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74 contexts.org

terrorism
by ziad munson
Terrorism may be the most influential buzzword of the decade. Beyond the obvious connection to national security and the war in Iraq, immigration, taxes, drug trafficking, and even corporate power today are inflected through the prism of terrorism. In many ways it has defined the collective lives of Americans since 2001. The term terrorism originated during the French Revolution (1789 1799) and referred to attempts by the new regime to consolidate its power and intimidate opponents, many of whom were supporters of the old monarchy. The term had a much different connotation thenterrorism was associated with defending new notions of justice and democracy against an old order perceived as tyrannical and corrupt. For more than 100 years, terrorism was a method by which the weak and downtrodden might overcome the powerful and oppressive. By the eve of World War II, though, terrorism had developed a much different meaning. The term referred to the actions of established government authorities to repress their own people. It was discussed in the context of Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and Stalinist Russia. Terrorism regained its connection to revolutionary movements after the war, but any positive connotations it once possessed were lost. Today the word is used only in highly pejorative ways to describe actions seen as unjustified, destabilizing, and threatening to justice and democratic institutions. Most social scientists would agree that terrorism can be defined as violence or the threat of violence directed at noncombatants for political purposes. But such a definition is seldom applied to the public discussion of terrorism. Politicians, the media, religious leaders, and even law enforcement and military officers help construct the meaning of the term by labeling some individuals and events with it, but not others. We find the brutality of terrorism horrifying, but often support the same violence when conducted by police or soldiers. Indeed, we call them heroes. Our differing reactions result from how the meaning of terrorism has been socially constructed. The social construction of the term also makes it a shifting target in public discussions, subject to the political winds of the time. Regardless of the definition, the central mechanism in all terrorism is the fear it evokes in a target population. The success of terrorism therefore depends critically not only on attacks themselves, but also on how the targets of terrorism react to attacks. Hysterical rhetoric from political leaders and alarmist, breathless coverage from journalists greatly contribute to the effectiveness of terrorism, and thus the likelihood of terrorist organizations pursuing further attacks. Research after the wave of terrorism in the mid-1980s showed the important role the media play in dramatizing terrorism and making it an effective means of communication. Newspaper and television coverage of attacks changed as a result, in order to minimize these impacts. Most of what was learned during that time, however, was lost in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. The relentless focus on terrorism and security in public discourse in the United States since then has greatly exaggerated the threat it really posesand concomitantly raised the level of fear terrorism can evoke. For example, more Americans have died in automobile accidents caused by deer in the last 40 years than all those killed by terrorists, including the attacks on 9/11. That such comparisons come as a surprise to many demonstrates just how effective the fear-mongering surrounding terrorism has been over the past seven years. Sparking this fear is precisely the goal terrorism seeks to achieve. Organizations that can exploit such fear lie at the root of the vast majority of terrorist attacks. Individuals rarely decide on their own to bomb a shopping mall or hijack a plane. Terrorism doesnt result from disturbed personalities, psychopaths, or even individual rage or hatred; its a specific strategy the violent targeting of non-combatantsorganizations choose because they believe it will help them gain recognition, highlight issues they perceive as being ignored, force concessions from existing power holders, or solidify the allegiance of supporters. Thus, terrorism isnt a random act. Its part of calculated, and often publicly declared, campaign of opposition to the status quo. Sociologists, political scientists, and public policy analysts have paid a lot of attention to explaining when and where terrorism occurs. This research shows that organizations choose terrorism only when they or the populations they claim to represent have been previously subjected to significant violence by the state. Indeed this appears to be a prerequisite. Terrorism emerges only in the context of the state attempting to repress its opposition by force. The FARC in Columbia, the IRA in Ireland, the PLO in the Palestinian Territories, and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka all represent populations that experienced significant state violence before an opposition group initiated any terrorist attacks. If state violence is a necessary condition, however, it isnt on its own sufficient. State violence occurs all the time around the world without groups taking up terrorist campaigns. So what determines when government violence

