us to connect with it, still we cannot think away those through which we think the object as substance, or inhering in a substance, What is left in the first case is space, taken as a form of our sensibility. In the second case, it is the concept of substance, taken as a category. Kant thus concludes: Compelled, therefore, by that necessity with which the conception of substance forces itself upon us, we must confess that it has its seat in our faculty of cognition a priori (B6). The origin of the stability of experience, therefore, comes from us. The necessity and universality of the rules of experience points to forms of our sensibility (space and time) or to our action of combining sensuous impressions so as to refer them to a referent (the interpretative category of substance) rather than from the forms of nature in itself. The next distinction Kant makes is that between analytic and synthetic judgments. In analytic judgments, the predicate is included in the subject. In synthetic judgment it is not. Analytic judgments simply explicate what is involved in the thought of the subject. Whatever contradicts this thought must be denied. For example, in the judgment, All bodies are extended, the notion of an unextended body is selfcontradictory since a body by definition is what occupies space. An example of a synthetic judgment is the assertion, All bodies are heavy. Nothing in being extended implies having weight. I can think of specters, ghosts, etc. as extended and weightless (that is, as floating through space). Similarly, objects outside of the gravitational pull of the earth can be considered to be without weight.

To assert that bodies have weight is simply to add to its concept a property that my experience assigns to them. Here, this concept indicates an o#-ect of e%pe!ience th!o$(h one of its pa!ts'* name y' "ei(ht. Gi)en that o$! e%pe!ience in)o )es the contin$o$s synthesis of o$! pe!ceptions' -$d(ments #ased $pon e%pe!ience a!e #y definition synthetic -$d(ments. &hey a!e synthetic insofar as in making them I put together two things that do not imply each other and can exist apart. For example, having experienced the book and the table, I can assert, The book is on the table. This is an example of a synthetic apostiori judgment. Here, as in the judgment, Bodies have weight, the synthesis of the subject with the predicate rests on experience. As Kant writes, +hi e the one concept is not contained in the othe!' they yet #e on( to one anothe!' tho$(h on y contin(ent y' as pa!ts of a "ho e' name y' of an e%pe!ience "hich is itse f a synthetic com#ination of int$itions.* ./0 (N1S234) There are however synthetic judgments that are prior to experience. Everything that happens has its cause is an example of a synthetic apriori judgment. I can analyze the notion of something that happens all I want, I never can come up with the idea that it has a cause. In Kants words, the concept of a 5ca$se5 ies enti!e y o$tside the othe! concept' and si(nifies somethin( diffe!ent f!om 5that "hich happens5' and is not the!efo!e in any "ay contained in this atte! !ep!esentation* (i#id.). Here, of course, Kant is relying on Humes argumentation. The question is: how do I make such judgments? Both mathematics and natural science show that there are such judgments. When, for example, I assert that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, I add something new to the concept of straightness 6o! my concept of straight contains nothin( of 7$antity' #$t on y of 7$a ity.* ./8' (N1S239) Simi a! y' "hen I add : and 3 to ma,e /0' ;in me!e y thin,in( this $nion of : and 3 < I may ana yse my concept of s$ch a possi# e s$m as on( as I p ease' < I sha ne)e!'* 1ant c aims' ;find the /0 in it.* I (et the s$m #y co$ntin( $sin( dots o! my fin(e!s as (i)en in int$ition. He!e' the concept of the s$m a!ises "ith e%pe!ience. .$t' it does not a!ise f!om e%pe!ience. It is not an ind$cti)e (ene!a i=ation' #$t !athe! a $ni)e!sa and necessa!y asse!tion. The same holds for the basic assertions of physics, which Newton states in his Principia. For example, the judgments that in a chan(es of the mate!ia "o! d 5

the 7$antity of matte! !emains $nchan(ed> and that in a comm$nication of motion' action and !eaction m$st a "ays #e e7$a .* ./: (N1S23?) &he 7$estion is2 ;Ho" a!e a priori synthetic -$d(ments possi# e@* (N1S233). H$me' in his ana ysis of o$! notion of ca$sa ity' dec a!ed that they a!e not. His position' acco!din( to 1ant' is that "e on y ;fancy o$!se )es to ha)e !ationa insi(ht into "hat' in act$a fact' is #o!!o"ed so e y f!om e%pe!ience' and $nde! the inf $ence of c$stom has ta,en the i $so!y sem# ance of necessity.* .04 (N1S233). He adds2 ;If he had en)isa(ed o$! p!o# em in a its $ni)e!sa ity' he "o$ d ne)e! ha)e #een ($i ty of this statement' so dest!$cti)e of a p$!e phi osophy. 6o! he "o$ d then ha)e !eco(nised that' acco!din( to his o"n a!($ment' p$!e mathematics' as ce!tain y containin( a priori synthetic p!opositions' "o$ d a so not #e possi# e> and f!om s$ch an asse!tion his (ood sense "o$ d ha)e sa)ed him.* (i#id.). In fact' of co$!se' H$me a so denied in his Treatise the possi#i ity of p$!e mathematics. 1ant' ho"e)e!' "ant to asse!t #oth p$!e mathematics and p$!e science. He' th$s' "i ha)e to sho" ho" #oth a!e possi# e. Now, there is another discipline that makes synthetic apriori claims: namely metaphysics. It employs the concepts of God, freedom, and immortality and asserts things about them that go beyond the mere analysis of their concepts. While, mathematics and natural sciences show their possibility, by the actuality of their results, the same cannot be said of metaphysics. The questions it proposes to itself, fo! instance' "hethe! the "o! d has a #e(innin( o! is f!om ete!nity' ha)e a "ays met "ith $na)oida# e cont!adictions* .00' (N1S238A:). +hi e metaphysics as a nat$!a disposition e%ists' the same cannot #e said of metaphysics as a science. &h$s' the 7$estion' ;How is metaphysics, as science, possible?'* has to #e !aised not necessa!i y to -$stify it (as "ith science and math) #$t !athe! to see if' in fact' it is impossi# e. To answer these question, Kant will engage in a critique of pure reason. He defines it as follows: !eason is the fac$ ty "hich s$pp ies the p!incip es of a priori ,no" ed(e. B$!e !eason is' the!efo!e' that "hich contains the p!incip es "he!e#y "e ,no" anythin( a#so $te y a priori.* B24 (NKS:58) What Kant is proposing is an examination of pure reason, of its sources and limits B25 (NKS:59).

What he is after in analyzing the principles of pure reason are the principles of apriori synthesis. He will show that they are limited to synthesizing our experiences, they are principles for combining and separating them. Given this, they cannot be used, as they are in metaphysics, in areas where exceed every possible experience. Thus, while he will show that mathematics and natural science are possible since they simply delineate the apriori elements of our experience, metaphysics, in exceeding experience, will be shown to be impossible. The Introduction concludes with one further distinction: that between the transcendent and the transcendental. Transcendent has to do with the objects, transcendental has to do with our apprehension of them. As Kant writes: I apply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible a priori. A system of such conceptions would be called transcendental philosophy. (NKS:B25). The critique of pure reason in investigating the contributions we make to the experience of objects lays down the architechtonic plan of such philosophy B27 (NKS:60). It supplies a comp ete en$me!ation of a the f$ndamenta concepts that (o to constit$te the "ho e of a priori h$man ,no" ed(e'* #$t does not e%ha$sti# y ana y=e s$ch concepts. It on y p!oceeds fa! eno$(h to ans"e! the 7$estions !aised "ith !e(a!d to mathematics' nat$!a science' and metaphysics.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1-4; B33-B45; NKS: 65-74 Kant begins his transcendental aesthetic by making certain general remarks about the relation between sensibility, intuition, and understanding. Sensibility designates the way in which we are affected by objects. Sensibility yields intuitions. The understanding thinks the latter, and from the understanding concepts arise. B33-34 (65). Intuition can be called an informed sensibility. Sensation provides its matter, and form is what allows it to be "in certain relations." B34 (66). Now, according to Kant, the form that orders the matter must be distinct from it. In Kants words, it "cannot itself be sensation. Such sensation is externally provided. It is given to us aposteriori, that is, only with our being affected by the object. The form, by contrast, lies "ready for the sensations a priori in the mind." Present before any external affection, it is our contribution to the arising of intuitions. What exactly is this form? What remains once we take away all the specific matter of intuition? Kant calls it a pure form of sensibility or, alternately, "pure intuition." He gives the example of abstracting from an intuition of a body both what the understanding thinks with regard to it, for example, s$#stance' fo!ce' 7

di)isi#i ity' etc'* and a so ;"hat #e on(s to sensation' impenet!a#i ity' ha!dness' co o$!' etc.'* this #ein( the senationCs ;matte!.* +hat !emains is the #odyCs e%tension and fi($!e. Ap!io!i e)e!y int$ition of an o#-ect "i #e one ma!,ed #y e%tension and fi($!e. &hese then m$st #e "hat "e cont!i#$te to the int$ition. E%tension and fi($!e pe!tain to space. 1ant "i ma,e a simi a! a!($ment "ith !e(a!d to time' it a so #ein( an ap!io!i e ement of int$tion &he st$dy of #oth space and time is ca ed #y 1ant the Dt!anscendenta aesthetic.D &he s$#-ect of s$ch an aesthetic is space and time ta,en as the medi$ms that a o" o$! int$itions to #e o!de!edEo!de!ed eithe! in the a on( side of itse f of space o! in the #efo!e and afte! of time. The distinction between space and time is, according to Kant, also a distinction between outer sense and inner sense. According to Kant, .y means of o$te! sense' a p!ope!ty of o$! mind' "e !ep!esent to o$!se )es o#-ects as o$tside $s' and a ' "itho$t e%ception' in space.* .y cont!ast' Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state yields only temporal relations. Everything which belongs to inner determinations is therefore represented in relations of time (NKS:67-8) B37. As Kant sums up their difference, Time cannot be outwardly intuited, any more than space can be intuited as something in us (NKS:68) B37 His point is that when I look out at the world, everything I see is now. I cannot directly see intuit -- the future. To represent it, I must turn inward and anticipate. Similarly I cannot directly see the past. Again, outward intuition does not help me. I must turn inward and remember if I want to represent what is past. In other words, I can only represent temporal relationships to myself through the inner sense that directs itself to what I remember or anticipate. This limitation, it should be noted, is what makes the minds of Others inaccessible to us. As out there in space, they can only be grasped as now. The very inner sense by which they represent themselves to themselves (that is, represent what they have been and what they will, is unavailable to us. Another way of putting this is to say that the mind is a field of temporal relations. Precisely because such temporal relations cannot be outwardly intuited, I cannot see directly the minds of Others. All I can do is proceed by analogy with what I know of my own mind. In this analogy, I form the proportion: My mind, as revealed by my inner sense, is to my outward appearing behavior as the others mind is to his outward appearing behavior.

Three of these terms are graspable by myself. Through outer sense, I can grasp both my own and the Others appearing behavior. Through inner sense, I can grasp my mind as directing my appearing behavior. The other's mind, however, is not directly graspable by me. It is only graspable directly by the Other through his inner sense. But I do not have access to this. The best I can do is fill it in like a fourth proportional. I say, on the basis of the other persons appearing behavior, he behaves as I would in this situation, therefore he must have a mind similar to mine. Let us return to Kant. His point is that my inability to grasp time through my outer sense is matched by my inability to grasp space through my inner sense. To state the obvious, I cannot say how large a mental image is. Such an image may occupy more or less of my visual field as I approach an object. But this very fact points to the images lack of a definite size. This holds not just for extension but also for figure. This is what happens when we view a circular object, for example, a hula-hoop. Depending upon our perspective, it can appear in a myriad of shapes, extending from a line to an oval to a perfect circle. To actually tell what figure it is, we cannot focus on the inner mental images that our memory presents us with. We must rather turn outward to the object they represent. Doing so, we avail ourselves of a different form of sensibility: that of space. To say that space is a form of our sensibility is to assert that it is what we contribute to intuition. It is to assert that space is not a property of things. To assume that it is such a property is to take space as a concept. In this way of proceeding, I see things about me, I abstract a common feature, say, that of position or location, and I say: this is space. This is what Aristotle and Locke do. Locke asserts that space is just the distance between the things that we see. It is a concept arising from our experience of such distances. Kant tries to undermine this by showing that the notion of space cannot be a concept, but must in fact be a form of intuition. The arguments that space is not a concept are as follows: 1. If space were a concept, then first I would experience objects and then I would grasp the concept of space. But I have to presuppose space in order to represent them [objects] as outside and alongside of each other. (NKS:68) B38 The point is that space is this outside, alongside relation. Thus, the rules of perspectival appearing have to be presupposed if my experience of the world is to have any depth. Their disruption is its flattening. The rules, in other words, are a kind of form of appearing that must first be given before I represent external objects as alongside or outside of each other. In fact, as Husserl notes, such rules are 9

required for the inside me outside me split. Inside of me are the perceptions, outside of me are the objects of which I am having perceptions. The objects are what show themselves through multiple perceptions. They exhibit themselves perspectivally. An individual perception, however, does not itself show itself through different perceptions. As such, it is within me. Its relations are limited to the temporal relations determinative of inner sense. 2. I cannot represent the absence of space. I can only empty space of objects. This implies that space can be given prior to objects. But if space was an empirical concept coming from objects, this would be impossible. (NKS:68) B38-39 3. Space is always a unique singular. I can represent only one space. Any multiplicity here comes from the division of the one space into parts. Here the parts (the multiplicity) are posterior to the unity of space. In concepts, however, the multiplicity is prior--I go from the many individuals to the one common trait. Therefore, space is not a concept. (NKS:69) B39 4. Space is understood as infinite. But it is also taken as one space. Now a concept contains an infinite number of different possible representations (as their common character). Thus, the concept of black cloth gives the common character of a number of pieces of black cloth. But it contains these under the concept black cloth. The pieces are examples of the concept. As such, they are distinct from the concept. The concept, itself is not black nor made of cloth. The examples are. In space, however, we have an infinite number of representations within it. All the parts of space coexist ad infinitum. B40. They all are spaces. They are not ontologically distinct from it as examples are distinct from a concept. The point of all these arguments is that concepts are derived from particulars. They represent their common elements. Were space a concept, then it would be derived from the objects of appearance. It would represent their common features. As such, however, it would be distinct from them. Space, however, is not so distinct. What we can predicate of distinct spaces, we can also predicate of space itself. They all, for example, have extension. The concept of space, however, is not an extended concept. It does not have extension. Space, furthermore, has an infinite extension. But, but the individual spaces we experience have only finite extensions. Because of this, we cannot call space an empirical generalization (a concept) derived from our experience of individual spaces.

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5. Geometry is not an empirical science. It treats the relations of space. Therefore these relations cannot be empirically grounded. But then space is not an empirical concept. The alternative would be to say, our sense of space comes from objects and hence is empirical. But this, as Hume shows in the Treatise, implies that geometry itself is an empirical science. If this conclusion is false, so is the premise. A further point. Geometry is synthetic. As such, it must rely on intuition. Its theorems are not simply the results of its analyses of concepts. This intuition must be that of space itself. But this is apriori. In Kants words, Furthermore, this intuition must be apriori, that is, it must be found in us prior to any perception of the object. Why call it an intuition? Because it has a single object. Space is one. It is not a concept (a one in many). But the way we grasp individual unities is through intuition--not through conceptualization. Therefore we must have a pure intuition of space. This, of course, is a curious use of the word intuition--since the intuition of space is not sensuous and Kant denies any intellectual intuitionany intuition that goes directly to the object rather than proceeding through its representations. The object of this intuition is the fo!m of a appea!ances of o$te! sense. The claim here is that this is what we see when we do geometry. How we are able to intuit this form is not further explained at this point. We have to wait to B6869 for an answer. At any rate, Kants point is that space can have its apriori character (which geometry reveals) only if its intuition has its seat in the subject as the formal character of the subject ... only therefore insofar as it is merely the form of outer sense in general (NKS:71) B41. Now, since space is simply the form of all appearances of outer sense, it must necessarily precede all intuitions. (NKS:71) B42 As a form of appearances, it designates a subjective condition, i.e., that of our liability to be affected by objects. Outside of this, the representation of space stands for nothing whatsoever (ibid.). It is not a feature of the external world. The conditions of our sensibility are not necessarily those of things in themselves and we cannot judge in regard to the intuitions of other [types of] thinking beings whether they are bound by the same conditions as those which limit our intuition. (NKS:72) B43 We thus have the ideality of space with regard to things in themselves, and its reality with regard to what ever can be present to us. As Kant expresses this:

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O$! e%position the!efo!e esta# ishes the reality' that is' the o#-ecti)e )a idity' of space in !espect of "hate)e! can #e p!esented to $s o$t"a!d y as FanG o#-ect' #$t a so at the same time the ideality of space in !espect of thin(s "hen they a!e conside!ed in themse )es th!o$(h !eason' that is' "itho$t !e(a!d to the constit$tion of o$! sensi#i ity (N1S2:0) .??. He e%p ains this #y sayin( that it is !ea fo! $s' i.e.' fo! "hat "e e%pe!ience' #$t it is not !ea #$t !athe! idea (in the sense of idea ism) "ith !e(a!d to thin(s in themse )es2 We maintain, therefore, the empirical reality of space in regard to all possible external experience, although we must admit its transcendental ideality; in other words, that it is nothing, so soon as we withdraw the condition upon which the possibility of all experience depends [namely our receptivity, our capacity to be sensuously affected by objects] and look upon space as something that belongs to things in themselves (ibid.). Kant ends up by cautioning against equating this ideality of space with the fact the colors, sounds, tastes, smells, and tactile sensations of the external world refer our sensibility rather than the object itself. From such things, we dont obtain any apriori knowledge. The sensuous qualities of things appear differently to different observers. Furthermore, as Kant notes, since they are mere sensations and not intuitions, they cannot of themselves yield knowledge of any object, least of all apriori knowledge (NKS:73) B44. The point here is that knowledge of objects requires objects. But sensations by themselves do not give us objects. For objects to appear, we have to synthesize our perceptions. But to have perceptions, we need the form of spacethe form of spread-outness of our sensibility. Beyond this, there is a general point: Kants argument, as I indicated before, is not that if it is subjective, it is apriori, but rather the reverse: If it is apriori, it must be subjective. But subjective here refers to the form of our intuition. What is apriori is space itself as a form of appearing. Things like colours, tastes, etc. can appear differently to different observers. Because of this, they cannot of themselves yield knowledge of any object, least of all apriori knowledge (ibid.). What precisely is this apriori character of space? What does space as such contribute to the organizing of our perceptions that allows us to specify (as in geometry) apriori relations? Kants Prologomena points to the fact of its homogeneity. It is only in homogeneous space that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points or that two straight lines cannot enclose a space. If space is curved and if its curvature is irregular, none of these points would necessarily hold. In fact, the particular propositions proved by Euclid would hold only locally, i.e. only in the areas where the curvature of space is 0. 12

In considering Kants remarks thus far, one has to ask how faithful they are to our experience. Can we, in fact, separate off our grasp of space (and outer intuition in general) from our grasp of time? Kant later admits, &ime is the fo!ma a priori condition of a appea!ances "hatsoe)e!. < since a !ep!esentations' "hethe! they ha)e fo! thei! o#-ects o$te! thin(s o! not' #e on(' in themse )es' as dete!minations of the mind' to o$! inne! state> and since this inne! state stands $nde! the fo!ma condition of inne! int$ition' and so #e on(s to time' time is an a priori condition of a appea!ance "hatsoe)e!. It is the immediate condition of inne! appea!ances (of o$! so$ s)' and the!e#y the mediate condition of o$te! appea!ances. B50 (NKS: 77) There is, however, something more involved here than the fact that all representations as present in our minds fall under the condition of time. For example, the three dimensionality of space, which we grasp through the flow of perceptions, requires a grasp of time. Part of the way we apprehend that things are more distant from us is the fact that their relative angular velocity diminishes according to their distance from us. Thus, distant objects hardly seem to move as we view them from a car window, while objects close by seem to whiz past us. Needless to say, this apprehension requires a sense of time. Without it, we cannot grasp motion. What about the side by side quality that objects display in the visual field? Couldnt we say that such a quality, even when we limit ourselves to a momentary representation, gives us a sense of space? The difficulty is that a single representation is indistinguishable from an inner mental image. It does not have any definite extension. It also does not convey any sense of outside of ourselves. What we require for such a sense is a joining together of a series of perceptions, their link being a common referent. While the perceptions are within me, the object they refer to (which is not itself a perception) transcends them. It is what I take as something outside of me. If this analysis is correct, then the outside of me (and, hence, space itself) cannot be abstracted from time. Without the ability to retain the previous perceptions, I could not synthesize them. But such retention gives me a sense of past time. Thus, while we can say that while the alongside of one another that space requires is not, itself, a temporal relation, it is also not per se a spatial relation. Space as implying the outside of me requires that we add time to this alongside-of-one another relation. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 4-8; B46-B73; NKS: pp. 74-91 Kants arguments on time parallel those he made with regard space. Their point is to show that time is not an empirical concept, that is, that it is not derived from our experience of objects (e.g., our experience of their temporal positions). If we grant this, then we also admit that rather than being derived from objects, it is rather an apriori form of our intuition of them. As such, however, it only applies to appearances and not to the things in themselves. 13

Here are the arguments that time is not an empirical concept 1. Were time an empirical concept, it would be gradually built up out of our experiences. Thus, first we would experience objects, then as generalizations we would grasp the concepts of simultaneity and succession. This presupposes that we can grasp objects without being aware of simultaneity and succession. But, this is impossible. In fact, as Kant writes: Only on the presupposition of time can we represent to ourselves a number of things as existing at one and the same time (simultaneously) or at different times (successively) (NKS: 74), B46 2. If time were a concept, we should be able to apprehend the instances of it without apprehending the concept itself. (Just as I can see some chairs, without necessarily having the concept of chair). The intuitions are first, then the concept follows. As inductively derived from the intuitions, the concept presupposes them. The reverse, however, is the case with time. We can think of time as void of appearances. But if time were a concept, this would be like thinking of chairness, without thinking of the chairs whose common features the concept expresses. This, however, is impossible. Also, +e cannot' in !espect of appea!ances in (ene!a ' !emo)e time itse f.* .$t' if time "e!e a concept' "e sho$ d #e a# e to do this' since "e can see chai!s "itho$t ha)in( the concept of chai!. Given this, we have to say: &ime is' the!efo!e' (i)en a priori. In it a one is act$a ity of appea!ances possi# e at a .* (N1S2 :3) Question: Can we really think time as void of appearances? What would empty time be? If we strip it of content, what would distinguish its flow? Could we even think of succession without successive appearances? Certainly, as Locke and Hume point out, without the consciousness of succession, we have no experience of time. 3. We can make obvious apriori statements about time E.g., different times are parts of one and the same time Different times are successive, not simultaneous (the opposite holds for space, where different spaces are simultaneous not successive) Time has only one dimension (one variable determines it). But if time were an empirical concept, these statements would be generalizations of experience and, hence, capable of being overturned by experience. We would also be able to think time differently, say, with two dimensions. Since we cannot, time is not a concept derived from experience. 4. There is only one time. Since different times are parts of one and the same 14

time. But the representation of that which can be given only through a single object is intuition. Thus, we think concepts by thinking the common features of a number of individual objects, but we intuit directly single objects. Therefore, since time is singular, it is not a concept, but rather something grasped through an intuition. Furthermore, the notion that different times cannot be simultaneous is something that intuition shows us immediately. As Kant writes, this is a synthetic proposition and, thus, it cannot have its origin in concepts alone. 75 In other words, it is not by analyzing the concept of time that we come to the conclusion that different times cannot be simultaneous. Our pure intuition of the apartness of times moments shows us this. 5. The infinitude of time points to the fact that different times are limitations of one and the same underlying time. The original representation, time, must therefore be given as unlimited. But time cannot be a concept, since we do not get infinite time by abstraction from the common features of times. We get, at most, the category when. Furthermore, the different times are not examples of the concept time. They are parts of it. But what would be a part of the concept of time (which is simple). If we think of column, we can break up its concept into elements such as straightness and roundness for a column. But neither of these is a column. The point is that the parts of a complex concept are different from concept itself. But the parts of time are themselves times. 6. The notion of change presupposes time, hence, so does motion. Now change (alternation) is the presence of opposites in one subject at different times. Example: Socrates learns music. Before he did not know music, now he does. Without the addition of the words, before and now, that is, without the addition of different times, we have a combination of contradictorily opposed predicates in one and the same objecte.g., something being and not being in one and the same place. (NKS: 76) We affirm that Socrates knows and does not know music. If time were a concept, then the concept would render this contradiction intelligible. But no concept renders a contradiction intelligible. Contradictions undo the unity of concepts. (In fact, as Duns Scotus argues, the being of a concept is the lack of contradiction of its formal elements). Therefore time is not a concept. Kant makes this argument with change as change of place, i.e., motion. A moving object is in different places at different times. Without the addition of different times, we simply have the contradiction, the objects is both at a place and not at this place but somewhere else. A concept cannot resolve this contradiction. Therefore time is not a concept. Kant now draws his conclusions from these arguments: 15

The first is that time is not somethin( "hich e%ists of itse f < +e!e it se fA s$#sistent' it "o$ d #e somethin( "hich "o$ d #e act$a and yet not an act$a o#-ect.* (N1S2 :8) &he second is that ;time is not somethin( < "hich inhe!es in thin(s as an o#-ecti)e dete!mination.* If this "e!e the case' "e co$ d fo!m an empi!ica concept of it. .$t "e cannot. &ime' the!efo!e' is on y the ;s$#-ecti)e condition $nde! "hich a one int$ition can ta,e p ace in $s.* (i#id.). &his is "hy it ;can #e !ep!esented p!io! to the o#-ects' and hence a priori.* As Kant also puts this, time is simply the fo!m of inne! sense' that is' of the int$ition of o$!se )es and of o$! inne! state (NKS: 77). Outside of this it is nothing. Now, as the form of inner sense, time cannot #e a dete!mination of o$te! appea!ances> it has to do neithe! "ith shape no! position.* A o$! ideas' ho"e)e!' do come f!om o$te! appea!ance. +e (ain o$! conceptions f!om the "o! d. In 1antCs "o!ds' ;the !ep!esentations of the outer senses constit$te the p!ope! mate!ia "ith "hich "e occ$py o$! mind.* (N1S2 H:) Gi)en this' "e attempt to pict$!e time to o$!se )es in te!ms of thin(s that appea! o$t"a!d yEfo! e%amp e' ;a ine p!o(!essin( to infinity.* (N1S2 ::) &his spatia i=ation of time' ho"e)e!' fa s sho!t since ;"hi e the pa!ts of the ine a!e sim$ taneo$s the pa!ts of time a!e a "ays s$ccessi)e.* .e!(son' in his #oo,' Time and Freewill' sho"s ho" it is -$st th!o$(h s$ch an i e(itimate spatia i=ation of time that "e inco!!ect y ta,e o$!se )es not to ha)e f!ee "i . 1antCs ne%t conc $sion is that e)en tho$(h "e do attempt to spatia i=e time in o!de! to concei)e it' time' in fact' is the formal a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever. He writes, all representations, even the outer ones that pertain to space, belong in themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our inner state and so belong to time (NKS: 77). Time, therefore, is the immediate condition of inne! appea!ances (of o$! so$ s)' and the!e#y the mediate condition of o$te! appea!ances* (i#id.). If "e "ant to thin, of this in a ess fo!ma "ay' "e can note that the fo!m of o$te! sense inc $des that of the pe!specti)a appea!in( of o#-ects. .$t this in)o )es the s$ccessi)e' tempo!a o!de!in( of o$! pe!ceptions in these pe!specti)a patte!ns. &h$s' "itho$t time, there is no ordering of the perceptions that make up inner sense, and without this, we have no representation of objects out there in threedimensional space. This does not mean that time replaces space in the alongsidedness that characterizes external perception. It does, however, mean that the representation of objects in space does require time as its mediate condition. Against Kants views on time and space as pertaining to our mode of intuition, there are two alternatives: 16

The first is to assume that time and space are something self-subsistent (independent). To assert this is to say that they are actual, but are not actual objects. They contain objects. (This is Newtons belief. He rests his physics on there being absolute time and space.) Kant does not argue against this except to say that this is to admit two eternal and infinite self-subsistent nonentities (space and time) which are there (yet without being anything real) only in order to contain in themselves all that is real (NKS: 81) (B56). He thinks that this is an impossible supposition. The second alternative, which Locke and Hume adopt, is that space and time are relations of appearances abstracted from appearances. People who advocate this are obliged to deny that a priori mathematical doctrines have any validity in respect to real things (NKS: 81). Whats left? Kants view. Space and time are just the forms of our intuition. They do not pertain to the things in themselves. This means not just that objects in themselves are not in space or time, but also, in myself, I am not in space or time. This holds even though all objects, including myself, appear to be in space and time. Thus, even though all my self-representations are temporal, I am not temporal. What, then, is the origin of time? Kant asserts that it comes through our auto-affection. He writes with regard to the form of inner sensewhich is time: Since this form does not represent anything save insofar as something is posited in the mind, it can be nothing but the mode in which the mind is affected through its own activity (namely, through this positing of its representations), and so is affected by itself (NKS: 87). One can also translate this: time can be nothing else than the mode in which the mind is affected by its own activity, to wit--its presenting to itself representations, consequently the mode in which the mind is affected by itself. How does my positing of my representations affect myself such that time results? The point becomes clearer later when he talks about the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. Not to leave you in suspense, I will sketch out Kants answer. It involves the fact that in positing an object, I have to retain the impressions I have of it. If I cannot retain them, if they vanish the moment I apprehend them, then I cannot synthesize them. According to Kant, I retain them through my imagination, understood as my ability to picture what is absent. This picturing is 17

a reproduction. Through my imagination, then, I reproduce and thereby retain the successive impressions I have of an object and thus make them available for my synthetic activity of connecting them such that they refer to an object. Now, the result of this reproduction affects me, that is, provides me with data. Originally such data were the impressions by which the object affected me. But, as reproduced, the are results of my own activity. Through this activity I affect myself, I provide myself with data. This is the famous Kantian auto-affection of consciousness. Now, time arises because I take these reproduced data as the departing moments of time. A datum is given and then vanishes. I reproduce it. The reproduction vanishes. But I reproduce the reproduction and so on. The more the reproductions, the fainter is this datum. I interpret this increasing faintness as the temporal departure of the original sense datum. As the process continues, I thus take it as further and further past. The result, then, is my sense of time as departure into pastness. With this, we see how Kant solves the problem of how the subject can inwardly intuit itself. Such an intuition demands an inne! pe!ception of the m$ tip icity Fof dataG "hich is antecedent y (i)en in the s$#-ect.* &his m$ tip icity m$st #e (i)en in the mode of sensation. &his !e7$i!es that "hat ; ies in the mind < m$st affect the mind.* It !e7$i!es a se fAaffection. .$t this occ$!s th!o$(h o$! action of !ep!od$ction. &h$s' "e a "ays (!asp o$!se )es as depa!tin( into pastness' i.e.' th!o$(h the fo!m of time (N1S2 HH). The point is that the mind is constituted as an object for itself through reproduction. The latter makes it appear, and with this makes it be in time. In Kants words, the mind intuits itself < as it is affected #y itse f' and the!efo!e as it appea!s to itse f' not as it is* (i#id.). Difficulty: What about the need for constantly new impressions, doesnt such newness presuppose time? The objection here is that alterations are real, this being proved by the change of our own representations But alterations are possible only in time; and time is therefore something real (NKS: 79) B53. Kants answer is that what is real is time, not as an object, but as the mode of representation of myself as an object (B54). The deeper answer is that such alterations do not depend on time. Rather time depends on alterations. It depends on contents being given in order that they can be reproduced. But such alternations can be without being reproduced. They can be as a sheer otherness of impressions. Such otherness does not imply time. The now (i.e., space) can simply constantly exhibit different content, which appears 18

only to vanish. In such sheer alteration, no before, no after, no duration need to be presupposed. Given that the alteration of the contents of the now does not imply time, but rather simply supplies the phenomena from which time is constituted through reproduction, we can say that the phenomena constituting time are not themselves in time. This is Kants answer to Lockes and Humes assertion that I cannot experience time without experiencing succession. Thus, in dreamless sleep, when I experience no succession, I have no experience of time. I cannot tell how long I have slept. Kant would assert that the experience of time occurs only when I experience succession, but he would add: I cannot experience succession without the self-affection that generates my sense of time. In other words, to get a sense of succession, I have to reproduce the impressions that I receive. Their relative fading then gives me the sense of before and after. Thus, experiencing A, B, C, the fact that A is more faded that B, which is more faded than A gives me the temporal succession A, B, C. Without out this activity of reproduction, A, B, C are not themselves in time. They do not have the before-after relation of time Husserl puts the same point as follows: "The phenomena which constitute time are objectivities which are evidently different in principle from those which are constituted in time" (HA X, Boehm ed., pp. 74-5). The predicates which are applicable to the latter -- such as having a definite temporal position or enduring through a succession of such positions -- "cannot be sensibly applied" to the constituting phenomena (Ibid.). Thus, our present reproductions of past impressions are not per se in time. Only that which is posited from the series of reproduced impressions is in time. Thus, the series is simply one of the fadings of some given content that gets fainter and fainter as we reproduce it. We interpret this getting fainter as departure in time. We thus posit time as that in which the content departs. But the basis of this positing is simply the momentary impression and the momentary reproductions of it. None of these are in time. The time in which we ultimately locate them is rather constituted by us through our interpretation of fading as temporal departure. Kant, I believe, would assert the same thing. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Doctrine of the Elements, B74-B91; NKS: pp. 92-101 Having outlined the a priori elements our sensibility, Kant nows turns to the work of the understanding. His treatment of the understanding involves what he calls transcendental logic. Such logic concerns the science of the rules of the understanding in general. B76 (NKS:93)

19

As we shall see, the relationship between logic and the understanding concerns the relation of the judgment to the categories or concepts of the understanding. Kant will shortly present us with two tables: those of the judgments and those of the categories of the understanding. The table of the judgments gives us the ways we connect the subject and predicates of our judgments. Such ways are given by the logical forms, such as All A is B, Some A is B, A particular A is B, If A is x, B is y, Either A is x or B is y, and so on. Such logical forms are the forms of our judgments. The table of the categories or concepts of the understanding (here, concept and category are taken as equivalent terms) specifies the ways in which we synthesize our intuitions in order to present to ourselves objects. Every item in the table of the judgments will correspond to an element in the table of the categories. In making these two parallel tables Kant is showing why logic applies to reality. The forms of our judgments are actually formal representations of the forms of connecting perceptions. Thus, the judgment A is B, e.g., the book is white, expresses in a logical form, the synthetic connection of perceptions, by which we link all our perceptions of whiteness to the book. This does not mean that we can use logic as a tool (organon) to gain new knowledge in the absence of intuition. What it does mean, however, is that our grasp of objects is structured by logic. This is because the forms of our logic are, at bottom, forms of the way we connect intuitions to grasp objects. This is a unique vision of logic. Kant prepares us for it, by carefully distinguishing what he means by transcendental logic. This involves a number of definitions. While they may seem scholastic they do have a definite point, which is to delineate precisely the notion of logic that will allow Kant to develop the relation of logic to his categories of the understanding. Kant begins by noting that our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind. The first is the capacity we have to receive impressions. Such a capacity, of course, is not yet intuition. As we know from the Transcendental Aesthetic, this capacity must be informed by the forms of our sensibility, that is, by the forms of space and time. Intuition, however, is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the apprehension of objects. Here, Kant follows Descartes in affirming that this apprehension requires the understanding. I am referring here to Descartes example of the wax, that he brings to the fire and transforms from being cold, hard and dark to a melted, fluid substance that has lost its odor. Viewing the wax during its various transformations, Descartes asks: But what is this piece of wax which cannot be understood excepting by the [understanding or] mind? It is certainly the same that I see, touch, 20

imagine, and finally it is the same which I have always believed it to be from the beginning. But what must particularly be observed is that its perception is neither an act of vision, nor of touch, nor of imagination, and has never been such although it may have appeared formerly to be so, but only an intuition of the mind (Med. II.) This perception by the mind directs itself to the substance of the wax, i.e., to that which underlies all the various features through which the wax shows itself. With this we have the second source of knowledge for Kant: which is the power of knowing an object through these representations or intuitions of it by means of a concept. B74 (NKS:92). What we have, then, is a tripartite structure: in order to grasp an object, I have to have sensations. I also have to be able to form such sensations into intuitions. This requires submitting the sensations to the pure forms of intuition. Finally, I need to connect these intuitions so as see them as intuitions of some object. For this I need the concepts of the understanding, such concepts being simply the forms of connection. Suppose, for example, I regard my hand, which I move in various directions, opening and closing it. During this process, I am continually receiving impressions from it. I am also informing such impressions with both the alongside of one another of the form of space and with the before and after of the form of time. My contribution, here, is that of providing the impressions with the media (space and time) in terms of which they can be connected. Beyond this, however, I must actually connect them. This I do by means of a concept. Take, for example, the concept substance. Applying it to the perceptions I have of my hand I link them by giving them a common referent. I take them as perceptions of my hand. Now, the hand I perceive is not itself a perception. It is that of which I am having perceptions. I take it as the same hand throughout all the shifting perceptions. This mode of connection of the many perceptions to a single referent is what Kant terms the category of substance. As I indicated above, each of the categories expresses a rule for putting together or synthesizing our perceptions. Each can be thought of as an interpretation of our perceptions. This is an interpretation that I continue to make until the perceptual evidence contradicts it. An example will make this clear. Suppose you notice what seems to be a cat crouching under a bush on a bright sunny day. As you move to get a better look, its features seem to become more clearly defined. One part of what you see appears to be its head, another its body, still another its tail. Based upon what you see, you anticipate that further features will be revealed as you approach: this 21

shadow will be seen as part of the cats ear; another will be its eye, and so forth. If your interpretation is correct, then your experiences should form a part of an emerging pattern that exhibits these features, i.e., that perceptually manifests the object you assume you are seeing. If, however, you are mistaken, at some point your experiences will fail to fulfill your expectations. What you took to be a cat will dissolve into a flickering collection of shadows. Here, not just the thought of the cat, but the underlying category of substance, i.e., of a single referent for your perceptions, breaks up. The perceptual evidence is such that it can no longer be maintained. This interpretative work of the understanding should not be confused with what we contribute through the forms of our sensible intuition. It is through the latter that our perceptions appear to be spread out, that is, have a certain extended quality; it is also through them that these perceptions also appear to succeed one another. Both the extended and successive quality of our perceptions are the contribution of the pure forms of our sensibility to the work of the understanding. Kant writes in this regard: pure intuition, therefore, contains only the form under which something is intuited; the pure concept only the form of the thought of an object in general B75 (NKS:92). The pure intuition gives us a spatial temporal forms in which objects are intuited, while the pure concepts of the understanding gives us the ways in which we interpret the sensuous material that has been placed in such spatial temporal forms. For example, with the concept of substance we think of the object in general just in so far as it stands as a referent for a pattern of perceptions.1 The point of Kants remarks is that the apprehension of an object requires both sensibility and understanding. Neither by itself is a sufficient condition for such apprehension. As Kant puts this, without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. The second assertion signifies that we have to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, bring them under concepts if we are to have a relationship to objects and not just to our individual perceptions B75 (NKS:93). The blindness of intuitions without concepts is that of not recognizing the object in the multitude of perceptions, that is, of grasping a determinate referent for the multitude. The emptiness of concepts without intuition is that of their not having any objects to apply to. By themselves, concepts are ways of connecting intuitions. Without intuitions, however, they are simply empty schemata for such connecting.

