Philosophical Review

All Kinds of Possibility Author(s): Ian Hacking Reviewed work(s): Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (Jul., 1975), pp. 321-337 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184116 . Accessed: 14/07/2012 20:27
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ALL KINDS OF POSSIBILITY

NE reads of many kinds of possibility: physical, logical,

epistemic, de dicto, de re, technical, theoretical, economic, human, real, metaphysical. I describe a simple grammatical device that helps put these cross-cutting classifications in their places. The proposed framework has consequences for essentialism, the ontology of possible things, the number of planets, possible worlds, rigid designators, and the philosophy of Leibniz. For example, in English there are a number of distinct grammatical derivations of expressions of the form, possible-so-and-so. Ignoring the distinctions, Quine launched a notable attack on possible things, and thereby on essentialism and modality. This prong of his attack fails when directed at any of the possible so-and-sos that are grammatically admissible, for none of them can offend even the most intransigent nominalist. But I contend that the philosophers' possible world either cuts across a grammatical distinction or gains sense through a cosmology such as that of Leibniz. So the admissibility of the possible-so-and-so construction, although contrary to Quine, is of no solace to today's possible-world semanticist. For another example, we find in our grammar a counterpart to the disputed contrast between de re and de dicto. The neatness of the grammatical distinction shows that the philosophical one is viable. Indeed, grammar terminates some controversy, because the de re possibility that it defines is referentially transparent, and the problems of opacity for de dicto constructions turn out to have nothing to do with modality. But the basis of the grammatical distinction is incompatible with the drift toward essentialism so often noted in the exponents of modal logic. Naturally this result does not preclude essentialism as a philosophical theory, any more than the preceding paragraph stops us from inventing non-Leibnizian possible worlds. But it does debar the essentialist from appealing to "intuitions" of "ordinary linguistic behavior" because what he is trying to construct cuts
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across the grammatical de re/de dicto distinction from which he starts. It is obscure what else he can appeal to. Evidently this paper is reminiscent of the linguistic philosophy of twenty years ago. Most of that work was ephemeral, but thanks to the revolution in grammatical studies going on at the time, it was widely noticed that when linguistic philosophy works, it uses syntactic rather than semantic facts. An example is the lasting effect of Ryle's distinguishing of knowing how from knowing that-as opposed to the forgotten wrangles about the number of senses possessed by the verb to know. Grammar has progressed apace since then and we now have exacting theories about what grammar ought to be. So it is disappointing that the following work is pretty untheoretical, but there is a good reason not to expect help from grammars, yet. Disparate theories about possibility are precisely what divide several competing systems of grammar. We bave been taught that any grammar should carry semantics with it. Some students of Montague think that possibleworld semantics just does the trick, while others who have learned from Davidson spurn all that. Compare the heady confidence of Chapter 4 of David Lewis' Counterfactualsand the sarcasm of Davidson's parenthetical remark on page 78 of "In defence of convention T."1 The student of possibility cannot expect an unbiased analysis from his neighborhood grammarian, and so he has to do it on his own. What he finds, I believe, is that despite all the scare stories, possibility is all right. But contrary to the glowing prospectuses of unreal estate salesmen, possibility is very much rooted in this world.
I.

