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Benny Shanon

Hallucinations
This paper examines the standard conceptualizations of the notion of hallucination in light of various non-ordinary phenomenological patterns associated with altered states of consciousness induced by psychoactive agents. It is argued that in general, the conceptualizations encountered in the literature do not do justice to the richness and complexity that the psychological phenomenology actually exhibits. A close inspection of this phenomenology reveals some pertinent distinctions which are usually not made in the scientific literature. On the one hand, the discussion is based on first-hand experiences and, on the other hand, it is grounded in empirical and theoretical cognitive investigations of the phenomenology of human consciousness. Theoretically, the discussion is grounded in an approach highlighting the centrality of experience, meaning and action in cognition. Introduction Let us start with some definitions found in the literature.1 The classical definition of hallucination is often attributed to Esquirol (1845/1965):
A man . . . who has the inward conviction of a presently perceived sensation at a moment when no external capable of arousing this sensation is within the field of his sense, is in a state of hallucination. (p. 93)
Correspondence: Benny Shanon, Psychology Dept, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel. Email: b.shanon@mscc.huji.ac.il
[1] I do not include William James in this survey of standard definitions. This calls for an explanation, for

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in the Principles of Psychology, James (1890/1950) observes that In hallucination there is no objective stimulus at all (p. 115). On the other hand, James further argues that An hallucination is a strictly sensational form of consiousness, as good and true a sensation as if there were a real object there (p. 115). He also emphasizes that there are various kinds and degrees of hallucinations. Indeed, in other, less known, texts James (see Burkhardt and Bowers, 1986) explicitly acknolwedges the problematic nature of the term hallucination. In part, the problems have to do with reasons similar to those indicated in this paper. Specifically, James (1890/1986; see also the long citation from a text by Sidgwick) objects to the various pejorative connotations people usually associate with the term of these he critically mentions falsity, lack of meaning and value, and morbidity. Appreciating both the heterogeneity of the phenomenon of hallucination and the connotation which he does not share, and considering several alternatives, for lack of a better alternative, James decides to hold to the term hallucination. Thus, it appears that despite the definition James offers in the Principles, which seems to be in line with the establishment view of hallucination, a broader inspection of James writings presents a view much more in line with the alternative picture presented in this paper.

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10, No. 2, 2003, pp. 331

B. SHANON

Practically all the definitions in the literature are variants of this old definition. Thus, the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1971) defines hallucinations as:
The perception of objects with no reality or the experiencing of sensations in the absence of the usual cause. In effect, a hallucination is a perception within or of a persons fantasy that is mistakenly ascribed, by the person who experiences it, to sources outside.

Essentially identical definitions appear in the Grand Larousse and in many other lexicons and dictionaries. For instance, Websters Third New International Dictionary (1975) specifies that hallucination is:
Perception of objects with no reality; experience of sensations with no external cause usually arising from disorder of the nervous system (as in delirium tremens or in functional psychosis without known neurological disease).

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Similarly, Reber (1984), in The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology, explains that hallucination is:
A perceptual experience with all the compelling subjective properties of a real sensory impression but without the normal physical stimulus for that sensory modality. Hallucinations are taken as classic indicators of a psychotic disturbance and are a hallmark of various disorders like schizophrenia.

Definitions in the medical and scientific literature are similar. Here is that given by the DSM, the standard manual of the American Psychiatric Association (1994):
A sensory perception that has the compelling sense of reality of a true perception but that occurs without external stimulation of the relevant sensory organ. (p. 767)

Likewise, a leading psychiatric textbook, Schrafetter (1980), explains that:


Hallucinations, or false perceptions, are diagnosed when someone hears, sees, smells or tastes something, or feels something on or in his body, for which other people can find no objective basis (p. 136)

Similar definitions are found in standard psychiatric lexicons (see, for example, Campbell, 1981, and Noll, 2000). A definition framed in cognitivepsychological thinking of the informationprocessing orientation is that offered by Horowitz (1975):
Hallucinations are images based on immediately internal sources of information, which are appraised as if they came from immediately external sources of information (p. 165).

This definition differs from those cited above in its theoretical orientation, which is more technical cognitive rather than epistemological or clinical. Yet, as far as the basic view of hallucination it presents as with respect to all issues to be discussed below it is not essentially different from them. The most extensive and thoughtful analysis of the phenomenon of hallucination in the literature is, I find, that presented by Slade and Bental (1988). Grounding their discussion in a comprehensive empirical survey, these investigators examine hallucinations from both a psychological and a clinicalpsychiatric point of view and they also present an extensive theoretical analysis. They offer the following threefold definition:

HALLUCINATIONS Any percept-like experience which (a) occurs in the absence of an appropriate stimulus, (b) has the full force or impact of the corresponding actual (real) perception, and (c) is not amenable to direct and voluntary control by the experiencer (p. 23).

The first two criteria of the definition are in line with those of the various definitions considered above, the third adds to them. Summing up the survey of the literature, we note that a substantive consensus prevails. By it, hallucinations are defined by the following cluster of characteristics: i. Vividness: Subjectively, the experience is that of vivid perception. ii. Non-correspondence: Factually, the experience does not correspond to any real objects or state of affairs in the real world. iii. Ignorance: The cognitive agent, however, is not cognizant of (ii).
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iv. False judgement: Hence, the hallucinatory experience involves false judgement on the part of the cognitive agent. v. Negative evaluation: Thus, overall, the hallucinatory experience is evaluated pejoratively, and it is assumed that it is of no positive import. Typically, the experience is taken to be indicative of some psychological impairment. vi. Dismissal: Implied in all this is the assessment that any person other than the one having the hallucinatory experience will adhere to the negative evaluation indicated in (v). In this paper I would like to show that the common definitions of hallucination and the conceptualizations on which they are based do not do justice to the pertinent psychological facts. It seems to me that the actual phenomenology of hallucinations that human beings may experience is both richer and more complex than these definitions may suggest. Highlighting these definitions, I shall point out some cognitive distinctions which, to my mind, are central for any psychological study of the phenomenon of hallucinations. With this, I hope, new lines for such a study may be charted. Lest I be misunderstood, let me make a further clarification. Obviously, simpliciter hallucination is, indeed, a perceptual experience in which lack of correspondence to states of affairs in the real world is noted. The main aim of this paper is not to debate with the simple, and obviously valid, core of the standard definition but rather to point out that instead of opening the cognitive psychological investigation of hallucination, this definition closes it. The goal of cognitive research is to investigate the phenomenology of human mental life empirically in a manner not constrained or bounded by prior preconceptions be they common-sensical or philosophical. The standard definition of hallucination is, I believe, constrained in this manner. Only when this is appreciated can the perspective of investigation be changed and fruitful empirical research proceed. Thus, I hope, the critical conceptual analysis will eventually bear concrete constructive consequences.

B. SHANON

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Fundamental to the discussion to be pursued here is that to a great extent it is based on first-hand experiences I myself have had with South American psychotropic agents, all consumed in traditional contexts in Brazil and Peru. Indeed, the distinctions and the various possible cognitive states of affairs indicated below would not have occurred to me had I not had such experiences. It is my firm belief that just as one cannot talk of music if one had not experienced music first-hand, one cannot seriously discuss the phenomenology of the so-called altered states of consciousness without actually having had a first-hand feel of the non-ordinary experiences associated with these states. Being more blunt, I would thus venture saying that, to a great extent, most scientists philosophers, psychologists and psychiatrists who talk of hallucinations do not know what they are talking about and that, in fact, what they say is more a reflection of their conceptual presuppositions with regard to this subject matter than a fair characterization of the psychological phenomenology at hand. Background Information Before turning to the specific subject matter of this paper, let me present some background information about the psychotropic substances I shall mention here and about the context of their use. Three substances will be mentioned in this discussion. All are very powerful, and all induce vivid visual hallucinations. Hallucinatory effects in other sensory modalities as well as marked ideational and affective effects are also common. All three have been used by the Amerindians for millennia and have been at the centre of their cultures. In particular, these substances have been pivotal in both religious rites and shamanistic practices, and much of the artistic and cultural creations of the indigenous societies in question e.g., mythologies, music, drawings and graphic decorations were directly related to them. The primary raison dtre for the use of these substances is the appraisal that they allow human beings to transcend their daily existence and thus bring them in contact with the Gods or the ultimate energies of Nature and Life (for a general discussion, see La Barre, 1972). The healing effects of these substances are taken to be a corollary of this. The first substance, Ayahuasca2, is a brew consumed throughout the entire upper Amazon, the main active ingredients of which are the alkaloids N,N-Dimethyltryptamine or DMT, harmine and harmaline (for general discussion, see Reichel-Dolmatoff, 1975; 1978; the various contributions in Harner, 1973; Luna, 1986a; Langdon, 1979; 1992; for a comprehensive bibliography see Luna, 1986b). The brew is made out of two plants Banisteriopsis caapi, a liana, and Psychotria viridis, a bush (or rather, the leaves thereof). The indigenous peoples of the Amazon region have used Ayahuasca for millennia, and in the past, the brew was the pillar of their cultures and used in all religious rites and tribal ceremonies. Nowadays, Ayahuasca is still the basic instrument of shamans
[2] I prefer to use the traditional, vernacular, names to refer to these substances, as the botanical ingredi-

ents may at times slightly vary.