It is important to note that what Norman Kemp Smith translates as the manifold of intuition is simply the multitude of perceptions (or intuitions) 22

Having completed these preliminary observations, Kant now turns his attention to specifying what he means by transcendental logic. He does this through a number of distinctions. The first is between logic either as logic of the general or as logic of the special employment of the understanding. The first contains the absolutely necessary rules of thought without which there can be no employment whatsoever of the understanding B76 (NKS:93). The second contains the rules of correct thinking as regards acertain kind of objects. Consider, for example, the kinds of objects presented in biology and mathematics. They have very different identities. If a living thing is the materially same over time, its metabolism has ceased to function, and, hence, it is dead. Its identity requires its metabolic functioning, which requires the exchange of materials with the external world. The identity of a number or a geometric figure in mathematics, however, demands absolute sameness. To think correctly about living organisms in biology we have to take account of this difference, which will express itself in rules of correct thinking that will be different from those concerning the treatment of identity in mathematics. Kant now makes a further distinction. He writes, general logic is either pure or applied. It is pure if we abstract from all the conditions under which our understanding is exercised. It is applied, if we consider such conditions. Thus applied logic is directed to the rules of the employment of the understanding under the subjective empirical conditions dealt with by psychology. B77 (NKS:94).2 One way of putting the distinction between pure and applied logic is in terms of the distinction between the conditions for the applicability and the conditions for the validity of thought. Let me put this first in terms of mathematics. The same mathematical laws are followed by both an electronic calculator and a mechanical adding machine in calculating sums. These mathematical laws concern the validity of the calculations. Those machines which follow them give the correct sums. Very different laws, however, pertain to the making the mathematical laws applicable to the machines. In one case, they involve laws of electronics, in the other those of the gear and the lever. The fact that we can instantiate the same mathematical laws in very different machines with very different laws governing their construction shows that the laws governing applicability and those governing validity are not the same. The same holds for logic. In pure logic, we do not consider conditions for the applicability of its laws. In applied logic we do. We consider the conditions of imagination, sensibility, memory, habit, etc. with regard the subjects capability to
2

John Stuart Mills Logic is a good example of this applied logic. 23

think logically. For example, children who have not yet reached the age of reasonabout seven yearscannot reason logically. This is because their cognitive development does not yet allow them to hold concepts stable. Without this, however, they cannot apply the rules of logic, that is, the rules of correct thinking to their thought processes. This however does not mean that suddenly at the age of seven the rules of logic becomes valid. They just become applicable. Having defined pure general logic, Kant now distinguishes it from the transcendental logic that is the concern of the Critique of Pure Reason. Transcendental logic is pure general logic regarded from a transcendental (subjective) perspective. Kant writes that general logic... has nothing to do with the origin of knowledge... [it deals] on y "ith that fo!m "hich the $nde!standin( is a# e to impa!t to the !ep!esentations' f!om "hate)e! so$!ce they may ha)e a!isen* #e this ap!io!i o! empi!ica . &!anscendenta ' o(ic' ho"e)e!' does conce!n itse f "ith this. In 1antCs "o!ds' it "o$ d ;t!eat of the o!i(in of the modes in "hich "e ,no" o#-ects' in so fa! as that o!i(in cannot #e att!i#$ted to the o#-ects* .H/ (N1S2I8). It' th$s' ;conce!ns itse f "ith the a"s of the $nde!standin( and !eason so e y in so fa! as they !e ate a p!io!i to o#-ects* . H0 (N1S2I:). &h$s' t!anscendenta o(ic is distin($ished f!om (ene!a o(ic #y )i!t$e of the fact that it foc$ses on the cont!i#$tions of the $nde!standin( to o$! ,no"in( o#-ects. S$ch modes' as p!io! to the e%pe!ience of o#-ects' a!e ap!io!i. In this conte%t 1ant ma,es a distinction #et"een the te!ms ;t!anscendenta * and ;a p!io!i.* Not e)e!ythin( a p!io!i is t!anscendenta . 6o! e%amp e ;Neithe! space no! any a priori (eomet!ica dete!mination of it is a t!anscendenta !ep!esentation.* .H/ (N1S2I8). One can p$!s$e (eomet!y as an p!io!i science "itho$t any tho$(ht as to its t!anscendenta (o! s$#-ecti)e ap!io!i) o!i(ins. As 1ant contin$es' ;"hat can a one #e entit ed t!anscendenta is the ,no" ed(e that these !ep!esentations a!e not of empi!ica o!i(in' and the possi#i ity that they can yet !e ate a priori to o#-ects of e%pe!ience* (i#id.). &h$s' "hat the te!m ;t!anscendenta * !efe!s to is not the o#-ect' #$t !athe! the "ay "e ,no" the o#-ect. As 1ant p$ts this' the ,no" ed(e a p!io!i that sho$ d #e ca ed ;t!anscendenta * is the ,no" ed(e ;#y "hich "e ,no" that and ho" ce!tain !ep!esentations (int$itions o! concepts) can #e emp oyed o! a!e possi# e p$!e y a priori.* &h$s the t!anscendenta aesthetic sho"s $s ho" o$! !ep!esentations of space and time can #e emp oyed a p!io!i' and t!anscendenta o(ic sho"s $s ho" the concepts of o$! $nde!standin( can #e emp oyed a p!io!i to the o#-ects that "e int$it. &he ne%t theme 1ant ta,es $p is the !e ationship of o(ic to t!$th. Has o(ic any ans"e! the 7$estion' ;"hat is t!$th@* &his 7$estion as,s' ;"hat is the (ene!a and s$!e c!ite!ion of the t!$th of any and e)e!y ,no" ed(e*@ A3H (N1S2I:). As 1ant !ema!,s' such a general criterion cannot take account of the varying content of 24

knowledge (its relation to its specific object). The only thing we can speak up with regard to such a criterion are the forms of knowledge. This is what logic supplies. In Kants words, in so fa! as it e%po$nds the $ni)e!sa and necessa!y !$ es of the $nde!standin(' F o(icG m$st in these !$ es f$!nish c!ite!ia of t!$th. +hate)e! cont!adicts these !$ es is fa se.* +hy is this@ 1ant ans"e!s' in )io atin( the !$ es of o(ic' ; the $nde!standin( "o$ d the!e#y #e made to cont!adict its o"n (ene!a !$ es of tho$(ht' and so to cont!adict itse f* .H? (N1S2IH). Suppose, for example, I were to affirm the contradiction: this is and is not a red ball. Here I am asserting that a predicate does and does not pertain to a subject. The transcendental analogue of this is that perceptions -- namely those of redness -- pertain and do not pertain to some common referent. This is to assert that they can and cannot be connected together in the pattern exhibiting this referent. This however violates the a priori conditions of the possibility of experiencing the referent. The referent, i.e., the object, is there as something experienced by me only through such connections. The rule of the understanding I am violating is, therefore, that pertaining to the concept of substance. Since my apprehension of objects involves the understanding and since expressing a contradiction violates one of its categories, no contradiction can be considered to be true. That is to say no contradiction can find fulfillment in the experience of an actual object. This experience is through my connecting my intuitions. But the contradiction implies that I am and am not making such connections. In undermining the possibility of my synthesizing my perceptions to grasp a given object, the contradiction violates the notion of truth as agreement of knowledge with its object. It makes knowledge impossible since it makes impossible the syntheses its rests on. Kant remarks that general logic ... is merely a canon of judgment. Its provides norms for examining our judgments. It is not an organic for the actual production of ... objective assertions. That is to say is not a tool for this production. If we use it as such, then we engage in a logic of illusion. The reference here is to metaphysics. B85 (NKS:99) With this we have the final distinction of the section: that between the transcendental analytic and the transcendental dialectic. The transcendental analytic part of transcendental logic deals with the elements of the pure knowledge yielded by understanding. B87 (NKS:100). Its use is that of providing a canon for passing judgment upon the empirical employment of the understanding B88 (NKS:100). It shows us the ways in which we should employ the understanding in making assertions about what we experience. The transcendental dialectic engages in a critique of the activity of using the pure modes of knowledge of the understanding... beyond the limits of experience. In it, Kant will provide his critique of metaphysics. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B91-B113, NKS, pp. 102-118

25

Having defined transcendental logic, Kant now turns to the table he has composed of logical judgments. The table is largely traditional, being drawn from the standard Aristotelian logic. It is, however, accompanied by the claim that it is complete, covering the whole field of the pure understanding (NKS:102) B89. This completeness comes from the fact that its elements are not empirically based i.e., based on collecting the judgments people make. It rather comes from an examination of the understanding. Kant claims that the pure understanding ... is a unity It is selfsubsistent, self-sufficient, and not be increased by any additions from without. (NKS:102) B90 This is because there is one function underlying the whole of it. This is synthesis, suntithemi in Greek, which means literally bringing or placing together. As Kant defines this: By synthesis in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in [one act] of knowledge) (NKS:111) B103 Kants definition of function implies synthesis: By function I mean the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation. (NKS:105) B93. A representationliterally, a presentation--can be an intuition, concept uniting intuition, a concept uniting concepts, etc. Accordingly, the synthetic function is a grasping of representations under a concept. A concept is a one in many. As indicated, the many can either be other concepts or intuitions. Here, we should note that Kants use of the word representation (Vorstellung literally placing before one or presentation) is ambiguous. Both concepts and intuitions (Anschauungen) are representations. The word intuition is also ambiguous. At times it means the direct presentation of the object. Then, it signifies our perceptual experience informed by the categories. At times it can simply signify a single perception (Wahrnehmung). Also the notion of concept is ambiguous. It can signify the one in many function of grasping an object through a multitude of single perceptions. It can also signify one in many function of grasping a common feature of a number of objects. The full schema here is: First affections or impressions. Then affections being informed by the forms of our sensibility (space and time), the result being single perceptions, Then synthesis of perceptions resulting in an intuition that presents some object. Such synthesis involves a categorical concept such as substance. Then concepts based on objects, which grasp what is common to objects.

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The order here is not temporal but rather foundational. We cannot have individual perceptions without impressions, even though the perception and the impression may be occurring at the same time. Kant uses this schema when he writes: +he!eas a int$itions' as sensi# e' !est on affections' concepts !est on f$nctions. .y 5f$nction5 I mean the $nity of the act of #!in(in( )a!io$s !ep!esentations $nde! one common !ep!esentation. Concepts a!e #ased on the spontaneity of tho$(ht' sensi# e int$itions on the !ecepti)ity of imp!essions. (NKS:105) B93 Here sensible intuitions refer to single perceptions. They do not rest on functions, but rather on affections or impressions. However, the intuition that gives us an object, insofar as involves a synthesis of perceptions, does rest on a synthetic function. This notion of intuition as referring to a single perception also appears when Kant writes: Since no !ep!esentation' sa)e "hen it is an int$ition' is in immediate !e ation to an o#-ect' no concept is e)e! !e ated to an o#-ect immediate y' #$t to some othe! !ep!esentation of it' #e that othe! !ep!esentation an int$ition' o! itse f a concept. He!e int$ition is a(ain in immediate !e ation to an o#-ectEi.e.' to the imp!essions it p!o)ides $s. Concept' #y cont!ast' !e ate to the o#-ect' not immediate y' #$t eithe! th!o$(h a synthesis of int$itions o!' if they a!e (ene!a concepts' th!o$(h othe! ess (ene!a concepts. So anima !efe!s to a specific anima ' say' a do(' not di!ect y #$t th!o$(h a concept of do( and then th!o$(h the syntheses of pe!ceptions (i)e $s the indi)id$a do(s that se!)e as instances of this concept. The point is that we have a cascade of functions. We have the synthesis of individual intuitions that give us an object. We have the synthesis of objects that gives us a general concept, and we can have syntheses of concepts that give us even more general concepts. We can move from a single intuition of a chair to an synthetic perception of the chair as a three dimensional object, to the concept of the chairness, to the more general concept of furniture, that includes not just chairs, but tables, etc. Judgment, then, insofar as it relates an object to a concepts is a mediate knowledge of the object, that is, the representation of a representation of it. (ibid.). Thus, if I say, John is a man, I relate the represented object, John, to the concept man. The concept man is a representation of the representation of John. In other words, I have the concept man, by representing the common element I find in the a number of humans. John also has this element. Thus, I

27

represent him in terms of this representationi.e., the concept representing this common element. Kants example of this is: All bodies are divisible. Here, the object of the judgment, body, is itself a concept. Now, the concept of the divisible has a wider extension than the concept of body. It applies to various other concepts, but is here applied in particular to the concept of body, and this concept again is applied to certain appearances that present themselves to us B93 (NKS:105) Kants point is that the general concept, divisible, applies to the more special concept body and, through this concept of body, applies to the particular bodies that we see, and through them to the particular appearances of bodies, i.e., individual intuitions that we have of them. In the last case, divisibility is a function of the form of space that is applied to the impressions we receive. Note: Kant here skips the step of the intervening bodies in going from the concept body to the appearances. Kants point, however, is clear: all judgments are functions of unity among our representations. Instead of an immediate representation, a higher representation, which comprises this and various others, is used for our cognition of the object, and thereby many possible cognitions are collected into one (B93-94). Having defined judgment in terms of synthesis (the function of subsuming many under one), Kant now defines the understanding as judgment. In his words, we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgments, so that understanding may be represented as the faculty of judging (NKS:106) B94 Having defined judgment in terms of synthesis (the function of subsuming many under one), Kant now defines the understanding as judgment. In his words, we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgements, so that understanding may be represented as the faculty of judging. (NKS:106) B94 The point follows because what understanding does is think rather than sense. But thought deals with concepts. It is knowledge by means of concepts. This knowledge is expressed in judgments. For example: I think the concept body. Under it are various types of bodies, for example metals. This means that I can think metals by means of the conception of body. This thought is expressed by the judgment, every metal is a body. The judgment is a function: a bringing of many representations (those of metals) under a single representation (that of body). It is an expression of the underlying act of the understanding, which is synthesis. Now, given that the functions of understanding are expressed by judgments, to find out what the functions or syntheses of the understanding are, we can look at the functions of judgment, i.e., the ways in which judgment unifies (or 28

synthesizes) representations. In Kants words: All the functions of the understanding therefore can be discovered when we can completely exhibit the functions of unity in judgments. B94 (NKS:106) When we do so we find twelve ways of uniting representations. Why are there only twelve types of judgments? Kants answer is that this is because logic is a finished science. It has shown that there are only twelve ways of uniting representations in judgments. In other words, synthesis is exhaustively divisible into twelve ways of putting representations together. Thus, each type of judgment is a type of putting representations together and the twelve possible ways are given by his table of logical judgments. Let me go through them: Judgments can be universal: All S is P, or particular: Some S is P If you take all of one particular thing, you have also a singular judgment--e.g., Harry is an American Judgments can also be either affirmative or negative or infinite. So: All souls are immortal: Universal Affirmative No souls are mortal: Universal Negative All souls are non-mortal: Infinite [note: this is the obverse of the universal negative] "Here, I locate the soul in the [infinite] universe of non-mortal beings" (NKS:108) Judgments can also be Categorical, S is P Hypothetical, If S then P Disjunctive, Either S or P. In the disjunctive judgment, I divide up reality: Kant gives the following example of this: "The world exists either through blind chance, or through internal necessity, or through an external cause. Each of these propositions embraces a part of the sphere of our possible cognition as to the existence of a world; all of them taken together comprise the whole sphere. To take the cognition out of one of these spheres is equivalent to placing it in one 29

of the others; and, on the other hand, to place it in one sphere is equivalent to taking it out of the rest. This division of reality involves a certain community insofar as what one says about one of the alternatives affects how one takes the other alternatives. In Kants words: There is, therefore, in a disjunctive judgment a certain community of cognitions, which consists in this, that they mutually exclude each other, yet thereby determine, as a whole, the true cognition, inasmuch as, taken together, they make up the complete content of a particular given cognition. Finally, judgments can be Problematic, S may be P Assertoric, S is P Apodeictic, S must be P (or S is necessarily P). In this, I take a fact that I assert, e.g., the assertoric judgment, e.g., something caused this to break, and put it together with the necessary rules of the understanding, e.g., every event has a cause. I think the factual judgment under the category of causality. Note: All of these three judgments express my attitude to the assertion. I can take it either as probable, or as a fact, or as necessary. The linguistic expression of this is given by the moods of language, indicative for S is P, subjunctive for S may be P, and imperative for S must be P. The point: All twelve types of judgment are the ways in which logic formalizes the combination of representations (e.g., the representations of S and P) Now, if understanding is the function of combination, then the table of logical judgments is also a table of the understanding. As Kant puts this in the Prologomena, which is a book he wrote to summarize the Critique, "The pure concepts of the understanding [the categories] are nothing more that the conceptions of intuitions in general insofar as intuitions are universally and necessarily determined in respect to the types of judging (Prol. Sec. 21). This means that all our judgments are functions of unity among our representations. They are the way we connect our representations. If we apply them to the representations that are intuitions, we get the categories. Thus, the same rules of synthesis apply both for judgments and for objects. The same forms of one in many apply. This is why logic applies to both concepts and 30

objects, and can be used with regard to the applications of concepts to the appearing world. Let me finish up by making a point about synthesis: Kant writes that Synthesis in general is a mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul. ... To bring this synthesis to concepts is a function which belongs to the understanding. (NKS:112). The act, "I reproduce," is the ultimate act of synthesis. It goes on continuously and blindly. Experience on its lowest level is just the addition of the just expired impression to the present actual impression through its reproduction. Such reproduction is a function of the imagination. It results in a chain of reproductions of reproductions . of original impressions that is attached to our present perceptual awareness. The result is the extended tissue of experience. This tissue consists of both our present impressions and the reproduced previous impressions. But if we are to get objects out of this experience, that is, objects that we can know and apply predicates to, we have to apply the rules of the syntheses of the understanding. In other words, we have interpret the tissue of experience, seeking out the corresponding patterns, according to these rules. These rules give us the twelve categories of the understanding. Each is required for us to (1) grasp the object and (2) bring it under concepts. For Kant, then, to see, and to conceptualize involve each other. I successively see a multiplicity of colored (red) appearances. I grasp them as pertaining to one object, e.g., a book. The object appears to me under the concept of substance since the rule of synthesis I employ is that given by the category of inherence and subsistence. I thereby express what I gain from such synthesis in the judgment the book [the object] is red [the concept]. Thus, as Kant writes, what must first be givenwith a view to apriori knowledge of all objectsis the manifold [the multiplicity] of pure intuition; the second factor involved is the synthesis of this multiplicity by means of the imagination. But even this does not yield knowledge. The concepts which give unity to this pure synthesis ... furnish the third requisite for the knowledge of the object; and they rest on the understanding. (NKS:112). Another example of what he is talking about is given by the concept causality. I get a sequence of perceptions. I reproduce them. I take their temporal ordering as necessary, not just for me but for everyone. I, thus, for example, make the 31

assertion: He broke the dish by dropping it. Here, I assert that his dropping the dish necessarily preceded its breaking. To summarize: Kant gives us a way to explain how we can apply concepts to the world. The very same action by which we grasp a concept (a one in many), using this to name an object, is that action that allows us to pick the object out from its background and assert that others see it and its relation to other things as we do. This action is synthesis.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B114-B129; NKS: pp. 118-128 The final section on the table of categories, Sec. 12, gives Kants treatment of the mediaeval predicates, one, true, good. According to its medieval formulation, whatever exists is one, is true, and is good. All 3 are, in the medieval terminology transcendental predicates. This means that they apply to being wherever it is found. Let me take a moment to give you the medieval background to these concepts. To begin with unity, this implies both conceptual (specific) unity and real unity. Specific unity is the unity of the concept. A concept is unified when it is noncontradictory, that is, when the elements (in Duns Scotuss terms, the formal notes) making it up are consistent with one another. Thus the concept, equilateral triangle has a specific unity: the notions of equal sides and of triangular figure are consistent. They can be joined into a single concept. By contrast, the concept of square circle lacks any such specific unity. Real unity is the unity of a thing. This is the unity that it has as a substance. A substance is defined as what receives predicates, but cannot itself be predicated of other substance. Thus, I can predicate musical of Socrates. But I cannot predicate Socrates of Plato. The unity of Socrates is that of self-subsistent individual thing. For material objects, real unity involves the specific unity of the form in its informing some matterfor example, the form of humanity informing the flesh of Socrates. Given that beings are impossible when the predicates assignable them contradict one another, one can also express the distinction between real and specific unity by saying that while real unity concerns the actuality of a thing, specific unity concerns its possibility. As for the concept of the true, this concerns a beings being in accord with its idea. A true man, for example, is a person fully in accord with the idea of man. For Plato, these ideas express the formal self-identities that define things. They 32

are their underlying identities throughout change. As such, they express the very being of the to be of entities. The medieval transformation of this is the locates such ideas in the mind of God, making them the patterns God used to create the world. Here a true man is a man in accordance with Gods conception of man when he created him. None of us, after the fall, are true men, our nature having been corrupted. At any rate, the point is that truth here is not the correspondence of knowledge with its object but rather the correspondence of the object with its idea, be this idea a Platonic form or a creative idea in the mind of God. Turning finally to the concept of the good, in the Christian formulation this points to the goodness of creation. Its biblical reference is to the repeated pronouncement after each of the acts of creation: and God saw that it was good. Thus whatever exists is good simply by virtue of the fact of its being created by God. The Platonic antecedent of this replaces God with the Good that stands at the top of the divided line. Instead of the action of creation, we have, in Plato, simply the static relationship between the good that is beyond being and each of the formal ideas that express being. The Good is that in which all things ultimately participate through their ideas. Kants treatment of these transcendental predicates follows the line of his treatment of the ancient Platonic-Aristotelian ontology. He transforms an account of being qua being into an account of our grasp of being. Thus according to Kant, These supposedly transcendental predicates of things are ... criteria of all knowledge of things B114 (118). They are the categories of unity, plurality, and totality from the table of the categories. In Kants formulation, unity refers to the unity of the concept. It becomes limited to specific unity. True refers to the plurality of consequence that can be validly derived from the concept; and Good refers to the perfection of the concept, i.e., to the fact that the plurality together leads back to the unity of the concept, and accords completely with this and with no other concept. B114 (119) All of these have to do with the knowledge of objects. They are not concerned with the objects in themselves. Since, in Kants formulation, unity is reduced to the specific unity of the concept and, hence, to its possibility, what is at issue here is not objects, but rather the possibility of our cognition of objects. This is the possibility of the concepts we employ in such cognition. As Kant sums up his position: Thus the criterion of the possibility of a concept (not of an object) is the definition of it, in which the unity of the concept, the truth of all that may be immediately deduced from it, and finally, the completeness of what has been thus deduced from it yield all that is required for the construction of the whole concept (ibid.)

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Kant now turns to his famous deduction of the concepts of the understanding. The deduction concerns our right to use them He expresses this in terms of the legal distinction between the question of right (quid juris) and the question of fact (quid factus). The question of right is the question of law. It asks for the relevant law in question. Only if there is some relevant law, can one make a factual legal claim. Thus, first one asks, is there a law covering the relevant situation? Then one asks, has this law in fact been violated? Positively, this distinction appears in the questions, is there a law that allows me to make a legal claim? and Do I and my factual situation fall under this law? Lawyers, according to Kant, term proving the !i(ht o! the e(a c aim < the deduction* of it. .//8 (/04). 1ant "ants to e%amine o$! !i(ht o! e(a c aim to $se the cate(o!ies of the $nde!standin(. These concepts claim to be a priori, that is, prior to experience. They claim universality and necessity. What is their legal title (or right) to this claim? Hume denies any such right. He asserts that concepts of the understanding have only a empirical basis. As such, they can claim neither universality nor necessity. This follows since what is established by experience can be overthrown by subsequent experience. This does not mean that we cannot use empirical concepts. Arising from experience, their legitimacy is grounded by experience. Thus our right to use the concept dog is grounded in our factual experience of dogs. There is also no question regarding our right to use the categories of space and time. Both the question of fact and that of right are answered in their employment in geometry and arithmetic. We employ them in developing these sciences. Our right to do so comes from the pure intuitions underlying such sciences. Thus the homogeneity of space understood as a pure form for intuition gives us the right to make such factual claims as two straight lines cannot enclose a space. Similarly, the homogeneity of time gives us the right to employ the unit as that according to which all things are one. The unit, as Kants Prolegomena points out, is simply the empty moment of time. Each moment, as an empty container of a possible content, is exactly like every other moment. As such, the moment stands as the ultimate unit. Given this we can say with Kant that the objects of geometry [as well as those of arithmetic] so far as their form is concerned are given ... a priori in intuition. B120 (122) Here, I should note in passing one of the many examples of the terminological ambiguity that makes the reading of the Critique of Pure Reason so difficult for beginners. Kant, having devoted many pages of the transcendental aesthetic to proving the space and time were not concepts but rather intuitions (or rather the pure forms of our intuitions) now calls them concepts. He writes, for example, 34

+e ha)e a !eady' #y means of a t!anscendenta ded$ction' t!aced the concepts of space and time to thei! so$!ces* .//I' (/00). Simi a! y he "!ites' ;+e ha)e a !eady #een a# e "ith #$t itt e diffic$ ty to e%p ain ho" the concepts of space and time' a tho$(h a priori modes of ,no" ed(e' m$st necessa!i y !e ate to o#-ects.* ./0/ (/09). &his ,ind of inconsistency may #e a !es$ t of his ha)in( "o!,ed on this #oo, fo! s$ch a on( time. Is not c ea! that he "!ote it contin$o$s y f!om #e(innin( to end. At any rate, let us return to Kants question: What justifies our use of pure categories of the understanding? We do in fact employ them, but by what right do we? In posing this question, Kant also has in mind the limitations of this employment. If their right turns out to be based on our perceptual interpretations of our experience, that is, on the ways in which we make sense of such experience, then their employment will be limited to experience. It will not extend beyond it. Kant, in this introduction to the transcendental deduction, confuses this issue when he compares the categorical concepts to those of space and time. Space and time, he writes, must necessarily relate to objects since only by means of such pure forms of sensibility can an object appear to us. B121 (123) He then adds, The categories of understanding, on the other hand, do not represent the conditions under which objects are given in intuition. O#-ects may' the!efo!e' appea! to $s "itho$t thei! #ein( $nde! the necessity of #ein( !e ated to the f$nctions of $nde!standin(> and $nde!standin( need not' the!efo!e' contain thei! a priori conditions.* ./00 (/09A?) ita ics added. &his imp ies that "e can e%pe!ience o#-ects "itho$t the emp oyment of the cate(o!ies. .$t t"o pa(es ate!' he "!ites' !efe!!in( to the ap!io!i concepts of the $nde!standin(' ;on y as th$s p!es$pposin( them is anythin( possi# e as an object of experience.* ./08 (/08) The point follows because a e%pe!ience does indeed contain' in addition to the int$ition of the senses th!o$(h "hich somethin( is (i)en' a concept of an o#-ect as #ein( the!e#y (i)en' that is to say' as appea!in(. Concepts of o#-ects in (ene!a th$s $nde! ie a empi!ica ,no" ed(e as its a priori conditions. &he o#-ecti)e )a idity of the cate(o!ies as a priori concepts !ests' the!efo!e' on the fact that' so fa! as the fo!m of tho$(ht is conce!ned' th!o$(h them a one does e%pe!ience #ecome possi# e.* (i#id.). How can he say both?

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How can an object appear to us without be related to the functions of the understanding and yet such functions, as expressed by the concepts, make experience of objects possible? Jeadin( #ac, f!om the Prologomena to the Criti ue' it seems that 1ant is thin,in( of the distinction #et"een -$d(ments of pe!ception and those of e%pe!ience. In a -$d(ment of pe!ception' the connections I ma,e to (!asp the o#-ect a!e ta,en as my o"n. In a judgment of experience, the connections are taken as necessary and universal. In the first, I am only reporting on my perceptual experience. My claim is only I see x say, a cat. In the second, I claim that everyone will make the same synthetic connection of the different perceptions, that is, everyone will see what I do. My claim here is that there is a cat there, a cat which I see and which everyone else who looks where I am looking will also see. &he!e is in a -$d(ment of e%pe!ience an imp icit co!!e ation #et"een of objective and universal validity Objective validity: the judgment holds (is valid, agrees) with regard to the object Universal validity: the judgment holds (is valid) for everyone judging the object Objective validity qua agreement with the object is the agreement of all judgments concerning the object with each other and vice versa In Kants words: Therefore when a judgment agrees with an object, all judgments concerning the same object must likewise agree among themselves, and thus the objective validity of the judgment of experience signifies nothing else than its necessary universality of application. And conversely when we have reason to consider a judgment necessarily universal we must consider it objective also, that is, that it expresses not merely a reference of our perception to a subject, but a quality of the object. For there would be no reason for the judgments of other men necessarily agreeing with mine, if it were not the unity of the object to which they all refer, and with which they accord; hence they must all agree with one another. Therefore objective validity and necessary universality (for everybody) are equivalent terms, But having assumed that we cannot know the object in itself, Kant then reduces objective validity to universal validity. In universal validity, the connections between perceptions that give us the objects we judge about are taken as universal and necessary. Example: If I assert that When the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm the connection of the 36

corresponding perceptions is assumed to be merely subjective, i.e., merely according to my experience. If, however, I assert that The sun warms the stone, the addition of the concept of cause makes the assertion one that holds for every experiencer. Here the connection the corresponding perceptions is asserted to be universal and necessary. Let me no" !et$!n to the iss$e at hand. 1ant asse!ts O#-ects may' the!efo!e' appear to $s "itho$t thei! #ein( $nde! the necessity of #ein( !e ated to the f$nctions of $nde!standin(> and $nde!standin( need not' the!efo!e' contain thei! a priori conditions.* .$t' !efe!!in( to the ap!io!i concepts of the $nde!standin(' he a so asse!ts that ;on y as th$s p!es$pposin( them is anythin( possi# e as an object of experience.* ./08 (/08) Ho" can he say #oth. &he ans"e! is that the fi!st asse!tion !efe!s to a -$d(ment of pe!ception' a -$d(ment that % appea!s to me. &he second !efe!s to a -$d(ment of e%pe!ience' a -$d(ment that the!e is an % the!e "hich I am seein( and "hich othe!s can see. &h$s' if "e ta,e the appearance of o#-ects to !efe! to o$! p!i)ate pe!cept$a a"a!eness of them' then s$ch a"a!eness' "hi e !e7$i!in( the cate(o!ies as !$ es fo! connectin( pe!ceptions so as to (i)e $s the int$ition of o#-ects' does not, as such, re uire the categories to be interpreted as apriori, uni!ersal forms. &he cate(o!ies can #e ta,en as !$ es app yin( on y to my p!i)ate pe!cept$a a"a!eness. &his seems to #e "hat 1ant has in mind "hen he "!ites2 ;Appea!ances mi(ht )e!y "e #e so constit$ted that the $nde!standin( sho$ d not find them to #e in acco!dance "ith the conditions of its $nity. E)e!ythin( mi(ht #e in s$ch conf$sion that' fo! instance' in the se!ies of appea!ances nothin( p!esented itse f "hich mi(ht yie d a !$ e of synthesis and so ans"e! to the concept of ca$se and effect. &his concept "o$ d then #e a to(ethe! empty' n$ ' and meanin( ess. .$t since int$ition stands in no need "hatsoe)e! of the f$nctions of tho$(ht' appea!ances "o$ d none the ess p!esent o#-ects to o$! int$ition.* ./09 (/0?). 1antCs point is that the o!de! of o$! pe!ceptions mi(ht #e s$ch so that "e do not ine)ita# y ass$me that one e%pe!ience (say that of A) m$st necessa!i y #e fo o"ed #y anothe! (say that of .). &his ce!tain y is the case if "e imit o$!se )es to -$d(ments of pe!ception. &he fact that I a "ays pe!cei)e A fo o"ed #y . does not ma,e it necessa!y that A #e fo o"ed #y .. +hat a#o$t the cate(o!y of s$#stance@ In this case' if "e do not (i)e pe!ceptions a common !efe!ent' "e do not ha)e the pe!ception of a spatia Atempo!a o#-ect. At this 37

point' the conf$sion ;in the se!ies of appea!ances* is s$ch that the synthesis that (i)es $s s$ch o#-ects is impossi# e. &h$s' if this !$ e of synthesis is )io ated' "e cannot int$it o#-ects at a . Nonethe ess' it sti ho ds that my int$ition of o#-ects does not e7$a o#-ecti)e e%pe!ience. O#-ecti)e e%pe!ience is e%pe!ience that ma,es an o#-ecti)e c aim Ea c aim that "hat I o#se!)e a#o$t an o#-ect othe!s a so can o#se!)e. No"' the empi!ica fact that I a "ays e%pe!ience o#-ects th!o$(h s$ch a synthesis does not ma,e it necessa!y that e)e!yone e se a "ays does so. &he!efo!e' if "e ta,e the experience of o#-ects to !efe! to the experience that ma"es an objecti!e claim, one can !eso )e the cont!adiction #y sayin( that the cate(o!ies' as !efe!!in( to ap!io!i' $ni)e!sa and necessa!y feat$!es of o$! $nde!standin(' a!e necessa!y fo! o#-ecti)e experience. &his in)o )es ta,in( them as app ica# e to a . A cate(o!y' then' is not simp y a !$ e of synthesis' #$t a so an inte!p!etation of this !$ e as $ni)e!sa and necessa!yEand hence as a !$ e fo o"ed not -$st #y myse f' #$t #y e)e!yone e se as "e . If "e accept this )ie"' then "hat the t!anscendenta ded$ction m$st e%p ain is o$! !i(ht to ta,e these f$nctions of synthesis as app yin( not -$st to o$!se )es #$t to a othe!s as "e . At iss$e is o$! !i(ht to ass$me the inte!s$#-ecti)e cha!acte! of o$! p!i)ate e%pe!ience. &his !i(ht is "hat the t!anscendenta ded$ction "i p!o)ide.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A edition of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, section 2, A95-A114; NKS, pp. 129-140, EV: 120-130 In the last lecture, I focused on Kants legal definition of the deduction of the categories, which is a deduction of our right to use them. One can also think of this in a Cartesian (mathematical sense) as a A deduction from a ground that we must accept as an axiom. What exactly is this ground? The short answer is that the possibility of experience per se. Here the argument is, experience is actual, therefore it is possible, but it would not be possible without the categories understood as rules for synthesis The longer answer includes what Kant calls the transcendental unity of apperception. Here the bare bones of the argument are: 1. Experience is possible insofar as it is unified, that is insofar as it manifests that unity of experience that gives the object as an X, a common referent for our perceptions 2. But this unity of experience depends on the unity of consciousness that, in turn, depends on the unity of the self, taken as the function of synthesis.

38

3. This unity of the function of syntheses depends on the categories being posited, such categories being the formal structures that make up the identity of the synthetic act. 4. Thus, given the categories, we have the identity of the synthetic act and, with this, we have the identity of consciousness as one consciousness. 5. This identity is actual (we are not schizophrenic). 6. Therefore, the conditions for its possibility must be given. 7. But these are the categories. The above is the framework. Lets go through the arguments. Kant begins by considering possibility of experience per se. He writes: If, therefore, we seek to discover how pure concepts of understanding are possible, we must inquire what are the apriori conditions upon which the possibility of experience rests (A96, NKS 129). What are these conditions? 1) synopsis Experience occurs in time and relates to objects. For such a relation to be possible, we must take the multiplicity of perceptions, and view them together. We need a synopsis (a viewing together) of the perceptions. Kant: For knowledge is a whole with which presentations stand compared and connected. As sense contains a manifold in its intuition, I ascribed to it a synopsis. (A97/NKS 130) 2) How does this viewing together occur? Through a synthesis (a placing the perceptions together). But to such synopsis a synthesis must always correspond. (ibid.) What is this synthesis? How does it arise? What forms does it take? Its origin, according to Kant, is the spontaneity of the mind in its action dealing with the impressions it receives. Since the spontaneity is its action, it is distinguished from the minds receptivity to the impressions. For Kant, receptivity can make knowledge possible only when combined with spontaneity (ibid.) Now, according to Kant, this spontaneity or independent action of the mind takes the form of synthesis. The action of synthesis unifies the manifold (or multiplicity) of perceptions. This uniting concerns inner sense and, hence, the temporal relations of the perceptions. As Kant puts

39

this: All our knowledge is subject to time, the formal condition of inner sense. In it, they [the perceptions] must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relation. Through synthesis, then, the temporally disparate perceptions must be brought together. Kant calls this the synthesis of apprehension. Every intuition contains in itself a multiplicity ... In order that a unity of intuition may arise out of this multiplicity, it must be run through and held together. This act I name the synthesis of apprehension (A99/NKS 131). Now, according to Kant this synthesis has three distinct forms or aspects. He, therefore, also refers to it as a threefold synthesis of apprehension. There are, in other words, three requirements for grasping a temporally extended object; to each corresponds an element in the transcendental synthesis of apprehension. The first requirement is that of distinguishing the moments of time. Thus, the apprehension of a temporally extended object involves a "multiplicity" of temporally distinct impressions. Such an apprehension, as Kant writes, would be impossible "if the mind did not distinguish time in the succession of impressions following one another" (A99/NKS 131) The impressions must be given distinct temporal positions. They must, we can say, be inserted into definite, unchanging positions in objective, successively given time. The second requirement is that of reproducing the impressions, once the successive moments that carry them expire. Kant introduces the notion of reproduction by mentioning the empirical reproduction that occurs in association. Here, one representation can, in accordance with a fixed rule, bring about a transition of the mind to the other. (A100/NKS 132). For example, I see Peter, I think of Paul. I re-produce the absent perception of Paul. Kant asks, what underlies this? What makes the reproduction of experiences possible? (A101). Kant answers that there must be a spontaneous reproduction that goes on all the time for experience as such necessarily presupposes the reproducibility of appearances (A102/NKS 133) Thus, in the flow of perceptions, I necessarily reproduce the earlier as I proceed to the later perceptions, otherwise, I could have no extended experience. In his words, If I were always to drop out of thought the preceding representations ... and did not reproduce them while advancing to those that follow, a complete representation would never be obtained (A102/NKS 133) Thus, the synthesis of apprehension is inseparably bound up with the synthesis of reproduction. 40

Together, these two requirements point to a third requirement: The reproduced must be seen as the same as what was originally given or produced; hence it must also be distinguished from what is presently being given. Thus, reproduction can fulfill its function of bringing the past up to the present only if we are capable of recognizing that the reproduced presentation is the same as the presentation originally given in the past. In Kant's words, "Without the consciousness that what we think is, in fact, the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of presentations would be useless" (ibid., A 103, IV, 79). For example, in counting, I have to identify the units, which now hover before me, with those that have already been added to one another in succession. Without this, I would never know that the total is being produced through this successive addition of unit to unit. In other words, I would forget that such units had already been counted (A103/NKS 134). As is obvious, without this consciousness, the reproduced would appear as something new. Reproductions would not be temporally distinguished from the impressions that we are presently experiencing. Now, the consciousness that a reproduction is not a new presentation is a consciousness that what it reproduces--i.e., its content--is something past. The necessity, then, is that of temporally tagging the reproduced. It must be grasped as not new or past, that is, as occupying a departing moment. For Kant, this is not a separate condition, it is simply part of requirement (1) above, namely that the impressions be given distinct moments in time. Note: for Husserl, who intensively studied Kants deduction, this tagging occurs through the serial process of retention. The consciousness that what a retention retains--i.e., its content--is something past is guaranteed if we grant that a retention presents what it retains through a series of retentions and grant as well that a consciousness of this series is, in fact, that of the pastness of the retained. A content is retained [for Kant by its imaginative reproduction], this retention is retained [through a further reproduction] , this retention of the retention of the content is retained, and so on as time advances Each retention adds a degree of pastness to the content, and the content, grasped through a lengthening chain of retentions of retentions, is grasp as departing into pastness as the process continues. One way to put both Kants and Husserls insight is to say that an impression gives rise to an associated phantasm or image of its content, an image that reproduces this content. Association then gives rise to phantasm of this phantasm, one that reproduces this content, and so on. We interpret this series of images of images as departure into pastness. In other words, the tagging occurs because as the reproductive process 41

proceeds, the images become increasingly faded. We interpret this fading as departure into pastness. The parallel here is our interpretation of something getting spatially smaller as spatial departure. For Kant, this reproductive process of the transcendental imagination works on all the perceptions that successively fill the now. Without it, we would be limited to the shifting content of the now. With it, this content becomes spread out in time as a series of retained perceptions. 3) Finally, we have the third necessity, which is that of recognition in a concept. Now that we have a multitude of retained perceptions, we need to link them to an object, that is, give them a common referent. A concept is the one in many. To think the object (that is to intuit it beyond the present instant), the object must be grasped as the single referent of a multitude of perceptions. The object is not anyone of these perceptions; it is an X, an empty referent point. As Kant puts this, What, then, is to be understood when we speak of an object corresponding to and consequently distinct from our knowledge? This object must be thought only as something in general = X, since outside our knowledge we have nothing which we could set over against this knowledge as corresponding to it (A104/NKS 134). The X, in other words, corresponds to the knowledge we gain through our perceptions. Such an X, if we strip the content of our perceptions from it, is empty. In itself, it is only a reference point. Having shown how the threefold synthesis of the imagination satisfies the conditions for the perception of the object, Kant now proceeds to his deduction of the categories. Let us recall the first two steps: 1. Experience is possible insofar as it is unified, that is insofar as it manifests that unity of experience that gives the object as an X, a common referent for our perceptions 2. But this unity of experience depends on the unity of consciousness that, in turn, depends on the unity of the self, taken as the function of synthesis. He has accomplished the first step and now moves on to the second. He begins by stressing the relationship between the unity of the object and that of knowledge.

42

He states: the object is !iewed as that which pre!ents our modes of "nowledge from being hapha#ard or arbitrary, and "hich determines them a priori in some definite fashion. 6o! in so fa! as they a!e to !e ate to an o#-ect' they m$st necessa!i y a(!ee "ith one anothe!' that is' m$st possess that $nity "hich constit$tes the concept of an o#-ect. A/4?3K/9?A3. No"' a tho$(h he spea,s of o#-ect as dete!minin( o$! ,no" ed(e' the !e ation' in fact' is the !e)e!se. &he e ements of o$! ,no" ed(e' in thei! a(!eein( "ith each othe!' a!e "hat possesses the $nity that ;constit$tes the concept of the o#-ect* as a one in many' i.e.' as a !efe!ence point. Ne%t' he ma,es a simi a! asse!tion a#o$t the $nity of the o#-ect and that of o$! conscio$sness. He "!ites2 ;since "e ha)e to dea on y "ith the m$ tit$de of o$! !ep!esentations' and since that x (the o#-ect) "hich co!!esponds to them is nothin( to $s A#ein(' as it is' somethin( that has to #e distinct f!om a o$! !ep!esentations Athe $nity "hich the o#-ect ma,es necessa!y can #e nothin( e se than the fo!ma $nity of conscio$sness in the synthesis of the m$ tit$de of !ep!esentations. It is on y "hen "e ha)e th$s p!od$ced synthetic $nity in the m$ tit$de of int$ition that "e a!e in a position to say that "e ,no" the o#-ect* (A/43KN1S /93). A(ain it seems that the $nity of the o#-ect is dete!minati)e' this time' of the $nity of conscio$sness. .$t' in fact' the !e)e!se is the case. It is "hen "e $nify the m$ tit$de of int$ition (the!e#y p!od$cin( the $nity of conscio$sness)' that "e can ,no" the o#-ect. Ha)in( tied the $nity of the o#-ect to the $nity of conscio$sness' 1ant no" !e ates this second $nity to a !$ e of synthesis (a !$ e #y "hich "e p$t to(ethe! o$! pe!ceptions). He "!ites' this unity of consciousness is impossible if the int$ition cannot #e (ene!ated in acco!dance "ith a !$ e #y means of s$ch a f$nction of synthesis as ma,es the !ep!od$ction of the manifo d a priori necessa!y' and !ende!s possi# e a concept in "hich it is $nited.* (ibid). Here, &his unity of rule dete!mines a the m$ tip icity* of pe!ceptions. It dete!mines them as ha)in( a sin( e !efe!ence point' name y the o#-ect. He!e' in 1antCs "o!ds' ;&he concept of this $nity is the !ep!esentation of the o#-ect L x* (i#id.). For example, the concept of the unity of the rule of substance is the representation of the object as the single referent of a series of appearances. Object, here, is defined in terms of the synthesis of such appearances. In Kants words, This object is no more than that something, the concept of which expresses such a necessity of synthesis (A106/NKS 136). For example, the concept of a spatial object expresses the necessity of the synthesis according to the rule of perspectival appearing.

