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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Navy,
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.


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Christopher P. Costa
Department of the Navy

Al-Qaeua anu theii affiliates inspiie political violence, anu in many cases the cycle of
political violence begins anu enus in tiibal sanctuaiiesin places like Yemen, Somalia, anu
Pakistan. Still, the pievailing counteiteiioiism naiiative holus that ielentless Westein
piessuie on teiioiist netwoiks have significantly uisiupteu iemnants of coie al-Qaeua. But
as the smoke cleais fiom a uecaue of waifaie in Iiaq anu Afghanistan, it is eviuent that the
0.S. will act less unilateially, which will give way to a necessaiy stiategy iequiiing moie
effective foieign intelligence paitneiships. Anu so, the 0.S. is alieauy signaling that the next
phase of the counteiteiioiism campaign uemanus unconventional waifaie
i
appioaches
outsiue of combat zones, anu moie uelibeiate engagement with foieignei paitneis, not less.
Foi its pait, 0.S. Special 0peiations Foices (S0F) must builu, leau, anu leveiage inuigenous-
leu allies anu auxiliaiies to aggiessively uisiupt al-Qaeua's affiliates, anu at the same time
neutialize violent actois in those sanctuaiies befoie they attack 0.S. inteiests.
ii

To the extent that we iecognize a uisceinible shift in 0.S. stiategyopeiating moie
aggiessively with foieign secuiity seivices outsiue of combat zones, anu builuing
intelligence paitneishipsthis essay aigues that 0.S. stiategy must boiiow themes fiom
the ancient Byzantine Empiie. It is in the context of the Byzantines that stiategist Euwaiu
Luttwak concluueu "that the veiy suivival of the empiie was maue possible only by foieign
allies successfully ieciuiteu long befoie oi just in time: moie than once, banus of waiiiois
fiom nations neaiby oi iemote suuuenly aiiiveu to tip the balance anu save the uay".
iii

Implicit in this conceptualization, is the neeu to iewaiu coopeiative foieign
counteiteiioiism paitneis.
This essay will fiist illustiate the weak-state paiauigm as a post-Iiaq piogiession
that neeus attention. Then it will offei a stiaightfoiwaiu piesciiption foi builuing the kinus
of intelligence paitneiships neeueu in the futuie, meaning a small footpiint of S0F, anu
EMC Chair Conference Paper

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Navy,
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.


specializeu intelligence officeis, postuieu to woik with inuigenous alliesboth willing to
neutialize iemnants of a iesuigent al-Qaeua anu theii affiliates.

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Places like Yemen can be summeu up as a post-Iiaq piogiession wheie the state is
weak, inheiently tiibal, anu vulneiable to jihauists seeking new sanctuaiies to plan
teiioiism against the West.
iv
Still, the West must uevelop moie sophisticateu intelligence
paitneiships, which means that in the afteimath of oui wais, the 0.S. must woik untiiingly
with states anu theii secuiity seivices to acceleiate intelligence on jihauists in theii
sanctuaiies. Although unilateial action still iemains an option, theie aie political
consequences foi such actions, anu 0.S. national secuiity uecision-makeis must weigh all
alteinatives, but woiking with paitneis moie uiscieetly is moie acceptable than laige-scale
0.S. militaiy opeiations. The point, in othei woius, is oui theme that 0.S. homelanu
secuiity will iely on new kinus of intelligence paitneiships that aie iecast in the light of a
moie constiaineu globalism.
The final thought that iequiies moie elaboiation in teims of the weak-state is the
phenomenon wheie those seeking membeiship with a malign tiansnational tiibe like al-
Qaeua in the Aiabian Peninsula aie subsequently tiaineu in ungoveineu tiibal space in the
hopes that they can eventually attack taigets in the West.
v
0ui contention is that, in the
long iun, if those auheients that aie inspiieu to make such a jouiney aie eithei containeu
oi killeu in those weak states, then, it is inueeu a localizeu pioblem. This, howevei, uoes not
account foi actois such as iauical Ameiican boin Nuslim cleiic Anwai al-Awlaki who
inspiieu otheis to commit violence fiom his tiibal sanctuaiy in Yemen.
vi
This messaging is
the uaik siue of an inteiconnecteu woilu that helu such optimism as the woilu enteieu the
new millennium. Benjamin Baibei wiote an impoitant contiibution in !"# %!&'(!)*+ making
the case that "the two axial piinciples of oui agetiibalism anu globalismclash at eveiy
point except one: they may both be thieatening to uemociacy.
vii
Still, the iuea of tiibalism
anu the consequences of oui wais aie not in full focus, yet we can uiaw some pieliminaiy
conclusions, which suggest that jihauists that make theii way to places like Yemen may
ultimately thieaten secuiity in the West.
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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Navy,
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.



