Phoenicians

Chapter 15

If you have reached this far in this “short synopsis” of Phoenician/Lebanon you
more than likely have arrived at the same conclusion that I have, they have had
very little to do with their overall destiny. They have been pulled – twisted – turned,
and yet through the years they haven’t broken, a few minor tears or rips along the
way, but they have maintained. But they have suffered and felt the ambitions of
others, and I guess this is what history is, after all who wants to read about a man
or his family who wakes every morning, feeds the children, goes to work, comes
home and the next day, and the next day does it all over again. They don’t scale
any high mountains, sit on the consuls of the high and mighty nor do they sit idling
at home when the armies are assembled and roll against each other when the high
and mighty worry about their supposed existence or what direction “they” think the
man in the street should go. Another thing that strikes me is the impact that
religion has really played on this region of the world, and the impact it still has
today --- its amazing to the point of being ridiculous and if you really think about it –
scary. Does it continue today in this part of the world?”
“Sunnis and Shiites in many professions now interact almost exclusively with
colleagues of the same sect. Sunnis say they are afraid to visit hospitals because
Shiites loyal to the cleric Moktada al-Sadr run the Health Ministry, while Shiite
laborers who used to climb into the back of pickup trucks for work across the Tigris
River in Sunni western Baghdad now take jobs only near home.” (March 4th, 2007)
You tell me!

Vasa Pasha, the new governor “appeared” irrelevant to “Patrimonio” the

French consul – who sitting there in all his glory reflected on his successful
participation against Rustem. As “Spagnolo” wrote, “Patrimonio was confident on
an upsurge of French influence in the Mountain. From now on (he predicted) ‘no
governor will be able to administer Lebanon without us.’” Under orders (do this as
quick as possible) from the Quai d’Orsay, he at first befriended Vasa, in turn Vasa
was touched, but not impressed and by all means did not feel obligated to fulfill
Patrimonio’s request to replace any officials that had been appointed by Rustem.
Being new to the position, Vasa contacted Ahmed Hamdi Pasha for his advice.
Ahmed briefed him on the politics of the Mountain:
1. Rivalry between the leading Druze families
2. Intra-Maronite conflicts between the clergy and notable land-owners
3. Interdenominational between Druze and the Maronites
4. Other Christian sects against each other
5. Position of external foreign entities in the mix of all the preceding
6. Strongly warned him of the French Consulate an the Maronite Clergy
Ahmed believed that the Maronite clergy, “never ceased contriving and
executing whatever action was necessary to humble and oppress other
denominations in order to bring the Mount Lebanon under their unrestrained
control.” With strong French assistance!
Concern was admitted by the ruling powers that Vasa (due to his inexperience in
his new position) had adopted a friendly disposition towards the French Consul,
much more than was necessary. They pointed out his inexperience and the
influence of “some mischievous Maronites who were displeased by his
predecessor’s polices,” had misled Vasa.
At this point I would like to take a step back and provide a brief description of
the “council” and how it was established under the 1864 Reglement.
It was to consist of 12-members, four Maronites, three Druze, two Greek
Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Shiite (mutawali), and one Sunni. The regional
areas were also specified where Batroun and Kasrawan would each elect one
councilor, and they both would be Maronite. The three councilors from Jezzine were
to be Maronite, Druze and Sunni, and the four from Matn, Maronite, Druze, Shiite
and Greek Orthodox. The councilor from the Shouf to be Druze, and from Kuna,
Greek Orthodox. The only Greek Catholic member was to be elected by the citizens
of Zahla, which was depicted as a constituency in itself. This electoral process
being based on “rough” estimated of the distribution of the population and land
ownership had to be modified after the census of 1868, whereas the Sunni
representative was elected from the Shouf and the Shiite councilor from Kasrawan.
It appears that the “Maronites” were not represented properly on the council in
that they consisted of 57.5% of the population base, and paid 51.2% of the land tax
and had only four-votes in the council. However, clauses in the Reglement and a
number of administrative measures improved their under-representation.
According to the Reglement, each village community, irrespective of its
denominational makeup, would elect a village leader for itself, and it was these
leaders who would elect the councilors from each administrative district. Because
of this “clause”, the Maronites who consisted of the majority of the population base
in Batroun, Kasrawan, Matn, and Jezzine (Jazzin), and 30% of the Shouf were in an
excellent position to influence the outcome of their elections.
