OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v.

COURT
OF APPEALS and
DR. MERCEDITA J. MACABULOS
G.R. No. 159395, 07 May 2008,
The use of the word may is ordinarily
construed as permissive or directory, indicating
that a matter of discretion is involved.
Dr. Minda Virtudes (Dr. Virtudes) charged Dr.
Mercedita J. Macabulos (Dr. Macabulos) who
was then holding the position of Medical Officer
V at the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports National Capital Region (DECSNCR) or the Chief of the School Health and
Nutrition Unit with dishonesty, grave
misconduct, oppression, conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
acts unbecoming a public official in violation of
the Civil Service Laws and the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. Dr. Virtudes alleged that Dr.
Macabulos incurred a cash advance of P45,000
and she was required by the latter to produce
dental and medical receipts for the liquidation of
the cash advance. Taking into account that Dr.
Virtudes was not yet assigned at School Health
and Nutrition Unit, DECS-NCR, she did not
submit the receipts and invoices.
Upon failure to submit the receipts, Dr.
Macabulos allegedly subjected her to several
forms of harassment. Dr. Macabulos denied the
accusations and claimed that it was Dr. Antonia
Lopez-Dee (Dr. Dee), the Supervising Dentist,
who used the money to purchase medical and
dental supplies. In support of her claim, she
attached an unnotarized affidavit of Dr. Dee
admitting said purchase using the cash advance
of Dr. Macabulos. Dr. Virtudes asserted that it
was Dr. Macabulos who used the cash advance
by improperly spending it and that she tried to
liquidate the same by submitting a tampered
invoice in conformity with the amount of the
cash advance. Graft Investigation Officer I
Ulysis S. Calumpad rendered a decision
absolving
Dr.
Macabulos
from
the
administrative charge. However, Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr.
disapproved the decision. He found out that Dr.
Dee signed an unnotarized affidavit but the

contents of the first page were entirely different

from the affidavit submitted by Dr. Macabulos
in her counter- affidavit. A new memorandum
by the Ombudsman was released finding Dr.
Macabulos guilty imposing upon her the penalty
of dismissal from the government service.
Thereafter, Dr. Macabulos filed a motion for
consideration before the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA reversed the decision of the
Ombudsman ratiocinating that the Ombudsman
can no longer investigate the complaint since the
acts complained of were committed one year
from the filing of the complaint and that the
penalty imposed by the Ombudsman is not
immediately executory.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not CAs interpretation of Section
20(5) of Republic Act No. 6670 (The Political
Law Ombudsman Act of 1989) as a prescriptive
period on the Ombudsman administrative
disciplinary cases is correct
2) Whether or not the penalty of dismissal from
the service meted on the private respondent is
immediately executory in accordance with the
valid rule of execution pending appeal uniformly
observed in administrative disciplinary cases
HELD: The Court of Appeals should have
granted the motion for intervention filed by the
Ombudsman. In its decision, the appellate court
not only reversed the order of the Ombudsman
but also delved into the investigatory power of
the Ombudsman. Since the Ombudsman was not
impleaded as a party when the case was
appealed to the Court of Appeals in accordance
with Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
the Ombudsman had no other recourse but to
move for intervention and reconsideration of the
decision in order to prevent the undue restriction
of its constitutionally mandated investigatory
power. The Court of Appeals held that under
Section 20(5) of R.A.6770, the Ombudsman is
already
barred
by
prescription
from
investigating the complaint since it was filed
more than one year from the occurrence of the
complained act. The Court found this
interpretation by the appellate court unduly
restrictive of the duty of the Ombudsman as
provided under the Constitution to investigate on

its own, or on complaint by any person, any act

or omission of any public official or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.

or failure by any officer without just cause to

comply with an order of the Office of the
Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
or censure shall be ground for disciplinary
action against said officer.

The use of the word may is ordinarily

construed as permissive or directory, indicating
that a matter of discretion is involved. Thus, the
word may, when used in a statute, does not
generally suggest compulsion. The use of the
word may in Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770
indicates that it is within the discretion of the
Ombudsman
whether
to
conduct
an
investigation when a complaint is filed after one
year from the occurrence of the complained act
or omission.

Hence, in the case of In the Matter to Declare in

Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, the Court
noted that Section 7 of A.O. 17 provides for
execution of the decisions pending appeal,
which provision is similar to Section 47 of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service.