Two

KINDS OF POSSIBILITY

Let us work with the adjective possible. Two important forms of sentence in which it occurs are: L: It is possible that p. M: It is possible for A to x. Substitutions for p are sentences in the indicative mood only. The form A to x is derived from the indicative A x's, and my
' Truth, Syntax and Modality, ed. by Hugues Leblanc (Amsterdam, I973).
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notation is intended to suggest the case of an agent doing something: It is possiblefor Rachel to hold her breathfor a whole minute. But we also tend to treat inanimate objects as agents (the tree crushed the house, the flowers delighted him). So we include It is possiblefor the kettleto boil dry infive minutes.Moreover, the form allows of mass nouns: It is possiblefor sand to wear down a mountain. The A also takes as values what in the oldest and newest of grammars count as general terms: It is possiblefor any python to swallow some monkey.Finally, the x, as well as including actions, may also specify states into which the agent moves: It is possible for him to be a woodsman;it is possiblefor Anne to becomeQueen; it is possiblefor me to be killed on the way home. In general, however, I shall have my eye fixed on an agent doing something, and that is why I use the notation A to x. That L and M are not identical is shown by the fact that M does not entail L. It may be possible for the judge to give the woman a suspended sentence, but it is not possible that he will; he is notoriously mean and will certainly send her to jail. Moreover, L takes the usual Boolean operations while M does not. It is possible that Joe will go and Lydia will stay, but not It is possible for Joe to go and Lydia to stay. We must sometimes conjoin outside the scope of possiblefor: It ispossiblefor Joe to go andfor Lydia to stay. Finally, the classes of adjectives that contrast with the two possibles are different. The L construction takes certain, true, doubtful, believable, alleged, plausible: none of these fit M. The adjectives that fit the M construction divide roughly in two. Some fit both M and It is . . . of A to x: unwise, delightful, insulting; note that possible itself does not fit that blank. Then there is another class of adjectives, more akin to possible and which, like it, do not fit that blank: obligatory, unheardof, essential. I shall say that members of this latter class characteristically contrast with possible in M.

II.

THE P-P TEST

I shall leave logical possibility alone until the end of the paper, preferring to treat every other kind of possibility before the 323

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logician's favorite. Leaving aside logically possible, then, a simple grammatical test based on contrasting adjectives indicates whether an arbitrary construction, in which the word possible occurs, is directly related to L or M or both. In addition to the examples just cited note that probable may replace possible in L, and permissible characteristically contrasts in M. In my paper Review (LXXV [ I 967], 143- I 68)"Possibility" in the Philosophical henceforth PR67 I contend that for any grammatical construction in which the word possible occurs, there are just three cases. (a) Only probable fits. (b) Only permissiblefits. (c) Both fit. I think the only case when neither fits is when possible is preceded by an adverb whose sense precludes both words, but then (except in the thus far excluded case of the adverb logically) we may classify the occurrence of possible by deleting the adverb. In case (a), I claimed, the construction is always related to an L-sentence by a paraphrastic transformation, in case (b) to an M-sentence, and in case (c) we have a grammatically based ambiguity. Take, for example, I know a possiblespyfor her to take to theparty. If one has been asked to bring people who may be spies to the party one who is a possible (probable)spy, would mean, perhaps, I knowsomeone, for her to take to theparty. On the other hand, if and who is a person known spies are not much welcomed at parties but she still wants to bring one, one might mean, perhaps, I know a spy, whom it is for her to take to theparty. If it is true that after possible (permissible) careful parsing, every sentence in which the word possible occurs is directly derived from an L or an M construction, then it is reasonable to speak of L and M occurrences of possible. One case that may appear problematic is the subjunctive. I restricted the p in L to the indicative. What of It is possible that the kettle should (should have) boiled dry in five minutes? By my test this is an M occurrence, for only permissiblefits. This is confirmed by the fact that these sentences are closely paraphrased by It is possiblefor the kettle to boil dry (to have boiled dry) in five minutes. I shall try to leave the subjunctive alone, for no one has a good theory about it, and usage varies widely. The subjunctive is, for me, a natural way to express some possibilities, but I shall abjure it. The great virtue of a syntactic approach, as noted above in the introduction, is that in general people agree on what is grammatical. The
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subjunctive, in contrast, provokes controversy so I shall skirt it with paraphrases.

III.

