Background Naidus coming to power in AP leading a coup against NT Rama Rao in August 1995 has been projected as a vindication

of vibrant democratic process in the State. But it must be said that the factor that was decisive in Naidus take over as against any other leader, when there were leaders, articulate and more experienced in the matters of both the party and government, must be seen as something demonstrative of the non-democratic impulse in the Indian party system in general and the TDP in particular. What weighed heavily in favour of Naidu as against others in the TDP obviously was the fact that he was the son-in-law of NTR. This leverage has been effectively used by Naidu to consolidate himself in the party and government. At one level, unlike NTR, Naidu has been known as an organization man. Earlier, he was general secretary of the party and as one he played a key role in the 1984 crisis, when NTR was toppled by his cabinet colleague, N. Bhaskar Rao. If NTRs threat to dissolve the assembly was decisive then the image of Naidu as an efficient `manager was an important consideration in the TDP MLAs shifting their loyalty to Naidu in 1995. There is no marked difference between the styles of these two leaders except that NTR relied more on his personal charisma and Naidu counts on his control over the party and government, basically to compensate for the lack of charisma. But what characterizes the functioning of the TDP party and government under Naidu is his highly personalized style of running them. It would not be far from true to state that Naidus leadership is more personalized and centralized than that of NTR. It would be wrong to believe that Naidus style of functioning has been generally found acceptable to the rank and file of the party. The discontent and uneasiness in the party and government has so far manifested itself as protests by certain prominent individuals and thus has been tackled at the individual level by either offering and promising certain sop or marginalizing and eventually forcing them to leave the party. What is important to note is that the discontent within the TDP has been carefully sought to be pre-empted through continuous monitoring and check. If the effective control of the supremo over the rank and file of the party is one dimension of the present scenario then that over the party MLAs and cabinet colleagues is another. The nature and extent of concentration of decision making power should be clear from the fact that it is the chief minister himself who most often not only takes but also announces key decisions and policies of the government irrespective of the ministry (when as a matter of fact it should be the concerned minister who should do that). Even in the Assembly, the ministers are sidelined. The highlight enjoyed by the persona of Naidu is not just symbolic but points to the substantial concentration of power in him. Both the members of the ruling party as well as opposition view what is happening in the name of e-governance with much more apprehension. This is seen to contribute to the erosion of whatever scope and possibilities were available for the initiative of ministers.

It is so because every decision and action of the concerned persons can easily be monitored thanks to information technology. The mechanism of video conference and scrutiny of data (fed into the computer system by various government agencies) on a daily basis introduced with fanfare and sought to be sustained much to the displeasure of the officials and ministers has only further contributed to the centralization process: the chief minister while conducting the video conference picks up an official or a minister asks him to explain the failure to meet targets or a discrepancy between what is claimed and what is seen on the computer screen. During the video conferences, it is the CM who dominates the show. For example, in the matters related to irrigation, it is the irrigation minister, secretary of the irrigation ministry and the chief engineer who should review work progress with the concerned line staff. In the present regime it is the CM who does all this with those concerned directly with the ministry remaining mute spectators. This entire happening in full public view helps only to boost the personal image of Naidu as somebody who is in full control of the administration and knows every aspect of it (as this whole show goes on in the presence of the print and electronic media which flash the same in their news bulletin). A recent report presents the essence of the style of functioning of Naidu regime: Mr Naidu said that he would use information technology in all the reforms and with regard to water he would use his personal computer every day to know the flow and consumption under each canal. He would accord incentives if a WUA ensured optimum utilization and disincentives if otherwise. [The Hindu, June 7, 2001]. In this, the concerned minister and the officials, needless to say, have very little role. Thus one cannot but agree with the observation of a senior administrator that planning, execution and evaluation of macro as well as micro aspects, the three important aspects of administration are totally controlled by the CM. Further it is observed that information technology has been used for greater control. This process of constant monitoring and supervision, it would be no exaggeration to say, demoralizes and renders one reluctant to take initiative, of course the risk accompanying it, and confines one to aim at meeting the targets. Against this backdrop the possibility of any democratic decision-making seems even more difficult

Theme I.