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and medicine men in the entire region: it is said to enable healers to see the inner constitution of their patients, and thus establish a diagnosis and perform treatment (for general discussions of the healing practices associated with Ayahuasca, see Dobkin de Rios, 1972; Langdon, 1992; Luna, 1986a). In this century, in Brazil, a number of syncretic religious groups have been founded that employ the brew in rites bringing together Christian and Amerindian traditions; in some, Afro-Brazilian elements are incorporated as well. For further anthropological information the reader is referred to the works of Dobkin de Rios (1972); Reichel-Dolmatoff (1975; 1996), Luna (1986a) and the anthology edited by Luna and White (2000). For botanical, pharmaceutical and medical information see Schultes (1972) and Ott (1993; 1994); for excellent artistic depictions of Ayahuasca visions, the reader is referred to Luna and Amaringo (1993). The second substance I shall mention is San Pedro (Trichocereus pachanoi), an Andean cactus, the main psychotropic ingredient of which is mescaline. It, too, has a long tradition of indigenous use. Nowadays, however, by and large this use is confined to folk medicine. For Western accounts of mescaline-induced experiences the reader is referred to Klver (1928; 1966), Michaux (1972) and Huxley (1971). To, the third substance, is both the most powerful of the three and also that whose use is the rarest. It is made from Brugmansia suaveolens (Floripondio, in Spanish), a plant related to the Daturas. Unlike the two other plants noted above, to may be physiologically (as distinct from psychologically) dangerous. For this reason, its use is much less common than that of the other substances mentioned here (for a first-hand report, see Chango, 1984). Personally, I have had extensive experience with Ayahuasca I have partaken of this brew about 140 times in various contexts and locales, both indigenous and non-indigenous, throughout the Amazon region and elsewhere. With the other two substances, San Pedro and to, I have had only occasional first-hand experience. Specifically, I have partaken of San Pedro four times and have inadvertently consumed to twice, in both cases as an admixture to Ayahuasca which was administered by indigenous shamans in the Peruvian Amazon. Finally, let me explain my own professional involvement with the study of psychoactive substances and altered states of consciousness. For the past decade I have been engaged in a project concerned with the cognitivepsychological aspects of the Ayahuasca experience. This is the first cognitivepsychological, as distinct from physiological, medical, anthropological or applied psychological, study of this brew. Its aim is to draw a systematic, comprehensive chart of the psychological phenomenology of the state of mind induced by Ayahuasca and gain a cognitive theoretical understanding thereof. Empirically, my research is based on the analysis of both the records my own first-hand experiences and on interviews I conducted with a large number of informants. The latter included indigenous and non-indigenous individuals, coming from different personal and socio-cultural backgrounds, who partook of Ayahuasca in different places and contexts throughout South America. Preliminary reports of this research appear in Shanon (1997a,b; 1998a; 2001; 2002a); a full account of my work appears in Shanon (2002b).

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B. SHANON

A Series of Examples As noted, it is my firm belief that the topic of hallucination like any other aspect of the phenomenology of human cognition and consciousness cannot be studied in the abstract. It has to involve careful observations, and these have to be collected first-hand. Thus, by way of setting the empirical grounds for the progression of our discussion, I shall recount some personal experiences. The specific reports were chosen because they exemplify what seem to me to be several very different types of hallucination. In order to facilitate the reading, I assign a label to each example; this label will serve for later reference.

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Example 1: The golden city This is one of the very first, and most powerful, experiences I have had with Ayahuasca. It took place during day time when I was sitting on a small bench looking at a grove of the Amazonian forest. When the brew had its effect, I saw an enchanted city, all constructed of gold and precious stones. It was of indescribable beauty. The scene that I was seeing appeared to be in front of my eyes and, at the same time, separated from me just as a scene in the theatre would be. Every now and then I would turn my head aside and away from the scene of the vision. Returning my gaze, I would come back to the same visionary scene I had inspected before this turn. Example 2: The enchanted forest The occasion was the same as described in Example 1. Sitting there by the Amazonian grove, I saw the forest in front of me full of animals both zoological and mythological. Amongst others, these included dragons, tigers and big birds. With my eyes open, I was sitting viewing the forest as if it were a stage. It was as if a screen were raised and another world made its appearance. Indeed, it was as if the forest was revealing its mysteries to me. It was all blissful, and very real. The experience coupled together exquisite aesthetic gratification, a profound sense of personal well-being and a feeling that a new dimension of reality was revealed to me. Now, almost ten years after this has taken place, I still consider this experience as one of the most beautiful, most enriching ones of my entire life. While I was enjoying this spectacle, a group of young women were standing off to one side singing. From time to time, I would turn my head and observe these women. Returning my head to the fore, the same spectacle of the enchanted forest would still be there in front of me. Once, I also nodded my head to the women expressing my appreciation for their singing (this gesture, I shall note, was socially appropriate, and acknowledged as such by the women). The distinction between what pertained to the hallucination and what pertained to ordinary reality was clear-cut, evident and effortless. Just as a person in the theatre does not confuse what he sees on the stage and in the hall (his companion sitting next to him, say) so too here I did not confuse the creatures seen in the vision with the real women standing nearby. On the one hand, my eyes were open and what I saw in front of me seemed to be so very real; on the other hand, my perception of the

HALLUCINATIONS

physical environment, the (real) people and the (real) objects was totally normal and I had no problem whatsoever in ascertaining who they were and to act properly towards them.

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Example 3: The cosmic lottery This too is an experience I have had with Ayahuasca. It took place in an indigenous Amazonian hut, in full darkness, and with my eyes closed. The effect of the brew was very strong. In my vision I was thrown up into a realm high above the planet and found myself in the midst of what I interpreted to be a cosmic lottery. My understanding was that my entire existence, both physical and mental, was at stake: If I played it right, I would be saved, if not, I would lose everything and perish. In order to redeem myself, I began to sing. There was no reflection involved in this decision, nor any recourse to past experience with Ayahuasca (as would be the case today). For six or eight hours I continuously sang the praises of God. The words that spontaneously came out of my mouth were Gloria a Dios (in English, Glory to God); the melody was being composed as it was being sung. As I was singing, I found myself to be surrounded by an immense choir of angels I was taking the leading role and they were accompanying me. The music was exceedingly beautiful. Every now and then the choir was joined by guest groups that came in, performed, and then left. Especially impressive was an orchestra of Black players whose playing was very rhythmic and exceedingly sensual. Experientially, the vision was very real and I was a full participant in the act that was unfolding. In the morning, when the session was over, the other persons present told me that they were deeply affected by my singing. Example 4: The rock lions This Ayahuasca experience took place in the course of a religious ritual conducted in a large circular building during the daytime. The building consisted of pillars and a roof, but it lacked walls, so that nature was seen all around. The participants in the session were all singing. At one point I looked outside and carved out of the rocky hills surrounding the building, there were lions. The rock lions were looking attentively, with interest and appreciation, to what was going on inside the hall. When I would move my gaze to the inner part of the hall I would no longer see the lions. Whenever my gaze returned to the hills, the very same lions were there just as I had seen them before. I wondered are the rock lions really there or are they just the fancy of my imagination? The answer that came to my mind was that they were both. The animals I was seeing could not be there without there being the rocks from which they were made. At the same time, they could not be without my being there, me with my power of imagination. And it further occurred to me that, in fact, there was a third agent involved in what was happening, namely, whatever was linking me to the world. When this was appreciated, the dichotomous division between the internal and the external seemed to lose much of its relevance.