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Continuing his deduction, Kant now provides a ground for the synthesis that unifies consciousness by giving it a reference to an object. This ground is the action of the subject itself. It is one subject engaging in synthesis. The subjects identity is the identity of its function of synthesis, the very function that yields the unity of consciousness. This means, Kant writes, this unity of consciousness [that yields the unitary object] would be impossible if the mind in knowledge of the multiplicity could not become conscious of the identity of function whereby it synthetically combines the multiplicity into one knowledge [of the object]. He continues: The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, that is, according to rules. (A108/NKS 136-7). Given this, if we violate the rules of synthesis which are the categories, we disrupt 1) the unity of synthesis of the appearances and 2) the consciousness of our self identity. We become schizophrenic. As Kant puts this: The mind would never think the [objects] identity in the multiplicity of its presentations, and indeed think it apriori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act (A108/NKS 137). Thus, in thinking the unity of the object I also think the unity of my act. There is, then, an original self-reference in all my thoughts about the object. Here, we should note that in Kants terminology, apperception signifies self-perception. He writes: This o!i(ina and t!anscendenta condition Fof ,no" ed(e of the o#-ectG is no othe! than transcendental apperception* (A/48KN1S /98) This is the self-perception that accompanies all my acts. According to Kant, Kant: The I think must accompany all my representations. As Descartes observed, whatever I sense, see, imagine, think, etc., the I that engages in these acts is always copresent. The point follows for Kant since reproduction is self-referential. A presentation occurs, I reproduce the presentation, I reproduce this reproduction of the presentation ... and so on. The object of my act of reproduction is, here, the previous reproduction. Thus, to reproduce, I must focus on myself, i.e., on the result of my act of reproduction. The identity of this act gives me my sense of an identical self. I am self-present since by virtue of reproduction, the contents of my consciousness have not vanished, but remain available to me. I am self-identical since the act that continues to make these contents available to methe act of reproductionremains the same. 44

Kant, therefore, asserts that nothing can come to our knowledge except in terms of this original apperception (or self-perception) (A113/NKS 140). The point follows automatically, since this self-perception is implicit in the basic act of synthesis, which is that of reproduction. Thus, for Kant, the deduction is as follows: we go from the relation to the object to the necessary unity of consciousness and from thence to the synthesis of the manifold through a common function, that of reproduction. In his words, &his !e ation Fto the o#-ectG is nothin( #$t the necessa!y $nity of conscio$sness' and the!efo!e a so Fthe necessa!y $nityG of the synthesis of the manifo d' th!o$(h a common f$nction of the mind Fthat of !ep!od$ctionG' "hich com#ines it in one !ep!esentation.* &he cate(o!ies specify the particular forms that the threefold synthesis must take if our consciousness is to have a relation to objects in their various aspects. Their violation is a violation of our self-identity. Thus' "itho$t the cate(o!ies' e.(.' the cate(o!y of ca$se' ;no tho!o$(h(oin(' $ni)e!sa ' and the!efo!e necessa!y' $nity of conscio$sness "o$ d #e met "ith in the manifo d of pe!ceptions. &hese pe!ceptions "o$ d not then #e on( to any e%pe!ience' conse7$ent y "o$ d #e "itho$t an o#-ect' me!e y a # ind p ay of !ep!esentations' ess e)en than a d!eam.* (A //0' /9I). Since this is not the case' the cate(o!ies o#tain. +e' th$s' ha)e the fina steps of the ded$ction. &hey a!e2 1. Given the categories, we have the identity of the synthetic act and, with this, we have the identity of consciousness as one consciousness. 2. This identity is actual (we are not schizophrenic). 3. Therefore, the conditions for its possibility must be given. 4. But these are the categories.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A edition of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, section 3, A115-A130; NKS, pp. 141-150 Let us recall that the point of the transcendental deduction is to ground the categories, that is trace them to a necessary ground such that if we admit the existence of the ground, we then admit the necessary existence of the categories. For Kant, this ground is the necessary unity of the self. His claim is that because I am necessarily one consciousness, the categories, understood as rules for connecting my experiences to form one consciousness, must also be necessarily given. Let me outline the steps of this argument. What makes this section difficult to read is not just its density, but also the fact that Kant makes the same argument in three, slightly different ways. In the first, he argues.

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1.

Intuitions are nothing to us if they cannot be taken up into consciousness. This, of course, is analytically true. An intuition is the presence of something to consciousness A116 (141) 2. In consciousness, however, they can represent something insofar as they belong with all other [representations] to one consciousness. A116 (142). This also is obviously true. If your perceptions were split between yourself and a number of other people, those that belonged to the others would not be available to you. Therefore you could not use them to represent some object. Another way of putting this is to note that such perceptions must be synthesized (or connected) to represent an object, but this putting them together also yields the synthetic unity of consciousness that perceives the object. 3. By definition, the synthetic unity of consciousness presupposes or includes a synthesis (142). If the synthetic unity of consciousness is an a priori necessity, so is the synthesis. But the synthetic unity of consciousness is an a priori necessity since, without it, we could not represent any objects to ourselves at all. As indicated, if our consciousness were split, we could not have available the perceptions we require to represent an object. Thus, this synthetic unity is an a priori condition of experience. Therefore the synthesis that this unity of consciousness presupposes must also be an a priori condition of experience. 4. The categories, however, simply are the rules by which this synthesis is generated, therefore they must be also be a priori. Simply put the argument is that the synthetic unity of consciousness is both presupposed by the connecting of experiences to represent something and is established in such connecting. Thus, the connecting (the synthesis) that established it is an a priori condition for the representation of something. This synthesis, however, follows the rules for connecting perceptions that the categories express. Therefore, the categories are necessary both for the synthetic unity of our consciousness and the presence of objects to this consciousness. Now, right at the end of this argument, Kant blends in another way of putting the same insight. This occurs when he adds the remark, p$!e appe!ception Fthat is' p$!e se fApe!ceptionG s$pp ies a p!incip e of the synthetic $nity of the manifo d in a possi# e int$ition* A//: (/?0) The argument, here, as presented in the footnote to this remark, is that: 1. All awareness of objects involves self-awareness. In Kants terms, this is the conscio$sness of myse f as o!i(ina appe!ception. Apperception means self-awareness. Kants point is that when I say that I see x, I am necessarily aware that I see x. If such self-awareness were not presupposed, then I would merely register perceptions like a mirror. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary that all consciousness belong to a single consciousness, that of myself. 46

2. The self I am aware of is one. The a priori necessity of its being one is also that of the categories. Therefore the categories are necessary. Yet another way of putting the same argument concerns the relation of the transcendental imagination to the categories. 1. Empircal imagination in its generating images though its act of reproduction can produces various syntheses. But only if the syntheses that it produces follow the categories will a unity of consciousness be produced. Only then will I have my necessary self-perception as one subject. 2. Given that I do have this self-perception, that is, given that I am not schizophrenic and do see myself as one subject, the categories, as rules for connecting perceptions, must be at work. 3. Thus, the perception of myself as one consciousness, which Kant calls, the unity of my apperception, occurs when the syntheses of the imagination follow the rules of the understanding. In Kants words, The unity of apperception [self-perception] in relation to the synthesis of the imagination is the understanding. In other words, the understanding, as a faculty of rules, is just the synthesis of the imagination that follows such rules. It is the putting together of our perceptions in accordance with such rules. Thus, as Kant continues: In the understanding there are, then, pure a priori modes of knowledge [i.e., rules for connecting experiences] that contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of imagination in respect of all possible appearances. These are the categories, that is, the pure concepts of the understanding. A119 (143). For Kant, the unity of this synthesis of imagination is my necessary unity as a subject, and both unities occur when my experiences are connected according to the rules of the understanding. 4. Since my unity as a subject is necessary, so is the unity of the pure synthesis of the imagination and, hence, so are the categories taken as the rules that establish this unity of the pure synthesis of the imagination. To put this argument in the simplest possible terms, what Kant is saying is that the imagination in its ability to reproduce perceptions as images has a wide range. Not all of the images it produces enter into the syntheses that give us a perceptual world. Those that do are interpreted in terms of the categories. For example, the imagination preserves the successive perceptions we have of an object by generating images that reproduce these. Following the category of substance, we interpret these retained images as appearances of some object. The result is the unity of consciousness as a consciousness of this single object and the corresponding presence of the same object. Thus, without the categories neither would obtain.

47

The argument Kant presents is quite formal, but Kant fills it out by bringing in his division of the three subjective sources of knowledge: sense, imagination' and apperception. He defines them as follows: Sense presents appearances empirically in perception, imagination [presents them] in association (and reproduction), [and] apperception [or self-perception presents appearances] in the empirical consciousness of the identity of the reproduced representations with the appearances whereby they were [first] given. A115 (141) As Kant notes, each of these can be viewed empirically, namely in their use with regard to specific given experiencese.g., those of chair. They can also be viewed as a priori e ements o! fo$ndations' "hich ma,e this empi!ica emp oyment itse f possi# e* (i#id.). With regard to such foundations, we can say that all perceptions are grounded a priori in pure intuition (in time, the form of their inner intuition as representations), [all] association [is grounded] in the pure synthesis of imagination, and [all] empirical consciousness [is grounded] in pure apperception, that is, in the thorough going identity of the self in all possible representations. A115-116 What is behind this thorough going self-identity? It is the synthesis of recognition. As Kant notes, since diffe!ent pe!ceptions the!efo!e occ$! in the mind sepa!ate y and sin( y' a com#ination of them' s$ch as they cannot ha)e in sense itse f' is demanded. &he!e m$st the!efo!e e%ist in $s an acti)e fac$ ty fo! the synthesis of this manifo d. &o this fac$ ty I (i)e the tit e' ima(ination.* A/04 (/??). &he ima(ination fi!st t!ansfo!ms the imp!essions to ima(es. In H$meCs te!mino o(y' it ma,es them ;ideas.* .$t this is not s$fficient> s$ch ima(es ha)e to #e !etained. &h$s' ;the!e e%ists a s$#-ecti)e (!o$nd "hich eads the mind to !einstate a p!ecedin( pe!ception a on(side the s$#se7$ent pe!ception to "hich it has passed' and so to fo!m "ho e se!ies of pe!ceptions. &his is the !ep!od$cti)e fac$ ty of ima(ination* A/0/ (/??). This still is insufficient; I also need the synthesis of recognition, where I recognize the reproduced perceptions as the same that I originally had. As reproduction moves along, I recognize the reproduced as reproduced. This means that I recognize that the contents of my consciousness, with the exception of the new perceptions, are the same as those that I had before. In this, way 48

reproduction assures me of my self-identity over time. Without such recognition, I would have a completely new consciousness with new contents at each moment. But in fact I dont. Rather, as I quoted Kant, apperception results in the consciousness of the identity of the reproduced representations with the appearances whereby they were [first] given. A115 (141) Given this, to assert my self -identity and to assert the synthesis of recognition are one and the same. Thus, if I can assert my necessary self-identity, I can assert the necessity of the synthesis of recognition. Now, in fact, as Kant says, we are conscious a priori of the complete identity of the self with respect to all the representations which can ever belong to our knowledge as being a necessary condition of the possibility of all representations. Therefore, the synthesis of recognition must occur. Now, the synthesis of recognition involves more than simply the consciousness that what we think is, in fact, the same as what we thought a moment before. A 103, IV, 79). It involves the categories. In Kants words, Act$a e%pe!ience < contains in !eco(nition < ce!tain concepts "hich !ende! possi# e the fo!ma $nity of e%pe!ience' and the!e"ith a o#-ecti)e )a idity (t!$th) of empi!ica ,no" ed(e* (/?8). &o see the tie #et"een !eco(nition and the cate(o!ies' et $s !et$!n to the asse!tion that the conscio$sness of o$! se fAidentity is the condition of the possi#i ity of a !ep!esentations. 1antCs point is that the !ep!esentations have to be connected in one consciousness for them to represent some object = x. In Kants words, For in me they can represent something only insofar as they belong with all others to one consciousness, and they therefore must be at least capable of being so connected. (A116) 142. The alternative would be splitting ones perceptual experience with someone else. But intuitions are nothing do us if they cannot be taken up into consciousness. In other words, half the experience would be missing. Thus, without this one consciousnessi.e., its self-identity with regard to our representationswe have no connected series of perceptions representing objects and hence have no experience. But what does it mean to place them into one consciousness? It means regulating the syntheses of the imagination by the rules for connecting perceptions that are the categories. In other words, more is required than just reproducing them and recognize them as mine. I have to interpret what I reproduce in terms of the categories. Kant puts this in terms of the relation of the understanding to the imagination. The understanding, with its categories, is the unity of apperception [selfperception] in relation to the synthesis of the imagination. As for the categories of the understanding, they are just the modes of knowledge, that is, ways of connecting representations, which contain the necessary unity of the pure 49

synthesis of the imagination in respect to all possible appearances. (A119) The categories, in other words, are the formal constraints on the imaginations connecting appearances, constrains that allow of a unity of consciousness Therefore, if I follow the rules of the categories in using the powers of the productive imagination to unite the appearances, I will have a unitary self. I will also have, corresponding to this, a world or nature understood as the lawful unity of appearances. This will be the world that manifests the categories. It will, e.g., be a world where nothing happens without a cause. Thus, without the categories, it might be possible that there might exist a multitude of perceptions, and indeed, an entire sensibility, in which much empirical consciousness would arise in my mind, but in a state of separation, and without belonging to a consciousness of myself (145) The reference here is to Humes picture of the self as a bundle of perceptions, or even as a theater or place of shifting perceptions. Kant, however, continues, This, however, is impossible. For it is only because I ascribe all perceptions to one consciousness (original apperception) that I can say of all perceptions that I am conscious of them (145). This ascription requires more than the recognition that the contents of ones consciousness are the same from moment to moment. It requires the synthetic unity of such contents into one consciousness. The point is that a bundle of perceptions is not aware of itself as unity, neither is a theater. Self-awareness presupposes the unity of the self as that one thing that is having perceptions. The shattering of the unity of the self is a shattering of this self-awareness. Given that the latter is necessary, the unity is necessary, but then the categories which establish this unity are also necessary. Thus, one can say that the formal reason (the objective ground) why I associate the way I do is to be found in the necessity of ascribing what appears as an appearance to me, that is to my unitary consciousness. This means, as Kant puts it: The objective ground of all association of appearances is nowhere to be found save in the principle of the unity of apperceptions, in respect of all knowledge, which is to belong to me. (145). All appearances [as being in me and my being aware of them as mine] must so enter the mind or be apprehended [and connected] such that they conform to the unity of apperception. (145). For Kant, then, the imagination is the intermediary ground here between sensibility and understanding. It explains why our experiences of the world conform to the categories. The imagination in its syntheses of sensory data follows the categories. It is the link between the understanding and experience.

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What forces the imagination to follow the categories is the necessary apperception of ourselves as one subject. Kant: It is this apperception [this self-perception] that must be added to pure imagination in order to render its function intellectual(146) render its syntheses such that the concepts of the understanding apply to the world the imagination creates. As he also expresses this intermediary character: The synthesis of the imagination connects the manifold only as it appears in intuition, ... it is always in itself sensible. And while concepts, which belong to the understanding, are brought into play through relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception, it is only by means of the imagination that they can be brought into relation to sensible intuition (146). The relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception [i.e., of the multiplicity of perceptions to the unity of our self-perception] occurs through the necessity of our having one consciousness. If the manifold is going to be there for us, it must be present in a single consciousness. This necessity sets a priori limits to the imagination in its syntheses. The result is that the rules of unification (the categories) that make this unitary consciousness possible apply to sensible experience. A note on terminology: You will have noticed that Kant distinguishes the productive synthesis of the imagination from the reproductive. He writes: only the productive synthesis of the imagination can take place a priori; the reproductive rests on empirical conditions A118 Such a pure productive imagination without distinction of intuitions is directed exclusively to the a priori combination of the manifold. So understood, it is, in its syntheses, the pure form of all possible knowledge. (ibid.). What he wants us to think of is the pure act of I reproduce, abstracted from all empirical content. Why is this productive? If you abstract the empirical content of the content filled moments (impressions) that you reproduce, what is left is simply the moments themselves. The reproduction of an expired moment is, then, a production. It results in the presence of that which did not exist before: a moment of the past. Reproduction, then, is productive in the strong sense of producing something new: namely the moments of time. Without it, there is only nowness. One can also say that this production is one of the reasons why Kant calls consciousness spontaneous. It doesnt simply reproduce, it produces.

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To call it productive is to contrast it to the subjective faculty which leads the mind to reinstate a preceding perception alongside the subsequent perception to which it has passed, and so to form a whole series of perceptions. This, Kant states, is the reproductive faculty of the imagination, which is merely empirical. What is empirical in it is the content of the reproduced. Once, one abstracts from this, you get the productive synthesis of the imagination. Finally, let me remark that we never have the categories apart from the imagination since they must work together to generate experience. Similarly, we never have the pure spontaneous imagination apart from the empirical reproductive imagination. What we have is the empirical operation of consciousness, whose necessary (and hence a priori) functions Kant is teasing apart.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B edition of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, section 2, 15-23, B 129-B150; NKS: pp. 151-164, EV: 98-109 B edition of the Critique Once again, we have the same formal argument as we had in the A editions version of the deduction: given the unity of the self, we must assume the unity of consciousness, which means we must assume the categories that impose this unity on consciousness. Here, however, the unity of the self is thought in terms of the unitary action of the self as the synthesizer of consciousness. The imagination does not come in as the intermediary between sense and understanding. Kant begins by noting that we cannot sense the combination of the manifold. Combination is not a perceived thing, but an actnamely the act of understanding: .$t the com#ination (conjunctio) of a manifo d in (ene!a can ne)e! come to $s th!o$(h the senses' and cannot' the!efo!e' #e a !eady contained in the p$!e fo!m of sensi# e int$ition. 6o! it is an act of spontaneity of the fac$ ty of !ep!esentation> < this fac$ ty' to distin($ish it f!om sensi#i ity' m$st #e entit ed $nde!standin( B130-1 (151) For the A edition, this act is that of the transcendental imagination as guided by the categories. It is the three-fold synthesis limited by the categories so as to produce the unity of the consciousness that is required for positing objects. The B edition makes no mention of this synthesis of this synthesis of the imagination. Why? Here we have to speculate. My view is that Kant may have thought that the A deduction reasoned in a circle. Thus the action of this three-fold synthesis must be an action of the I in itself. But such an I in itself cannot be known. Thus, the account of the threefold synthesis, on the one hand, is given in terms of time, i.e., it assumes the succession of impressions, which have to be successively reproduced to generate a complete presentation. On the other hand, the threefold synthesis is called a productive 52

one. It produces the moments of time. Thus, the synthesis is described in terms of its result. But what the action of the I in itself is, i.e., what it is prior to time, remains unknowable. Therefore, Kant in the second edition eliminates this account of the transcendental imagination and asserts that the action of synthesis is actually the act of the understanding. He also asserts that this act of the understanding points to the self as an agent. Thus, Kant writes: To this act we shall give the general title of synthesis, as indicating that we cannot represent to ourselves anything as combined in the object that we ourselves have not previously combined. ... Being an act of the self-activity of the subject, it cannot be executed save by the subject itself. This action is originally one and isequally valid for every combination (151-2/B131). In other words, to experience the object is to synthesize the perceptions of it (add them one to the other). This combination is what we do. It is an act of our selfhood and is one action applying to all that we experience. Rather than describing this act (which in A is a three-fold synthesis), Kant limits himself to asserting that the thought of unity of the manifold cannot arise out of the combination; rather it is what, by adding itself to the representation of the manifold, first makes possible the concept of combination. For the A edition, by contrast, the thought of the unity of the manifold does arise out of combination. The unity of the manifold is, first of all, the result of the synthesis of recognition, where we recognize that what we have reproduced is not something new, but rather the same as what we have previously experienced. If we didnt do this, then what we reproduced would be seen as something completely new, and at every successive moment we would have a new consciousness. The unity is, second of all, a result of the categories, which limit the possibilities of the associations generated by the imagination. Such categories are themselves expressions of the fact that all my presentations must be combined into one consciousness for experience to be possible. Having eliminated the syntheses of the transcendental imagination, however, Kant can no longer go down this path. Where, then, does the thought of the unity of the manifold come from? From the categories? No. According to Kant, the categories are rules for combination, and this includes the category of unity. But, as I just quoted Kant, the thought of unity of the manifold cannot arise out of the combination. Therefore, this unity, which precedes apriori all concepts of combination, is not the category of unity. As Kant also puts this, in the categories, combination and therefore unity of given concepts is already thought (152/B132). It is already presupposed.

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Where, then, does this unity of the manifold come from? It must be unity of the self that engages in this combination and that is, therefore, prior to such combination. The thought of unity of the manifold is the thought of the active self as an uncombined combiner, that is, a combiner that is prior to every combination. Thus, to think synthesis or combination is also to think the combiner, i.e., to think its unity. Now, according to Kant, this thought of the combiner expresses itself in the I think that accompanies all my presentations. If I could not say of some presentation, x, I think (i.e., I am aware of) x, x could not be thought all, and that is equivalent, Kant adds, to saying that the presentation would be impossible. B131-132 (152-153) This points follows since the being of a presentation is its being perceivedwhich signifies its being present to a perceiver, namely, the I of the I think. But if all my intuitions are attached to the I think, then their manifold [or multiplicity] has a necessary relation to the I think in the same subject in which this manifold is found. Kant calls this I think a pure apperception. It is a pure example of the self-awareness that accompanies all our acts. This I think, as the thought of the one combiner, is a transcendental unity of selfconsciousness or, as he takes to calling it, a transcendental unity of apperception. Kant calls it an original apperception' #eca$se it is that se fAconscio$sness "hich' "hi e (ene!atin( the !ep!esentation 5$ thin"5 (a !ep!esentation "hich m$st #e capa# e of accompanyin( a othe! !ep!esentations' and "hich in a conscio$sness is one and the same)' cannot itse f #e accompanied #y any f$!the! !ep!esentation.* ./90 (/39) It cannot #e f$!the! !ep!esented' #eca$se as the I ;in itse f'* it is no$mena i,e a othe! ;in itse fCs.* &h$s' "e cannot p!esent it di!ect y to o$!se )es. A "e can ha)e is a #ac,(!o$nd se fAa"a!eness that e%p!esses itse f in the ;I thin,.* He!e this #ac,(!o$nd se fAa"a!eness is not the !es$ t of the synthesis of !eco(nition (as it is in the A edition)' #$t !athe! di!ect y (ene!ated f!om o$! action as a synthesi=e!. Now, formally, all my representations are my representations because the I think is one and is attached to them all. All my representations are accompanied by my awareness of myself as having them. Of course, the deeper reason that they are all mine is because I combine them. In combining them I produce the unity of consciousness as mine.

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Kant, however, does not want to come to this conclusion just yet. Instead, he focuses on the fact that the I think that accompanies representations shows that they belong to one self-consciousness. He writes: For the manifold representations which are given in an intuition would not all of them be my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness. (NKS 153) Now, the fact that they do belong to one self consciousness means that they must exist together. They are then subject to what makes possible this co-existence. Thus, Kant continues: As my representations they must conform to the condition under which alone they can exist together in a common self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me. (ibid.). This condition is the act of the understanding, taken as the act of synthesis. The I think is actually a consciousness of this act. This means that the identity of the manifold that comes through the I think points back to this act. In Kants words, this universal identity of the apperception of the manifold given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations and is possible only by means of the consciousness of this synthesis. Thus, all my representations have a reference to one subject, and not just because the I think must accompany my representations. What underlies this reference to the subject is the unitary act represented by this I thinki.e., the act of I combine, which is the act of the understanding. In Kants words, This relation [to the identity of a subject] does not exist because I accompany every representation with consciousness, but because I join one representation to another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them. Consequently, only because I can connect a variety of given representations in one consciousness is it possible that I can represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these representations. B133 (153) Thus, all my representations are mine because I unite them. In Kants words, the assertion that these representations given in intuition belong all of them to me, is accordingly just the same as [the asserition] I unite them in one self-consciousness (ibid.). The ground of the identity of my self-consciousness [apperception] is therefore my generation of the unity of the manifold. (154). 55

Without presupposing the unity of this act, my self would be split among the representations. In Kants words, I would have as many-coloured and various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious B134 (154). My selfhood would be, in other words, that of Humes bundle of perceptions. The synthetic act itself is an affair of the understanding alone, which is nothing but the faculty of combining apriori, and of bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception (B135/154). From this, the deduction of the categories follows immediately. Without this combination, I cannot say I think x, that is I have no self-awareness of my perceptions, no apperception. But then my perceptions are nothing to me. I am like a mirror that receives impressions without registering them as mine. Given that the categories are the formal structures of combination, one cannot deny the categories without also denying that my representations are mine. This would make experience as my experience impossible. But such experience is actual, therefore so are the categories. They are actually present as rules for combining the manifold. As Kant puts this, the manifold of intuitions, if its members are to be recognized as my intuitions, must be subject to the conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception (B136/155). This means that the intuitions must allow of being combined in one consciousness. But this means that the categories, as rules of combination, must obtain. In Kants words: A manifold, contained in an intuition, which I call mine, is represented by means of the synthesis of the understanding, as belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness; and this is effected by the category. (B144/160). Thus, if I deny the category, I deny the unity, and I cannot call the representations mine. Given that I do call them mine, I must admit the category. This holds for all objects of experience. The generation of the unity consciousness is such that every intuition must conform to this unity to be recognized as mine, that is to be an object for me. (B138/156). To sum up, we can say that to assert that the I think must accompany all my representations is to see the necessity for the unity of consciousness and, therefore, of the act that underlies this unity. But this is to see the necessity of the categories. For Kant, then, to be able to assert the I think and to ascribe them to the identical self as my representations are equivalent B138 (157).

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Note: Kants reinterpretation of Descartes I think therefore I am. For Kant it is, I synthesize, therefore all my representations are mine. Note: Kants redo of the Cartesian assertion of the unity of the self. Descartes asserts that the ego, since it is unextended, and is one and the same in different acts, is unimaginable. We cannot picture it. For Kant, the I is the uncombined combiner. Given that all perception involves synthesis (or combination) and this I is uncombined, it is noumenal, not phenomenal. It cannot appear. I am compelled to think it, but I cannot know it (grasp it through the categories). Its only appearance is the background self-awareness that expresses itself in the ability to add an I to whatever act one engages in. Thus, thinking can always be expressed as I think, seeing, as I see, etc. This does not mean that this I is directly apprehended. There is here a distinction between Denken and Erkennen. I can think the I in itself, but I cannot know it. This holds both for my self and for the selves of others. Kant makes a few remarks, whose implicit point is to distinguish this deduction of the Categories from that of the A edition. In the A edition, the categories are rules imposed on the actions of the reproductive imagination. Such rules insure the unity of our consciousness. Kant now asserts that the laws of the reproductive imagination only have a subjective validity. (B141/159). They form the empirical unity of consciousness, through association of representations, such unity being distinguished from the original apriori unity of consciousness. (B140/158). As he also puts this, the reproductive imagination, only gives us a subjective unity of apperception through its laws of association. What we need is an objective unity, one that is necessary: ;On y in this "ay does the!e a!ise f!om this !e ation a judgment' that is' a !e ation "hich is objecti!ely !alid' and so can #e ade7$ate y distin($ished f!om a !e ation of the same !ep!esentations that "o$ d ha)e on y s$#-ecti)e )a idityEas "hen they a!e connected acco!din( to a"s of association. In the atte! case' a that I co$ d say "o$ d #e' 5If I s$ppo!t a #ody' I fee an imp!ession of "ei(ht5> I co$ d not say' 5It' the #ody' is hea)y5.* ./?0 (/3I) &he imp icit !efe!ence he!e is to the distinction #et"een -$d(ments of pe!ception and -$d(ments of e%pe!ience. &he c aim is that if "e imit o$!se )es to the !ep!od$cti)e ima(ination' "e on y ha)e -$d(ments of pe!ception. O$! statements a!e on y t!$e fo! $s. &o ma,e them t!$e fo! e)e!yone' "e ha)e to (!o$nd them in the t!anscendenta $nity of appe!ception. +hen "e do so' "e ma,e them o#-ecti)e y )a id. +e asse!t that o$! 57

!ep!esentations a!e ;com#ined in the object' no matte! "hat the state of the s$#-ect may #e.* (i#id.). &his' of co$!se' is a so the point that the A ded$ction ma,es. 6o! #oth ded$ctions' this point ho ds #eca$se no matte! "hat its state' the s$#-ect sti m$st #e a $nita!y $ncom#ined com#ine! fo! e%pe!ience to #e possi# e. Here, I have to say that I am not sure how much better the B edition is than the A. In the B edition, Kant speaks of an act of synthesis, but give no details as to its working. He also bases everything on a noumenal I in itself, whose action somehow generates the background self-awareness of the I think. But we have no idea how this is so. All of these are difficulties of the regressive method, where we assume that something must be the case, even though we have no way of describing it. Thus, we go from the unity of experience back to the action of the uncombined combiner as a necessary presupposition. But we leave its actual nature a mystery. In the A edition, an attempt is made to penetrate this mystery. It is for this reason that many philosophers, from Hegel to Husserl and Heidegger preferred the A edition. It is not clear that transferring the functions of synthesis from the imagination to the understanding (that is, conceiving the understanding as an act rather than as a set of rules guiding the imagination) solves the problem I first mentioned. The act, to be conceivable, must be thought of as an action in time, but this makes it an act of the phenomenal self, not the noumenal self. But the latter is the actual agent.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B edition of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, section 2, 24-27; B 150-B 169; NKS: pp. 164-175, EV: 109-119 In this reading, Kant reintroduces the transcendental imagination, though he remains silent on the nature of its threefold synthesis. He begins by distinguishing the figurative from the intellectual synthesis. The categories, as Kant notes, are me!e forms of thought' th!o$(h "hich a one no dete!minate o#-ect is ,no"n.* &hey e%p!ess on y the ap!io!i possi#i ities of ,no" ed(e. &h!o$(h them' "e thin, the com#ination of the manifo d s$ch that a $nity of appe!ception (a $nified se fA conscio$sness) is possi# e. S$ch a synthesis ;is at once t!anscendenta and a so p$!e y inte ect$a .* &his inte ect$a synthesis' "hich ope!ates "itho$t int$ition' is !esponsi# e fo! the f i(hts of metaphysica spec$ ation. (B150/164) As opposed to it' the!e is the fi($!ati)e synthesis' "he!e ;the $nde!standin(' as spontaneity' is a# e to dete!mine inne! sense th!o$(h the manifo d of (i)en !ep!esentations.* (i#id.). He!e' the synthesis is that of a (i)en set of pe!ceptions. +hen "e en(a(e in it' the categories, in themselves mere forms of thought, gain objective reality, that is, application to objects which can be given us intuition (ibid.).

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Now, from the A edition, we know that the transcendental imagination must be at work for any extended perception to arise. In particular, for any extended presentation, we require its reproductive action; we need its ability to make present again that which has expired by reproducing it through a phantasm. This reproduction is the origin of our synthesis of the manifold, since it places together o$! p!esent "ith o$! e%pi!ed pe!ceptions #y !ep!od$cin( the atte!. Kant seems to acknowledge this when he writes that the fi($!ati)e synthesis < m$st' in o!de! to #e distin($ished f!om the me!e y inte ect$a com#ination' #e ca ed the transcendental synthesis of imagination. $magination Fhe addsG is the fac$ ty of !ep!esentin( in int$ition an o#-ect that is not itself present* ./3/ (/83). 1ant' ho"e)e!' does not (o into ho" the ima(ination does this. Instead' he foc$ses on the mediatin( cha!acte! of the ima(ination. On the one hand, since all intuition is sensible, this imagination belongs to sensibility. On the other hand, it is spontaneous and active, while sensibility is receptive and passive. As such, it also seems to belong to the understanding. In fact, to the point that the imagination determines sensibility apriori in accordance with the unity of our self-consciousness, its synthesis is transcendental. Its syntheses of perceptions conform to the categories. Given this, it is not distinguished from the understanding, which for the B edition is the faculty of synthesizing the manifold. As Kant draws the conclusion: &his synthesis Fof the ima(inationG is an action of the $nde!standin( on the sensi#i ity> and is its fi!st app icationEand the!e#y the (!o$nd of a its othe! app icationsEto the o#-ects of o$! possi# e int$ition.* ./30 (/83). What we have in the second, B edition is thus the absorption of the transcendental imagination by the understanding. The understanding is imagination guided by the categories. As in the A edition, Kant calls this purely spontaneous action of generating phantasms of expired perceptions, the producti!e ima(ination' to distin($ish it f!om the reproducti!e ima(ination' "hose synthesis is enti!e y s$#-ect to empi!ica a"s' the a"s' name y' of association* (./30 (/83). As in the A editions use of the term productive, what is produced here can only be the expired, content-filled moment. The imagination, through its reproduction of expired moments, is productive of the moments of past time. This re-introduction of the imagination brings in the problems I mentioned in the last lecture: namely, how can you describe an act that, as generating time, is prior to time. In the B edition, this description is kept to a minimum. But this only means that we have to refer back to the A edition to follow Kants rather cryptic remarks on the productive imaginations role in syntheses. Kant, however, does not entirely avoid a description of the action of the $nde!standin( on the sensi#i ity.* &his occ$!s "hen he e%p ains his c aim that o$! inne! sense p!esents 59

$s to o$!se )es on y as "e appea! to o$!se )es' not as "e a!e in o$!se )es. +e int$it o$!se )es on y as "e a!e in"a!d y affected #y o$!se )es. If this affection is di!ect' then "hy canCt "e say that "e int$it o$!se )es di!ect y@ 1antCs ans"e! is to distin($ish inne! sense f!om appe!ception (se fAconscio$sness). Inne! sense p!esents $s "ith imp!essions' #$t' as sense' it does not com#ine them. +hat does is the $nde!standin(. See,in( to (!asp the s$#-ect' it ta,es the mate!ia of inne! sense and' #y synthesi=in( it' (i)es $s an e%tended p!esentation of o$!se )es. &his p!esentation is #$i t $p of o$! imp!essions of the e%te!na "o! d. +hat ma,es them mine is simp y the fact that I ha)e synthesi=ed them' that is' made them imp!essions #e on(in( to one conscio$sness' to one point of )ie" on the "o! d. &his mineness' insofa! as it is #$i t $p of imp!essions' the contents of "hich come f!om the "o! d' does not p!esent me as I am in myse f' #$t on y in te!ms of the appea!ances of the "o! d. I am a se f that is pa!t of the "o! d. In myse f' ho"e)e!' I am on y the action of com#inin( s$ch appea!ances. &o #e affected #y o$!se )es is to #e affected #y this action of com#ination. No"' in the A edition' this se fAaffection can #e t!aced to the !ep!od$cti)e act' "he!e in !ep!od$cin( the past imp!essiona moments' "e a!e affected #y this !es$ t of o$! action (-$st as "e a!e affected #y the o!i(ina imp!essions). &h$s' the se f affection of conscio$sness is th!o$(h the !es$ ts of its actions. In the . edition' ho"e)e!' 1ant' ha)in( e iminated the th!eefo d synthesis' does not #!in( this $p. Instead' he me!e y says that "e a!e di!ect y affected #y o$! act of synthesis ("itho$t mentionin( ho" "e a!e affected). The subject acts to synthesize and is aware that it acts. This awareness grasps the act itself apart from the sensibility which it synthesizes. In Kants words, Its synthesis, therefore, if the synthesis be viewed by itself alone, is nothing but the unity of the act, of which, as an act, it is conscious to itself, even without sensibility (B153/166) Thus, on one level, my self-consciousness is simply the consciousness of the unity of my act of syntheses. I am constantly adding impression to impression, and I am aware that I do this. Kant then notes that this sense is not a knowledge of the self. Here, I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, or as I am in myself, but only that I am. This representation is a thought, not an intuition (B157/168). The reason is that this self presence is immediate. It involves no temporal synthesis of contents. My self presence is a moment by moment self-awareness. To move from such background self-awareness to knowledge, we need to have an extended presentation. But this requires that we add to our direct perception of the act a perception of manifold that is synthesized through its action of combining. In Kants words, to know ourselves, there is required, in addition to the act of thought, a determinate mode of intuition, whereby the manifold is given. (ibid.).

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Here I know myself through the perceptions that I synthesize. They form the contents of my consciousness. While they are perceptions of the external world, they are all mine as belong to my consciousness, my perspective on this world. Accordingly I have no knowledge of myself as I am [in myself] but merely as I appear to myself (B158/169). I appear to myself through the appearances of what is not myselfi.e., the world. I do not appear to myself through what makes possible such appearances, the act of my selfhood, which is that of combination or synthesis. Kant puts this point in terms of the temporality of inner sense: He writes, [Inherently] I exist as an intelligence which is conscious [of itself] solely [as conscious] of its power of combination; but in respect of the manifold which it has to combine I am subjected to a limiting condition (entitled inner sense), namely that this combination can be made intuitable only according to the relations of time, which lie entirely outside the concepts of the understanding. Such an intelligence, therefore, can know itself only as it appears to itself. (B159/169) In other words, I am inherently the a-temporal, uncombined combiner. But if I want to present this selfhood concretely, I have to present it in terms of the manifold it combines. This is the manifold of inner sense, which consists of temporal relations. Therefore, I have to present the notion of combination as a temporal process. But this makes the subject itself something temporal or extended in time. This, however, is only its appearance. In itself, it is not temporally extended. As I noted, the same point can be made with regard to the threefold synthesis of the imagination. If we think the act of reproduction, we think of reproducing the previous impression at the moment of the next impression, with the expiry of this next impression, we think of this impression as also being reproduced. The point is that we are presupposing time (in the succession of given moments) to think the act of reproduction. But Kants position is that time is the result of this act. Thus, we are thinking the act, not as it is in itself, but only as it appears as an act in time. In addition, Kant makes the point that inner sense is not separable from outer sense. Kant puts this in terms of the point that inner sense is not apperception. It is not the selfconsciousness that grasps all our representations as joined together in one consciousness. For this, synthesis is required. In Kants words, Inne! sense < contains the me!e fo!m of int$ition' #$t "itho$t com#ination of the manifo d in it' and the!efo!e so fa! contains no determinate int$ition.* 6o! s$ch dete!minate int$ition' "e !e7$i!e com#ination. &h$s' ;+e cannot thin, a ine "itho$t drawing it in tho$(ht' o! a ci!c e "itho$t describing it.* Similarly, even time itself we cannot represent save insofar as we attend in the drawing of a straight line ... to the act of the synthesis of the manifold where by we successively determine inner sense (B 154/167). Why is this the case? Why do we have to represent even time in terms of space? The answer is that all our perceptions ultimately come from the external world. Given this, the inner sense that presents us to ourselves does so in terms of such perceptions. Thus,

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we represent ourselves to ourselves in terms of the world (the spatial temporal whole) we find ourselves in. But this is the world as it appears, not as it is. Let me now turn to the deduction of the categories, which involves space and time. Kant expresses this in terms of space and time. He writes: ;In the !ep!esentations of space and time "e ha)e a priori forms of o$te! and inne! sensi# e int$ition> and to these the synthesis of app!ehension of the manifo d of appea!ance m$st a "ays confo!m' #eca$se in no othe! "ay can the synthesis ta,e p ace at a .* (. /84K/:4) .$t space and time a!e not -$st fo!ms of int$ition. &hey a!e themse )es intuitions "hich contain a manifo d Fof thei! o"nG' and the!efo!e a!e !ep!esented "ith the dete!mination of the unity of this manifo d.* &he !efe!ence he!e is to the t!anscendenta aesthetic' "hich sho"ed that these fo!ms a!e not concepts' #$t !athe! int$itions. &his means thei! manifo d' thei! m$ tip icities of pe!ceptions' ha)e to #e com#ined to fo!m a $nity. ;&his synthetic $nity'* he adds' ;can #e no othe! than the $nity of the com#ination of the manifo d of a (i)en intuition in general in an o!i(ina conscio$sness' in acco!dance "ith the cate(o!ies' in so fa! as the com#ination is app ied to o$! sensible intuition. A synthesis' the!efo!e' e)en that "hich !ende!s pe!ception possi# e' is s$#-ect to the cate(o!ies. (B161/171) But if this is true then all experience, involving as it does, space and time must exhibit the categories. In Kants words: since e%pe!ience is ,no" ed(e #y means of connected pe!ceptions' the cate(o!ies a!e conditions of the possi#i ity of e%pe!ience' and a!e the!efo!e )a id a priori fo! a o#-ects of e%pe!ience. (B161/171). It is interesting to note here that this involves an extension of the notions of space and time as given in the transcendental aesthetic. As Kant writes in a footnote, Space' !ep!esented as object (as "e a!e !e7$i!ed to do in (eomet!y)' contains mo!e than me!e fo!m of int$ition> it a so contains combination of the manifo d* so as to p!od$ce a $nity of !ep!esentation. As he admits' ;In the Aesthetic I ha)e t!eated this $nity as #e on(in( me!e y to sensi#i ity' simp y in o!de! to emphasise that it p!ecedes any concept.* .$t ;as a matte! of fact' it p!es$pposes a synthesis "hich does not #e on( to the senses.* It p!es$pposes the action of the $nde!standin( in com#inin( the manifo d. It is' #eca$se ;$nde!standin( dete!mines the sensi#i ity* that ;space and time a!e fi!st gi!en as int$itions.* (note a' pp. /:4A:/). +hat this means' conc!ete y' is that insofa! as space !e7$i!es com#ination' it a so !e7$i!es time. &h$s' the th!ee dimensiona ity of space !e7$i!es an e%pe!ience of its pe!specti)a $nfo din(' "hich !e7$i!es a sense of the time in "hich the )a!io$s sides of o#-ects sho" themse )es. 62

One can a so say that #y the . edition' 1ant has !etho$(ht the t!anscendenta aesthetic. He has !ea i=ed that space and time as fo!ms of int$ition !e7$i!e com#ination. Othe!"ise they a!e simp y m$ tip icities of o$te! and inne! pe!ceptions. Kant ends the B deduction by providing some examples of how the categories, when applied to space and time, are valid for all experiences. The first involves the category of quantity. To intuit a house by passing my eyes over its various features, I assume that the space, the alongsidedness of what I intuit, is homogenous. At work here is, Kant writes, the cate(o!y of the synthesis of the homo(eneo$s in an int$ition in (ene!a ' that is' the cate(o!y of uantity. &o this cate(o!y' the!efo!e' the synthesis of app!ehension' that is to say' the pe!ception' m$st comp ete y confo!m.* (. /80K /:/) The second involves the category of causality: As it gets colder, I notice that the water freezes. This is a temporal relation. But to synthesize time to get temporal objects, I necessa!i y !ep!esent to myse f the synthetic unity of the manifo d' "itho$t "hich that !e ation of time co$ d not #e (i)en in an int$ition as #ein( determined in !espect of timeAse7$ence.* (. /89K /:0). &his #ein( dete!mined "ith !espect to a timeAse7$ence is' ho"e)e!' #ein( dete!mined #y the cate(o!y of ca$sa ity. I get this category by representing relations of time to myself as determined according to their sequence. (B162-2/ 172). Thus, when I apply the category of cause when I determine everything that occurs according to [necessary] relations of time (ibid.). Finally, let me note that this B deduction of the categories shares with the A deduction a certain paradoxical character. It claims that we see ourselves only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves. This means that our act of combining the manifold (which, here is the act of the understanding) appears only through its result. We have therefore to interpret the act as occurring in time. This holds even though we know that it generates time and hence is prior to time. Kant, in spite of his reluctance to describe this act in the B edition, seems still trying to master this paradox. This paradox seems to be inherent in the whole project of modern philosophy, which is that of seeing in the subject an ultimate explanatory ground. Such a ground removes itself from the grounded (if it had the same nature, it would itself be in need of a ground and would not be ultimate). But this very removal makes it problematic. We have no evidence for its nature. We can only regressively deduce what it must be.