Corruption:

There is a generally shared view expressed by journalists, politicians, activists and academics that corruption has undergone a major change in terms of form, quantum and degree in the present regime. The reform process, inflow of foreign funds are said to provide an almost one-time opportunity for large scale corruption. The power sector agreements, infrastructure projects, and privatisation of public sector enterprises are seen as major sources of corruption. The lack of transparency and information, and the hurry with which some of these agreements are rushed through strengthen the view that corruption at high places has not only reached new heights but also it is involved in with impunity and without fear.

The present regime is also credited with evolving a system or a network for the creating, accessing and distributing the spoils with the officials, MLAs, Ministers and contractors as the core constituency meant to consolidate and preserve the preeminent position of the CM. Corruption is seen as chief instrument adopted by Naidu to consolidate his political and personal position. Electoral expenditure and its ever-increasing significance in India is another principal cause of corruption. The 1999 assembly election in AP represents a phenomenal rise in the election expenditures. In the high stake electoral drama, the TDP and the Congress (I) competed with each other in spending huge sums with total disregard to the guidelines of the election commission. Of course, the TDP emerged as a superior player in this game. As one observer pointed out that the 1999 elections have changed the ground rules of electoral competition so much that henceforth it would impossible for not only for individuals but even for small parties to contest. The following observations may be taken up for further consideration: 1. There is no respect for government suspension orders. None of the threats of Naidu to take action against errant officials have been followed up. 2. The IAS and IPS officers identified as corrupt by the Anti-corruption Bureau are not prosecuted despite the application for permissions from the ACB to do so. 3. Cases, where prima facie evidence of corruption at highest levels was available, have not been pursued seriously and there is no single conviction so far in the State in this regard. 4. Real estate interests of IPS officers, through a network of ex-Naxalites were exposed but were not acted upon. In fact, there was news report that one accused police officer was promoted. 5. Administrative enquiries on corruption and other aspects have not made any headway due to internal politics within the executive. 6. A number of officers were upgraded to IAS without proper procedures. 7. Persons belonging to a particular caste are heading (or are in a decision-making position) most of the Ministries, departments, lobbying associations and pressure groups. 8. Government properties, especially lands in urban areas, are being sold away (grossly under-valued) to private parties.

II. Decentralization

Background Decentralization can be seen in terms of five aspects: a) b) c) d) e) Democratic decision-making Intra-administrative devolution of powers and responsibilities Delegation of powers Revenue generation and expenditure capacity Project management in terms of efficiency and efficacy

There is a need for decentralization for the following reasons: a) b) c) d) e) To Achieve Equity To Balance out Regional disparities To Reduce and remove corruption To Ensure local development To Enable resource efficiency Findings 1. This is perhaps the most centralized decision-making system in the entire country. The Chief Minister himself takes all the decisions. Mention of lack of powers to ministers by the Opposition parties in the State Assembly was not even challenged by the ruling party. Even the Home Minister, who is said to be second in the cabinet, does not exercise any powers worth mentioning: even simple transfer orders in the department are said to require the approval of the CM. 2. Since the political scenario and administrative set-up is totally centralized by the Chief Minister, it becomes important to assess the personality of the Chief Minister vis--vis governance reforms. 3. There is no semblance of Administrative decentralization despite claims on the contrary. 4. State government is uninhibitedly active and partisan to (and is working openly on behalf of) business and industrial class. 5. Widespread corruption is said to be alienating poor people from the government services. 6. Panchayat raj institutions their funds, and powers have been usurped. Curiously enough, in Nellore and Rayalaseema districts the rural roads were transferred from Panchayat raj to Road and Buildings department - for what purpose and gain is not understood at all.

