Augustine's Compatibilism

Augustine's Compatibilism Author(s): Katherin A. Rogers Source: Religious Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Dec., 2004), pp.
415-435 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20008554 . Accessed: 22/04/2014 12:42
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Religious Studies 40, 415-435 DOI: 10.1017/S003441250400722X
? 2004 Cambridge University Press Printed in the United Kingdom
Augustine's compatibilism
KATHERIN A. ROGERS
Department of Philosophy, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716
In analysing Augustine's views on freedom it is standard to draw two Abstract: distinctions; one between an earlier emphasis on human freedom and a later insistence that God alone governs human destiny, and another between pre-lapsarian and post-lapsarian freedom. These distinctions are real and important, but underlying them is amore fundamental consistency. Augustine is a compatibilist from his earliest work on freedom through his final anti-Pelagian writings, and the freedom possessed by the un-fallen and the fallen will is a compatibilist freedom. This leaves Augustine open to the charge that he makes God the ultimate cause of sin. In analysing tinctions. alone One notes an earlier emphasis that governs view of pre-lapsarian or wrongly, wrongly, unless On turned but Augustine's on human human freedom, towards views on freedom it is standard of his thought to draw two dis over time, from Augustine's choose distinctions rightly only are
the historical destiny.
development
freedom, in which 'freedom',
to a later insistence the human in which being
that it is God's will between could
The other distinguishes
and post-lapsarian
fallen man grace. These them
can choose
the good by God's that underlying of the way
real and important, consistency. though would he does
Iwill argue question He holds responsible
is a more
fundamental today choices with the
the basic not use
the free will coinage, the causes
works, Augustine, is what we of human
the term which to factors outside
is of recent of the agent,
call a 'compatibilist'. traceable fully morally it even
that although
are ultimately agents being very clearly that he held different, of the will This causal
this is compatible He expresses
for their choices. writings,
this position to believe early
in the later, anti-Pelagian that the options open
but there is every reason
in his earliest work of the causes
on freedom. And
though Augustine,
and late, holds
to the free will before of the first sins shows
and after the Fall are that the basic nature and the
an examination is of more
in terms of motivation than historical troubled choice have been
and choice
does not change. rejection of any genuine position,

415
interest. From his day to ours, philosophers by the later Augustine's in the salvation of fallen man. For example,
theologians
role for human
second Council
of Orange
in 529 CE raised, against
the later Augustine's
416
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
the same problem are ultimately issue being will While rightly, Council
that faces compatibilists of causal claim that God's
today. If the choices outside grace the agent, irresistibly and
of rational agents in this case the elect responsible? the to The backed it is up to if the fun causes
the product the Augustinian how can
factors
the agent
really be merit-worthy of Catholic grace, that, having of divine
set the tone for the later development it upheld agent analysis the necessity to persevere, of freedom of un-fallen and gratuity and insisted is the same willing They views
thinking
on this issue.
it nonetheless grace, But
away from the late Augustine the human damental
received salvation.1
and be rewarded with are essentially on freedom are endemic
for the early Augustine
as for the late, from a late, of
and if the mechanics then the difficulties over-zealous freedom and pose
the same as after the Fall, do not stem to his basic philosophy
with Augustine's a problem
anti-Pelagianism.
for those sharing choice, made
that philosophy. by a rational agent, is the inevi the effect. The occur, but the For instance
First, some definitions I shall mean table product 'Inevitable' some other 'ceteris paribus' cause the view of causes here means
and introductory that a given
remarks are in order. By 'determinism' from the conscious the cause necessitates be the case choice might can occur. take many take place. agent himself.
that do not originate that, ceteris paribus, since such it might
is needed intervene the effect, who
that the cause be crushed
that the effect not
agent on the brink of causally the instant before Causal the mad should nition; necessitation neurosurgeon implant its cause a chip
necessitated the choice, could
by a boulder if
in this context haunts in an agent's which
forms. So, for example, free-will literature that makes to my is operant to the agent an instance defi since a brain event according
the pages brain
of contemporary
that produces
the agent choose
A over B, the choice is something the mad
for A is determined cannot
be identified with engineers leads
the agent,
it the of in of
is the chip and ultimately agent cannot a desire evitably This but fail to choose such in the agent, choosing second example
neurosurgeon,
and if the cause
A. Or if the neurosurgeon that in situation be thought
the implanting
X, the desire to be
A over B, then in X, the choice might
for A is determined. less obviously The chain of causes It might the agent the desire, is longer, be argued less the to of it towards leads
determination
than the first. Certainly difference itmight
it is different. causal more
that, in itself, does not undermine since be analysed him.
determinism. as drawing
that the important necessitating choice, choosing the causally
is that one of the causes,
is somehow
rather than impelling determined as inevitably
I do not see that this distinction To appeal
undermines is dis to pull
nature
of the event,
so long as the drawing to an analogy which inserted you have instance
as impelling would.
tant, but perhaps iron. It is one over the edge responsibility
still helpful, a magnet.
take a toy in which In the second
a chunk
thing to push using
the toy off the edge of a table, and another you might that itmoved
try to deny in a
for the toy's falling by claiming
on its own. And
417
sense hold falling Take
it did. But you put the iron in and you held up the magnet the toy so that it wouldn't is causally one necessitated does not seem follow by factors to make its attraction outside implants a difference itself, and
and you didn't The toy's pulled
to the magnet. to that claim. a cognitive
that it was
rather than pushed reasons, processes and a desire, which
last case:
the neurosurgeon
faculty which faculty the causal judgements, the for A is
such that, in situation
Y, the operation now
of the rational
and the desire the addition determinacy inevitable, back these God, This choice causal choice of which the agent's choice. produce certain cases
lead inevitably
to the agent choosing for A might faculty
A over B. Though involve complex
lead to the choice
of the cognitive of the choice and the causal outside if, instead
to the chain of causes explains agent, the choice
does not mitigate the choice
for A in Y. In each of these cases chain which
for A can be traced In each of cause outside of
to a cause
of the choosing of the mad
to the neurosurgeon. the originating of a blind nature,
neurosurgeon,
of the choosing the choice
agent had been narrow
the processes definition of
or the activity only event
is no less determined.2 'determinism', determinism. have makes focusing on a it in its is still in rather than on universal choice might if the mad causes On this definition a non-determined the choice Or take a choice of particles the source of nor
is a somewhat and its causes, history.
is possible
that a determined For example, the chip which
an indeterminate in the agent, motion is not
neurosurgeon the choice
to implant
determined,
although brain
it has indeterminacy cause
in its causal history. agent
the sole, originating and assume God's
is the indeterminate
that the conscious
identifiablewith the moving particles. This is, by my definition, a determined