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Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Analytic, Book II, Analytic of Principles, Schematism, B 169-B187; NKS, pp. 176-187, EV: 139-148.

The point of the chapter on the schematism is to exhibit the conditions of sensibility that allow the concepts of the categories to be applicable to the appearing world. The categories are rules for connecting the perceptions that we successively experience. Such connecting involves the content filled moments of time. Thus, the schematism of the categories give the conditions of time, including those of its relation to the contents that fill it, that make possible the application of the categories to experience. Kant begins with some remarks regarding the difference of general and transcendental logic General logic is a merely formal logic. It abstracts from all content and deals only with the form of thought B170 (176). Now, if we define judgment as the faculty of subsuming under rules, that is, of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a given rule, this general logic can contain no rules of judgment B171 (177). To have such, it would have to include some content. For only then would it have a concrete case and then decide whether or not it stands under a given rule. If, as a set of formal rules, it attempted to show how something fell under these rules, it could only do this by means of another rule. But then the question of the application of this new rule would come up, and so on ad infinitum B172 (177). Kants point is that the ability to rightly employ rules cannot itself be given by a rule. It must come from the learner himself. He must be able to distinguish whether a concrete case comes under the rule. (B173/178). This is a judgment. Kant somewhat acidly remarks, Deficiency in judgment is just what is ordinarily called stupidity, and for such a failing there is no remedy B172 note (178). Stupidity is incurable. Now, transcendental logic is different from general logic. It concerns the forms of connections of experience that underlie the table of the categories and hence the forms of judgment. Here, we can specify a priori the instance to which the rule is applied. We can give, by means of universal but sufficient marks, the conditions under which objects can be given in harmony with these concepts [of the categories]. (B175/179)

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If we couldnt do this, the categorical concepts would be void of all content, and therefore mere logical forms, not pure concepts of the understanding. (ibid.). In other words, precisely because transcendental logic does have a content, namely, the content of the those modes of knowledge that are pure and apriori, it must specify the relation of its rules to this content. (B170/176). What is this content? Empirically, it whatever is given in inner sense, i.e., all the material that floods our consciousness. Apriori, it is the temporal relations of such content insofar as these relations are conditions for the possibility of the experience of objects. Now, it is in terms of such temporal relations that we can speak of the applicability of the categorical concepts. Such concepts are applicable to appearances only when these relations are present. In other words, in the absence of time having the qualities that Kant will specify, we cannot apply (or use) the categories. Kant thus defines the schema of each concept as those qualities of time that permit it to be applicable to appearance. He introduces the notion of a schema by noting that whenever we subsume an object under a concept, they must have something in common. As he puts this, the representation of the object must be homogeneous with the concept; in other words, the concept must contain something which is represented in the object (B176/180). Thus, if we say that a plate is circular, the roundness that we intuit in the plate can be thought in the concept of a circle. Roundness is the mediating element. But what about the categories? We do not intuit causality or unity or possibility, etc. Where then is the mediating element? We need some third thing that is homogeneous, on the one hand, with the category and, on the other hand, with the appearance (B177/181). Since we are dealing with an apriori category, this mediating representation must be pure, that is, void of all empirical content, and yet at the same time it must in be sensible. (ibid.). This is time. At the origin of all our presentations of external objects are the contents of our consciousness. These are the individual perceptions that are synthesized into an extended intuition of an object. Now, time is the formal condition of the manifold of inner sense and, therefore, of the connection of all representations. And it contains an apriori manifold in pure intuition. Thus, it is homogenous with appearance since every appearance is in time. But its transcendental determination is 65

homogenous with the categories in that it is universal and rests on an apriori rule (B177-8/181). In fact, the categories are simply rules for connecting perceptions in time. The categories, therefore, are transcendental determinations of time. To see what Kant is getting at, we can note Platos difficulty of relating the concept to reality. As Plato in his dialogue, the Parmenides, writes if the concept is like the thing, then both the concept and the thing would need a new concept to express their likeness. But if this new concept is like the thing and the concept under it, yet another concept would be needed to express this likeness. If, on the other hand, the concept was not like the thing, then how could we ever know the concept since all our knowledge begins with the things. Kants solution to this problem is to turn concepts into rules for connecting perceptions and turn things into presentations which achieve their presence through the connecting of perceptions. What mediates between the two is, then, that which the rules are applied to, namely the content filled moments of time. Thus, a concept is not an image as Berkeley thought. It is not an image, for example, of a particular triangle acting as a sign pointing to other triangles. Its referencing the objects falling under it is not based on association as Hume thought. As Kant, writes, No image could ever be adequate to the concept of a triangle in general. It would never attain that universality of the concept which renders it valid of all triangles, whether right-angled, obtuseangled, or acute-angled (B180/182). Rather than an image, it is a rule of synthesis of the imagination, in respect to pure figures in space. The rule is to join three straight lines such that you enclose a space. Similarly, the rule for a number is the rule by which you add units, the rule for the concept dog is that of deliniating the figure of a four-footed animal in a general manner consistent with the concept, etc., etc. Here, I should note that such empirical schemas are the shorthand of our perceptual life. We see a few features, apply the schema to them, and pronounce that we have seen a certain object, even though we have barely glanced at it. In each case, the synthesis of imagination aims at no special intuition, but only at unity in the determination of sensibility. It expresses a rule for connecting perceptions so that you get an object. Thus, for a dog, the rule would be a wagging tail at one end, a head with certain general features at the other, four legs on the bottom. We see things in this general sequence, and we interpret what we see as a dog. 66

Kant asserts: The schema of sensible concepts, such as of figures in space, is a product and, as it were, a monogram, of pure a priori imagination, through which, and in accordance with which, images themselves first become possible. Thus, we get our image of the triangle, as I said, by connecting three straight lines together so as to enclose a space. Kant continues: These images can be connected with the concept only by means of the schema to which they belong. In themselves they are never completely congruent with the concept. Thus, no triangle I imagine by following this rule is completely congruent with the concept triangle. If it were, the concept would only apply to it and not to any other image of a triangle. But, none the less, the image is connected to the concept through this rule. The concept express the rule, and we follow it to generate the image. What about the categories? We cannot bring their concepts into images. We cannot have an image of causality as we do of a dog. But, nonetheless, the schemas of the concepts of the categories continue to be rules determining sensibility (inner sense) which are required for the application of the concepts to experience. In Kants words, the schema of a pure concept of understanding is simply the pure synthesis determined by a rule of that unity [of consciousness], in accordance with concepts, to which the category gives expression. (B181/183). What are these rules of pure synthesis for the categories? How do they express the conditions for the applicability of the categories to appearances? Kant answers this as he goes through them one by one: The first set of categories is that of Quantity. It is composed of the concepts of unity, plurality, and totality. Now, number is the pure schema of quantity (magnitude). It is generated by the the successive addition of homogeneous units. This is the rule for generating a concrete number. What are conditions for its applicability? The moments of time, considered as empty containers of contents, must be homogenous units. Such units must be that by virtue of which each thing is one, i.e., they must be the ultimate units allowing me to count everything. This means

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1) Number is the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous intuition in general. 2) It also means that this unity is due to my generating time itself in the apprehension of the intuition B182 (184). Thus, the number 5, is the rule that allows me to add the unit to itself five times. Its condition is that because of the homogeneity of the time I generate, this unit, which is the empty moment, is always available to me. Note: if content depended on the time when the content appeared, no content would be unchanged since time always changes. But then we could not add things, since what we had added would be different from what we presently add. The second set of categories is that of Quality. It is composed of the concepts of reality, negation, and limitation. Kant remarks, every sensation has a degree or magnitude whereby, in respect of its presentation of an object otherwise remaining the same, it can fill out one and the same time, that is, occupy inner sense more or less completely, down to its cessation in nothingness. Here, Kant is thinking of Humes equation of reality with the vividness of some presentation. The more vivid it is the more we take it to be real. What has no vividness at all, i.e., no sensory or imaginary input, we take to be not real or nothing. Thus, for both Kant and Hume, reality is time filled with some content, negation is the absence of content, while limitation is some point on the progression from one to the other. For example, an image is not a real object, but it is also not nothing. Thus, as a rule, the schema of reality is just this continuous and uniform production of that reality in time as we successively descend from a sensation which has a certain degree to its vanishing point. The condition of its applicability is the ability of the moments of time to have different intensities of content. The third set of the categories is that of Relation. It consists of substance, causality, and community. Substance is the permanence of the real in time. Here I present the real thing as a substrate of empirical determination of time in general, and so as abiding while all else changes. (B183/184). It is the unchanging substrate of change. The rule, then, is that of continually ascribing your changing perceptions (say, of a box as you turn it around) to one and the same referent. The condition of its applicability to experience is for there to be something unchanging in experience. All experience occurs in the now. The now abides even as it is filled with changing content. As such, the now is time as non-transitory and 68

abiding. The now, thus, expresses this condition. Because the now remains, we can posit substances as something remaining. For Kant, then, To time, itself nontransitory and abiding, [i.e., to time as the abiding now], there corresponds in the [field of] appearance what is non-transitory in its existence, that is, substance. Only in [relation to] substance can the succession and coexistence of appearances be determined in time. This relation to substance has as its condition the abidingness of the now. One may compare this to Aristotles position: The now [that is the same] corresponds to the body that is carried along, as time [as a succession of different nows] corresponds to the motion [that is, to the different places making up the motion] (Physics, p. 64). Thus, the fact that it is always now for us comes from the continuous presence of the body. Insofar as the body does not change position relative to itself, the now remains. In other words, the moving bodys internal lack of change (its remaining the same as it moves) is registered as a lack of time, i.e., as an internally unchanging now. Similarly, its change with regard to its environment is registered as time, that is, as the change of position of this now. What we have here is a dual perspective in which the bodys presence is regarded both as unchanging and as changing. What Kant would say is at work here is the category of substance. The now that corresponds to the body is simply the condition of time that is required to posit substance.

As for the concept of causality, a cause of something is the real upon which, whenever posited, something else always follows. It is that which always precedes this other thing. Its schema thus consists in the succession of the manifold in so far as that succession is subject to a rule. The condition here is the uni-directionality of time. A (a cause) cannot sometime precede B (the effect) and sometimes follow it. The concept of community is that of things being in mutual or reciprocal causal relations. Each as a cause of the other, must proceed it. Each as an effect of the other must follow it. Each must therefore both precede and follow the other. For this to be possible they must be simultaneous. Its schema is therefore the coexistence, according to a universal rule, of the

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determinations of the one substance with those of the other. The condition is that time must allow such co-existence. Finally we have the categories of Modality. It consists of possibility, existence, and necessity. As Kant describes it: Possibility is the agreement of the syntheses of different representations with the conditions of time in general. Opposites, for instance, cannot exist in the same thing at the same time, but only the one after the other. The schema is therefore the determination of the representation of a thing at some time or other. The schema of actuality is existence in some determinate time. The schema of necessity is existence of an object at all times. B184 (185) The conditions for applicability of these concepts is, therefore, the possibility of time to have a complex content consisting of different times, its ability to have a content at some determinate time, and finally its ability to have some content at all times. Summing up, Kant assert that the schema of each category contains and makes capable of representation only a determination of time (ibid.). Thus, for magnitude, it is the generation (synthesis) of time itself in the successive apprehension of an object. For quality: it is the ability for time to be filled with some definite content. In Kants words, it is the synthesis of sensation or perception with the representation of time; it is the filling of time. For relation: It is the ability of time to have a fix order of content. It is this that allows our connecting of perceptions with one another at all times according to a rule of time-determination. For modality, it the determination whether and how an object belongs to time. As Kant concludes, The schemata are thus nothing but a priori determinations of time in accordance with rules (B189/185. They are those determinations that allow the categories to be applicable to inner sense and hence to appearances in general. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Doctrine of Judgment, B 187-B202; NKS: pp. 188-197, EV: 148-156 Kant now moves from a deduction of the categories of the understanding to the principles of their use.

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Such principles should be distinguished from the schematism of the categories. The latter concern the sensible conditions for the employment of the categorical concepts. As I said in my last lecture, they can be thought of as rules determining sensibility (inner sense). They have to be followed if we are apply these concepts to experience Thus, the category reality is employed only when the moments of time are content laden. Negation, is employed only when the moments of time are empty of some given content. The rule (or condition) here is that time must be capable of being filled with content ranging in intensity from 0 to full reality. Once, however, the sensible conditions for the employment of the categories are present, the question is: are their principles governing the use of the categories? For Kant, there are. To take an example, the applicability of the category of quantity to sensible experience gives one the principle All appearances are, in their intuition, extensive magnitudes (B202/197). In other words, nothing can appear that does not occupy some quantity (either of time or of space). If we think about this, it follows from the schematism for quantity, which is that of the successive addition of homogeneous units. Its basis our generating [the homogenous units of] time itself in the apprehension of the intuition B182 (184). We require such homogenous units for counting and hence for the category of quantity. Now, all intuitions involve some extension because all of them involve a synthesis in time of a multiplicity of perceptions and hence involve this generating of time. At very least, then, intuitions of objects must have a quantifiable duration. Before Kant goes on to talk about the principles of the understanding, he notes that, as involving the categories, they are principles of synthetic as opposed to analytic judgments. In other words, they concern transcendental as opposed to general logic, since their field is our action of synthesizing perceptions. Analytical judgments, by contrast, simply concern the form of our judgments. Their highest principle is that our judgments cannot be self-contradictory (B189/189). It tells us that no predicate contradictory of a thing can belong to it (B190/190). Kant, in passing, makes an interesting remark about the principle of contradiction. This is that the usual formula, It is impossible that something should at one and the same time both be and not be, has been carelessly formulated.

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When we assert, for example, A man cannot be learned and unlearned at one and the same time, we are not asserting the same thing as the purely formal assertion, no learned men are unlearned. The latter is a genuine contradiction, since it denies the opposite of a predicate (learned) that is thought in the subject. Formally, then, the contradiction is of the identity of the subject: The statement, No learned me are unlearned men is, formally, No A is nonA. The obverse of this is Learned men are learned men or A is A. In the first formulation, A man cannot be learned and unlearned at one and the same time, we separate out a predicate (leaned), from the concept of that thing (man), and connect this predicate with the opposite (unlearned). Here, the contradiction is not with the subject (man) since a person at different times can be learned and unlearned. It is to correct this that we have to add the condition at the same time (B192/191). But this involves something synthetic insofar as it involves time. It would, thus, make the principle of contradiction a synthetic rather than an analytical principle. But, as Kant notes, the principle is a merely logical principle and, as such, must not in any way limit its assertions to time-relations (ibid.). His underlying point is that all judgments involving time are synthetic judgments. Thus, analytic judgments simply follow from the analysis of a given concept. Synthetic judgments go beyond this to something else that is not thought in a given concept. Here the subject and predicate dont have a relation of identity or contradiction (B194/192). For example, if I say, The book is on the table, Book is neither identical with nor contradictory to table. We do not think of table when we think of book. How, then, are the two concepts synthetically related? Through time. There is only one whole in which all our presentations are contained, namely, inner sense and its apriori form, time. What we have here is a twofold grounding: The synthesis of representations rests on imagination; and their synthetical unity, which is required for judgment, rests on the unity of apperception (ibid.). Thus, for synthesis, we require imagination. This is the productive imagination of the A edition. It produces the phantasms of the expired content filled moments, thereby reproducing the original moments.

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By virtue of this, we have the synthesis of representations. We connect our present representation (what we are now perceiving) with our previous representations (that are present as phantasms). Beyond this, synthetic judgments require the synthetic unity of what we synthesize and this involves the necessary unity of self-perception (apperception). By virtue of the synthetic unity of what we synthesis, we grasp one coherent world. The consciousness that grasps this is also necessarily one. It is one consciousness of one world, and it is aware of itself as such. The relation between this synthetic unity of representation and the unity of selfperception can be illustrated by a diagram:
A P E P' A' A'' A''' E' P''

Looking back from the reproduced segment AP to the initial segment AP which is intuitively given, we see that the reproduced segments AP, AP, AP coincide with one another. This means that the consciousness of data given during AP is also preserved. Our consciousness as containing this data is thus itself preserved. Thus, the unity of our self-perception preserves itself over time. As for the synthetic unity of representation that results in some object, this comes from our connecting the data we successively experienced along AP, and kept in mind by reproducing it as AP, AP, AP. The interpretation that connects this data is preserved along with the data and thus the synthetic unity of representation of some given object is also preserved. As is obvious, both the synthetic unity of representation and the unity of self-perception rest ultimately on the action of the imagination. This action of the imagination must of course be perfectly regular and automatic. If it speeded up or slowed down over time then the diagonal lines in the diagram, which represent the results of its action, would not be parallel but would cross, and the original experience AP would not preserve its identity over time. Kant makes some interesting remarks about the constraints of synthesis. These constraints apply even to our pure intuitions of space and time. Space and time, he writes, would be without objective validity, senseless and meaningless, if their necessary application to the objects of experience were not established. What they require is this reproductive work of the imagination. As Kant continues, Their representation is a mere schema which always stands in relation to the reproductive imagination that calls up and assembles the objects of experience. In other words, to concretely experience space and

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time we need the action of reproduction, specifically we require that it be perfectly regular and automatic (B195/193). Kant then mentions the constraint of assigning a referent to our reproduced experiences. As he puts this, Experience rests on the synthetic unity of appearances, that is, on a synthesis according to concepts of an object of appearances in general. We need to refer them to some object in general, some object = x. Otherwise, we would have only a rhapsody of perceptions. These disordered perceptions offer us no stable intuitions of objects and, hence, they also do not allow of any stable self-consciousness as persons viewing such objects. In Kants, words, this rhapsody of perceptions would not fit into any context according to rules of a completely interconnected (possible) consciousness, and so would not conform to the transcendental and necessary unity of apperception. This means, I could not even call them my perceptions (ibid.). He has made this point many times before. We require the categories understood as rules for connecting perceptions if we are to experience objects. As he states the conclusion: Experience depends, therefore, upon a priori principles of its form, that is, upon universal rules of unity in the synthesis of appearances (B196/193). As for synthetic apriori judgments, they are based on the possibility of experience. Thus, they require what makes experience possible, namely, the formal conditions of a priori intuition [space and time], the synthesis of imagination, and the necessary unity of this synthesis in a transcendental apperception. Such judgments occur when we apply these conditions to a possible empirical knowledge. When we do this, these judgments have objective validity. As Kant puts the general principle here: the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience (B197/194). The reason for this is that the conditions of experience are the same as those for the syntheses that result in the presence of the objects we experience. Kant, incidentally, indicates how we can refer to an object in its absence. According to Kant, the actual or possible givenness of the object means simply that the presentation through which the object is thought relates to actual or possible experience (B195/193). Thus, I think an object through some concept. The concept of the object, as a one in many, has for its range the multiple possible experiences one could have of the one object. It is just this thought I have when I refer to the object in its absence. To experience the objects presence is to fill in this range with corresponding intuitions. Thus, suppose you make some assertion about the object. Hearing it, I conceive of the range of possible experience that would give me the object with the feature you assert. When I actually intuit this range, i.e., have the perceptions, then I can confirm your assertion. This, of course, involves synthesizing the perceptions so that the object appears with the indicated feature.

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Another point Kant makes in passing concerns the fact that in science, when we discover a law of nature, only a few crucial, repeatable experiments suffice. Kant writes, The laws of nature, indeed, one and all without exception, stand under higher principles of understanding. They simply apply the latter to special cases in the field of appearance (B198/195). Given the apriori nature of such principles, the law that fall under them, once discovered, does not need constant empirical verification. Its apriori character comes from such principles. What then are the principles of the understanding? They are such things as All intuitions are of extensive magnitudes, The object of sensation always has a degree, i.e., an intensive magnitude, Objective experience requires a necessary connection of perceptions. Substance can only appear in time. All change occurs in conformity with the law of cause and effect. And so on. These judgments express rules for the objective employment of [the categories]. The categories themselves express the necessary conditions of synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience (B197/194). As one would expect the table of the principles of the understanding follows that of the categories. This is because the principles are simply rules for the objective employment of the categories. We thus have our principles grouped according to the four groups of the categories: 1 Axioms of intuition correspond to the categories of quantity. 2 Anticipations of perception correspond to the categories of quality. 3 Analogies of experience correspond to the categories of relation. 4 Postulates of empirical thought in general correspond to the categories of modality. The first two are mathematical, the second are dynamical. Kants claim is that [i]t is through these principles of pure understanding that the special principles of mathematics and of [physical] dynamics become possible (B202/197). The mathematical principles are concerned with the mere intuition of an appearance in general. The dynamical are concerned with its existence. Thus, a mathematical principle would be All intuitions are of extensive magnitudes. A dynamical would be In all change of appearances, substance is permanent. 75

Also, the mathematical principles as a priori conditions of intuition are absolutely necessary conditions of any possible experience. Those concerning its existence, however, will presuppose the givenness of the experience. Therefore they will only mediately necessary (B 200/196). These indications will be filled out in the following readings.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Axioms of Intuition, Anticipations of Perception, B 202B218; NKS: pp. 197-208, EV: 156-164 Review: The schema of a concept is the sensible condition under which it can be employed Thus, reality is employed only when the moments of time are content laden Negation, only when they are empty of some given content. The principles of the understanding deal the synthetic judgments which, given these sensible conditions, follow from the categorical concepts. Example: The category of quantity leads one to say, as an axiom of intuition, that all intuitions are intuitions of extensive magnitudes. Why? Because, all of them involve a synthesis in time of a manifold of perceptions Example: The category of quality leads one to say, as an anticipation of perception, that all sensations have degree, that is has an intensive magnitude. Hence the real, as an object of sensation, can be anticipated as having an intensive magnitude. Note: the difference between an axiom of intuitionwhich holds for all intuitions apriori by virtue of their involving a synthesis of the manifoldand an anticipation of perception. This is something that we anticipate when this manifold is filled with a given sensuous content. In todays reading, Kant now goes over more fully the axioms of intuition and the anticipations of perception. Starting with the former, he states that the principle of the axioms of intuition is that all intuitions are [intuitions] of extensive magnitudes (B202/197). This is because, [a]s intuitions in space or time, they must be represented through the same synthesis whereby space and time in general are determined (B203/198). But such determinations yield extensive magnitudes. Thus, I intuit objects by uniting the multiplicity of intuitions. But this requires the reproduction of expired moments, which adds them together to produce a duration. In Kant's words, I grasp objects only through

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that successive advance from one moment to another whereby, a determinate time magnitude is generated through the parts of time and their addition (B203/198). The same holds for space: the uniting of a multitude of intuitions unites their spatial quality (their ability to represent the alongside of each other relation). This means, I cannot represent to myself a line, however small, without drawing it in thought, that is, generating from a point all its parts one after another (ibid.). In both cases we have extensive magnitudes as defined by Kant. A magnitude is extensive when the representation of the parts makes possible, and therefore necessarily precedes, the representation of the whole (ibid.). Note: This seems obvious for time, with its necessarily successive quality. But cannot I imagine a complete line without drawing it in thought? Once again, Kants language is betraying him. What he wants to say is that outer intuition of objects proceeds by synthesis and thus necessarily has a magnitude. Although a single perception, which, of course, is an abstraction, can represent a complete line, the actual perception of a line in space requires more than one perception. It requires the unfolding of perspectives to locate the line, say the edge of a table, in space. With this, we have Kants proof of the principle of the axioms of intuition. As Kant formulates it: As the [medium of] pure intuition in all appearances is either space or time, every appearance is, as intuition, an extensive magnitude. This is because only through [the] successive synthesis of part to part in [the process of] its apprehension can [an appearing object] come to be known. All appearances [of such objects] are consequently intuited as aggregates, as complexes of previously given parts. As such, they are intuited as extensive magnitudes (B203-4/198-9). In other words, given that perception is synthesisi.e., a putting together part by part of somethingits result must be an extensive magnitude as Kant defines it. It must be the case that the apprehension of the parts precedes and makes possible the apprehension of the whole. Note the seamless way that the schema fits in to the axiom. The schema of the category of quantity is number, a presentation that composes the successive addition of homogenous units. Number is therefore simply the unity due to my generating time itself in the apprehension of the intuition. In this generation, the now functions as a container of any possible content. It forms the unit by which we count. The fact that all perception is through synthesis and synthesis involves the reproductive imagination, that is, the reproduction and addition to the now of the expired content filled moments, means that at every moment (every countable now) a quantitative, numerable whole is being assembled.

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Thus through synthesis, we generate that which we can count. Our ability to count comes from the nows role in this generationits role of being filled with successive content, that is, its not being tied to any specific content, that is, its being inherently simply a container of content, that is, its being the same for all content and hence capable as serving as a unit for counting all that we synthesize. To move from the principle of the axioms of intuition to the actual axioms, we have to turn to mathematics. The axioms are what give mathematics is apriori applicability to objects of experience (B206/200). As Kant put this: The mathematics of space (geometry) is based upon this successive synthesis of the productive imagination in the generation of figures. This is the basis of the axioms which formulate the conditions of sensible a priori intuition under which alone the schema of a pure concept of outer appearance can arise B204/199.) Question: what concretely are these axioms? Kant gives as examples: Between two points only one straight line is possible two straight lines cannot enclose a space, etc. (B204/199) A third possible example appears when he writes, If I assert that through three lines, two of which taken together are greater than the third, a triangle can be described, I am only giving the function of the productive imagination whereby the lines can be drawn greater or smaller and so can be made to meet at every possible angle (B205/200). This general rule for the productive imagination of a triangle also seems to be an axiom, since it governs all triangles. All these axioms pertain to the measurability of space. Thus, to say that only one straight line is possible between two points is also to say that such a line is the shortest distance between the two points. Implied here is that there is a unique shortest distance. If there were not, then one could not say that space was unambiguously measurable, that is, that we could not assign unique quanta (numbers) to given distances in space. But this is just what the axiom of intuition asserts. The same point can be made with regard to two straight lines not enclosing a space. If they could, then the line would not be the unique shortest distance, but could bulge. Kant asserts that these axioms hold for quanta, magnitude as such. They do not hold for quantitythat is for what Euclid would call multiplicity (number) as opposed to magnitude. Thus, 7+5 = 12 is not an axiom, but only a numerical formula. Kant asserts that even though it is synthetic, it is not a general proposition like those of geometry (B205/199). It is only a singular proposition. If we made it an axiom, this would involve recognition of an infinite number of axioms, one for each possible addition. (B206/200).

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The important point in all this is that, for Kant, an extensive magnitude is a whole created out of its parts. As such, it is the result of the action of synthesis, which itself follows from the underlying act of I reproduce. Each I reproduce results in a new moment of time. The identity of the act yields the identity of the moments, qua containers of content, that it generates. With it, I have the successive addition of homogenous units due to my generating time itself, that is, I have, number understood as that by which I count and measure magnitude. Kant next goes on speak of anticipations of perception. Their principle is that in all appearances, the real that is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, that is, a degree (B207/201). This follows because appearances contain sensory content over and beyond their extension in space and time. This real of sensation indicates only that the subject is affected (ibid.). Here, a graduated transition possible, one from an actual empirical consciousness to a pure consciousness (one that is abstractly considered as empty of any particular sensuous content). This transition marks the intensive magnitude of the appearance. The difference between intensive and extensive magnitudes follows from the fact that sensation is not itself an objective representation. (B208/202). Sensation is instantaneous. It does not need time to appear. Thus, sensation is not extensive but intensive. In Kants words, As sensation is that element in the appearance the apprehension of which does not involve a successive synthesis proceeding from parts to the whole representation, it has no extensive magnitude (B209/203). One can also put this by saying that sensation is what is synthesized, rather than a result of synthesis. Without it, synthesis cannot begin. Now, on the one hand, we cannot anticipate sensation. It cannot be known apriori with regard to its particular content (B209/202). On the other hand, there is in every sensation, as sensation in general something that can be known apriori that we can anticipate (ibid.). This is the fact that every sensation has its degree. It has its intensive magnitude. For Kant, then, every appearance has both an extensive and an intensive magnitude. The extensive magnitudes are continuous since they are extended in space and time. And space and time are continuous since time is composed of times and space is composed of spaces. In other words, in dividing space and time, we never come to a least unit of space or a least unit of time. If we could come to a least unit, then such units would be like 79

atoms in a void. Times would be surrounded by non-times, spaces by non-space. Thus, we would think of a time not having a before and an after and we would also think of a space outside of which there would not be another space. But this is impossible. A time is in time, i.e., surrounded by times. A space is in space, i.e., surrounded by spaces. In Kants words, Space and time are continuous quantities because no part of them can be given save as enclosed between limits (points or instants), and therefore only in such fashion that this part is itself again a space or a time B211/204 What is the transcendental reason for this? It is because every moment of time is there only by being reproduced, but this implies that something preceded it, the original presentation and something followed it, the reproduction that reproduces the reproduction and keeps it in consciousness. Thus, no moment in time can be the first or the last. The fact that this act goes on continuously means that such [spatial and temporal] magnitudes may also be called flowing, since the synthesis of the productive imagination involved in their production is on going. [Kant here says is a progression in time instead of ongoing. But this is misleading since the productive imagination is what generates time out of sheer change]. Kant goes on to say that sensation is also continuous, therefore all reality has a degree. In his words, Every sensation, therefore, and likewise every reality in the [field of] appearance, however small it may be, has a degree, that is, an intensive magnitude which can always be diminished. Between reality and negation there is a continuity of possible realities and of possible smaller perceptions (B211/203). Thus, both intensive and extensive magnitudes are continuous. Kant now notes that it might seem easy to prove from this the proposition that all alteration (all transition of a thing from one state to another) is continuous. But in fact this cannot be done because the causality of an alteration in general, presupposing, as it does, empirical principles, lies altogether outside the limits of a transcendental philosophy. (B213/205) Unfortunately, he forgets he says this, since 25 pages later he proclaims law of the continuity of all alteration. Its basis is that neither time nor appearance in time consists of parts which are the smallest [possible], and that, nevertheless, the state of a thing passes in its alteration through all these parts (B234/231). The remainder of our reading is taken up with showing why we cannot prove the existence empty space from experience. A complete absence of reality, which requires a complete absence of sensation, can never be perceived or experienced. We also cannot infer it from appearance since the degrees by which it can diminish in intensity are infinite (B214/205-6).

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Physicists assume the existence of a void to explain the different densities of matter. The possibility of the same volume of matter having different densities is explained by the fact that this volume , must in all material bodies be empty in varying degrees (B215/206). Against this, there are the examples of gravity and radiation: a radiation that fills a space can diminish in its degree in infinitum without leaving the smallest part of it empty (217). The atomists limit themselves to one type of explanation, which assumes empty space filled with particles. But such examples show that they forget about intensive magnitudes such a radiation, gravity, magnetic fields, etc. Thus, the point of bringing up intensive magnitudes is to establish from a principle of pure understanding that the nature of our perception allows such a mode of explanation as given by these examples (B216/207). It is to assert that those who think that the atomistic interpretation can be based on an apriori principle of the understanding are in error. Does this mean that Kant believes that there is no void? This seems correct, given that radiation can completely fill a space.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Analogies of Experience, First Analogy, B218-B232; NKS: pp. 208-217 Kants analogies of Experience correspond to the third set of categories, those of substance, causality and community Kant begins by stating that experience is a synthesis of perceptions. This synthesis determines the object through perceptions. But as Kant notes, following Hume, in experience perceptions come together only in an accidental order, so that no necessity determines their connections or can be revealed in the perceptions themselves (B219/209). He, then, however, adds that the determination of their relation can only take place through their relation in time in general, and therefore only through the concepts that connect them apriori. His point is that the necessity behind these categorical concepts is not to be found in the perceptions filling time, but in time itself. And behind this is the fact that all time determinations have to correspond to the necessary unity of apperception (the unity that allows me to call all my perceptions mine). If we violate the analogies, we violate this unity (B220/209). Now, there are three modes of time: duration, succession, and coexistence. Kant will connect them to the categorical concepts of substance, causality, and community. He will assert that these three categories are necessary rules for 81

connecting perceptions. His claim will be that experience is only possible through a representation of a necessary connection of perceptions (B219/209). If we violate these rules, we violate the possibility of experience, that is, of experience relating to some object. We also violate the possibility of the perceptions forming such experience being called mine. One further preliminary remark of Kant is worth repeating. This is that in philosophy, analogy is not the equality of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations. This means that I cannot fill in the fourth proportional as I can in mathematics. In philosophy, as opposed to mathematics, from three given terms, I can give apriori, and cognize, the relation to a fourth member, but not this fourth term itself, although I certainly possess a rule to guide me in the search for this fourth term in experience and a mark to assist me in discovering it. An analogy of experience is therefore only a rule according to which unity of experience must arise out of perceptions in respect to objects (phenomena) not as a constitutive, but merely as a regulative principle. So with regard to causality, if something happens, I know there must be a cause. But I have to go and actually search for it empirically. This is different from the two previous principles concerning quantity and quality, which instruct us how phenomena, as far as regards their intuition or the real in their perception, can be generated according to the rules of a mathematical synthesis. Here, I can find the fourth proportional. I can gage the illumination of the moon, that of the sun, see that one is 200, 000 times the other, and then conclude apriori that out of 200,000 illuminations by the moon, I might compose and give a priori, that is construct, the degree of our sensations of the sun-light (B221/210). Let me now turn to the first of the analogies, which is the synthetic apriori judgment corresponding to substance. It is: In all change of appearances, substance is permanent. Kant begins his account of by noting that all change occurs in time. In his words, Time is that in which, and as determinations of which, succession and coexistence can be represented. Time itself, however, does not change (in what time would such change occur?) (B225/213) But this permanence of time underlying change cannot be directly represented. Since time by itself cannot be perceived.

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Therefore, we represent this permanence in the objects of perception. In doing so, we think the permanent underlying change. We thus necessarily have the idea of substance. Here, the permanent is the substratum of the empirical representation of time itself (A183/214). Thus, permanence, as the abiding correlate of all existence of appearances, of all change and of all concomitance, expresses time in general (ibid.). It does so because change does not affect time itself, but only appearances in time (ibid.) What is Kant getting at? He is asserting that to concretely grasp time, we have to synthesize our intuitions into some object. The object is the x. It is not identical to the temporally disparate perceptions, but rather is their common referent. As such, it endures through them. To postulate it is, therefore, to posit time as enduring. We conceive of time as enduring, as an open ended lasting in which things happen, in our thinking of the object as the x, as that self-identical thing that exist through the changing series of moments. Kants point is that what he calls the object=x represents time as enduring since this is the way we make such enduring present to ourselves. As he puts this, only in the permanent are relations of time possible. In other words, the permanent is the substratum of the empirical representation of time itself; in it alone is any determination of time possible. (B226/214) The permanent is some object=x. It is the object not just as a referent for the changing perceptions, but also as a substance underlying the changing predicates that such perceptions give us. Thus, we only make time relations present in the context of the synthetic act which yield the object =x. Thus, Kant continues, Only through the permanent does existence in different parts of the time series acquire a magnitude which can be called duration. For a bare succession of existence is always vanishing and recommencing, and never has the least magnitude. (B226/214) We only get out of this bare succession by positing the object=x. This positing, which places the x as the unchanging substratum, is also the condition of the possibility of all synthetic unity of perceptions, that is, of experience. All experience of objects is, therefore, necessarily an experience of substance. Kant makes two further claims with regard to the category of substances. The first is that the unity of experience would never be possible if we were willing to allow that new things, that is, new substances, could come into existence. (B229/216) Why? This would be the same as time itself coming into existence. But in what time would time come to be? If this is a separate time, then we have shattered the 83

unity of experience, which is a unity of time relations (time being the form of inner sense). Kant makes the claim about time itself coming into existence as follows: the permanent is what make possible the representation of the transition from one state to the other. If we assume that something absolutely begins to be we must have a point of time in which [the permanent] was not. But to what are we to attach this point, if not to that which already exists, for a preceding empty time is not an object of perception. But if we connect the coming to be with things which previously existed ... this latter must be simply a determination of what is permanent in that which precedes it (B231/217). The point is that we need to posit the object=x to speak about a previous time. We cannot intuit time directly, we have to do it in terms of an object. Thus, the coming into being of some object is always connected with some other object. The x of this other object links up with the x of the object that comes into being. What is the permanent in the object? Kant hints that it is matter. Thus he cites a philosopher who asserts that when you burn wood, the weight of the ash and that of the smoke equals the original weight. The quantity of matter remains unchanged in this transformation (B228/215). The example points to the conservation of matter, which Aristotle also maintained. Matter is the referent of the classical statement, nothing comes from nothing and nothing reverts into nothing (B229/215). In other words, even though a thing may undergo a radical change, e.g., an animal dies and undergoes material dissolution, its matter remains. Another indication that Kant is thinking of matter is when he writes with regard to the reality of accidents, If "e asc!i#e a specia F,ind ofG e%istence to this !ea in substance (fo! instance' to motion' as an accident of matter)' this e%istence is entit ed inhe!ence* (.094K0/8). What is this matter? It cannot be matter understood as a thing in itself. Kant insists that he is only talking about appearances. It may be that what Kant is thinking is that we posit the permanence of matter simply as the substance underlying the changing appearances. Matter, in other words, is the substancethe unchanging substrateof the changing world. We represent the permanence of time as this unchanging substrate. Presently, of course, the unchanging substrate is the totality of matter and energy, given that we can transform one into the other. The point, however, is not the physics but the necessary idea of substance. On the level of appearances, the ultimate object=x is the world. The world continues to endure throughout all changes in it. The thesis of the x is, ultimately, that of a common referent (the world) of all my perceptions. The perceptions are of objects. But such objects are

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part of one world. This means that the objects as well as the perceptions of them cohere in one underlining unity=x. The positing of this x is the representation of an enduring world-time. It corresponds in its way to the circular motion of the heavens that Aristotle felt compelled to posit as the ultimate motion that time numbered. Such motion was common measure to all other motions and hence a common ground for time as a measure of motion. Now, for Kant, there is a line of dependencies that goes from being able to posit the object=x to being able to posit a common time to being able to unify my consciousness by having all its perceptions be mine. If I fail in this positing, I cannot unify my consciousness, which means that there are perceptions that I cannot recognize as mine. The link here is the fact that time is the form of my inner sense. It is that in which all my perceptions are ordered and arranged. The unity of time is thus also the unity of my consciousness. Thus, my failure to represent the unity of time as substance points back the failure of my consciousness to be itself unified. Its being unified is its being able to make sense of the world by assigning its perceptions to objects, objects ultimately pertaining to one world with one overriding sense as that which includes all these objects. Thus, what we have here are correlative notions: the unity of the world and the unity of my consciousness and the unity of time as underlying both. The loss of the unity of the world is thus the loss of the unity of my consciousness and hence the presence of perceptions that I cannot recognize as mineas belong to my consciousness. The psychological analogues of such perceptions are the impossible representations of traumatic events. For Freud, the symptoms of my mental illness are possible representations that I substitute for these impossible representations. Thus, in Freuds account, Emmas fear of shopping is a substitute, a possible representation for the impossible representation of being groped by a shop keeper as a child. Whenever she enters the milliners shop, she faints. She cannot represent to herself the past event. Kant brings up another point that has a psychological analogue when he writes: Substances in the field of appearances are the substrata of all determinations of time. If some of these substances could come into being and others cease to be, the one condition of the empirical unity of time would be removed. The 85

appearances would then relate to two different times, and existence would flow in two parallel streams--which is absurd. (B231-2/217). In the shattering of the unity of consciousness, as in multiple personality disorder, this is what happens. The substance that comes into being is the traumatic event, which is an event that is so completely out of context that it appears to arise out of nothing. I cannot integrate this event. It shatters the thesis of the underling unity of the world and, with this, shatters the thesis of the unity of time and hence the unity of my consciousness. As a result I have the splitting of my consciousness that shows itself in multiple personality disorder. All these phenomena point back to Kants basic point that substance is nothing in itself. It is simply a reflection of the way we posit objects by connecting together those perceptions we take to have a common referent. The permanence of substance is that of this referent. If we accept this, there are no immaterial substances or atemporal divine substances, etc. The permanence of substance is not its being out of time, but only its enduring through time. It is a projection of a feature of time, namely the fact that it is a framework for change, such time being the medium of our connecting experiences. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Analogies of Experience, First and Second Analogy, B233-B256; NKS: pp. 218-233, EV: 165-185 Kants second analogy (from the third set of categories) concerns causality It is: All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect (B232/218). Kant begins by noting with Hume that this principle cannot be grounded in the perceptions themselves. If I regard my perceptions, I am conscious only that my imagination sets the one state before and the other after, not that the one state precedes the other in the object. (B233/219). Examples: In scanning the house, as Kant writes: my pe!ceptions co$ d #e(in "ith the app!ehension of the !oof and end "ith the #asement' o! co$ d #e(in f!om #e o" and end a#o)e> and I co$ d simi a! y app!ehend the manifo d of the empi!ica int$ition eithe! f!om !i(ht to eft o! f!om eft to !i(ht. &he point is that there is no determination of the order of my perceptions. There is nothing in my perceptual life specifyin( at "hat point I m$st #e(in in o!de! to connect the manifo d empi!ica y* (.09:AHK00/). &his means ;the objecti!e relation of appea!ances that fo o" $pon one anothe! is not to #e dete!mined th!o$(h me!e pe!ception.* 86

1ant contin$es2 6o! s$ch an o#-ecti)e !e ation' pe!ceptions ha)e to #e necessa!i y dete!mined as to ;"hich of them m$st #e p aced #efo!e' and "hich of them afte!' and Fit has to #e dete!minedG that they cannot #e p aced in the !e)e!se !e ation.* (.09?K0/I) But since I cannot get this from the perceptions. I must then get it from what turns the perceptions into experience, i.e., into experience of objects. For Kant, we grasp an object, as distinct from the perceptions we have of it, by seeing the perceptions of it as having a common referent. We do this by grasping the pattern exhibited by a series of perceptions and then assigning this pattern to a referent. Now, the grasp of the pattern is that of the rule. Thus Kant says, appea!ance' in cont!adistinction to the !ep!esentations of app!ehension' can #e !ep!esented as an o#-ect distinct f!om these !ep!esentations on y if it stands $nde! a !$ e "hich < necessitates some one pa!tic$ a! mode of connection of the manifo d. &he o#-ect is that in the appea!ance "hich contains the condition of this necessa!y !$ e of app!ehension. To understand this passage we have to note that Kant defines the successive perceptions of the object as the representations of [its] apprehension. He defines appearance of the object as the sum of these representations of the object. He then asserts that the appearance can be taken as distinct from these perceptual representations only if it stands under a rule which necessitates some one particularly mode of connection of the manifold (B236/220). Thus, the object is the sum of the perceptions that stand under a rule. As such, it distinguishes itself from my subjective perceptions. This means the object is that in the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension. I take the object to be what determines the rule that determines the pattern of perceptions (B236/220). This terminology is yet another attempt of Kant to describe the fact that we posit the object by identifying a pattern of perceptions, connecting them, and positing a common referent. The pattern is the rule we follow in choosing to connect a selection of the perceptions we experiences. How do we move from the notion of a rule to that of causality? Kants answer is that we have to take the appearance of the objectunderstood as the sum of our perceptual representations as an event.

