ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY, deceased, vs. LUZON SURETY CO., INC., claimant-Appellant FACTS: Luzon Surety Co.

filed a claim against the Estate based on 20 different indemnity agreements, or counterbonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K. H. Hemady, a surety solidary guarantor. Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the 20 bonds it executed inconsideration of the counterbonds, and asked for judgment for the unpaid premiums and documentarystamps affixed to the bonds, with 12 % interest thereon. CFI dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety Co.,on failure to state the cause of action. ISSUE: What obligations are transmissible upon the death of the decedent? Are contingent claims chargeable against the estate? RULING: Under the present Civil Code (Art. 1311),Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in the case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 & 776,NCC,provides, thereby confirming Art. 1311. ART. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death. The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision in our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs and distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive. The gene ral rule is that a partys contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive depersonalization of patrimonial rights and duties. Of the 3 exceptions fixed by Art 1311, the nature of obligation of the surety or guarantor does not warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated as a principal inducement for the contract. Creditor Luzon Surety Co. expects from Hemady when it accepted the latter as surety in the counterbonds was the reimbursement of the moneys that the Luzon Surety Co. might have to disburse on account of the obligations of the principal debtors. This reimbursement is a payment of a sum of money, resulting from an obligation to give; and to the Luzon Surety Co., it was indifferent that the reimbursement should be made by Hemady himself or by someone else in his behalf, so long as the money was paid to it. The 2 nd exception of Art. 1311, is intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties. Being exceptional andcontrary to the general rule, this intransmissibility should not be easily implied, but must be expressly established, or at the very least, clearly inferable from the provisions of the contract itself, and the text of the agreements sued upon nowhere indicate that they are non-transferable. The 3rd exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Art. 1311 exists when they are not transmissible by operation of law. The provision makes reference to those cases where the law expresses that the rights or obligations are extinguished by death: legal support, parental authority, usufruct, contracts for a piece of work, partnership & agency. By contract, the articles of the Civil Code that regulate guaranty or suretyship (Art 2047 to 2084) contain no provision that the guaranty is extinguished upon the death of the guarantor or the surety.The contracts of suretyship entered into by Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual liability there under necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The contracts give rise to contingent claims provable against his estate under sec. 5, Rule 87. The most common example of the contigent claim is that which arises when a person is bound as surety or guarantor for a principal who is insolvent or dead. Under the ordinary contract of suretyship the surety has no claim whatever against his principal until he himself pays something by way of satisfaction upon the obligation which is secured. When he does this, there instantly arises in favor of the surety the right to compel the principal to exonerate the surety. But until the surety has contributed something to the payment of the debt, or has performed the secured obligation in whole or in part, he has no right of action against anybody no claim that could be reduced to judgment.Our conclusion is that the solidary guarantors liab ility is not extinguished by his death, and that in such event, the Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against the estate

a contingent claim for reimbursement. Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, and the records are ordered remanded to the court of origin. Costs against the Administratrix-Appellee ALVAREZ v IAC (YANES) FACTS - Two parcels of land were registered in the names of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes, under an Original Certificate of Title.- Fortunato D. Santiago was issued a Transfer Certificate of Title. Santiago then sold the lots to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. The lots were sold thereafter Rosendo Alvarez.- The Yaneses filed a complaint against Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of the lots, and prayed for an accounting of the produce of the land from1944 up to the filing of the complaint, and that the share or money equivalent due the heirs be delivered to them, and damages.- During the pendency of the case, Alvarez sold the lots to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. The CFI ordered Alvarez to reconvey and deliver the possession of the lots to the Yaneses. However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to one of the lots, as it had been subdivided into two and that that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez, and that the lot could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of execution."- The Yaneses filed a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title and for a declaration of nullity of the TCTs issued to Rosendo Alvarez. The court required Rodolfo Siason to produce the certificates of title covering the lots, which order was later nullified by the court in view of a manifestation filed by Siason.- the lower court found Siason as a buyer in good faith, and ordered the heirs of Alvarez to pay the Yaneses the actual value of the lots, plus damages. The IAC affirmed except as to damages.- Petitioners contend, among others, that the liability arising from the sale of the lots made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death. ISSUE WON the liability arising from the sale of the lots made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death. HELD NO. - It overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Under our law, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.- The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state: Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death. Art. 1311 . Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property received from the decedent. - Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc.: The binding effect of contracts upon theheirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court thatmoney debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before theresidue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whateverpayment is thus made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs ordistributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces theshares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.- The general rule (above) is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco, has characterizedthe history of these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person toperson, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony withthe persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases wherethe obligation is strictly personal, ., is contracted intuitu personae , in considerationof its performance by a specific person and by no other. - Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim fordamages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved is of no momentbecause by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the

estate.It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance NHA v. Almeida Facts: The Land Tenure Administration awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land in San Pedro, Laguna. She had two children, Francisca and Beatriz(she died before her mom; mother of PR). When Margarita passed away, Francisca executed a deed of self-adjudication claiming that she was the only remaining relative of Margarita. The deed of was based on a 'Sinumpaang Salaysay' allegedly executed by Margarita. The surviving heirs of Beatriz filed a case for annulment of the deed. A decision was rendered and the deed was declared null and void. During the trial, Francisca filed an application with the NHA to purchase the same lots. The NHA granted the application. The PR appealed to the Office of the President. The NHA reso was affirmed. When Francisca died, her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they submitted to the NHA. The transfer of rights was approved by the NHA. The heirs of Francisca directed PR to leave the premises that she was occupying. Feeling aggrieved, PR sought the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a complaint in the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna. She invoked her 40 year occupation of the property and re-raised the fact that Francisca's declaration is a nullity because the other heirs were disregarded. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The CA reversed the decision and remanded the case for further hearing. The RTC rendered a decision setting aside the resolution of the NHA and the decision of the Office of the President. The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but a disposition of property which shall take effect upon death. It then held that the said document must first be submitted to probate before it can transfer property. The NHA and the heirs of Francisca filed their respective motions which were both denied. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: WON the decision of NHA is arbitrary. Ruling: Yes. The NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over the disputed properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirs in accordance with a will or by operation of law. When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as the next "person" likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price. The opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera should have put the NHA on guard as to the award of the lots. Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the deed therein null and void should have alerted the NHA that there are other heirs to the interests and properties of the decedent who may claim the property after a testate or intestate proceeding is concluded. The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots ***When the petitioner received the Sinumpaang Salaysay, it should have noted that the effectivity of the said document commences at the time of the death of the author of the instrument; in her words "sakaling ako ay bawian ng Diyos ng aking buhay." Hence, in such period, all the interest of the person should cease to be heirs and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to the heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code: Article 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights, and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant has already passed away. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirs, in accordance with a will or by operation of law. If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the decedent should transfer by operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the NHA. For as

it stands, NHA cannot make another contract to sell to other parties a property already initially paid for by the decendent. Such would be an act contrary to the law on succession and the law on sales and obligations. Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals Facts: Petitioners and respondent Romeo Nazareno are three of the five children of spouses Maximino and Aurea Nazareno, who during their marriage had acquired properties. After the death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed for intestate proceedingsand he was thereafter appointed administrator of his fathers estate. Romeo discovereda deed of sale selling petitioner Natividad six lots including Lot-3b occupied byRomeo but which was sold to petitioner Maximino, Jr. Maximino, Jr. filed an actionfor recovery of possession which was favored by the court. Romeo in turn filed anannulment of the sales on the ground of lack of consideration in that the transfer wasmerely to avoid inheritance tax and that Natividad was only to hold the said lots intrust for her siblings. Petitioners on the other hand filed a third party complaintagainst Romeo and his wife Eliza seeking the annulment of the transfer to Romeo of Lot 3 which is granted by the trial court except as to Lots 3, 13-b, 13 and 14 whichhad passed on to third persons. Issue: Whether a decision ruling against an administrator of an estate who is acting inhis own interest may bind the estate. Held: The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of itsown. Though Romeo represented at one time the estate of Maximino, Sr., the latter has a separate and distinct personality from the former. Hence, the judgment in CA-GR CV No. 12932 regarding the ownership of Maximino, Jr. over Lot 3B bindsRomeo and Eliza only, and not the estate of Maximino, Sr., which also has a right torecover properties which were wrongfully disposed ***Issue: Whether or not the subject properties of the Deeds of Sale are part of the estate of the deceased. Held: No, the children never acquired ownership because the sale was void for lack of consideration. The sale to a Natividad, one of the children, is deemed in trust for the other children of the deceased. The properties should be collated as part of the estate Subjects of Succession Capacity to succeed Determination Cayetano v Leonides GENERAL RULE: Limited jurisdiction of the probate court EXCEPTION: Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issues. FACTS: Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Hermogenes Campos (father) and her sisters, Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez, and Marieta Medina as the surviving heirs. As the only compulsory heir is Hermogenes, he executed an Affidavit ofAdjudication, adjudicating unto himself the entire estate of Adoracion. Later that same year, Nenita filed a petition for reprobate of a will, alleging among others that Adoracion was anAmerican citizen and that the will was executed in teh US. Adoracion died in Manila while temporarily residing in Malate. While this case was still pending, Hermogenes died and left a will, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix. Hence, this case. ISSUEs: Whether or not the will was valid Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over probate proceedings HELD:

As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issues. In this case, it was sufficiently established that Adoracion was an American citizen and the law which governs her will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the decedent. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, the national law of the decedent mustapply. As to the issue of jurisdiction -The settlement of estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the CFI of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, USA and not a usual resident of Cavite. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. Who may succeed PARISH PRIEST OF VICTORIA V. RIGOR FACTS: Father Pascual Rigor devised forty-four hectares of ricelands to his nearest male relatives who would study priesthood and provided that the administration of the ricelands would be under the responsibility of the parish priest of Victoria during the time that there is no qualified devisee as contemplated in the will. The parish priest of Victoria petitioned for the delivery of the Riceland to the church since no nearest male relative is available. The lower court, after declaring the bequest inoperative, later reconsidered its findings on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew(born after the testators death), who was a seminarian, and directed the administrator of the estate to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee. RULING: THE Supreme Court ruled that the will referred to the nearest male relative of the testator who was living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter, because in order to be capacitated to inherit, the devisee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper. C. WHO ARE INCAPABLE OF SUCCEEDING Art. 1027. The following are incapable of succeeding: (1) The priest who heard the confession of the testator during his last illness, or the minister of the gospel who extended spiritual aid to him during the same period; (2) The relatives of such priest or minister of the gospel within the fourth degree, the church, order, chapter, community, organization, or institution to which such priest or minister may belong; (3) A guardian with respect to testamentary dispositions given by a ward in his favor before the final accounts of the guardianship have been approved, even if the testator should die after the approval thereof; nevertheless, any provision made by the ward in favor of the guardian when the latter is his ascendant, descendant, brother, sister, or spouse, shall be valid; (4) Any attesting witness to the execution of a will, the spouse, parents, or children, or any one claiming under such witness, spouse, parents, or children; (5) Any physician, surgeon, nurse, health officer or druggist who took care of the testator during his last illness; (6) Individuals, associations and corporations not permitted by law to inherit. (745, 752, 753, 754a) Art. 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions. (n) Art. 1031. A testamentary provision in favor of a disqualified person, even though made under the guise of an onerous contract, or made through an intermediary, shall be void. (755) Art. 1032. The following are incapable of succeeding by reason of unworthiness:

(1) Parents who have abandoned their children or induced their daughters to lead a corrupt or immoral life, or attempted against their virtue; (2) Any person who has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants; (3) Any person who has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless; (4) Any heir of full age who, having knowledge of the violent death of the testator, should fail to report it to an officer of the law within a month, unless the authorities have already taken action; this prohibition shall not apply to cases wherein, according to law, there is no obligation to make an accusation; (5) Any person convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator; (6) Any person who by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence should cause the testator to make a will or to change one already made; (7) Any person who by the same means prevents another from making a will, or from revoking one already made, or who supplants, conceals, or alters the latter's will; (8) Any person who falsifies or forges a supposed will of the decedent. (756, 673, 674a) Art. 1033. The cause of unworthiness shall be without effect if the testator had knowledge thereof at the time he made the will, or if, having known of them subsequently, he should condone them in writing. Object of Succession REYES vs.DIMAGIBA FACTS: , Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were finally set aside by this Supreme Court ISSUE: (b) whether or not the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become final; and (c) whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent RULING: As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249, that the presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled. The last issue, that of revocation, is predicated on paragraph 2 of Article 957 of the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of the Code of 1889), which recites: Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect: (1) . . . . (2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase; As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances (affirmed in that point by this Supreme Court inReyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620, promulgated on July 31, 1954), "no consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom.1 Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts below, that in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellants Reyes and Fernandez. Estate of Hemady v Luzon Surety (inulit) GUINTO VS. MEDINA FACTS: Leon Guinto filed an action for forcible entry against Santiago Medina. The trial court ruled in favor of Guinto.However, Guinto still appealed because the trial court dismissed his claim for damages. While the case was onappeal, Medina died. Medina was substituted by his heirs. ISSUE: WON the heirs of Medina are liable for damages to Guinto in excess of the inheritance they received RULING: The heirs of Medina, having been merely substituted in his place at the time of his death, their liability for damages is only to the extent of the value of the property they might have received, if any, from him Guinto vs. Medina, 50 OG # 1, p 199, Oct 7, 1953 D. Opening of Succession Article 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. (657a) Balane: 1. This article literally means that the "decedent has the right to the succession which is transmitted upon his death." This is illogical bec. the decedent does not have rights to the succession. To improve the provision, change the words "succession" to "inheritance" (the right to succeed is an inchoate right) and the verb "transmitted" to "become vested." 2. Four Elements of Succession: 1. Death 2. Will or Operation of law 3. Existence and capacity of the successor 4. Acceptance. 3. This provision is the heart and soul of succession. The most essential provision of the law on succession. 4. Rights to succession vest at the moment of death, not transmitted. The right should be made effective from the moment of death. This is so bec. the rights to succession before death are mere inchoate. But from the moment of death, those inchoate rights become absolute. Rights to succession are vested from the moment of death, not upon the filing of petition for testate/ intestate proceedings, not upon the declaration of heirship or upon settlement of the estate. The rights to succession are automatic. Tradition or delivery is not needed. Fiction of the law is that from the moment of the death of the decedent, the right passes to the heirs. During the lifetime of the predecessor, rights to succession are a mere expectancy. Hence, no contract can be legally entered into regarding the expected inheritance. When a heir receives his inheritance, he is deemed to have received it at the point of death. this is so by legal fiction to avoid confusion. Nazareno v CA (inulit) HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA vs. HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA Facts: Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime. He has 14 children. He owned several fishpens, a fishpond, a sari-sari store, a passenger jeep, and was engaged in the buying and selling of copra. In order to reduce inheritance tax Alfonso made it appear that he sold some of his lands to his children. Accordingly, Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in favor of Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and his common-law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz. The Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969, in favor of Policronio, covered six parcels of land, which are the properties in dispute in this case. Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce. On April 19, 1989, Alfonso's heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all the lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes.