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B. SHANON

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Example 5: The dilapidated house This example was reported to me by an informant, a patient in the Takiwasi rehabilitation centre in Peru.3 The man was shown a dilapidated house. The house was poorly maintained and piles of rubbish were all over it. A guide appeared and explained that actually, when the house was built it was of good construction and appearance. Only because it was not taken care of did the house reach its present desolate state. The guide further explained that The house is you. It is up to you how your life would proceed: If you take care, you can make it into a good life. The informant explained to me that this vision had a deep effect on him, and that it played a crucial transformative role in the further conduct of his life. I have no way to verify the long-term effects of this vision, but I know of other persons whose life was drastically changed for the better through similar experiences. In many instances, the beneficiary effects of the visionary experience are very long lasting and clearly observed by other people.4 Example 6: Insights The last piece of data pertaining to Ayahuasca visions I shall offer does not present the story of any specific visionary experience, but rather a summary statement regarding insights gained in conjunction with such experiences. Insights both I and my informants had involved themes of personal, psychological concern, topics of special intellectual or professional interest, and ideas of general philosophical nature (for a review of the latter, see Shanon, 1998b). In the indigenous Amerindian context insights pertaining to healing are especially valued. As noted above, medicine men use Ayahuasca to diagnose their patients and to know how to treat them. It is for this that Ayahuasca (along with other plants) is referred to as a master or a teacher (see Luna, 1984; the notion of master plants). Personally, with Ayahuasca I had various new ideas regarding my professional concerns in the study of human cognition and consciousness. The insights I gained in this fashion were novel to me and I considered them interesting even when I returned to the ordinary state of consciousness; I still do. Similar experiences were reported to me by my informants. Example 7: The hippy In a remote Indian village in the upper Amazon, an old indigenous healer administered Ayahuasca to me; the session took place at the inner yard of a house in which his entire extended family resided. Unbeknownst to me the brew also contained some to as an admixture; only I partook of it. In the beginning, the session proceeded in a manner which I recognized to be totally standard and rather uneventful (this episode took place when I already had quite extensive experience with Ayahuasca). At a certain point the healer retired to sleep and I
[3] In this centre cocaine addicts are treated with Ayahuasca. By comparision to other treatment of drug

addiction, the success rate of the treatment is high (see Mabit, 1996).
[4] Note the similarity between this kind of vision to parables, especially those of the Prophets of the Old

Testament.

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remained in the yard stretching myself out on a long wooden log and half sleeping for, I gather, the last two hours of the night. When I opened my eyes it was the beginning of day and I discovered that I was having great difficulty pulling myself up from my prostrate position. Eventually, I managed only to see, at the corner of the yard, behind a door, a young man. He was a Caucasian, looked like a hippy, and had what seemed to me an overall suspicious presence. Around that time, the house began to fill with movement. The members of the family were getting up and preparing for the day. Children were criss-crossing the courtyard and their mother, the healers daughter, was helping them get ready for the day. Whenever this woman passed, the suspicious looking man withdrew and hid in a small space between the door and the wall. In that position he could not be seen by anyone but me. He stared at me, and it was clear he was indicating that I should not say anything about his presence. I did my best to avoid his look. I was also preparing to leave and go back to the village hospice where I resided. As I was doing this, however, I realized that one of my bags was gone. I had three items with me when I arrived, I reckoned two shoulder bags that contained clothes and other personal effects and one smaller blue bag with all my guide books, diaries and phone booklets. My legal travel documents and money were tucked underneath my clothes on my body, but the material in the blue bag was my actual connecting line to the world, and without the information contained in it I could not go on with my journey nor establish contact with the many persons I was planning to meet in the next stops of my planned itinerary throughout South America. In addition to these three items, I had a plastic bag that contained a flashlight, a bottle of mineral water and a roll of toilet paper. So, here I was getting up only to realize that one of my shoulder bags was gone. I looked around, the hippy man was gone too. Evidently, he had stolen my bag. I went outside intending to alert someone, but all the people present were too busy with their preparations for the new day. I tried to tell them that there was a suspicious person in the house, but no one would pay any attention to me. I stepped back into the inner yard, and I saw that now the second of my large bags had disappeared. In my distress, I sat down on the log. And then I saw him again that man. He was looking at me half maliciously, half in a friendly manner. It was clear to me that he was attempting to make a pact with me. If I collaborated, my belongings would be given back to me. At any rate, I knew that I should beware and not tell anyone of his presence. By now I was determined to get some help. I got up and looked for the owner of the house. I stepped out of the house and tried to explain what was going on, but, again, no one would pay attention to me. When I got back to the inner yard, only the plastic bag was there. I could have managed without my clothes and various travelling items, but with my blue bag gone I was completely lost. What happened later is not of relevance here. Let me just point out that in reality, all my personal possessions had been left securely in the lodging place where I was staying; when I got to the healers house, I only brought along the plastic bag that contained those items that I deemed to be of potential use for me during the session.

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B. SHANON

I have described this episode at length, for to intoxications are very rarely described in the literature. I shall further emphasize that this experience was totally different from those usually induced by Ayahuasca. First, it lacked any fantastic allure. With Ayahuasca I have very seldom seen regular persons the persons I have normally seen were royalty, historical figures, people of other lands and other times. In the episode just described, the person I saw was a man of our time that I could have met on the street. Second, the hallucination was completely incorporated within the perception of the veridical world around and there was no separation or distinction between them whatsoever. Indeed, and this is a third point to be noted, I took the hallucination to be real, never suspecting that it was not. With Ayahuasca this was never the case for me.

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Example 8: The starry night I was partaking of San Pedro in a session administered by a traditional Peruvian healer; three other persons participated in the session. Apparently, on me the effect was strongest and the other participants urged me to go out from the closed hall in which I was sitting and join them outside around a campfire that the leader of the session had set up. I had difficulty in motor coordination and one fellow participant assisted me in my walk and placed me on a bench. There I was, in the middle of the warm starry night, seeing the pastoral landscape around: There was the campfire in front of me and several individuals, all of whom I recognized, around it. By any external criterion, all that I have perceived was real; yet, to me, experientially, it was all a dream.
Phenomenological Analysis A First Round Let me begin my analysis by examining the foregoing nine examples in light of the specifications of the consensus listed on p. 5 above. Example 1 (The golden city) fully satisfies specifications (i) [vividness] and (ii) [non-correspondence]. Clearly, neither specification (iii) [ignorance] nor specification (iv) [false judgement] is met and in contrast to the stipulation of (v) [negative evaluation], subjectively, the experience at hand is deemed, by the person having it (me), to be a most rewarding one. Furthermore, the example shows that the person experiencing the hallucination can effortlessly make a clear-cut distinction between what pertains to the hallucination and what does not. The example further indicates that, contrary to what is normally stated in the literature, hallucinatory contents can have stability and experientially they can be perceived as independent of the hallucinating person: the vision was not affected by the movement of the subjects head and gaze. Example 2 (The enchanted forest) is, from a phenomenological point of view, similar to Example 1 (The golden city). (As noted, the episodes described in the two examples took place in the same afternoon.) I cite it in order to underscore a difference with respect to specification (ii) [non-correspondence]: In the case of Example 1 there was no correspondence between the vision and the world; in the case of Example 2 there was partial correspondence between items in the vision