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Thus, in my scanning the house, Kant writes the!e "as no dete!minate o!de! specifyin( at "hat point I m$st #e(in in o!de! to connect the manifo d empi!ica y.* As opposed to this' ;in the pe!ception of an e)ent the!e is a "ays a !$ e that ma,es the o!de!' in "hich the pe!ceptions (in the app!ehension of this appea!ance) fo o" $pon one anothe!' into a necessary o!de!.* (.09HK00/) 1antCs point is that in ta,in( the appea!ance of the ho$se as an e)ent' I ocate it at specific point of time. I ass$me that e)e!y e ement in this appea!ance is the!e fo! a !eason. E)e!ythin( in the ho$se appea!anceEthat is' e)e!y feat$!e of the ho$se Ehas a ca$sa e%p anation. Thus, the stain on the ceiling is taken as having a cause. There must have been a leaking roof that caused it. The wear and tear on the staircase also has a cause, so does the arrangements of the furniture in the rooms. Someone I assume has placed them there. Thus, I take the house synthesized from all these elements, synthesized as I walk through it, as necessarily at this place (and no other) in the temporal order. The house appearance becomes an event. +hat I am doin( in ta,in( it as s$ch is mo)in( #eyond the cate(o!y of the ho$se as a s$#stance. The category of substance gives me the object=x, where the x expresses the time through which the object as single referent endures. Adding the concept of causality, I make this time an objective world time. The object (to be, i.e., exist as a substance with these given features) must be at some definite objective time (now). The result, then, of assuming causality is that I represent something as an event, as something that happens, that is to say, I apprehend an object to which I must ascribe a certain determinate position in time, a position which, in view of the preceding state, cannot be otherwise assigned. (B243/225). Need ess to say' a I ha)e done is aye! o)e! my inte!p!etation of the o#-ect as a s$#stance "ith the f$!the! inte!p!etation that it is an e)ent. As a s$#stance' I inte!p!et the pe!ceptions that fo!m a pa!tic$ a! patte!n as ha)in( a !efe!ent. &his I ta,e to #e the o#-ect. As an e)ent' I a so inte!p!et these pe!ceptions as occ$!!in( in a definite position in o#-ecti)e time. &hei! !efe!ent I no" ta,e to #e an e)ent. &his ne" inte!p!etation mo)es me f!om a -$d(ment of pe!ception (a s$#-ecti)e -$d(ment conce!nin( my contents of pe!ception) to a -$d(ment of e%pe!ience (a -$d(ment conce!nin( the o#-ect that I see). &he o#-ect e%ists' I am no" c aimin(' in this specific state' in this specific time. It is the !es$ t' in its p!esent condition' of "hat happened at a p!e)io$s time. One can put this in terms of Kants assertion that objective and universal validity are equivalent. 88

O#-ecti)e )a idity2 the -$d(ment ho ds (is )a id' a(!ees) "ith !e(a!d to the o#-ect Universal validity: the judgment holds (is valid) for everyone judging the object

Objective validity qua agreement with the object is the agreement of all judgments concerning the object. This implies universal validity, that is, the judgments agreeing with each other. Similarly, universal validity implies objective validity. (Why else would all the judgments about some object agree?) This means that if I want to assert something that we can agree on I am also going to assert that the perceptual connections underlying my judgment are those of my fellows. But to do this is to assert that their temporal sequence is the same for us all. First this, then this. But this is to apply the category of causality to interpret what I see, that is, to take what I see as an event. For Kant, then, I render my subjective synthesis of apprehension [of the house] objective only by reference to a rule in accordance with which the appearances in their succession ... are determined by the preceding state. The experience of an event is itself possible only on this assumption (B240/223). Given the equivalents of objective and universal validity, we can say that I go from the judgment of perception, I see X, to the judgment of experience, there is X there of which I and anyone else here can see, only by assuming that the connections which yield the object connect contents in some given determinate temporal order which necessarily holds for other perceivers. I dont see this, I assume it. I get out of my head (my subjective synthesis) through this assumption. This does not mean that I rely on others for my concept of causality. My own perceptual life seems to require that I take things as events. Kant writes. Let $s s$ppose that the!e is nothin( antecedent to an e)ent' $pon "hich it m$st fo o" acco!din( to !$ e. A s$ccession of pe!ception "o$ d then #e < me!e y s$#-ecti)e' and "o$ d ne)e! ena# e $s to dete!mine o#-ecti)e y "hich pe!ceptions a!e those that !ea y p!ecede and "hich a!e those that fo o". &he c aim is that if this is the case' "e donCt app!ehend o#-ects. As 1ant contin$es2 +e sho$ d then ha)e on y a p ay of !ep!esentations' !e atin( to no o#-ect> that is to say' it "o$ d not #e possi# e th!o$(h o$! pe!ception to distin($ish one appea!ance Fof the o#-ectG f!om anothe! as !e(a!ds !e ations of time (.09IK000).

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&h$s' s$ppose that the appea!ances of o#-ects "e!e not in definite times so that some first appeared as I walked through the room and then others, and this order was different each time I turned about and walked through the room. I would, then, not have the sense that any order pertained to the room itself. The quality of the room being objective, of standing over against me in having its own qualities, would disappear. The claim here is that we really need to interpret appearances as events to make objective assertionsthat is assertions about objects as opposed to assertions just about our perceptions. Of course, once we introduce the equivalents of objective and intersubjective validity, such assertions of objects also involve the confirmation of others. We ask them if they see what we see. If they do, we assume that the objects exist in objective time and are there for both of us to see. Kant concludes by noting that the concept of causality leads to that of action (that is, of acting as a cause). This action is necessarily that of a substance. According to the first analogy, every alteration (or change) must be thought in terms of some substance (which is the permanent underlying change). If I think of causality (of necessary sequence of alterations) in terms of substance, then I place the agency in the substance I take to be the cause. I cannot see this agency. Here, Hume is right. I must however assume it if I assume causality and substance. In Kants words, whenever there is action ... there is also substance, and it is in substance alone that the seat of this fruitful source of appearances must be sought. ... Action signifies the relation of the subject of causality to its effect. Since, now, every effect consists in that which happens, and therefore in the transitory, which signifies time in its character of succession, its ultimate subject, as the substratum of everything that changes, is the permanent, that is substance. Thus, one billiard ball hits another that was at rest. It sends it flying down the table. Where is the action? It is not in the ball hit, since, as caused, it did not move itself. It must be in the ball that hit it. As Kant continues, according to the principal of causality, actions are the first ground of causes, and cannot be found in the subject that changes, therefore they must be found in the subject that precedes and causes these changes. (B250/229) Thus, we have a world not just of perceptions in a necessary order, but of objects (substances) acting on one another.

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In other words, to think causality is also to think of substances causally acting on each other.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Analogies of Experience, Third Analogy, Postulates of Empirical Thought, B257-B274, NKS: pp. 233-244, EV: 185-195 1ant no" ta,es $p the thi!d ana o(y of e%pe!ience. It is the p!incip e of coe%istence. It !$ns2 ;A s$#stances' insofa! as they can #e pe!cei)ed to coe%ist in space' a!e in tho!o$(h(oin( !ecip!ocity* In the A edition' this !$ns2 ;A s$#stances' so fa! as they coe%ist' stand in tho!o$(h(oin( comm$nity' that is' in m$t$a inte!action.* (A0//K.038A:KN1S 099) No"' ;thin(s a!e coe%istent "hen the ... pe!ceptions of them can fo o" !ecip!oca y* 6o! e%amp e' I can oo, fi!st at the moon' then at the ea!th' o! )ice )e!sa. I then asse!t that they a!e coe%istent. (.03:K099). No" fo! 1ant' it is #eca$se they a!e coAe%istent that the o!de! that I pe!cei)e them is indiffe!ent. &he cont!ast he!e is #et"een the o#-ecti)e coincidence of the s$n and the moon and the s$#-ecti)e o!de! of my pe!ceptions of them. &he fi!st ma,es the second a matte! of indiffe!ence. &o ta,e anothe! e%amp e. It is #eca$se a the sides of a piece of dice a!e sim$ taneo$s that it does not matte! "hat the o!de! is in my )ie"in( them. Ho" do I (!asp this coe%istence@ 1ant says that ;coe%istence is the e%istence of the manifo d in one and the same time.* &h$s' the si% faces of the die fo!m the manifo d. As coe%istent' they e%ist in one and the same time. .$t I cannot pe!cei)e this one and the same time. As I (o f!om a )ie" of one of the side to the othe!' the on y thin( I can say is ;that the one pe!ception is in the s$#-ect "hen the othe! is not the!e' and !ice !ersa.* &his' ho"e)e!' does not (et me to the asse!tion ;that the o#-ects a!e coe%istent' that is' that if the one e%ists the othe! e%ists at the same time' and that it is on y #eca$se they th$s coe%ist that the pe!ceptions a!e a# e to fo o" one anothe! !ecip!oca y* (i#id.). +hy not@ &he diffic$ ty is that in fo o"in( thei! s$ccession' the!e is nothin( that te s $s that the pe!ceptions p!esentin( the o#-ects co$ d a so ha)e p!oceeded in !e)e!se o!de! at the same time that "e "ent f!om the fi!st to the second. Afte! a ' "e cannot (o #ac, in time and !edo the pe!cept$a se7$ence. &o so )e this p!o# em' 1ant has to !each fo! ca$sa ity. As "e !emem#e! f!om the second ana o(y' to asse!t a ca$sa !e ation #et"een A and . is to ta,e them as e)ents' i.e.' as fi%ed in o#-ecti)e time s$ch that I oo, fo! an e%p anation of the feat$!es of . in A. A' I asse!t' m$st ha)e occ$!!ed fo! . to #e in the state I find it in. &h$s' to so )e the p!o# em of sim$ taneity "e ha)e to posit the o#-ecti)e coe%istence that a o"s o$! pe!ceptions to !$n !ecip!oca y. .$t on y ca$sa ity mo)es one f!om the s$#-ecti)e to the o#-ecti)e. +hat "e need to do is fi% the appea!in( A and . in time as 91

e)ents. As fi%ed they m$st occ$! in a definite position in the se7$ence of pe!ceptions. If A ca$ses .' A m$st #e p!io!. If . ca$ses A' . m$st #e p!io!. &o (et them sim$ taneo$s' "e m$st ma,e each the ca$se of the othe!. Note' #ein( a ca$se does not mean #ein( sepa!ated in time f!om the effect. As 1ant ea! ie! p$t this' ;No" "e m$st not fai to note that it is the o!de! of time' not the apse of time' "ith "hich "e ha)e to !econ> the !e ation !emains e)en if no time has e apsed. &he time #et"een the ca$sa ity of the ca$se and its immediate effect may #e a )anishin( 7$antity' and they may th$s #e sim$ taneo$s> #$t the !e ation of the one to the othe! "i a "ays sti !emain dete!mina# e in time.* (.0?HK00H). He!e' he is p!o#a# y thin,in( of the so a! system' "he!e the p anets and the s$n sim$ taneo$s y dete!mine each othe!Cs motion. &his ho ds e)en tho$(h (!a)ity t!a)e s at the speed of i(ht. &he s$n and ea!th sim$ taneo$s y att!act each othe!' e)en tho$(h it ta,es s$ch att!action I min$tes to !each its o#-ect. &he point is that it is the same I min$tes. &he effect is sim$ taneo$s. 1ant' of co$!se' is i(no!ant of the speed of (!a)ity "a)es. His point is simp y that "e ha)e to ha)e the entities act on each othe! to p$t them in the same sim$ taneo$s time. In his "o!ds2 No"' on y that "hich is the ca$se of anothe!' o! of its dete!minations' dete!mines the position of the othe! in time. Each s$#stance < m$st the!efo!e contain in itse f the ca$sa ity of ce!tain dete!minations in the othe! s$#stance' and at the same time the effects of the ca$sa ity of that othe!> that is' the s$#stances m$st stand' immediate y o! mediate y' in dynamica comm$nity' if thei! coe%istence is to #e ,no"n in any possi# e e%pe!ience (.03IK093) +hat "e ha)e then is o#-ects in a !e ation of m$t$a inf $ence. &he #iAdi!ectiona ity of the e%pe!ience of each "he!e "e can )ie" fi!st the one and then the othe! o! !e)e!se this is matched #y a #iAdi!ectiona ity of thei! inf $ence on each othe!. &his' of co$!se' is not a pe!ception. It is on y an ass$mption' an inte!p!etati)e cate(o!y. As 1ant admits' ;the coe%istence of s$#stances in space cannot #e ,no"n in experience sa!e on the assumption of thei! !ecip!oca inte!action* (my ita ics' 09?). As 1ant states the conc $sion2 ;&he!e m$st' the!efo!e' #esides the me!e e%istence of A and .' #e somethin( th!o$(h "hich A dete!mines fo! .' and a so' !e)e!se"ise' . dete!mines fo! A its position in time' #eca$se on y on this condition can these s$#stances #e empi!ica y !ep!esented as coe%istin(.* ;Each s$#stance' the!efo!e' m$st contain ... in itse f the ca$sa ity of ce!tain dete!minations in the othe!* (.03IK093). As I said' this is an ass$mption. J$st as "e ass$me that o#-ects a!e e)ents' that is' a!e fi%ed in time' "e a so ass$me that o#-ects m$t$a y dete!mine each othe!' i.e.' fi% one anothe! in a common time.

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+ith this "e ha)e nat$!a "o! d of s$#stances' actin( to m$t$a y dete!mine each othe! and th$s fo!min( a "ho e. +e ha)e nat$!e as a ;dynamica comm$nity.* He!e o#-ects ;m$t$a y dete!mine thei! position in one time.* (.08/K098) &he a!($ment in a n$tshe can #e p$t as fo o"s2 Goin( th!o$(h a se!ies of pe!ceptions in #oth di!ections' i.e.' scannin( a !oom f!om eft to !i(ht and then f!om !i(ht to eft' is not eno$(h to (i)e me a sense of o#-ecti)e coe%istence. A it (i)es me is the sense of one afte! the othe! in t"o di!ections. +hat I need to do is to p ace the o#-ects of my pe!ceptions in o#-ecti)e time. I do this #y int!od$cin( ca$sa ity. I ma,e a the o#-ects of the !oom m$t$a y inf $ence each othe!Efo! e%amp eEth!o$(h thei! (!a)ity. As coA dete!minin( each othe!' they a ass$me the stat$s of sim$ taneo$s e)ents. 1ant emphasi=es the fact that "e ha)e to ass$me this m$t$a dete!mination ;in o!de! that the s$ccession "hich is a "ays fo$nd in pe!ceptions' as app!ehensions' may not #e asc!i#ed to the o#-ects' and in o!de! that' on the cont!a!y' these o#-ects may #e !ep!esented as coe%istin(* (.08/K098). +hat "e a!e doin( is f!eein( the o#-ect f!om the o!de! "e app!ehend it. +e say that the o!de! is indiffe!ent. &his is pa!t of the o#-ecti)ity of the o#-ect' i.e.' its #ein( the!e fo! e)e!yone as the same o#-ect independent y of the o!de! they pe!cei)e it in. &he ho$se' fo! e%amp e' is the same ho$se' "hethe! I (a=e on it sta!tin( f!om the !oof o! the (!o$nd f oo!. &his means that in itse f the appea!in( ho$se has sim$ taneo$s y a the feat$!es that "e s$ccessi)e y see in it. Once a(ain' "e ha)e to st!ess that this is an inte!p!etationEone that Me! ea$ABonty fo! one "i a!($e a(ainst. In Me! ea$ABontyCs "o!ds' this positing of one single object, in the full sense exceeds perceptual experience and the synthesis of horizons . It is, in fact, the death of consciousness understood as the process by which we intuit the world (Phenomenology of Perception, 1962, p. 71). He argues for this by noting that consciousness, in directing itself towards an object, always brings one of the objects sides or aspects to the foreground and relegates the rest to the background. It does so because, as embodied, it always has a spatial position from which it views the object. Given this, to posit the object as intuitively available, in the full simultaneous sense, to a single consciousness implies both robbing consciousness of its orientation and dispensing with the foreground-background structure that characterizes its awareness. Kant, here, would reply, this is what the objective world is. It is the world that is assumed to be in itself apart from any subjective apprehension which is necessarily successive. In itself, however, does not mean that we apprehend the objects in

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themselves. It just means a set of interpretative categories we make regarding the appearances. 1ant no" ma,es some (ene!a !ema!,s on the ana o(ies of e%pe!ience2 He "!ites' the ana o(ies of e%pe!ience ;a!e simp y p!incip es of the dete!mination of the e%istence of appea!ances in time' acco!din( to a its th!ee modes* S$#stance co!!esponds to ;time itse f as a ma(nit$de' the ma(nit$de of e%istence' that is' d$!ation.* Ca$sa ity co!!esponds to ;the !e ation in time as a s$ccessi)e se!ies.* Comm$nity co!!esponds to ;the !e ation in time as a s$m of a sim$ taneo$s e%istence.*(.080K098) &he point2 a th!ee !e ate to ;the connection of appea!ances $nde! ce!tain p!incip es FE%ponentenG "hich e%p!ess nothin( #$t the !e ations of time ... to the $nity of appe!ception (s$ch $nity #ein( possi# e on y in syntheses acco!din( to !$ es)* (.089K09:). &his means that the ana o(ies do not app y to the thin(s themse )es #$t on y to appea!ances. &his is "hy 1ant can ;p!o)e* the p!incip e of s$fficient !eason (n$ a a#s7$e ca$sa)' "hi e othe!s cannot. His method has #een ;to in)esti(ate the possi#i ity of e%pe!ience as a ,no" ed(e "he!ein a o#-ects ( if thei! !ep!esentation is to ha)e o#-ecti)e !ea ity fo! $s) m$st fina y #e capa# e of #ein( (i)en to $s* (.08?K09H). &h$s' the fact that e)e!ythin( has a ca$se is t!aced #ac, to this possi#i ity. If "e donCt ass$me that e)e!ythin( has a ca$se' "e ha)e no o#-ecti)e o!de! in time. &$!nin( to the post$ ates of empi!ica tho$(ht in (ene!a ' he !ema!,s that the possi# e' the act$a ' the necessa!y co!!espond to ;p!o# ematic' asse!to!ic' FandG apodictic* -$d(ments. &hey a so co!!espond to the cate(o!ies ;possi#i ity' e%istence' necessity.* G!ammatica y' the !efe!ence he!e is to moods of )e!#s' these #ein( the s$#-ecti)e and optati)e (may and mi(ht)' indicati)e (is) and impe!ati)e (m$st). &hese moods specify o$! attit$de to "hat "e asse!t. In the s$#-$ncti)e and optati)e' "e ta,e it as possi# e' in the indicati)e' as fact' and in the impe!ati)e as necessa!y. &he moods do not affect the content of "hat "e asse!t. 1ant (i)es the o(ica pa!a e of this #y notin( that ;no additiona dete!minations a!e the!e#y tho$(ht in the o#-ect itse f. &he 7$estion is on y ho" the o#-ect < is !e ated to the $nde!standin( and its empi!ica -$d(ment* (.088K09I). On y this !e ation' not the content of the o#-ect' is in)o )ed in these cate(o!ies. &h$s' 1ant defines

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the possi# e as ;that "hich a(!ees "ith the fo!ma conditions of e%pe!ience* ( i.e.' the fo!ma conditions of int$ition and the cate(o!ies). &he act$a is ;that "hich is #o$nd $p "ith the mate!ia conditions of e%pe!ience' that is' "ith sensation.* 6ina y' the necessa!y is ;that "hich in its connection "ith the act$a is dete!mined in acco!dance "ith $ni)e!sa conditions of e%pe!ience* (.083A8K09I)

1ant st!esses the distinction #et"een his notion of possi#i ity and that of his p!edecesso!s. &hei!s is2 the possi# e is "hat is not se fAcont!adicto!y. 1antCs is2 Somethin( mo!e is !e7$i!ed. A t"o sided fi($!e is impossi# e' #$t the!e is no cont!adiction in thin,in( a t"o sided fi($!e. Ha)in( t"o sides does not cont!adict the notion of a fi($!e o(ica y. It is' ho"e)e!' cont!a!y to the synthesis of space' "he!e to enc ose space I ha)e to ha)e th!ee inte!sectin( ines. His point is that it is the conditions of synthesis that dete!mine possi#i ity #eyond those of fo!ma o(ic. 6o! e%amp e' "hat ma,es the fo o"in( thin(s ;impossi# e* is not that they a!e se fA cont!adicto!y #$t that they can ne)e! #e !ea i=ed in e%pe!ience /. A s$#stance p!esent in space #$t not fi in( it is impossi# e. &h$s' somethin( inte!mediate #et"een mind and matte!' e.(. an an(e that can dance on the head of a pin o! Mesca!tesC mind that is "ithin the pinea ( and' #$t is nonAe%tendedEa these a!e impossi# e. Ho" co$ d I synthesi=e thei! ocation@ 0. An a#i ity to int$it the f$t$!e (not -$st anticipate it) Ho" can I app!ehend that "hich I ha)e not yet e%pe!ienced and he d in my mind th!o$(h !ep!od$ction@ 9. An a#i ity to stand in a comm$nity of tho$(ht "ith othe! peop e (to !ead thei! minds) (.0:4K0?/) Ho" do I e%pe!ience that "hich is p!io! to e%pe!ience ( the othe! as an a(ent' as a s$#-ect !athe! than o#-ect)' ho" "o$ d I $nde!stand the m$t$a inf $ence of minds "itho$t a synthesis of appea!ances@ Acco!din( to 1ant' a these a!e impossi# e' e)en tho$(h they a!e not se fAcont!adicto!y. &he (ene!a point is that if one "ants to spea, of possi#i ity' one m$st mo)e #eyond concepts as s$ch. No$ ha)e to ta,e these concepts as ;fo!ma and o#-ecti)e conditions of e%pe!ience in (ene!a .* It is in connection "ith e%pe!ience' in pa!tic$ a!' "ith its mate!ia content' that possi#i ity is to #e -$d(ed. (.0:/K0?0) &$!nin( to the cate(o!y of act$a ity' he "!ites that post$ atin( somethin( as act$a does not demand ;immediate pe!ception* of it (e)en tho$(h the act$a is ;#o$nd $p "ith < sensation*). It does' ho"e)e!' !e7$i!e ;the connection of the o#-ect "ith some act$a pe!ception in acco!dance "ith the ana o(ies of pe!ception* (.0:0K0?0A9)

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&h$s' an act$a pe!ception connected "ith the necessa!y se7$ence as specified #y the ana o(y of ca$sa ity "i s$ffice. If I see the ca$se' I can ass$me the e%istence of the effect. In this connection "e can note a st!i,in( diffe!ence #et"een 1antCs position and that of his p!edecesso!s. &hey often ta,e e%istence as a !ea p!edicate (as pa!t of the concept of a thin(). &h$s' they say that e%istence #e on(s to the )e!y concept of God as s$p!eme #ein(. If God did not e%ist' he "o$ d not #e s$p!eme' somethin( e se "o$ d #e (!eate! ( i.e.' an e%istent thin( "o$ d #e (!eate! than a none%istent God). 1ant' ho"e)e!' asse!ts2 ;In the me!e concept of a thin( no ma!, of its e%istence is to #e fo$nd.* E%istence is not p!esent in the concept of somethin(' #$t on y conce!ns ;the 7$estion "hethe! s$ch a thin( can #e so (i)en $s that the pe!ception of it can' if need #e' p!ecede the concept.* &he concept' as containin( the !$ e of synthesis fo! the o#-ect' (i)es its possi#i ity (its a#i ity to #e e%pe!ienced). .$t' ;the pe!ception "hich s$pp ies content to the concept is the so e ma!, of act$a ity.* (.0:9K0?9). &h$s' one can say that /44 !ea do a!s has as m$ch concept$a content as /44 ima(ina!y do a!s. (If it didnCt de#ts co$ d not #e !epaid' act$a ity "o$ d chan(e the concept. &he possi#i ity of #ein( !epaid "o$ d ne)e! match the act$a ity). +hat ma,es the diffe!ence is the pe!ception. O$! act$a pe!ceptions of the /44 do a!s fi o$t the !an(e of possi# e pe!ceptions indicated #y the concept. +hat is st!i,in( he!e is 1antCs s$#-ecti)i=ation of A7$inasCs distinction #et"een e%istence and essence "he!e e%istence is the act that !ea i=es an essence. A7$inas a!($es' I can ,no" "hat a thin( is' #$t #e i(no!ant of "hethe! it is. 6o! the thin( to #e I m$st thin, of the essence as act$a i=ed #y some inhe!ent act of e%istence. &he essence is ta,en as shapin( this act of e%istence so that it is e%istence of some specific entity. 6o! 1ant' ho"e)e!' e%istence points on y to my positing the o#-ect as !ea . I do so on the #asis of my sens$o$s e%pe!ience.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Refutation of Idealism, Postulates continued, B274-B294, NKS: pp. 244-256, EV, 195-205 This reading begins with Kants refutation of idealism. The type of idealism Kant is concerned to refute is the problematic idealism of Descartes. According to Kant, such idealism asserts that the e%istence of o#-ects in space o$tside $s* is ;do$#tf$ .* It ;ho ds that the!e is on y one empi!ica asse!tion that is ind$#ita# y ce!tain' name y' that 5I am5.*

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To combat this form of idealism, Kant has to show that even our inner experience, which for Descartes is indubitable, is possible only on our outer experience (ibid.). Inner experience is experience of our own existence as determined in time. Outer experience is experience of objects outside of me. Note: Descartes does not exactly embrace this distinction between inner and outer experience. He has no doubt that we have outer experience. But he doubts the existence of anything corresponding to the referent of such outer experience. Thus, Descartes does not have any doubt that he experiences objects in space. But he doubts that such objects actually exists.i With regard to inner experience, it is not clear that the I that Descartes is certain of is determined in time. As the same for our shifting experiences, it does not seem to have their temporal determinations. They pass away, but it remains now. Thus, its determination in time seems problematic. Kants proof that we cannot experience our own existence as determined in time without the external experience of objects in space outside of us is remarkably brief. It begins with the assertion: I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. (B275/245). Kant then adds: All determination in regard to time presupposes the existence of something permanent in perception. (ibid.). This is the point of the first analogy. All change occurs in time. As Kant wrote: Time is that in which, and as determinations of which, succession and coexistence can be represented. But all change is change of something, something that itself does not change. One needs something unchanging in order to measure the change. Thus, Kant continued, Only through the permanent does existence, in different parts of the time series, acquire a magnitude which can be called duration. For a bare succession of existence is always vanishing and recommencing, and never has the least magnitude (B226/214). Where is this permanent? Kants claim is that it is not within me. The contents of my consciousness continually shift. This, in fact, was Humes refutation of the ego as something permanent . He could not find any permanent, unchanging impression (or content) in his consciousness. Kant agrees that the permanent cannot be something in me, yet none the less, it is only through this permanent that my existence in time can itself be determined. Why is this so? Kants remarks from the preface to the Second Edition help here: He writes:

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In me, all I find are representations that change. But such representations themselves require a permanent distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and so my existence in the time wherein they change, may be determined (Bxl/34). His point is that the permanent cannot be one of the changing representations in me. I must then determine my temporal relations (succession, co-existence, and duration) through something permanent outside of me. This permanent thing is not a representation that is itself permanent. In Kants words, The representation of something permanent in existence is not the same as a permanent representation. The representation of something permanent is of an external thing distinct from all my representation (ibid.). What we have here, of course, is the representation of the object=x, the object in distinction to my representations of it. The representations can be regarded as part of my inner sense. They are there for my reflective regard. But the object=X is not. Kants claim is that this object=x is crucial to determining my existence in time. As Kant puts this: Its existence must be included in the determination of my own existence, constituting with it but a single experience such as would not take place even inwardly if it were not also at the same time, in part, outer. (Bxl, 34) As Kant also asserts: conscio$sness Fof my e%istenceG in time is necessa!i y #o$nd $p "ith conscio$sness of the possi#i ity of this timeAdete!mination> and it is the!efo!e necessa!i y #o$nd $p "ith the e%istence of thin(s o$tside me' as the condition of the timeAdete!mination. In othe! "o!ds' the conscio$sness of my e%istence is at the same time an immediate conscio$sness of the e%istence of othe! thin(s o$tside me (B276/245). Both then arise simultaneously. Both then are equally certain. But this is what was to be proved, namely that the existence of the external object is a certain as the ego. If the existence of the ego is indubitable, so is the existence of the external object. At bottom, Kants claim seems to be that my consciousness of myself as something enduring in time piggy backs as it were on my consciousness of outer objects that endure. It is in terms of their enduring that I have something permanent over against which my changing presentations can be determined as being in time. As I noted in my lecture on the first analogy, what we do in positing the object as a substance is simply represent to ourselves time in its abiding. Time does not itself pass away. It remains. But we cannot see time. We represent its abidingness in positing the enduring object = x, the object as a persisting referent of our changing perceptions. The claim here is that this x does double duty. It represent the abidingness of the object. It is in terms of this abidingness that we represent our own abiding. 98

Thus, the object abides as the constant referent of my different perceptions of it. I abide as their perceiver, the one person having these different perceptions. I can say, before I had perception a, now I am having perception b of this abiding object. Here, of course, a certain qualification has to be made. We do not see the external object the way we see the ego. The content of our perceptions is made up by and large of the features of external objects. Thus, their synthesis results in an external object=x, not an internal ego=x. In other words, I do not achieve a definite content the way the thing does through my perceptions of it. The content of my perceptions refers to the object, not to me as a perceiver. This can be put in terms of the fact that when we think of ourselves as an I or ego, we think of ourselves as an agent. This agent is not some content that is synthesized. It is also not a result of synthesis, i.e., an x that is posited as a common referent of the perceptions we link together, this being an x that appears through such perceptions. Given this, the thought of ourselves as an agenti.e., of ourselves as a perceiveris not an intuition. Thus, Kant writes: &he conscio$sness of myse f in the !ep!esentation 5I5 is not an int$ition' #$t a me!e y intellectual !ep!esentation of the spontaneity of a thin,in( s$#-ect. &his 5I5 has not' the!efo!e' the east p!edicate of int$ition' "hich' as pe!manent' mi(ht se!)e as co!!e ate fo! the dete!mination of time in inne! sense* (B278/246-7). For such a correlate, then, we have to turn to the external object. In fact, as Kant remarks, the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me (B276/245). As I said, the one consciousness piggy backs on the other. Another way of making the same point is in terms of the first analogy where Kant writes that the positing, which places the x as the unchanging substratum, is also the condition of the possibility of all synthetic unity of perceptions, that is, of experience (B229/216). If I cannot make the thesis object=x, I cannot unify my perceptions, but then I cannot have a unified consciousness. This means that I have no sense of my own existence as something that is unified, something that remains, endures over time. This, however, is the sense of Descartes I think, therefore I am. The I is, for Descartes, his own existence as the person who thinks, that is, who perceives, wills, imagines, etc. If this I is certain, then so is the external object=x. An example, here, is that of sensory deprivation experiments. Without external stimuli, the mind attempts to make up the deficit by hallucinating. But such hallucinations, since they are internally provided, do not give the mind any stability. It falls apart as a unitary consciousness.

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The ultimate refutation of Descartes idealism comes, it should now be obvious, from the transcendental deduction of the categories. Such categories are required to posit the object=x, but their ground is the fact that without them no transcendental unity of apperception, no unified self-consciousness is possible. Thus, to posit the object = x is also to posit a unified self-consciousness and, hence, an I. Both are equally certain. Kant makes a number of points in his notes on this proof. The first is that it turns the tables on Descartes idealism. Descartes idealism assumes that the only immediate experience is inner experience, and that from it we can only infer outer things (B276/245). If we take experience as experience of unities in time, the actual situation is the reverse of this: outer experience is really immediate, and . Only by means of it is inner experience the determination of my own existence in time possible (B276-7/246). We cannot posit our own enduring unity without first positing that of an external object. The second is that to perceive any determination of time, we have attend to the change in outer relations (motion) relatively to the permanent in space (for instance the motion of the sun relative to objects on earth) (B278/246). Thus, we judge the passage of time through our sundial. The motion of the sun is judged from the perspective of the nonmoving object on earth, namely, the sundial. The sundial remains the same, only the motion of the shadow changes. Here, we should note that for Kant motion is locomotion, that is, change in spatial relations. Thus, the permanent in terms of which such motion is judged is the permanent in space. What ultimately is this permanent in space? Kant asserts, we have nothing permanent on which, as intuition, we can base the concept of a substance, save only matter. Do we actually intuit this matter? Kant admits that we dont. He adds: Even this permanence is not obtained from outer experience, but is presupposed a priori as a necessary condition of determination of time (ibid.). In other words, the whole notion of the conservation of matter is simply a presupposition required for the determination of inner sense in respect of our own existence through the existence of outer things (ibid.). I must assume some ultimate permanent to assume my own permanence in any ultimate sense. (Such a sense, of course, refers to my self-experience in time and not to an afterlife). What about Descartes assertion that the positing of something external could be a dream, a delusion?

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In his third note, Kant simply asserts that, the representations of dreams are themselves created by the reproduction of previous external perceptions, which, as has been shown, are possible only through the reality of external objects. (B278/247). In other words, all the material for our imaginative dream life comes from external perception. After having observed that the results of the analogies (or postulates of empirical thought) imply that there is no breaks in the series of alternations (B281/248) or any gaps between two appearances (e.g., perspectival appearances unfold smoothly), Kant goes on to pose the question whether the field of possibility is larger than the field that contains all actuality, and this latter, again, larger than the sum of that which is necessary. (B282/230). This is an old metaphysical belief. It is expressed by the mediaeval formula: God thinks essences (possibilities), he speaks existences (actualities), and he never says everything he knows. The logical basis for this is, as Kant writes: Everything actual is possible; from this follows naturally, according to the logical laws of conversion, the particular proposition: "Some possible is actual." Now this seems to be equivalent to: "Much is possible that is not actual." (B231/250). In other words, All A is B, implies Some B is A. But this seems to imply that B is larger than A. Thus, in the syllogism, All humans are animals implies some animals are humans, and this seems to indicate that animals has a larger extent than humans. Humans have a specific difference, rationality, that is added to animality and as such constitutes a class of animals. The class is only a part of animals. For the relations of the actual and possible to follow the same schema, Kant writes, something must be added [as a specific difference] to the possible to constitute the actual (ibid.). But this is precisely the error. Existence is not a predicate like rationality. It adds nothing to the concept. As I quoted Kant in the last lecture: In the mere concept of a thing no mark of its existence is to be found. Existence is not a concept. It is only concerned with the question whether such a thing can be so given us that the perception of it can, if need be, precede the concept. The concept gives the object its possibility (its ability to be experienced). But the perception which supplies content to the concept is the sole mark of actuality (B273/243).

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Given this, Kant writes, what can be added [to the possible] is only a relation to my understanding, namely, that, in addition to agreement with the formal conditions of experience, there should a connection with some perception. But whatever is connected to perception is actual (B284/250). If perception is what assures us of actuality, then the possibility of being is the possibility of such perception. To assume that the possible exceeds the actual is to assume that there is more than one possibility of perceiving the object, i.e., one involving a different set of categories or rules for connecting our experiences than those we use. In Kants words, it is to assume anothe! se!ies of appea!ances in tho!o$(h(oin( connection "ith that "hich is (i)en in pe!ception' and conse7$ent y that mo!e than one a Aem#!acin( e%pe!ience is possi# e (ibid.). But we cannot infer this. To do so would be to assume another set of categories, one giving different conditions of possibility for perception. But how could we know this? The general note on the system of the categories that concludes the reading reaffirms that the categories, as categories of perception, are not in themselves knowledge, but are merely forms of thought for the making of knowledge from given intuitions. (B288/253). To use them, we need intuitions, in particular, outer intuitions. Thus, we need outer intuition to employ the concept of substance for space alone is determined as permanent, while time, and therefore everything that is in inner sense, is in constant flux. (B291/255). We need the intuition of motion, of alternation in space, to employ the concept of causality. This holds in with regard to ourselves. It is by means of outer intuition [that we] make comprehensible to ourselves the successive existence of ourselves in different states. The reason for this is that all alternation, if it is to be perceived as alteration, presupposes something permanent in intuition, and that in inner sense no permanent intuition is to be met with. Given that community is founded on mutual causality, the same assumption of the necessity of outer intuition follows for the employment of this concept. The space that we grasp through such intuition, Kant writes, a !eady contains in itse f a priori fo!ma o$te! !e ations as conditions of the possi#i ity of the !ea !e ations of action and !eaction' and the!efo!e of the possi#i ity of comm$nity (B293/256). Why is Kant going through these points? He wants to show the limits of the possibility of self-knowledge. This is knowledge by mere inner consciousness, that is, by determination of our nature without the aid of outer empirical intuitions (B293-4/256). The claim here is that we cannot find a world within. In fact, the contents of our consciousness are all taken from the world outside of us. 102

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Phenomena and Noumena, B295-B315, NKS, pp. 257-275, EV: 205-215 Kant in this section sums up the result of the previous sections of the Critique: this being that the categories have a sense only when they are applied to intuition. Thus, he distinguishes the transcendental employment of a concept which is its application to things in general and in themselves from the empirical employment of a concept which is its application merely to appearances. (B298/259). He then asserts that only the empirical application of concepts is possible. Only through intuition can they have an object to which they can be applied. (ibid.). As he also puts this, without intuition, nothing is given that could be subsumed under a concept (B304/265). Thus, the concept has no real meaning without intuition This lack of meaning comes from the very nature of the concepts that make up the categories. They are simply rules for synthesizing the manifold or multiplicity of intuitions of our conscious life. Apart from intuition, as he remarks in the A edition, they are only so many modes of thinking an object for possible intuitions. They are representations of things in general, so far as the multiplicity of their intuition must be thought through one or other of the logical functions correlated to the categories. (A245/263) Thus, apart from intuition, we can say that reality is that determination which can be thought only through an affirmative judgment; substance is that which, in relation to intuition, must be the last subject of all other determinations and so on. But, as Kant remarks, what sort of thing it is that demands one of these functions rather than another, remains altogether undetermined. (A246/264). Thus, apart from intuition, we dont have any affirmative judgments by which we can make clear to ourselves what the reality we are affirming is. Similarly, we cannot think of what might be the last subject of all other determinations in relation to intuition so as to fix upon some definite idea of substance. In fact, apart from intuition, the categories cannot themselves be defined (A245/263). They cannot since their essential definition involves intuition. They are the ways we synthesize sensible intuition. As Kant puts this last point, since it is a mode of combining the manifold, a category by itself, in the absence of that intuition wherein the manifold can alone be given, signifies nothing at all (B306/266).