M DEFINITION

PR67 was chiefly concerned with L possibility. I contended that, when not modified by logically, L occurrences of possible are entirely epistemic. To say it is possible that so-and-so, is to say that so-and-so is consistent with all we know or can readily find out to the contrary. A fancier definition is offered in PR67, but that is the general intent. It now seems to me that M possibility is immensely more important than the merely epistemic L possibility. How is it to be defined? There can be no noncircular definition. The question is to find an instructive circle. M occurrences of possible can be modified by many adverbs of the form q-ly: technically, economically, theoretically, medically, metaphysically, humanly. It is perhaps significant that the 0 tend to be academic disciplines. I exclude, of course, fortunately, perfectly, and so forth as values of u-ly, although really will do. The "disciplinary" adverbs, for most of which there is an adjective +-al, must readily fit into any scheme explaining possibility. It will be tempting to proceed in a positive way: if it is 0-ly possible for A to x, then A has the +-al ability or power to x. But we say it is theoretically possible to get people on Venus. I do not well understand a "theoretical power or ability." A "metaphysical ability" would seem to be absurd. It is wiser to proceed negatively. It is impossible for A to x if something absolutely prevents A from x-ing. It is possible for A to x if nothing absolutely prevents A from x-ing. It is 0-ly possible for A to x if thereis nothingof a +-al sort that absolutely preventsA from x-ing. I do not want to insist on the details of this account. J. L. Mackie reminds me that legal possibilities are often positive. The legal possibility of appealing to a higher court is a positive privilege, not a negative lack of constraint. My negative reading of many possibilities as lack of constraint is intended to be an antidote to the common view that possibilities are positive powers. Thus far, to repeat, I have resolutely ignored logical possibility.
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Nearly everything else is falling into place. Epistemic possibility is L possibility. Technical, human, economic, medical, and so forth possibilities are species of M possibility. What of de re and de dicto?

IV.

DE RE POSSIBILITY CENTRAL

In the L construction, It is possible that p, there is a manifest dictum in view-namely, p. Since L is epistemic, and dicta are objects of belief and knowledge, it is to be expected that L possibility is de dicto. It would be nice if M possibility were simply de re. That is plausible. The bulk of the adjectives contrasting with possible in L are about dicta: doubtful, true, credible, and the like. Two classes of adjectives contrast with possible in M. The ones I called characteristic concern what agents may do: obligatory, forbidden. The other class applies to what agents do: unwise, delightful. So it appears that the M construction applies possibility to things and agents, and may therefore be properly called de re. We also understand the failure of Boolean operations for some cases of M. I gave as an example It is possible for Joe to go and Lydia stay, which is no good, although one can say It is possible for Joe to go andfor Lydia to stay. The fact is that although Joe is a res and Lydia is too, Joe-and-Lydia, except when the two act in concert, is no res, and so does not fit into a de re construction except as It is possiblefor Joe and Lydia to play duets. When the A in It is possiblefor A to x is an individual thing or agent, then the M construction may properly be called de re. This forms only a subclass of M constructions. We must beware, for example, of generic descriptions, as in It is possiblefor the sperm whale to survive at least two moreyears before extinction. In this case the sperm whale indicates not an individual but a species, and classically that is no res. There is some controversy as to whether generic descriptions designate species. I suppose that an ardent realist, who believes both that the spermwhale designates a species and that a species is a res will gladly say that the possibility in my example is de re, but I could do so only with tongue in check. De re modality is a philosophical invention with a long history 326

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that fits only loosely with a grammatical distinction currently encoded in English. When the A in It is possiblefor A to x designates an individual thing or agent I shall say that we have a central de re modality. Otherwise M construction is de re only in an extended or Pickwickian sense. De dicto, epistemic, L possibility is referentially opaque just like most other epistemic contexts. If a statement is de dicto it is about what is or can be said, so naturally the truth value may change according to how one says what is said. The opacity does not arise from modality but from the epistemic character of the construction and from the fact that one is talking about a dictum. In contrast I should like to say that de re possibility, as in It is possible for A to x, is referentially transparent in the subject expression. This is readily verified for central de re possibility, when the A denotes an individual thing or agent. If the statement is centrally de re, its subject is some res and it does not matter to the truth of the statement how one describes that res. Unfortunately, the M construction admits of substitutions for A which do not denote individuals. Such off-center constructions do present problems. These problems are, I think, not about referential transparency but about referentialtransparency. That is, we are put in doubt as to what the subject expression refers to, even before any question of modality arises. Thus, I shall claim that central de re modality is referentially transparent, while other M constructions are often not referentially anything, neither referentially opaque nor transparent. But since I claim that the problem arises prior to modality, I must embark on a digression that will, in the subsequent section, take us back to the allegedly opaque sentence, It is possiblefor the numberof planets to exceednine. First let us think just about the numberof planets.

V.

VALUES OF FUNCTIONS

Barbara Partee drew the attention of philosophers to sentences like The (daily) price of wheatfluctuateswildly.2 The subject expres2 "Opacity, coreference and pronouns," Semanticsof Natural Language, ed. by Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (Dordrecht-Holland, 1972).

