THE PATTON LIFE SAFETY SYSTEM

The fire sprinkler system was originally developed during the 1860s and was standardized by the newly created National Fire Protection Association during 1896. The design code remained stagnant until I began to research the sprinkler criteria during 1954. I was named research director for the Distilling Industry and was able to conduct large scale testing. At the time sprinklers were considered a property protection system. The system had never been revised to be a reliable and economical system for protecting liives in properties where large numbers of people congregated. Later I left Seagram Distillers and concentrated on developing the technology to protect lives. The innovations I developed are listed below. Many of these improvements have been incorporated into the NFPA codes. These are the key features of the Patton Life Safety System. 1. 2. Steel pipe had been required. I tested and incorporated copper and plastic pipe in my LSS. Copper and plastic pipe had lower friction losses than steel pipe; therefore smaller diameter pipe would deliver equal water. The NFPA code pipe layout was dead ended. I developed systems that were looped or gridded with more than one flow path. This greatly reduced the friction loss and balanced the density. Flexible pipe including copper and plastic were less likely to be destroyed by an earthquake and less likely to suffer internal corrosion. With few exceptions (high hazard industrial properties) all NFPA code sprinkler heads were limited to inch orifices. I varied orifice size as appropriate to water density and coverage. The NFPA system design keyed to 7 psi at the orifice of a inch sprinkler. A inch sprinkler discharged 15 gpm. This produced large particles and therefore nearly all water ran off as warmed water. Most heat is absorbed when water is converted to steam. By reducing the orifice size and increasing the pressure at the orifice, the small drop spray resulted in a greater surface area, increased conversion of water to steam and far more efficient use of water. By providing increased cooling at the ceiling my system prevented extraneous sprinklers from opening. Hence, in the Life-at-Risk properties one sprinkler will nearly always provide fire control with my design. The standard NFPA sprinkler code keyed to a very low orifice pressure (7psi); therefore the spray over the early fire sometimes failed to control the heat. Therefore additional sprinklers opened which further dropped the pressure and further reduced the effectiveness of the close by sprinklers. As a consequence additional sprinklers further from the fire opened. This really represented system failure. However, when firefighters arrived and controlled the fire the inspector would count the open sprinklers and assume that count was the needed number of open heads for a successful system design. Rather than using engineering logic, the insurance inspectors and engineers created requirements sometimes for a 50 open head design or more and in some occupancies the regulations called for flows as high as 4000GPM. This resulted in incredibly costly systems with very weak fire control when the first sprinklers opened. I designed for far better control of the early fire with but a fraction of the water needed. 8. For example, insurance engineers were requiring designs for distillery buildings (when I worked for the industry) based on 3000, 4000 or 5000 square foot areas of open sprinklers. I created system designs keyed to a strong and adequately high density when the first one to four heads opened. These designs were tested in the field and at the FM Test building and the worst expected fires were controlled with 200 GPM and less. 9. An example of the difference in concept as applicable to industrial risks, the Factor Insurance Association (later renamed the Improved Risk Insurers) set 4,450 gallons of water a minute (gpm) as the requirement for a sprinkler system protecting whiskey in bottles in cardboard cartons piled 20 feet high. I designed a system that was tested against 21 foot high storage at the Factory Mutual test facility in Norwood, MA. The fire was controlled with four open sprinklers discharging 190 gpm. 10. For many decades a sidewall sprinkler was limited to coverage of a plat 14 feet by 15 feet. (This was based on 7 psi at the orifice, the very weak but standard pressure). When I needed a sidewall to throw from the corridor wall to the exterior wall at the Pioneer hotel in Tucson, AZ, I was allowed by the research engineer at Gamewell to use the Gamewell test lab to check coverage at higher pressures. With a 20 psi pressure at the orifice (easily obtained) I proved that the protection at 20X20 foot coverage with 20 psi at the orifice was superior to the NFPA maximum allowed coverage of 14x15 at 7 psi. Eventually NFPA and UL recognized extended throw sprinklers but never acknowledged my breakthrough in this matter. 11. When a hotel room was to be protected, for example, it would be necessary to install a sprinkler in the closet, the entryway, and the bath. If the bed area was more than 16 by 16 feet in area, four