7. Government was instrumental in postponing elections to PRIs despite the Constitutional obligation to hold them; this, indicates the regimes reluctance to decentralize. 8. Self-help movement promoted by this government through World Bank projects is undermining the strength and constitutional position of PRIs. Unlike Panchayats, electoral constituencies of different committees under the self-help movement are narrow and are captive of functionaries of the ruling party and the rural elite. Self-help organizations are largely in the control of elite of the villages. Thus excluding the weaker sections completely from participating in decisions and programmes concerning their resources, poverty and development. 9. There is no formal arrangement and interaction between Panchayats and self-help movement. If there are any informal interactions, they can only be attributed to the local factors. There is also no clarity with regard to the role and position of JFM and watershed committees. In these programmes, lack of and unequal participation of weaker and vulnerable communities in resource management and conservation is often reported. 10. Specifically, JFM committees (Van samrakshana samithies) are under the thumb rule of the Forest Department. This department is reluctant to secede this control over forest resources to the Panchayats. Thus, VSSs become a midway arrangement for the governance for the government, World Bank and NGOs alike. Formation of VSSs is accepted only to the extent they can be controlled. Its impact on the livelihood and rights of the poor people dependent on the forest resources, especially the silent majority of tribal communities, is yet to be assessed. 11. Government takes a charity approach in Janmabhoomi programmes disbursing pensions, pattas and other marginal benefits. Janmabhoomi has become a platform for deliverables. In general, Janmabhoomi has failed in addressing the real problems of the poor people. It has avoided the livelihood issues of the poor. 12. Chief Minister himself admitted that there are marginal results from 15 rounds of Janmabhoomi. 13. Fresh demand for Telangana is likely to increase centralization and concentration of party and government powers in the Chief Minister. 14. Departments have lost the purpose and objective for which they were established, especially in the case of departments like police and revenue. Police department is largely confined to security, and order functions, while the revenue department is merrily selling lands under its jurisdiction.

III. Judiciary 1. There is a huge backlog of cases with the High court and other courts in AP. 2. Judicial system is undermanned and faces the problem of inadequate resources. Nothing much has happened here with regard to the justice reforms that could be said to be State specific, except the introduction of video conference facility for the extension of the judicial custody of under trial prisoners (which is found necessary because of the shortage of escort police) and Maitri sangams (friendship committee) attached to individual police stations. All other measures for alternative dispute resolution in the civil matters (like land acquisition, accident cases, matrimonial matters), amicus curie in criminal matters, etc. are part of the national level reforms. The question of the access of the poor to justice in an extremely unequal society like India, where the poor and vulnerable sections are quite heterogeneous and differentiated, any suggestions regarding this cannot be uniform. We need to pay specific attention for instance to the Scheduled Caste question. AP in the last couple of decades (especially after the TDP's came to power in 1983) has seen an escalation in the upper caste attacks on (also rioting against) the dalits, esp., in the advanced coastal Andhra districts of Guntur, Prakasham, Krishna and the Godavaris. Regarding the Lok Ayuktha: It is true that the offices of CM (plus Governor and judges of High Court) are excluded from the jurisdiction of the lok Ayuktha. Presently there is no full-fledged LA; it is now headed by the upa-Lok Ayuktha. IV. Legislature Background To appreciate the role of the legislature, its capability to exercise autonomy vis--vis the executive it is necessary to examine the composition of the State legislature following the 1999 elections. Out of 293 seats for which elections were conducted the TDP won as many as 179 seats and the Congress only 91. The BJP, which is the electoral ally of the TDP in the State, has 12 members in the house. The BJP is under pressure from the national party, because of the NDA compulsions (TDPs support to the BJP is crucial to its survival at the centre). The TDPs numerical strength in the State legislature and the total control exercised by Naidu over the elected representatives makes the TDP government one of the most centralized State regimes in the country. Committee System: It is an important mechanism of control of the legislature over the executive. The members of a committee shall be appointed or elected by the House on a motion made, or nominated by the Speaker, as the case may be.