103

An interesting point here is that the categories, although used for defining objects of intuition cannot themselves be defined. All definitions already employ them since taken by themselves the categories are the logical functions of judgment, but since the definition m$st itse f #e a -$d(ment' < FitG m$st a !eady contain these f$nctions* (A083K089). &h$s' the definition is a "ays ci!c$ a!. Having limited the categories to the appearing worldthat is, to objects as appearances Kant, however, still has to posit something beyond the appearances, If he didnt, he would be an idealist, he would be left only with the appearances and be unable to affirm that anything corresponds to them. The refutation of idealism was supposed to banish this possibility. The difficulty remains, however: how are we supposed to conceive of the thing in itself apart appearances. We cannot employ the categories. They apply only to sensible intuition. There must, according to Kant, be something beyond sensible intuition that provides us with the impressions that form the elements of such intuition. The difficulty is: how are we to conceive of this providing? We cannot say that the thing in itself causes these impressions. Causality is a category that applies only to appearances. In the B edition, Kant admits that no answers to such questions are possible. What is left is a kind of negative problematic concept of the thing in itselfwhich he terms the noumenal object. The concept of such a noumenal object is not self-contradictory and it is connected with other modes of knowledge. But rather than adding to them, it serves to limit the employment of their concepts (B310/271). It limit their use to sensible intuition. As Kant put this: this concept of a noumenon is necessary to prevent sensible intuition from being extended to things in themselves and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge. (B310/272). In other words, if appearances were all that there were, then they would be the things in themselves and the categories (and hence the objective validity of sensible knowledge) would apply to the things in themselves. To prevent this, we posit realities beyond the appearances. They are what remains, once we subtract what we can know through our senses. As Kant continues, The remaining things to which such knowledge does not apply are entitled noumena, in order to show that this knowledge cannot extend its domain over everything which the understanding thinks (ibid.). This concept of the noumena, however, is entirely empty. As he continues, But none the less we are unable to comprehend how such noumena can be possible, and the domain that lies out beyond the sphere of appearances is for us empty.

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In other words, I am compelled to think the noumena, but I cannot know anything about them. Denken (thought) exceeds Erkennen (knowledge), but in doing so it points out to the void. All it does is limit the claims of sensibility to the sensible world. As Kant puts this, The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility. (B310-11/272). There are two necessities at work in this curbing the pretensions of sensibility. The first is the rather general one that if the categories such as causality applied to the things in themselves, they would apply to the human subject as well. This would imply that thinking and judging of such a subject would be causally determined. But this would lead to the kind of skepticism that follow when we confuse the laws of thought (which are logical laws) with causal laws. The latter have nothing to say about valid or invalid reasoning. A calculator follows the laws of causality whether or not gets the right sums or not (i.e., whether or not it follows the laws of arithmetic). A similar argument can be made about the freedom of the human subject. To affirm such freedom and, hence, possibility of morality, we cannot have the subject in himself be subject to a blind causality. Kant will draw out this implication in his moral works. The difficulty with such the notion of such a noumenal subject, however, is that it does not explain our obvious vulnerabilities to things like mental illness, etc. Something like the division between conditions of applicability (which are those of causality) and conditions of validity (which are those of rationality) seems to be needed to confront this issue. One can causally configure a calculator to follow the laws of arithmetic, cant one do the same with regard to our ability to follow the laws of logic? Kant, however, does not choose to follow this line of thought. The second necessity for the phenomenal-noumenal split is internal to Kants system. As I said, he needs the phenomenal-noumenal distinction if he is not to fall prey to idealism. If the categories could determine objects apart from sensibility (as opposed to in conjunction with sensibility), they would be ontological categories. They would apply to being as opposed to appearing. At this point, we would be on our way to a Leibnizian metaphysics where thought alone determines reality: namely, Gods thought of the best of all possible worlds. The A edition makes the same points about the emptiness of the concept of the noumenon, but relates this to the refutation of idealism. This refutation asserts that inner experience is dependent on outer experience, in particular on our positing of an external permanent as a condition for inner sense. Kant now emphasizes that such an eternal permanent is not the noumenal object. Kant reintroduces the notion of this permanent by writing: All our representations are referred by the understanding to some object; and since appearances are nothing but representations, the understanding refers them to something, as the object of sensible intuition. (A250/268). What we have here is the positing of the object of sensible intuition as that of which we are having intuitions. All the representations are 105

representations of it. It, however, is not itself a representation. It is only the point of their reference. It is the object = x. As Kant continues. But this something, thus conceived, is only the transcendental object; and by that is meant a something = x, of which we know . nothing whatsoever, but which, as a correlate of the unity of apperception, can serve only for the unity of the manifold of intuition (ibid.). Why not call the object = x the noumenal object? After all, the external permanent, which we have to posit to refute idealism, is not itself any representable thing, it is only an x. I intend it, but I dont see it. In itself, it is not visible. Were it visible, it would be one of the representations. But it is not such. Thus, the phenomenological situation is as follows. I constantly receive impressions. I reproduce them and thereby retain a whole series of them. This series is the manifold of intuition. To unify my consciousness, I given them various referents. I group them as representations of various objects. To each group I posit the correlate the object = x as their external referent. This is the transcendental as opposed to the empirical object. Now, Kant writes, This transcendental object cannot be separated from the sensible data for nothing is left through which it might be thought. (A250-1/268). It is simply the point of unification of such data, a point of common reference. But this means that, in itself, apart from such data, the transcendental object is empty. It is just an x = the unknown. As Kant continues, Consequently it is not in itself an object of knowledge, but only the representation of appearances under the concept of object in general (ibid.). This is the concept of the object as the referent of the appearances, the object as one in many. As a referent, it is, apart from the appearances, not an object of knowledge. This, however, does not mean that we must not posit it. If we didnt, all we would have would be appearances, which would not be appearances of any thing. Furthermore, if all we had were appearances without any X as their referents, we would not have a unified consciousness. Thus, the very conditions of our sensibility, the fact that we have to synthesize appearances, means that we have to go beyond such appearances and posit the object=x that is correlated to such appearances. Is this transcendental object=x, which is also the external permanent, the noumenal object? It seems to be, since as Kant remarks, it follows from the concept of an appearance in general that something which is not in itself appearance must correspond to it. Thus, the word appearance must be recognized as indicating a relation to something which, even apart from the constitution of our sensibility . , must be something in itself, that is an object independent of sensibility. There, thus, results the concept of a noumenon. (A 252/269-70). 106

The concept of such a noumenal object is, Kant remarks, not in any way positive. If I want it to be positive, it is not enough that I free my thought from all conditions of sensible intuition; I must have grounds for assuming another kind of intuition, different from the sensible, in which such an object may be given (ibid.). But I have no such grounds. I, thus, cannot assume this intuition is possible. Kant now comes down against this noumenal object being the transcendental object. He writes that the transcendental object is the comp ete y indete!minate tho$(ht of something in (ene!a . &his cannot #e entit ed the noumenon* (A039K0:/). +hy not@ In (i)in( his !easons a(ainst the t!anscendenta o#-ect #ein( the no$menon' 1ant in fact seems to a!($e fo! it #ein( the no$menon. He "!ites of the t!anscendenta o#-ect' ;cannot #e entit ed the noumenon fo! I ,no" nothin( of "hat it is in itse f' and ha)e no concept of it sa)e as me!e y the o#-ect of a sensi# e int$ition in (ene!a ' and so as #ein( one and the same fo! a appea!ances. I cannot thin, it th!o$(h any cate(o!y> fo! a cate(o!y is )a id Fon yG fo! empi!ica int$ition' as #!in(in( it $nde! a concept of o#-ect in (ene!a .* 6o! 1ant' the no$mena o#-ect is "hat "e ,no" nothin( of "hat it is in itse f. It is "hat co!!esponds to appea!ances' #$t does not appea!. It a so "hat cannot #e tho$(ht th!o$(h any cate(o!y. +hy then isnCt the t!anscendenta o#-ectL% the no$mena o#-ect@ &he fact is that the o#-ectL% is tho$(ht th!o$(h a cate(o!y' that of s$#stance. It is the e%te!na pe!manent' that "hich end$!es th!o$(h the chan(in( appea!ances. +hy is 1ant so conf$sed on this point. &he diffic$ ty comes "ith the o#-ectL%. If "e st!ip the % f!om its int$ita# e p!edicates' i.e.' distin($ish it f!om the appea!ances and thei! tempo!a y dete!minant moments' then it is the no$mena o#-ect. It does not e)en ha)e the stat$s of a s$#stance that end$!es th!o$(h s$ch moments. At this point' I thin, of it as ;one and the same fo! a appea!ances* #$t donCt thin, of it th!o$(h the cate(o!y of s$#stance. &h$s' emptied o$t' the o#-ectL% #ecomes the no$menon.

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Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Concepts of Reflection, B316-349, NKS 276-296, !" 216-233 &his Appendi% to the &!anscendenta Ana ytic #e(ins the p!ocess of app yin( the doct!ine of the C!iti7$e to the p!ocesses of phi osophica !easonin(. &he point is to sho" ho" s$ch !easonin( (oes ast!ay #y not $nde!standin( the imitations of !eason o! its st!$ct$!e. &he ta!(et of 1antCs c!iticism is Lei#ni=. As "e sha see Lei#ni= is fo! 1ant an e%emp a!y case of the e!!o!s that occ$! "hen "e do not see ,no" ed(e as !e7$i!in( #oth sensi#i ity and $nde!standin(. Bhi osophica y' the point of the appendi% is to sho" the type of e!!o!s that fo o" "hen "e donCt as, ;in "hich of o$! co(niti)e fac$ ties a!e o$! !ep!esentation a!e connected to(ethe!@ Is it the $nde!standin( o! is it the senses #y "hich they a!e com#ined o! compa!ed* (.9/8K0:8). +hat "e need to ans"e! s$ch a 7$estion is ;t!anscendenta !ef ection.* +e need to !ef ect on ;the !e ation of the (i)en !ep!esentations to o$! diffe!ent so$!ces of ,no" ed(e.* (i#id.). He!e t"o thin(s sho$ d #e noted2 &he fi!st is that "hen 1ant in this Appendi% is ta ,in( a#o$t com#inin( o! compa!in( !ep!esentations' he is not !efe!!in( to thei! synthesis o! com#ination th!o$(h the t!anscendenta ima(ination as !e($ ated #y the $nde!standin(. It is not this ;passi)e* synthesis that is his conce!n. It is the acti)e synthesis "he!e #y "e p$t concepts to(ethe! to fo!m theo!ies. &h$s' "hat 1ant is inte!ested in a!e ;the !e ations in "hich concepts in a state of mind can stand to one anothe!.* &hese a!e the !e ations ;of identity and diffe!ence' of a(!eement and opposition' of the inne! and the o$te!' and fina y of the dete!mina# e and the dete!mination (matte! and fo!m).* (.9/:K0::) &he 7$estion he!e is2 a!e "e ta ,in( a#o$t s$ch !e ations in te!ms of the o#-ects of sensi#i ity o! in te!ms of the o#-ects of the $nde!standin(@ &he second point is that this 7$estion does not conce!n the o(ica compa!ison of !ep!esentations. &h$s' o(ica y spea,in(' identity' diffe!ence' a(!eement and opposition !e ate to $ni)e!sa ' pa!tic$ a!' affi!mati)e and ne(ati)e -$d(ments. In 1antCs "o!ds' ;.efo!e const!$ctin( any o#-ecti)e -$d(ment' "e compa!e the conceptions that a!e to #e p aced in the -$d(ment' and o#se!)e "hethe! the!e e%ists identity (of many !ep!esentations in one conception)' if a uni!ersal -$d(ment is to #e const!$cted' o! "hethe! the!e e%ists difference' if a particular -$d(ment is to #e const!$cted> o! "hethe! the!e is agreement "hen an affirmati!e is to #e const!$cted> and opposition "hen negati!e -$d(ments a!e to #e const!$cted' and so on.* (.9/:A/HK0::). 108

S$ch compa!isons ha)e on y to do "ith the o(ica form of the -$d(ments. &he 7$estion of the !e ation to o$! fac$ ty of ,no" ed(e' that is' "hethe! the !e ation is to the $nde!standin( o! to sensi#i ity comes $p !e(a!din( the content of the -$d(ments. Mo the e ements o$! -$d(ments com#ine conce!n sensi# e o#-ects o! p$!e o#-ects of the $nde!standin(@ 1antCs c aim is that ;it is the p ace to "hich they #e on( in this !e(a!d that dete!mines the "ay in "hich they #e on( to each othe!.* (i#id.). If the e ements a!e d!a"n f!om the $nde!standin(' then they a!e !e ated #y -$d(ment in one "ay. If they a!e d!a"n f!om sensi#i ity' they a!e !e ated in anothe! "ay. In othe! "o!ds' the senses of identity and difference' of agreement and opposition' of the inner and the outer' and fina y of the determinable and the determination (matte! and fo!m) a!e diffe!ent acco!din( as the contents they !e ate a!e sensi# e contents o! p$!e concepts of the $nde!standin(. &hese concepts' "hose sense !ef ection on thei! so$!ce m$st dete!mine' a!e the ;concepts of !ef ection. 1ant e%p!esses this diffe!ence in thei! sense in a schematic fashion and then $ses it to attac, Lei#ni=. +ith !e(a!d to identity and diffe!ence' s$ppose ;an o#-ect is p!esented to $s on se)e!a occasions #$t a "ays "ith the same inne! dete!minations* of 7$a ity and 7$antity. If it is an o#-ect of an $nde!standin(' then it is the same o#-ect. It is n$me!ica y one and the same. If' ho"e)e!' it is a sensi# e o#-ect' then ;diffe!ence of spatia position at one and the same time is sti an ade7$ate (!o$nd fo! the numerical difference of the o#-ect.* &h$s' t"o identica d!ops of "ate! that on y diffe!s in spatia ocation a!e sti n$me!ica y diffe!ent (.9/IK0:H). &he !eason fo! this that diffe!ent pa!ts of space' a tho$(h concept$a y identica ' a!e sti o$tside of each othe!. +ith !e(a!d to a(!eement and opposition' o#-ects of the $nde!standin( donCt ha)e the ,ind of opposition that "o$ d cance o$t thei! conse7$ences. .$t sensi# e o#-ects do. &h$s' fo!ces f!om diffe!ent o#-ects ;can act to att!act o! impe a point in opposite di!ections* cance in( o$t the effect of each othe! (.90/K0:I) 9) +ith !e(a!d to the inne! and the o$te!2 In an o#-ect of p$!e $nde!standin(' the ;inne! dete!minations* of an o#-ect do not !e ate ;to anythin( diffe!ent f!om the o#-ect.* &h$s' the an( es and sides of a t!ian( e pe!tain to the t!ian( e a one. .$t the sensi# e o#-ectCs ;inne! dete!minations a!e nothin( #$t !e ations and it itse f is enti!e y made $p of me!e !e ations.* &his means that "e ,no" ;s$#stance in space on y th!o$(h fo!ces "hich a!e acti)e in this and that space' eithe! #!in(in( othe! o#-ects to it (att!action)' o! p!e)entin( them penet!atin( into it (!ep$ sion and impenet!a#i ity). +e a!e not ac7$ainted "ith any othe! p!ope!ties constit$tin( the concept of the s$#stance "hich appea!s in space and "hich "e ca matte!.* (.90/K0:I).

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As 1ant a so p$ts this' ;a "e can ,no" in matte! is me!e y !e ations ("hat "e ca the inne! dete!minations of it a!e in"a!d on y in a compa!ati)e sense).* (.09IK0I4). 1antCs )ie" seems to #e #o!n o$t #y science. +e on y ,no" the 7$a ities of matte! #y o#se!)in( its !e ations to othe! matte!. &h$s' its #ein( ma(netic appea!s in its att!action of meta o#-ects' etc. 6$!the!mo!e' the sensi# e o#-ect m$st occ$py space. .$t then it is s$#-ect to spatia !e ations. In 1antCs "o!ds' ;co!po!a thin(s a!e ne)e! anythin( sa)e !e ations on y' at east of thei! pa!ts Fthat a!eG e%te!na to each othe!. * (.09IK0I4). ?) +ith !e(a!d to the determinable and the determination (matte! and fo!m). 6o! the $nde!standin(' matte!' ta,en as the s$#-ect of f$!the! dete!mination' p!ecedes fo!m. As 1ant "!ites' ;the $nde!standin(' in o!de! that it may #e in the position to dete!mine anythin( in a definite fashion' demands that somethin( #e fi!st (i)en. <. Conse7$ent y in the concept of the p$!e $nde!standin(' matte! is p!io! to fo!m. (.909K0H4). 6o! sensi#i ity' ho"e)e!' ;space and time come #efo!e a appea!ances.* &h$s' the fo!m of int$ition is p!io!. He!e' ;the fo!m of int$ition (as a s$#-ecti)e p!ope!ty of sensi#i ity) is p!io! to a matte! (sensations)* (i#id.). 1ant no" #e(ins his attac, on Lei#ni=. Acco!din( to 1ant' Lei#ni= is ($i ty of a t!anscendenta ;amphi#o y.* An ;amphi#o y* is a o(ica fa acy #ased on an am#i($ity. &he am#i($ity fo! Lei#ni= is ca$sed #y his t!eatin( o#-ects of sensi#i ity as if they "e!e o#-ects of the $nde!standin(. In 1antCs "o!ds' ;He compa!ed a thin(s "ith each othe! #y means of concepts a one' and nat$!a y fo$nd no othe! diffe!ences sa)e those th!o$(h "hich the $nde!standin( distin($ishes its p$!e concepts f!om one anothe!.* As fo! the ;conditions of sensi# e int$ition'* these "e!e fo! him ;not a sepa!ate so$!ce of !ep!esentation* #$t !athe! on y a ;conf$sed mode of Fconcept$a G !ep!esentation.* (.908K0H0). Lei#ni=' in fact' is the opposite of Loc,e (and .e!,e ey and H$me) "ho ;sensualised a concepts of the $nde!standin(.* &hey too, o$! ideas as menta ima(esEthat is' memo!y t!aces of imp!essions. .y cont!ast' Lei#ni= ;intellectualised appea!ances.* (.90:K0H9). &h$s' Lei#ni= has a p!incip e ca ed ;the identity of indisce!ni# es* that states that thin(s that ha)e no inte!na diffe!ences (thin(s "hose definitions a!e the same) a!e the same. &his ho ds fo! concept$a o#-ects' e.(.' t!ian( es. .$t Lei#ni= too, it ;to co)e! a so the o#-ects of the senses.* (.90HK0H9). Gi)en that s$ch o#-ects a!e diffe!ent' Lei#ni= had to conc $de that a o#-ects ha)e diffe!ent essences. &his is his p!incip e of $ni7$eness2 nothin( in the "o! d is identica to anythin( e se. In Lei#ni=Cs "o!ds' For in nature there are never two beings which are perfectly alike and in which it is not possible to find an internal difference, or at least a difference founded upon an intrinsic quality (Monadology 9). Acco!din( to Lei#ni=' s$ch #ein(s ("hich he ca s monads) do not e%te!na y affect each othe!. In his "o!ds' ;the nat$!a chan(es of the Monads come f!om an inte!na p!incip e' since an e%te!na ca$se can ha)e no inf $ence $pon thei! inne! #ein(* (O//). &he point fo o"s fo! Lei#ni= since the monad is "itho$t pa!ts o! e%tension o! shape. .$t as 1ant 110

!ema!,s' it !ea y fo o"s #eca$se' he t!eats them as if they "e!e concept$a o#-ects. In 1antCs "o!ds' ;the p!incip e that !ea ities < ne)e! < conf ict "ith each othe! is an enti!e y t!$e p!oposition as !e(a!ds the !e ation of concepts' #$t has not the east meanin( in !e(a!d eithe! to nat$!e o! to anythin( in itse f. 6o! !ea conf ict ce!tain y does ta,e p ace < &his is #!o$(ht #efo!e o$! eyes incessant y #y a the hinde!in( and co$nte!actin( p!ocesses in nat$!e* (.90IK0H?). Ne%t' acco!din( to Lei#ni=' the monadCs inte!na diffe!ences' since they a!e not e%te!na y ca$sed' m$st #e inte!na y p!od$ced. &hey m$st th$s consists of a chan(e of pe!ceptions. A monads m$st #e pe!cei)e!s. In his "o!ds' ;&he passin( condition' "hich in)o )es and !ep!esents a m$ tip icity in the $nit F$niteG o! in the simp e s$#stance' is nothin( #$t "hat is ca ed Be!ception* (O/?). 6o! 1ant' this fo o"s since concepts can #e distin($ished on y #y inte!na diffe!ences and ;that "hich is inne! in the state of a s$#stance cannot consist in p ace' shape' contact' o! motion (these dete!minations #ein( a o$te! !e ations).* &h$s' the on y thin( eft is to say that the diffe!ences a!e those of !ep!esentations (pe!ceptions). In 1antCs "o!ds' ;"e can the!efo!e assi(n to s$#stances no inne! state sa)e that th!o$(h "hich "e o$!se )es in"a!d y dete!mine o$! sense' name y' the state of the representations.* &he !es$ t #ein( the post$ ations of pe!cei)in( monads as ;the #asic mate!ia of the "ho e $ni)e!se* (.994K0H3). No" monads' e)en tho$(h they do not e%te!na y affect each othe! act as if they do. &he!e is a p!eAesta# ished ha!mony #et"een thei! inte!na states. &his a so fo o"s f!om t!eatin( them as concept$a $nits' since s$ch $nits do not e%te!na y affect each othe!. Ne%t' Lei#ni= t!eated time and space as concepts. In 1antCs "o!ds' ;Lei#ni= concei)ed space as a ce!tain o!de! in the comm$nity of s$#stances' and time as the dynamica se7$ence of thei! states < &h$s space and time "e!e fo! him the inte i(i# e fo!m of the connection of thin(s (s$#stances and thei! states) in themse )es> and the thin(s "e!e inte i(i# e s$#stances* (.990K0H3A8). In neithe! cases "e!e they the fo!ms of o$! sensi# e int$ition o! an independent so$!ce of concepts. &hey "e!e -$st conf$sed modes of !ep!esentation. &his "ho e system is fo! 1ant #ased on a conf$sion of inte ect$a and sensi# e o#-ects. Lei#ni= is t!eatin( inte ect$a o#-ects as if they "e!e sensi# e. 6o! 1ant' ho"e)e!' inte ection o#-ects' i.e.' the p$!e concepts of the $nde!standin(' ha)e no meanin( apa!t f!om sensi# e o#-ects. Concepts a!e fo!ms fo! int$ition. If yo$ st!ip int$ition f!om them' nothin( is eft. In 1antCs "o!ds' ;If #y inte i(i# e o#-ects "e $nde!stand thin(s "hich can #e tho$(ht #y means of the p$!e cate(o!ies' "itho$t the need of the schemata of sensi#i ity' s$ch o#-ects a!e impossi# e.* (.9?0K0I0) &he othe! a te!nati)e is to thin, of s$ch inte i(i# e o#-ects as o#-ects of some nonAsens$o$s int$ition. .$t o$! cate(o!ies a!e then not )a id "ith !e(a!d to s$ch

111

int$itions and this "e means that ; "e can acco!din( y ha)e no ,no" ed(e (neithe! int$ition no! conception)* of s$ch o#-ects. (i#id.). &he conc $sion he!e is that ;"e cannot' the!efo!e' positi!ely e%tend the conditions of o$! tho$(ht #eyond the conditions of o$! sensi#i ity' and ass$me Fas Lei#ni= t!ied to doG #esides appea!ances o#-ects of p$!e tho$(ht < since s$ch o#-ects ha)e no assi(na# e positi)e meanin(.* (.9?9K0I0). One can extend Kants critique to Descartes confusion of a real and a rational distinction. According to Descartes if I can conceive two things apart from each other so that the definition of one of them does not involve the definition of the other, the two are distinct realities. Thus, I can conceive of minds apart from bodies, the former being non extended substances, the latter being extended substances. Therefore minds must be able to be apart from bodies. This holds if we are talking about conceptual units. One concept can be thought of an independent of the other if it does not refer to it in its definition. It does not hold of sensible things. Two appearing things, even if their definitions do not imply each other, can still affect each other. Leaving his critique of Leibniz behind, Kant finishes up by making some interesting remarks on the concepts of reflection. He notes that I can have no idea of the inner nature of matter considered as object of sense. I can only know "hat is compa!ati)e y Fnot a#so $te yG in"a!d.* .$t this ;is itse f < composed of o$te! !e ations.* This means that the a#so $te y in"a!d Fnat$!eG of matte!' as it "o$ d ha)e to #e concei)ed #y p$!e $nde!standin(' is nothin( #$t a phantom.* If this is co!!ect' then "e "i ne)e! find $ timate $nits of matte!. Matte! "i on y consists of !e ations definin( the !e ata (the thin(s !e atedG' ne)e! of some $ timate !e ata f!om "hich a the !e ations sp!in(. .999K0H8. In fact' 1ant asse!ts' ;the t!anscendenta o#-ect "hich may #e the (!o$nd of this appea!ance that "e ca matte! is a me!e somethin( of "hich "e sho$ d not $nde!stand "hat it is' e)en if someone "e!e in a position to te $s* (i#id.). &he !eason fo! this is that s$ch a (!o$nd of appea!ance "o$ d not appea!. .$t ;"e can $nde!stand on y that "hich #!in(s "ith it' in int$ition' somethin( co!!espondin( to o$! "o!ds.* (i#id.). 1ant' then' (oes on to o#se!)e' that "e can ne)e! ;ans"e! those t!anscendenta 7$estions "hich (o #eyond nat$!e. &he !eason of this is that it is not (i)en to $s to o#se!)e o$! o"n mind "ith any othe! int$ition than that of inne! sense> and that it is yet p!ecise y in the mind that the sec!et of the so$!ce of o$! sensi#i ity is ocated.* &he p!o# em is that s$ch inne! sense on y p!esents $s as "e appea! to o$!se )es' not as "e a!e in o$!se )es. &he same ho ds fo! the o$te! sense that o#se!)es the f$nctionin( of the #!ain. &h$s' "hat int!ospection !e)ea s to $s is -$st appea!ance "hich can #e co!!e ated to the appea!ances of the f$nctionin( of o$! #!ains. .$t a "e a!e doin( he!e is co!!e atin( t"o types of appea!in(' not (oin( f!om appea!in( to the (!o$nd of appea!in(.

112

&his' I thin,' is "hy 1ant (oes on to asse!t2 ;&he !e ation of sensi#i ity to an o#-ect and "hat the t!anscendenta (!o$nd of this Fo#-ecti)eG $nity may #e' a!e matte!s $ndo$#ted y so deep y concea ed that "e' "ho afte! a ,no" e)en o$!se )es on y th!o$(h inne! sense and the!efo!e as appea!ance' can ne)e! #e -$stified in t!eatin( sensi#i ity as #ein( a s$ita# e inst!$ment of in)esti(ation fo! disco)e!in( anythin( sa)e a "ays sti othe! appea!ances Aea(e! as "e yet a!e to e%p o!e thei! nonAsensi# e ca$se.* .99?K0H: &he point is that "e #y definition ne)e! (et o$t of o$! "ay of )ie"in( thin(s' e)en "hen "e !ef ect on o$!se )es. &his means that the mind #ody p!o# em is inso $a# e. In fact' it may #e that the mind #ody p!o# em is itse f #ased on an am#i($ity' one "he!e "e t!eat the mind as a concept$a $nit (since it is nonAe%tended and its defined on y in te!ms of its contents' that is' in te!ms of "hat o$! inne! sense p!esents $s "ith) and t!eat the #ody as a spatia o#-ect (since it is e%tended). If 1ant is !i(ht' o$! #asic concepts ha)e diffe!ent senses depend on "hethe! "e ta,e them as app yin( to the concept$a o! to the spatia o#-ects. &h$s' the mind #ody p!o# em' i.e.' the p!o# em of #$i din( a concept$a #!id(e #et"een the mind and #ody' is act$a y set $p #y a cate(o!y mista,e. +e fa se y ass$me that o$! concepts ha)e the same sense in te!ms of the mind and the #ody. 6ina y' 1ant !eaffi!ms' H$meCs position that a "e ha)e a!e o$! imp!essions. +e donCt ,no" "hat thei! so$!ce is. Spea,in( of the ;ca$se of appea!ance'* he "!ites' ;+e a!e comp ete y i(no!ant "hethe! it is to #e met "ith in $s o! o$tside $s' "hethe! it "o$ d #e at once !emo)ed "ith the cessation of sensi#i ity' o! "hethe! in the a#sence of sensi#i ity it "o$ d sti !emain* (.9??K0I9) &his is comp ete i(no!ance.

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Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic, B350-B377, NKS, 297-316, EV: 233-248 This reading begins the examination of the errors that the mind engages in when it exceeds the bounds of sensibility in the employment of its ideas. Let me begin by giving a broad overview of the Kants aims in presenting the Transcendental Dialectic. There is what Kant calls a transcendental illusion that leads to the errors that such dialectic engages in. According to Kant the illusion is inevitable. In his words, This illusion it is impossible to avoid, just as we cannot avoid perceiving that the sea appears to be higher at a distance than it is near the shore, because we see the former by means of higher rays than the latter, or, which is a still stronger case, as even the astronomer cannot prevent himself from seeing the moon larger at its rising than some time afterwards, although he is not deceived by this illusion (B353-4/299-300). The illusion occurs when we take the subjective necessity of a certain connection of our concepts, which is of benefit to the understanding, for an objective necessity in the determination of things in themselves (B353/299). What is this subjective necessity? It is the necessity reason has to bring the understanding into thoroughgoing accordance with itself, just as the understanding brings the manifold of intuition under concepts and thereby connects the manifold. There is, in other words, a subjective law for the orderly management of the possessions of our understanding that by comparison of its concepts [reason] may reduce them to the smallest possible number (B362/305). The attempt as he also puts it is to find for the conditioned knowledge obtained through the understanding the unconditioned whereby its unity can be brought to completion. (B364/306). We see the same attempt at work throughout science. Thus, there is the attempt to reduce the four known forces of nature, the strong and weak nuclear forces, gravity, and the electromagnetic force to a single force. There is also the current attempt to see relativity physics and quantum mechanics in terms of a single set of laws of a unified field theory. In the 19th century, Maxwell showed that the electrical force (the attraction of opposite charges) and the magnetic force, were variants of the same force, the electromagnetic force. The same motivation is at work in Newtons Principia, which shows how the same force law accounts for all the planetary movements. In philosophy, this motivation leads one to assume that if the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions subordinated to one anothera series which is therefore unconditionedis likewise given (ibid.). 114

We therefore proceed from the conditioned to the unconditioned. This is the natural movement of pure reason. The principles arising from this are the ideas of pure reason. They concern the self or soul, the world, and God all understood as unconditioned starting points The illusion here is to assume that these ideas, which are generated by pure reason, actually pertain to the things in themselves. The difference between these pure ideas and the unifying principles that science seeks after is that the latter have to show themselves capable of empirical verification. One must be able to draw from them some prediction that can be verified. With regard to the principles or ideas of pure reason, however, there is no verification possible. Thus, with regard to the self, how can one know that the it is free, that it is an uncaused (unconditioned) initiator of a causal chain? With regard to the world, how does one know if it has a beginning in time and is limited in space or has no beginning and no spatial limits? Similarly, how can one know if the composite substances within the world have simple parts or if they are no such parts, but everything is infinitely divisible? Finally, with regard to God, how can one know if there is a first, unconditioned necessary cause of existence or if the chain of causes continues forever? These are, Kant writes, four natural and unavoidable problems of reason. Reason has to pose them, given its drive for completeness, but they are insoluble (B490/422). The point of the transcendental dialectic is to show that such insolubility comes from taking the subjective necessities of reason and thinking that they are necessities of the things in themselves. Rationally, I cannot think the conditioned without thinking its conditions, and I cannot think these without thinking their conditions, and so on till I come to the unconditioned. But this does not mean that this subjective necessity applies to the things themselves. It doesnt. I have no way of making empirical sense of the unconditioned. Thus, the beginning of time is inconceivable to me. To be conceivable, it would have to be in time. But when would such a beginning take place? Equally inconceivable is the notion of a limit of space. To be conceivable, it would have to be in space. But then, couldnt I just go to the boundary and stick my hand out? The same point can be made of the concept of a first cause. Causality has a sense as a sequence in time, but a first cause presupposes a beginning of time, but I cannot conceive this. Kants point is that in none of these cases is the intuition that would allow my concepts some definite object possible.

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This is the big picture of the transcendental dialectic, which begins with this reading. Let me turn to the details of todays reading. Kant begins by giving an account of error. He writes: Neither the understanding by itself (uninfluenced by another cause) nor the senses by themselves would fall into error. Both are natural faculties. The understanding, left undisturbed follows its own laws. The senses dont judge at all (B350/297-8). Error comes through the unobserved influence of the sensibility on the understanding. That is, it happens when the subjective grounds of the judgment enter into union with the objective grounds and make these latter deviate from their true function. The subjective grounds are those of sensibility, the objective are those of the pure understanding. We see this deviation in the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection where one takes what is valid in the realm of understandinge.g., every individual is specifically different from every otherand applies it to the realm of sensibility, that is, assumes that sensible subjects can be distinguished conceptually, forgetting that mere difference in space can distinguish them (B351/298). We also see this when we assume a merely deceptive extension of the pure understanding which takes its principles, which have a use only with regard to intuition, and attempts to pass beyond these limits (B352/298-99). What we have here are transcendent principles which incite us to tear down all those boundary fences and to seize possession of any entirely new domain, which recognizes no limits of demarcation (B352/299). What these principles do is make us take a subjective necessity of a certain connection of our concepts, which is of benefit to the understanding, for an objective necessity in the determination of things in themselves (B353/299). What are these principles? They are, as I noted, those that follow from our proceeding in various domains (the self, the world, and causality) from the conditioned to the unconditioned. Now the reason why these principles constitute an inevitable transcendental illusion is that the very method of proceeding from the conditioned to its conditions is inherent in reason. We can see this in the very method of reasoning which involves the syllogism. As Kant writes: In every syllogism I first think a rule (the major premise) by means of the understanding. [For example, All men are mortal] In the next place I subsume something known under the condition of the rule (and this is the minor premise) by means of the judgment. [Here the minor premise is Socrates is a man which is subsumed under the rule All men are mortal] 116

6ina y' "hat is the!e#y ,no"n I determine th!o$(h the p!edicate of the !$ e' and so a priori th!o$(h reason (the conc $sion). (B360-61/304) In other words I connect Socrates as he is known through the minor premise [Socrates is a man] with the predicate of the major premise [All men are mortal] to determine a priori the conclusion, Socrates is mortal. What we have here, Kant adds, is a relation between what is known and its conditions. Thus, the condition of Socrates being mortal is that it falls under the rule all men are mortal. Thus, in checking a syllogism, I attempt to see if the conclusion follows from its premises, that is if it stands under the rule of the major premise through the mediation of the minor premise. In Kants words, If I find such a condition, and if the object mentioned in the conclusion can be subsumed under the given condition, then this conclusion follows from a rule which is also valid for other objects of cognition. In other words, I see that the logical inference is valid and can be applied elsewhere. Not just Socrates is mortal, but so is Plato, Kant, etc. This is because they are all men and all men are mortal. Kant concludes: From this we see that reason endeavors to subject the great variety of the knowledge obtained through the understanding to the smallest possible number of principles (universal conditions), and thus to produce in it the highest unity (B361/304)

Thus, I know through the understanding, that Plato, Kant, etc. are men. And I know via the one principle, all men are mortal, that all of these men are mortal. The point is that reason works by looking for the major premise or rule, taking it as a condition and regarding what it knows in terms of this. As Kant puts this, Reason, in its logical use, endeavors to discover the general condition of its judgment (the conclusion), and a syllogism is itself nothing but a judgment by means of the subsumption of its condition under a universal rule (the major premise). (B364/306). Now in doing this, I can ask if the major premise itself stands under a rule, that is if it itself is conditioned by something higher. As Kant continues: Now as this rule may itself be subjected to the same process of reason, and thus the condition of the condition be sought (by means of a prosyllogism) as long as the process can be continued, it is very manifest that the peculiar principle of reason in its logical use is to find for the conditioned knowledge obtained by the understanding the unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion. (B364/306). 117

Thus, consider the following: All living beings are mortal All men are living beings All men are mortal Socrates is a man Socrates is mortal As it makes evident, the movement of reason is from the conditioned to the unconditioned. It leads to the transcendental illusion that we are getting somewhere once we admit that, if the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions subordinated to one another--a series which is consequently itself unconditioned--is also given, that is, contained in the object and its connection. (ibid.). Here we are assuming from the givenness of the conditioned the givenness of the unconditioned. An example of this is Aquinass proof of the existence of God. Everything that happens has a cause as its condition. Such causes, as things that happen, themselves have a cause or condition for their happening. But the series of causes or conditions cannot go on for infinity, otherwise nothing would happen. Therefore this series must be assumed as having occurred (as being given) along with the present objectthe event just occurring. Therefore, its initial cause must also be given. Therefore, the givenness of the present event is also givenness of the first cause. Both must be assumed. But the first cause is God. Therefore just as the caused event we experience exists, so also God exists as its ultimate condition or cause. For Kant, this proof is an illusion because it exceeds the bounds of possible experience. The knowledge of objects that results from the synthesis of our experience is always conditioned. We cannot talk about a cause, without placing it in a causal chain and hence in time, that is, as surrounded by a before and an after. In fact, when we recall that causality is just a category we impose upon our experiences (that it is just an interpretation that lets us get out of our heads to an objective world), we realize that talk of a first causea cause of everythingdoes not make any sense. What should have warned us of this misuse is the fact that reason in the syllogism does not concern itself with intuitions, but with concepts and judgments. This is, in fact, why it can be formalized with letters standing for subjects and predicates. Thus, as Kant continues, even if pure reason does concern itself with objects, it has no immediate relation to these and the intuitions of them, but only to the understanding and its judgments (B363/306). The unity it engenders, he adds, is therefore not the unity of a possible experience, but is essentially different from such unity, which is that of the understanding. (ibid.). The transcendental illusion arises when we ignore this fact, when we think that this unity, which involves assuming an unconditioned condition, has a possible experiential sense. 118

In seeking to go to the unconditioned, we arrive at certain concepts of reason. Here, as Kant says, we are dealing with something which does not allow of being confined within experience, since it concerns a knowledge of which any empirical knowledge (pe!haps e)en the "ho e of possi# e e%pe!ience ) is only a part. We exceed such knowledge in proceeding to the unconditioned. Thus, Kant continues, If the concepts of reason contain the unconditioned, they are concerned with something to which all experience is subordinate, but which is never itself an object of experience (B367/308). The pure concepts of reason are transcendental ideas (B368/309). To think that we can actually make sense of them is the transcendental illusion.