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sprinklers would be needed to cover that area. Each would be required to discharge 15 GPM meaning one room would require water for 7 sprinklers or 105 gpm. Also, the NFPA code often required a design based on enough water to protect as many as 6 hotel (or motel) rooms. That a fire within one fire rated and sprinklered room would not contain the fire (and prevent spread to 5 other rooms) defied logic; but that was the NFPA engineering. The LSS was based on 80 GPM being adequate for virtually all Life-at-Risk type occupancies, with logic being allowed for reductions when justified. For the first time I developed the concept that in a sprinklered property fire would be contained by the sprinkler flow to the room of origin only. 12. The Pioneer Hotel in Tucson, AZ suffered a major fire and management would not be allowed to reopen without sprinklers throughout. But the above-the-ceiling area in the corridors but NFPA size pipe would not fit. I designed a two riser system at the far ends with 1-1/4 copper tube running between with two way flow. Then I ran one inch pipe thru the corridor walls to sprinkler each room. In some cases I needed a 19 foot throw from a sidewall to cover an area. So I tested designs at the Grinnell lab and proved for authorities that the sidewall at 20 foot throw would cover the area better than the sidewall at the NFPA 7 psi with a 15 foot throw. The point is when engineering replaced a cook-book code that was 70 years antiquated the fire design world got better. 13. The NFPA code that was being used to design sprinklers for the light hazard (Life-at-Risk) type properties had been written 7 decades prior (to the 1970s) and was originally intended to protect only the factories and warehouses. Therefore the cost of protecting the following type properties was incredibly high: hotels, motels, schools, office buildings including the high rises, hospitals, nursing homes, apartment buildings, single family homes, houses of worship, bars, restaurants, night clubs, dance halls, theatres, small stores and commercial properties, etc. The LSS system was engineered to protect those Life-at-Risk properties where nearly all the fire deaths occur. 14. Historically, less than two open sprinklers controlled nearly all the fires in the Life-at-Risk class. Thus, small water supplies could protect these buildings 15. If a city water main did not provide the NFPA code mandated quantity of water (gpm) at the required pressure (psi) it was normal to require either a 50 or 100 thousand gallon elevated water tank or a 500 gpm (or greater) UL approved fire pump (drafting from an adequate ground level tank) and the associated equipment. Costs usually were from $50,000 on up. But, I determined with my research and investigations that nearly all the light hazard properties as defined by the NFPA could be

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protected adequately with the already available domestic water connection. Thus in most cases these light hazard property types (which I call the life at risk category) would have a $50,000 cost reduction just by keying to the real water need for protecting the building. When the city water was adequate in volume (gpm) but inadequate in pressure (psi), which was sometimes the case in tall buildings, I would install a commercial electric driven centrifugal in-line pump at a cost (at the time) less than $1000. This pump could be installed in less than one day and could run continuously for years. The UL pump and related equipment often ran in the $30,000 to $50,000 range installed. And because of the size and complexity such large approved pump installations were more likely to fail in time of need. The NFPA code required the eaves of buildings (that often were 3 or more stories high and with nothing but sidewalk to burn below) to be equipped with sprinklers. This was a special problem in freezing weather. Such protection served no purpose except to increase costs. Illustrations of cost differences are pertinent. In Ohio I was installing Life Safety Systems for 8 to 12 thousand dollars based on using the water already available to the homes. The sprinkler contractors were bidding systems with elevated tanks with costs of 70 to 100 thousand dollars. The NFPA criteria resulted in pipe as large as 4 inch steel hanging below the ceilings. The small looped or gridded (two or more flow paths) could be readily concealed. The bid for an NFPA system for the basement of the University of Kansas Medical Center was $2.88 per square foot. I designed a Patton LSS that covered 1.2 million square feet at 35 cents a square foot. This was approximately a 90 percent reduction in cost on a square foot basis. Normally, nearly all the sprinkler discharge runs off as warmed water. But, it is the conversion of water to vapor that will result in the greatest absorption of heat. One gallon of water converted to small drops will have a greater surface area than the same quantity converted to large drops. Heat absorption increases with an increase in surface area. Hence small drops are more effective at controlling the heat than large drops. There are two ways to convert water to small drops, increase pressure and decrease orifice size. I proved that a 5 to 7 gpm discharged through a smaller orifice at say 20 psi had a better fire control ability than 15 gpm discharged at 7 psi pressure. This was one of the keys to using the available water in a home to control the early fire. Most homes have only a 5 to 15 gpm water supply. But at the 1980 NFPA convention, based on fraudulent fire testing, the NFPA set 40 gpm as the

CHECKED TO HEREminimum water amount to protect a home with sprinklers. This required an industrial size and costly water connection or a secondary sprinkler water supply. With small orifice sprinklers a home can be protected if there is enough water to take a shower. Thus the Patton LSS was a practical and affordable system for a home whereas the NFPA code severely restricted the installation of residential sprinklers. 22. The NFPA code required piping in an attic of a home in a freezing area to be protected with a dry pipe system. This is an extremely costly and complex system for a home. My solution was to run the pipe at the floor of the attic, remove insulation below the pipe and install sheet insulation abve the pipe. Thus heat will penetrate from below but be trapped by the insulation above the pipe. One or more heat detectors should be installed in the attic as a warning device. Attic fires seldom kill especially if there are supplemental heat detectors and smoke detectors. 23. I initiated the concept that to make home protection practical the closets and baths need not be sprinklered and wherever practical rooms up to 20 by 20 should require only one sprinkler. Note that to save lives a warning and the prevention of rapid fire growth is all that is necessary. If life, not property is the primary concern, limiting fire spread (fire department should soon arrive) while allowing time for all to survive is an adequate goal. Nothing would prevent installing superior protection but by requiring unrealistic protection lives are at risk. By R. M. Patton April 2013

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