The important committees are: Business Advisory committee, Select Committee on Bills, Committee on Petitions, Committee on Public Accounts, Committee on Estimates, Committee on Public Undertakings, Committee of privileges, Committee on Subordinate Legislation, Committee on Amenities, Committee on Government Assurances, Rules Committee, Committee on Welfare of Scheduled Castes, Committee on Welfare of Scheduled Tribes, Committee on Welfare of Backward Classes, Committee on General Purposes, Committee on Library

It is in fact shocking to note the members of the Opposition parties, especially the Congress (I), saying that these committees, one effective control mechanism in their hands, have not been of late made proper use of. A senior Congressman observed that this neglect has been on account of inadequacy on the part of the Congress legislative leadership and ignorance and ineptitude on the part of the majority of the MLAs. Invariably, it is observed, the membership in these has been used either for personal aggrandizement or for free `trips to tourist spots in other States. Findings 1. Reform agenda of this government has not been discussed in the legislative assembly. The legislature has been bypassed through various means some of them are mentioned below. 2. Members have also not been keen on utilizing the opportunities provided by the procedures and the committee system in the Assembly. There has been a general decline of the members interest in the Assembly procedures and practices. This seems to be due to the lack of capacity (education, poor reading aptitude, analytical capacity) and/ or changing perceptions of individual and constituency needs. 3. Partisan attitude of the Speaker(s) to ensure party interests has undermined the supremacy of the legislature. This has been said so in the case of both Yanamala Ramakrishnudu and Pratibha Bharathi.

4. Governments approach towards providing information, etc. In one instance, when the opposition demanded the tabling of the power purchase agreements in the assembly, government took a categorical stand that it affects the business interests and then when it was forced to table just one hour was given to the members to scrutinize 22 PPAs, without providing individual copies. 5. The sheer strength of the ruling party and its monolithic approach is sought to be unduly relied upon while dealing with issues rose by the opposition. 6. Oppositions lack of access to information regarding sectoral issues is a major factor restricting informed discussion on the issues. 7. Contrary to the public perception that MLAs do not have a say, our assessment has revealed that this government ensures total control of MLAs over the official activities in their respective constituencies. They are also given lot of leeway in getting contracts to their yes men. Additionally, Janmabhoomi and Naidus other pet programmes, which are beyond the regular audit procedures, provide enormous scope for gratification of the MLAs. 8. Our assessment revealed that even Congress MLAs have a share in this. This is explained by the fact that Congress MLAs tend to raise trivial aspects of serious issues, and waste the time of the Assembly without any seeming progress in matters of public concern. V. Main Opposition Parties 1. Here it has to be remembered that ideologically or practically none of the political parties have any categorical stand against reforms. In fact, it was the Congress, which initiated the reform process. As a result, they are not inclined to go into the finer details of the reform programme and to assess the results and performance of the reforms and governance of Naidus government. 2. Congress and BJP have already acceded to the reform programmes in general, but the government through its partisan attitude is preventing them from playing any positive role. 3. BJP role in the State is more governed by its vulnerable position at the Centre, and the discreet pressure tactics of the Chandra babu Naidu (acceptable to Vajpayee in comparison to public rantings of people like Mamata Banerjee and previously Jayalalitha). However, the BJP may get aggressive once its vulnerability is gone, which is very unlikely in the present conditions even if a tamed Trinamool Congress comes back into the NDA government. 4. In any case, BJP-led Central government is also equally committed to reforms. There is less likelihood of any threat or pressure from State BJP unit.

5. All mainstream parties tend to fail in fulfilling their role as responsible opposition partly because they are captives of interest groups and caucuses. There is no substantial internal democracy in these parties of course degree of variance notwithstanding. 6. The respective units of national parties are likely to play a role, conducive to the progress of reforms initiated by this government. However, it is highly likely that this role would be defined by the impact of the reforms on the people and their livelihood patterns. If there is any adverse impact, the role is likely to be negative. As we go down the structure of each of these parties, functionaries down the level would be more attuned to the peoples perceptions rather than to the policies and ideologies of the parties. 7. It is however, somewhat likely that this situation might change with the entry of new political entity Telangana Rasthra Samithi. This may upset the existing relationship between the main opposition parties and the government. However, there is every likelihood of parties ignoring the governance reforms esp., those which are unrelated to changes in the pattern of employment within the government. 8. Given this scenario, where management from above rather than genuine involvement and participation of people is involved, there is very less likely situation of the main opposition parties assuming any significant role (constructive or otherwise) in the governance reforms. VI. Civil Society and private sector 1. Civil society, comprising of NGOs, associations, trade unions, media, and conscientious citizens, is very active. 2. However, government has been discouraging their participation in the policy and decision-making processes. 3. Government is extremely conscious of criticism and does not encourage any independent viewpoint to influence its management and decision-making processes. 4. Government usually manages civil society participation through the involvement of external representation and not the local civil society. 5. Industrial growth rate is very low, not because of environmental regulations, but because of government policies, corruption and lack of necessary resources. General Comments