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Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic, B 378-B396, NKS: 315-326, EV: 248-258 This reading in part repeats the material of the previous reading. It explains why reason, which proceeds syllogistically, inherently involves the idea of the unconditioned. The unconditioned is the major premise of a syllogism that is not the conclusion of any higher syllogism. Kant then goes on to assert that the three types of syllogism, the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive, give rise to three distinct conceptions of the unconditioned, that of unconditioned subject, the unconditioned cause, and the unconditioned totality. These ideas have value insofar they serve to regulate the use of the understanding, that is, insofar as they are regulative ideals. Insofar as no definite object can be given corresponding to them, when we try to hypothesize them (i.e., make them ideas of realities) they become illusions. Kant begins by noting that just as the form of judgments (converted into a concept of the synthesis of intuitions) yielded categories which direct all employment of understanding in experience, so also we may expect that the form of syllogisms, when applied to the synthetic unity of intuitions under the direction of the categories, will contain the origin of special apriori concepts, which we may call pure concepts of reason, or transcendental ideas (B378/315). Such ideas will determine, according to principles, how the understanding is to be deployed in dealing with experience in its totality (ibid.). The analogy, then, is: judgments are to categories directing the understanding in dealing with finite experience as syllogisms are to ideas directing the understanding in dealing with experience in its totality. Consider the categorical syllogism: All men are mortal Socrates is a man Socrates is mortal What we have here is a relation of conditioned to conditions. For example, all men are mortal conditions the fact that particular men are mortal; and given that Socrates is a man, it follows that he is also mortal, that is, falls under the condition of the major premise. Since reason proceeds syllogistically, Kant can thus assert the transcendental concept of reason is, therefore, none other than the concept of the totality of the conditions for any

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given conditioned (B379/316). What reason does its view things in terms of their conditions. In this it follows its syllogistic form; In the above example, the major premise relates Socrates to mortality by first thinking the universal condition, all men are mortal. In Kants words, it thinks mortality in its whole extension that is, thinks it as extended to all men. This complete quantity of the extension in relation to such a condition is called universality. Corresponding to this, we have the allness (the universality) of conditions (ibid.). Now, the unconditioned makes possible the totality of conditions. Syllogism comes from the Greek word meaning chain, a syllogism being a chain in which the truth of the conclusion hangs or depends or is conditioned by the truth of its premises. Taking the major premise as a conclusion, we can have a chain of syllogismsi.e., a chain of chains. Here, the truth of all of the assertions forming the chain hangs on the truth of the first, unconditioned major premise. For example, the truth of All men are mortal, hangs on the truth of all organic beings are mortal, given that men are organic beings. This can hang on the truth of all living beings are mortal, given that all organic being are living beings. In such a chain, the conclusion hangs from the totality of its premises. They all must be true. And if the first premise is false, every conclusion of all the successive syllogisms is doubtful. The relation of the ideas or pure concepts of reason to such a totality (and to the unconditioned premise that stands at its beginning) is put by Kant as follows: Now as the unconditioned alone renders possible the totality of conditions, and, conversely, the totality of conditions is itself always unconditioned; a pure concept of reason in general can be defined and explained by means of the concept of the unconditioned, in so far as it contains a basis for the synthesis of the conditioned (ibid.). In other words, the pure concepts of reason are concepts of the unconditioned premises of the syllogistic ways in which we unite or synthesize experience. There are three ways in which the understanding synthesizes its experiences. They are, first, the categorical synthesis in a subject; secondly, the hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series; thirdly, the disjunctive synthesis of parts in a system. They correspond, in fact, to the three types of judgments, categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments. The way we syllogistically synthesize experiences follows this pattern. We have the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogism An example of a hypothetical syllogism is: If you are an Antigonisher, you are a Nova Scotian You are an Antigonisher Therefore, you are a Nova Scotian An example of a disjunctive syllogism is:

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Either you are an Antigonisher or a New Glasconian. You are an Antigonisher Therefore, you are not a Nova Scotian Each type of syllogism, Kant writes, proceeds through prosyllogisms to the unconditioned--one to the subject which cannot be employed as predicate, another to the presupposition which supposes nothing higher than itself, and the third to an aggregate of the members of the complete division of a conception (ibid.). Thus, the ultimate premise of categorical syllogisms is the assertion of a subject that cannot be a predicate. In the hypothetical syllogism, we continually go back until we have an ultimate iffor Kant this is, if there is a world. In the disjunction syllogism, we continually divide reality till we have as an ultimate premise a disjunction that contains every possibility of reality. With this, we have the three main ideas of reason. The soul or self is the ultimate subject. The presupposition which supposes nothing higher than itself is the world considered as an absolute totality of all conditions. The idea here is that everything is a thing of the world. The aggregate of the members of the complete division of a conception leads to the conception of God. Here, I proceed from this aggregate, understood as expressing the possibility of entities, to a being of such entities. I will return to this point later in the lecture. What reason is attempting to do with these ideas is to grasp the unconditioned premises implied in the use of the categories of the understanding. In Kants words, it endevours to carry the synthetic unity, which is thought in a category, up to the completely unconditioned (B383/318). In each case, it arrives at a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense experience (ibid.). On the one hand, such concepts are imposed by the very nature of reason itself and therefore stand in a necessary relation to the whole employment of the understanding. On the other, they are transcendent and overstep the limits of all experience (B384/319). Their necessity follows since it is implied in the conditioned nature of what we know. In Kants words, since knowledge (the conclusion) is given only as conditioned, we cannot arrive at it by means of reason otherwise than on the assumption that all the members of the series on the side of the conditions are given (totality in the series of premises) (B388/321). As Kant also puts this, when a cognition is contemplated as conditioned, reason is compelled to consider the series of conditions in an ascending line as completed and given in their totality. In doing so, it is compelled to think the transcendental ideas (ibid.).

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But this does not mean that I can really go to the unconditioned and expect to find an object corresponding to these ideas. Thus, their only real use is practical. They can guide the understanding, that is, serve as regulative ideals for its practice. Thus, following the notion that the conditioned always presupposes its conditions, I can always search further for causes for what has happened. Now, as I said, there are three transcendental ideas, the soul or self, the world, and God. One can speak of types of ideas: psychological, cosmological and theological ideas. Thus, Kant, at the end of the reading, talks of three classes of transcendental ideas He writes, the first contains the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject, the second the absolute unity of the series of the conditions of a phenomenon, the third the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general (B391/323) They correspond to three pure sciences: The thinking subject is the object-matter of Psychology; the sum total of all phenomena (the world) is the object-matter of Cosmology; and the thing which contains the highest condition of the possibility of all that is thinkable (the being of all beings) is the objectmatter of all Theology (ibid.). Thus pure reason presents us with the idea of a transcendental doctrine of the soul (psychologia rationalis),of a transcendental science of the world (cosmologia rationalis), and finally of a transcendental doctrine of God (theologia transcendentalis) (B3912/323). Each of these, he adds, corresponds to a type of syllogism: reason, merely through the synthetical use of the same function which it employs in a categorical syllogism, necessarily attains to the conception of the absolute unity of the thinking subject Similarly, the logical procedure in hypothetical ideas necessarily produces the idea of the absolutely unconditioned in a series of given conditions, this being the world. Finally, the mere form of the disjunctive syllogism involves the highest conception of a being of all beings (B392-3/324), this being God. The point of all this is that by our very nature as rational beings, we are compelled to posit such entities as the subject, the world, and God in an unconditioned manner, even though we cannot make objective sense about them. Negatively, we have to do here with 123

an unavoidable illusion, like that of the moon being larger at the horizon than at its zenith. The illusion is that we can make objective sense of such ideas, that is, give to them some definite content that we draw from experience. We cannot. By definition, they exceed experience. Thus, we can never experience a subject apart from its predicates. This holds, in particular, with regard to ourselves as thinking subjects. We have no definite idea of ourselves apart from our thoughts. Similarly, the conception of the world as a world escapes us. Such a world is not an object among objects, but rather uniquely singular. It is one, not one among many. As the totality of what is, it, however, escapes our finite grasp. At most, we can think of it as an unending, advancing horizon of experiences and objects of experience. As such, it has the character of we can always go further. Finally, we cannot thing of God as the being of beings. We can think of particular beings, each of which has a particular essence, that is, a particular way of being. But, we escape this framework when we try to think being as such. Now the fact that we are compelled by our reason to think such entities means that thought (Denken) always exceeds knowing (Erkennen). What we are compelled to think, however, can neither be proved nor disproved. This, of course, is but another example of the phenomenon-noumenon split. The phenomenal world rests on the noumenal, it implies it, but we can never turn this implication into something we can know. Both Levinass notion of the other that is included in the same without being able to be absorbed by it, and Derridas notion of the difference that troubles identity ultimately can be traced back to this Kantian position.

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Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic, Paralogisms of Pure Reason, A 338-A380, NKS: 327-352, EV: 258-263 [stop at first full paragraph], 276-293 In this section, Kant considers the errors that arise in considering the transcendental idea of the subject or self. He begins by reviewing what a transcendental idea is. It is necessary product of reason, but it results in an object of which we have no concept that is, [no] concept that allows of being exhibited and intuited in a possible experience. (A338-9/337). The inferences that generates it are purethey contain no empirical premises. Yet they conclude from something that we know to something else of which we have no concept. Yet we seem compelled to ascribe objective reality to the latter A339/327). There are, Kant writes, three types of these dialectical syllogism, which correspond to the three transcendental ideas. In the first, I conclude from the transcendental conception of the subject, which contains no multiplicity, the absolute unity of the subject itself. This is the transcendental paralogism that will be the subject of todays lecture. In such a paralogism, Kant writes, there is a transcendental ground [namely the fact that the conception of the subject does not contain a multiplicity] that constrains us to draw a formally invalid conclusion. (A340/328). The other two types syllogisms are those that proceed from the absolute totality of a series of conditions for any given appearance to the concept of the world and those that proceed from the totality of conditions under which objects have to be thought to the unity of such conditions taken as the Being of beings or God. (ibid.). Note: God here is not thought of as the first cause, the unconditioned condition of everything, but rather in terms of a totality of being. He is thought in terms of the disjunctive rather than the hypothetical syllogism. Lets concentrate on the erroneous inferences concerning the self or soul. Now since the inference that generates this syllogism is pure (a matter of pure reason), it cannot contain any empirical premises. Its sole premise then the fact that all our thoughts presuppose an I that thinks them. This is apriori. In speaking of the I, Kant notes, I am not here seeking to learn in regard to the soul anything more than what can be inferred independently of experience (which determines me more specifically and in concreto) from this concept I so far as it is present in all thought. (A342/329). Since the content of consciousness shifts with the change of experiences, but the I remains the same, this I is absolutely simple and has no content. 125

We can think of it as a substance [according to the category of inherence and subsistence i.e., substance and accidents], as simple, and as numerically self-identical. From such premises, we can supposedly deduce its immateriality, its incorruptibility, and its personality (that is, its identity as a spiritual substance), which in relation to matter becomes its principle of life or soul. Since this soul is immaterial and therefore incorruptible, we can further deduce its immortality (A345/331). All of this supposedly follows, Kant notes, from the simple and in itself completely empty representation I. This I is not even a concept since nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of the thought = X. Lets turn to the first paralogism, the one that affirms the premise that the I is a substance. The definition of a substance is that which is a subject of predicates, which cannot itself stand as a predicate of some other subject. Thus, I can predicate musical of Socrates, but I cannot predicate Socrates of Plato. Therefore Socrates is a substance according to Aristotle's definition. Here also, I argue, I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my possible judgments, and this representation of myself cannot be employed as a predicate of any other things. Thus, I conclude that following Aristotle's definition of a substance, I, as a thinking being (soul) am a substance (A348/333). The difficulty with this inference is that it assumes that the relation of the I to its representations is the same a that between an object of outer perception and the representations we have of this object. Now the external object can be posited as something permanent enduring through these representations and we can apply the concept substance to it in a manner that is empirically serviceable (A349/334). But this is not the case when we turn inward. In fact, as the refutation of idealism showed, to determine inner sense, we need first to have given the external permanentthe object of outer sense. Without the latter, we have nothing to span the before and after of inner sense, that is, nothing abiding by which to gage the before and after. All we have is the incessant succession of representations in inner sense. Thus, as Kant remarks, we can indeed perceive that this representation [the I think] is invariably present in all thought, but not that it is a binding and continuing intuition, wherein the things, as being transitory, give place to one another. The abiding and continuing intuition can only be supplied by something outside us. (A350/334). The second paralogism affirms the simplicity of the I or soul. Formally, the argument here is that a thing is simple if its action cannot be regarded as the concurrence of several things acting (A351/335). Now the action of the soul is that of thinking, but such thinking cannot be regarded as the concurrence of several things acting. If it could, then we would have to say that every 126

part of [the soul] would be part of the thought, and only all of them taken together would contain the whole thought (A352/335). But this is impossible. Think of the words of a verse. If these are distributed among different beings, they would never make up a whole thought (a verse). (ibid.). Therefore, we have to say that thought is possible only in a single substance, which, not being an aggregate of many, is absolutely simple.] (ibid.). The argument, then, is that if a multiplicity of representations are to form a single representation, they must be contained in the absolute unity of the thinking subject. (ibid.). How are we to prove this? It is certainly true, Kant writes, that we demand the absolute unity of subject of thought because otherwise we could not say I think (the multiplicity in one representation). But this presupposition is not itself an experience. It is only the form of apperception (of self-consciousness). It is the formal fact that all my representations are mine. Such a form, Kant asserts, precedes every experience; and as such it must always be taken only in relation to some possible knowledge as a merely subjective condition of that knowledge (A354/ 336-7). But we have no right to transform it into a condition of knowledge in the sense of turning it into a concept of thinking beings in general, that is, into a concept of the beings who have this knowledge (A354/337). For this, we would have to have some intuition. But external subjects cannot be seen by us since we can only access them by outer sense. Thus, we only consider them as subjects by a transfer: one where, as Kant writes, I substitute, as it were, my own subject for the object I am which seeking to consider as a subject (A 353/336). As for my own subject, its very simplicity signifies actually that there is nothing determinate in it. But the simplicity of the representation of a subject is not eo ipso a knowledge of the simplicity of the subject itself (A355/337). In fact, we abstract altogether from its properties when we designate it solely by the entirely empty expression I. Such an empty expression can apply to every thinking subject since it is merely formalthat is, since has no intuitive content (ibid.). The point here is that the attribute in question concerns only the condition of our knowledge. It does not apply to any assignable object. (A356/338). Kant then remarks that if the thinking subject could be apprehended by inner sense, it would not be in space and therefore would not be corporeal. But when we view objects of outer sense, we could just as well say that, regarded as noumena, they too are not corporeal. As noumena they are not extended in space either. So as far we know, such material external objects could (when regarded as noumena) be the subjects of our thoughts (A358/339). 127

The point is that once we go to the noumenal (actual subject), we dont have any criteria to judge. In Kants words, even granting the human soul to be simple in nature, such simplicity by no means suffices to distinguish it from matter, in respect to the [noumenal] substratum of matter if we consider matter, as we ought to, as mere appearance. (ibid.). The third paralogism takes the soul as a person. It defines a person as that which is conscious of the numerical identity of itself at different times. It then asserts, the soul is conscious of this identity, therefore it is a person. (A361/341). This conclusion seems inevitable since I refer each and all of my successive determinations to the numerically identical self and do so throughout time, that is, in the form of the inner intuition of myself (A362/341). This, however, says no more than that I recognize all my representations as mine, they all belong to the same consciousness. What we have here is only a formal condition of my thoughts and their coherence. But this in no way proves the numerical identity of my subject (A363/342). Just as a series of elastic balls hitting each other pass on their motion, it could be that there is a whole series of substances of which the first transmits its state together with its consciousness to the second, the second its own state with that of the preceding substance to the third and so on. Thus, the last substance in this chain would be conscious of all the previous states and yet it would not have been one person in these states (A364/342). Aside from this, we really cannot posit from inner sense alone anything permanent. We require the external permanent to do so as the refutation of idealism teaches. Thus, we would need someone outside of me regarding me to come up with the thesis of my permanence. But if someone else regards me, the time in which the permanent will be considered to endure will be his own time, that is, the time of his sensibility. Thus, he will draw no inference from this to the objective permanence of myself as my I (A363/342). Finally we have the paralogism of ideality. We assert that existence of all outer objects is doubtful since they can only be inferred as the cause of our perceptions (344). The assumption here is that the existence of an actual object is never given directly in perception. It has to be inferred as its outer cause (A367/345). But the inference from a given effect to a determinate cause is always uncertain, since the effect may be due to more than one cause. It thus remains doubtful whether the cause be internal or external (A368/345). I cant tell whether I somehow was the cause of the perception rather than some external object. This is the reasoning found both in Descartes and Hume.

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Here the notion of idealism is problematic. I dont deny the existence of external objects, I just deny that their existence is known through immediate perceptions. I am always involved in an uncertain inference of such existence. (A368-69/345). Before exhibiting the flaw in this reasoning, Kant distinguishes two types of idealism. There is (1) transcendental idealism which simply takes the appearances as representations only and not things in themselves and which takes space and time as forms of our intuition (A369/345). It is opposed to transcendental realism that takes space and time as independent realities (A369/346). The transcendental realist thus takes the outer appearances as realities. In fact, for him, they are the things in themselves existing independently of us. (2) When the transcendental realist subsequently discovers that such appearances do not have an independence with regard to our senses, he then questions his ability to infer such independent realities from these dependent appearances. At this point, he becomes an empirical idealist. This is the second form of idealism. Now the transcendental idealist can admit the existence of matter, but he considers it to be appearance only. He simply takes it as a species of representations (intuition) which are called external because they relate perceptions to the space in which all things are external to one another, while yet the space itself is in us (A370/346). As for external objects (bodies), they are what I posit through these [external] representations (A371/346). Thus, for the transcendental idealist, external things exist as well as I myself. There is no need here to resort to inference to assume their reality. Thus, the transcendental idealist is an empirical realist. He does not have to (as the empirical idealist does) infer the existence of external objects. Thus, the transcendental realist believes in the existence of matter as something in itself and wonders if his perceptions correspond to some external material reality. Since he cannot prove this, he become an empirical idealist. (A371/347). Such matter, however, for the transcendental idealist, however, is mere appearance. There is no need to infer it. It is simply the object of outer perception. In terms of such perception, we grasp the real as something in space. Outer perception represents something real in space. As Kant puts this, perception is the representation of a reality and, as outer perception, necessarily represents this reality as a reality in space. (A374/349). The point here is that the real is immediately given through empirical intuition and not inferred (A375/349). Thus, Kants position is that while space itself, with all its appearances is only in me, the real, that is, the material of all objects of outer intuition, is actually given in this space, independently of all imaginative invention (ibid.).

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The error of the idealist then is demanding that the real object be intuited and represented as outside of us. Space is inside of us. And reality in space, being the reality of a mere representation, is nothing other than perception itself. The real of outer appearances is therefore real in perception only, and can be real in no other way (A376/350). But that means that we cannot doubt the existence of outer objects. In fact, we have to assert that whatever is connected with a perception according to empirical laws, is actual (A376/350). Outside of this, we need only assert that the data of sensation come from actual objects. In Kants words, we have to admit that our outer senses, as regard the data from which experience can arise, have therefore their actual corresponding elements in space. (A377/350). This final admission is necessary since the action of consciousness is that of synthesis, not of providing the material that is synthesized.

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Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic, Paralogisms of Pure Reason, A381-A405, NKS: 352-367, EV: 293-306 In this reading, Kant takes a general look at the paralogisms concerning the soul and attempts to clarify his presentation, which has been somewhat obscure. He also deals with the paralogisms concerning the souls relation to the body, that is, those arguments that attempt to explain how it is supposed to communicate with the body. Kant begins by noting the difference between the rational doctrine of the soul, as based on inner sense, and that of the body as the object of outer sense. In the doctrine of the body, he writes, much that is apriori can be synthetically known from the mere concept of an extended impenetrable being. But in the doctrine (or science) of the soul, nothing whatsoever that is a priori can be known synthetically from the concept of a thinking being (A381/353). The difference is that in outer sense, we are given something fixed or abiding which supplies a substratum. But in inner sense, in what we entitle soul, everything is in flux and there is nothing abiding (ibid.). Given this, we cannot have any synthetic knowledge, since such knowledge is knowledge of the forms of connections that allow us to synthesize an enduring object. Such forms are conditions of the possibility of the experience of such objects. But these objects are not given in inner sense, therefore neither are the forms; hence, no any apriori assertions based on these forms are possible. We forget this lack of enduring objects in inner sense because we fasten on the I of the I think. Since this I has no content, we assume that it is simple. We hypothesize it as a simple object. But the I is not an object. It is only the mere form of consciousness. If some material content is supplied for this form, then the form (which is that of the unification of consciousness and implicitly contains all the particular forms of such unification) can result in knowledge. But this will be knowledge of some object, not knowledge of itself (A382/353) What good then is this science of rational psychology? It has, according to Kant, a negative value. What its failure tells me is that I cannot know anything about the thinking self. For example, I cannot say this self is just an arrangement of matter. If it were, then with this arrangement being removed, the soul would vanish. But since matter is nothing in itself, but only appearance, I cant make matter the condition of the soul. As Kant puts it, it is clearly shown that if I remove the thinking subject, the whole corporeal world must at once vanish: it is nothing save an appearance in the sensibility of our subject and a mode of its representations (A383/354). This means that I can hope for an independent and continuing existence of my thinking nature (ibid.). Not that I can convert this hope into knowledge. Rather, an opponent can never know more of the nature of the self in denying the possibility of my expectations that I can know in clinging to them (A384/354).

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Kants implicit claim is that he is limiting knowledge to make room for faith. What do you think of this defense? What would prevent a faith that was based on a lack of knowledge, from taking on bizarre forms? Kant would say that such forms would also be inhibited insofar as they could not claim the knowledge they needed for their doctrines. Kant then next turns to the questions involving the souls relation with the body: how does the soul communicate with the body? Does the soul precede the body as Plato thought? Does it also survive the body? All such questions assume that the body and, in general, that matter is something in itself. In Kants words, they all rest on a mere delusion by which they hypostatize what exist merely in thought in other words, they regard extension, which is nothing but appearance, as a property of outer things. They take such things as material realities, forgetting that matter is nothing but a mere form, or a particular way of representing an unknown object by means of that intuition which is called outer sense (A384-5/355). As he also puts this: matter does not mean a kind of substance quite distinct from the object of inner sense (the soul), but only the distinctive nature of those appearances of objects the representations of which we call outer (A385/355). Matter, in other words, is simply a name for the way that outer objects appear. Such objects have weight, they occupy particular extensions in space, they have a certain resistance, manifest inertia, etc. All these predicates are ways they appear. The title for their totality is matter. If this is true, there is no real issue about the soul communicating with substances essentially different from it. In particular, the problem Descartes setshow can a nonextended soul or self communicate with an extended bodydisappears. At issue is, as Kant writes, only the connection of the representations of inner sense with the modifications of outer sensibilityas to how these can be so connected with each other according to settled laws that they exhibit the unity of a coherent experience.] (A38586/355). The question, in other words, is: how do the representations of inner experience relate to the representations of outer experience? What are the settled laws that connect the two? What, in other words, are the connections existing between the inner experiences that allow us to posit the objects of outer experience? The settled laws refer to the types of these connections. The answer to this is provided by the categories. Thus, the category of substance means that we connect our inner representations to pertain to one and the same object which shows itself through such representations. This involves the perspectival ordering of such representations. The whole mind body problem is, then, based on an error. We take outer appearances not as representations but as things existing by themselves outside us. We then take them as bringing to bear on our thinking subject the activities which they exhibit as appearances in relation to each other. Thus, they act as efficient causes with regard to 132

each other. We assume they can act like this on usthat is, on our souls as revealed through inner sense. But we cannot see how this could be possible. Thus, in outer sense we found no other outer effects save changes of place, and no forces except mere tendencies which issue in [changes in] spatial relations as their effects. But when we look within us, we dont find any relation of place, motion, shape, or other spatial determinations. But this means that we cannot see how the outer object is supposed to cause changes in the soul. In Kants words, we altogether lose the thread of the causes in the effects to which they are supposed to have given rise in inner sense (A386-7/356). The point is that in the outer world, we have simply changes of place of bodies. But how can such changes in place cause the non spatial contents of inner sense? Lockes formulation of the problem is: We are so far from knowing what figure, size or motion of parts produce a yellow color, a sweet taste, or a sharp sound, that we can by no means conceive how any size, figure, or motion of any particles, can possibly produce in us the idea of any color, taste, or sound whatsoever: there is no conceivable connection between the one and other (Locke 1995, p. 445). Leibniz makes the same point in his analogy of the mill. Perceptions, he writes ... are inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is to say, by figures and motions. Supposing that there were a machine whose structure produced thought, sensation, and perception, we could conceive of it as increased in size with the same proportions until one was able to enter into its interior, as he would into a mill. Now, on going into it he would find only pieces working upon one another , but never would he find anything to explain perception (Leibniz 1962, p. 254). Kants point is that the whole problem can be solved once one realizes that neither bodies nor motions are anything outside us. Both alike are mere representations in us; and it is not, therefore, the motion of matter, that produces representations in us. In fact, he adds, the motion itself is only a representation. Given this, we only have the problem of relating the two types of representations. How do the representations of inner sense come together so that through them we posit the outer object. In Kants words, the real problem is how the representations of our sensibility are so interconnected that those that we call outer intuitions can be represented as objects outside us (A387/356). Thus, for example, we have the individual representations of the sides of the cat. The question is how they come together so as to we can have the representation of the cat as an object existing outside of us. The cat is a three dimensional object. Each individual representation in inner sense is not. It does not show itself perspectivally, but the cat does. The individual representation is not in space. It does not have a size, but the cat does. How do we get from one to the other? Kants answer is through the order and connection of the representations of inner sense. Through them we posit the outer appearing, i.e., the appearing of an object in space.

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If we do not accept this solution, then, as Kant remarks, we either have to assert that the external objects are related to the representations of inner sense through 1) physical influence or 2) predetermined harmony or 3) supernatural intervention. The first, everyone admits, is impossible to conceive. Everyone since Locke has admitted that what appears as matter cannot by its immediate influence be the cause of our representations, these being effects which are quite different in kind from matter. (A390/358). So they assume either that there is some pre-established harmony between what goes on in the outer world and what goes on in our minds. This is Leibnizs view. Or else they assume that God himself intervenes and every time something happens in the external world, he puts a representation that matches this in our heads. He has to do this, since he is not a deceiver and he has created us. This is the view of the followers of Descartes. Both explanations, according to Kant, miss the point that matter is only appearance. In his words, the difficulties in regard to the connection of our thinking nature with matter have their origin, one and all, in the view that matter as such is not appearance but the object in itself as it exists outside us independently of all sensibility (A391/359). What really exists outside of ourselves independently of all sensibility is the thing in itself. But we can have not knowledge whatsoever of this, and we shall never acquire any concept of this (A394/360). None of our categories, not even that of causality, apply to it. We cannot even say that it causes the material of our sensation in a way that objects in space produce effects on one another. What this leaves us with is a lack of knowledge about the souls existence before and after the body. If we abstract from bodies as appearances, all we have left are the things in themselves. If the soul is to have some contents, it would have to be able to intuit the things in themselves with an intuition different from that which we presently have, which only intuits appearances. But no one can give the least ground for any such assertion Kant writes. It presupposes a type of intuition that we dont have. But it is equally impossible for anyone to bring any valid dogmatic objection against it. For whoever he may be, he knows, Kant writes, just as little as I or anybody else of the absolute inner cause of outer corporeal appearances (A394/360). So once again, skepticism leaves room for faith. Kant finishes up the A editions account the first type of paralogism with some general remarks on the illusion that takes the I as a substance. The most interesting of these is his statement about why we necessarily think of the soul in terms of the categories. According to Kant, the being which thinks in us is under the 134

impression that it knows itself through pure categories, and precisely through those categories in which each type of category expresses absolute unity. So it thinks that it is one, simple, and a numerical (as opposed to a specific) unity. The reason for this is that it has hypothesized self-consciousness. It has made it a thing. But selfconsciousness is the representation of that which is the condition of all unity and is itself unconditioned. It is the ground of the possibility of the categories. It represents the synthesis of the multiplicity of intuition, in so far as this multiplicity has unity in apperception (A401/365). When we therefore engage in the transcendental illusion and regard ourselves as substance, as simple, as numerically identical at all time and so on, what is happening is that we are not really knowing ourselves through the categories, we are knowing the categories themselves. But it is through the categories, in the absolute unity of apperception, that I know objects. Insofar as I am this unity of apperception, I know objects through myself. But as Kant remarks, I cannot know as an object that which I must presuppose in order to know any object. This holds insofar as the determining self (the thought) is distinguished from the self that is to be determined (the thinking subject) (A 401/365). The point is that it is through the unity of consciousness that I know objects, but such unity is not itself an object but rather that which determines that objects be unities. The unity of consciousness, in other words, is just the demand that all my representations fit together to give me a coherent world. The demand is unconditioned. What it conditions are the objects that together form my coherent world. So the error is simply taking the formal conditions of the demand, that the world itself be unified, and treating this demand as if it were some thing that was itself a unity.

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Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic, Paralogisms of Pure Reason, B407-B432, NKS, 368-383, EV: 263 We now turn to the B edition of the paralogisms of pure reason. It is considerably shorter and somewhat clearer than the A edition. The doctrine, however, is essentially the same. What we have to do with in all the arguments treating the immortality of the soul is a conflation. The arguments take the unity and simplicity of the I of the I think and forget that this I think is only a form of consciousness. They treat this form as if it were a thing. They given the mere form of consciousness the unity and simplicity of a substance. Before making this argument, Kant starts out with some general remarks. The first is that we cannot speak of knowledge of the I of the I think in the same way as knowledge of an object Thus, I know an object on y in so fa! as I dete!mine a (i)en int$ition "ith !espect to the $nity of conscio$sness in "hich a tho$(ht consists that is, through my determining it through the categories which structure the unity of my consciousness. This holds for my self-knowledge. Thus, I require intuition of myself, e.g., the representations of inner sense, to know myself. In Kants words, I need something more than my being conscious of myself as thinking I need an intuition that is structured by the categories. In Kants words, I know myself on y "hen I am conscio$s of the int$ition of myse f as dete!mined "ith !espect to the f$nction of tho$(ht' this function being the connection of intuitions according categories (B407/368). Where am I going to get these intuitions? From inner sense? The difficulty, here, is twofold. First the contents of inner sense pertain to objects of the world. They are the content that I synthesize to present such objects to myself. Secondly, even if I say that there is a twofold object=x with regard to such contents (x=external object and x=internal subject), the internal subject=x would a synthesized object, not a synthesizing subject. To make it a synthesizing subject, I would have to confuse two very different notions of the subject. The object as a subject for various predicates that I gain through intuition: e.g., this ball is red, round, etc. The self as the active subject that thinks such predicates by connecting its perceptions so as to take them as perceptions of some object, e.g., I think this ball as red, round, etc. To think various predicates is not to have them. To take the traditional Aristotlean example, when the mind thinks a stone, it does not become a stone. It does not suddenly have the predicates of hardness, roundness, etc.

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The confusion here is between the consciousness of the determining se f* that is the se f as synthesi=e! and the conscio$sness of ;the determinable se f' that is' of my inne! int$ition (in so fa! as its manifo d can #e com#ined in acco!dance "ith the $ni)e!sa condition of the $nity of appe!ception in tho$(ht).* &he diffic$ t is that "hen I (!asp myse f as an o#-ect' I do not (!asp myse f as a s$#-ect (B407/368) Given this, we can affirm the following: The first is that even though the I of the I think can always be regarded as a subject, this does not mean that the I, as an object, am, for myself, a self-subsistent being or substance (B407/369) The second is that even though the I of the I think is one and simple, this does not mean that this thinking I is a simple substance. The reason is that the I think refers to my activity of understanding and thinking, but the concept of substance always relates to intuitions, which with me cannot be other than sensuous, and which consequently lie completely outside of the sphere of the understanding and its thought (B408/369). The point is that such sensuous intuitions are the material of my understanding and thought, not the understanding and thought that connects such material assigning it referents. The third is that even though the I of the I think is identical with itself, this selfidentity does not conce!n any int$ition of the s$#-ect' "he!e#y it is (i)en as FanG o#-ect' and cannot the!efo!e si(nify the identity of the pe!son' if #y that is $nde!stood the conscio$sness of the identity of one5s o"n s$#stance' as a thin,in( #ein(' in a chan(e of its states (ibid.). The point holds since this identity of the thinking being is not the identity of an object that endures through the changes of its predicates, but rather the identity of the subject that thinks this enduring object by connecting its perceptions and assigning them a referent. This referent is the external permanent that is given in outer sense. It is the object=x that is distinguished from the perceptions that are given in inner sense. The subject that constitutes this object is not this object. Its identity is distinct from it The fourth point is that even though the I of the I think is distinct from things outside of me including my body, this does not mean that this conscio$sness of myse f "o$ d #e e)en possi# e apa!t f!om thin(s o$tside me th!o$(h "hich !ep!esentations a!e (i)en to me' and "hethe!' the!efo!e' I co$ d e%ist me!e y as thin,in( #ein( (i.e. "itho$t e%istin( in h$man fo!m). (B409/370). Thus, I cannot prove the immortality of my soul from the I think. The point of this is that I cannot argue: The I is one and simple. Therefore it is an unchanging substance (all change having to do with the contents of its consciousness not with itself as conscious of such contents). Therefore, it is immortal. Once alive, it cannot change and be dead. 137

Here Kant also notes that if I could make such arguments, the whole point of the Critique of Pure Reason is lost, since then synthetic apriori judgments such as every thinking being is a simple substance would be possible and would be applicable to things in themselves an inference which makes an end of the whole of this Critique, and obliges us to fall back on the old mode of metaphysical procedure (B410/371). In fact, however, all such arguments are based on the logical fallacy of a paralogism. One changes the meaning of a term in moving from the major to the minor premise of a syllogism . Here is the general syllogism: That which cannot be thought otherwise than as a subject does not exist otherwise than as a subject, and is therefore substance. A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject. Therefore it exists also as a subject, that is, as substance. (B410-411/371) As Kant notes: 5&ho$(ht5 is ta,en in the t"o p!emisses in tota y diffe!ent senses2 in the ma-o! <' to an o#-ect as it may #e (i)en in int$ition> in the mino! . no o#-ect "hatsoe)e! is #ein( tho$(ht> a that is #ein( !ep!esented is simp y the !e ation to se f as s$#-ect (as the fo!m of tho$(ht). (B411-412/371). Thus, we have the notion of subject as object that is the subject of various predicates in the major premise. Such as subject is a unitary substance. In the minor premise, we have the notion the subject as a thinking being, i.e., the subject who thinks such predicates. The only unity here is the unity of consciousness, such unity being the form of thought. This unity is not the unity of a substance. To apply the concept of substance to the self, we need something permanent. If, however, we do turn to inner intuition, we find nothing permanent. The intuition here is Humes as he says in the Treatise: The mind is a kind of theater where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations ... The comparison of the theater must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it composed. (Treatise, Oxford ed., p. 253). In this theater, there is nothing permanent. I cannot therefore find a self in it. In Humes words, 138

from what impression could this idea [of an unchanging self] be derived? ... It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. ... If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same through the whole course of our lives; since the self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. (251) As Kant writes: through intuition alone can an object be given. But in inner intuition there is nothing permanent (B413/372) What about synthesizing my perceptions, that form the contents of my inner intuition, taking them as perceptions of some one thing? This is the Kantian idea of a substance. But if I do so, all I get is an external object, what Kant call the external permanent. This object=x, as I said, is not the subject as agent, i.e., the subject as a thinker. Kant now turns to make short shrift of Moses Mendelssohns proof of the immortality of the soul. Mendelssohn argues that as simple, the soul cannot, as simple, be diminished and so gradually become nothing. It must, as simple, vanish all at once. But then between the moment in which it is, and the moment in which it is not, no time can be discovered-which is impossible. In other words, there is no time for it even to vanish (B414415/372-73). Kants position is that existence or reality does admit of degrees. As we recall, the schema of reality is time filled with some content, while the schema of negation is the absence of content, and that of limitation is some point on the progression from one to the other. Thus, we cannot deny to the existence of the soul any less than to any other being, intensive quantity, that is, a degree of reality But this degree of reality can become less and less through an infinite series of smaller degrees. Thus, we can perfectly well imagine the soul diminishing to nothing over time (B414/373). This, of course, assumes that we could intuit the soul, which we cannot. We can, however, imaging the gradual diminishment of its powers and, hence, avoid Mendelssohns argument. There is another point to be made here. Mendelssohn assumes that we can conceive of the soul apart from the world that it perceives. But this means that we would not need the conception of the external permanent in order to determine the inner sense that supposedly gives us the soul. We thus give up the argument that the existence of outer things is required for the determination of ones own existence in time. But then means that the assumption of [the existence of these

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outer things] is a gratuitous assumption which remains without the possibility of a proof (B418/375). In other words, given, as Kant thinks, his refutation is the only possible one, without it, we become at least problematic idealists. Does this mean then that the soul is mortal? That we must give up the hope of an afterlife? Not according to Kant. The simplicity and unity of the I if the I think does make the material explanation of it impossible. There is nothing simple in nature. Points in space are simple, but they are only limits, not things. But material explanation is in terms of space and spatial relations. As he puts this: Now in space there is nothing real that is at the same time simple; for points, which are the only simple things in space, are merely limits, but not constituent parts of space. From this follows the impossibility of a definition on the basis of materialism of the constitution of my Ego as a merely thinking subject (B420/276). But this does not mean that that the I thinkthat is, I exist thinking, is something we can know anything about. To know it is to have intuition of it, but we dont have this. So really, all we can say is that in no way whatsoever can we know anything of the constitution of the soul, so far as the possibility of its separate existence is concerned. (ibid.). To sum up, we cannot intuit the I that thinks, all we can intuit are outer objects. So we cannot really say anything at all about the soul. We are free to believe what we want about its existence after death. The general point here is critical. It is that of pointing out the mistake on which all the arguments concerning the soul are based. In Kants words, &he $nity of conscio$sness' "hich $nde! ies the cate(o!ies' is he!e mista,en fo! an int$ition of the s$#-ect as o#-ect' and the cate(o!y of s$#stance is then app ied to it (B421/377). The unity of consciousness, however, not an intuition of anything. It is just the form of thought. It is simply the necessity we have of unifying our consciousness by connecting our experiences and assigning them referents. The paralogism takes this necessity a makes it an object, claiming that such an object can be intuited. In fact, the thinking subject (the I that actually engages in thinking the world through the categories) is presupposed in every thinking and is not itself a result of such thinking or explainable in terms of such results. As Kant put this: The subject of the categories cannot, therefore, for the very reason that it [thinks objects through] these categories, frame any conception of itself as an object of the categories; for, to think these, it must presuppose its own pure self-consciousness--the very thing that it wishes to explain and describe.(422/377) 140

In other words, the categories are grounded in its unity, that is, in the necessity of its being one consciousness of one subject. The objects they determine are also grounded in this necessity. But then, this necessity is presupposed by such objects and its not explained by them. The same point holds with regard to time. The subject is the ground of the presentation of time. But as such, it is not in itself determined by the results of such determination. In Kants words, In like manner, the subject, in which the representation of time has its ground, cannot determine, for this very reason, its own existence in time (ibid.). But the categories are such determinations of an object in time. Therefore, they are inapplicable. Note: this, of course, puts into question the descriptions in the A edition of how we ground timewhich may account for their absence in the B edition. The section on the paralogism ends with some remarks about how reason can still serve as a practical guide for our life, especially with regard to the moral law. It is clear from such remarks, that Kant has his Critique of Practical Reason in mind.