The Court of Appeals held that the order of the

Ombudsman imposing the penalty of dismissal
is not immediately executory. The Court of
Appeals applied the ruling in Lapid v. Court of
Appeals, that all other decisions of the
Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not
enumerated in Section 27 of RA 6770 are
neither final nor immediately executory. In all
administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of
the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by
the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of
justice may require. An appeal shall not stop the
decision from being executory. In case the
penalty is suspension or removal and the
respondent wins such appeal, he shall be
considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such
other emoluments that he did not receive by
reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases shall be executed as a
matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman
shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly
enforced and properly implemented. The refusal

More recently, in the 2007 case of Buencamino

v. Court of Appeals, the primary issue was
whether the decision of the Ombudsman
suspending petitioner therein from office for six
months without pay was immediately executory
even pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.
The Court held that the pertinent ruling in Lapid
v. Court of Appeals has already been superseded
by the case of In the Matter to Declare in
Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, which
clearly held that decisions of the Ombudsman
are immediately executory even pending appeal.
The petition is meritorious.
Intrinsic Aids
Where the meaning of a statue is
ambiguous, the court is warranted in
availing itself of all illegitimate aids to
construction in order that it can ascertain
the true intent of the statute.
The aids to construction are those found
in the printed page of the statute itself;
know as the intrinsic aids, and those
extraneous facts and circumstances
outside the printed page, called extrinsic
aids.
Title

It is used as an aid, in case of doubt in

its language to its construction and to
ascertaining legislative will.

If the meaning of the statute is obscure,

courts may resort to the title to clear the
obscurity.
The title may indicate the legislative
intent to extend or restrict the scope of
law, and a statute couched in a language
of doubtful import will be constructed to
conform to the legislative intent as
disclosed in its title.
Resorted as an aid where there is doubt
as to the meaning of the law or as to the
intention of the legislature in enacting it,
and not otherwise.
Serve as a guide to ascertaining
legislative intent carries more weight in
this jurisdiction because of the
constitutional requirement that every
bill shall embrace only one subject who
shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The constitutional injunction makes the
title an indispensable part of a statute.

The limit and purpose of the Legislature in

adopting Act No. 2874 was and is to limit its
application to lands of public domain and that
lands held in private ownership are not included
therein and are not affected in any manner
whatsoever thereby. Jones Law of 1916: That
no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject, and that subject shall be
expressed in the title of the bill.
Preamble

Central Capiz v. Ramirez

G.R. No. L-16197 (March 12, 1920)

FACTS:
Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner
Corporation for a term of 30 years, a supply of
all sugar cane produced on her plantation, which
was to be converted later into a right in rem and
recorded in the Registry of Property as an
encumbrance upon the land, and binding to all
future owners of the same. The Respondent
refuses to push through with the contract
thinking it might violate Act No. 2874, An Act
to amend and compile the laws relating to lands
of public domain, and for other purposes, since
more than 61 percent of the capital stock of the
corporation is held and owned by persons who
are not citizens of the Philippine Islands or of
the United States. The land involved is a private
agricultural land.

ISSUE:
W/N said Act no. 2874 is applicable to
agricultural lands, in the Philippine Islands
which are privately owned.
HELD:

It is a part of the statute written

immediately after its title, which states
the purpose, reason for the enactment of
the law.
Usually express in whereas clauses.
Generally omitted in statutes passed by:

Phil. Commission

Phil. Legislature

National Assembly

Congress of the Phil

Batasang Pambansa
These legislative bodies used the
explanatory note to explain the reasons
for the enactment of statutes.
Extensively used if Presidential decrees
issued by the President in the exercise of
his legislative power.
When the meaning of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, the preamble can
neither expand nor restrict its operation,
much less prevail over its text. Nor can
be used as basis for giving a statute a
meaning.
When the statute is ambiguous, the
preamble can be resorted to clarify the
ambiguity.
Preamble is the key of the statute, to
open the minds of the lawmakers as to
the purpose is achieved, the mischief to
be remedied, and the object to be
accomplished, by the provisions of the
legislature.
May decide the proper construction to
be given to the statute.
May restrict to what otherwise appears
to be a broad scope of law.

It may express the legislative intent to

make the law apply retroactively in
which case the law has to be given
retroactive effect.

People v. Purisima

A person was charged w/ violation of

PD 9 which penalizes, among others, the
carrying outside of ones residence any
bladed, blunt or pointed weapon not
used as a necessary tool or implement
for livelihood, with imprisonment
ranging from five to ten years.
Question rose whether the carrying of
such weapon should be in relation to
subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence, criminality, chaos or
public disorder as a necessary element
of the crime.
The mere carrying of such weapon
outside ones residence is sufficient to
constitute a violation of the law
Pursuant to the preamble which spelled
out the events that led to the enactment
of the decree the clear intent and spirit
of the decree is to require the motivation
mentioned in the preamble as in
indispensable element of the crime.
The severity of the penalty for the
violation of the decree suggests that it is
a serious offense, which may only be
justified by associating the carrying out
of such bladed of blunt weapon with any
of the purposes stated in its preamble.