1. Governance reforms generally tend to keep out departments like police and revenue, as can be seen in the report of the Task Force on good Governance. 2. Some aspects of the analysis and findings above indicate and/or emphasize the need for reforms. However, looking from the political commitment of the present regime, reforms are less likely to proceed any further, precisely due to the situation explained above. 3. Self-help movement is helping the government to upstage criticism over its role in development, create confusion in the departments, retain control; over resources, and channelise peoples participation, circumvent the established procedures of governance and create a new administrative hierarchy either parallel to the existing one or completely replacing it. 4. There is no transitional approach (worth noting) in governance reforms. 5. Telangana has the potential to upset Naidu, with TDP MLAs worried over their electoral prospects. The benchmark for such prospects is the upcoming Panchayat elections. Anti-establishment and anti-TDP votes are likely to be garnered by the TRS championing the separate Telangana cause. 6. Numerous government projects address peripheral issues and have not been able to reduce poverty. 7. After the imposition of the prohibition by the previous TDP government, to recover losses government then had imposed taxes to the tune of Rs.4,600 crores. These taxes have not been withdrawn after the lifting of prohibition on liquor. 8. Three important sectors in the State, which employ almost tow thirds of the work force, agriculture, handloom and small-scale industries, have been in a state of crisis. This situation leading to unemployment may further cause increase in social unrest and crime. 9. Crime -violent and economic - has been increasing rapidly with the police department unable to cope up with it, saddled as it is political functionalism. 10. The biggest constraint can be the lack of information, circumventing legislative procedures, lack of efforts to build a legislative consensus over governance reforms through information, education and understanding, and resorting to short term political gains (explained in detail in other sections of the report). 11. Though the reform programme may appear to be properly managed, unless the above problems are addressed adequately it may boomerang on the government, leading to delay in the reform process, perhaps ultimately derailing the reform process itself.

Civil society and Private sector

The wide array of reforms underway in AP and India has different implications for civil society. There is presently a large gap in the discourse of the civil society and the thrust for AP State reform programmes. These reforms from the NGO point of view aim at reduction in state intervention, promotion of privatization and greater involvement of multinational corporations in the domestic market. Whereas the government is looking at reforms as tending to increase the state capacity towards management and marketoritentation, and promotion of political equity and participation. Whereas civil society celebrates the power of social groups and organizations to contribute to the institutional changes necessary for democracy and development, the crux of the government reforms are aimed at privatisation and management, giving prominence to market forces, managerial efficiency and accountable government. Chandra babu Naidu tried to fill this gap by inventing programmes such a Janmabhoomi and other programmes like Neeru-Meeru. However, several evaluations of these programmes point to the fact that they at best reflect addendum programmes, the objectives of which are suspect in the eyes of both the people and the civil society alike. In this context, it has to be agreed that institutional change and democratization require enlightened and sustained pressures from organised groups of civil society.
Civil society has no widely agreed definition but DfID and World Bank including State government would think of largely three sections: NGOs, CBOs, professional associations (farmers, trade unions, industries, etc..), struggle organizations, and activist groups. However, there can be debate and controversy on what to include, how to define and how to categorise different institutions, associations and groups. Whatever category or definition is taken, civil society in AP was largely concerned and/or associated with empowerment, democratization and participation. This civil society includes a myriad of non-state organizations of varying membership and interests.

