Descartes - Formal vs.

Objective Reality (1/15, 1/17): Objective reality - The dragon in the painting Formal reality - The painting itself -each of our ideas has formal reality (exists in the world) -each contains the objective reality of what it represents -A finite substance (like a car) has more reality than a mode (like a dent) -An infinite substance (like God) has more reality than a finite substance. -Descartes: an idea can represent something only if it is caused in the right way specifically, by a cause whose formal reality is at least as great as the objective reality contained in the idea. Descartess first proof that God exists (1/15, 1/17): [1] If the degree of objective reality contained in idea A = x, then the degree of formal reality possessed by idea As cause x. [2] I have an idea of God, that is, an idea that contains an infinite degree of objective reality (since this idea represents an infinite substance). [3] I do not have an infinite degree of formal reality. Therefore, [4] The degree of formal reality possessed by the cause of my idea of God is infinite. (From 1, 2) Therefore, [5] Something other than me exists, and it has an infinite degree of formal reality. (From 3, 4) [6] Only God could have an infinite degree of formal reality. Therefore, [7] Something other than me exists, and it is God. (From 5, 6) Descartess proof that there is a material world (1/29): [1] God has given me a great inclination to believe that my ideas of material things are caused by material things. [2] God has given me no way to correct my inclination to believe that my ideas of material things are caused by material things.

[3] If God has given me a great inclination to believe that my ideas of material things are caused by material things, and God has given me no way to correct this inclination, then: unless my ideas of material things are caused by material things, God is a deceiver. Therefore, [4] Unless my ideas of material things are caused by material things, God is a deceiver. (From 1, 2, 3) [5] God is not a deceiver. Therefore, [6] My ideas of material things are caused by material things. (from 4, 5) [7] If my ideas of material things are caused by material things, then material things exist. Therefore, [8] Material things exist. (from 6, 7) Lockes distinction between primary and secondary qualities Primary Qualities: Q is a primary quality of material objects if and only if: [i] Necessarily, every material object has Q; [ii] At all times, every material object has Q; [iii] Every time we sense a material object, we sense it to have Q; [iv] We cannot conceive of a material object without Q. Examples: solidity, extension, figure (shape), motion-or-rest, and number. Secondary Qualities: Nothing in the objects themselves. The properties that produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities. Examples: colors, sounds, tastes, etc. Locke vs. Leibniz on innate ideas: Locke - no innate ideas; each mind comes into being like white paper Leibniz - argument: [1] Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII - no two things can have all their properties in common)

[2] The only way in which two newly-created minds could differ is by having different ideas. [3] If minds have no innate ideas, then two newly-created minds do not have different ideas. Therefore, [4] If minds have no innate ideas, then two newly-created minds do not differ (i.e. are exactly alike). (from 2, 3) Therefore, [5] Minds do have some innate ideas. (from 1, 4) Leibnizs argument for the PII: [1] If x and y were exactly alike, then there would be no reason for them to be where they are and not transposed. [2] x and y are where they are and not transposed. [3] The Principle of Sufficient Reason is true; that is, for every true proposition, there is a sufficient reason why it is true (PSR). Therefore, [4] Its not the case that any two things are exactly alike (PII). Locke, in defending his denial of the existence of innate ideas, might have to deny the PII. But to do so, he would probably have to deny the PSR, which he relies upon in his argument for the existence of God. Leibniz on Pre-Established Harmony: God designs all created substances so that their states will develop in harmony with each other, so that created substances seem to interact with each other. illustration: musicians in separate rooms, cannot see/hear each other, playing in harmony -> God has wound up the clockwork of each thing to develop in harmony without actually interacting Why? Leibniz believes this claim follows from his Predicate-in-Notion Principle and his theory of Complete Individual Concepts; -> it is required by his Causal Isolation Thesis: no created substance interacts with any other created substance. He argues for the CIT like this: [1] If S is a created substance, then everything that happens to S is a consequence of Ss complete individual concept. [2] If an event E is a consequence of Ss complete individual concept, then