People of the Philippines v. Purisima

G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978)
FACTS:
Twenty-six petitions for review were filed
charging the respective Defendant with illegal
possession of deadly weapon in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9. An order quashed the
information because it did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It
failed to state one essential element of the crime,
viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of
the accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt
weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of,

connected with or related to subversion,

insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness
or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a
perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited
acts need not be related to subversive activities
and that they are essentially malum prohibitum
penalized for reasons of public policy.
ISSUE:
W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts
need not be related to subversive activities.
HELD:
The primary rule in the construction and
interpretation of a legislative measure is to
search for and determine the intent and spirit of
the law. Legislative intent is the controlling
factor. Because of the problem of determining
what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary
to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree
and this can be found among others in the
preamble or whereas clauses which enumerate
the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and the stiff
sanctions stated therein.
Punctuation marks

Semi- colon used to indicate a

separation in the relation of the thought,
what follows must have a relation to the
same matter it precedes it.
Comma and semi- colon are use for the
same purpose to divide sentences, but
the semi colon makes the division a
little more pronounce. Both are not used
to introduce a new idea.
Punctuation marks are aids of low
degree and can never control against the
intelligible meaning of written words.
An ambiguity of a statute which may be
partially or wholly solved by a
punctuation mark may be considered in
the construction of a statute.
The qualifying effect of a word or
phrase may be confined to its last
antecedent if the latter is separated by a
comma from the other antecedents.
An argument based on punctuation is
not persuasive.

Case No. 203

G.R. No. L-22945 (March 3, 1925)

US. v. Hart
G.R. No. L-8327 (March 28, 1913)
FACTS:
Respondent was caught in a gambling house and
was penalized under Act No. 519 which
punishes every person found loitering about
saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, or
tramping or straying through the country without
visible means of support. The said portion of
the law is divided into two parts, separated by
the comma, separating those caught in gambling
houses and those straying through the country
without means of support. Though it was proven
that Hart and the other Defendants had visible
means of support, it was under the first part of
the portion of law for which they were charged
with. The prosecution persisted that the phrase
without visible means of support was in
connection to the second part of the said portion
of Act No. 519, therefore was not a viable
defense.
ISSUE:
How should the provision be interpreted?
HELD:
The construction of a statute should be based
upon something more substantial than mere
punctuation. If the punctuation gives it a
meaning which is reasonable and is in apparent
accord with legislative will, it may be as an
additional argument for adopting the literal
meaning of the words in the statute as thus
punctuated. An argument based on punctuations
alone is not conclusive and the court will not
hesitate to change the punctuation when
necessary to give the act the effect intended by
the legislature, disregarding superfluous and
incorrect punctuation marks, or inserting others
when necessary. Inasmuch as defendant had,
visible means of support and that the absence
of such was necessary for the conviction for
gambling and loitering in saloons and gambling
houses, defendants are acquitted.

FACTS:
Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court
finding her guilty for the violation of illegal
practice of medicine and illegally advertising
oneself as a doctor. Defendant practices
chiropractic although she has not secured a
certificate to practice medicine. She treated and
manipulated the head and body of Regino
Noble. She also contends that practice of
chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and
that unauthorized use of title of doctor should
be understood to refer to doctor of medicine
and not to doctors of chiropractic, and lastly,
that Act 3111 is unconstitutional as it does not
express its subject.
ISSUE:
W/N chiropractic is included in the term
practice of medicine under Medical laws
provided in the Revised Administrative Code.
HELD:
Act 3111 is constitutional as the title An Act to
Amend (enumeration of sections to be
amended) is sufficient and it need not include
the subject matter of each section. Chiropractic
is included in the practice of medicine.
Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage
of the term. The constitutional requirement as
to the title of the bill must be liberally construed.
It should not be technically or narrowly
construed as to impede the power of legislation.
When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be
resolved against the doubt and in favor of its
validity. A bill shall embrace only one subject,
expressed in its title, to prohibit duplicity in
legislation by apprising legislators and the
public about the nature, scope, and
consequences of the law.
Capitalization of letters

An aid of low degree in the construction

of statute.