A reform programme, which pursues socially accountable public policies and upholds the rule of law, is likely to benefit from the growth of civil society institutions and actors. Losers, and the representative civil society, is bound to be skeptical of the reform programmes, in a context of weak alternative livelihoods in the private sector, absence of adequate social protection or safety nets, the long period of gestation of institutional reforms and poor governmental track records in managing reforms. In the private sector, large sections of population dependent on agriculture and handloom sectors are affected by the reform process which discourage state welfare programmes, and favourable policy prescriptions. This has alienated the civil society which represents the interests of these sections of population. Privatisation of public undertakings, and reduction in government staff threaten trade unions not just in terms of employment, but also reduction in their membership and funds. Though there are contuing protests, they are tapering off for a variety of reasons. This is despite the evidence of gorwing poverty and unemployment. Decimation of organised labour force need not be construed as acceptance and participation. It might weaken the efforts to evolve a civil society committed to democracy, leading to the growth of anti-state organisations. Growth of civil society would mean dispersal of authority, emergence of multiple centers of social power, and limits to the authority and power of the state, with no single organization dominating the situation. Going by the ideological climate of the times, present thrust of the reform programme appears to be orientated towards empowerment of markets and business-oriented groups. Such a limited approach is has the potential to alienate other sections of civil society, and thus harm or slow down the reform process itself. This would increase the possibilities of a situation of contestation. In general, there is a lack of correspondence or convergence between the agenda of the civil society and the content of the State reforms. Civil society is championing the cause of people asking for institutional changes for democracy and development, while the reform programme limits itself to privatization of essential services. Underlying the state reform discourse is the need for the government and civil society groups to view the reforms as a process of that may require new forms of mutual engagement, and to understand the limitations of extra-legal forms of competition. Further, there is a need for the reform process to bring in the understanding that there is no trade-off between the growth of civil society organizations and the powers of the state. This might be difficult with the Chief Minister adopting a strongly centralized approach to government which means the process of reform is highly dependent on him (DFID strategy paper on AP). NGOs are increasingly replaced by the government in known rural development programmes like watershed development, thrift and credit, afforestation and welfare activities. This is being done in the name of corruption and lack of results of such partnership. However, government cannot ignore the fact that corruption is within the governance system and is not within the voluntary sector. Voluntary sector is accountable to the people. For this reason, governance reforms can find a surprising ally in

voluntary sector wherein the corruption in government is reduced, enabling a development-oriented partnership with the government. Reforms that are aimed at power sharing require new types of political competition or dialogue between activists groups, leading political parties and struggle movements, if tensions in the political contexts are to be contained. Reforms of decentralization require a dispersal of both political and civic power and cooperative relations between various levels of government and among civic organizations in order to nurture a universal civic order at both central and local levels. To be effective, there is a need for to build the institutional capacity and competence in policy advocacy of the civil society, especially that of the voluntary sector. To obviate the criticism of the control of reforms being in the sectional interests, reform programme has to encourage the participation of voluntary sector in service provisioning. Presently, through competitive bidding government is contracting-out its activities to private sector. In few cases, private companies including multinationals are being hired to manage urban solid waste disposal. There are reports over privatization of water distribution, both in rural and urban areas, similar to what is being done in energy sector. Civil society participation, especially that of voluntary sector, can be improved by enabling subcontracting of government services to include NGOs to manage services that were previously provided by the government in areas such as health, education, rural road construction, sanitation, etc. Such an inclusive approach can lead to the growth of service-oriented NGOs. Reforms have to be cautious about the development of new policy-making actors, with specialist knowledge, usurping the role of the civil society. Central aspects of public policy are increasingly being screened off from the pressures of civil society and elected representatives through the involvement of global consultancies, networks of outisde individuals and institutions. Bureaucrats are deciding the quality and range of services to be provided, unlike the consumers, though it is said that reforms are inherently demandled and pro-people. Consumer organizations are very weak in Andhra Pradesh. If the aim of reforms is bring public services closer to the people, consumers and small-scale organizations have to be empowered small-scale organizations have the advantage of flexible work practices and low overhead costs.

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