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and objects in the world (i.e., the trees). Furthermore, contrary to specification (iii) [ignorance], the subject (myself) appreciated that he is hallucinating and was cognizant of the correspondences (or lack thereof) just discussed. Significantly, although from an analytical, external point of view, the difference between the two examples with respect to specification (ii) [non-correspondence] may seem categorical, it is not so from the experiential, internal point of view of the subject. Indeed, experientially, the two episodes seemed to be on a par: both were very vivid and in both the subjective feeling was that of a marvellous other reality being revealed. Along with specification (iii) [ignorance], specification (iv) [false judgement] is not met either. While the scene of the vision was vivid to the utmost, it was clearly distinct and well segregated from the things that surrounded me in the real world. The physical environment, the people, the objects I perceived them all in a totally normal manner, knowing exactly what they were and how to act and interact with them. It was not unlike the situation in a theatre hall or in the cinema. The curtain is lifted and one sees a scene depicting other people, other places, other times. These scenes may strike one as very real and they may strongly take hold of one both cognitively and emotionally. In the case of the theatre, the people on the stage are indeed real. Yet in no way does one confuse whatever one has seen either on the screen or on the stage with what is there in the hall. Furthermore, one fully knows that what one sees is not reality in the ordinary sense of the term. Example 3 (The cosmic lottery) satisfies both (i) [vividness] and (ii) [noncorrespondence]. Specifications (iii) [ignorance] and (iv) [false judgement] seem to be irrelevant as the subject experiences himself being in a different reality. It is not that the hallucinatory person misjudged reality; rather, experientially he finds himself situated in a domain which is completely different and separated from the ordinary world. Again, in contrast to what is stipulated by (v) [negative evaluation], the experience is valued very positively. Furthermore, contrary to what is indicated by (vi) [dismissal], the overt expression of the experience (i.e., my singing) was also held in high regard by other people. Example 4 (The rock lions) is presented in order to further emphasize how unsuitable for the characterization of the hallucinatory experience are seemingly objective distinctions such as that differentiating between internal and external realities (in contrast to (ii) [non-correspondence]). Example 5 (The dilapidated house) and the insights subsumed under Example 6 are mentioned so as to present the long-term positive effects of the hallucinatory experience. These effects may be cognitive, affective, behavioural, spiritual and transformativepsychological ones. In particular, it will be noted that the insights gained during the so-called hallucinatory experience can be of value to the subject and be deemed so even when he/she is no longer under the influence of the psychotropic substance. The orientation adopted by the consensus would dictate the opposite: By it, once an ordinary, non-hallucinatory stance is adopted, the hallucinatory experience should be regarded as false and the insights drawn on its basis would be dismissed. Surely, no positive import will be associated with the hallucination, let alone a significant, long-term one.

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Example 7 (The hippy) is the only one in which all the specifications of the consensus are met. In the episode it presents I had a false evaluation of reality without being cognizant that this was the case. The experience was far from pleasant, and the people around regarded my behaviour as disturbed. I should note that this kind of experience never happened to me with Ayahuasca. Example 8 (The starry night) is special because, by the standard definitions encountered in the literature, it would not be deemed as hallucinatory at all. Specifically, the experience in question does not satisfy the crucial specification (ii) [non-correspondence]. What the cognitive agent under the intoxication sees is precisely what is there in the world. Yet, for him/her, what s/he sees is not real. The perception is most vivid, yet is experienced as a dream. Furthermore, even though specification (ii) [non-correspondence] is not met, the false judgement indicated by specification (iv) [false judgement] is actually made and, in line with specification (iii) [ignorance], the person at hand is not cognizant of that. However, an external observer adopting the general orientation of the consensus and of the definitions associated with it will not be aware of all this. Let us take stock. Taken in unison, the foregoing examples demonstrate how inappropriate the consensus is. Except for the first specification, which is necessary for the discussion to proceed, all of them may be violated and yet, a radically non-ordinary perceptual experience will still take place. Remarkably, Example 8 (The starry night) presents a case in which none of the specifications of the consensus is met, yet from both a subjective experiential point of view and as far as any meaningful cognitivepsychological analysis is concerned, the experience is definitely hallucinatory. Taken together, the examples discussed show that the specifications are either inapplicable or irrelevant. Often, these specifications fail to capture those distinctions that are actually meaningful to the persons having the experiences under consideration. Alternatively, they might force differential categorization when as far as the substance of the matter is concerned there is no real distinction (viz. Examples 1 and 2). In conclusion, all this is tantamount to saying that the consensus and the definitions associated with it are neither empirically valid nor theoretically productive. In other words, these definitions and the specifications made by them do not capture the interesting distinctions actually manifested by the psychological phenomenology at hand, they do not capture the richness and complexity of the domain under investigation, and they do not offer the proper framework for its cognitive analysis. With this critical conclusion in mind, we shall now turn to a more constructive discussion and see how the foregoing analysis may further our understanding of the cognitivepsychological phenomenon of hallucination. Further Examination of the Definitions Guided by the foregoing critical observations, let us take a further look at the definitions of hallucination cited in the opening section of this paper. Why are they lacking? It seems to me that this is due to several basic features of these definitions and some underlying assumptions on which they are based.

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First, the definitions are content-free. In them, the characterization of a mental state as hallucinatory does not depend on the types of content experienced to be seen during that state. In other words, the definitions pertain solely to the epistemic status of the perceptual experience, not its semantics (nor, as shall be noted below, their pragmatic). In this sense, they may be regarded as being structurafunctional and not semiotic. Incidentally, this was not true of the original use of the term hallucination, when first introduced into the English language (at the beginning of the sixteenth century; see Sarbin and Juhasz, 1967). Then, the term was used in conjunction with particular contents of false perception, namely, the seeing of ghosts; in this respect, this term is closer to the modern term apparition. Second, the basic criterion these definitions employ is physical, not psychological. Specifically, a state is considered to be an instance of hallucination if there is an actual physical mismatch, or lack of correspondence, between a persons perceptual experience and putatively corresponding physical objects. The third characteristic is related to the second. The evaluation of hallucination is external in the sense that it is accomplished by an observer other than the person experiencing the hallucination. It is this external observer who attests to the lack of physical correspondence indicated above. The foregoing three characteristics are, I think, criterial; that is, they define the core of the standard conception of hallucination in the literature. In addition, I would like to single out two characteristics which may be regarded as typical, but not mandatory. The first of these two is an epistemic criterion, which is implicit in the standard definition. I refer to the hallucinating subject not appreciating that he or she is hallucinating or is in a non-ordinary state of mind (cf. in contrast to specification (iii) [ignorance] of the consensus). The significance of this aspect of the definition is underlined when the contrast to pseudo-hallucination is made. Secondly, the characterization of a state as hallucinatory often involves a value judgement. Specifically, it is assumed that this state is a perturbation of normal cognitive functioning, that it is a symptom of a mind which is deranged, that it is a condition that, in terms of good mental health, one should hope not to be in. This value judgement is pervasive throughout the medical treatments of hallucination; in the definitions cited above it is explicitly specified in that of Reber. Phenomenological Analysis A Second Round In light of the five characteristics introduced in the previous section, let us re-examine the examples presented earlier.

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Content and ambiance Consider first the assumption regarding the assumed content-free characterization of hallucinations. Clearly, this assumption is not supported by the facts. Often, the very content of the hallucinatory experience is the major factor indicating to subjects that the experience at hand is distinct from ordinary perception.