Or suppose will freedom is of the radical, voluntarist the created and desires agent to make although that combined by God, sort. Should God a given choice, or to a the is lead inevitably it is ultimately choice indeterminately choice, and cause faculties
in the agent
that choice holds
is determined
result of indeterminacy.
'Compatibilism' determined (The freedom to choose Augustine's Compatibilists Compatibilism are advanced outlines Choice comes that it is consistent is nonetheless and most to believe morally that a given and that the agent that Augustine, terms, between responsible significant choices variations it will Iwill suffice argue, between inevitably for that choice. freedom, must on or, be made the theme the is essentially options chooses and that. in
of us, are interested but morally
in is not the freedom
indescernibles, the freedom grant 'freedom'
to turn to God or to sin. That will be our topic.) that morally today, and responsible countless Here which, or 'free will' literature. as compatible with determinism. to sketch
typically
freely, and then analyse
is very popular in the contemporary brand
of a standard is caused
of compatibilism
Augustine's position.
by desire. The rational agent deliberates about what itmost desires and to a conclusion
418
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
The agent shaped
is not
the author
of his reason
or his desires. lie in the will's
Perhaps being
his desires drawn
are to
by his character, which may
in turn be shaped
by past choices. inevitably
Still, there
is a beginning
to the process which must
choose what the agent pre-volitionally judges most desirable, because that is how motivation works. This is determinism since, under the circumstances, the
choice outside is inevitable of the agent. and the causes which naturalist lead to it are the product universe where the reasoning of factors and desires In a non-theist,
which determine the choice are the product of the processes of blind nature. In
a classical status Since theist universe in being such as Augustine's, from moment product all that has real ontological by the divine will, they are from means is sustained the choice to moment
given by God.3
is the inevitable of causes which it is free because do not originate what 'freedom' the agent, caused, pulsion, patibilism, within him; it is determined. Nonetheless, behaviour, being forced considered
is the ability to follow one's rationally considered desires. Natural necessity, i.e.
non-deliberative i.e. an agent's of one's like the falling of a rock, is unfree. And com to act against desires, argues action. his will, The And agent is unfree. But choosing version of com to be at in that it can be held options this standard
on the basis
is the essence
of voluntary
least the proximate
originator
of his own choices and judgements. him most. have chosen had been have choices
in that they arise from factors he has open because thus, his choice he could have just that in he that is the The
his own desires
he can choose whatever is correct concludes, rewarding as a whole. which This genuinely if his desires and
attracts
Even after he has made otherwise', And different.
to say that, 'he could judgement the agent Though deserves
the compatibilist It is not and on society is a sense otherwise, choices. it entails
can be genuinely him may the agent's with
morally a salutary
responsible.
and punishing
effect on him there
are determined, for his morally
they originate is, of course, God
him, and because and blame position.
he could have chosen significant theist For the classical to moment. produce
the praise
a problematic is caused sustains
the free choice him, and which originating created causality causes It is correct will of God.
of the agent
by the reason and desires from moment agency, that inevitably
that God has given Thus, God the choice.
in him
cause
of the series of events
agent has only a kind of 'secondary' in general. possess, Secondary causality upon in total dependence and actions So it is equally, the cotton
on the analogy causal
of secondary created of God. and all to say
is the sort of causal the primary
power power
to say that the fire burned
the cotton, more
but the fire, the cotton, fundamentally, correct
their properties that God causes Augustine he expresses which
exist right now as the immediate or perhaps to burn.4 causality'
effect of the active
does not use the term 'secondary the concept in precisely
but, as we will how
see below, a choice if God is
the context
of explaining
is caused
by God can still, in a sense, be caused
by the agent. But
419
the primary difficult
cause of the choices which the author
we make
as merely argue,
secondary
agents, the charge open
it is of to
to see how He can justly hold us responsible of sin. Augustine, agents to be morally Iwill
and escape
being, Himself,
leaves himself and who
this problem.
One who If (contrary free will Augustine the nature pre-lapsarian that morally the aspects desires choice. dependently holds created to what was I will radically responsible, position judges moral of
responsibility to be incompatiblewith determinism, may opt for 'libertarianism'.

argue) Augustine's over the course ifAugustine I will on the basic workings presumably between that all his in the view changed of his career, the early
a libertarian. And freedom was
sees a radical difference take 'libertarianism' tomean
of the will before significant
and after the Fall, then presumably libertarian. in which originates solely the agent in the conscious faces
he believes agent. While including exist
choice may
of the situation of the agent
the choice, is not
and motivations,
be traced back
to things or events which the same to libertarian
and his choosing,
true of the actual freedom. An agent libertarian freedom 'from our freedom. and
I do not take open options worlds'
to be essential
which existed absolutely from itself, likeGod, might recognize only one option
(the 'best of all possible since selves', its choice For created agents perhaps) and yet choose with though, comes ifwe is generated possibilities entirely may from itself. are to choose libertarian desires, be necessary status to enable from God, to conflicting our choice.5
in a theist universe, ontological
alternative
If all that has genuine our desires can endow way which dom, choice, but us with
then our reason
are from Him. But ifwe are subject sufficient entails 'primary' agency and constitute not only desire will 'win out'
perhaps God free of the that that
that it is up to us in some absolute So libertarian cause to note to hold
for a creature,
that the agent be the ultimate possibilities. It is important allows one entail genuine in the history of choice,
that there are alternative the 'aseity'
emphasizing any given Suppose, against
('from oneself-ness')
free choice may for example,
not, at the time it ismade, somewhere
alternatives, of the choice. given who
so long as there were
such alternatives
that you briefly consider commitment were
immorally
lying, but quickly decide truthful character in that God caused cemented freedom. to choose to choose with just your
it out of a long-established
to truth-telling. Maybe, up to you, choices
you are now, you really could not have is the result of past choices which conflicting choice On desires in you such
lied. But if your present absolutely which
that the initial it ismade you with
propensity for truth-tellingwere entirely up to you, then although the present

grows out of your character, this analysis, freedom. The And certainly can hold libertarian open you do not now have to have options
libertarian anything. by desires
do not have through
to be able
libertarian
that every choice
you make may
be motivated there is a
and, to some extent, explicable
reasons. Nonetheless,
serious and standardly recognized 'intelligibility' problem with libertarianism,
420
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
which choices answer explain choice nothing rewind exactly
predates
Augustine
and ismentioned career you 'But why and faced
by him.6 If it is true that at some key literally open options, then there is no each to the we to be But is, you can
in your moral to the question, the motivation with your
did you opt for this over that?'. That interests. it which Nonetheless, holds when
for each choice,
and so in a sense you can connect it comes out. Were
character
actual choosing except the same
of one over the other, that you choose as before, argued, but
the libertarian makes you made
that there is absolutely everything the other they must would choice.
one option win one choice, make
the tape of life to back before 'if events
this time you might And as such, of libertarianism was
then, as the Stoics inexplicable morally present
are not necessitated,
be uncaused, really be held of the never drawn 'A
and hence mysterious'. A defence
the agent cannot lies outside
responsible.7 paper.8 Here
the scope
Iwill argue that Augustine consistently by
always a compatibilist, of the soul being
a libertarian, Throughout by love. material Wetzel body writes
and that his compatibilism his career Augustine is my weight; along is borne that:
is problematic. speaks it I am borne wherever direction do whatever attracts I am borne.'9 us more.'11
'My love
in a particular that we
by its weight,
just as a soul James
is by its love.'10 'It is necessary
... one of themost important principles of Augustine's philosophy of mind

we always act in response to what attracts us (even ifwe should have to act
[is that]
in
response towhat repels us least). One tempting understanding of freewill, that we are self-movers, is consequently ruled out of court.We have no motives for acting independently of what we perceive to be the good in acting.12 This certainly works suggests compatibilism express as I have a compatibilist defined doctrine it, and the later anti proof text.13 The and
Pelagian work blame produces
very clearly (2.2) by proving
of freedom. do indeed have of grace, which
Grace and Free Choice, written begins free choice and so we deserve in us the praiseworthy
clearly, once grace For, has been
in 426 CE, provides praise
an excellent beings
from Scripture But
that human
for our good behaviour choices,