Conrado, Policronio's eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs. After their father's death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his name covering the six parcels of land. On June 15, 1995, they obtained a copy of the Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969 by Alfonso in favor of Policronio. Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late father, and as such, excluded from the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of Policronio sought to amicably settle the matter with the Heirs of Alfonso. Earnest efforts proving futile, the Heirs of Policronio filed a Complaint for Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of Documents, Partition, and Damages against the Heirs of Alfonso before the RTC on November 17, 1995 Issue: 1. Whether or not the Deed of Sale was valid; 2. Whether or not the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was valid Ruling: The Deed of Sale was void because it is simulated as the parties did not intend to be legally bound by it. As such, it produced no legal effects and did not alter the juridical situation of the parties. It is only made to avoid tax purposes. The CA also noted that Alfonso continued to exercise all the rights of an owner even after the execution of the Deed of Sale, as it was undisputed that he remained in possession of the subject parcels of land and enjoyed their produce until his death. Two veritable legal presumptions bear on the validity of the Deed of Sale: (1) that there was sufficient consideration for the contract; and (2) that it was the result of a fair and regular private transaction. If shown to hold, these presumptions infer prima facie the transaction's validity, except that it must yield to the evidence adduced. 2) It has been held in several cases that partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property resulting in change of ownership. It is not a transfer of property from one to the other, but rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. It is merely a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition cannot, therefore, be considered as an act of strict dominion. Hence, a special power of attorney is not necessary. In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors are affected. The requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is not a conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. Opening of Succession Acceptance of the inheritance Uson v. Del Rosario FACTS: This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land in Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four illegitimate children. Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment. Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that Uson and her husband, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of which Uson was given a parcel of land and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death. CFI found for Uson. Defendants appealed ISSUE: 1.W/N Uson has a right over the lands from the moment of death of her husband. 2.W/N the illegitimate children of deceased and his common-law wife have successional rights. HELD: 1.Yes. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, was merely a common-law wife with whom she had four illegitimate children with the deceased. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it

is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Art777 NCC).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death". From that moment, therefore,the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands inquestion became vested. The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson hadrelinquished her right over the lands in question because sheexpressly renounced to inherit any future property that herhusband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.2.No. The provisions of the NCC shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation only if no vested rights are impaired. Hence, since the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband, the new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute. PACIO vs. BILLON Facts: -a donation propter nuptias was made in a private instrument by Flaviano Pacio in favor of his first wife Severa Jucutan -That the land continued to be declared in the name of Flaviano Pacio notwithstanding this donationpropter nuptias until 1956 when the same was changed in the name of the defendants Brigida, Manuela and Dominga, all surnamed Pacio; -That land taxes were paid in the name of Flaviano Pacio Issue: The plaintiffs-appellants contend that the donation was void, because it was not made in a public instrument. RULING: Art. 633 of the Spanish Civil Code states that "In order that a donation of real property be valid it must be made by public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described and the amount of the encumbrances to be assumed by the donee expressed . . .." . And this Court has held that a donation propter nuptias of real property written on a private instrument is not valid even between the parties.1 The trial judge said "a donation propter nuptias in order to be valid between the donor and the donee, need not be embodied in a public instrument as such formality is only necessary for registration purposes in the Office of the Register of Deeds" so as to bind third persons. He was obviously applying the new principles in the Philippine Civil Code effective in the year 1950.2 But in 1901 when the gift was made, the law was contained in the Spanish Civil Code, according to which, even between the parties, the donation must be in a public instrument. It follows that Flaviano Pacio continued to be the owner of the land as the donation had no effect and there was no prescription. Upon his death, the land became the joint property of his children by the first and second marriage. Subject of course to the rights of his surviving spouse, the plaintiff Toribia Fontanilla. Reversing the decision in so far as this parcel is concerned, we hereby order the return of the expediente to the court below for further proceedings on partition in accordance with these views. ANGELA M. BUTTE vs.MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., FACTS: Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, was a co-owner of a house and lot. Thereafter he died. Subsequently, Special Proceeding was instituted to settle his estate, that included the one-sixth (1/6) undivided share in the aforementioned property. And although his last will and testament, wherein he bequeathed his estate to his children and grandchildren and one-third (1/3) of the free portion to Mrs. Angela M. Butte, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff-appellant, has been admitted to probate, the estate proceedings are still pending up to the present on account of the claims of creditors which exceed the assets of the deceased. The Bank of the Philippine Islands was appointed judicial administrator. Thereafter, Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, one of the co-owners of the late Jose V. Ramirez in the Sta. Cruz property, sold her undivided 1/6 share to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. defendant-appellant herein, for the sum of P500,000.00.

On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, thru Atty. Resplandor Sobretodo, sent a letter and a Philippine National Bank cashier's check in the amount of P500,000.00 to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. offering to redeem the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. This tender having been refused, plaintiff on the same day consigned the amount in court and filed the corresponding action for legal redemption. Without prejudice to the determination by the court of the reasonable and fair market value of the property sold which she alleged to be grossly excessive, plaintiff prayed for conveyance of the property, and for actual, moral and exemplary damages ISSUE: whether or not plaintiff-appellant, having been bequeathed 1/3 of the free portion of the estate of Jose V. Ramirez, can exercise the right of legal redemption over the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez despite the presence of the judicial administrator and pending the final distribution of her share in the testate proceedings RULING: That the appellant Angela M. Butte is entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption is clear. As testamentary heir of the estate of J.V. Ramirez, she and her co-heirs acquired an interest in the undivided onesixth (1/6) share owned by her predecessor (causante) in the Santa Cruz property, from the moment of the death of the aforesaid co-owner, J.V. Ramirez. By law, the rights to the succession of a deceased persons are transmitted to his heirs from the moment of his death, and the right of succession includes all property rights and obligations that survive the decedent. ART. 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right to the pure and simple legacies or devisees from the death of the testator, and transmits it to his heirs As a consequence of this fundamental rule of succession, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez acquired his undivided share in the Sta. Cruz property from the moment of his death, and from that instant, they became co-owners in the aforesaid property, together with the original surviving co-owners of their decedent (causante). A coowner of an undivided share is necessarily a co-owner of the whole. Wherefore, any one of the Ramirez heirs, as such co-owner, became entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption (retracto de comuneros) as soon as another co-owner (Maria Garnier Vda. de Ramirez) had sold her undivided share to a stranger, Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. This right of redemption vested exclusively in consideration of the redemptioner's share which the law nowhere takes into account. , the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside, and another one entered: (a) Declaring the consignation of P500,000,00 made by appellant Angela M. Butte duly and properly made; (b) Declaring that said appellant properly exercised in due time the legal redemption of the one-sixth (1/6) undivided portion of the land covered by Certificate of Title No. 59363 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila, sold on December 9, 1958 by Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez to appellant Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. (c) Ordering appellant Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. to accept the consigned price and to convey to Angela M. Butte the undivided portion above referred to, within 30 days from the time our decision becomes final, and subsequently to account for the rentals and fruits of the redeemed share from and after January 15, 1958, until its conveyance; and. (d) Ordering the return of the records to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this opinion. SALVADOR v. STA. MARIA FACTS - In 1941, Celestino Salvador executed a deed of sale over 7 parcels of titled land and 2 parcels of untitled land in favor of the spouses Alfonso Salvador and Anatolia Halili. Alleging that the sale was void for lack of consideration, he filed in 1955 a suit for reconveyance of said parcels of land in the CFI. In 1956, Celestino Salvador died, testate. As his alleged heirs, 21 persons were substituted as plaintiffs in the action for reconveyance.- Meanwhile, special proceedings for the probate of his will and for letters testamentary was instituted in the CFI of Bulacan, Br. II. Dominador Cardenas was appointed special administrator. He filed an inventory of properties of the estate covering the same parcels of land subject matter of the reconveyance action. Celestino Salvador's will was admitted to probate and Dominador Cardenas was appointed executor of said will. 23persons were instituted heirs in the will. Of these,9 were not among the 21 alleged relatives substituted in the reconveyance case; and of the21 substituted alleged heirs, 7 were not instituted in the will.- Br. I (reconveyance court) rendered judgment ordering the spouses Alfonso and Anatolia to reconvey the parcels of land to the estate of Celestino Salvador. The spouses appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the reconveyance judgment, with the correction that reconveyance be in favorof the 21 heirs substituted as plaintiffs.- Pursuant to an order of Br. II (probate court) one of the parcels of land, Lot 6, was sold so that with its proceeds debtors who filed claims may be paid. PNB bought it for P41,184 which was thendeposited in the same bank by the administrator, subject to court order.-

In 1964, the defendants in the suit for reconveyance executed a deed of reconveyanceover the parcels of land in favor of Celestino Salvador's estate. Revoking the same as not inaccordance with the judgment, Br. I ordered anew deed of reconveyance to be executed in favor of the 21 persons substituted as plaintiffs in that action. Accordingly, a new deed of reconveyance was made and a new TCT wassubsequently issued in the name of the 21persons.- In 1965, Br. I ordered PNB to release theP41,184 proceeds of the sale of Lot 6, to the 21plaintiffs in the reconveyance case. Apparently although the passbook was given by the administrator to said 21 persons, no release was made, as the PNB awaited Br. II's order.Meanwhile, in 1966, Br.II approved variousclaims against the estate amounting toP33,872.58. Br. II ordered the return of the passbook to the administrator; and release to the administrator by the PNB of the P41,184 or so much as is needed to pay the debts of the estate. After failing to get reconsideration of the order, the 21 substituted heirs filed this special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction. ISSUE WON the P41,184 proceeds of the sale of Lot 6belong to the estate. HELD YES. Ratio The right of heirs to specific distributive shares of inheritance does not become finally determinable until all the debts of the estate are paid. Until then, in the face of said claims, theirrights cannot be enforced, are inchoate, andsubject to the existence of a residue afterpayment of the debts. Reasoning Petitioners do not question the existence of the debts. They only contend that the properties involved having been ordered by final judgment reconveyed to them, not to the estate, the same are not properties of the estate but their own, and thus, not liable for debts of the estate.- Such contention is self-refuting. Petitioners rely for their rights on their alleged character as heirs of Celestino; as such, they were substituted in there conveyance case; the reconveyance to them was reconveyance to them as heirs of Celestino Salvador. It follows that the properties they claimare, even by their own reasoning, part of Celestino's estate. Their right as allegedly his heirs would arise only if said parcels of land are part of the estate of Celestino, not otherwise. Their having received the same, therefore, in there conveyance action, was perforce in trust for the estate, subject to its obligations. They cannot distribute said properties among themselves as substituted heirs without the debts of the estate being first satisfied.- At any rate, the proceeds of Lot 6 alone appears more than sufficient to pay the debt and there will remain the other parcels of land not sold. As to the question of who will receive how much as heirs, the same is properly determinable by the settlement court, after payment of the debts. Disposition Petition DENIED HEIRS OF PEDRO REGANON vs. RUFINO IMPERIAL FACTS: The heirs of Pedro Reganon filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of about one-hectare portion of a parcel of land with damages, against Rufino Imperial. Defendant not having filed an answer within the reglementary period, the plaintiffs on April 8, 1963 filed a motion to declare the former in default. The court a quo on May 6, 1963, rendered a decision declaring the plaintiffs lawful owners of the land in question and entitled to its peaceful possession and enjoyment; ordering defendant immediately to vacate the portion occupied by him and to restore the peaceful possession thereof to plaintiffs; and sentencing defendant to pay plaintiffs the amount of P1,929.20 and the costs. the plaintiffs filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution. This was granted by the trial court ISSUE: the property of an incompetent under guardianship is in custodia legis and therefore can not be attached. RULING: The new Rules of Court 2 now specifically provides for the procedure to be followed in case what is attached is in custodia legis. 3 The clear import of this new provision is that property undercustodia legis is now attachable, subject to the mode set forth in said rule. Besides, the ward having died, the guardianship proceedings no longer subsist:

The death of the ward necessarily terminates the guardianship, and thereupon all powers and duties of the guardian cease, except the duty, which remains, to make a proper accounting and settlement in the probate court. 4 When Eulogio Imperial died on September 13, 1962, the rights to his succession from the moment of his death were transmitted to his heirs, one of whom is his son and heir, defendant-appellant herein. 7 This automatic transmission can not but proceed with greater ease and certainty than in this case where the parties agree that the residuary estate is not burdened with any debt. For, The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of death, and where, as in this case, the heir is of legal age and the estate is not burdened with any debts, said heir immediately succeeds, by force of law, to the dominion, ownership, and possession of the properties of his predecessor and consequently stands legally in the shoes of the latter. 8 That the interest of an heir in the estate of a deceased person may be attached for purposes of execution, even if the estate is in the process of settlement before the courts, is already a settled matter in this jurisdiction. 9 Besides, as earlier stated, the heirs of Eulogio Imperial, one of whom is appellant, have already executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition the end result of which is that the property is no longer the property of the estate but of the individual heirs. And it is settled that: When the heirs by mutual agreement have divided the estate among themselves, one of the heirs can not therefore secure the appointment of an administrator to take charge of and administer the estate or a part thereof. The property is no longer the property of the estate, but of the individual heirs, whether it remains undivided or not. 12 WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against defendant-appellant. So ordered.1wph1.t RAMIREZ v. BALTAZAR FACTS: Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged a real estate to spouses Baltazar, defendants in this case. Upon demise of Victoriana, the mortgagees, as creditors of the deceased, filed a petition for the intestate proceedings of Victoriana's estate, alleging further that plaintiffs Felimon and Monica Ramirez are heirs of the deceased. Felimon was later appointed as adminstrator but did not qualify so that Artemio Diawan was appointed as judicial administrator of the estate. The mortgagees then filed a foreclosure of the property in question and succeeded, after Diawan failed to file an answer against the petition. The foreclosure sale ensued, the property was bought by the mortgagees themselves and the sale was confirmed by the court. Felimon sued for the annulment of the entire foreclosure proceedings, alleging among others the failure of the judicial administrator to protect their interests. Defendants contended that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue and hava no cause of action. ISSUE: Have plaintiffs the cause of action against the defendant? HELD: Yes. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically transmitted to the heirs from the moment of the death of the decedent. While, as a rule, the formal declaration or recognition to such successional rights needs judicial confirmation, this Court has, under special circumstances, protected these rights from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration. In Pascual vs. Pascual, it was ruled that although heirs have no legal standing in court upon the commencement of testate or intestate proceedings, this rule admits of an exception as "when the administrator fails or refuses to act in which event the heirs may act in his place." In Ramirez vs Baltazar we ruled that since the ground for the present action to annul the aforesaid foreclosure proceedings is the fraud resulting from such insidious machinations and collusion in which the administrator has allegedly participated, it would be far fetched to expect the said administrator himself to file the action in behalf of the estate. And who else but the heirs, who have an interest to assert and to protect, would bring the action? Inevitably, this case should fall under the exception, rather than the general rule that pending proceedings for the settlement of the estate, the heirs have no right to commence an action arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased. De Borja v. Vda. De Borja Facts: Upon the death of his wife, Josefa Tangco, Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of her will. He was appointed executor and administrator; their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-administrator. His son Jose became the sole administrator when he died.