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Hallucinations especially those, like the ones specifically discussed here, induced by psychotropic substances often present contents that would not be presented by ordinary perceptions. Typically, these contents are fantastic and they usually exhibit unusual beauty and magnificence. Ayahuasca visions very rarely depict scenes that the subject could have encountered in his or her day-to-day life. Usually, the scenes seen pertain to what seem to be other places and times, ancient and futuristic civilizations, mythological realms and, last and definitely not least, the realm of the Divine. In a cross-population investigation of the contents of Ayahuasca visions I have conducted (Shanon, 1998a) the only systematic such investigation in the literature it was found that the most frequent items that appear in these visions include serpents, felines, birds, palaces and temples as well as objects of art and magic all items that normally are not part and parcel of subjects daily life experiences. Coupled with the special contents seen in Ayahuasca visions is the special ambiance associated with these visions. This ambiance is characterized by otherworldliness, enchantment, beautification (that is, enhanced aesthetic quality) and sanctity. Typically, this ambiance induces feelings of, on the one hand, fear and awe, and, on the other hand, euphoria and profound well-being, spiritual uplifting and religious sentiments as well as powerful mystical experiences. Psychological insights, intellectual ideas and philosophical reflections are also very common. All these characteristics have also been observed with other psychotropic substances, notably mescaline (see Huxley, 1971; Watts, 1962; Masters and Houston, 1966). The distinct contents seen in the visions and the very special ambiance associated with them often serve as sufficient indicators to the visioning person that he/she is in a non-ordinary psychological state. This is especially true of hallucinations induced by psychotropic substances, notably DMT (as in Ayahuasca), mescaline (as in San Pedro and peyote) and psilocybin (as in the various magic mushrooms). As indicated by Example 7 (The hippy), this is not true of to. In this regard, it is interesting to mark the contrast between the contents of Ayahuasca visions and those of dreams. The following observations are made on the basis of a comparative analysis I have conducted of the contents of these visions and those of three corpora of dreams my own, those reported by Freud in his Interpretation of Dreams (1900/1953) and those analyzed in Hall and Van de Castle (1966). The distributions of contents in the visions and in the dreams were very different. The contents of regular5 nocturnal dreams usually pertain to the dreamers daily life and concerns the majority of the items seen in dreams depict personal acquaintances and ordinary objects. As noted, the contents seen with Ayahuasca rarely pertain to the ordinary. Above, I have employed the terms semantic and semiotic. This is because the considerations entertained here are similar to those encountered in the study of texts and works of art. The question as to whether there is anything in the
[5] The epithet regular comes by way of a differentiation vis--vis lucid dreams. The phenomenology of

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these may actually be much more similar to Ayahuasca visions than to that of regular dreams (see LaBerge, 1985).

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hallucinatory experience that can tell one that this experience is indeed hallucinatory is analogous to the question of whether looking at the contents of a text one is able to determine its literary genre. Well, perhaps not fully and unequivocally, but usually something can indeed be said. For instance, gnomes, fairies and witches are usually found in fairy tales whereas murdered persons and detectives are characteristic of detective stories. As indicated above, a major distinction of Ayahuasca visions is the non-ordinariness of their content. Apparently (on the basis of Example (7) as well as on subsequent queries with several informants), with to this is not the case. Physicalistic vs Psychological Approaches Overall, an experience of perception without a corresponding object in the real world is, of course, a key feature of the phenomenon of hallucination. However, the examples we have considered reveal that at times things are less clear-cut. The contrast between Examples 1 (The golden city) and 2 (The enchanged forest) indicates that there are cases where there being a physical correspondence or not is not as criterial as one may surmise a priori. Experientially, the episodes described in (1) and (2) were very similar, and both were very powerful. The fact that in (2) there was partial overlap between items seen in the vision and objects in the physical world by no means detracted from the feel and power of the hallucination. Nor did the fact that the subject (me) was cognizant of the correspondences and lack of correspondences in question. Example 8 (The starry night) is more extreme: It presents a case in which a hallucinatory experience occurs even though there is full correspondence from a physicalistic point of view. Would we say that because of the existence of this correspondence there is no hallucinatory experience? Or shall we base our judgement on the individuals subjective experience and say that since he/she feels that he/she is in a non-ordinary state of consciousness, phenomenologically the hallucinatory states does indeed obtain? I strongly opt for the second assessment. To my mind, the subject matter at hand is psychological phenomenology and the aim of the scientific enterprise pertaining to it is the analysis of human experience and the understanding of its nature. There is no question about it: experientially hence, I propose, as far as any psychological inquiry is concerned the case at hand is not one of ordinary perception. This is so even though, from a physicalistic point of view, there is a correspondence between what is seen in the hallucination and states of affairs in the real world.

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The external perspective The consideration of the external perspective is directly linked to that of the contrast between the physicalistic and the psychological approaches. Manifestly, some aspects of mental life simply cannot be captured by an externalistic analysis. The paradigmatic case is that of subjective experience. As pointed out by Nagel (1947), what distinguishes subjective experience is its being defined by a point of view. States of affairs in the physical world are not defined in this manner:

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they can be investigated from any point of view, or rather in effect, from nowhere (see Nagel, 1986). Not so states of mind these are grounded in a point of view. Even when two persons entertain the same thought, even when two persons see the same image (same in content and in structure), the very fact that each persons experience is his or hers renders these mental states distinct and different. Thus, psychological phenomena are by their very nature subjective and internal. Confronted with this, the psychologist can take one of two positions. The first is to dispense with the subjective. This stance reflects psychologists great concern with being scientific and objective and is grounded in a meta-scientific perspective that regards the methods of the natural sciences as paradigmatic. By this approach, then, if psychology is to be scientific it has to dispense with anything that is intrinsically subjective. This, in turn, implies that psychological theories have to be formulated in terms which are not genuinely psychological patterns of overt behavioor (as in behaviourism), brain activity (as in biological reductionism) or underlying computational processes (as in the dominating paradigms in contemporary cognitive science). Alternatively, it may be argued that in psychology, subjective experience is the very topic of investigation (see James, 1890; Nagel, 1974; Searle, 1992). It is an objective fact that human beings have subjective experiences. Such experiences are part and parcel of the fabric of the world (see the essay Does consciousness exist? in James, 1912). The job of the psychologist is precisely this to chart these experiences, to define lawful patterns in them, to establish orders and interdependencies between them, and to ground all these in a suitable theoretical framework. Epistemic Considerations Throughout the literature, not knowing that one is hallucinating is taken to be a mandatory criterion for the experience to be characterized as a hallucination. As indicated above, when this criterion is not met the label pseudo-hallucination is usually employed. To my mind, this practice is misguided and it does not do justice to the psychological phenomenology at hand. As revealed by the examples presented above (notably, Examples 1 (The golden city), 2 (The enchanted forest) and 4 (The rock lions)), with Ayahuasca, people do know that what they see are not ordinary perceptions. In other words, the persons under the intoxication do know that they perceive without there being a physical object, at least a physical object in the standard sense, in front of them. Furthermore, it is very rare that drinkers of Ayahuasca confuse the visions that they have with real-world objects or scenes. As indicated in Examples 1 (The golden city) and 2 (The enchanted forest), drinkers usually differentiate between the two correctly and the hallucinatory state does not lead them to relate to persons and objects in the real world in a inappropriate fashion. This is the case even when the hallucinatory experience may be very powerful.6
[6] Leudar and Thomas (2000) present analogous data in the auditory modality. They point out that indi-

viduals who experience auditory hallucinations may at the same time appreciate that the voices they hear are not real.

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At the same time, what is seen in the visions is not simply dismissed as unreal. Rather, the common assessment subjects make is that this material pertains to another kind of reality. The assessment is based on the coupling of two features of the visions: On the one hand, they appear so vivid, so stupendous, and, indeed, so very real; on the other hand, the states of affairs presented in them are so different from anything one has encountered in ones regular life and they seem to surpass the scope of ones personal imagination. I shall note that this stance towards the visionary material is adopted even by individuals with no prior familiarity with Ayahuasca and that in general it perseveres long after the intoxication is over. From an epistemic point of view, also pertinent are subjects attitudes towards the insights and ideations associated with the visions. These insights and ideations may be either psychological (concerning either the subject or other persons he/she knows) or intellectual (concerning various subject matters, not necessarily ones with which the subject is concerned with in his/her ordinary life). Ideations of metaphysical and theological nature are especially common with Ayahuasca (see Shanon, 1998b). As indicated above, subjects highly value these insights and ideations and very often these become permanently held beliefs and opinions. Furthermore, as in Example 5 (The dilapidated house), the psychological insights often have concrete ramifications resulting in profound personal transformations and actual changes in peoples conduct of their lives. I shall also note that similar effects are encountered with mystical experiences which are not substance induced, be they associated with visions or not. Indeed, noetic feelings (that is, the subjective experience that one is gaining knowledge) have been singled out as a key characteristic feature of mystical experience in general (see James, 1929, and Stace, 1961).