For example, in Jezzine where three councilors, Maronite, Druze and Sunni were
to be elected, all candidates had to win the support of the Maronite leaders, who
were clearly in the majority – this fact not only made the Maronite the unelected
leaders of Mount Lebanon, but because of the crossing of denominational lines, and
the direct participation in the communities in the elections of the leaders (sheikhs)
and councilors helped the Maronite population accept the new regime.
Dawood (Davud) Pasha, during his governorship, introduced the position of
“deputy chairman” (a position not stated in the Reglement) and appointed a
Maronite to fill the chair. This position had the power to oversee the council in his
absence – this position set a “precedent” for all the successive governors. The
“deputy chairman” (invariably a Maronite) became a regular member of the Council
with a right to “vote”. As the Council’s power and prestige increased, the position
of “deputy chairman” became the most sought after position in the administration
of the mutasarrifiyya.

Vasa, as most statesmen of his era, carried a great amount of respect for Ahmed
Hamdi Pasha, and received his advice with serious attention, but --- at this stage he
was not convinced of the suggestion that Rustems’ model of leadership would be in
his best interest, nor that of Mount Lebanon’s. In December 1884 an article in the
London Times, revealed some petitions sent to the French government expressing
the desire of the “Maronite community” to fall under French protection.
Istanbul took these reports seriously, as they supported their intelligence data
that indicated that the French were developing plans for a military invasion of Syria.
Vasa and the Ottoman ambassador to Paris were asked to issue a report – in the
same frame of mind as Ahmed previous report, the ambassador reiterated it as yet
another indication of France’s well-known ambitions with regard to Syria, and of the
importance the Maronite community on the mountain, and stated that if Vasa
followed his predecessor’s course of actions, Istanbul would be in a better position
to contain the harmful effects of the French policy.
This information was handed off to Vasa, along with a note stating the need for
serious precautions. He in turn agreed with a vigilant policy regarding French
threats, but took issue width suggestions that called for a categorical response to
the French, the Maronite clergy, and the Maronite community that suggested they
all actively participated in direct correspondence amongst each other concerning
the problem.
Vasa went on to state that Rustem had made this mistake, and the result was
closer ties between the Maronite clergy and many of it followers to the French.
Whereas when Rustem turned to other foreign powers for support, his actions
inflamed the numerous frictions already existing among the population of the
Mountain.
In his words they became, “Preoccupied in slandering one another and in
cultivating the support of this or that consulate in order to retain their positions or
to acquire one, and became oblivious to the destruction of the rights of the weak
and the poor.” This position he inferred, had weakened the people’s confidence in
the government. History proved that when Istanbul had yielded to the French
pressure to replace Rustem, they had been found lacking in not insisting the
replacement of the French consul (Patrimonio) in Beirut, the Ottoman prestige had
declined ever further.
Vasa in December 1884, determined not to make the same mistake as Rustem,
responded to Istanbul in stating he did not believe that the Maronites were a lost
cause to the Empire – in this he approached the petitions. He told the government
that the petitions “simply” expressed an appreciation for “Patrimonio’s” services to
the Maronite community and that only the Maronite Patriarch Boulos Mass’ad, and a
few of his bishops had endorsed the appreciation, these endorsement under
Patrimonio’s initiative, upon the circulation of rumors about his appointment to
anther post (letters of endorsement so-to-speak) and that “Certain influential
Maronites from Beirut”, had deliberately misinformed the London Times about the
actual content and purpose of the petitions. He advised Istanbul that these
movements should be ignored, in that it was obvious that “some” were intent on
igniting the Sultan and his advisors into initiating repressive measures against the
Mountain in general, so that the Maronites could be led into looking to France as its
savior.
Vasa had already met with the Patriarch and the bishops involved, asking them
to denounce the “distorted” news, and they had done so despite the pressure from
Patrimonio. His desire was to leave the matter as it rested, and not hold
responsible the entire community of the Mountain, instead the government should
direct its efforts into making the Ottoman rule more acceptable to the population
without discrimination by improving the quality of life, administration, providing
justice for all.
In following letter to Istanbul, he elaborated on his position where he desired to
see, better access to the courts and government offices by the Mount Lebanon
population, which would ignite their competence of these institutions in the solution
to their problems and disputes fairly – this accomplished he envisioned the people
being able to travel safety to work, and other tasks safe in the knowledge and
having peace of mind concerning their lives, property, and their rights.
Vasa’s other goals were that the sitting government should provide schools,
roads, and other opportunities to assist the population in reaching a higher level of
civilization, whereas wealth and comfort would accrue to all from undisturbed hard
work, gained under the advantages of a peaceful co-existence under a “benign”
sovereign and a just local government, his hopes being the people of the Mountain
then would abandon their “primitive” feuds and join together furthering their
collective well-being.