While a widower Francisco de Borja his second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the CFI of Nueva Ecija, wherein she was appointed special administratrix. The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits and counter-suits. Jose and Tasiana entered into a compromise agreement. When submitted to the court for approval the Rizal court approved the compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable. Tasiana appealed the order of approval contending that the compromise agreement is not valid: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect. Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara , wherein the Court held that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy. On the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses that at the time it was entered into, the governing provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. ISSUE: Whether the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet been probated. HELD: Yes. Decision appealed from is affirmed. RATIO: The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000 as full payment for her hereditary share in the estate of Francisco and Josefa. This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Also, as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir. Therefore determining the validity of the agreement is unnecessary since her successional interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case. Bonilla v. Barcena FACTS: On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the CFI of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. In the hearing for the motion to dismiss, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband; but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue. ISSUE: W/N the CFI erred in dismissing the complaint. HELD: While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion.

The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court whenever a party to a pending case dies it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives. This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died, her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff. The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This should not have been done for under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case. GO ONG vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: ...: Two (2) parcels of land in Quezon City Identified as Lot No. 12. and Lot No. 1, are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188705 in the name of "Alfredo Ong Bio Hong married to Julita Go Ong. Alfredo Ong Bio Hong died on January 18, 1975 and Julita Go Ong was appointed administratrix of her husband's estate. Thereafter, Julita Go Ong sold Lot No. 12 to Lim Che Boon, and TCT No. 188705 was partially cancelled and TCT No. 262852 was issued in favor of Lim Che Boon. Thereafter, Julita Go Ong through her attorney-in-fact Jovita K. Yeo (Exh. 1) mortgaged Lot No. 1 to the Allied Banking Corporation to secure a loan of P900,000.00 obtained by JK Exports, Inc.. On the loan there was due the sum of P828,000.00 and Allied Banking Corporation tried to collect it from Julita Go Ong, (Exh. E). Hence, the complaint alleging nullity of the contract for lack of judicial approval which the bank had allegedly promised to secure from the court. In response thereto, the bank averred that it was plaintiff Julita Go Ong who promised to secure the court's approval, adding that Julita Go Ong informed the defendant that she was processed the sum of P300,000.00 by the JK Exports, Inc. which will also take charge of the interest of the loan. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER THE PARCEL OF LAND UNDER PETITIONER'S ADMINISTRATION IS NULL AND VOID FOR WANT OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL. RULING: The instant petition is devoid of merit. the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted in ruling that the questioned mortgage constituted on the property under administration, by authority of the petitioner, is valid, notwithstanding the lack of judicial approval, with respect to her conjugal share and to her hereditary rights. The fact that what had been mortgaged was in custodia legis is immaterial, insofar as her conjugal share and hereditary share in the property is concerned for after all, she was the ABSOLUTE OWNER thereof. This ownership by hers is not disputed, nor is there any claim that the rights of the government (with reference to taxes) nor the rights of any heir or anybody else have been prejudiced for impaired.

The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court cannot adversely affect the substantiverights of private respondent to dispose of her Ideal [not inchoate, for the conjugal partnership ended with her husband's death, and her hereditary rights accrued from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code) share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership formed between her and the other heirs/co-owners (See Art. 493, Civil Code, supra.). Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the Civil Code applies in a case where judicial approval has to be sought in connection with, for instance, the sale or mortgage of property under administration for the payment, say of a conjugal debt, and even here, the conjugal and hereditary shares of the wife are excluded from the requisite judicial approval for the reason already adverted to hereinabove, provided of course no prejudice is caused others, including the government. Moreover, petitioner is already estopped from questioning the mortgage. An estoppel may arise from the making of a promise even though without consideration, if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice (Gonzalo Sy Trading vs. Central Bank, 70 SCRA 570). PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Sandejas v Lina Doctrine: . In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such matters include selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Facts: On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition in the lower court praying that letters of administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his wife, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS. Letters of Administration were issued by the lower court appointing Eliodoro as administrator. On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and among the records burned were the records of the Court where Sandejas filed his petition. On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention was filed by Alex A. Lina alleging that Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, obligated to sell to Lina 4 parcels of land. Eliodoro died sometime in November 1984 in Canada His counsel is still waiting for official word on the fact of the death of the administrator. He also alleged that the matter of the claim of Alex becomes a money claim to be filed in Eliodoro's estate. the lower court issued an order directing the other heirs of Sandejas to move for the appointment of a new administrator within 15 days from receipt of the order. On January 1986, Alex filed a Motion for his appointment as a new administrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas on the following reasons: that Alex has not received any motion for the appointment of an administrator in place of Eliodoro; that his appointment would be beneficial to the heirs; that he is willing to give away his being an administrator as long as the heirs has found one. The heirs chose Sixto Sandejas as new administrator. They were reasoning out that it was only at a later date that Sixto accepted the appointment. The lower court substituted Alex Lina with Sixto Sandejas as administrator. On November 1993, Alex filed an Omnibus Motion to approve the deed of conditional sale executed between Alex A. Lina and Elidioro and to compel the heirs to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of Alex. The lower court granted Alex's motion. Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the ownership of the four lots was to remain in the intestate estate of Remedios until the approval of the sale was obtained from the settlement court. Issue What is the settlement court's jurisdiction? Held: Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. One can sell their rights, interests or participation in the property under administration. A stipulation requiring court

approval does not affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may be taken out of custodia legis, but only with the court's permission. Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this action to proceed. The factual differences have no bearing on the intestate court's jurisdiction over the approval of the subject conditional sale. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate court's recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries. In the present case, the Motion was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to Alex; hence, that obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a separate action -- on whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses. * Re: Intervenor's Standing Petitioners contend that under said Rule 89, only the executor or administrator is authorized to apply for the approval of a sale of realty under administration. Hence, the settlement court allegedly erred in entertaining and granting respondent's Motion for Approval. There is no such limitation. Section 8, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, provides: "SEC. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased contracted to convey. Notice. Effect of deed. -- Where the deceased was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed real property, or an interest therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on application for that purpose, authorize the executor or administrator to convey such property according to such contract, or with such modifications as are agreed upon by the parties and approved by the court; and if the contract is to convey real property to the executor or administrator, the clerk of the court shall execute the deed. " This provision should be differentiated from Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, specifically requiring only the executor or administrator to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estate for the purpose of paying debts, expenses and legacies (Section 2);or for authority to sell real or personal estate beneficial to the heirs, devisees or legatees and other interested persons, although such authority is not necessary to pay debts, legacies or expenses of administration (Section 4). Section 8 mentions only an application to authorize the conveyance of realty under a contract that the deceased entered into while still alive. While this Rule does not specify who should file the application, it stands to reason that the proper party must be one .who is to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one who is to be entitled to the avails of the suit. Santos vs Lumbao Facts: 1. Respondent spouses Lumbao filed an action for reconveyance with damages against petitioners. Petitioners are survivors and legitimate heirs of Rita Santos who allegedly sold 2 parcels of land to respondents when she was alive by virtue of a document called bilihan ng lupa, The repsondents even claimed that the execution of the document was signed and witnessed by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo. 2. After having acquired the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession and built a house which they occupied as exclusive owners up to the present. The respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in their favor. 3. Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire property inherited by her and her coheirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned. 4. Finally, the respondents Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the

other heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the lot already sold to them. Due to refusal of petitioners to convey the said propert, the spouses filed the action. 5. The lower court (RTC) dismissed the complaint of ground of lack of cause of action as the spouses allegedly did not comply with the required barangay conciliation. The CA granted and ordered the petititoners to convey the land to the spouses, hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the admissions made are admissible and binding YES. As a general rule, facts alleged in a partys pleading are deemed admissions of that party and are binding upon him, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. 1. An answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. And in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a partys pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented.However, in the case at bar, petitioners had not adduced any other evidence to override the admission made in their answer that Virgilio and Tadeo actually signed the [Bilihan ng Lupa. Hence, the general rule that the admissions made by a party in a pleading are binding and conclusive upon him applies in this case. 2. In the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979, the signatures of petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared thereon. Moreover, in petitioners Answer and Amended Answer to the Comp laint for Reconveyance with Damages, both petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo made an admission that indeed they acted as witnesses in the execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979. However, in order to avoid their obligations in the said "Bilihan ng Lupa," petitioner Virgilio, in his cross-examination, denied having knowledge of the sale transaction and claimed that he could not remember the same as well as his appearance before the notary public due to the length of time that had passed. REYES vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI FACTS: Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo C. Reyes (Rodrigo) are two of the four children of the spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro, Anastacia, Oscar, and Rodrigo each owned shares of stock of Zenith Insurance Corporation (Zenith). Pedro died in 1964, while Anastacia died in 1993. Although Pedros estate was judicially partitioned among his heirs sometime in the 1970s, no similar settlement and partition appear to have been made with Anastacias estate, which included her shareholdings in Zenith. On May 9, 2000, Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Oscar. The complaint stated that it is "a derivative suit initiated and filed by the complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes to obtain an accounting of the funds and assets of ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION which are now or formerly in the control, custody, and/or possession of respondent [herein petitioner Oscar] and to determine the shares of stock of deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that were arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated [by Oscar] for himself [and] which were not collated and taken into account in the partition, distribution, and/or settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, for which he should be ordered to account for all the income from the time he took these shares of stock, and should now deliver to his brothers and sisters their just and respective shares." In his Answer with Counterclaim,6 Oscar denied the charge that he illegally acquired the shares of Anastacia Reyes. He asserted, as a defense, that he purchased the subject shares with his own funds from the unissued stocks of Zenith, and that the suit is not a bona fide derivative suit because the requisites therefor have not been complied with. He thus questioned the SECs jurisdiction to entertain the complaint because it pertains to the settlement of the estate of Anastacia Reyes. ISSUE: whether the trial court, sitting as a special commercial court, has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Rodrigos complaint RULING: Based on these standards, we hold that the allegations of the present complaint do not amount to a derivative suit. First, as already discussed above, Rodrigo is not a shareholder with respect to the shareholdings originally belonging to Anastacia; he only stands as a transferee-heir whose rights to the share are inchoate and unrecorded. With respect to his own individually-held shareholdings, Rodrigo has not alleged any individual cause or basis as a shareholder on record to proceed against Oscar.

Second, in order that a stockholder may show a right to sue on behalf of the corporation, he must allege with some particularity in his complaint that he has exhausted his remedies within the corporation by making a sufficient demand upon the directors or other officers for appropriate relief with the expressed intent to sue if relief is denied. Paragraph 8 of the complaint hardly satisfies this requirement since what the rule contemplates is the exhaustion of remedies within the corporate setting: 8. As members of the same family, complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes has resorted [to] and exhausted all legal means of resolving the dispute with the end view of amicably settling the case, but the dispute between them ensued. Lastly, we find no injury, actual or threatened, alleged to have been done to the corporation due to Oscars acts. If indeed he illegally and fraudulently transferred An astacias shares in his own name, then the damage is not to the corporation but to his co-heirs; the wrongful transfer did not affect the capital stock or the assets of Zenith. As already mentioned, neither has Rodrigo alleged any particular cause or wrongdoing against the corporation that he can champion in his capacity as a shareholder on record. In summary, whether as an individual or as a derivative suit, the RTC sitting as special commercial court has no jurisdiction to hear Rodrigos complaint since what is involved is the determination and distribution of successional rights to the shareholdings of Anastacia Reyes. Rodrigos proper remedy, under the circumstances, is to institute a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Anastacia Reyes, a move that is not foreclosed by the dismissal of his present complaint. WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and REVERSE the decision of the Court of Appeals. The complaint before the Regional Trial Court, is ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. PUNO vs. PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC FACTS: Upon the death of a stockholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the corporation; neither are they mandatorily entitled to the rights and privileges of a stockholder. Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent Puno Enterprises, Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint for specific performance against respondent. Petitioner averred that he is the son of the deceased with the latters common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges of his late father as stockholder of respondent. The complaint thus prayed that respondent allow petitioner to inspect its corporate book, render an accounting of all the transactions it entered into from 1962, and give petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or income pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. Puno ISSUE: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE JOSELITO PUNO IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS DEMANDED HE BEING THE HEIR OF THE LATE CARLOS PUNO, ONE OF THE INCORPORATORS [OF] RESPONDENT CORPORATION. RULING: Petitioner anchors his claim on his being an heir of the deceased stockholder. However, we agree with the appellate court that petitioner was not able to prove satisfactorily his filiation to the deceased stockholder; thus, the former cannot claim to be an heir of the latter. Similarly, only stockholders of record are entitled to receive dividends declared by the corporation, a right inherent in the ownership of the shares. Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that no transfer shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation. During such interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the stock. Until a settlement and division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the administrator or executor. Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or executor who is entitled to exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder. Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he is the son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect respondents books and be entitled to receive dividends from respondent, absent any showing in its transfer book that some of the shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would only be possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir and has participated in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming proprietary rights over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted

precisely for the purpose of settling the estate of the latter. The status of an illegitimate child who claims to be an heir to a decedents estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action, as in a case for the recovery of property. The doctrine applies to the instant case, which is one for specific performance to direct respondent corporation to allow petitioner to exercise rights that pertain only to the deceased and his representatives. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. Cabalu v. Tabu Contracts; capacity. Contracting parties must be juristic entities at the time of the consummation of the contract. Stated otherwise, to form a valid and legal agreement it is necessary that there be a party capable of contracting and a party capable of being contracted with. Hence, if any one party to a supposed contract was already dead at the time of its execution, such contract is undoubtedly simulated and false and, therefore, null and void by reason of its having been made after the death of the party who appears as one of the contracting parties therein. The death of a person terminates contractual capacity. Contracts; future inheritance; contractual capacity Under Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. Paragraph 2 of Article 1347 characterizes a contract entered into upon future inheritance as void. The law applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature. Kinds of succession Contractual Blas et al vs Santos et al 1 SCRA 899 Succession Promise Sometime before 1898, Simeon Blas married Marta Cruz with whom he had three children. He also had grandchildren from his children with Marta Cruz. In 1898, Marta Cruz died. In 1899, Blas married Maxima Santos (they had no children) but the properties he and his former wife acquired during the first marriage were not liquidated. In 1936, Simeon Blas executed a will disposing half of his properties in favor of Maxima the other half for payment of debts, Blas also named a few devisees and legatees therein. In lieu of this, Maxima executed a document whereby she intimated that she understands the will of her husband; that she promises that shell be giving, upon her death, one-half of the properties shell be acquiring to the heirs and legatees named in the will of his husband; that she can select or choose any of them depending upon the respect, service, and treatment accorded to her by said legatees/heirs/devisees. In 1937, Simeon Blas died. In 1956, Maxima died and Rosalina Santos became administratrix of her estate. In the same year, Maria Gervacio Blas, child of Simeon Blas in his first marriage, together with three other grandchildren of Simeon Blas (heirs of Simeon Blas), learned that Maxima did not fulfill her promise as it was learned that Maxima only disposed not even one-tenth of the properties she acquired from Simeon Blas. The heirs are now contending that they did not partition Simeon Blas property precisely because Maxima promised that theyll be receiving properties upon her death. ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs should receive properties based on the promise of Maxima. HELD: Yes. The promise is valid and enforceable upon her death. Though it is not a will (it lacks the formality) nor a donation, it is still enforceable because said promise was actually executed to avoid litigation (partition of Simeon Blas estate) hence it is a compromise. It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the reason that the conjugal properties of his first marriage had not been liquidated. It is an obligation or promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal properties acquired with her husband, which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal properties in the will of the husband. BALUS vs. BALUS Facts: Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as a security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was

foreclosed and was sold to the bank as the sloe bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale in favor of the Bank. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank. On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time. Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land was executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in the name of respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot. On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to them. The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank. Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA. The CA ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title in the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Issue: Whether or not co-ownership by him and respondents over the subject property persisted even after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from the Bank. Held: The court is not persuaded. At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court on October 28, 1996. Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale was issued in favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father. Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. In other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case. Santos v Lumbao (Inulit)

Union Bank v. Santibanez FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation(FCCC) and Efraim Santibaez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annualamortizations. On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement for the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Bank. Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under the joint agreement. Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased hadpassed to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped Florence, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document.In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains thatUnion Bank is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing probateproceedings. She asserts that even if the agreeme nt wasvoluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. ISSUE: W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending. W/N the agreement between Edmund and Florence (which was in effect, a partition of the estate) was void considering that it had not been approved by the probate court. W/N there can be a valid partition among the heirs before the will isprobated. HELD: Wellsettled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court isprimarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the provision which reads as follows (e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, mychildren. The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provisionembracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and otherproperties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are thethree (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors amongthemselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of itsexecution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors. The Court notes that the loan was contracted by thedecedent. The bank, purportedly a creditor of the late EfraimSantibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. The filing of a money claim against the decedents es tate in the probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased

by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty. Estate of Carungcong vs. People FACTS: Mediatrixcarungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrixof petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda.deCarungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. It was alleged that the said accused feloniously induced Manolita Gonzales, the owner of the estate and herein deceased, to sign and thumb mark a special power of attorney (in the pretense of presenting a document pertaining to taxes) which authorized the sale, assignment, transfer and disposition of the latters properties. In relation to this, the accused moved for the dismissal of the case. ISSUE: WON Sato was liable? Ruling: YES. The falsification of public document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her intention in connection with her taxes. While the falsification was consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign the document) but by the subsequent use of the said document. That is why the falsification of the public document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the commission of the estafa. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court which is directed to try the accused with dispatch for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. WILLS Definition VITUG vs CA FACTS: This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court involving the probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New York, U. S.A. naming private respondent Rowena FaustinoCorona executrix. In said decision, the court upheld the appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitugs estate with her (Mrs. Vitugs) widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate. Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate, plus interests, which he claimed were personal funds. As found by the CA the alleged advances were spent for the payment of estate tax, deficiency estate tax, and increment thereto. Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds withdrawn were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure to include the sums in question for inventory and for concealment of funds belonging to the estate. Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank. The trial courts upheld the validity of such agreement. On the other hand, the CA held that the survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which did not comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code, and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: W/N the survivorship agreement between the spouses Vitug constitutes a donation?

HELD: NO. The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. A will has been defined as a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death. In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. In this case, the monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds In the case relied on, Rivera v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co., we rejected claims that a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one partys separate properties in favor of the other, but simply, their joint holdings. There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marital relations. Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouses own properties to the other. It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal partnership, as held by the Court of Appeals, by mere stipulation and that it is no cloak to circumvent the law on conjugal property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more commonly denominated in banking parlance as an and/or account. In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No. 35342-038, they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited donation. The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased. Interpretation of Wills Solla vs. Ascueta Facts: Dona Maria Sollas will read: "I desire and hereby name Leandro Serrano, my grandson and I desire him to comply with the obligation to give or to deliver to the parish priest of this town a sufficient sum of money necessary for a yearly novena and for an ordinary requiem mass for the 1st to 8th days thereof and on the9th or last day, a solemn requiem mass with a vigil and a large bier (a stand on which a corpse or coffin is placed before burial),- for these masses are for the repose of my soul and those of my parents, husband, children, and other relatives. I repeat and insist that my heir shall execute and comply with this request without fail. And at the hour of his death, he will insist that his heirs comply with all that I have here ordered". In the earlier part of the will, Dona Maria ordered the distribution of legacies to her brothers, nephew, protges and servant. Leandro Serranos will on the other hand read: "I command my executor to put all of my property in order. I order my son Simeon not to forget annually all the souls of the relatives of my grandmother and also of mine and to have a mass said on the 1stand 9th days of the yearly novena and that he erect a 1st class bier. I sincerely desire that the property of my deceased grandmother, Capitana Maria (Solla) be disposed of in conformity with all the provisions of her will and of mine". Leandro named his son Simeon Serrano, as executor of his will and that he directed him to put all of his property in order and to separate that which came from his deceased grandmother, Maria Solla. Leandro took possession of the property left by his grandmother when she died on June 11, 1883. He continued in possession of the same until his death on August 5, 1921. The petitioners (grandnieces and grandnephews) now assail his continued possession. The respondent is the widow of Leandro Serrano. Issue: What were the orders and requests that Maria Solla wanted her grandson and his heirs to faithfully comply with? Did she want Leandros heirs to continue the distribution of legacies too? Held:No. Ratio: In order to determine the testators intention, the court should place itself as near as possible in his position, Where the language of the will is ambiguous or doubtful, the court should take into consideration the situation of the testator and the facts and circumstances surrounding him at the time the will was executed. Where the testators intention was manifested from the context of the will and surrounding circumstances, but was obscured by inapt and inaccurate modes of expression, the language will be subordinated to the intention, in order to give effect to such intention, as far as possible. The court may depart from the strict wording and read the word or phrase in a sense different from that which was ordinarily attributed to it, and for such purpose, may mould or change the language of the will, such as restricting its application or supplying words or phrases. In this case, it clearly appeared that it was Maria Sollas intention to insist upon compliance of her order by Leandros heirs, that the latter should comply with the pious orders and that was nor referring to her

order concerning the legacies. The will should only be interpreted in so far as the pious orders are concerned(the prayers and masses). RIVERA vs. DIZON FACTS: the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs: six legitimate children (Estela, Tomas, Bernardita, Marina (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina and Josefina) and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. The deceased testatrix left a last will written in Kapangpangan. Named beneficiaries in her will were the abovenamed compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon. In her will she distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at P1,801,960.00(except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued atP2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her abovenamed heirs. Testate proceedings were commenced and by order the last will and testament of the decedent was allowed and admitted to probate; and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate. The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11. (1/7of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and descendants). o In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specificreal properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her sixchildren and eight grandchildren. The executrix filed her project of partition. Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made bythe testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs and devisees totalling one-half while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositorsappellants, to be divided among them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes. Court: sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling that Articles 906and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. o The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. o With reference to the payment in cash of some, TC regarded it as a valid solution as to the impaired legitimes. From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed an appeal. Oppositors invoke A1063 property left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitimes shall in any case remain unimpaired" ISSUE: Whether Art. 1603 applies? No. The orders appealed from are affirmed. RATIO:First off: about the counter-project by oppositors: The counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants where they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to and limit the same, which they would consider as mere

devises or legacies, to one-half of the estateas the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and protanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him."Second: application of Art. 1603 When the testatrix has not made any previous donations during her lifetime, nor left merely some properties by will, collation isnt necessary to de termine the legitime s of each heir. Here, we have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitimes of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call for the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the legitimes of the heirs is here determined and undisputed. *** Ratio When the testatrix has not made any previous donations during her lifetime, nor left merely some properties by will, collation isnt necessary to determine the legitime of each heir. Reasoning Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given by some authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it may have some plausibility in an appropriate case, has no application in the present case. Here, we have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merelysome properties by will which would call for the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determinedand undisputed. VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. JUICO FACTS: Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Faustina of all his real and personal properties giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto. Petitioner filed an action against the administrator contending that upon the widows death, she became vested with the ownership of the properties bequeathed under clause 7 pursuant to its 8th clause of the will. ISSUE: WON the petitioner is entitled to the ownership of the properties upon the death of Dona Faustina. HELD: The intention of the testator here was to merely give usufructuary right to his wife Doa Fausta because in his will he provided that Doa Fausta shall forfeit the properties if she fails to bear a child and because shedied without having begotten any children with the deceased then it means that Doa Fausta never acquired ownership over the property. Upon her death, because she never acquired ownership over the property, the said properties are not included in her estate. Thoseproperties actually belong to Villaflor. That was theintention of the testator. Otherwise, if the testator wanted to give the properties to Doa Fausta then heshould have specifically stated in his will thatownership should belong to Doa Fausta withoutmentioning any condition ARTICLE 789. When there is an imperfect description,or when no person or property exactly answers thedescription, mistakes and omissions must be corrected, if the error appears from the context of the will or from extrinsic evidence, excluding the oral declarations of the testator as to his intention; and when an uncertainty arises upon the face of the will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to beascertained from the words of the will, taking intoconsideration the circumstanc es under which it wasmade, excluding such oral declarations

Law governing form Place of execution In re: Will of Rev Abadia FACTS: Fr Abadia executed a document (Exhibit A) purportedly his Last Will and Testament. He died Jan14, 1943, and left properties estimated at Php8k. One of the legatees, Enriquez, filed a petition for its probate before CFI Cebu. Some cousins andnephews, who would inherit had there been no will, opposed. Two of the 3 witnesses already died. The remaining witness testified that in his presence andthe other 2 co-witnesses, Fr Abadia wrote out in long hand in Spanish said will; that Fr Abadspoke and understood.; that he signed on the left hand margin of the front page of each of the 3folios and numbered the same with Arabic numerals; all this in the presence of the 3 attestingwitnesses who signed their names on the last page after the attestation clause I his presenceand in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence. CFI Cebu declared said document as a holographic will and was admitted to probate. It was in the handwriting of the testator At the time of execution, and at the time of testators death, holographic wills were not permitted by law. At the time case was decided, New Civil Code already in force, allowing holographic wills.The trial court also the controlling factor, which is the intention of the testator, overridesany defect in form Oppositors appeal involved questions of law, thus certified to the Supreme Court ISSUE: WON Fr Abadias holographic will maybe admitted to probate HELD: Order appealed from is reversed. Exhibit A is denied probate. The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time itis made From the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees anddevisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of theconstitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will Although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testatorabout the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemnexpression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes acompleted act. This ruling has been laid down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be followed. At the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certainrequirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio orsheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attestingwitnesses, requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were notnumbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator **** ISSUE: Whether or not the holographic will should be allowed despite the fact that when it was executed the civil code proscribes the execution of such wills. RULING: The Supreme Court held that despite the effectivity of the new Civil Code allowing the execution of holographic wills, the contested holographic will still cannot be allowed and admitted to probate. This is

because under Art. 795 of the Civil Code, the extrinsic validity of a will should be judged not by the law existing at the time of the testators death nor the law at the time of its probate, but by the law existing at the time of the execution of the instrument. For the very simple reason that although the will becomes operative only after the testators death, still his wishes are given expression at the time of execution. Fleumer vs. Hix Facts: The petitioner is a special administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. He alleged that the latters will wasexecuted in Elkins, West Virginia on November 3, 1925 by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction,and that the laws of that state govern. To this end, the petitioner submitted a copy of Section 3868 of Acts 1882, c.84 as found in West Virginia Code, annotated by Hogg, Charles E., vol.2 1914, p. 1690 andas certified to by the Director of National Library.The Judge of the First Instance however denied the probate of the will on the grounds that Sec 300 and301 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not complied with. Hence, this appeal. Issue:Is it necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of such law in West Virginia as a prerequisiteto the allowance and recording of said will. Held: Yes. The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of thePhilippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various states of theAmerican Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of the law were not met.There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the state of West Virginia, as provided in Sec 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor wasthe extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under theseal of the State of West Virginia as provided in Sec 301. No evidence was introduced showing that theextract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time alleged will was executed.The court therefore did not err in denying the probate of the will. The existence of such law in WestVirginia must be proved. ESTATE OF GIBERSON

the same was filed but was denied on the ground that itis a joint will. The CA reversed the ruling of the trial court. Issue: whether the testamentary heirs of Gervalia have rights even if the will was jointly made? Held: No, the testamentary heirs of Gervalia shall have no successional rights. The SC ruled that where a husband and wife executed a joint will and upon the death of thehusband said will was admitted for probate by a final decree of the court although erroneous,and the wife dies late, it is held that said first decree of probate affects only the husband butcannot affect the estate of his wife, considering that a joint will being prohibited by law, theestate of a wife should pass upon her death, to her intestate heirs and not to the testamentaryheirs, unless some other valid will is shown to exist in favor to the latter or unless thetestamentar y heirs is the only heir to the wife. Law governing content Successional rights ESTATE OF CHRISTENSEN Facts: Edward Christensen, American Citizen residing in Davao was the manager of the MindanaoEstates. During his stay, he met Bernada Compredora, wherein they lived as husband and wifewithout being married. During their cohabitation for 30 years, they bore 2 daughters namelyMaria Lucy and Maria Helen. When Edward died he left a will containing: 1) Maria Lucy is his onlydaughter to which he gave all his properties and income; 2) Maria Helen, who is not herdaughter, but uses his surname and alleged to be the offspring of Bernada with another man,giving her trust fund of P3,600.00; 3) Bernada was given P1,000.00 and 4) Adolfo Cruz Aznan asexecutor.Maria Helen and Bernada opposed the said will, wherein the former contended that she was anatural child and therefore must be entitled to the said properties, the latter however contendedthat although they were not married, they cohabited for 30 years, therefore she should be given of the said properties because of co-ownership. Issue: whether Bernada is entitled to of the state under the law on co-ownership?