also begin being
('good merits')
for our wickedness.
it is the presence or blameworthy

given,
or absence
But
our good merits a human
to exist,
but
through
that grace.
if grace
is withdrawn,
falls, no
longer
standing upright, but cast headlong by free choice. Hence, even when a human
being to God. begins to have good merits, he ought not to attribute them to himself, but (6.13)14
We merit Therefore, own wills who
heaven 'eternal
by living a good life ... is grace
life, but
the good
life is itself a gift of grace. (9.20). And yet enough it is by our [God] causes against those
in return for grace'
that we choose. is good' attack
'It is certain
that we will when we will, but does not destroy and, once
us to will what violently changes
(16.32). 'I think that I have argued to a good will,
the grace of God which
the human will, but it' (20.41).
it from an evil will
it is good, helps
421
Our wills
are determined
by God's
grace
to love and choose chooses well
the good,
and yet
they are genuinely and rewarded. will is in control His good instances achieve Gera
free, and the created of the wills purposes; causing of those who hardening
agent who
is justly praised that the divine in order to a list of scriptural deeds the evil son of
In Grace and Free Choice, Augustine God has caused evil wills
even suggests
do evil. He provides and consequent heart, (20.41).
in which
Pharaoh's
causing
to curse David,
Judas to betray Christ
Who would not tremble before these judgments of God by which God does what he wills even in the hearts of evil persons, repaying them, nonetheless, according to theirmerits? ... For the almighty produces in the hearts of human beings even the movement of theirwill in order to do through them what he himself wills to do through them, he who absolutely cannot will anything unjust. (21.42) In the example cursing would hidden because actually Augustine least good causality, about have the son of Gera, God been obedient inclined This 'tells' him to curse David. Augustine else the just and was evil of God Rather, 'by his
says that this telling could not have been judgement of its own produces clearly human implying God toward
in the form of a commandment, this sin that man's to suggest and a hidden Unfinished with will which
and praiseworthy. seems
sinfulness'. all events
the Calvinist
doctrine
an explicit will of God In the book he was
in His commandments, including writing at his death,
will by which against and
sinful choices."5 Work primary I have Julian, (at of divine will is what and human called agency
expresses agency)
the interaction through free willing
an analogy
secondary 'secondary'
that created
agency.
And from ifGod produces a good will will in a human being, He does it so that the good will being comes to be being that comes
the one whose another
it is, just as He works being. Just because being is not
so that a human it is God who born from
through does
human that
creates
a human being.
not mean
the human
another
human
(5.42)
Not only does Augustine later works, 'intelligibility' locutor, problem.
clearly express In his Unfinished
a compatibilist Work Against agree
doctrine Julian,
of will
in these
but he considers
libertarianism,
and raises against that willing
it the standard he and his inter of even
the Pelagian, in man
Julian of Eclanum,
is the 'movement that freedom,
the soul, with no compulsion' as it exists existent causal
(5.41). But Julian goes on to hold to choose well the choice. If the movement
after the Fall, is the ability source it ceases
or badly, with no pre of soul arises from reasons to salvation critics on our of liber accident
factors determining
some preceding own, makes and
to be free. Augustine sacrifice
has theological is unnecessary.
reject this view. As it stands, if that is the case the philosophical
it seems often entails
to imply that we can merit repeated by present-day it begins
then Christ's
But he also
case,
tarianism, that happens
that Julian's position
that a choice
is a sort of random
to the agent. He writes,
'you say, certainly
to be, but it does
422
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
not have it never But
any source. Or, what began'. Moreover,
is even if the
crazier, choice
it was to sin
not,
it is, and nevertheless it seems willing as it.
is uncaused
if sin is something to blame These Augustine mid-39os, (5.56)? later works himself,
that just happens
to the agent without to the agent a compatibilist
him genuinely
then how can the evil be connected certainly express
such that the agent doctrine
is really
of free will. Does in his views in the of Jacob over
this constitute
a radically different in his Retractions
position
from that held by the early Augustine? to a change election to Simplician, written
(426/427 CE), points of the pre-natal
on free will. He discusses
how in On Diverse Questions
he had tried to solve the question
Esau,
... in favour of the free choice of the human will, but God's grace triumphed. And it was only by reaching this point, that I could understand that the apostle had spoken with the clearest truth: What sets you apart?What do you have that you have not received? And if you received it,why do you boast as if you had not received it? (2.1) Some scholars argue that this work analysis this fiction of life.'16 To Simplician represents of the human for divine a significant will change in how Augustine saving action. not based as It is in relation to God's of the way [of libertarian from the 390s signals the will works. that God free choice] when a change in Augustine's 'Augustine to a
philosophical abandons new way sesses here humanly work,
James Wetzel he comes
writes,
to the conclusion, irresistibly
early in his long career as a theologian, Certainly,
can call sinners
the responsibility that he comes initiated
to believe petition
that election
is unconditional,
on any is always to a com in the to the of the it is one
aid, and
that the call to election from a libertarian position not need
effectual.17 But different the change patibilist metaphysics earlier writings, fundamental cian certainly respective made had always possible
as this may
be from the views he expressed signal a move a libertarian views
in his earlier
does not necessarily of free will. Unless the change
is expressed reach down thought
in Augustine's
level of the basic workings constitutes an important and human are drawn him roles of divine assumed: would of the will without we
of the will. The argument realigning in Augustine's but on my metaphysics what we at which
in To Simpli
willing,
interpretation, judge most
by the underlying then mark allowed simply
compatibilist the point denying he
of freedom Augustine desirable. that of Augustine realized primacy
to choose
To Simplician his doctrine divine ports Augustine's early work
to insist upon human insists
the unqualified freedom
sovereignty this reading.
and responsibility. of free will misread finished sup his
own analysis On Free Will they cited
of his development CE; books
on the question 2 and 3 were who
In the Retractions (387/388-395 it in support against
that the Pelagians
between freedom.
391-395) when
of their own emphasis
on human
On Free Will was written
the Manicheans,
proposed
two separate
423
wills
in the human own.
agent,
such that one does Augustine
evil by a will which
is somehow
not agent that to the
really one's chooses responsible.
In response,
had emphasized
that the human Augustine insists
good or bad through his own individual does not advance is fundamentally Even good choices, come
and single will, and so ismorally of the divine the position all goods, among as we
But in looking back from his later perspective, a view of the relationship different
the earlier work against goods, whether
created will which the Pelagians. including
from the one he later enunciated that all said, 'Since
in On Free Will he had maintained from God. and or small, are from God, is also from God, have to be seen it follows is numbered
great or moderate is virtue, would
that the good use of the great his in is
free will, which This
goods' (Retractions,9.6).
interpretation as Augustine misrepresenting early work were we there clear evidence insists or blamed. of libertarianism And which is likened in On Free Will. Certainly be voluntary, movement for otherwise of the will like the
that dialogue Augustine could not be praised distinguished or towards clearly
that our choices must occurs
the voluntary to a hinge,
from motion the bad here
by natural
necessity
falling of a stone the good as our wills, libertarianism. we are drawn the driving about man not
(3.1.2). The will
in that it can turn towards in our own possession to possess it (1.12.26). of and so no evidence argues
(3.1.3). Nothing to will with
is so much compatibilism, seems 1 Augustine
and we have only On the contrary, to choose
the good will
in order
But there is nothing
inconsistent
the assumption In book
to be that we choose what that libido is to say
by our desires.
factor in all wrongdoing by his love of what and open which deception' to follow what drawn to choose telling
(1.3.21). (There will be a great deal more of the first sins.) And and immutable They is eternal
the cause of evil below is defined
in the discussion
that the good (1.15.31). 8 and hence made irresistible choices
In book 3Augustine really voluntary 'some or 'some able through, cause',
offers a list of types of 'choice' which to praise compels or blame. against
are unfree include 'some
violence always
one's will',
(3.18.51). These you judge most
are exactly desirable
the sorts of examples they are explaining is enough freedom to
compatibilists how being being
give of what
is not free choice, when
ground moral responsibility.Augustine's list of unfree 'choice' does not include

