Expropriation

is

two-pronged

proceeding:

first,

the

determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts which terminates in an order of dismissal or an order of condemnation affirming the plaintiff's lawful right to take the property for the public use or purpose described in the complaint and second, the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated.1

Expropriation proceedings are governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Under the Rules of Court of 1940 and 1964, where the defendant in an expropriation case conceded to the plaintiffs right to expropriate (or where the trial court affirms the existence of such right), the courtappointed commissioners would then proceed to determine the just compensation to be paid.2 Otherwise, where the defendant had objections to and defenses against the expropriation of his property, he was required to file a single motion to dismiss containing all such objections and defenses.3 This motion to dismiss was not covered by Rule 15 which governed ordinary motions, and was then the required responsive pleading, taking the place of an answer, where the plaintiffs right to expropriate the defendants property could be put in issue.4 Any relevant
1

Abad v. Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 189239, November 24, 2010, 636 SCRA 247, 255, citing Lintag v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 158609, July 27, 2007, 528 SCRA 287. 2 See Act 190, Sec. 243. 3 Section 3 of the old Rule 67 of the Rules of Court allowed a defendant in lieu of an answer, [to] present in a single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all his objections and defenses to the plaintiffs right to take his property x x x. See Feria-Noche, Civil procedure Annotated, Volume 2, th 2001 ed., p. 536 and Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, 8 Revised ed., p. 752. 4 Robern Development Corporation v. Quitain, 373 Phil. 773, 790 (1999); Rural Progress Administration v. Guzman, 87 Phil. 176, 178 (1950).

and material fact could be raised as a defense, such as that which would tend to show that the exercise of the power to condemn was unauthorized, or that there was cause for not taking defendants property for the purpose alleged in the petition, or that the purpose for the taking was not public in character. With that, the hearing of the motion and the presentation of evidence would follow. The rule is based on fundamental constitutional provisions affecting the exercise of the power of eminent domain, such as those that seek to protect the individual property owner from the aggressions of the government.5 However, the rule, which was derived from the practice of most American states, proved indeed to be a source of confusion because it likewise permitted the filing of another motion to dismiss, such as that referred to in Rule 16, where the defendant could raise, in addition, the preliminary objections authorized under it.6

The Supreme Court, in its en banc Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803 dated April 8, 1997, has provided that the revisions made in the Rules of Court were to take effect on July 1, 1997. Thus, with said amendments, the present state of Rule 67 dispenses with the filing of an extraordinary motion to dismiss such as that required before in response to a complaint for expropriation. The present rule requires the filing of an answer as responsive pleading to the complaint. provides:
Sec. 3. Defenses and objections. If a defendant has no objection or defense to the action or the taking of his property, he may and serve a notice or appearance and a manifestation to that effect, specifically designating or identifying the property in which he claims to be interested, within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.
5

Section 3 thereof

Robern Development Corporation, supra, citing Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. IV-B, Part I, 1972 ed., pp. 405-412. 6 th Id. at 790-791, citing Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, 8 Revised ed., pp. 752-753.

If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the summons. The answer shall specifically designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or any subsequent pleading. A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in the interest of justice, may permit amendments to the answer to be made not later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof. However, at the trial of the issue of just compensation, whether or not a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may present evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his property, and he may share in the distribution of the award.

The defendant in an expropriation case who has objections to the taking of his property is now required to file an answer and in it raise all his available defenses against the allegations in the complaint for eminent domain. While the answer is bound by the omnibus motion rule under Section 8, Rule 15,7 much leeway is nevertheless afforded to the defendant because amendments may be made in the answer within 10 days from its filing. Also, failure to file the answer does not produce all the disastrous consequences of default in ordinary civil actions, because the defendant may still present evidence on just compensation.8 Clearly, under the new Rules on expropriation, the filing of an answer is a complete response by a defendant in expropriation proceedings. A defendant who has filed an answer need not also file a
7