Value judgements Of all the specifications of the consensus, that pertaining to value judgements is the only one that has been seriously contested in the literature. It has been noted that there are social and cultural contexts in which hallucinatory experiences are highly valued and are believed to afford psychological and spiritual growth (see, for instance, Sarbin, 1967; La Barre, 1975; Sarbin and Juhasz, 1975; Slade and Bentall, 1988; Bentall, 2000; Leudar and Thomas, 2000). As indicated above, this is true of the traditional Amerindian cultures. Psychotropic substances were central to both the religious and the social life of these cultures and were prominent in their various aspects of the artistic expressions, notably myths, music and drawing (see, for instance, Reichel-Dolmatoff, 1975). Universally, these substances were considered as sacred and regarded as masters and teachers leading human beings to knowledge (see, for instance, Luna, 1984). In fact, in preColombian America they were all considered to be Plants of the Gods and even divinities in their own right. It goes without saying that these substances were always used in the context of sacred ritualized ceremonies and never in an individualistic, recreational manner.

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The negative value judgements noted are, of course, reflections of a general bias of the contemporary secular Western civilization (for general discussion, see Ott, 1995). However, important as it is from a socio-cultural point of view, this aspect of the definition of hallucination is not of much psychological and philosophical interest to us here. It reflects important social biases and prejudices, but not cognitive assumptions of any theoretical import. Thus, the judgements at hand may be very important in sociological and anthropological studies of altered states of consciousness, but not to us here. For general anthropological and cross-cultural discussions, the reader is referred to Bourguignon (1970), Furst (1976) and Dobkin de Rios (1984). More than anything, the negative value judgements reflect the psychological literature on hallucination being based on clinical observations of psychiatric and neurological patients. For these individuals, hallucinations are the symptom of an unhappy condition which is neither wanted nor desired. This, however, need not be universally the case. Opening the study of hallucinations to nonpatient populations and to contexts that value the hallucinatory state positively, may, I suspect, have substantive effect on the conceptualization of the phenomenon of hallucination and its cognitive understanding. Having said the above, let me clearly acknowledge that psychopathology is an unhappy fact of the human condition, and that hallucination can indeed be a symptom of neurological and psychological dysfunction. There is no question about it: The psychological states of psychotic patients and of persons willingly partaking of psychoactive substances (especially in controlled ritualised contexts that are embedded in an established socio-cultural framework!) are categorically different. Thus, Walsh (1990) points out that whereas the shamanic experience is structured, the psychotic one is not, and while the shaman finds joy and fulfilment in his experience the psychiatric patient does not. The discussion presented here aims at marking the limitations and failures of the standard theoretical conceptualization of hallucination; by no means am I claiming that standard distinctions and analyses are inappropriate in the clinical context of their application. Phenomenological Analysis A Third Round Before I proceed to more general theoretical considerations, I would like to highlight another phenomenological aspect revealed by the examples discussed here. I refer to variations with respect to the experiences of reality. In this respect, I would like to distinguish three main types of hallucinatory experiences. First are experiences in which non-real scenes are perceived as if they were real without the experiencer appreciating this to be the case. Essentially, this is the state indicated by the standard definitions of hallucination in the literature. With psychotropic substances, however, experiences of this kind are rare. Personally, I have experienced this type of hallucinatory state only with to, as in Example 7 (The hippy). Experiences of the second kind constitute the paradigmatic case discussed here. In it, non-real scenes are perceived as real while the experiencer does

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appreciate this to be the case. Two subsidiary distinctions will be made between major and minor types of such experiences, the difference having to do with the impact of the hallucination and the significance attached to it. In the cases characterized as minor, all sorts of non-standard perceptions are experienced but not much significance is associated with them and the psychological and/or spiritual impact they have on the experiencer is not remarkable. In contrast, in the major hallucinatory experiences, the subject encounters entire scenes that he/she appreciates as non-real in the standard sense of the term but comes to appreciate as real in another sense. Universally, the experience is regarded as presenting one with another, separate, reality. I shall emphasize that I am not making any ontological statement here; my concern is only with human psychology. What is significant to us here is that, regardless of the status the visions might have in any absolute ontological sense, cognitively they are experienced as real. Furthermore (and as will be further discussed below) a distinction is usually made between this reality and the ordinary one. The conferral of reality has various repercussions which extend beyond the hallucinatory phase itself (hence, beyond the physiological state of intoxication). In particular, the visions may radically modify ones worldview, lead to new beliefs that one will regard as veridical long after the hallucinatory experience itself. As a result, people often undergo major personal transformations which may very well have concrete manifestations in the future conduct of their lives. The third type of hallucinatory experience noted here is one in which the real is perceived as not-real. Again, in the context of psychotropic substances this is a rare case and I myself have experienced it only once, in conjunction with San Pedro as recounted in Example 8 (The starry night). The distinctions just noted bring us to a more general, theoretical analysis of the experience of reality. Further Theoretical Considerations I now turn to more general theoretical considerations. Central in the following discussion is the topic of reality and the assessment that, as far as the psychology of hallucination is concerned, the dichotomous distinction between reality and non-reality is not sufficient. Thus, a third status, that of non-ordinary reality, will be introduced. The discussion will be related to the topic of fiction and special emphasis will be made on pragmatic considerations. Before I proceed, I shall emphasize once again that what I am discussing here is the phenomenology of experience, not ontology. All distinctions made here are introduced by way of attempting a systematic charting of this phenomenology and defining significant lawful patterns in it. No metaphysical or paranormal conclusions whatsoever are implied.

Reality, non-reality and other-reality The data we have surveyed suggest that in addition to reality and non-reality, the phenomenology of hallucination calls for a third category, one of other-reality.

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From an external, physicalistic point of view the hallucinatory perceptions are, of course, not real. In this sense, the standard definitions of hallucination are valid. But, again, the question is how insightful and enriching these definitions are, and what their import on the further study of hallucination is. A main point of my critique is that labelling the hallucinatory perceptions as non-real will not do justice to the psychological phenomenology at hand. Phenomenologically, these perceptions are characterized by several features that distinguish them from mere illusions or phantasms and, by contrast, mark a commonality between them and ordinary perception of what is normally deemed to be real. Essentially, all these features are the various facets or symptoms of one underlying common denominator, namely, the feeling that what is seen is not dependent on the individual at hand. This quality is to be denoted by the term otherworldliness; the following are several aspects that characterize this quality. The first aspect pertains to content. Typically, the contents of the visions are unfamiliar they need not be related to ones life history nor to ones socio-cultural background and they present states of affairs that strike one as foreign and which one had not known of beforehand. The second aspect or symptom has to do with the general ambiance of the visionary experience. Often what one sees is so magnificent, awesome and/or wondrous that one feels that it is not possible that these are merely the fancies of human imagination. Third to be noted is the ideational aspect. As noted in Example 5 (The dilapidated house) above, the visionary experience often imparts upon people insights and ideas that they regard as true, meaningful and important. Not infrequently, these effects have concrete, long-lasting ramifications. The characterization of what is presented by the visions as pertaining to another reality is also grounded in direct experience in a manner not attributable to specific details of content or meaning. I am referring to a non-mediated experience of evidentiality: One sees and one believes. Directly related to evidentiality is what may be referred to as the gripping quality of the hallucinatory experience. When this experience is powerful, one feels that without having any say or choice in the matter, one is sucked into it. Come to think of it, the same holds for ordinary perception (see Llins and Ribary, 1994). Not only what is seen in hallucination may be deemed as real, it may be regarded as more real than real. Many have argued that what distinguishes true perception, on the one hand, and memories, imagination and dreams, on the other, is that the former is clearer, more distinct, and more coherent than the latter (for a classical analysis, see Hume, 1739/1978; for a modern treatment, see Casey, 1976). In contrast, the Ayahuasca experience presents cases of an enhanced sense of reality. Typically coupled with it are an enhanced sense of meaningfulness and noesis (feeling of knowledge).