inevitably the one option against you find most the libertarian desirable.19 interpretation the of 'free-will a liber Perhaps On Free Will defence'.20 perfectly good the most Augustine's evidence
is the absence, and omnipotent defence, since
in that work, God permits
of what
is today called It asks: how that he would answer
dialogue
is in part a theodicy. expect
is it that a avail himself to the theist are these:
evil? IfAugustine libertarian
had been
tarian at the time he wrote of the free-will problem without of moral God has made
the work, one would it is a standard premises
evil.21 The original
of the free-will
defence
creatures with
free will, and free will
is a very good
thing because In On Free Will
it the creature
could not choose
rightly and be virtuous.
424
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
Augustine wholeheartedly defends both of these claims. But the free-will defence
goes on to argue the libertarian point that a genuine ability to choose the good in
theway required for created aseity and morally significant freedom, necessarily entails the genuine, alternative possibility of not choosing the good, but instead
choosing Gilson, possibility (2.19.52-53) which must always evil. Thus for example, it is not possible in discussing about by for God to leave us free and yet prevent that for Augustine, condition the text which 'the
us from choosing evil. Some scholars have attributed this position toAugustine.
On Free Will writes the necessary its good use'.22 But of the evil use of free will was brought does not say exactly and achieve and open good without for the goodness he cites good
and happiness
this. It says that the will happiness. options, impairing
is an intermediate
can turn towards good or evil, and that we must such
have a will
ifwe are to love that free choice our
truth and wisdom include choosing
But this does not entail that God our free will.
aseity
could not bring about His
In On Free Will Augustine creatures anything one would even so that they would
does
indeed
ask why God did not make the good,
rational suggests who exist,
always the good
choose
but he never
like the free-will defence
in response.
Rather, he says that God has made creatures remain in sin. But even the that it should all of these strata of (3.5.14). Augustine good. And defence to remain
class of such creatures, sin and be redeemed, of creature in unhappiness, agents
angels. God has also made
and creatures who would
last category created
is a good
sort of thing, and it is better not exist at all. And of the whole the good creation angels
than that it should simply causes
serve the order and beauty say that God
here does not he is careful universe or indeed it about in On made
to say that God does not somehow his answer assumptions. in On Free Will creatures would developed
need sin in order to round out the the free-will
(3.9.24). Nonetheless, any libertarian response of a more between that rational
does not suggest to the question
This sketchy early version long period men
of why God did not bring the good gives seems to be an over a have concede things' best that of to the same question should
always a work
choose he wrote no wish
answer Augustine he writes,
the Literal Meaning
of Genesis,
after To Simplician to sin. Now, we in forbidden that it was that entails claim
401 and 415. Here
'They say that God no delight freedom
so that they would is better which seems to expressly
have absolutely takes absolutely deny
that a nature (11.7.9). This open Note unfree, options.
the libertarian significant
God make men with evil men
the sort of morally
genuinely
He goes on to say that God could these defence
turn (convertere)
the bad wills
into good wills. that forAugustine as the free-will to good, with 'turned' wills would would have not be destroyed or rendered just be turned He (Cur noluerit, good, at least it, rather they would to? God only knows all men
from bad penes
no harm done. Why
then did God not do so? Because
did not choose
to. And why
did He not choose
ipsum est). We
can say at least this, that had He made
425
one class of good the number inished' just different On Free Will, argument, defence,
creatures
would
not have
existed,
that is, those who of good kinds would with it. Thus, to offer
are con be dim is not at of this
verted by the thought (11.10.13). This
of the miserable argument
condition
of evil doers.
'Thus by increasing of Genesis version
of the best kind of thing, from the free-will it is plausible one would
the number it conflicts the presence
from On defence,
the Literal Meaning
in looking
to interpret have was and
of a sketchy a libertarian
where
expected
a libertarian
the free-will understand of free On the
as evidence
that Augustine radically between
not assuming
ing of freedom Diverse Questions
in the earlier work, to Simplician.
that his underlying
metaphysics
will did not change
the earlier work a compatibilist
and the time he wrote when it comes to how
Though always
he did adjust his emphases
on the roles
of grace and free will, he was
will actuallyworks. Focusing on the philosophical question ofAugustine's compatibilism ishelpful