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sion of this sentence evidently does not refer to a number. Richard Montague has said that in such examples the noun phrase " 'denotes' [his scare quotes] an individual concept, not an individual."3 Putting aside certain niceties of his system of grammar, he takes the extensions of individual concepts to be functions. The daily price of wheat is a function from dates to dollars, and we are asserting that this function fluctuates wildly. The analysis of our sentence should be like that of Thefunction X2 increases monotonically. As Montague indicates on page 236, however, the function in question cannot be a straightforward function in extension that is, an ordered set of pairs (date, dollars). We show this by exhibiting two arguments, one valid, and one invalid. From
(i)

The price of wheat fluctuates wildly

and
(2)

The price of wheat is fixed daily on the Chicago grain exchange

it follows that (3) Something, that fluctuates wildly, is fixed daily on the Chicago grain exchange. Since the argument is valid, the phrase theprice of wheat must have the same reference in (i) and (2). But suppose this reference were simply a function in extension. Take some irrelevant extensionally equivalent function, say the daily-rabbit function that maps dates onto the number of rabbits at noon each day in a particular fluctuating region of Australia, A. If the price of wheat in (2) referred to a function in extension, it would follow that (4) The number of rabbits in A is fixed daily on the Chicago grain exchange. Since (4) is false, we conclude that the price of wheat in (2), and hence in (i), does not denote a set of ordered pairs. It must "denote" a function in intension, an "individual concept."
3 "Quantification in Ordinary English," Approaches to Natural Language, ed. by J. Hintikka et al. (Dordrecht-Holland, I 973), p. 239.

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Perhaps a function in intension is like a rule, or a principle for the application of a term. I know of no decent criteria for identifying functions in intension. If the price of wheat and the price of cocoa were by chance to coincide throughout I 975 the subjects of The price of wheat in I975 is fixed in Chicago and of The price of cocoa in I975 is fixed in London would still not have the same "reference." Had world wheat prices been fixed in Saskatoon since I97I, the price of wheat would still "denote" the same function in intension as it does now. If the phrase A in some sentence denotes a function in intension all questions about substitution become a bit foggy. First of all, it is obscure that A denotes anything, and so it may not even make sense to ask whether B has the same denotation as A. But even if we do play with the lingo of reference, the criteria of identity for such functions are so poor that we shall not know whether A and B have the same reference or not. My discussion may suggest that only numerical functions give trouble, so I should mention Thomas Baldwin's The color of the sea changed in a momentfrom green to troubled blue. We are not asserting that the color green went blue. In this sentence the color of the sea "denotes" a function from times to colors, the locale being taken as fixed. Perhaps expressions for official positions furnish a further class of examples: The chairman was changed everysix months; the king of France was often beheaded. VI.
REFERENTIAL TRANSPARENCY

When the A in It is possible for A to x manifestly denotes an individual thing or agent, we have a central de re possibility. We are speaking about a definite thing, and it does not matter how we describe it. If it is possible for A to x, that is possible under any description whatsoever. Central de re possibility is referentially transparent. But if thef in It is possiblefor thef to x "denotes" a function in intension, matters are less clear. Examples are easy to come by: It is possible for the price of wheat to be regulated; it is possible for the color of the sea to be almost black. The most famous example is: It is possiblefor the numberof planets to exceed nine. Is this referentially transparent?
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First put the sentence in a context. A large loose body is heading toward us at the correct angle and speed and it might go into orbit without messing up the rest of us too much. A numerologist protests that nine is the quintessential number of planets. The astronomer replies: It is (physically) possible for the number of planets to exceed nine. The numberof planets in this utterance no more denotes nine than the height of the tree in The height of the tree increasesa foot ayear denotes 76 feet. It "denotes" a function in intention. Since it does not denote nine, the falsehood of It is possible for nine to exceed nine does not prove that this construction is referentially opaque. Or consider the counterfactual, It is possible for the present numberof planets to have exceedednine, which is perhaps more naturally expressed in the subjunctive. This says that the solar system is such that a particular function in intention, whose present value is in fact nine, might have had a value greater than nine at this very moment. For my part I have no relish for the task of defining this function in intension but that task has nothing to do with modality. We are merely reminded that functions in intension are pretty murky anyway. De re possibility is referentially transparent. I block the Quinean counterexample of the planets by observing that the number of planets is probably not referential at all and, if referential, "denotes" a function and not a number. This is not an ad hoc device to preserve referential transparency of the M construction. Some of us accuse Frege of being ad hocwhen he claims that in some contexts an expression refers to its sense rather than its reference, because he has almost no support for that claim except the failure of substitution salva veritate.My analysis does not have that defect. We saw in Section V that even a straightforward nonmodal sentence such as The price of wheatfluctuateswildly cannot be about a particular number. Our solution of Quine's riddle about the planets proceeds by withdrawing it from the quarantine of modality and putting it where it belongs, in the public ward of the
categorical indicative.