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Fictionality The introduction of a state of affairs which is neither real (in the ordinary sense) nor unreal is, in fact, familiar to us all. Some of the experiences considered in the

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foregoing discussion are reminiscent of those encountered in a theatre hall or in the cinema. In plays we are presented with, and even carried into, a world of fiction. The curtain is lifted and one sees scenes depicting other people, other places, other times. These scenes may strike one as very real and they may strongly take hold of one both cognitively and emotionally. In the case of the theatre, it is further the case that the people on the stage over there are indeed real people. Yet, in no way does one confuse whatever one sees either on the screen or on the stage with what is there in the hall around one. Furthermore, one fully knows that what one sees is not reality in the ordinary sense of the term. And still, the psychological effect of what one observes may be both powerful and meaningful. On the one hand, a film or a play may cause one to laugh or cry; on the other hand, films and plays may have significant, and even long-lasting, effects on viewers beliefs and attitudes. Thus, while not real in the ordinary sense of the term, the fictional has a reality of its own, one which is distinct from both the (ordinary) real and the (ordinary) unreal. I propose that hallucinations be treated in the same fashion: rather than dismissing them as unreal, it would be more proper to characterize them as fictional. By way of further driving my point, let me present the following hypothetical scenario. In the midst of a performance of Hamlet, a person in the audience raises up and shouts: I know this man, he is not the Prince of Denmark, he is my neighbour John Smith!. The ridiculousness of this act calls for no further comment. But note: It is grounded in exactly the very externalistic, semantically nave, perspective which is the basis for the standard definition and treatment of hallucination in the literature. Fiction is not only an epistemic status, it is a domain of artistic creation and genius. The achievements of the author of fiction are not confined to the creation of another reality this is a mere, very elementary, outcome of his/her toil. What differentiates works of fiction and what makes them great is their semiotic richness, the structural complexity they exhibit, the formal compositions they present. The same is true with hallucinations. Complex visionary experiences may be composed of several visions that are linked in various manners. These include semantic variations on a common theme, the intercalation of two thematic series, visions within visions, and higher order visions. Focusing on this phenomenological richness opens the door for, to my mind, is the really interesting, psychologically genuine, study of hallucination.

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The pragmatic dimension On several occasions throughout the foregoing discussion allusions to actual, manifest behaviour were made. These indicate that the hallucinatory experience is not merely a perceptual one, it also pertains to action. Following is a review of the different actional facets of this experience; on the basis of it, I shall argue that the study of hallucination cannot be confined to the semantic (or semiotic) level and that it should also involve a pragmatic dimension.

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The first pragmatic aspect to be noted is enactment: the hallucinatory experience is not confined to perception, it may also involve action. Indeed, when visions are powerful, the person under the intoxication stops being a mere spectator and he/she may assume the role of an actor. As described in detail in Shanon (2002b), enactments of this kind have a different form, differing in degree of involvement and level of initiative. One may step into the scene of ones visions but remain passive and not move about, one may move about in the scene but not interact with the beings and objects in it, and one may totally immerse oneself within the scene and act within it as if in reality. At times, immersion may be coupled with an experience of identity change and metamorphosis in these one feels that one is transformed into another person or creature. The second pragmatic aspect to be noted is one that is also encountered in conjunction with films and plays. As indicated above, attending these involves a differential pattern of behaviour whereby some manifest behaviours normally associated with the real world are allowed, but others not. Normally, laughing or weeping in the lack of any real cause is considered inappropriate, but doing so when watching a film or a play is totally acceptable. In contrast, attempting to converse with the people seen in a film or a play is ludicrous; this is the case even though the people on stage are actually flesh and blood. Likewise in the case of visionary experience. It is simply not true to say that since the hallucinations are not real, any behaviour relating to them which is manifest is, by dint of this very fact, inappropriate. As in the case of fiction, some manifest behaviours executed in conjunction with hallucinations are definitely appropriate. As shown in Example 3 (The cosmic lottery), the most salient such behaviour is singing, Often, the activities in question exhibit remarkable levels of performance and are appreciated as special also by external observers not under the influence. Thus, just as with respect to reality, where the dichotomous distinction between real and non-real is not sufficient, so on the pragmatic level: distinct profiles of appropriateness have to be invoked. Systematically charting the various profiles of pragmatic appropriateness can serve, I propose, as a new and constructive basis for the psychological study of hallucination. The assessment that hallucinations are associated with differential, non-standard profiles of appropriateness may be linked to the following ethnographic observation. When in the Amazon, I collected indigenous myths related to Ayahuasca. In one such myth mention was made of creatures that disappear once they are touched. It seems to me that this distinction reflects the fact that tactile hallucinations are especially rare: The modality of vision is far more likely to produce hallucinations than the modality of touch. Thus, if under the Ayahuasca intoxication a person were to test his or her visions with the touch of the hand, this person would be likely to lose the hallucinatory experience. If, indeed, one wishes to maintain this experience, one had better not attempt to touch what one sees in the hallucination. Thus, as far as the hallucinatory state is concerned, not all behaviours are on the same par. With experience, people learn the constraints on the spectrum of behaviours that may be invoked in conjunction with this state.

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Lastly, let me mention overt patterns of behaviour that are part and parcel of the special state of mind induced by psychotropic substances. Being manifest, these are actually observable from an external point of view. In the context of Ayahuasca especially noted are activities associated with music: singing, the playing of instruments, dancing. Under the intoxication, some people achieve remarkable accomplishments in these activities. Again, the achievements are observable and can be appreciated and enjoyed also by external observers.

Back to the definition of hallucination Earlier in this article I criticized the standard definitions of hallucination, and argued that qua psychological phenomenon hallucination has to be investigated from the internal point of view of subjective experience. The consideration of the pragmatic dimension brings forth additional features of these definitions and marks further limitations thereof. As we have seen, the external, physicalistic perspective assumed by the standard definitions involves a criterion of correspondence (and the marking of non-correspondence between experienced percepts and states of affairs in the external world). This criterion is also central in the domain of semantics. Specifically, in classical theories the meaning of expressions is established by reference to a correspondence to states of affairs that these expressions represent or refer to (see Frege, 1892/1952 ; Wittgenstein, 1922; Tarsky, 1944). Following the later work of Wittgenstein (1953; 1958), correspondence accounts of meaning have been criticized and alternatives based on the notion of verbal behaviour and language use were put forward (see, for instance, Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969). Such accounts carry the study of meaning from the strict domain of semantics and bring it to the more general realm of pragmatics (see also Shanon, 1988; 1993). The ideas presented here define an analogous move from the semantic to the pragmatic in a new domain, hitherto not analyzed from this perspective. I might note that the pragmatic approach may be especially useful in the clinical context. The semantic approach puts an emphasis on whether the hallucinating person knows or does not that he/she is hallucinating (hence the notion of pseudo-hallucination which, as pointed out, does not seem to be phenomenologically apt). Alternatively, a pragmatic characterization of the hallucinatory state will highlight the appropriateness and inappropriateness of a persons behaviour vis--vis his/her hallucinations. An individual may declare not knowing that he/she is hallucinating, yet his/her actual behaviour may manifest patterns that are distinct from those associated with ordinary behaviour he/she exhibits in relations to objects and states of affairs in the real world. Such patterns of a mismatch between declared knowledge and actual behaviour are, in fact, encountered in conjunction with other cases notably, confabulations and blindsight (for reviews, see Moscovitch, 1995; Weiskrantz, 1986, respectively).

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Brief Allusion to Topics Not Discussed Here In closing, I would like to mention three topics which are directly related to the issues examined here, but whose discussion would carry us outside the scope of this paper. The first concerns the nature of perception, the second is that of reality judgement and reality monitoring, and the third pertains to the mechanisms by which hallucinations are generated. I also mark limitations of the present discussion with respect to the phenomenological study of the hallucinatory experience.