in assessing Augustine. goodness the historical development of his thought since it provides human reason agency to in be careful not to over-emphasize destiny, and the difference between the early and the later the absolute
But if the later Augustine and justice of God, always held desirable, determine
leaves no room for genuine if this is difficult thus far seems of the intellect
the story of human one. Augustine it judges most nature which that God Here the will This condition. human
to square with
then the conclusion that the rational How is the cause
to be an unhappy and the desiring the conclusion drawn to
agent chooses can Augustine being
on the basis of what avoid
and God the choices.
is the author is a possible irresistibly
of sin? the Fall the human steps in with is inevitably grace, unless God and, story. But the grace which the present, will draw
answer: After to the good,
sin by desire is indeed beings.
for lesser goods, a compatibilist So Adam is not
if God gives persevering it describes
to salvation. of the first of if to and con then
post-lapsarian
And mankind
is in this fallen state because and Eve, and before for it. This a will which certainly though,
of the free choice
them Satan,
are the originators view. And sense,
evil, and God he allows he may choose
responsible creatures
is indeed Augustine's is free in the libertarian between
to un-fallen
be able to prevent moral Iwill God
the conclusion argue,
that God determines sees a distinction that he is a consistent that created and, agent
the created will the un-fallen compatibilist agency
evil. Augustine to avoid
and the fallen will. thus is unable secondary sistently prove insists agency.
the difficult
consequence
is only a
is the only primary analysis
though Augustine
that his view does not entail look at Augustine's and Grace (426/427
it, bears
the ultimate
responsibility
for sin. A careful the case. In On Rebuke Augustine human will
of the causes
for the first sins will works, can
CE), one between In answer
of the later anti-Pelagian will before to the question
draws a clear distinction in its present condition.
Adam's
the Fall, and the of how Adam
426
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
be blamed ance
for failing him
to persevere
in the good, writes,
if he didn't
receive
the persever
to enable
to do so, Augustine
If thatman had not abandoned this help through free choice, he would always have been good, but he abandoned it and was in turn abandoned. This help was, of course, such that he could abandon it if he willed to and could remain in it if he .... For he could have willed to, not such that itwould make him towill this (11.31) persevered if he willed to, but his not willing to do so came from his free choice which was at that point so free that he was able towill both good and evil. (11.32)23 We have seen that positing an ability will to choose between good and evil is con freedom is pres it is a
sistent with compatibilism. The question is this: is the difference between the
pre-lapsarian while ently being being and the post-lapsarian inexorably drawn drawn that the former has libertarian that after the Fall the will to sin, unless, while before drawn by God's towards the latter does not? Or is the difference downwards inexorably upwards to salvation,
grace,
the Fall there was judge the newly This would
time when Adam's in a condition presented compatibilist sort of natural its desires, drawn in the good,
will continued desirable upon to choose
in a state of being and choose between
the good but
such that, upon depending freedom necessity.
the arising of new desires, the character a defective not have it. But freedom in him
it could
objects most
on that basis
to sin or to persevere be a can maintain sin by a of to persevere the creator responsi in it. So if was
of the new desires. nature sinned, was such agent
good and evil. Augustine had he desired is not
that God did not make Adam with He might in the good more and inevitably than to abandon if pre-lapsarian by a desire have implanted judge
that he must
the created
compatibilist, to persevere desirable not see God
then Adam
for which
he does not bear the desire
the ultimate and pursue
bility. God might such a way pre-lapsarian source freedom intuitions company metaphysics essentially were of sin.
in the good as the ultimate of pre-lapsarian by
that he would freedom
that choice most it is difficult
is compatibilist,
It is not enough because which of many, the claim
to insist upon justice requires most,
the libertarian it.24 That does not
interpretation is driven and share, and
argument
libertarian is in the on the and it is which
Augustine perhaps
apparently
in this he who work for choices
contemporary has been,
philosophers responsibility compatibilist. Augustine's
of free will. Compatibilism by causes to make discussion he discusses the difference seems independent the case
is, very popular,
that the agent bears moral that Augustine
determined
of him. And is a consistent
there is very strong evidence clearest between general purely and most 12 of level, as 417 and spiritual,
for the interpretation The best way well-developed The City of God 425) where setting Augustine aside
is to examine 12would being
of the causes
of the first sin, and that is in book have been written angels. At embodied and being the most
(413-427 CE, book between
the fall of the bad the workings
to understand
of the human
and angelic wills
427
essentially between
the same.
In the text cited above quoted, he writes,
from Rebuke and Grace,
in the ellipsis
the two passages
But the fact that [Adam] did not will to remain in [agood will], is of course, his fault, as itwould have been his merit if he had willed to remain in it, as the holy angels did.When the other angels fell through free choice, the holy angels remained standing through the same free choice and merited to receive the reward due to their
remaining, ....
There choice, which
are two reasons Augustine must
to focus on the City of God text. First, in analysing Adam's situate about the discussion within the actual Genesis question can focus did not of how texts, the with Why distract from the philosophical will, Augustine angels
import details which In writing of the causes have of the workings
will works. mechanics analysis
the angelic group'.
on the pure
of the choices of the will insists
of the good and bad angels. Secondly, The good by centring on the question: in the good? of the good this because them
the angels we
a 'control fall while
fall, and so the
is clarified
did the bad angels first chapter bad angels'. but must bad angels of nature Augustine
the good
angels persevered
Well, why? Augustine of book
that the difference 'Concerning and desires
does not lie in their nature. The the one nature We (12.1). know and the
12 is entitled, to their wills
The evil choices are justly punished
of the bad angels for this sin, and
are not the result of an evil nature, 'No one pays retribution could have caused means have for faults to sin? which
be attributed
but for faults of will' answers,
(12.3). Then what
'If you should
seek the efficient cannot
cause of this evil will, nothing something a willing agent which it caused by a
will be found' takes action caused bad. cause things again, There
(12.6). By an 'efficient' to produce
cause, Augustine
an effect. There
have been cause
the first evil will, evil will
for the will of the agent would not have been which
to have been good or left as a of the and, the
It is absurd
to say that a good will could then itwould is something though
evil, but were
pre-existing
the first. The only option might serve as an object in themselves,
for the evil will lower down choice. There good cannot But,
does not have a will, one of those good these things are good for the evil choices in the good
on the scale of being which inferior, be the efficient just is no efficient cause cause cause
perverted possibilities.
of evil. Augustine
has exhausted of a free will. angels,
is an efficient
of the will
to persevere
and it is
God. We have seen above that God's to salvation in which case
grace is the active cause of the will to persevere the same explanation from the Creator, 'If the good without themselves or itwas for a good will later given to a it by this
in the fallen elect. Essentially the good will must It cannot come
holds for the good angels. Either theywere created complete with theirgood wills,
them by God. and then chose good will follows God. And be the case that they were created without angels were the operation better the good will of God, then
the good on their own. it in themselves they made Itmust
at first without
and produced that is absurd.'
that, on their own
than they were made that they receive
be through God's work
428
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
good will because made be turned Him who being
'they could not
not have made to themselves
themselves who were to Him
better inferior in him'
than they were that they should in being, (12.9). but those be com or at this is are but to in advance
by the best Creator'. [converterentur] supremely exists,
'And the effect of their good will was so that by clinging
they might
and live in wisdom
and happiness
by participation
Augustine makes roughly the same point regardingAdam's will in Unfinished

Work Against who mitted least will We more do good Julian. Those who that 'aman better do evil do it through is good through through himself false himself, than their own wills, we would not do it through God. We must say this, otherwise
to the view which
through God, And
that he becomes chooses the good
through God'. yet
a position meritorious,
Scripture
plainly
proves
(5.57). When
the pre-lapsarian the angels in the good. of the bad says,
it is determined have been choose
to do so by God. And what they choose. that mean writes
and Adam would the good
also, had he persevered
know why
angels
But what
angels? There
is no efficient cause
for evil, but does
that there is nothing that if someone
to be said? Speaking
of the bad angel, Augustine
... that [the bad angel] himself produced lfecisse] the evil will though he was good
before the evil will, he should ask why he caused it, whether because he is a nature,
or because he ismade from nothing. He will find that the evil will arises [incipere]
not from the fact that he is a nature, but from the fact that that nature is made
from nothing (12.6). The cause only any more That makes through a number offered the thesis of the first sin 'is not efficient the higher good than we can see darkness of the evil will throughout but deficient'. The bad choice grasp consists its cause
in deserting the cause consistently
for lesser goods, or hear silence and is 'nothing'
and we cannot (12.7). 'deficiency'
is a case Augustine (2.20.54) all the way are have recent Even scholars at his death. There
his career, might A canvas
from On Free Will by this, and compatibilist.
to the book against different suggestions. chooses
Julian which
he left unfinished mean of the possible
of things Augustine that Augustine
interpretations
will support the pre-lapsar desires 'from' that of a the responsible.
is straightforwardly evil does so inevitably, for which to hold
ian will which
drawn by its desires, which agent can be held created 'out of' or
do not result from a choice A first possibility nothing allows might mean is this: only
the un-fallen
that the first sin arises being seems
that it is the agent's Julian. In the dialogue, that saying
from nothing Augustine evil on
for the possibility Work Against
of an evil will. Augustine Julian argues from insists
to be saying
this in the
Unfinished for sin tenebrae
Julian accuses that 'nothing' blaming
crypto-Manicheanism.
is a sort of cause moral
is really no different (darkness). Augustine