Facts: An action to probate document was filed alleging it was the will of Illinois citizen Gibersonand was executed in California.Giberson died in UST concentration Camp in Manila. Spring, son of Giberson opposed theproceeding claiming that it is void because it does not reflect the true intent of the deceased andthe same was not executed according to the law. (California law requires that the will must beprobated in the place of execution before it be probate din the Philippines.) Issue: whether the will of Giberson can be probated in the Philippines despite the fact that therewas no showing that the will was probated in the place of execution? Held: The will can be probated in the Philippines due to the fact that person has a right todispose of his property after death through a will and he is not compelled to execute the will inthe Philippines. He can do so in his own country or anywhere else provided it complies with thelaws of the place where it was executed. The Rules in Civil Procedure respects the right of atestator to make his will anywhere he likes and the same can be probated here. It is asubstantive right and cannot be negated by rules DELA CERNA VS POTOT Facts: Spouses Bernabe de la Cerna and Gervalia Rebaca, executed a joint will and testament inthe local dialect, giving parcels of land including fruits to Manuela Rebaca, being married toPotot. De la Cerna died and said will was submitted to the court for probate. Upon the death of Gervalia, another petition for probate of

Held: No, Bernada is not entitled to of the properties. Before the Civil Code went intooperation, the court already decided, that when a man and a woman, not suffering from anyimpediment to contract marriage, lived together as husband and wife, an informal civilpartnership exist, and each of them has an equal interest in the properties acquired during saidunion and is entitled to participate therein said properties were the product of their joint effort.In the case at bar, aside from the observation of the trial court that Bernada was an illiteratewoman, there appears no evidence to prove her contributions or participation in the acquisitionof the properties involved, therefore following the aforecited ruling the claim of of theproperties cannot be granted. Even assuming for the sake of argument that this case falls underthe provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code which recognizes the parties as co-owners of theproperties acquired after the act concerned and to no other, for such law cannot be givenretroactive effect to govern those already possessed before August 30, 1950. ESTATE OF AMOS BELLIS Facts: Amos Bellis was a citizen of Texas. By his 1st wife, Mary Mallen, whom he divorced andhas 5 children, by his 2nd wife, Violet whom he survived 3 legitimate children and he hadillegitimate children. Amos executed a will in the Philippines to which he gave: 1) $240,000 to hisfirst wife; 2) $40,000 to each of his 3 illegitimate children and 3) all his remaining properties willbe given to his legitimate children. When Amos died, his will was to be probated in the CFI of Manila. However, the capacity to succeed is governed by the national law of the decedent orunder the law wherein it is executed.

Issue: whether the capacity to succeed is governed by the national law of the decedent or underthe law where it is executed? Held: Capacity to succeed shall be governed by the laws of the decedent. The decedentsnational law governs the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, the intrinsicvalidity of the provision of the will and capacity to succeed. Whatever public policy and good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes congress has intended to extend the sameto the succession of foreign nationals CAYETANO VS. LEONIDES Facts: Adoracion Campos, a citizen and permanent resident of USA died and left a will executedin the said country. She died leaving properties both in the Philippines and the USA. As acompulsory heir, Hermogenes, Adoracions father, executed an affidavit of Adoracion whereby headjudicated into himself the ownership of the entire estate of Adoracion.Nenita, the sister of the decedent, filed a petition for reprobate of the will which was allegedlyexecuted in the USA and for her appointment as administrator of the state of the said decedent. The petitioner argue that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of the will,Hermogenes was divestive of his legitime which was reserved by law for him. Issue: whether the Philippine law shall apply in as much as the National Law of the deceaseddoes not provide legitime? Held: Under Article 16 (2) and Article 1039 of the Civil Code, the law which governs Adoracionswill is the law of the USA which is the National Law of the deceased. It is therefore evident thatwhatever public policy or good customs maybe involved in our system legitimes. Congress hasnot intended to extend the same succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chose toleave the amount of successional rights to the decedents national law. Specific must prevailover general law. Supervening incapacity TORRES vs. LOPEZ This case concerns the probate of the alleged will of the late Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez. Tomas Rodriguez died in the City of Manila Philippine Islands. On February 25, 1924, leaving a considerable estate. Shortly thereafter Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will asked that the will of Rodriguez be allowed. Opposition was entered by Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the deceased on the grounds: (1) That the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of senile dementia and was under guardianship; (2) that undue influence had been exercised by the persons benefited in the document in conjunction with others who acted in their behalf; and (3) that the signature of Tomas Rodriguez to the document was obtained through fraud and deceit. After a prolonged trial judgment was rendered denying the legalization of the will HELD: If the testator made the will after he had been judicially declared insane, and before such judicial order had been set aside, the testator is presumed insane. The law requires that proponents of the will shall have the burden of proof to show that the testator had soundnessof mind if the testator made the will after a judicialdetermination of his insanity

BALTAZAR vs. LAXA FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala(Will) in the Pampango dialect onSeptember 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (JudgeLimpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of theinstrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4thereof.The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia(Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three attested to the Wills due execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4thereof, in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notarypublic.Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties torespondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children LunaLorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa,The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencias nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treatedPaciencia as his own mother. Paciencia lived with Lorenzos family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she who raised and cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the execution of the Will or on September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for the United States of America (USA). There, she residedwith Lorenzo and his family until her death on January 4, 1996.In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin. More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua,Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administrationin his favour.Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencias Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with therequirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of itsexecution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; thatthe execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence byLorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will wasforged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and,that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed anOpposition and Recommendation reiterating their opposition to the appointment of Lorenzo asadministrator of the properties and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in his stead. ISSUE: Whether Paciencia was not of sound mind at the time the will was allegedly executed. RULING: The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsoundso as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states: To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of thetestamentary act. Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue andimproper influence and pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as basis to deny theprobate of a will.Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsoundmind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the C As finding that petitioners failed to discharge such burden.Furthermore, the Court is convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate tobe disposed of, the proper objects of her bounty and the character of the testamentary act.

SOLEMNITIES OF WILLS Notarial Wills General requirements ABANGAN v ABANGAN

of Agapito, but she was not legally adopted.Marliyn married Oscar Medrano- Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will when she was 73 years old. That willwhich is in English was thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. Marcelina bequeathedall her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn. When Marcelina died, sheowned a 150-square meter lot and house in that place.- Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina and the executrix in her will,filed with the Court a petition for the probate of Marcelina's alleged will. The case wasassigned to Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado.- Judge Honrado appointed Marina as administratrix.- Upon motion of Marina, Judge Honrado issued another order instructing a deputysheriff to eject the occupants of the testatrix's house, among whom was Nenita V.Suroza, and to place Marina in possession thereof. That order alerted Nenita to theexistence of the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of Marcelina's estate.She and the other occupants of the decedent's house filed a motion to set aside theorder ejecting them. They alleged that the decedent's son Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, that he has a daughter named Lilia, that Nenita was Agapito's guardianand that Marilyn was not Agapito's daughter nor the decedent's granddaughter. Later,they questioned the probate court's jurisdiction to issue the ejectment order.-Judge Honrado issued an order probating her supposed will wherein Marilyn was theinstituted heiress.- Nenita filed in the testate case an omnibus petition "to set aside proceedings, admitopposition with counter-petition for administration and preliminary injunction". Nenitareiterated her allegation that Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina, that the will was notduly executed and attested, that it was procured by means of undue influenceemployed by Marina and Marilyn and that the thumbmarks of the testatrix wereprocured by fraud or trick.- Marina in her answer admitted that Marilyn was not Marcelina's granddaughter butwas the daughter of Agapito a nd Arsenia de la Cruz and that Agapito was not Marcelina's son but merely an anak-anakan who was not legally adopted.- Judge Honrado dismissed Nenita's counter-petition for the issuance of letters of administration because of the non-appearance of her counsel at the hearing.- In a motion for the consolidation of all pending incidents, Nenita V. Suroza reiteratedher contention that the alleged will is void because Marcelina did not appear beforethe notary and because it is written in English which is not known to her. - Judge Honrado "denied" the various incidents "raised" by Nenita.- Nenita "filed a case to annul" the probate proceedings which was assigned to JudgeHonrado. It was dismissed.- Judge Honrado closed the testamentary proceeding.- About ten months later, Nenita charged Judge Honrado with having probated thefraudulent will of Marcelina. Nenita further alleged that Judge Honrado, in spite of hisknowledge that the testatrix had a son named Agapito, who was preterited in the will,did not take into account the consequences of such a preterition.- Nenita filed in the CA against Judge Honrado a petition for certiorari and prohibitionwherein she prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the proceedings in theprobate case be declared void. Attached to the petition was the affidavit of DomingoP. Aquino, who notarized the will. He swore that the testatrix and the three attestingwitnesses did not appear before him and that he notarized the will "just toaccommodate a brother lawyer on the condition" that said lawyer would bring to thenotary the testatrix and the witnesses but the lawyer never complied with hiscommitment. - The CA dismissed the petition because Nenita's remedy was an appeal and herfailure to do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil action of certiorari . HELD - We hold that disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for hisimproper disposition of the testate case which might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the decedent's legal heirs and not the instituted heiress in the voidwin should have inherited the decedent's estate.- A judge may be criminally liable or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment orinterlocutory order or rendering a manifestly unjust judgment or interlocutory order byreason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance.- Administrative action may be taken against a judge of the court of first instance forserious misconduct or inefficiency. Misconduct implies malice or a wrongful intent, nota mere error of judgment. "For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliableevidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by anintention to

FACTS - On September 19, 1917, CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan'swill executed July, 1916. From this decision the opponents appealed.- The will consists of 2 sheets. The first contains all the disposition of thetestatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name andunder the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The followingsheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by thethree instrumental witnesses.Neither of these sheets is signed on theleft margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numberedby letters. These omissions, according to appellants' contention, aredefects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied. ISSUE: WON the will was duly admitted to probate. HELD YES. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will be signed on the leftmargin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 evidently has for its object the avoidance of substitution of any of said sheets which may change the disposition of the testatrix. Butwhen these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet (as inthe instant case) signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses,their signatures on the left margin of said sheet are not anymore necessaryas such will be purposeless. In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numberedcorrelatively in letters placed on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewiseclear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the willhas been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written onone sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentarydispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and thesecond contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by thethree witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on theirmargins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged. The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the dooragainst bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and toguaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should beinterpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal ends. But, on the other hand,also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrainand curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation alreadygiven assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing butdemands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testator'slast will, must be disregarded. SUROZA v HONRADO FACTS - Respondent judge admitted to probate a will, which on its face is void because it iswritten in English, a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which isprobably forged.- Mauro Suroza, a member of the US Army married Marcelina Salvador. They werechildless but they reared a boy named Agapito. Mauro died and Marcelina became apensioner of the Federal Government.- Agapito married Nenita and had a child Lilia. Agapito was eventually disabled andNenita was appointed guardian when he was declared as incompetent in a courtproceeding. Arsenia dela Cruz also wanted to be Agapito's guardian. She tried toprove that Nenita was unfaithful to Agapito. The second guardianship proceeding wasdismissed and Nenita's appointment was confirmed.- Spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot a child named Marilyn Sy, who wasentrusted to Arsenia and later delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza. Marilyn wasbrought up as the supposed daughter

violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules"- In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written inEnglish and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readilyperceived that the will is void.- In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language"understood and known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was statedthat the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". Thatcould only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiteratetestatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to thetestator. Thus, a will written in English, which was not known to the Igorot testator, isvoid and was disallowed.Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to be inexcusable. Specific requirements

other subscribing witnesses would necessarily have beenimpeded by the curtain separating the inner from theouter one "at the moment of inscription of eachsignature." The question whether the testator and thesubscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign theinstrument in the presence of each other does not dependupon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually castupon the paper at the moment of its subscription by eachof them, but that at that moment existing conditionsand their position with relation to each other weresuch that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign PAYAD vs. TOLENTINO FACTS:

BARUT vs. CAGACUNGAN FACTS: The signature of the testatrix was written by Severoat the request of the testatrix and in her presence and in thepresence of all the other witnesses to the will.The probate of the will was contended on the groundthat the handwriting of Severo looked more like thehandwriting of one of the 3 other attesting witnesses to thewill. HELD: Whether one person or another signed the name of the testatrix in this case is absolutely unimportant so far asthe validity of her will is concerned. It is because there were4 witnesses to the will of the decedent and the lawrequires only 3 attesting witnesses to the will. It is unimportant whether the person who writes thename of the testatrix signs his own name or not. Theimportant thing is that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction in thepresence of 3 witnesses and that they attested andsubscribed it in her presence and in the presence of each. That is all the law requires.It may be wise as a practical matter that the one whosigns t he testators name signs also his own; but that is notessential to the validity of the will NERA vs. RIMANDO FACTS: There was a dispute as to the circumstances attending the signing of the will on the day of itsexecution: 1.whether one of the subscribing witnesses waspresent in the small room where executedat the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures it was Probate of the will must be allowed. Atty. Almariodid not sign for the testatrix. She signed for placing her thumb mark on each and every page thereof . "A statuterequiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature ismade by the testator's mark." It is clear, therefore, that it wasnot necessary that the attestation clause in question shouldstate that the testatrix requested Attorney Almario to sign her name inasmuch as the testratrix signed the will in question in accordance with law GARCIA vs. LACUESTA FACTS: Antero died leaving behind a will, which appearsto have been signed by Atty. Javier who wrote the nameof Antero, followed below by A ruego del testador andthe name of Javier. Antero is alleged to have written across immediately after his name.It was alleged that the attestation clause is fatallydefective for failing to state that Antero caused Atty. Javier to write the testators name under his express direction.The proponent theorized that the cross is as much asignature as a thumb mark. HELD: 2.whether at that time he was outside, some eightor ten feet away, in a large room connecting withthe smaller room by a doorway, across whichwas hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator andthe other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument HELD: The SC admitted the first one and the will wasadmitted for probate. If the 2nd circumstance had happened, had thesubscribing witness been proven to have been in theouter room at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures to theinstrument in the inner room, it would have been invalidas a will, the attaching of those signatures under circumstances not being done "in the presence" of thewitness in the outer room. This because the line of vision from this witness to the testator and the The will is invalid. A testator cannot sign a will by only marking a crossagainst his name if it is not his customary signature. It isnot here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is theusual signature of Antero or even one of the ways by whichhe signed his name. The mere sign of a cross cannot belikened to a thumb mark. The cross cannot and does nothave the trustworthiness of a thumb mark. When the testator expressly caused another to sign the formers name, this fact must be recited in theattestation clause. Otherwise, the will is fatally defective and cannot be probated The probate of the will was denied on the groundthat the attestation clause was not in conformity with therequirements of law in that it is not stated therein that thetestatrix caused Atty. Almario to write her name at her express direction. The evidence establishes the fact that Leoncia, thedecedent, assisted by Atty. Almario placed her thumb markon each and every page of the questioned will and that saidattorney merely wrote her name to indicate the place whereshe placed said thumb mark. HELD:

LOPEZ vs. LIBORO FACTS: In 1947, Don Sixto Lopez executed a will where Jose Lopez was named an heir. Agustin Liboro questioned the validity of the said will based on the following ground, among others: The first sheet, which is also the first page) is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals. That the witnesses to the will provided contradictory statements. That Don Sixto used his thumb mark to sign the will. There was no indication in the will that the language used therein is known by Don Sixto Lopez.

testatrix was a mestiza espaola,was married to a Spaniard, made several trip to Spainand some of her letters submitted as evidence by theoppositor were written in Spanish by the testatrix in her own writing give rise to the presumption that thetestatrix knew the language in which the testament hasbeen written, which presumption should stand unless thecontrary is proven.Where the attestation clause of the will states that thetestatrix knew and possessed the Spanish language thoughthis matter is not required to be stated in the attestation clause, its inclusion can only mean that the instrumentalwitnesses wanted to make it of record that the deceasedknew the language in which the will was written. Matias vs. Salud Facts:

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid. HELD: Yes, the will is valid. The omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than the conventional numeral words or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page. Further, the first pages is captioned Testamento. The contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses as are set out in Liboros appelants brief are incidents not all of which every one of the witnesses can be supposed to have perceived, or to recall in the same order in which they occurred. Don Sixto affixed his thumb mark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The reason for this was that he was suffering from partial paralysis. There is nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or preference. Both ways are good. There is no statutory requirement which prescribes that it must be expressly placed in the will that the testator knows the language being used therein. It is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde. ***Lopez executed a will in Spanish. The probateof his will was opposed on the ground that the will is silent on the testators understanding of the language used inthe testament. HELD:There is no statutory requirement that thetestators understanding of willbe expressed therein. It is a matter that may beestablished by proof aliunde REYES vs. VIDAL FACTS: There was nothing in the testimony of the witnessespresented by Juan which indicated that the testatrix knewand spoke the Spanish language used in the preparation of the will in question. The oppositors submitted as evidenceletters written in Spanish by the deceased in her ownhandwriting. HELD: The will can be admitted.The failure of the petitioners witnesses to testify that thetestatrix knew and spoke Spanish does not itself alonesuffice to conclude that this requirement of law has not beencomplied with when there is enough evidence of recordwhich supplies this technical omission.Where the evidence of the oppositor to the probate of awill shows that the testatrix possessed the Spanish language,the oppositor cannot later on be allowed to allege thecontrary.The fact that the the language used in the

1. This case is an appeal from a CFI Cavite order denying the probate of the will of Gabina Raquel. The document consist of 3 pages and it seems that after the attestation clause, there appears the siganture of the testatrix 'Gabina Raquel', alongside is a smudged in violet ink claimed by the proponents as the thumbmark allegedly affixed by the tetratrix. On the third page at the end of the attestation clause appears signatures on the left margin of each page, and also on the upper part of each left margin appears the same violet ink smudge accompanied by the written words 'Gabina Raquel' with 'by Lourdes Samonte' underneath it.

2. The proponent's evidence is to the effect that the decedent allegedly instructed Atty. Agbunag to drat her will and brought to her on January 1950. With all the witnesses with her and the lawyer, the decedent affixed her thumbmark at the foot of the document and the left margin of each page. It was also alleged that she attempted to sign using a sign pen but was only able to do so on the lower half of page 2 due to the pain in her right shoulder. The lawyer, seeing Gabina unable to proceed instructed Lourdes Samonte to write 'Gabina Raquel by Lourdes Samonte' next to each thumbmark, after which the witnesses signed at the foot of the attestation clause and the left hand margin of each page. 3. The probate was opposed by Basilia Salud, the niece of the decedent. 4. The CFI of cavite denied the probate on the ground that the attestation clause did not state that the testatrix and the witnesses signed each and every page nor did it express that Lourdes was specially directed to sign after the testatrix. Issue: Whether or not the thumbprint was sufficient compliance with the law despite the absence of a description of such in the attestation clause HELD: YES The absence of the description on the attestation clause that another person wrote the testatrix' name at her request is not a fatal defect, The legal requirement only ask that it be signed by the testator, a requirement satisfied by a thumbprint or other mark affixed by him. As to the issue on the clarity of the ridge impression, it is held to be dependent on the aleatory circumstances. Where a testator employs an unfamiliar way of signing and that both the attestation clause and the will are silent on the matter, such silence is a factor to be considered against the authenticity of the testament. However, the failure to describe the signature itself alone is not sufficient to refuse probate when evidence fully satisfied that the will was executed and witnessed in accordance with law. JAVELLANA vs. LEDESMA FACTS: The opposition to the probate of the will of Apolinaria is founded on 3 specific issues.

One of the issues is whether the acknowledgment clause was signedand the notarial seal affixed by the notary without thepresence of the testatrix and the witnesses Issue: Whether or not the notary signed the certificationof acknowledgment in the presence of the testatrix andthe witnesses does not affect the validity of the codicil HELD: The new Civil Code does not require that the signing of thetestator, witnesses and notary should be accomplished inone single act.While testator and witnesses must sign in the presenceof each other, all that is thereafter required is that "every willmust be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses" (Article 806); i.e., that the latter shouldavow to the certifying officer the authenticity of their signatures and the voluntariness of their actions in executingthe testamentary disposition. This was done in this case.The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of hiscertification that the testament was duly acknowledged by theparticipants therein is no part of the acknowledgment itself nor of the testamentary act. Hence, their separate executionout of the presence of the testatrix and her witnesses can notbe said to violate the rule that testaments should becompleted without interruption. BALONAN vs. ABELLANA FACTS: Anacleta died leaving a will signed in her behalf byDr. Abello and under his name appears typewritten Por latestadora (for the testator) Anacleta.The oppositors questioned the will because it was notsigned in the name of the testator but rather in the name of Dr. Abello HELD: The will may not be admitted to probate. The witness should not have signed in his own name but rather that of the testator. In this case, the name of the testatrix does not appear written under the will by herself or by Dr. Abello. There is failure to comply with the express requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed thereto by some other person in his presence and by his express direction ICASIANO vs. ICASIANO FACTS: The will in this case consists of 5 pages. It had all the formality requirements and was signed at the end of every page, but it does not contain the signature of the one of the attesting witnesses on page 3. But the duplicate copy is signed by the testatrix and her 3 attesting witnesses in each and every page. HELD: The will is not invalid. The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to 1 page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of 2 pages inthe course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate . Impossibility of substitution if this page is assured not only by the fact that the testatrix and the 2 other witnesses signed the defective page, but also by its bearing the imprint of the seal of the notary public. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate

deviation existed, and the recordattests to the full observance of the statutory requisites.Otherwise, by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause GARCIA vs. GATCHALIAN FACTS:

evidence witnesses may sabotage

on the will

On March 15, 1967, Gregorio Gatchalian, a widower of 71 years of age, died in themunicipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, leaving no forced heirs. On April 2 of the sameyear, appellant filed a petition with the above named court for the probate of saidalleged will (Exhibit "C") wherein he was instituted as sole heir. Felipe Gatchalian, Aurora G. Camins, Angeles G. Cosca, Federico G. Tubog, Virginia G. Talanay and Angeles G. Talana y, appellees herein, opposed the petition on the ground, amongothers, that the will was procured by fraud; that the deceased did not intend theinstrument signed by him to be as his will; and that the deceased was physically andmentally incapable of making a will at the time of the alleged execution of said will. ISSUE: Whether or not the will may be probated with out complying Article 808 of theCivil Code. RULING: NO. We have held heretofore that compliance with the requirement contained in the above legal provision to the effect that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and also by the witnesses is indispensable for its validity (In re: Testate Estate of Alberto, G. R. No. L-11948, April 29, 1959). As the document under consideration does not comply with this requirement, it is obvious that the same may no tbe probated. *** Ruling: The requirement in Article 806 is indispensable. The will must be acknowledged before a notary public by both the testator and the witnesses. Here only the testator acknowledged the will. Vda de Ramos vs. CA FACTS: Adelaida Nista and siblings Buenavetura and Marcelina both claimed to be the instituted heirs of Eugenia Danila, the adopting parents of both Buenaventura and Marcelina. Both parties agreed to settle extra judicially their claims towards the estate of the decedent. Barely two weeks after such agreement, or on November 16, 1968, Rosario de Ramos et al, filed a motion for have to intervene as co-petitioners alleging that being instituted heirs on devises, they have rights and interest to protect in the estate of Eugenia. They likewise filed their opposition tothe compromise reached by Marcelina and Adelaida. The court granted theopposition and the original petitio n and amended opposition to probate of thealleged will and codicil stand. The lower court then allowed the probate of the will although two attesting witnesses, Odon and Rosendo testified that they did not see Eugenia signed the will but was already signed when they affix their signature. Notaries public Barcenas and Alvero affirmed the execution of the will. ISSUE: Whether or not the last testament and its accompanying codicil wereexecuted in accordance with the formalities of the law, considering the complicated circumstances that two of the attesting witnesses testified against their dueexecution while other nonsubscribing witnesses testified to the contrary. RULING: It appears positively that the documents were prepared by a lawyer and the execution of the same was evidently surprised by him. The solemnity surrounding the execution of a will is attended by some intricacies not usually within the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of the will and testament and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. If there should be any stress on theparticipation of

the lawyers in the execution of the will, it cannot be less than the exercise of their primary duty to uphold the lofty purpose of the law. Cruz v. Villasor Facts: 1. The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valenti Cruz. However, the petitioner opposed the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged that the instrument was executed without the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was not executed in accordance with law. 2. One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will was acknowledged. Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there is substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary public was one of them. Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the NCC HELD: NO. The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging officer cannot serve as witness at the same time. To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and 'before' means in front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation int he making of the will. To permit such situation would be absurd. Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements, a function defeated if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. he would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud. GABUCAN vs. CA FACTS: The petition for probate of a will was dismissed on the ground that it does not bear a thirty-centavo documentary stamp. HELD: The dismissal of the petition was not proper. What the probate court should have done was to Require the petitioner or proponent to affix the requisite thirtycentavo documentary stamp to the notarialacknowledgment of the will which is the taxableportion of that document. After all, the documentary stamp may be affixed at the time the taxable document is presented in evidence. TABOADA vs. ROSAL FACTS:

The 1st page of the will contains the entiretestamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the lefthand margin by the 3 instrumental witnesses. The 2nd page which contains the attestation clause and theacknowledgement is signed at the end of the attestationclause by the 3 attesting witnesses and at the left handmargin by the testatrix.The trial court denied the probate of the will because it is not enough that only the testatrix signs at the end but all the 3 subscribing witnesses must also sign at the same place or at the end, in the presence of the testatrix. HELD: The will must be probated for there is not such requirement. It is enough that only the testator signs in the end .It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed. Attestation consists in witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are, done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses'names upon the same paper for the purpose of Identification of such paper as the will which wasexe cuted by the testator. Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this case was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of identification. The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of thesole page which contains all the testamentarydispositions, especially so when the will was properlyIdentifie d by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be the same will executed by the testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned order. The SC noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will. Such is not a fatal defect because the number of pages is easily discernible for there are only 2 pages. The acknowledgement itself states that This Last Will and Testament consists of 2 pages including this page. There is substantial compliance TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA vs. ABAJA FACTS: Abada executed his will in 1932. Abada died in1940. It was asserted that the will of Abada does not indicate that it was written in a language or dialect known to the testator and that the will was not acknowledged before a notary public, citing Articles 804 and 806 of th eNew Civil Code. HELD: The law that governs the validity of the will of Abada is the Code of Civil Procedure. Although the lawsin force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889 and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure (which governed the execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code), the Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary inthe execution of any will. Abadas will does not require acknowledgement before a notary public. Under Article 795, the validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at thetime it is made ARTICLE 16 .Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. iatdc2005However, intestate and testamentarysuccessions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a) Azuela vs CA Facts:

The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The petition filed by petitioner FelixAzuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent. The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino. The three named witnesses to the will affixed theirsignatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause.The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent, namely: petitioner himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad. Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart Prague. The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent. Oppositor Geralda Castillo argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated 10 August 1992. The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had substituted his since deceased mother-in-law, Geralda Castillo. In a Decision dated 17 August 1995, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. Hence, the present petition. Issue: Whether or not the can be probated? Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative and affirmed the decision of the appellate court. It held that the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written remains a fatal flaw,despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause tostate the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguardagainst possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages andto prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. The failure to state the number of pages equates with the absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to. Itis the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805to state the number of pages used upon which the will is written; the factthat the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these elemental facts would be their signatures onthe attestation clause.Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental witnesses, as they failed to sign the attestation clause Guerrero v. Bihis FACTS: Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A.Guerrero and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died. Guerrero filed for probate in the RTC QC. Respondent Bihis opposed her elder sister's petition on the following grounds: the will was not executedand attested as required by law; its attestation clause andacknowledgment did not comply with the requirements of the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud and petitioner and her children procured the will through undue and improper pressure and influence. Petitioner Guerrero was appointes specialadministratrix. Respondent opposed petitioner's appointment butsubsequently withdrew her opposition. The trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with because the will was "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix's residence at No. 40 Kanlaon Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City. ISSUE: Did the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code? HELD: No. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.6Thisformal requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a will.7In other words, a notarial will that is not

acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate. cDICaS The Notarial law provides: SECTION 240.Territorial jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shallbe co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. Nonotary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. The compulsory language of Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with and the interdiction of Article 240 of theNotarial Law was breached. Ineluctably, the acts of the testatrix,her witnesses and Atty. Directo were all completely void. Lee v. Tambago FACTS:Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty.Regino B. Tambago, with violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will that is alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged signatures of his father, th edecedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses. In the said will,the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wifeLim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant. The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965.Complainant, however, pointed outthat the residence certificate of the testator noted in theacknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962.Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donation which supposedly contained his purported signature. Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the deed of donation were "in any way entirely and diametrically opposed from one another in all angle[s]."Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged andmerely copied from their respective voters affidavits.Complainant further asserted that no copy of suchpurported will was on file in the archives division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA). ISSUE:Was the will spurious? HELD: Yes, thus Tambago violated the Notarial Law and the ethics of legal profession. The law provides for certain formalities that must befollowed in the execution of wills. The object o f solemnitiessurrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The will in question was attested by only two witnesses. On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered void. Thisis in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary publicby the testator and the witnesses. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves anextra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testators wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that heintends it to be done. A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous sabsence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, thenotation of the testators old residence certificate in the sameacknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will. As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully observe formalities of awill and those of notarization. These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded the

Samaniego-Celada vs. Abena Facts: Margarita died single and without any ascending nor descending heirs as her parents, grandparents and siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first cousins Catalina Samaniego-Bombay, Manuelita Samaniego Sajonia, Feliza Samaniego, and petitioner. Petitioner argues that Margaritas will failed to comply with the formalities required under Article 8058 of the Civil Code because the will was not signed by the testator in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and in the presence of one another. She also argues that the signatures of the testator on pages A, B, and C of the will are not the same or similar, indicating that they were not signed on the same day ISSUE: Is a will paged with A, B, C instead of 1, 2, 3 valid? RULING: It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the "doctrine of liberal interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads: "In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805." WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. ECHAVEZ VS. DOZEN FACTS: Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of several lots in Cebu City, which includes Lot No. 1956-A and Lot No. 1959 (subject lots). On September 7, 1985, Vicente donated the subject lots to petitioner Manuel Echavez (Manuel) through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.[1] Manuel accepted the donation. In March 1986, Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in favor of Dozen Construction and Development Corporation (Dozen Corporation). In October 1986, they executed two Deeds of Absolute Sale over the same properties covered by the previous Contract to Sell. On November 6, 1986, Vicente died. Emiliano Cabanig, Vicente's nephew, filed a petition for the settlement of Vicente's intestate estate. On the other hand, Manuel filed a petition to approve Vicente's donation mortis causa in his favor and an action to annul the contracts of sale Vicente executed in favor of Dozen Corporation. These cases were jointly heard. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed Manuel's petition to approve the donation and his action for annulment of the contracts of sale.[2] The RTC found that the execution of a Contract to Sell in favor of Dozen Corporation, after Vicente had donated the lots to Manuel, was an equivocal act that revoked the donation. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision.[3] The CA held that since the donation in favor of Manuel was a donation mortis causa, compliance with the formalities for the validity of wills should have been observed. The CA found that the deed of donation did not contain an attestation clause and was therefore void. RULING The CA correctly declared that a donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities prescribed by law for the validity of wills,[4] "otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no effect." [5] Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code should have been applied. As the CA correctly found, the purported attestation clause embodied in the Acknowledgment portion does not contain the number of pages on which the deed was written. The exception to this rule in Singson v. Florentino[6] and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,[7] cannot be applied to the present case, as the facts of this case are not similar with those of Singson and Taboada. In those cases, the Court found that although the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the will was written, the number of pages was stated in one portion of the will. This is not the factual situation in the present case.

Even granting that the Acknowledgment embodies what the attestation clause requires, we are not prepared to hold that an attestation clause and an acknowledgment can be merged in one statement. That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two separate provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806, respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts that serve different purposes. An acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed, declaring before a competent officer or court that the deed or act is his own. On the other hand, the attestation of a will refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to the execution of the instrument before them and to the manner of its execution.[8] Although the witnesses in the present case acknowledged the execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa before the notary public, this is not the avowal the law requires from the instrumental witnesses to the execution of a decedent's will. An attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of Article 805 requires. In the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. Finding no reversible error committed by the CA, the Court hereby DENIES Manuel's petition for review on certiorari. Baltazar v Laxa (inulit) LOPEZ vs. LOPEZ Facts: Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez, and their four legitimate children, namely, petitioner Richard B. Lopez (Richard) and the respondents Diana Jeanne Lopez (Diana), Marybeth de Leon (Marybeth) and Victoria L. Tuazon (Victoria) as compulsory heirs. Before Enriques death, he executed a Last Will and Testament and constituted Richard as his executor and administrator. Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and Testament before the RTC of Manila with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed the petition contending that the purported last will and testament was not executed and attested as required by law, and that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of Richard. HELD: The petition lacks merit. The court applied the provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly, Articles 805 and 809. The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.9 While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written"10 cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliund.11 On this score is the comment of Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding the application of Article 809, to wit: x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings.12(Emphasis supplied) Hence, the CA properly sustained the disallowance of the will. Moreover, it correctly ruled that Richard pursued the wrong mode of appeal as Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that in special proceedings, as in this case, the appeal shall be made by record on appeal. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. Witnesses to a will Who are competent? Gonzales v. CA

Facts: 1. Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Lutgarda Santiago (Private respondent) are the nieces of the deceased Isabel Gabriel who died a widow. A will was thereafter submitted to probate. The said will was typewritten, in Tagalog and appeared to have been executed in April 1961 or two months prior to the death of Isabel. It consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and acknowledgment, with the signature of testatrix on page 4 and the left margin of all the pages. 2. Lutgarda was named as the universal heir and executor. The petitioner opposed the probate. 3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the will was not executed and attested in accordance with law on the issue of the competency and credibility of the witnesses. Issue: Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to the validity of a will RULING: No. The law requires only that witnesses posses the qualifications under Art. 820 (NCC) and none of the disqualifications of Art. 802. There is no requirement that they are of good standing or reputation in the community, for trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony is believed and accepted in court. For the testimony to be credible, it is not mandatory that evidence be established on record that the witnesses have good standing in the the community. Competency is distinguished from credibility, the former being determined by Art. 820 while the latter does not require evidence of such good standing. Credibility depends on the convincing weight of his testimony in court. Nera v Rimando (inulit) Icasiano v Icasiano CAGRO vs. CAGRO FACTS: In the attestation clause of the will, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin, is not signed by the attesting witnesses at the bottom. HELD: The will is not valid. The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation. The signatures on the left margin of the will are only incompliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses ABANGAN CASE Facts : A will consisted of 2pages. The 1st page is thedisposition signed by thetestator at the bottom.Second page is theattestation signed by thewitnesses Issue : There were nosignatures on the leftmargin. According to theoppositors the signaturesshould also appear on the left margin. Ruling : It is enough that the signatures appear on each and every page of the will.The purpose here is toidentify that indeed thetestator and the witnessessigned the will. No dissenting opinion CAGRO CASE Facts : The signatures instead at the bottom, the signatures were on the margin. Issue : the signatures should be at the bottom so that there were signatures on the left and at the bottom. Ruling : The main text of Cagro v. Cagro, it was considered a Fatal defect by the Supreme Court. According to the SC, these signatures in order to be incompliance with requirement of the law, aside from signatures on the left margin, you should still sign at the bottom. However, there were strong dissenting opinions to the effect that to require that the signatures of the witnesses aside from the left margin should also

appear at the bottom is TOOTECHNICAL. It will not serve the purpose of the law because what is important is that the signature should appear on each and every page and this purpose is accomplished by affixing the signature on the left. Special requirements for deaf, etc GARCIA vs. VASQUEZ FACTS: The oppositors challenged the correctness of the admission of the will for probate on the ground that the testatrix eyesight was so poor and defective that she could not have read the provisions of the will, contrary to the testimonies of witnesses. The ophthalmologist testified that the vision of the testatrix remained mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading print. HELD: Against the background of defective eyesight of the alleged testatrix, the appearance of the 1960 will, acquiresstriking significance. Upon, its face, the testamentaryprovisions, the attestation clause and acknowledgment were crammed together into a single sheet of paper, so much so that the words had to be written very close to the top, bottom and two sides of the paper, leaving no margin whatsoever;the word "and" had to be written by the symbol "&,"apparently to save on space. Plainly, the testament was not prepared with any regard for the defective vision of DoaGliceria. The typographical errors remained uncorrectedthereby indicating that the execution thereof must have been characterized by haste. It is difficult to understand that so important a document containing the final disposition of one's worldly possessions should be embodied in an informal and untidily written instrument; or that the glaring spelling errors should have escaped her notice if she had actually retained the ability to read the purported will and had done so .Where Article 808 is not complied with, the said will suffers from infirmity that affects its due execution. ARTICLE 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of article 805. (n) ALVARADO vs. GAVIOLA FACTS: The testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the 8-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the 3 instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter 4 followed the readingwith their own respective copies previously furnishedthem.Said will was admitted to probate. Later on, a codicil was executed, and by that time, the testator was already suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of thenotarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading using their own copies. HELD: Article 808 not only applies to blind testators, but also to those who, for one reason or another, are incapable of reading their wills Hence, the will should have been read by the notary public and an instrumental witness. However, the spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. In this case, there was substantial compliance. Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has beensatisfied, the reason being that the solemnitiessurrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege. In this case, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with hisinstructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. Substantial compliance GIL vs MURCIANO

FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Manila admitted to probate the alleged will and testament of the deceased Carlos Gil. The oppositor Pilar Gil Vda. de Murciano appealed to this Court, raising only question of law It will be noted that the attestation clause above quoted does not state that the alleged testor signed the will. It declares only that it was signed by the witnesses ISSUE: WON the will is valid? RULING: This is a fatal defect, for the precise purpose of the attestation clause is to certify that the testator signed the will, this being the most essential element of the clause. Without it there is no attestation at all. It is said that the court may correct a mere clerical error. This is too much of a clerical error for it effects the very essence of the clause. Alleged errors may be overlooked or correct only in matters of form which do not affect the substance of the statement. There is no reason why wills should not be executed by complying substantially with the clear requisites of the law, leaving it to the courts to supply essential elements. The right to dispose of property by will is not natural but statutory, and statutory requirements should be satisfied. It has always been the policy of this court to sustain a will if it is legally possible to do so, but we cannot break down the legislative barriers protecting a man's property after death, even if a situation may be presented apparently meritorious In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, denying the probate of the alleged will and declaring intestate the estate of the deceased Carlos Gil CANEDA vs.Hon. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children,already in the twilight years of his life executed a last will and testament beforethree attesting witnesses and he was duly assisted by his lawyer and a notarypublic. It was declared therein that, among other things that the testator wasleaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties tospecific persons, all of whom do not appear to be related to Mateo. Not longafter, he himself filed a petition before the CFI seeking the probate of his last willand testament but the scheduled hearings were postponed, until the testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court.Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees named in the will, sought his appointmentas special administrator of the testators estate but due to his death, he wassucceeded by William Cabrera, who was appointed by RTC which is already theprobate court. CONTENTIONS:PETITIONERS: The petitioners assail to the allowance of the testator's will on the groundthat it was not executed in accordance with all the requisites of law since thetestator was already in a poor state of health such that he could not havepossibly executed the same. Petitioners likewise contend that the will is null andvoid because its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specificallystate that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing thewill in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. RESPONDENTS: The respondent, on the other hand, argue that Mateo was of sound anddisposing mind and in good health when he executed his will. Further, they alsocontend that the witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of thetestator and of each other. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballerois fatally defective such that whether or not it affects the validity of thewill.2. Whether or not the attestation clause complies with the substantialcompliance pursuant to Article 809 of the Civil Code. RULING: An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby theattesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before themand to the manner of the execution of the same. It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by thewitnesses; it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essentialformalities required by law has been observed. Under the 3rd paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of which would result in the invalidityof the will, should state:

1. The number of pages used upon which the will is written; 2. That the testator signed, or expressly cause another to sign, the willand every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and 3. That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and that the said witnesses also signed thewill and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of oneanother.It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attestand subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another.Attestation and subscription differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of sense,while subscription is the act of the hand. The attestation clause herein assailed isthat while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in thepresence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pagesthat were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance thatsaid witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presenceof the testator and of each other. What is then clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of thetestator and of one another. The absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfectionwhich must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought tobe admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the defect inthe attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving theform of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the applicationof the substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in Article 809 of the CivilCode: In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud or undue and improper pressureand influence, defects and imperfection in the form of attestation or in thelanguage used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is not proved that thewill was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all therequirements of Article 805. The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of theattestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfection wouldnot render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was really executed andattested in compliance with Article 805. These considerations do not apply wherethe attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signedeach and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of theattestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Article805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. That is preciselythe defect complained of in the present case since there is no plausible way bywhich it can be read into the questioned attestation clause statement, or animplication thereof, that the attesting witness did actually bear witness to thesigning by the testator of the will and all of its pages and that said instrumentalwitnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of thetestator and of one another. Holographic Wills Probate Roxas v. De Jesus FACTS: Bibiane Roxas died. Her brother, Simeon Roxas, filed a spec. pro. for partition of theestate of the deceased and also delivered the holographic will of the deceased. Simeon stated that he found a notebook belonging to deceased, which contained a letter-will entirely written and signed in deceaseds handwriting. The will is dated FEB./61 and states: This is my will which I want to be re spected although it is not written by a lawyer. Roxas relatives corroborated the fact that the same is aholographic will of deceased, identifying her handwriting and signature. Respondent opposed probate on the ground that it such does not comply with Article 810 of the CC because the date contained in a holographic will must signify the year, month, and day. ISSUE: W/N the date FEB./61 appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code. HELD: Valid date. This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions of the law wills consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. If a Will has been executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Will should be admitted to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282). If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is actually

attained by the form followed by the testator. In Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil. 476, we ruled that: The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two competing Wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in this case. We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness and due execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of theholographic Will of their mother and that she had the testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said Will. The objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic Will is fatally defective because the date FEB./61 appearing on the holographic Will is not sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be entertained. As a general rule, the date in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date FEB./61 appearing on theholographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance. Labrador v. CA FACTS: Melecio died leaving behind a parcel of land to his heirs. However, during probateproceedings, Jesus and Gaudencio filed an opposition on the ground that the will has been extinguished by implication of law alleging that before Melecios death, the land was sold to them evidenced by TCT No. 21178. Jesus eventually sold it to Navat. Trial court admitted the will to probate and declared the TCT null and void. However, the CA on appeal denied probate on the ground that it was undated. ISSUE: W/N the alleged holographic will is dated, as provided for in Article 810 of CC. HELD: YES. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. The intention to show March 17 1968 as the date of the execution is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. It states that this being in the month of March 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than Melecio Labrador, their father. This clearly shows that this is a unilateral act of Melecio who plainly knew that he was executing a will. Kalaw v. Relova Facts: 1. Gregorio Kalaw, the private respondent, claiming to be the sole heir of sister Natividad, filed a peition for probate of the latter's holographic will in 1968. The will contained 2 alterations: a) Rosa's name, designated as the sole heir was crossed out and instead "Rosario" was written above it. Such was not initialed, b) Rosa's name was crossed out as sole executrix and Gregorio's ma,e was written above it. This alteration was initialed by the testator. 2. Rosa contended that the will as first written should be given effect so that she would be the sole heir. The lower court denied the probate due to the unauthenticated alterations and additions. Issue: Whether or not the will is valid RULING: No, the will is voided or revoked since nothing remains in the will which could remain valid as there was only one disposition in it. Such was altered by the substitution of the original heir with another. To rule that the first will should be given effect is to disregard the testatrix' change of mind. However, this change of mind cannot be given effect either as she failed to authenticate it in accordance with Art. 814, or by affixing her full signature.