E is not an effect of any other created substance. Therefore, [3] If S is a created substance, then nothing that happens to S is an effect of any other created substance. **Leibniz: a created substance is supposed to exist independently of all other created substances.** Hume on the origins of ideas: Copy Principle: Every idea you can form is either like an exact* copy of an impression or is composed of ideas, each of which is an exact* copy of an impression. *(except for its degree of force, vivacity or liveliness) This might be demonstrated by pointing out that a color-blind person has no ideas of color. Hume on natural religion: Natural religion refers to religious beliefs that are based on ordinary human experience and reasoning (the kinds of evidence that we use in natural science). Natural religion is opposed to revealed religion, which is religious belief that is based on supposedly extraordinary sorts of evidence, such as the scriptures (which are supposed to report ways in which God miraculously revealed himself to certain persons in history) and extraordinary religious experiences. -In Humes Dialogues, the interlocutors take for granted that God exists. They understand God to be the original cause of the universe. -They are inquiring into Gods nature, not existence, through ordinary experience and reasoning. Cleanthes: Design argument -Philos response: The argument leaves open the possibilities that the original cause is finite and that there is more than one creator. Demea: Cosmological argument [1] Either the whole chain of causes and effects stretches back forever, or it has a first member (a necessarily existent being). [2] If forever, although each member explains the next member, nothing explains why the whole chain exists.

[3] Something must explain why the whole chain exists (rather than a different chain or no chain at all). Therefore, [4] It is not the case that the chain of causes and effects stretches back forever. (from 2, 3) Therefore, [5] The whole chain has a first member, which is a necessarily existent being. -Cleanthess objection: ??? -Philo: False dilemma - its possible that the whole chain exists necessarily Philo: God must lack at least one of the three features of the traditional view: a) Omnipotence b) Omnibenevolence c) Omniscience -Cleanthes: Gods power, knowledge, or benevolence could be limited. -Philos counter-reply: natural religion (which Cleanthes advocates) cannot provide us with the very powerful, knowing, and benevolent (less-thanperfect) God. The evil we observe undermines Cleanthess evidence concerning the nature of God. Hume concludes with Philo on true religion -The question of theism or atheism is a verbal dispute. -Theism=the first cause is intelligent -Atheism=the first cause is not intelligent -A question of length is different from a question of how great an artist is. -The question of whether God is intelligent is like the latter; there is no factual difference over which they argue. -the divine mind (according to the design argument) could be as close to any other operation of the universe as to a human mind -Even so, this question has no practical implications. The two questions: (Q1) Does God exist?, and (Q2) What is Gods nature? Hume: (A1) It doesnt matter., and (A2) We have no reason to believe anything about Gods nature that has any practical significance for us. Kant on experience: Our understanding of the external world is founded in experience and a

priori concepts Skepticism: Descartes adopts skepticism as a philosophical starting-point to establish a foundation for knowledge. His conclusions bring him out of skepticism. Hume called Descartess skepticism excessive antecedent skepticism (beginning with skepticism, rather than arriving at skeptical conclusions). Descartes argues for doubt in his first meditation. Hume Substances: Locke: A substance is the thing that has qualities. -There has to be a substratum; is not clear whether the substratum is the substance, or if the whole thing is -Not committed to an idea of how many kinds of substances there are, as we have so little knowledge of substances (we cannot know universal, necessary truths about material objects). Descartes: Substance Dualist -height, weight, extension, etc. belong to the body -perceives, thinks, believes, etc. belong to the mind Argument: [1] Whatever I clearly and distinctly understand is possible. Therefore, [2] If I clearly and distinctly understand one thing, X, existing without another thing, Y, then it is possible for X to exist without Y. (Conclusion from 1) [3] If it is possible for X to exist without Y, then X and Y are two different things. Therefore, [4] If I clearly and distinctly understand X existing without Y, then X and Y are two different things. (Conclusion from 2, 3) [5] I can clearly and distinctly understand myself existing without any feature except for thinking. [6] It is possible for me to exist without any feature except for thinking. (Conclusion from 2, 5.) [7] If it is possible for something to exist without a feature F, then F is not one of its essential features.