To summarize: epistemic L possibility is de dictoand referentially opaque. The opacity is a consequence not of modality but of the epistemic character. De re M possibility is referentially transparent. Some famous sentences using modalities have been thought to be
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referentially opaque when they are really not referentially anything. Opacity/transparency should be left where it began, in connection with dicta, be they indirect speech, thoughts, or objects of knowledge and belief. I guess that opacity/transparency may have nothing to do with modality. But I assert this only for possibility, and we have not yet got to logical possibility, which furnishes an obvious counterexample.
VII.
POSSIBLE THINGS

Nominalists have been leery of the possible N construction, where Nis a noun, because to speak of possible things is to conjure up a countless host of subsistent nonexistent entities. By "possible thing" I mean only a short name for the possible N constructionthe expression is not, in itself, even grammatical. In PR 67 I recalled Quine's taunt, "How many possible men are there in the doorway ?" I showed that prenominal L occurrences of possible do not usher in an undisciplined bunch of nonentities. is, be replaced Indeed, possible can L-occur prenominally-that by probable when standing in front of a noun-before very few nouns, and I characterized what nouns these are. Roughly, they are nouns for which there exist verbs V such that an N is an N only if it V's: spies spy, winners win, and so forth. Man is not one of them. Possible man is grammatical only in an M construction, as in He is a possible man to kiss beneaththe mistletoe. In general, a possible N for A to x is an actual N. There are no more possible men in the doorway to kiss than there are actual men in the doorway. There may be fewer because, as we say, some of those men may be quite impossible. There is an important exception to the rule that possible N's for A to x are actual N's. Consider the case of possible titles. This very expression is ambiguous between L and M occurrences. If I am trying to recall the name of something that Leibniz wrote on annuity theory, I may say, De reditibus ad vitam is a possible title of a work by Leibniz on annuities. Since theprobable can replace a possible here, but permissible won't go straight in, the p-p test says this must be an L occurrence. In contrast, some time ago I suggested to a textbook publisher that Logicfor Idiots
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is a possible title for my book. This is an M occurrence: permissible goes but not probable, even though the publisher would not in fact permit that title. Here we have a counterexample to the rule that in M occurrences, possible N's are actual N's, for this possible title, "Logic for Idiots," is not an actual title of anything. There is a class of nouns, already noted in PR67, that I call nouns for things to choose. N is a noun for a thing to choose if something becomes an or the N only by being chosen as an or the N. Sites to camp, and times for tea, and titles for books can be in this category. I conclude that so far as M possibility is concerned, something is a possible N if and only if it is an actual N, except when N is a noun for a thing to choose. I can now plead the ontological innocence of possible things. In general they can even stand up and be counted. Aside from such harmless children of the night as titles that become actual only by being chosen, an M possible N is an N. As for L possible N's, they also, on the theory of PR67, are thoroughly real, although they are not, in general, actual N's. A possible winner may be a bad bet if it is not the probable winner, but it is no phantasm. Only real horses are possible Derby winners. How then could possible things offend the nominalist? Partly by grammatical confusion. (a) An L possible NYneed not be an actual N-a possible winner need not win. L possible N's are, however, always actual things. (b) Only a few nouns can be modified by an L occurrence- of possible. (c) Virtually any noun can be modified by an M occurrence of possible, although the full construction is: possible Nfor A to x. Fortunately, (d) aside from nouns for things to choose, M possible iN's are actual N's. Possible things become ontologically suspicious only if you fail to distinguish L and M occurrences, and combine (a) and (c), forgetting about (b) and (d). Here is a rare case in which merely grammatical observations can put the finger on an ontological mistake.
VIII.
LOGICAL POSSIBILITY