' Nothing' sin is not any
the Manicheans that his view
is quite different:
force or power. from When nothing, we say that all we
sort of thing
at all and has no the creature
is possible
(not necessary)
because
is made
429
mean is this: things are either from God or from nothing. The Son and the Spirit are from God, for the one is begotten and the other proceeds, and they are co-equal with God. Created things are not from God in the sense of sharing the divine substance. Nor are created things made from some pre-existing substance. If creatures were from God as the Son and the Spirit are, theywould be God and so evilwould not be a possibility for them. This iswhy we say that it is creation from nothing which makes evil possible. (5.27-38) But this cannot evil will. Creation will, but were while question A second first sins sense writes, deficient it cannot created equally be all there is to the role of 'nothing' ex nihilo must function ex nihilo as an explanation as the deficient cause of the of the evil angels sin
be seen as the cause of the possibility
for the first sins. The good is: why
and so it is equally possible to answer claim
for them to sin. But the did the evil angels
that Augustine interpretation
is attempting in the good? of Augustine's choice
the good persevered is that the original 'If silence causality,
that 'nothing' without
is the cause of the a cause, in the of light, and William Babcock
for evil is absolutely radically of sound does and darkness that we
of being without
explanation, seem, must cause, have
unintelligible.
is the absence itwould
the absence 'know'
be the absence hold
of cause.'25 Yet Augustine, can silence silence causal rather seem them. appeal to and to do to
in speaking and darkness, efficacy.
of this deficient though nothing,
darkness, when
our ears and eyes fail to perceive to the question, explanation, cause for one's
sound or light (12.7). And yet explanatory, an absence, would
a sort of defective, it posits
In answer
'Why didn't you see that rock?', although failure 'nothing', to see. The unintelligible, that would analogy
'Itwas dark'
is a comprehensible than an efficient suggest, not to be explained 'nothing' something
that the first sins are utterly by the absence agrees with
but rather that they are have prevented that Augustine's
of something
T. D. J. Chappell unintelligible.
the interpretation agents were rational
as a defective they knew
cause means to be wrong,
that the first evil wills and wise. the choice must
are uncaused If they chose
The first created
be unmotivated.
Chappell
writes,
Such an action is, by its very nature, inexplicable, simply because the explicability of
an action supposed described, can only mean the possibility whatever specify of relating is aimed it to some good at which as correctly and hence it is to aim. But then if no good we at by an action to which
of course
cannot
any good
it is related;
it is necessarily true thatwe cannot explain it.26
Yet, throughout his career,Augustine frequently discusses themotives for sin.

The evil choice Will Augustine he holds ceived'. suggestion, that, He aims at a lesser good, not at no good writes goes on that libido iswhat motivates is not drawn how Satan to remark that Adam's himself, 'the will to do anything choice being at all. In book unless 1 of On Free is per have all wrongdoing was motivated the first sinner, (1.3). In book 3 by Satan's could
something
but wonders
430
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
perceived wills, recognize imitation darkness, pursue
the option wills
of evil, which something'.
he must a desire cause Pride,
have
done,
since
'[s]omeone God, Satan
who could
certainly
He answers
that, in knowing to exalt himself immediately
his own soul and develop of God Augustine (3.25.74-76). to know inserts over
in an inappropriate after the text on or see to the that in choosing motivates argues
In The City of God, a chapter the higher.
how attempting
the 'defective'
is like trying to hear silence evil consists which Later for example, own power.
(12.8) on how
the lower good
sin of the evil angels, God, when pride exaltation?' Augustine Moreover philosophically bility problem Augustine, is the beginning
is a perverse of an evil will, succumb
love of one's ' [b]ut what why
in The City of for a perverse from God, but and causal for sin. cause in the
he is elaborating
on the sins of Adam puzzling
and Eve, Augustine is pride but desire a good, rational, lead it away
(14.13) .27 It is indeed
and knowledge
able creature would
to the desires which which holds
is very clear that it chooses the interpretation speaking, and
on the basis of desire. that the first sin is unmotivated of how cannot to assign escape the respective both responsibility is the efficient
inexplicable, would attribute toAugustine what is probably theworst solution,

to the question agents roles to God and created in creaturely that God agree, choice. It entails the intelligi
the conclusion for example choice
as all his interpreters significant the good, inevitable
is very clear that God
of the good choice, sort of morally does not choose cause choice is both
of the perseverance
of the good angels. But two options.
at issue there are only evil. Thus,
If the agent the bad and unin by desire element choice for is for a
then he chooses and unintelligible.
if God does not efficiently
the good choice,
the bad choice must
follow. On this interpretation, of the deficiency ismoved
Scott MacDonald telligibility some involved to sin ismotivated recognizably how a desire creature made Donald which, 'carelessness while inappropriate reasons'.
offers a different and intelligible good, though
understanding
in the first sins, what
he refers to as 'primal' that the will object. succeed awareness of primal to attend desire,
sin. The choice
in the sense inappropriate, object could for whom cause' a failing
The puzzling inmotivating of God sin may
for the inappropriate both good and wise, that the
is a given. Mac be a preceding available, allows splits the the
suggests not
'deficient reasoning',
in practical desire
to the evidence nonetheless 'analysis to attend but
itself some to win
sort of motivating out.28 He writes
that Augustine's
act of sin into two components The act of will is not cause.29 of the inappropriate 'deficiency' ceding This succeed a 'deficient' reasoning motivation involves
- an act of will and a failure must be explained which
to relevant the success failure. The
is explicable
in terms of the motivation, but
by the preceding rather can plausibly with
that the first sins are unmotivated, a lack of attention suggestion, but
that the pre be analysed as
is an interesting
there are difficulties since
it. It does not Augustine
as an interpretation
of Augustine,
in the texts where
431
discusses in practical He explains tending
the original
sins, he does not trace them to any preceding is not too serious a problem in not only reconstructive of primal [he] can claim
carelessness though. but also to ex in of
reasoning.30 This answer
forMacDonald, interpretation,
that he is interested
in a constructive the texts'.3" The more Augustinian posed leaves
to the problem
sin, and so he admits
'Augustinian interesting
ideas beyond what question iswhether
to have found explicitly extension
or not this is a successful analysis cause
ideas such
that, given Augustine's responsible should have
of the first sins, the pro in a way which not. MacDonald -a that is adamant
'failure to attend' the agent morally writes could that and
could play the role of the deficient it is the initial to voluntary failure itself which
for the first sin. It seems avoided'.32 acts of will. following from But Augustine
sometimes failure one blame needs act of will, MacDonald
is 'blameworthy
can attach only explanation holds
If this initial failure some preceding the failure
is a voluntary sin which cause. be
then it, and not
the choice results
from it, is the primal
and which then,
deficient
that the initial failure contrary writes
is not a voluntary
act, or indeed any sort itself cannot
of act at all.33 But
to MacDonald,
blameworthy.
Sometimes failures directed worthy, choice And, the bad, expect MacDonald as if it is the choice which for evil traces back to choices if the failures themselves acts and not of these results from the failing resulting from these of mis blame then the of the are instances in themselves causes, the control sin? sin, one is left with and the failure of that the failure way. We do not and so a of intel a it that incurs blame: and no attention, and 'culpability farther'.34 But which
are not voluntary sins are the result
the primal
deficient
is determined if the issue of what in attending
by a mental is Augustine's explains
phenomenon understanding
not under for the primal of primal angels
agent. How, the question to attend may
then, can the agent be responsible the success
of the good
to the relevant uncaused, to attend
facts. MacDonald in an entirely is not a violation inMacDonald's
suggests innocuous
be genuinely explanation of the failure is a fair point, of primal
a causal
for every instance and useful
of not doing
something,
lack of a cause ligibility.35 This plausible move
of any principle attempt
to construct and hence responsibility
analysis
sin and wrongdoing that Augustine's
in general.
It does not, however,
us towards
a non-compatibilist
interpretation
of Augustine,
does not solve the problem for the primal good main angels sin to God.
view entails attributing
Following MacDonald's suggestion, suppose that the difference between the