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Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B432-B435, B472-B479, B532-B586, NKS: 384-386, 409-415, 464-479 Kant now turns his attention to the antinomies of pure reason. He introduces the topic by a short review. As we recall, logos means both reason and logic (we get the word logical from it). Reason proceeds through logic. Now there are three types of syllogism: the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive. From these we get the three classes of transcendental ideas. the categorical: those dealing with the soul the hypothetical: those dealing with the world the disjunctive: those dealing with God (B433/384) He has dealt with the ideas coming from the categorical in the paralogisms of pure reason. We now come to the ideas coming from hypothetical syllogism: those dealing with the worldthe cosmological ideas. Before he treats them, Kant distinguish them both from those ideas regarding the soul and those regarding God. With the transcendental ideas regarding the soul (the subject of our thought), the illusion was all on the side of what Kant calls pneumatism (from pneuma meaning spirit in Greek). The illusion was that we could prove the immortality of the soul (taken as a substance) from the unity and simplicity of the I of the I think. We treated a mere form of thought (the soul or self as a unitary, simple 0-point) as if were a substance. (ibid.). In the transcendental ideas regarding the world, we have two contradictory theses an entirely natural antithetic, both of which are generated by pure reason. These are the antinomies. There is, in regarding this opposition, no danger that reason will convince us by leading us in one direction. The danger is rather that we fall into skeptical despair. This Kant calls the euthanasia of pure reason. (B434/385). Alternatively, we could become dogmatists, assuming an obstinate attitude [in adopting one of the two opposing positions and] refusing to grant a fair hearing to the arguments for the counterposition (ibid.). Now, the cosmological ideas are distinguished from the theological because they concern only appearancesnamely, the absolute totality in the synthesis of appearances. What we have here is an empirical synthesis that concerns the appearing realities of the world. (ibid.). The theological ideas, by contrast, concern the synthesis of all possible

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things in general whether these are worldly realities or not. He we think God as the ultimate condition of absolutely everything. Continuing his general remarks, Kant recalls what a transcendental idea is. All our ideas come from the understanding. It is what engages in the formation of concepts. Reason does not really generate any concept, Kant remarks. What it can do is free a concept of the understanding from the unavoidable limitations of a possible experience. (B435/386). Now with the cosmological ideas, reason does this by thinking the absolute totality of conditions. Doing so, it follows the hypothetical syllogism, if the conditioned is given, then the entire sum of conditions is also given. Since there are no further conditions outside of this sum, this means that the absolutely unconditioned (through which alone the conditioned has been possible) is also given (B346/386). Not all the concepts of the categories allow the use of this hypothetical syllogism. Only those in which we have a series of conditions subordinated to, not co-ordinated with, one another. (B436/386-7). Since these ideas are those which concern only appearances, their basis is found in the form of all appearances, time and space. With regard to time, we have to presuppose a regressive series going back to the beginning. Thus, past time, as a condition of the given moment, is necessarily thought as being given in its entirety. (B439/388). In other words, the present moment would not be if all the moments which lead up to it had not been. With regard to space, it itself does not form a series. the parts of space are co-ordinated with, not subordinated to, one another, one part is not the condition of the possibility of another. (ibid.). Yet, since we are dealing with the synthesis of appearances, and hence with an act that takes place in time, we still can think of condition and conditioned with regard to space as synthesized by us. Thus, each part of space we can say is conditioned by the parts making it up. It itself is the condition of the whole it is a part of, and so on. Thus, we have the possibility of two types of series. The regressive where we try to go to the least parts, dividing space up and the progressive where we try to go to whole of space. (B440/388). Thus, according to Kant, I can as legitimately enquire regarding the absolute totality of appearances in space as of the absolute totality of appearances in time. With regard to reality in space, that is, matter, I can see each part as conditioned by the parts making it up, and these parts similarly conditioned till either the reality of matter vanishes into nothing or into what is no longer matternamely, the simple. (B440/389). Finally, I can also see causality as a series of causes of a given effect and think the totality of such causes as unconditioned. (B441/442/389-390). Thus, we get four cosmological ideas: 143

One: Absolute completeness of the composition of the given whole of appearances (the world as a totality) Two: Absolute completeness of the division of a given whole in the field of appearances (the least part of the world) Three: Absolute completeness in the origin of an appearance (the first cause of appearances: is it freedom or necessity) Four: Absolute completeness as regards Dependence of Existence of the alterable in the field of existence (the absolutely necessary being underlying the contingency of appearances). The difficulty with all such ideas is that they exceed experience. Reason demands them independently of our connecting them with any adequate empirical concepts. (B444/391). Thus, in following these ideas, even thought they are concerned exclusively with the world of sense, not with noumena, they yet carry the synthesis to a degree which transcends all possible experience (B447/393). The difficulty here is not with the argumentation or with logic (e.g., with the law of excluded middle) but rather with the hidden premise of the arguments. We cannot assert that either the thesis or its denial is true if both presuppose a notion which is inherently contradictory. In Kants words, If two opposed judgments presuppose an inadmissible condition, then in spite of their contradiction (which is not actually a genuine one), both fall to the ground, inasmuch as the condition, under which alone each of these propositions is supposed to hold, itself falls (B531). This condition is discoverable by examining the arguments of the antinomies. The examination is actually a kind of deconstruction, a dismantling to find the hidden premise. This is the assumption that the appearing world is the world in itself. If you look at the arguments, you see that they assume both that they are dealing with the appearances and that these appearances pertain to the world in itself. Thus, ultimately what the antinomies are supposed to prove is that the appearing world is not the world in itself. The antinomies are a kind of reductio ad absurdum, where you assume something and then show that it cannot be true because it leads to a contradiction. The assumption here is that the appearing world is the actual world, the contradictions are the antinomies. The conclusion is that the assumption is false. The appearing world is not the world in itself. Let us turn now to the third antinomy. 144

The third antinomy concerns freedom. Thesis We can argue that there must be freedom. To account for the phenomena, a causality of freedom is also necessary. For assume the opposite. Then everything that happens presupposes a previous condition, which it follows with absolute certainty, in conformity with a rule. But this previous condition must itself be something that has happened [and] this again presupposes, in conformity with the law of nature, a previous condition and its causality, and this another anterior to the former, and so on (B472/409). In other words, the chain of causality will go on for ever. Thus, there will always be a relative and never a first beginning and consequently no completeness of the series on the side of the causes that arise the one from the other. (B474/410). But the law of nature is that everything that happens must have a sufficient cause for it to happen. This contradicts the notion that we only have a relative cause. In other words, we have to assume the completeness of the series of causes to give a sufficient reason for the thing having happened. But this means we assume a first cause, one that is not determined by a previous cause. This however to assume the spontaneity of the cause. This is transcendental freedom. (B475/410-11). Antithesis Against this, we can argue that there is no freedom. For assume that there is freedom that is a power of absolutely beginning a series of consequences. If this is true, then there will be no antecedent through which this act, in taking place, is determined in accordance with fixed laws. We are thus presupposing a state which has no causal connection with the preceding state of the cause. It in no way follows from it. Such freedom thus stands opposed to the law of causality. But this renders all unity of experience impossible. (B475/410). Thus, remember that causality is what fixes appearances in definite positions in time. Without it, experience cannot be unified. Thus, according to the argument, nature and transcendental freedom differ as do conformity to law and lawlessness. The acceptance of nature, of the universal sway of causality, holds out the promise of [a] thoroughgoing unity of experience in accordance with laws (B475/411). By contrast the causality of freedom is blind, and abrogates those rules through which alone a completely coherent experience is possible. (ibid.). Kant appends a number of remarks to these arguments. On the thesis, he notes that he is only dealing with the transcendental idea of freedom, which stands only for the absolute spontaneity of an action. Thus, the problem is

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"whether we must admit a power of spontaneously beginning a series of successive things or states (B476/412). He admits that the assertion that the regressive chain of causes cannot go on forever has demonstrated a first beginning, due to freedom, to the point required to make an origin of the world conceivable. But once one admits the power of spontaneously beginning a series, one can admit this within the world and thus attribute to agents a power of acting from freedom. (B478/413). On the antithesis, he asks why cannot the world have existed forever. What authority have you for inventing an absolutely first state of the world (B477/412). He admits that one cannot comprehend how anything can happen if the causal chain is unending, but such lack of comprehension attends to every link of the causal chain. This is Humes point. I cannot see why one thing causes the other. I just have this experience. In fact, were you not assured by experience that alternation actually occurs, you would never be able to come up with apriori the possibility of such a ceaseless sequence of being and notbeing. (B479/413). The main point, however, is that if you admit freedom, the criterion of empirical truth whereby experience is distinguished from dreaming, would almost entirely disappear. (B479/4134). We could not get out of our heads into the common world, the world there for everyone. In his resolution of this antinomy, which I covered in my lectures on the Prolegomena, Kant claims that both sides of the antinomy are correct, but they have different references. In terms of the appearances, causality reigns. In terms of the things-in-themselves, freedom can occur. Only if we assert that the appearances are things in themselves can we claim that both alternatives cannot be true, that is, contradict each other. To maintain this thesis is a tricky business for Kant. As he writes in a footnote, the understanding cannot admit among phenomena a condition which is itself empirically unconditioned. But if it is possible to conceive an intelligible condition--one which is not a member of the series of phenomena--for a conditioned phenomenon, without breaking the series of empirical conditions, such a[n unconditioned] condition may be admissible. What one wants then is a non-appearing cause of appearances. One wants it to act without in the least interrupting the series of empirical conditions. In other words, it must act without prejudice to the continuity of the empirical regress. (B559/463) How are we to satisfy this condition? Freedom, Kant writes, is the power of beginning a state spontaneously (B560/464). Now such freedom cannot appear. In Kants words, Freedom is a pure transcendental idea. It cannot be given or 146

determined in any experience, because it is a universal law of the very possibility of experience, that everything which happens must have a cause, that consequently the causality of a cause, being itself something that has happened, must also have a cause. Thus, we cannot have any intuitable object for this idea. This, however, does not disturb Kant. As he notes, the dynamical concepts of reason are not concerned with an object considered as magnitude, but only with its existence. (B563/466). Thus, we need not worry about the intuitability of the free cause, but only about its existence. Now if we assert that freedom pertains to the object in itself, while necessity pertains to the appearance of the object, we can say that in one and the same event, in different relations, both [freedom and necessity] can be found. (B564/466). Thus, if we distinguish things in themselves from appearances, such appearances, as Kant writes, must themselves have grounds which are not appearances. Granting this we can say with regard to a free or intelligible cause, the effects of such an intelligible cause appear, and accordingly can be determined through other appearances, but its causality [that is the causality of the free agent] is not so determined. In other words, This cause and its causality exist therefore outside of and apart from the series of phenomena; while its effects do exist and are discoverable in the series of empirical conditions. (B565/467). If we grant this, then Kants conclusion follows: Such an effect may therefore be considered to be free in relation to its intelligible cause, and necessary in relation to the phenomena from which it is a necessary consequence. (ibid.). Kants point here is actually quite simple. Causality is a interpretative category I impose on appearances to get out of my head into the objective world. Yet, in my head, that is prior to any imposition of this category, I have the ineradicable sense of my own freedom. Thus, in my head, I cannot apply the category of causality to myself. In particular, I cannot apply it to myself as an actor. I can only apply it to the effects of my action insofar as I take them to be out there in the objective world. So I take myself as free, yet I also take myself as starting causal chains in the world out there. The same holds for my regard of other people. Insofar as I take them as free, I take them as not appearing. Insofar as I take them as appearing, I take them as causally determined. I actually take them as both. I both look for motives and causes of their actions and I hold them responsible. I also cannot see (intuit) their agency. The most I can imagine is a little man in their heads moving them. But this is ridiculous. All I can intuit are the causal relations appearing persons have to the world. So I say that the other as an independent agent is hidden.

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The sense of such hiddenness is given to me internally when I regard my mental life. The memories and anticipations that form such mental life are spread out in front of me. I can regard them in any order I choose. In the world out there appearances in time are successive. They are in the Kantian (and Humean) sense causally related insofar as their succession is necessarily the same for everyone and hence necessarily ordered into prior and posterior. But I escape this in my inner life. I can take an anticipation (some experience I would like to have) and I can use the information from my memories (that is, past sequences of appearances that let to this experience) to guide my conduct. The point is that in my head I am not subject to time in its necessary sequence, but am its master. As such I am free. Outside of my head, in the objective world, time is the master. But this is only because I interpret it as such so as to posit an objective world there for everyone. With this we have Kants double perspective on the same event. From the standpoint of the actor who acts not as an appearance but as a reality (a thing in itself), the event is free. From the standpoint of the interpretation of appearances which makes their order objective, the event is causally determined. Can I objectively prove freedom? Not really, since I cannot intuit it. But this lack of intuition, since we are talking about the dynamical (as opposed to a mathematical idea), does not disprove freedom. What we have here is a skepticism that leaves open the possibility of freedom. Before we consider the details of this position, let me note a problem with it. According to Kant, Nature proceeds via the rule of causality according to which nothing occurs without having a cause determining it to be just as it shows itself to be. This holds for every feature of a being. Freedom is the violation of this rule, that is, the ability to spontaneously initiate an action.

For Kant, we resolve the two by admitting that the other does not objectively appear as a free agent. But this only means that his agency is noumenal, not phenomenal. What does appear are the consequences of his agency. They are seen to be causally determined. Now, if a free agent initiates a causal chain, then that chain cannot have any sufficient cause prior to its appearance. We should thus see a gap such that the beginning of events caused by this free agent could not have been predicted. The events would therefore have no necessary beginning in time. Such a beginning would only occur if they had necessarily been caused to occur at some time by an event just prior to this time. But we dont see such gaps according to Kant.

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The difficulty concerns the initiation of a causally determined sequence which is itself not causally determined. How can we, following the categories, make this intelligible to ourselves? The categories, particularly that of causality, make every event (every initiation of an event, every insertion of the event in time) determined by what went before. But the free event is just what is not determined. Thus, in terms of appearance, we have to deny such events. They cannot appear. But it seems that they must. If they cannot appear, why should we posit freedom? Kant simply goes back to the phenomenal noumenal split. We have to assume that beneath the phenomena, there are noumenanon-appearing things in themselves. The free agent is one of these. With this, a second question arises: Given that the phenomena-noumena split occurs with regard to everything, why shouldnt we assume that everything non-appearing is a free agent? Here Kant turns to our inner sense of ourselves, to the fact that we employ reason in deciding on our free actions. Rational relations are not real relations. In fact, they dont involve time. Thus, all As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs expresses a timeless, non-causal relation. We assume that in following reason, we are not temporally determined and hence are free. We also assume that others are free to the point that they follow reason. Such an assumption, however, is never verifiable in appearance. Let me now turn to the details of Kants solution. First a terminological note. Kant writes: Whatever in an object of the senses is not itself appearance, I entitle intelligible (B566/467). Intelligible does not mean that the reference is to something intelligent. Rather, the reference here is to the split between Denken and Erkennen. I can think (denke) the intelligible notion of a thing in itself, even though I cannot know (erkenne) it. Now, the split between the appearance and the thing in itself means that I can regard the causality of a thing from two different points of view: Regarded as the causality of a thing in itself, it is intelligible in its action; regarded as the causality of an appearance in the world of sense, it is sensible in its effects. We should accordingly, have to form both an empirical and an intellectual conception of the causality of such a faculty or power--both, however, having reference to the same effect. (ibid.). Given this, we can say: every sensuous object possesses an empirical character, which guaranteed that its actions, as phenomena, stand in complete and harmonious connection, conformably to unvarying natural laws, with all other phenomena, and can be deduced from these

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We can also say: This sensuous object must [also] possess an intelligible character, which guarantees it to be the cause of those actions, as phenomena, although it is not itself a phenomenon nor subordinate to the conditions of the world of sense. The former, Kant adds, may be termed the character of the thing as a phenomenon, the latter the character of the thing as a thing in itself. (B567/468). Since the latter is a thing in itself, neither space nor time, nor the categories that determine the connections of phenomena in space and time, apply to it. It is timeless. In Kants words: this active subject would, in its character of intelligible subject, be subordinate to no conditions of time, for time is only a condition of phenomena, and not of things in themselves. No action would begin or cease to be in this subject; it would consequently be free from the law of all determination of time--the law of change, namely, that everything which happens must have a cause in the phenomena of a preceding state. (B657-8/468). We cannot know this intelligible character, we are only compelled to think it. As Kant remarks, This intelligible character can never be immediately known. It would have to be thought, just as we are constrained to think a transcendental object as underlying appearances, though we know nothing of what it is in itself. (B568/468). Since we are compelled to think of it apart from the categories, we have to say that in as much as it is a noumenon, nothing happens in it. Since it is outside of time, there can be no change demanding the dynamical determination of time. Thus, no action begins in this active being itself even though it begins its effects. (B569/469). As Kant observes, the question here is whether it is possible to consider an effect as at the same time an effect of nature and an effect of freedom--or, whether these two modes of causality are contradictory and incompatible?" (B571/470). An agent that acts out of freedom acts by virtue of thought and understanding. If the two modes of causality are compatible, then, we have to assume both that freedom produces effects that appear and that the appearance of such effects are completely explainable by natural causes. In Kants words, we have to assume that although the effects of this thought and action of the pure understanding are discoverable in phenomena, these phenomena must nevertheless be capable of a full and complete explanation, upon purely physical grounds and in accordance with natural laws. (B574/472). This is a tall order. Can we consider an effect to be causally explainable in terms of previous phenomena and to considered as the result of some free act? Further, how can we distinguish human action from the action of other things in themselves? If we simply say that all noumena act freely (since the conditions of causality do not apply to them), have we said anything relevant about human freedom? Kants only answer here is that we have experience of action being motivated by reason 150

and understanding only in ourselves. So we attribute this to others who look and act like ourselves. Thus, Kant asserts that as an appearance, mans actions are determined. But he grasps himself not just as an appearance, but through pure apperception; and this in actions and internal determinations, which he cannot regard as sensuous impressions. He is thus to himself, on the one hand, a phenomenon, but on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties, a purely intelligible object--intelligible, because its action cannot be ascribed to sensuous receptivity. These faculties are understanding and reason. (B575/472). Kants claim is, thus, that we do have some grasp of ourselves not as we appear but as we are in ourselves. Inherently, we possess understanding and reason. Possessing such faculties, we are an intelligible object whose action cannot be ascribed to sensuous receptivity. Reason, he remarks, employs ideas alone in the consideration of its objects, and by means of these determines the understanding. (ibid.). That such reason has causality is obvious from the fact that it issues imperatives or commands for our practical activities. From it, comes the conception of the ought. This ought is grounded on concepts not on appearances: This ought expresses a possible action, the ground of which cannot be anything but a mere concept; while the ground of a merely natural action is, on the contrary, always a phenomenon. (B576/473). As he also puts this: Reason will not follow the order of things presented by experience, but, with perfect spontaneity, rearranges them according to ideas, with which it compels empirical conditions to agree. It declares, in the name of these ideas, certain actions to be necessary which nevertheless have not taken place and which perhaps never will take place; and yet presupposes that it possesses the faculty of causality in relation to these actions. (ibid.). What Kant is here pointing to is our ability to reason out the consequences of the possible actions that present themselves to us. In doing so, we take a concept like that of causality and apply it to some proposed action to see what will happen if we do it. We then compare the results of doing this for several possible courses of action. Finally, we choose the best action. In doing so, we do not follow the order of things presented by experience. We rearrange this order, according to ideas. Thus, suppose I want to obtain some goal. The actions of realizing this goal have not taken place. Yet I reason out the means to obtain it. I then declare certain actions to be necessary which nevertheless have not taken place. I order my conduct accordingly to make them take place. The point here is that the determinant of my action is not temporal. It is rather the relations of the ideas I have which match means to ends.

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What about my goal? Can I think of myself as caused by this goal? If we think that causality precedes from the past to the present to the future, the goal cannot be a natural cause. It reality lies in the future. It is something I can realize, if I choose to. But I can also choose to not realize it. If I do, its causality is not temporal (in the sense of being temporally limited to a particular time, since it continually motivates the different actions I perform in time. For Kant, the case is even stronger in moral action. Here, in following the categorical imperative, I abstract from all external determinations of my will except the moral law. I ask, what would happen if everyone did some act. Doing so, I abstract from my personal situation and goals. Following the moral law, as Kant writes, we abstract from the personal differences between rational beings, and also from all the content of their private ends (Groundwork, p. 101; IV, 433). We consider only what we ought to do on the basis of what reason indicates. In all such cases, the cause of our action is simply an intuited relation of our ideas. This relation in itself is timeless. It does not begin or end. Only our actions do. Thus Kant can assert: Pure reason, as a purely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the conditions of time. The causality of reason in its intelligible character does not, in producing an effect, arise or begin to be at a certain time. (B579/475). The reason for this is that the condition which lies in reason is not sensible, and therefore does not itself begin to be. (B580/475). It is a timeless relation of ideas. We may access it at a certain time. But, as a static relation of ground and consequence, it is not determined as something temporal. Thus, here the condition is outside the series of appearances and therefore is not subjection to any sensible condition, and to no time-determination through an antecedent cause. (B580/476). The conclusion then is that reason acts freely. Even though in reason itself nothing begins, it has the power of originating a series of events , that is, a beginning in the series of appearances. (B582/476). Kant turns to an example to illustrate his solution. Suppose someone tells a malicious lie. As Kant notes, We at first proceed to examine the empirical character of the offence, and for this purpose we endeavour to penetrate to the sources of that character, such as a defective education, bad company, a shameless and wicked disposition, frivolity, and want of reflection--not forgetting also the occasioning causes which prevailed at the moment of the transgression. In doing this, our procedure is exactly the same as that pursued in the investigation of the series of causes which determine a given physical effect. (B582/477).

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Yet even though we believe the action is determined, we still blame the person. We dont blame him on account of his unhappy disposition, nor on account of the circumstances that have influenced him. We do so because we presuppose that all these considerations may be set aside as having never existed. Instead, we blame the offender as a rational agent. We regard this faculty [of reason] as a cause, which could have and ought to have otherwise determined the behaviour of the culprit, independently of all empirical conditions. (B583/477). In fact, the timeless nature of this faculty gives us the right to hold this person responsible years latter. He is the same qua rational agent. As Kant puts this, Reason is present and the same in all human actions and at all times; but it does not itself exist in time. It remains the same, even though its effects, its appearances in time do alter. B584/478) Kant concludes that it is not been our intention to establish the reality of freedom. In fact, he has not even aimed at demonstrating the possibility of freedom. All he has shown is that causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with nature. And this holds because of the phenomenal noumenal distinction. (B586/479). He cannot do any more since he has no idea of how the noumenal relates to the phenomenal. In fact, we cannot even say that it causes it, since causality is a category that applies only to appearance not to the relation between what appears and what does not. Thus, while I know that I have a rational will, how this effects the movement of my body in the realm of appearance is unknown to me.

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Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B432-B435, B472-B479, B532-B586, NKS: 384-386, 409-415, 464-479 Kant now turns his attention to the antinomies of pure reason. He introduces the topic by a short review. As we recall, logos means both reason and logic (we get the word logical from it). Reason proceeds through logic. Now there are three types of syllogism: the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive. From these we get the three classes of transcendental ideas. the categorical: those dealing with the soul the hypothetical: those dealing with the world the disjunctive: those dealing with God (B433/384) He has dealt with the ideas coming from the categorical in the paralogisms of pure reason. We now come to the ideas coming from hypothetical syllogism: those dealing with the worldthe cosmological ideas. Before he treats them, Kant distinguish them both from those ideas regarding the soul and those regarding God. With the transcendental ideas regarding the soul (the subject of our thought), the illusion was all on the side of what Kant calls pneumatism (from pneuma meaning spirit in Greek). The illusion was that we could prove the immortality of the soul (taken as a substance) from the unity and simplicity of the I of the I think. We treated a mere form of thought (the soul or self as a unitary, simple 0-point) as if were a substance. (ibid.). In the transcendental ideas regarding the world, we have two contradictory theses an entirely natural antithetic, both of which are generated by pure reason. These are the antinomies. There is, in regarding this opposition, no danger that reason will convince us by leading us in one direction. The danger is rather that we fall into skeptical despair. This Kant calls the euthanasia of pure reason. (B434/385). Alternatively, we could become dogmatists, assuming an obstinate attitude [in adopting one of the two opposing positions and] refusing to grant a fair hearing to the arguments for the counterposition (ibid.). Now, the cosmological ideas are distinguished from the theological because they concern only appearancesnamely, the absolute totality in the synthesis of appearances. What we have here is an empirical synthesis that concerns the appearing realities of the world. (ibid.). The theological ideas, by contrast, concern the synthesis of all possible

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things in general whether these are worldly realities or not. He we think God as the ultimate condition of absolutely everything. Continuing his general remarks, Kant recalls what a transcendental idea is. All our ideas come from the understanding. It is what engages in the formation of concepts. Reason does not really generate any concept, Kant remarks. What it can do is free a concept of the understanding from the unavoidable limitations of a possible experience. (B435/386). Now with the cosmological ideas, reason does this by thinking the absolute totality of conditions. Doing so, it follows the hypothetical syllogism, if the conditioned is given, then the entire sum of conditions is also given. Since there are no further conditions outside of this sum, this means that the absolutely unconditioned (through which alone the conditioned has been possible) is also given (B346/386). Not all the concepts of the categories allow the use of this hypothetical syllogism. Only those in which we have a series of conditions subordinated to, not co-ordinated with, one another. (B436/386-7). Since these ideas are those which concern only appearances, their basis is found in the form of all appearances, time and space. With regard to time, we have to presuppose a regressive series going back to the beginning. Thus, past time, as a condition of the given moment, is necessarily thought as being given in its entirety. (B439/388). In other words, the present moment would not be if all the moments which lead up to it had not been. With regard to space, it itself does not form a series. the parts of space are co-ordinated with, not subordinated to, one another, one part is not the condition of the possibility of another. (ibid.). Yet, since we are dealing with the synthesis of appearances, and hence with an act that takes place in time, we still can think of condition and conditioned with regard to space as synthesized by us. Thus, each part of space we can say is conditioned by the parts making it up. It itself is the condition of the whole it is a part of, and so on. Thus, we have the possibility of two types of series. The regressive where we try to go to the least parts, dividing space up and the progressive where we try to go to whole of space. (B440/388). Thus, according to Kant, I can as legitimately enquire regarding the absolute totality of appearances in space as of the absolute totality of appearances in time. With regard to reality in space, that is, matter, I can see each part as conditioned by the parts making it up, and these parts similarly conditioned till either the reality of matter vanishes into nothing or into what is no longer matternamely, the simple. (B440/389). Finally, I can also see causality as a series of causes of a given effect and think the totality of such causes as unconditioned. (B441/442/389-390). Thus, we get four cosmological ideas: 155

One: Absolute completeness of the composition of the given whole of appearances (the world as a totality) Two: Absolute completeness of the division of a given whole in the field of appearances (the least part of the world) Three: Absolute completeness in the origin of an appearance (the first cause of appearances: is it freedom or necessity) Four: Absolute completeness as regards Dependence of Existence of the alterable in the field of existence (the absolutely necessary being underlying the contingency of appearances). The difficulty with all such ideas is that they exceed experience. Reason demands them independently of our connecting them with any adequate empirical concepts. (B444/391). Thus, in following these ideas, even thought they are concerned exclusively with the world of sense, not with noumena, they yet carry the synthesis to a degree which transcends all possible experience (B447/393). The difficulty here is not with the argumentation or with logic (e.g., with the law of excluded middle) but rather with the hidden premise of the arguments. We cannot assert that either the thesis or its denial is true if both presuppose a notion which is inherently contradictory. In Kants words, If two opposed judgments presuppose an inadmissible condition, then in spite of their contradiction (which is not actually a genuine one), both fall to the ground, inasmuch as the condition, under which alone each of these propositions is supposed to hold, itself falls (B531). This condition is discoverable by examining the arguments of the antinomies. The examination is actually a kind of deconstruction, a dismantling to find the hidden premise. This is the assumption that the appearing world is the world in itself. If you look at the arguments, you see that they assume both that they are dealing with the appearances and that these appearances pertain to the world in itself. Thus, ultimately what the antinomies are supposed to prove is that the appearing world is not the world in itself. The antinomies are a kind of reductio ad absurdum, where you assume something and then show that it cannot be true because it leads to a contradiction. The assumption here is that the appearing world is the actual world, the contradictions are the antinomies. The conclusion is that the assumption is false. The appearing world is not the world in itself. Let us turn now to the third antinomy. 156

The third antinomy concerns freedom. Thesis We can argue that there must be freedom. To account for the phenomena, a causality of freedom is also necessary. For assume the opposite. Then everything that happens presupposes a previous condition, which it follows with absolute certainty, in conformity with a rule. But this previous condition must itself be something that has happened [and] this again presupposes, in conformity with the law of nature, a previous condition and its causality, and this another anterior to the former, and so on (B472/409). In other words, the chain of causality will go on for ever. Thus, there will always be a relative and never a first beginning and consequently no completeness of the series on the side of the causes that arise the one from the other. (B474/410). But the law of nature is that everything that happens must have a sufficient cause for it to happen. This contradicts the notion that we only have a relative cause. In other words, we have to assume the completeness of the series of causes to give a sufficient reason for the thing having happened. But this means we assume a first cause, one that is not determined by a previous cause. This however to assume the spontaneity of the cause. This is transcendental freedom. (B475/410-11). Antithesis Against this, we can argue that there is no freedom. For assume that there is freedom that is a power of absolutely beginning a series of consequences. If this is true, then there will be no antecedent through which this act, in taking place, is determined in accordance with fixed laws. We are thus presupposing a state which has no causal connection with the preceding state of the cause. It in no way follows from it. Such freedom thus stands opposed to the law of causality. But this renders all unity of experience impossible. (B475/410). Thus, remember that causality is what fixes appearances in definite positions in time. Without it, experience cannot be unified. Thus, according to the argument, nature and transcendental freedom differ as do conformity to law and lawlessness. The acceptance of nature, of the universal sway of causality, holds out the promise of [a] thoroughgoing unity of experience in accordance with laws (B475/411). By contrast the causality of freedom is blind, and abrogates those rules through which alone a completely coherent experience is possible. (ibid.). Kant appends a number of remarks to these arguments. On the thesis, he notes that he is only dealing with the transcendental idea of freedom, which stands only for the absolute spontaneity of an action. Thus, the problem is

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"whether we must admit a power of spontaneously beginning a series of successive things or states (B476/412). He admits that the assertion that the regressive chain of causes cannot go on forever has demonstrated a first beginning, due to freedom, to the point required to make an origin of the world conceivable. But once one admits the power of spontaneously beginning a series, one can admit this within the world and thus attribute to agents a power of acting from freedom. (B478/413). On the antithesis, he asks why cannot the world have existed forever. What authority have you for inventing an absolutely first state of the world (B477/412). He admits that one cannot comprehend how anything can happen if the causal chain is unending, but such lack of comprehension attends to every link of the causal chain. This is Humes point. I cannot see why one thing causes the other. I just have this experience. In fact, were you not assured by experience that alternation actually occurs, you would never be able to come up with apriori the possibility of such a ceaseless sequence of being and notbeing. (B479/413). The main point, however, is that if you admit freedom, the criterion of empirical truth whereby experience is distinguished from dreaming, would almost entirely disappear. (B479/4134). We could not get out of our heads into the common world, the world there for everyone. In his resolution of this antinomy, which I covered in my lectures on the Prolegomena, Kant claims that both sides of the antinomy are correct, but they have different references. In terms of the appearances, causality reigns. In terms of the things-in-themselves, freedom can occur. Only if we assert that the appearances are things in themselves can we claim that both alternatives cannot be true, that is, contradict each other. To maintain this thesis is a tricky business for Kant. As he writes in a footnote, the understanding cannot admit among phenomena a condition which is itself empirically unconditioned. But if it is possible to conceive an intelligible condition--one which is not a member of the series of phenomena--for a conditioned phenomenon, without breaking the series of empirical conditions, such a[n unconditioned] condition may be admissible. What one wants then is a non-appearing cause of appearances. One wants it to act without in the least interrupting the series of empirical conditions. In other words, it must act without prejudice to the continuity of the empirical regress. (B559/463) How are we to satisfy this condition? Freedom, Kant writes, is the power of beginning a state spontaneously (B560/464). Now such freedom cannot appear. In Kants words, Freedom is a pure transcendental idea. It cannot be given or 158

determined in any experience, because it is a universal law of the very possibility of experience, that everything which happens must have a cause, that consequently the causality of a cause, being itself something that has happened, must also have a cause. Thus, we cannot have any intuitable object for this idea. This, however, does not disturb Kant. As he notes, the dynamical concepts of reason are not concerned with an object considered as magnitude, but only with its existence. (B563/466). Thus, we need not worry about the intuitability of the free cause, but only about its existence. Now if we assert that freedom pertains to the object in itself, while necessity pertains to the appearance of the object, we can say that in one and the same event, in different relations, both [freedom and necessity] can be found. (B564/466). Thus, if we distinguish things in themselves from appearances, such appearances, as Kant writes, must themselves have grounds which are not appearances. Granting this we can say with regard to a free or intelligible cause, the effects of such an intelligible cause appear, and accordingly can be determined through other appearances, but its causality [that is the causality of the free agent] is not so determined. In other words, This cause and its causality exist therefore outside of and apart from the series of phenomena; while its effects do exist and are discoverable in the series of empirical conditions. (B565/467). If we grant this, then Kants conclusion follows: Such an effect may therefore be considered to be free in relation to its intelligible cause, and necessary in relation to the phenomena from which it is a necessary consequence. (ibid.). Kants point here is actually quite simple. Causality is a interpretative category I impose on appearances to get out of my head into the objective world. Yet, in my head, that is prior to any imposition of this category, I have the ineradicable sense of my own freedom. Thus, in my head, I cannot apply the category of causality to myself. In particular, I cannot apply it to myself as an actor. I can only apply it to the effects of my action insofar as I take them to be out there in the objective world. So I take myself as free, yet I also take myself as starting causal chains in the world out there. The same holds for my regard of other people. Insofar as I take them as free, I take them as not appearing. Insofar as I take them as appearing, I take them as causally determined. I actually take them as both. I both look for motives and causes of their actions and I hold them responsible. I also cannot see (intuit) their agency. The most I can imagine is a little man in their heads moving them. But this is ridiculous. All I can intuit are the causal relations appearing persons have to the world. So I say that the other as an independent agent is hidden.

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The sense of such hiddenness is given to me internally when I regard my mental life. The memories and anticipations that form such mental life are spread out in front of me. I can regard them in any order I choose. In the world out there appearances in time are successive. They are in the Kantian (and Humean) sense causally related insofar as their succession is necessarily the same for everyone and hence necessarily ordered into prior and posterior. But I escape this in my inner life. I can take an anticipation (some experience I would like to have) and I can use the information from my memories (that is, past sequences of appearances that let to this experience) to guide my conduct. The point is that in my head I am not subject to time in its necessary sequence, but am its master. As such I am free. Outside of my head, in the objective world, time is the master. But this is only because I interpret it as such so as to posit an objective world there for everyone. With this we have Kants double perspective on the same event. From the standpoint of the actor who acts not as an appearance but as a reality (a thing in itself), the event is free. From the standpoint of the interpretation of appearances which makes their order objective, the event is causally determined. Can I objectively prove freedom? Not really, since I cannot intuit it. But this lack of intuition, since we are talking about the dynamical (as opposed to a mathematical idea), does not disprove freedom. What we have here is a skepticism that leaves open the possibility of freedom. Before we consider the details of this position, let me note a problem with it. According to Kant, Nature proceeds via the rule of causality according to which nothing occurs without having a cause determining it to be just as it shows itself to be. This holds for every feature of a being. Freedom is the violation of this rule, that is, the ability to spontaneously initiate an action.

For Kant, we resolve the two by admitting that the other does not objectively appear as a free agent. But this only means that his agency is noumenal, not phenomenal. What does appear are the consequences of his agency. They are seen to be causally determined. Now, if a free agent initiates a causal chain, then that chain cannot have any sufficient cause prior to its appearance. We should thus see a gap such that the beginning of events caused by this free agent could not have been predicted. The events would therefore have no necessary beginning in time. Such a beginning would only occur if they had necessarily been caused to occur at some time by an event just prior to this time. But we dont see such gaps according to Kant.

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The difficulty concerns the initiation of a causally determined sequence which is itself not causally determined. How can we, following the categories, make this intelligible to ourselves? The categories, particularly that of causality, make every event (every initiation of an event, every insertion of the event in time) determined by what went before. But the free event is just what is not determined. Thus, in terms of appearance, we have to deny such events. They cannot appear. But it seems that they must. If they cannot appear, why should we posit freedom? Kant simply goes back to the phenomenal noumenal split. We have to assume that beneath the phenomena, there are noumenanon-appearing things in themselves. The free agent is one of these. With this, a second question arises: Given that the phenomena-noumena split occurs with regard to everything, why shouldnt we assume that everything non-appearing is a free agent? Here Kant turns to our inner sense of ourselves, to the fact that we employ reason in deciding on our free actions. Rational relations are not real relations. In fact, they dont involve time. Thus, all As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs expresses a timeless, non-causal relation. We assume that in following reason, we are not temporally determined and hence are free. We also assume that others are free to the point that they follow reason. Such an assumption, however, is never verifiable in appearance. Let me now turn to the details of Kants solution. First a terminological note. Kant writes: Whatever in an object of the senses is not itself appearance, I entitle intelligible (B566/467). Intelligible does not mean that the reference is to something intelligent. Rather, the reference here is to the split between Denken and Erkennen. I can think (denke) the intelligible notion of a thing in itself, even though I cannot know (erkenne) it. Now, the split between the appearance and the thing in itself means that I can regard the causality of a thing from two different points of view: Regarded as the causality of a thing in itself, it is intelligible in its action; regarded as the causality of an appearance in the world of sense, it is sensible in its effects. We should accordingly, have to form both an empirical and an intellectual conception of the causality of such a faculty or power--both, however, having reference to the same effect. (ibid.). Given this, we can say: every sensuous object possesses an empirical character, which guaranteed that its actions, as phenomena, stand in complete and harmonious connection, conformably to unvarying natural laws, with all other phenomena, and can be deduced from these

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We can also say: This sensuous object must [also] possess an intelligible character, which guarantees it to be the cause of those actions, as phenomena, although it is not itself a phenomenon nor subordinate to the conditions of the world of sense. The former, Kant adds, may be termed the character of the thing as a phenomenon, the latter the character of the thing as a thing in itself. (B567/468). Since the latter is a thing in itself, neither space nor time, nor the categories that determine the connections of phenomena in space and time, apply to it. It is timeless. In Kants words: this active subject would, in its character of intelligible subject, be subordinate to no conditions of time, for time is only a condition of phenomena, and not of things in themselves. No action would begin or cease to be in this subject; it would consequently be free from the law of all determination of time--the law of change, namely, that everything which happens must have a cause in the phenomena of a preceding state. (B657-8/468). We cannot know this intelligible character, we are only compelled to think it. As Kant remarks, This intelligible character can never be immediately known. It would have to be thought, just as we are constrained to think a transcendental object as underlying appearances, though we know nothing of what it is in itself. (B568/468). Since we are compelled to think of it apart from the categories, we have to say that in as much as it is a noumenon, nothing happens in it. Since it is outside of time, there can be no change demanding the dynamical determination of time. Thus, no action begins in this active being itself even though it begins its effects. (B569/469). As Kant observes, the question here is whether it is possible to consider an effect as at the same time an effect of nature and an effect of freedom--or, whether these two modes of causality are contradictory and incompatible?" (B571/470). An agent that acts out of freedom acts by virtue of thought and understanding. If the two modes of causality are compatible, then, we have to assume both that freedom produces effects that appear and that the appearance of such effects are completely explainable by natural causes. In Kants words, we have to assume that although the effects of this thought and action of the pure understanding are discoverable in phenomena, these phenomena must nevertheless be capable of a full and complete explanation, upon purely physical grounds and in accordance with natural laws. (B574/472). This is a tall order. Can we consider an effect to be causally explainable in terms of previous phenomena and to considered as the result of some free act? Further, how can we distinguish human action from the action of other things in themselves? If we simply say that all noumena act freely (since the conditions of causality do not apply to them), have we said anything relevant about human freedom? Kants only answer here is that we have experience of action being motivated by reason 162

and understanding only in ourselves. So we attribute this to others who look and act like ourselves. Thus, Kant asserts that as an appearance, mans actions are determined. But he grasps himself not just as an appearance, but through pure apperception; and this in actions and internal determinations, which he cannot regard as sensuous impressions. He is thus to himself, on the one hand, a phenomenon, but on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties, a purely intelligible object--intelligible, because its action cannot be ascribed to sensuous receptivity. These faculties are understanding and reason. (B575/472). Kants claim is, thus, that we do have some grasp of ourselves not as we appear but as we are in ourselves. Inherently, we possess understanding and reason. Possessing such faculties, we are an intelligible object whose action cannot be ascribed to sensuous receptivity. Reason, he remarks, employs ideas alone in the consideration of its objects, and by means of these determines the understanding. (ibid.). That such reason has causality is obvious from the fact that it issues imperatives or commands for our practical activities. From it, comes the conception of the ought. This ought is grounded on concepts not on appearances: This ought expresses a possible action, the ground of which cannot be anything but a mere concept; while the ground of a merely natural action is, on the contrary, always a phenomenon. (B576/473). As he also puts this: Reason will not follow the order of things presented by experience, but, with perfect spontaneity, rearranges them according to ideas, with which it compels empirical conditions to agree. It declares, in the name of these ideas, certain actions to be necessary which nevertheless have not taken place and which perhaps never will take place; and yet presupposes that it possesses the faculty of causality in relation to these actions. (ibid.). What Kant is here pointing to is our ability to reason out the consequences of the possible actions that present themselves to us. In doing so, we take a concept like that of causality and apply it to some proposed action to see what will happen if we do it. We then compare the results of doing this for several possible courses of action. Finally, we choose the best action. In doing so, we do not follow the order of things presented by experience. We rearrange this order, according to ideas. Thus, suppose I want to obtain some goal. The actions of realizing this goal have not taken place. Yet I reason out the means to obtain it. I then declare certain actions to be necessary which nevertheless have not taken place. I order my conduct accordingly to make them take place. The point here is that the determinant of my action is not temporal. It is rather the relations of the ideas I have which match means to ends.

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What about my goal? Can I think of myself as caused by this goal? If we think that causality precedes from the past to the present to the future, the goal cannot be a natural cause. It reality lies in the future. It is something I can realize, if I choose to. But I can also choose to not realize it. If I do, its causality is not temporal (in the sense of being temporally limited to a particular time, since it continually motivates the different actions I perform in time. For Kant, the case is even stronger in moral action. Here, in following the categorical imperative, I abstract from all external determinations of my will except the moral law. I ask, what would happen if everyone did some act. Doing so, I abstract from my personal situation and goals. Following the moral law, as Kant writes, we abstract from the personal differences between rational beings, and also from all the content of their private ends (Groundwork, p. 101; IV, 433). We consider only what we ought to do on the basis of what reason indicates. In all such cases, the cause of our action is simply an intuited relation of our ideas. This relation in itself is timeless. It does not begin or end. Only our actions do. Thus Kant can assert: Pure reason, as a purely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the conditions of time. The causality of reason in its intelligible character does not, in producing an effect, arise or begin to be at a certain time. (B579/475). The reason for this is that the condition which lies in reason is not sensible, and therefore does not itself begin to be. (B580/475). It is a timeless relation of ideas. We may access it at a certain time. But, as a static relation of ground and consequence, it is not determined as something temporal. Thus, here the condition is outside the series of appearances and therefore is not subjection to any sensible condition, and to no time-determination through an antecedent cause. (B580/476). The conclusion then is that reason acts freely. Even though in reason itself nothing begins, it has the power of originating a series of events , that is, a beginning in the series of appearances. (B582/476). Kant turns to an example to illustrate his solution. Suppose someone tells a malicious lie. As Kant notes, We at first proceed to examine the empirical character of the offence, and for this purpose we endeavour to penetrate to the sources of that character, such as a defective education, bad company, a shameless and wicked disposition, frivolity, and want of reflection--not forgetting also the occasioning causes which prevailed at the moment of the transgression. In doing this, our procedure is exactly the same as that pursued in the investigation of the series of causes which determine a given physical effect. (B582/477).

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Yet even though we believe the action is determined, we still blame the person. We dont blame him on account of his unhappy disposition, nor on account of the circumstances that have influenced him. We do so because we presuppose that all these considerations may be set aside as having never existed. Instead, we blame the offender as a rational agent. We regard this faculty [of reason] as a cause, which could have and ought to have otherwise determined the behaviour of the culprit, independently of all empirical conditions. (B583/477). In fact, the timeless nature of this faculty gives us the right to hold this person responsible years latter. He is the same qua rational agent. As Kant puts this, Reason is present and the same in all human actions and at all times; but it does not itself exist in time. It remains the same, even though its effects, its appearances in time do alter. B584/478) Kant concludes that it is not been our intention to establish the reality of freedom. In fact, he has not even aimed at demonstrating the possibility of freedom. All he has shown is that causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with nature. And this holds because of the phenomenal noumenal distinction. (B586/479). He cannot do any more since he has no idea of how the noumenal relates to the phenomenal. In fact, we cannot even say that it causes it, since causality is a category that applies only to appearance not to the relation between what appears and what does not. Thus, while I know that I have a rational will, how this effects the movement of my body in the realm of appearance is unknown to me.

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Thus, Descartess doubt extends to the thought that I have no senses; ... that body, shape, extension, motion and location are merely inventions of my mind (Meditations, II., p. 23). He even doubts himself as embodied, i.e., as having a face, hands, arms, and all this mechanism composed of bone and flesh and members (Meditations, II, p. 25).