[8] I have no essential features except for thinking. (Conclusion from 6, 7) [9] I can clearly and distinctly understand myself without my body, and vice versa. Therefore, [10] It is possible for me to exist without my body, and vice versa. (Conclusion from 2, 9) Therefore, [11] I (i.e., my mind) and my body are two different things. (Conclusion from 3, 10) Leibniz: Monads are the only substances PSR:

Leibniz: For every true proposition, there is a sufficient reason why it is true. For Leibniz, since everything has an explanation (the PSR), the entire series of contingent things requires an explanation !he explanation of the entire series cannot be a "e"ber of the series since then it #oul$ explain itself an$ no contingent thing is self%explanatory !hus the explanation of the entire series of contingent things "ust not be itself a contingent thing Rather it "ust be so"ething necessary Leibniz believes that any necessary being is &o$ So, &o$ exists Leibniz thin's that the PSR rules out the possibility that there coul$ be t#o or "ore in$istinguishable, that is, in$iscernible, things (( )*, iv, +,-+.(& -/) *f there #ere t#o such things, &o$ #oul$ have treate$ the" $ifferently insofar as he has relate$ the" $ifferently to the rest of the #orl$ For exa"ple, if there #ere t#o bla$es of grass that #ere in$iscernible fro" each other, then one bla$e #oul$ stan$ in spatial an$ te"poral relation R to the rest of the #orl$, #hereas the other bla$e #oul$ stan$ in so"e other spatial an$ te"poral relation R to the rest of the #orl$ 0hy $i$ &o$ choose to but the first bla$e relation R to the rest of the #orl$ instea$ of R 1 Leibniz clai"s that since they are in$iscernible fro" each other, there could be no reason for &o$ to treat the" $ifferently !hus if there #ere t#o in$iscernible in$ivi$uals, then

&o$ #oul$ have acte$ for no reason 2ut there is a reason for everything So, there are no in$iscernible yet nu"erically $istinct things 3ant: *n the Critique of Pure Reason (+45+, +454), 3ant clai"s to provi$e a proof for the PSR by sho#ing that 6the PSR is the groun$ of possible experience, na"ely the ob7ective cognition of appearances #ith regar$s to their relation in the successive series of ti"e8 (2./-9.(/:+) Relying on his transcen$ental "etho$ 3ant argues in the 6Secon$ (nalogy of ;xperience8 that <a certain version of= the PSR is a con$ition for the possibility of experience, an$ as a result also a con$ition for the possibility of ob7ects of experience >et, this argu"ent also restricts the vali$ity of the PSR to hu"an experience, i e , to things #hich appear in space an$ ti"e (ny use of the PSR that transgresses the boun$aries of hu"an experience is boun$ to generate antino"ies
Religious belief: Lockes argument for Gods existence: (Part 1) [1] We exist. [2] Bare nothing cannot produce anything, i.e. if something is produced, then there must be something that produces it. [3] What has not existed from eternity had a beginning, i.e. at some time it started to exist. [4] What had a beginning must be produced. Therefore, [5] From eternity there has been something. (Part 2) [6] What had its Being and Beginning from another, must also have all that which is in it, and belongs to its Being from another too. All the Powers it has, must be owing to, and received from the same Source. Therefore, [7] The eternal source of all being is also the eternal source of all power. Therefore, [8] The eternal source of all being is the most powerful being. [9] We have the powers of Perception and Knowledge.

[10] Either there was a time when no knowing being existed, or there has been a knowing being from eternity. [11] If there was a time when no knowing being existed, then it is impossible that there should ever have come to be any knowledge. (Defended in sect. 5) Therefore, [12] There has been a knowing being from eternity. Thus our Reason leads us to the Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, That there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being ; which whether any one will please to call God, it matters not. (Sect. 6) Hume vs. Kant on causation? Kant - the principle of causation is one that is required to make any sense of our experiences