/ 0#1" 23* 4561' ,7 8,."9 )#*'7"*1:,;1
The wai in Iiaq cieateu a whole geneiation of 0.S. militaiy talent, uespite a slow
auaptation fiom a conventional stiategy to one neeueu foi counteiing a compounu
insuigency. The eviuence foi weak-state uynamics notwithstanuing, this essay aigues that
the ieal uangei lies not in the 0.S. ability to tiain foieign paitneis, but in the acceptance
that S0F will neeu to stietch tiaining into a 'just in time' counteiteiioiism capability
outsiue of combat zones to contest jihauists in theii sanctuaiiesmeaning a potential foi
countei-sanctuaiy gueiiilla foices, an unueigiounu, anu auxiliaiies foi both opeiations anu
intelligence.
Even while acknowleuging that ueneial Casey anu the Aimy auapteu slowly to the
ueveloping insuigency in Iiaq, authoi anu Aimy ciitic Tom Rick's uoes cieuit Casey foi
staiting the Counteiinsuigency (C0IN) Acauemy in Taji, Iiaq.
viii
That's only half of the
stoiy, howevei, the lessei-known stoiy of the C0IN Acauemy began in 2uu4stoou up in
the 'fog' of a confusing insuigency, but owing its stait to a bottoms-up initiativeto tiain a
small numbei of vetteu Iiaqi teams in suigical uiban ieconnaissance skills.
ix
The
sophisticateu tiaining fiamewoik foi ueveloping tactical intelligence on the insuigents, anu
the infiastiuctuie useu foi the instiuction was aiguably the uiivei foi the latei, moie
conventional C0IN Acauemy. In the enu, the tiaining nevei tuineu out an inuigenous 'banu
of waiiiois'. Bisappointingly, the mission was limiteu to tiaining, anu the Iiaqis went back
to theii units anu melteu back into a uangeious lanuscape that was pie-suige Iiaq.

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The salient lesson, then, of oui tiaining in Iiaq is still somewhat ambiguous, but is a
woithy metaphoi foi counteiteiioiism outsiue of combat zones, anu can be giafteu to oui
theme foi builuing moie effective intelligence paitneiships in the futuie. 0n the one hanu,
it appeais to pioviue fuithei valiuation foi the obvious logic of tiaining paitneis to fight an
insuigency on theii own. 0n the othei hanuieflecting on the expeiience in Tajithe
tiaining shoulu have uevelopeu into a 0.S. guiueu cohoit capability: netwoikeu, puipose-
built, anu channeleu to get to the insuigents in theii sanctuaiies. In othei woius, the
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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Navy,
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.


enuuiing lesson is that S0F in combination with highly tiaineu paitneisallies anu
auxiliaiiesis the best chance of coming close to the Byzantine iueal of waiiiois 'saving
the uay'.


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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Navy,
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.



Author Biography
Colonel Christopher P. Costa, USA, Ret, is a Department of the Navy civilian, and a Research
Fellow with the Institute for National Strategic Studies Program for Irregular Warfare and SOF
Studies at the National Defense University. He holds an M.A in Strategic Intelligence from
American Military University and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies, from the
U.S. Naval War College. He earned his B.A. from Norwich University. In a 25-year U.S. Army
career, he specialized in counterintelligence, human intelligence and special operations,
deploying on multiple contingencies and to combat operations in the Republic of Panama,
Afghanistan and Iraq.