and the bad angels is that the former succeed in attending to the relevant angels do not re of the good this reasons and the latter fail. Augustine God's grace works them has told us that the good
good on their own, but rather through as the efficient properly by causing to attend
the grace of God. So, on the present cause of the good wills to the relevant reasons. Without
hypothesis,
432
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
grace God's attend, attend had
they would
have
fallen,
too. Thus point
the failure cannot
to attend
is inevitable without for the initial failure to will
grace. Perhaps we cannot but we know in practical Nor grace. MacDonald's reasoning and does
to a cause or reason attend analysis
that the creature
on its own, and hence
fail without
'Augustinian' as an explanation
of the role of the failure to sin and wrongdoing not what Augustine which causality
of primal
is an interesting in mind. challenges The most which why would
fruitful one. However, it supply
it is probably
an interpretation
of deficient and allows him claim that
the compatibilist for sin. plausible
reading of Augustine of Augustine's is the absence agent
to absolve God 'nothing' causes of for the less help, to if it is to say
of the responsibility the first evil wills lesser good. And
interpretation
is that 'nothing'
of something, from following
the presence its desires
have prevented fell while
the created
this is exactly what Augustine the good angels love than those who of bliss
says. In The City of God he explains stood firm. 'Either they received in it, or, if both were the others, cause certain This They them receiving more created never
the bad angels good,
grace of the divine equally achieved fall away' absent, chosen it didn't,
persevered
they fell through
an evil will, while from which follows grace is the efficient
that plenitude the created the good,
they are absolutely its baser desires.
(12.9). Since God's agent chose
of the good will, is not
inevitably
that the first agents
evil by any necessity had God's necessity,
of their nature. grace caused
could have to do so. But inevitably.
by their own wills, this interpretation
and so they fell, not by natural with that the responsibility agents. The creatures arise naturally He could
but nonetheless
The problem to the charge first created to help when intimated implicates in the end, vacillating embracing But ex nihilo. They
is that it leaves Augustine's did not produce from nothing. the will to others Babcock
position
open the fails
for the original themselves writes
evil lies with God, not with And then God
their lower desires 'has at least
in a being made
do so. Babcock gave grace
that here Augustine
that the origin of the evil will the God who is not uneasily an instance between of moral as caused position.37
lies outside agency'.36
itself and ultimately ... the first evil will, sees Augustine unintelligible grace, without hold that due are as
to some but not
the view
that the first sin is radically by the absence of divine
and the view that it is explained either problematic reason to argue the only
that Augustine intuition
does not clearsightedly pursuing that a rational determined agent disagrees
the first sins are caused to a lack of grace responsible ontirely outside Pelagian works heaven for choices
by the creature's which
inevitably
its base desires by causes which with
is the libertarian
is not morally this in
are ultimately
its control. Augustine are, inAugustine's
clearly and explicitly responsible objects
tuition. The good angels of The City of God, book view, morally their good wills the good voluntarily. They are the appropriate
12, and the elect of the later anti agents. They choose praise. They merit caused by God. of moral
for their good wills. And
are efficiently
433
Since Augustine wills, when grace, agent
says that the created is moved to suppose causality
agent
ismorally
responsible
for the good of divine in the other grace. that the created
it
its will
in one direction
by the efficient its will
causality ismoved
there is no reason ismorally responsible by the deficient does
that he must of base desire,
balk at saying unaided
for the evil itwills, when
direction will,
by divine
Though there are differences between the pre-lapsarian and the post-lapsarian
the difference not go as deep condition as the basic workings is not changed needed needs of the will. On
Augustine's account, creaturely freedom is compatibilist, before and after the

Fall. This entails human the original that the human After as radically by the first grace to persevere different salvation. But in in grace sins as itmight seem. Before the Fall, man
good condition.
the Fall, man
a somewhat towards
to rescue him
from his sinful condition grace we are damned and all ultimately problematic
and turn him and with God's doing.
either case, without This agency
itwe are saved, and all freely 'primary'
through our own wills, is an extremely
position.
It leaves no room for any from which choices it seems
on the part of the rational creature, 'the author of sin'. Augustine his view entails works by causes which the problem is not stem
to follow that God and they later, to the of on and just,
is indeed, Nonetheless,
says that he denies from the will of God. no originating went
this latter conclusion. IfAugustine's causal efficacy
that all creaturely
are determined,
are determined anti-Pelagian, human seems will,
go too far in allowing
that Augustine
to extremes
in the heat
his anti-heretical polemics. The problem is the underlying compatibilism, which