Sec. 8. Omnibus motion. Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived. 8 Robern Development Corporation v. Quitain, supra note 4, at 791, citing Regalado, Remedial Law th Compendium, Vol. I, 8 Revised ed., pp. 752-753.

motion to dismiss because all his defenses should already be incorporated in his answer. Thus, when one of the defendants to an expropriation complaint files a motion to dismiss, the other defendant who already filed his answer need not join in the other defendants motion to dismiss. Indeed, the answering defendant is deemed to have already done everything by filing his answer containing all his defenses against the complaint for expropriation. Therefore, the answering defendants act of waiting for the resolution of his co-defendants motion to dismiss after he had already filed his answer is not tantamount to a lack of interest in the case and can hardly be interpreted as passivity. In the instant case, by no stretch of the imagination can Federated Realty be considered to have come to court with unclean hands simply because it patiently awaited the resolution of General Millings motion to dismiss the complaint. As discussed above, Federateds answer to the complaint was sufficient in itself, and already contains all the grounds for the possible dismissal of the complaint. Thus, the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in equating the City of Lapu Lapus inaction for more than 5 years with Federateds act of respectfully waiting for the trial court to act on the defenses and grounds for dismissal that it and General Milling had raised. II The Court of Appeals also erred in not ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to resolve General Millings Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Possession filed on 21 October 2005. Because of the trial courts failure to resolve the Urgent Motion,

the City of Lapu Lapu used the trial courts inaction as its excuse for not prosecuting its complaint for expropriation for an inexcusable period of more than five years. Although tenuous, the City of Lapu Lapu has a point. The question of the propriety of the issuance of the writ of possession in favour of the City should have been judicially determined first (based on the legal requisites therefor) as part of the inquiry into whether or not the City of Lapu Lapu had authority to expropriate the subject properties and whether or not the purpose is for public use. Under ____________, a writ of possession should issue only if the complainant has deposited an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property sought to be expropriated. The pleadings do not show whether this was complied with. Once the order issuing the writ of possession becomes final, and defendant does not appeal therefrom, the only issue that can be determined in the case is the amount of just compensation. By not ruling on the issue raised by General Milling regarding the writ of possession, the trial court evaded an inquiry into the propriety of expropriation. In City of Iloilo vs. Hon. Besana and Javellana,9 Javellana did not file an appeal from the trial courts Order that granted petitioners Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession and authorized petitioner to take immediate possession of the subject property. Because of Javellanas failure to appeal from the issuance of the writ of possession, the Supreme Court ruled that the Order issuing the
9

G.R. No. 168967, 12 February 2010.

writ of possession had become final, and closed the door to the review of petitioners right to expropriate the property for public use. The Supreme Court explained its ruling, as follows:
An order of condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.

It, thus, behooved the trial court to move the expropriation proceedings forward by ruling on the Urgent Motion to Recall the Writ of Possession, and by delving into the Citys authority to expropriate the property, as well as into the nature of the use intended for the subject properties. However, as the records show, aside from failing to act on the Urgent Motion to Recall the Writ of Possession, the trial court also ignored the Citys failure to file a comment on the Motion to Dismiss despite order to do so, as well as the Citys failure to appear during the 14 July 2006 and 30 January 2009 hearings on said Motion. To add insult to injury, the trial court reversed its order of dismissal, and thereby condoned the Citys inaction of more than five years on the case and the consequent deprivation of defendants properties. Please note that with respect to General Milling, the order granting the writ of possession did not become final because the Urgent Motion questioning its issuance remains pending to date. However, with respect to Federated, the writ of possession might have become final already since Federated did not oppose it or appeal therefrom. The records should

be checked to confirm this. If so, the only question that remains for Federated is the matter of just compensation. In Javellana, aside from the payment of just compensation, the Supreme Court also ordered the payment of compensatory damages in the form of 6% interest from time of taking until full payment, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.