i
See, for example, Colonel David W. Wittys, The Great UW Debate. United States Army
Combined Arms Center, June 2011; available at, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/11-
34/ch_6.asp. It goes beyond the scope of this essay to examine in depth the various debates
centered on the definitions of Unconventional Warfare, however, for the purposes of this
examination, leveraging underground and auxiliary forces for achieving CT objectives is
adequate enough.
ii
Larry Shaughnessy, Panetta: America Beating al Qaeda but hasnt won yet. CNN
Blog, 20 November 2012. http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/20/panetta-america-beating-
al-qaeda-but-hasnt-won-yet/. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta is quoted as saying that going
after al-Qaeda and their affiliates is unconventional warfare and that the campaign against al-
Qaeda will largely take place outside declared combat zones using a small-footprint approach
that includes precision operations.

iii
Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2009), 7.
iv
See, for example, Editor Gabriel Koehler-Derricks, A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes and
Ungoverned Space in Yemen September 2011, published by the Combating Terrorism Center at
West Point. Web. 21 Jul 2012. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-false-foundation-aqap-tribes-
and-ungoverned-spaces-in-yemen.
v
See David Ronfeldts, Todays Wars Are less About Ideas Than Extreme Tribalism, The
Christian Science Monitor, 27 March 2006. Ronfeldt convincingly writes that al-Qaeda
members and affiliates are extreme tribalists who dream of making the West start over at a
razed, tribal level. The term malign tribalism were introduced by Dr. Jeffrey Kaplan, "Tribalism
and Mobilization: Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century, Program for Irregular Warfare and SOF
Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 2012. The term malign tribalism,
which threaten U.S. security as introduced by Col. Christopher P. Costa, USA, Ret, at this time.
See, for example, Christopher P. Costa and Dr. Jeffrey Kaplans On tribalism: Affiliates,
Auxiliaries and Aspirational Political Violence, in LTG Flynn, M. et al; "National Security
Challenges: Insights from Social, Neurobiological, and Complexity Sciences" Multilayer
Assessment Program, Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 2012.
vi
David Johnston and Scott Shane, US Knew of Suspects Tie to Radical Cleric, New York Times 9 November
2009. Web 10 Mar 2012. See also, for example, Scott Helfsteins, Edges of Radicalization: Ideas, Individuals and
Networks in Violent Extremism. Combating Terrorism Center. February 2012. Web 10 Mar 2012.
EMC Chair Conference Paper

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Navy,
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.



http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/edges-of-radicalization-ideas-individuals-and-networks-in-
violent-extremism. These contributions outline the direct links between al-Awlaki and Major
Hasan, which fits our model of Aspirational tribalism to a certain extent. Hasan was inspired and
motivated to act by al-Awlaki, while he was operating from ungoverned space in a tribal
sanctuary in Yemen. Hasan self-radicalized and acted out his political violence in the West.
vii
Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, The Atlantic Online, (March 1992),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1992/03/jihad-vs-mcworld/3882/#
viii
Thomas E. Ricks, General Failure, The Atlantic, (Nov 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/11/general-failure/309148/. Also, see, Thomas Ricks article,
U.S. Counterinsurgency Giving Officers a New Mindset, Washington Post, February 21, 2006. This article first
reported on a counterinsurgency school started in Taji, Iraq. Ricks wrote, The newest educational institution in the
U.S. military establishment seeks, as a course summary puts it, to stress the need for U.S. forces to shift from a
conventional warfare mindset to one that understands how to win in a guerrilla-style conflict.
ix
See also, President George W. Bush, June 29, 2005 Ft. Bragg speech retrieved from the World
Wide Web: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/06/28/national/ main704936_page2.shtml.On
June 29, 2005, President Bush addressed the nation in a prime time broadcast, delivering a major
speech on terrorism at Ft. Bragg, NC. During the speech the President highlighted U.S. training
that provided the Iraqis with important skills such as urban combat and intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance techniques. This speech raises interesting questions on the
value of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism training, and the benefits for enabling and
developing partnerships with security forces in Iraq, but more importantly its future implications.
Here again, specialized and sophisticated intelligence training programs must be broadened to
support operations outside of combat zones, which leads to the conclusions in this essay.