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The nature of perception Much of what has been said above concerns not only hallucination, but also ordinary perception. Often, perception is conceptualized as the reception of externally produced sensory impressions that the perceiver receives in a manner analogous to a camera (admittedly, an intelligent one). Against this prevailing view, Gibson (1979) and his followers in the school of ecological psychology proposed that perception is an active process which cannot be divorced from the cognitive agents acting and being in the world (for a review, see Michaels and Carello, 1981). The present analysis of the phenomenology of hallucination supports this view. If perception is the recording of external sensory stimuli then there is not much room for variation: either perception is veridical or not. In contrast, the alternative ecological view along with the view advocated here affords variation: just as there are various ways by which cognitive agents may act in the world, there are numerous ways by which they may perceive it. One way is ordinary perception, another is that associated with films and plays (incidentally, a case with which Gibson himself was concerned), dreaming is yet another way and so is hallucination. Reality judgement and reality monitoring As we have repeatedly noted, judgements pertaining to reality (and non-reality) are central to the hallucinatory experience. Such judgements are important in the various contexts of the more ordinary states of peoples existence. In particular, the extensive research program of Johnson and her associates (see, for instance, Johnson and Raye, 1981 and Johnson et al., 1993) on reality monitoring should be mentioned. These investigators especially focus on peoples differentiation of memories of real events and recollections which are internally produced (e.g., dreams and fantasies). I have not referred to these studies here for, while they relate to kindred topics, in their specifics they do not bear on the particular issues examined here. Above, I have mentioned that hallucinations may be experienced to me more real than real. This indicates that reality judgement is actually a parameter that can take different values. Dreams and imagination usually decrease the value assigned to this parameter; the Ayahuasca experience may increase it (for a related discussion in the context of mysticism, see Deikman, 1969). This notion of an enhanced sense of the real as it manifests itself in sensation, perception,

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ideation and noesis is, I find, potentially fruitful, and can serve as the basis for cognitive research not necessarily confined to hallucination.

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The generation of hallucination In this article, I confined myself to a phenomenological analysis and considered only issues which are directly related to the way hallucination is defined. I have not discussed the psychological processes involved with hallucinations and the mechanisms by which these are generated (for a recent review, see Bentall, 2000). These topics deserve an independent discussion; some reflections in this regard are presented in Shanon (2002b). There, I favour an approach that analyses the visionary experience in terms of enhanced creativity. Apparently, when under the influence of psychotropic substances at least some people can achieve virtual artistic-like creations that by far surpass those they could produce normally. The generative approach is to be contrasted with that characterizing the effect of these substances (and hence, hallucinations) in terms of the uncovering of covert internal representations and unconscious mental material. Most psychological analyses of hallucination both cognitive and psychoanalytical are in terms of this latter approach (see, for instance, Horowitz, 1975 and Reed, 1972, respectively). I shall note that my own generative approach is grounded in views not specific to hallucination at all, notably my view of metaphor (Shanon, 1992; 1993). Other limitations Finally, I would like to make it clear that the present discussion does not present a comprehensive phenomenological study of hallucinations. All I have attempted here is to examine the standard definition of hallucination and mark its problems. My critique was based on the consideration of some empirical data, but let me be clear: There is so much about the phenomenon of hallucination that I have not even mentioned here. A systematic analysis of the hallucinatory experiences encountered with Ayahuasca is presented in my forthcoming book.
A Final Caveat Before closing, let me add some words of further clarification. In reaction to the foregoing discussion it may be argued that what I have been talking about are not hallucinations but rather visions (see, for instance, Slade and Bentall, 1988). By this stance, the symptoms manifested by neurological and psychiatric patients pertain to the first category, whereas my experiences and those of the traditional users of psychotropic substances pertain to the second. I am ready to accept this distinction. Indeed, because of the pejorative connotations of the term hallucination, both the modern users of Ayahuasca (notably, the members of the Brazilian religious groups employing this substance) and myself (in my writings about this brew) prefer to employ the term vision instead. This, however, is not the practice scientists and clinicians usually employ. In general, these professionals refer to substances such as those discussed here as hallucinogens and to the non-ordinary

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perceptions induced by them as hallucinations. I acknowledge the possible distinction, but would like to underline what is of primary import in this discussion and what is not. The aim of my critique was not to show that the standard definition of hallucination has no sense whatsoever. Obviously, in some basic, and simple, straightforward sense hallucinations are as the standard definition stipulates perceptions experienced without there being corresponding physical objects or states of affairs in the real world to trigger them. The onus of the present critique was not to show that non-ordinary perceptions be they called hallucinations or visions are something totally different. Rather, as stated throughout this paper, the upshot of my critique was threefold. First, to identify the underlying premises psychological, epistemological, methodological and sociocultural in which the standard definition is grounded and to argue against them. Second, to show that there are cases in which the conditions postulated by the standard definition are not met and that the actual phenomenology of nonordinary perceptions is much more varied and complex than what the standard definition suggests. Third, to argue that the perspective on which the standard definition is based directs the cognitivepsychological study of non-ordinary perceptions into a certain direction and fixes it in a certain mould. As such, it misses what to my mind are the interesting phenomena and issues at hand. In contrast, the alternative perspective I advocate opens the door for new directions of investigation and lays the foundations for a genuine cognitivepsychological study of non-ordinary perceptions, be they called hallucinations or visions. Whatever the terms used, the question remains as to what are the similarities and differences between the experiences encountered with neurological and psychiatric patients and those reported by mentally healthy individuals who, on their own initiative, partake of psychotropic substances. This last question is an empirical one that lies outside the scope of the conceptual, programmatic discussion which is the topic of this paper. Conclusion: Towards an Experientially Oriented Study of Hallucination The moral of the present discussion is clear: the externalistic approach is not fitting for the cognitive psychological study of hallucination. The phenomenology of hallucination is rich and it defies seemingly straightforward definitions based on an externalistic, physicalistic point of view. Inspection of this phenomenology reveals that the criteria postulated by the standard definitions of hallucination are neither necessary nor sufficient. By and large, these definitions do not do justice to the complexity of the psychological facts. Furthermore, they seem to divert the study of hallucination from what, to my mind, are the cognitive issues of primary significance. In light of this, a twofold conclusion follows. On the one hand, a serious rethinking of our conceptualization of hallucination is required. On the other hand, systematic empirical data of the phenomenology are needed. If they are to be of general cognitivepsychological import, such data should not be confined to the clinical, psychiatric context. I shall also dare say that the phenomenology

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of hallucination cannot be appreciated without investigators having personal first-hand acquaintance of it. As I have said at the outset of this paper, would anyone theorize about dreams or music without ever having experienced these oneself? In the case of hallucination, very few of the investigators can attest that they had such a personal acquaintance. For a general presentation of this methodological stance the reader is referred to Shanon (2002b); for other phenomenological investigations of hallucination albeit not based on first-hand experiences the reader is referred to Casey, (1976) as well as to the older essay by Sartre (1940/1995). Recently, phenomenological studies of verbal hallucinations appeared Leudar and Thomas (2000), and Stephens and Graham (2000); for earlier psychiatric investigations of this phenomenon, see Hoffman (1986) and the various responses to it. Stated positively, the approach I am advocating is a genuine psychological one. As such, it is an internalistic one involving the consideration of experience, meaning and action. I shall point out that while the ideas made here are directly based on empirical observations of the phenomenology of hallucination, from a theoretical point of view, they are in line with more general ones I have developed independently. In Shanon (1993), I defend the view whereby theories in psychology should be genuinely psychological. This contrasts with the more prevailing approaches that attempt to found psychological phenomena on either neurological or computational ones. This change in theoretical perspective entails a radical change in the goals of the cognitive enterprise. To my mind, rather than attempting the modelling of underlying structures and mechanisms, students of mind should focus on the systematic study of experience: They should chart the geography of mental life, define lawful regularities in it, and attempt a theoretical formalization thereof. In this endeavour, the notion of meaning is pivotal. The present study of hallucination, along with other concurrent investigations of consciousness both ordinary and non-ordinary are to be viewed as specific, concrete implementations of this general theoretical approach.

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Acknowledgements Most of this paper was written while the author was a Golestan fellow at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study (NIAS). The assistance of the NIAS library in the finding of bibliographical material was essential. In the Hebrew University, my assistants Nurit Shacham, Yoel Strimling and Yossi Schellas helped in the preparation of the manuscript. Thanks are also due to the participants in my graduate seminar on the phenomenology of human consciousness in which some of the ideas presented here were discussed, as well as to Zvi Carmelli for his comments on an earlier version of the manuscript.
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Paper received November 2001

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