to have been and which will. his understanding is applicable of free will to his analysis from his earliest writings of both the pre-lapsarian is good and and God the subject,
the post-lapsarian
If sin is really blameworthy
compatibilism is false.38
Notes
1. Rebecca Harden Weaver Divine Grace and Human Agency: A Study of the Semi-Pelagian did not attempt the difficult to persevere on his own, when rest upon Controversy task of trying to is the on the
(Macon GA: Mercer sort out just how origin of all good mind/body determined 3. Choices 4. Recently
University things.
Press, 1996), 232. The council agent could choose nor my
the human
it is God who
2. Neither my definition question. whether
of determinism, If choices the agent
further conclusions, caused
a particular
position is
are inevitably ismaterial in which
by factors outside
the agent,
the choice
or immaterial. the divine designer set up the inexorable that God laws in the it seems to me. of the will', Faith and 20 is not blameworthy be equally determined, like this, insisting sovereignty and freedom:
made
in a deist universe,
beginning
and then let the universe Hugh McCann has proposed
run on its own, would a view something agents and 'Sovereignty ('Divine
for the evil choices He causes Faith and Philosophy, Philosophy, 5. This
in his created
and the freedom a reply to Rowe',
12 (1995), 582-589;
18 (2001), 1io-116). I offer a criticism by Anselm
in 'Does God cause doctrine
sin?', Faith and Philosophy,
(2003), 371-378. is a position suggested of Free Will of Canterbury's of the will, especially principle in On the Fall of the Devil. I take it that it could be elaborated using Robert Kane's of plural voluntariness;
The Significance
(Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996), 109-115.
434
KATHERIN
A. ROGERS
6. Libertarianism, free-will debate Aphrodisias
with
its concern
for alternative Susanne
possibilities, Bobzien
is apparently
rather a latecomer and Freedom
to the of
among
philosophers.
finds it first in the work of Alexander in Necessity, Cause and Blame suggests
in the second
and third centuries that some scholars
CE; see her Determinism Sorabji have argued that Aristotle
in Stoic Philosophy (Ithaca NY: Cornell choice, but
(Oxford: Clarendon he disputes 7. Ibid., 26-27. 8. Anselm of Canterbury
Press, 1998), 401. Richard
UP, 1980), 227-233, notes this reading.
uncaused
does,
I think, provide
an adequate
analysis
of libertarian advance
freedom
in a for solving the choice, for a thick and being
(non-Pelagian) the intelligibility self-caused. volume. problem 9. Augustine
theist universe. Against problem.
the Stoic claim, he would between due
two suggestions of the agent before This is all matter
First, there is a difference the agent produces
a choice
being uncaused
Second,
reward and punishment it here only to preclude 13.8. ad Galatas, and works 49.
attach, not to the character in himself the inference that, since
but to the character which Imention here,
to his choice.
I do not attempt
to solve the
I take it to be insoluble.
Confessions, epistulae Augustine
io. Idem City of God, 11.28. ii. Idem Expositio 12. James Wetzel 13. Dating D. Fitzgerald, B. Eerdmans, 14. Translation of The Works translation i6. Wetzel distinct cannot (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 84.
the Limits of Virtue from 'The works Through
of Augustine's
of Augustine
(dates and explanations)',
in Allan
OSA (ed.) Augustine 1999), xliiiff.
the Ages: An Encyclopedia, J.Teske,
(Grand Rapids MI: William to the Pelagians, a translator IV; pt 1, vol. 26 is not cited,
of Grace and Free Choice by Roland of SaintAugustine ismy own. is expressed and in the Enchiridion
SJ, from Answer
(Hyde Park NY: New City Press, 1999). Where (26.100) written holds our actions'. between
15. A similar position Augustine
a few years earlier
(421/422 CE).
the Limits of Virtue, desires, seem
8.Wetzel deliberate
that for Augustine, This seems to choice separate supplies which
'There is no faculty of will, to one or another. following or desire. and not even more
from desire, which
we use to determine seems to show
to imply that the person than simply as motive ismade from intellect us with chooses
stand back from conflicting on the contrary, does often
them, and commit
Introspection, I shall continue
that there ismore a faculty of will, is correct, since it is He who
desire. But Augustine literally identical with forcefully. Our choices Wetzel's interpretation the desires. 17. I thank an anonymous Augustinian 8. The analysis Babcock knowledge libertarian dragged 19. InAgainst bound. 20. There are, of course, attempting claims.
to elide voluntas assumes if Wetzel by God
as will and voluntas then my
to speak as ifAugustine desire. However, are determined simply dismisses
argument
our desires. in accord with of these See William 34. To my a that the soul is when accepted
the will as a 'middle-man', for pointing owes much Journal out to me
reader for this journal in this early work agency',
the importance
of wrongdoing it is not standard view of freedom.
to the influence Ethics, and classical seems
of Platonism. followers,
'Augustine
on sin and moral
of Religious
16 (1988), 40-56,
to argue that Plato, or his ancient The Platonic image of wrongdoing of the unfree for lower things.
to be consistently
downwards Fortunas
by its desires
(392 CE), the example different versions
act is being defence,
forced
to do something
tightly an
of the free-will
and if all one meant version
by the term was created of the argument it Anselm the
argument which without
to absolve God of responsibility does offer one. that it is best freedom. theodicy philosopher between Philosophy among
for sin by laying the blame with evil because
free will,
then perhaps Augustine purports to show destroying
I use the term to refer to a standard that God permit moral
He could not prevent To my knowledge, along libertarian agent entails
created
21. I am not aware of any developed Canterbury is the first Christian to choose
the libertarian Pelagians. a systematic freedom significant
of
to develop
theodicy
lines. In
his On the Fall of the Devil he argues literally open option 22. Etienne House, Gilson The Christian
that morally
for a created
good and evil. of Saint Augustine, consistently argues L. E. M. Lynch that Augustine (tr.) (New York NY: Random always held the view which
1960), 147. In spite of this, Gilson
435
I have 143-164.
labeled
'compatibilist'; (1999).
we
inevitably
choose what we
judge to be most
desirable.
See 132-136,
23. Translation
by Teske
24. See for example Press, 1994), 107. 25. Babcock
John Rist Augustine: on sin and moral
Ancient agency',
Thought Baptized 47.
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
'Augustine
26. T. D. J.Chappell 28. Scott MacDonald University 29. Ibid., 130. 30. MacDonald's sentences 31. MacDonald 32. Ibid., 126.
Aristotle
and Augustine
on Freedom (11.30.39). B. Matthews
(New York NY: St Martin's (ed.) The Augustinian
Press,
1995), 190. (Berkeley CA:
27. See also On the Literal Meaning of California evidence could
of Genesis
'Primal sin', in Gareth
Tradition
Press, 1999), 110-131, 121. is slender. He quotes support his hypothesis a paragraph (ii8). from On Free Will (3.18.50) which contains two
which
'Primal sin', 113. ascribes to the 'failing to attend' (132). One might is itself difficult that, while to assess. succeeding something. It is not an act, in attending But when
33. The status which MacDonald but is nonetheless to the relevant MacDonald attend comes an 'instance reasons
of agency'
suppose
is an act, failing is not, since of the process be explained seems of God might
it's just a matter
of not doing on other
to offer an example
of Eve's first sin, he writes in a 'not doing',
that her failure to facts she knows failure to act. about in
to the goodness
by her concentrating consists
the divine nature. But this is not a failure which misdirecting 34. Ibid., 126. 35. Ibid., 131. 36. Babcock 37. Ibid., 49. 38. Iwould comments like to thank Robert Brown, on earlier versions James Wetzel, 'Augustine on sin and moral agency', ones concentration (121),which
it is a failure which
consists
like an act, rather than a simple
48. and anonymous referees for this journal for helpful
of this paper.

Augustine&#39;s Compatibilism

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Augustine's Compatibilism Author(s): Katherin A. Rogers Source: Religious Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Dec., 2004), pp.

Religious Studies 40, 415-435 DOI: 10.1017/S003441250400722X

? 2004 Cambridge University Press Printed in the United Kingdom

Department of Philosophy, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716

the historical destiny.

freedom, in which 'freedom',

to a later insistence the human in which being

that it is God's will between could

The other distinguishes

fallen man grace. These them

the good by God's that underlying of the way

real and important, consistency. though would he does

Iwill argue question He holds responsible

fundamental today choices with the

the basic not use

the free will coinage, the causes

works, Augustine, is what we of human

the term which to factors outside

is of recent of the agent,

call a 'compatibilist'. traceable fully morally it even

this is compatible He expresses

for their choices. writings,

this position to believe early

in the later, anti-Pelagian that the options open

but there is every reason

in his earliest work of the causes

and late, holds

to the free will before of the first sins shows

in terms of motivation than historical troubled choice have been

does not change. rejection of any genuine position,

role for human

in 529 CE raised, against

the later Augustine's

that faces compatibilists of causal claim that God's

today. If the choices outside grace the agent, irresistibly and

the product the Augustinian how can

really be merit-worthy of Catholic grace, that, having of divine

it nonetheless grace, But

away from the late Augustine the human damental

and be rewarded with are essentially on freedom are endemic

for the early Augustine

as for the late, from a late, of

with Augustine's a problem

for those sharing choice, made

and introductory that a given

that do not originate that, ceteris paribus, since such it might

is needed intervene the effect, who

that the cause be crushed

that the effect not

necessitated the choice, could

in this context haunts in an agent's which

the pages brain

the agent choose

A over B, the choice is something the mad

for A is determined cannot

be identified with engineers leads

and if the cause

A. Or if the neurosurgeon that in situation be thought

A over B, then in X, the choice might

than the first. Certainly difference itmight

it is different. causal more

that, in itself, does not undermine since be analysed him.

that the important necessitating choice, choosing the causally

is that one of the causes,

Augustine's Compatibilism

Augustine's Compatibilism