Good tests can be applied blindly. What does the p-p test do for logical possibility? First, I note that G. E. Moore said logical
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possibilities should be expressed in the subjunctive mood.4 I appeal to authority here because of my deliberate refusal to discuss the subjunctive. If Moore is right, then logical possibility is M possibility. Moreover, It is logically possible for A to x is grammatically in order, confirming that at least some logical possibilities fit into the M category. It follows, on my analysis, that logical possibility is, sometimes or always, de re. When, several years ago, I reached that conclusion, I thought no one would believe it. Then Kripke taperecorded his "Naming and necessity" and changed everything.5 There is now a viable explication of de re logical modalities. On my account of ,b-lypossible, it is logically possible for A to x if there is nothing of a logical sort that absolutely prevents A from x-ing. After Kripke we are able to say what it is for something of a logical sort absolutely to prevent A from x-ing. It has long been known, I think, that it is something to do with criteria for individuating A: if they are such that x-ing would preclude the individuation of an individual as A, then it is not possible for A to x. But formerly we did not realize that it matters exactly how A is referred to. In the case of nonlogical possibility, It is possiblefor A to x is de re when A is an individual designator. In the case of the height of the tree we either do not have a designator, or we "denote" a function, not an individual. When logical possibilities are not in the offing, individual designators designate only if they designate real individuals. But in the domain of the "logical," Kripke's scheme enables us to treat nonrigid designators as ranging over a set of "stipulated" individuals. These are usually described as individuals in various possible worlds, but I shall briefly postpone discussion of that concept, reminding you only of Kripke's doctrine that his possible worlds are the result of certain verbal stipulations devised by us. For an example, we are to compare It is logically possible for Elizabeth II to have had parents other than George VI and his wife Elizabeth and It is logically possiblefor the present Queen of England
4 Commonplace Book (London, i962), p. 237. 5 Davidson and Harman (eds.), op. cit.

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to have had parents other than George VI and his wife Elizabeth. It is perhaps possible that Elizabeth II had different parents: we may be victims of a royal dupe. That is epistemic, L possibility. But according to Kripke, if she is born of the persons stated, then my first statement about Elizabeth II is false, and the second is true. It is not my intent to defend these ideas, but only to ally them to my own, and to make, in my context, a certain sense of them. In Kripke's view, when we say It is logically possiblefor the Queen to have had otherparents, the expression the Queenranges over a class of real and stipulated individuals. This can be taken to mean that the expression does not denote an individual, but a function from stipulations to stipulated individuals, and we are speaking not of the Queen, but of a certain function that it is possible to construct. Thus on my view, worked out for nonlogical possibilities, that is not a central de re modality. On the other hand, the corresponding assertion about that very person, Elizabeth, is de re. I claimed that de re possibility is referentially transparent. This holds of central de re Kripkean logical possibility, because any rigid designator denoting Elizabeth may be substituted for the usual name without change in truth value. It may here be asked if the logical possibility about the Queen of England is not also de re. In the case of nonlogical possibility, I have been loath to say that the height of the treedenotes a function. If one is content to speak of denotation here, however, then one may say that the Queen of England "denotes" a function from stipulated worlds to their denizens. There is even referential transparency. Any other description of the same function may be substituted without change in truth value, but those who like this approach will be at some pains to say what they mean by "the same function."

IX.

DE DICTo LOGICALPOSSIBILITY

There is no prephilosophical absolute truth about logical possibility. Leibniz invented our previously most favored concept of logical possibility, and Kripke has invented another. Neither acted in an intellectual void. Both had intuitions and common
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speech to draw on. But the truth about logical possibility now depends on the structures we have ourselves created. Philosophical confusion, of a sort a mere grammarian can help clear up, will result chiefly from forgetting the provenance of some of our own constructions. I think that possible worlds prove a case in point. First, it would be fatuous to contend that just because of my grammar, we must reject any concept of de dicto logical possibility. Words can be put to most uses we fancy. We are at liberty to say that a statement which does not entail a contradiction is logically possible, and we are free to utter the sentence It is logicallypossible that p in the indicative mood, to express that fact. Logicians, hitherto lacking Kripke's analysis, but having had for some time a fairly good notion of "not entailing a contradiction," have regularly spoken in this way. Why not, especially before anyone has made good sense of de re logical possibility? So of course there is a counterexample to my assertion, that modal as opposed to epistemic concepts are de re: we have invented a contrary way of speaking. There is nothing more to say about that in itself, although when we pass to the idea of a possible world, seen as characterized by a total state description free from contradiction, something curious happens.