His belief that the Lebanese could be won over to the Empire with a good
administration, fair justice and due material progress remained his steadfast goals
during his governorship --- unfortunately the mountain changed very little during his
tenure.
In short order he realized the limits of his and Istanbul’s power in implementing
his ideas – whereas the French remained a force that steadily and increasingly
became very difficult in the dealing with or about Mount Lebanon. Despite his
efforts to avoid confrontations using his tactful diplomacy, he found himself
involved in increasingly tense conflicts, first with Patrimonio and then his successor
“Petiteville”, over issues the involved the appointment of officials, elections of
councilors, budgetary problems, construction of road, and even judicial cases.
 The picture emerges, the French wanted the Mountain, and slapped up every
obstacle they could muster to pull down the government they had originally
endorsed for Mount Lebanon, their movement in this direction was to firmly
establish a record demonstrating the failure of the mustasarrifiyya, this in order to
prove the lack of ability and powerlessness of the Ottomans in ruling the region.
By the summer of 1887, Vasa’s friction with the French Consulate had reached
such a level that the leading Ottoman statesmen in Istanbul strongly advised
caution, whereas the Grand Vizier Kamil, and the Foreign Minister Said, (both
pashas), who at the time were occupied patching up existing differences (on other
matters) with the French, asked Vasa to try and improve his relations with the
French consul – indicating they would work on their end to do the same with the
French representative in Istanbul. The French ambassador (according to these
ministers) would work towards the same goal.
Vasa in reply, assured Istanbul (Cevdet Pasha) that he’d always done his best to
maintain friendly relations with the French consul, “demonstrating composure,
affability, patience, and even compliance as much as possible.” A greater
percentage of the time he found this practically “impossible”, as the French
recognized no restrictions in their constant involvement in Mount Lebanon’s
administration and their support to “certain” Maronite bishops who, to the point of
“despotism” in order to (his words) – augment the Church’s wealth and influence.
Under these circumstances, he said, “I find myself obliged to adopt a course of
action similar to my predecessor’s.”
Vasa was found to be “ready” to reach a re-conciliation with the French consul
as long as the consul clearly acknowledged the fact that Mount Lebanon fell under
Ottoman sovereignty and abstained from activities that threaten the inter-sectarian
peace in the Mountain. Otherwise, his duties and loyalties obligated him to confront
the French and their local allies.
The eventual posture of Vasa to mimic the attitude of Rustem was not at all
surprising, in that both men were faithful Ottoman statesmen who had served
during the time when the French government had shifted its emphasis in its Near
East policy onto the consolidation of its influence on Mount Lebanon. This a
necessary step (they felt) in bringing Syria under French control – however, after
the Berlin Treaty, the Ottoman Empire under “Abdulhamit II’s” leadership viewed
the Syrian provinces as a key to the success of its efforts to consolidate whatever
was “left” of the Empire.
Syria became a fundamental objective to the Ottomans in stopping any efforts
by the French and their plans to that end. The Ottomans logic dictated the denial of
the French opportunities in the use of “any” pretext to interfere or to interfere with
or without their active involvement in the affairs of Mount Lebanon. This was the
task of both pasha’s, Rustem and Vasa. Although differences in personalities are
noted and the circumstances obvious both responded to their challenges with the
same enthusiasm, but with different strategies.
Rustem by keeping his distance from local elements, where Vasa concentrated
his attention of winning the support of local interest groups in order to diminish the
influence of the French. This attitude of his worked to some degree to keep the
tension at a minimum. His relationship with the Maronite Church was a good case
in point, where he believed that if he could diminish or remove the inherent ties
between the Church and the French Consulate by assuring the clergy that under
“his” governorship there would be absolutely no room for prejudice against “any”
group because of creed or vocation. It becomes apparent that he believed that the
Maronite clergy’s hostility to the government was a result of Rustems’ “irreverent
and unjust treatment. It was “partly” because of this belief that he came to the
defense of the Church in the petitions that appeared in the London Times.
It didn’t take long; however, for him to abandon his hopes of an institutional
alignment between the Church and his government, therefore he concentrated his
energy on individual bishops in order to win their personal support, this in taking
advantage of the inter-clerical rivalries over the power and influence within the
Church and the Maronite community. In one letter to Istanbul he wrote, “since it
would be politically expedient to have the religious heads of the Maronite
community at loggerheads, I paid due attention to this important matter and
managed to bring about a degree of discord ad mutual aversion among them.”