Azaola v. Singson FACTS: Fortunata S. Vda. De Yance died in Quezon City on September 9, 1957. Petitionersubmitted for probate her holographic will, in which Maria Azaola was made the sole heir as against the nephew, who is the defendant. Only one witness, Francisoco Azaola, was presented to testify on the handwriting of the testatrix. He testified that he had seen it one month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix, as it was given to him and his wife; and that it was in the testatrixs handwriting. He presented the mortgage, the special power of the attorney, and the general power of attorney, and the deeds of sale including an affidavit to reinforce his statement. Two residence certificates showing the testatrixs signature were also exhibited forcomparison purposes. The probate was opposed on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the will. The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness presented did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix. Petitioner appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one witness because the wills authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the adverse party. ISSUE: W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive. HELD: Article 811 is merely permissive and not mandatory. Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, petitioner was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 can not be interpreted to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having theprobate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of aholographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses who know the handwriting and signature of the testator a nd who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express) that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. There may be no available witness of the testators hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become an impossibility. This is the reason why the 2nd paragraph of Article 811 allows the court to resort to expert evidence. The law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency. What the law deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the wills authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect. Codoy v. Calugay FACTS: On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the said will. They attested to the genuineness and due execution of the will on 30 August 1978. Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. They raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing on the will after every disposition, calling the same out of the ordinary. If the will was in the handwriting of the deceased, it was improperly procured. Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary evidence. The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and identified the records of the case bearing the signature of the deceased.

The second witness was election registrar who was made to produce and identify the voters affidavit, but failed to as the same was already destroyed and no longer available. The third, the deceaseds niece, claimed that she had acquired familiarity with the deceaseds signature and handwriting as she used to accompany her in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings and the deceased always issued receipts. The niece also testified that the deceased left a holographic will entirely written, dated and signed by said deceased. The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate proceedings of her late husband, who said that the signature on the will was similar to that of the deceased but that he can not be sure. The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar with the signature of the deceased which appeared in the latters application for pasture permit. The fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had lived with the deceased since birth where she had become familiar with her signature and that the one appearing on the will was genuine. Codoy and Ramonals demurrer to evidence was granted by the lower court. It was reversed on appeal with the Court of Appeals which granted the probate.

ISSUE: 1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare the signature in a contested will as the genuine signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory. 2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the deceaseds holographic will. HELD: 1. YES. The word shall connotes a mandatory o rder, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, is mandatory. In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator. The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased. 2. NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased. The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic will was that of the deceased. The election registrar was not able to produce the voters affidavit for verification as it was no longer available. The deceaseds niece saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased and did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note. The will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of the said niece, who kept the fact about the will from the children of the deceased, putting in issue her motive. Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the decreased write a note or sign a document. The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will. (As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was not complied with.) A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by the testator. The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce evidence in support of their opposition. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise the right to make a will. However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, the law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased. Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required. The word shall connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, is mandatory . Gan v. Yap

FACTS: Felicidad Yap died of a heart failure, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in Manila. Fausto E. Gan, her nephew, initiated the proceedings in the Manila CFI with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased. The will was not presented because Felicidads husband, Ildefonso, supposedly took it. What was presented were witness accounts of relatives who knew of her intention to make a will and allegedly saw it as well. According to the witnesses, Felicidad did not want her husband to know about it, but she had made known to her other relatives that she made a will. Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime. After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Judge refused toprobate the alleged will on account of the discrepancies arising from the facts. For one thing, it is strange that Felicidad made her will known to so many of her relatives when she wanted to keep it a secret and she would not have carried it in her purse in the hospital, knowing that her husband may have access to it. There was also no evidence presented that her niece was her confidant. In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositors evidence that Felicidad did not and could not have executed such holographic will. ISSUE: 1. May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator? 2. W/N Felicidad could have executed the holographic will. HELD: 1. No. The will must be presented. The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts. 810-814. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. This is a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided for wills under Act 190, which for fifty years (from 1901 to 1950) required wills to be subscribed by the testator and three credible witnesses in each and every page; such witnesses to attest to the number of sheets used and to the fact that the testator signed in their presence and that they signed in the presence of the testator and of each other. Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirements to be fulfilled when such will is submitted to the courts for allowance. For that purpose the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses would be sufficient if there is no opposition (Sec. 5, Rule 77). If there is, the three must testify, if available. From the testimony of such witnesses (and of other additional witnesses) the court may form its opinion as to the genuineness and authenticity of the testament, and the circumstances its due execution. With regard to holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses; provided however, that they are entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. In the probate of a holographic will says the New Civil Code, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three such witnesses shall be required. In the absence of any such witnesses, (familiar w ith decedents handwriting) and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. The witnesses need not have seen the execution of the holographic will, but they must be familiar with the decedents handwriting. Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these means of opposition, and of assessing the evidence are not available. And then the only guaranty of authenticity the testators handwriting has disappeared. The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof (and probate) of a lost or destroyed will by secondary evidence the testimony of witnesses, in lieu of the original document. Yet such Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills which could not then be validly made here. Could Rule 77 be extended, by analogy, to holographic wills? (NO) Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest objections to the holographicwill is that it may be lost or stolen an implied admission that such loss or theftrenders it useless. As it is universally admitted that the holographic will is usually done by the testator and by himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either its execution or its contents, the above article 692 could not have the idea of simply permitting such relatives to state whether they know of the will, but whether in the face of the document itself they think the testator wrote it. Obviously, this they cant do unless the will itself is presented to the Court and to them. This holding aligns with the ideas on holographic wills in the Fuero Juzgo, admittedly the basis of the Spanish Civil Code provisions on the matter.(According to the Fuero, the will itself must be compared with specimens of the testators handwriting.)

All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property of the deceased in accordance with his holographic will, unless they are shown his handwriting and signature. Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain why, unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of theholographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate. In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four with the notary) deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be checked and exposed, their whereabouts and acts on the particular day, the likelihood that they would be called by the testator, their intimacy with the testator, etc. And if they were intimates or trusted friends of the testator they are not likely to end themselves to any fraudulent scheme to distort his wishes. Last but not least, they can not receive anything on account of the will. Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible only one man could engineer the fraud this way: after making a clever or passable imitation of the handwriting and signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let three honest and credible witnesses see and read the forgery; and the latter, having no interest, could easily fall for it, and in court they would in all good faith affirm its genuineness and authenticity. The will having been lost the forger may have purposely destroyed it in an accident the oppositors have no way to expose the trick and the error, because the document itself is not at hand. And considering that theholographic will may consist of two or three pages, and only one of them need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages, which may be the most important ones, may go undetected. If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable feature feasibility of forgery would be added to the several objections to this kind of wills listed by Castan, Sanchez Roman and Valverde and other well-known Spanish Commentators and teachers of Civil Law. One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses would be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely the act of the testator of subscribing the will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to their opinion of the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which can not be tested in court, nor directly contradicted by the oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at hand. In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that clear and distinct proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6. 2. No. Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that clear and distinct proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6. Rodelas v. Aranza FACTS: Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds of: 1.Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court; 2.the copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will, it was merely an instruction as to the management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by the decedent; 3.the hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect because lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills. 4.the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required by law. MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR, Rodelas filed an opposition. The CFI set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the probate of the willstating that in the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regardsthe document itself as the material proof of authenticity of said wills. And that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. The lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of the decedent and the fact that the original of the will could not be located shows to that the decedent had discarded the alleged holographic will before his death. Rodelas filed an MR which was denied. Rodelas appealed to the CA. Aranza et al. moved to forward the case to the SC as it involves a question of law not of fact.

ISSUE: W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. HELD: If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between samplehandwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed becausecomparison can be made by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator. The probate court would be able to determine the authenticity of the handwriting of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity. But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court, RIVERA vs IAC FACTS: On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio Rivera died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Venancios estate. Docketed as SP No. 1076, this petition was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera. Who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent. Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and did not die interstate but in fact left two holographic wills ISSUE: Whether or not Jose Rivera was the legitimate son of the deceased Venancio Rivera. RULING: In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage the legitimacy of children. Even in the absence of any certificate of marriage or other documentary proof of the existence of marriage, the law presumes a man and woman cohabiting with each other as being married, in the absence of proof to the contrary. Based on this unrefuted legal presumption, Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr. who authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient Ajero v. CA FACTS: The holographic will of Annie San was submitted for probate. Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testame nts body nor the signature therein was in decedents handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was also contested by Dr. Ajero with respect to the disposition in the will of a house and lot. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner. However, the trial court still admitted the decedents holographic will to probate. The trial court held that since it must decide only the question of the identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, it finds no reason for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix. On appeal, the CA reversed said Decision holding that the decedent did not comply with Articles 313 and 314 of the NCC. It found that certain dispositions in the will were either unsigned or undated, or signed by not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made had not been authenticated by decedent. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that Articles 813 and 814 of the NCC were not complies with. HELD: YES. A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of thedispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the

result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testators signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. It is also proper to note that he requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Article 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of theholographic will (Article 810). This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only therequirements of Article 810 of the NCC and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 are essential to the probate of a holographic will. Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and Article 839 of the Civil Code enumerate the grounds for disallowance of wills. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. In a petition to admit a holographic will, the only issues to be resolved are: 1.whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedents last will and testament; 2.whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; 3.whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and 4.whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud; accordingly, laws on this subject should be interpreted to attain these primordial ends. In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally authographic or handwritten by the testator himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will no result in the disallowance of a holographicwill that is unquestionable handwritten by the testator. Baltazar v Laxa (inulit) Cabalu v Tadu Modes of revocation Gago v. Mamuyac FACTS: Miguel Mamuyac died on January 2, 1922. It appears from the record that Miguel executed a last will and testament on July 27, 1918. Gago presented such will forprobate which was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac et. al. Said petition for probatewas denied on the ground that the deceased executed another will on April 16, 1919. Gago presented the April 16 will for probate which was again opposed by Cornelio et. al. alleging that the will presented by Gago is a carbon copy of the original April 16 will; such will was cancelled during the lifetime of the deceased; and that said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased. The RTC found that the deceased executed another will on December 30, 1920. ISSUE: W/N the April 16 will was cancelled. HELD: YES. With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive proof, not denied, which was accepted by the lower court, that will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved of be inferred from evidence showingthat after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it. In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, we are forced to the conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the evidence. In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which wills are destroyed for the purpose of revoking them

there is no witness to the act of cancellation or destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the formalities andrequirements of the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the testator. Casiano v. CA FACTS: On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced on November 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunts estate in the CFI of Iloilo. While the case was still pending the parties Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adrianas estate. The agreement provided for the division of the estate into four equal parts among the parties. The Malotos then presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval which the court did on March 21, 1964. 3 years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adrianas counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo Hervas, discovered a document entitled KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT -AN (Testamento), dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be thelast will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have found the testament, the original copy, while he was going through some materials inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The document was submitted to the clerk of court of the Iloilo CFI. Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor. Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named in the will, filed in the same court which approved the EJ settelement a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the will which was denied by the CFI. Upon petition to the SC for certiorari and mandamus, the SC dismissed that petition and advised that a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will would be the appropriate vehicle to thresh out the matters raised by the petitioners. The CFI and CA found that the will to be probated had been revoked by the burning thereof by the housemaid upon instruction of the testatrix. ISSUE: W/N the will was revoked by Adriana. HELD: No. The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can be found in Article 830. The physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself. Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for th e effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one,the document or papers burned by Adrianas maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned. The two witnesses were illiterate and does not appear to be unequivocably positive that the document burned was indeed Adrianas will. Guadalupe believed that the papers she destroyed was the will only because, according to her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the burned document was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his testimony on this point is double hearsay. It is an important matter of public interest that a purported win is not denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its very foundations. Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation Diaz v. De Leon

Facts: 1. Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second will was not deemed in conformance to the requirements under the law. After executing his first will, he asked it to be immediately returned to him. As it was returned, he instructed his servant to tear it. This was done in the testator's presence and his nurse. After sometime, he was asked by his physician about the incident wherein he replied that the will has already been destroyed. Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will RULING: Yes. His intention to revoke is manifest from the facts that he was anxious to withdraw or change the provisions he made in the first will. This fact was shown from his own statements to the witnesses and the mother superior of the hospital where he was subsequently confined. The original will which was presented for probate is deemed destroyed hence, it cannot be probated as the last will and testament of testator. Molo vs. Molo Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation Facts: 1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces. 2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution. 3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will. Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent disallowed 1939 will RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void. There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.