X.

POSSIBLE STATES OF AFFAIRS

First I wish to put aside possible states of affairs. On my p-p criteria, this is an ambiguous expression, for we may speak both of the probable state and of a permissible state of affairs. Thus sometimes, in speaking of a possible state of affairs, we are implying ignorance through an epistemic context: for all we know to the contrary, so-and-so is a possible state of affairs. That is L possibility. On other occasions we may have M occurrence, as when we say that quite independent of what we know, it is possible (permissible)for the state of affairs to be such and such. Undoubtedly these two senses may be conflated. Possible world is not ambiguous. There is a Shavian joke to remind us of the lady who granted that this world is a permissible one, but the phrase
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IAN HACKING probable world makes no immediate sense. So by the p-p test, possible world is an M occurrence of possible. (An elaboration of Wheeler's interpretation of quantum mechanics as a tree of branching world states, whose nodes are moments of measurement or observation, would begin to give sense to probableworld.)

XI.

POSSIBLE WORLDS

Since possible world is an M occurrence it should be associated with a construction of the form This is a possible worldfor A to x. Leibniz, the founder of possible worlds, reminds us which one: This is a possible worldfor God to create. I said in Section VII that a possible N is an actual N unless it is a thing to choose. For Leibniz, possible worlds are things to choose. Indeed, he himself describes them very much like my example, possible title. Where, he wonders, is the region in which possible worlds strive for existence? The mind of God. I suppose that the possible titles for my next book are, similarly, in my mind. What then of my thesis about de re? Leibniz is insistent that the mind of God is real, for otherwise the struggle for existence would be impossible. Within his metaphysics, possible worlds certainly are de re. What is the connection between Leibnizian worlds that are de re possible for God to create, and internally consistent state descriptions that are de dictologically possible? Leibniz, we recall, simply took for granted that truth in all possible worlds equals deducibility in a finite number of steps. I know of no text in which he really argues for this doctrine. We know from Gbdel's completeness theorem for first-order logic that he was right. "Nondeducibility of a contradiction" does coincide with "truth in some possible world." Possible worlds are, for Leibniz, M possible, but since Leibniz thought that each possible world is characterized by an internally consistent state description in the divine language, each such M possibility is de dicto possible, too. Thus Leibniz keeps de re possibility separate from de dicto possibility, but at the apex of creation the two concepts intersect. Leibniz' de re possible worlds are very different from Kripke's. The latter "come into existence as possible worlds," if I may so
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ALL KINDS OF POSSIBILITY

put it, by being stipulated, while the former exist in the mind of God, and become actual by being chosen. Nothing in the conception of possibility ordains that there should be a category of de re possible worlds in the mind of God. If you dislike them, you should complain about God, not possibility. If you accept a great many of the metaphysical propositions favored by Leibniz then you are allowed, by grammar, to entertain a novel category of possible nonactuals. A grammar that precluded such feats of philosophical imagination would be stupid. It would be equally foolish to inveigh against possibility because Leibniz' metaphysics strikes you as bizarre. In one respect Leibniz' possible worlds, and the possible substances that inhabit them, are wonderfully sound. Recall Quine's query, "How many possible men in the doorway ?" I called the question ungrammatical but in Leibniz' context it takes on new life. We have an M occurrence: how many possible men in the doorway for God to create? If the doorway is this very doorway, right now, the empty doorway in front of me, we know exactly how many possible men are in it. None. Leibniz correctly perceived that if one is to have a category of nonactual possibles, then possibles, unlike actuals, can be characterized only by their complete concepts. A different gesture, a different Adam. No possible man is in this empty doorway, because it is part of the complete concept of each possible man that he is not in this doorway.
IAN HACKING

Stanford University Center for AdvancedStudy in the Behavioral Sciences

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