Examination of his reports indicate that he remained well informed about even
the supposedly “secret” meetings of the Church Council and other evidence (not to
mention his own assertions), it becomes clear that as the governor he had become
a factor to be dealt with in the internal affairs of the Church, including its relations
with the Vatican, and the election(s) of a new Patriarch (“Nanna El Hajj of Dlebta”)
in 1890. His influence should not be exaggerated, and he did not think otherwise,
where all he expected as a reward for his involvement in Church affairs was the rise
and acceptance of “less” Francophile bishops within the Church hierarchy and that
they make decisions based on the health, wealth and welfare of the Mountain,
rather than base their decisions based on French interests.
In other words, he had come to believe that the Maronite clergy had become
accustomed to “worldly” pleasures and the partaking in “worldly” affairs to such an
extent (to the displeasure of the Vatican, their spiritual superior) that they were
ignoring their duties at home. The French in turn, protected the Church from any
Vatican investigations, going as far as to protect the participating clergy and their
affiliates against existing governmental authority, as if they were actually French
citizens, providing a shield over and beyond the guarantees allowed to them (along
with other clergy) by the Ottoman laws and the Reglement.
Furthermore it was known that the French government assisted the Church
financially on a regular basis, supposedly for “charitable activities” but in reality to
keep them in step with their demands. It is noted, that should the bishops be lax in
fulfilling their directives, the French consul was in a position to browbeat them into
submission.
The key in his plan was to concentrate on reducing the influence of the clergy on
the Maronite community rather than that of the French influence on the clergy. In
many letters to Istanbul, he rejoiced in reports that indicated, “the disgrace of the
Maronite religious leaders even in the eyes of their own flock,” frequently
expressing his hopes to see the further “erosion of clerical prestige and influence.”
In reality Vasa knew he faced an uphill battle when it came to the Church and its
French Connection, whereas the Maronite community was the single beneficiary of
the French missionary schools, hospitals, and dispensaries – and according to him
and his knowledge of the situation, piety hardly disguised was the not the prime
motivation guiding the activities of these institutions, which reveled in the fact of
their financial and political backing from the French government. Nevertheless, he
also believed neither the French nor the clerical influence on the Maronite
community was absolute.
There were many Maronites who, “appreciated the privileges granted them
under the ‘mustasarrifiyya’ regime and realized that under the sovereignty of
another state they would be deprived of them.” He noted that there were also
Maronites who found the Church’s dominance over the community “oppressive” and
were eager to side with the government.
Associated with this group, Vasa formed a team he called “the government
party”, setup as an alternative leadership in lieu of the clergy in the community,
and supported it as much as he could against the “church party”, that is, without
causing any diplomatic problems for his central government. Remember these two
parties.
As a matter of “fact”, many of the projects that Vasa became involved with
became one-way or the other related to his drive against the clerical influence, in
one instance pursuing the “judicial reforms” initiated by his predecessor he said, “in
order to bring the clergy’s involvement in judicial affairs to an end!”
Another of his major concerns were the schools in which the “negative
influence” they had on the young minds of the Mountain, in that they only
perpetuated the division of the Christians and the Muslims, clouding their real
purpose of educating the children. In order to balance the situation he requested
funds from Istanbul to hire teachers, build public schools, issue scholarships to the
talented students if an effort to raise their overall standard of living, and too provide
diplomatic support for his request. Unfortunately given Istanbul’s financial
predicament it was only able to give Vasa “token” support in educational matters,
and virtually “none” in yet another project near and dear to him, road construction.
A project he visualized as a remedy to the general ignorance (being tied to their
village) of the people of certain regions, and their constant dependence on the
clerics and the information and false rumors spread amongst the villages – he
needed those roads to facilitate travel and most of all effective communications
removing the people affected beyond the grasp of false news and the seductions of
the church.
In his quest to provide a livable and peaceful environment on the Mountain, he
had to convince Istanbul and more importantly the “Administrative Council” to raise
the funds necessary to accomplish his projects. This proved to be very difficult,
(remember who was the majority on the council) because the Church and the
French Consulate opposed any project that involved the collection of funds
“beyond” the tax limits set in the Reglement. His hands tied, he considered this
the master of subterfuge, and placed the blame squarely where it belongs – the
French!
 In turn, the bishops were afraid that “they no longer would be able to treat their
flock as non-entities and ride roughshod over them once the veil of ignorance was
removed from their eyes,” (as they would be able to communicate with other
communities), due to the prosperity and contact with the outside world facilitated
with the construction of roads. And, since the Maronite Church was the principal
tool for the implementation of French policy objectives, the French were also
opposed to projects that might “undermine” the Church’s sway over the people.