leads to terrorism? The availability of viable alternatives for political expression is an important factor. Terrorism is more likely to emerge in societies in which the population, or some subset of the population, is denied the ability to express political will or discontent. In practice, this means the lack of a democratic electoral process, the right to assembly, an independent media, and a robust civil society that can exert political pressure on behalf of citizens all make terrorism more likely. These factors reduce the available options opposition groups have to address their grievances. A third important factor is international isolation. Groups well situated in a rich web of transnational connections are less likely to adopt terrorism because of its potential to alienate supporters in other parts of the globe. For example, in Turkey the Milli Grs , an Islamic opposition group with deep connections to international organizations and European supporters, has never adopted terrorism to further its goals. In contrast Ibda-C, also an Islamic opposition group in Turkey, but one relatively isolated from the outside world, has orchestrated a string of terrorist attacks. Similarly, the remarkable lack of terrorism by the African National Congress during South Africas apartheid era can be traced in large part to its extensive ties around the world, including relationships with the Soviet Union and European governments. International allies have a moderating influence on opposition groups, opening up alternative options for accomplishing their goals and reducing the attractiveness of political violence. Why would anyone join a terrorist group? The primary route into a terrorist organization is no different than the route into any other groupsocial network ties. People are drawn into violent groups because of who they know, particularly those they already know in the group. Families and friendships are the building blocks of any organizations recruitment of new members. The

attraction of getting involved is thus a personal one. No single type of personwith particular personality traits, economic circumstances, or even a certain set of beliefs and valuesbecomes involved in terrorism. What matters is the social context in which theyre embedded. Indeed, very often group members learn the ideology (and hatred) that accompanies terrorism only after they get involved in the first place. Organized groups can shape benign discontent into focused anger and commitment. They offer an alternative narrative of how the world might be if those currently holding power, whether Americans or Israelis or Colombians or Sri Lankans or anyone else, could just be overthrown through whatever tactics are possible and effective. Current debates over terrorism have thus far incorporated few insights from existing research. Many liberalminded people cling to the idea that poverty is the basis for global terrorism, but the reality is that economists have found no significant relationship between poverty and terrorism. More conservative-minded people focus on capturing or killing evildoers in order to eliminate terrorism. This view also finds little empirical supportrooting out all potential terrorists is impossible and attempts to stop terror campaigns through military force have been almost universally unsuccessful, even when large numbers of individuals tied to terror organizations are captured or killed. Not only do military strategies designed to punish terrorism or eliminate terrorists fail, they also create and reinforce exactly those conditions that raise the likelihood of terrorism in the future. People today are well aware that we live in a world in which terrorism is an ever-present threat. But we are less aware that this world didnt begin on 9/11. The threat of terrorism has been with us for many decades and will continue into the future. Understanding the basic definition of terrorism and its social

constructions can help us put the threat in proper perspective. Understanding the basic mechanisms responsible for its effectiveness as a strategythe ability to evoke fear in a population disproportionate to its true threatcan help us better confront the threat and reduce its likelihood in the future.

recommended resources
James Aho. This Thing of Darkness (University of Washington Press, 1994). A nuanced introduction to the social construction of enemies, with terrorists as a specific type of enemy. Martha Crenshaw. Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts, in Terrorism in Context (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). A general account of how government responses to opposition groups can contribute to terrorism. Jeff Goodwin. A Theory of Categorical Terrorism, Social Forces (2006) 84: 2027 2046. A political sociologist suggests political and social context is the most important determinant of the likelihood of terrorism. Ariel Merari. Deterring Fear: Government Responses to Terrorist Attacks, Harvard International Review (2002) Winter: 26 31. A good introduction to how reducing the fear of terrorist attacks is an important element of anti-terrorism policy. Robert A. Pape. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Random House, 2005). Demonstrates in detail how terrorism emerges as an organizational strategy rather than from individual psycho-pathology.
Ziad Munson is in the sociology and anthropology department at Lehigh University. He studies the mobilization of social movements.

fall 2008 contexts 75