“Spagnolo’s” research with French documents, confirms this collaboration, and it
should be noted that earlier in Vasa’s government the French Consulate did support
the construction of a road between “Bait al-Din” and Beirut through funds raised
“locally”, the French consul opposed the plan to build another one from “Antilias” to
“Jubail”, because (as found in French documents) the latter project might put the
Maronites in the north more involved in the Ottoman environment. As Spagnolo
states, “changes so fundamental to the economy and society of the Mountain were
to be ‘discouraged’ until the French themselves could be in a position to sponsor
them and to derive whatever benefits or ‘propaganda’ accrued.” This statement
according to the records of the French Consulate – showed a strong indication that
the French have always had the rights, education and well-being of the citizens of
Mount Lebanon in the forefront of all their concerns – “sarcasm” mine.
Despite the opposition, Vasa was able to convince the Administrative Council to
back the “Antilias-Jubail” carriage road and a few other roads as well – only after a
considerable effort of various moves that included replacing or winning over a
sufficient number of un-supportive councilors on the Mount Lebanon Council. By
the end of his governorship he had succeeded in building more than 149 kilometers
(93 miles) of roads on Mount Lebanon. This is significant when compared to the
total that were constructed by the previous governors, 108 kilometers (67 miles)
over a period of two decades – more so when their feat was accomplished with
Istanbul funds. Unfortunately, his achievement was used against him due to the
methods he used to reach his objective – in other words his opponents, the Maronite
Church and the French (in case you have forgotten) had the necessary ammunition
to attack him.
In the summer/autumn of 1886, when Vasa’s relations with the French Consulate
and the Maronite Church has reached it “lowest point” over disputes related to the
councilor elections during that year, the powerful Druze chief, “Mustafa Arslan”
joined the campaign against him. Mustafa was clearly more interested in the affairs
of his native Shouf than in, who controlled the Administrative Council or how they
got there. Nevertheless, he made common cause with the Church and the
Consulate to complain to the Istanbul about the “partisanship” and “graft” involved
in Vasa’s governorship.
The British consul-general, “Elridge” dressed in his tweed suit, stepped into the
fray and threw in his two-cents, expressing his concern over the greed of the
officials, although he empathized with Vasa’s efforts to win the support of the
Administrative Council and why!
Aware of the rising tensions on the Mountain, the Istanbul government “invited”
Vasa to reconsider his tactics, followed in November 1887, ordering Vasa’s son-in-
law and executive secretary “Kupelyan” out of Mount Lebanon. At the time, if was
widely believe that it was Kupelyan who was the primary architect of the graft and
moves that became an obvious part of Vasa governorship.
The British consul and Istanbul agreed with Vasa when he pointed to the
“hypocrisy” of his critics, leveling his finger at the bitterness of the French and their
local supporters, and the insecurity of the Maronite Church and their apparent
loosing of control over their flock! The French and the Church were more than
disappointed in their decline of their oppressive influence, which in the past had
manifested itself in many (too many to list) mischievous ways.
In all this, contrary to anyone’s expectations as shaped by past experience, the
mutasarrifiyya officials under Vasa did not solicit British support as a counter to
French influence, instead concentrating their attention on making the government
of Vasa the sole refuge of the people of the Mountain.
As for “Mustafa Arslan” (who had been ousted from office by Vasa for abusing
his authority), he only wanted to get his position back on the council and likewise
his district governorship of the Shouf. Mustafa now worked hard-in-glove with the
French to assemble an opposition against the current leader of the Shouf, “Nasib
Jumblatt” – his “opposition” including fanning the inter-Druze family rivalries. His
goals in due time, “sapped the strength of the Druze community,” and thereby
threatened to upset the sectarian balance in Mount Lebanon. Vasa expressed his
surprise at the support and credit given to him by people in Beirut, Damascus and
even Istanbul, pleading for discretion, worried about a serious rift in Druze ranks
that would threaten the Ottoman position in Mount Lebanon, and the ongoing
progression of the people living their in their growth and advancement.
Like a squeaky wheel (Mustafa), Vasa under orders from Istanbul, being
reminded that it wasn’t his own integrity that was being called into question nor the
methodology of his policy, and that “only” to complaints against his immediate style
needed an adjustment – he complied. Short of restoring Mustafa to his position, he
seriously addressed the grievances of the Druze and adopted a more pleasant
attitude toward the Maronite Church and the French Consulate. Complaints
subsided, and Vasa and his supporters were able to run the Mountain with relatively
few problems. But it wasn’t over for our Mr. Vasa Pasha!