43 March/April 2010

ARTICLES OF CURRENT INTEREST

By Kevin P. Cresswell, Field Forensics
On March 23, theUS DOT MARAD
sent out an advisory notice on the advice
of the Oce of Naval Intelligence;
Information suggests that Al Qaida
remains interested in maritime attacks
in the Bab-al-Mandab Strait, Red Sea,
and the Gulf of Aden, along the coast
of Yemen. Although it is unclear how
they would proceed.
In February, a Washington Post ar-
ticle referred to an audio tape released
to the BBC concerning, A Response
to Crusader Aggression. A Yemen-
based oshoot of Al Qaida has called
on Muslims in the region to wage holy
war against the U.S. and its allies. A
purported audio statement by Said al-
Shihri, deputy leader of Al Qaida in the
Arabian Peninsula, warned American
and Crusader interests are everywhere...
Attack them and eliminate as many en-
emies as you can, Mr Shihri urged. He
said the group aimed to gain control of
the strategically important strait of Bab-
al-Mandab, which connects the Gulf of
Aden to the Red Sea.
An attack on a vital choke point such
as Bab-al-Mandab would suggest the
strategic maritime sophistication of Al
Qaida (which hasnt been evident since
attacks on the USS Cole and MV Lim-
burg) is improving. Heightened security
at land and air borders has forced ter-
rorists to seek alternative targets. Te
asymmetric attacker is looking for the
soft targetsomething or someone who
is unaware, easily accessible, and a crea-
ture of habit. Ships, choke points and
ports meet these criteria. As long ago as
February 2002, Al Qaida was referring
to maritime warfare, and concentrat-
ing their eorts to blockade the worlds
choke points. Whats worse for Ameri-
ca is the fact that most of the important
straits and trade routes are controlled
by Muslim countries (Bosporus, Gi-
The Asymmetric Blockading of
the Worlds Maritime Choke Points
braltar, Suez, Malacca, Hormuz, Bab-al-
Mandab). Likewise, the long history that
Muslims have in maritime warfare and
stressing Crusader commerce increases
the possibility of returning to that form
of jihad Abu Ubeid al-Qurashi, Al Qa-
ida 13 FEB 2002.
Most of the worlds shipping choke
points are surrounded by Muslim coun-
tries. Tese present easy asymmetric
targets whose closure could result in
signicant global economic damage. Re-
cent estimates of the annual value of sea-
borne international goods exceed $3.5
trillion dollars.
Te worlds busiest choke point, the
Suez Canal, has been closed 5 times in
130 years, albeit in times of signicant
local military action. An economic loss
of billions of dollars could occur if it
were closed again. Tolls collected by the
Suez Canal Authority in 2002 amounted
to $1.96 billion, paid by 13,500 vessels.
Ships are convoyed through the narrow
canal one by one, and depending upon
the number of ships in the convoy, this
can take 11 to 15 hours, leaving these
vessels vulnerable to ambush at any time.
All ships have a specic time to enter
the canal and are required to maintain a
steady speed (up to 10 knots). Most of
the canal is designed to handle one-way
trac, and is narrow enough to easily
mine. Tese two vulnerabilities, along
with the ships transit details being pub-
lished in advance, give the attackers all
the information that they need to design
a well-planned ambush.
Historically, attacks at sea have been
rare. In the last 30 years, only two per-
cent of terrorist incidents have been in
the maritime arena. However, the im-
pact of marine attacks since 2000, and
the successes by the Abu Saya Group,
and of course the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (Sea Tigers), have con-
vinced terrorist organizations that the
vast un-policed isolation of global oce-
anic transportation is an attractive oper-
ating environment.
Te Prince of the Sea, Abdul Al-Ra-
him Al Nashiri, was the mastermind be-
1. Gibraltar
2. Bosporus
3. Suez
4. Hormuz
5. Bab-al-Mandab
6. Malacca
1
2
3
4
5
6
Major Shipping Choke Points
Controlled by Muslim Countries
Vol. 37, No. 2, The Detonator 44
hind his organizations maritime terror-
ist operationsright up until his capture
in 2002. Strategic and tactical direction
of the maritime global terrorist network
is still provided by the leadership of Osa-
ma Bin Laden. Bin Laden provided the
strategic leadership for the USS Cole at-
tack in 2000, and reviewed the plans at
every stage, pinpointing on photographs
where the explosive-laden attack boat
should strike. Al Qaida loosely has own-
ership and, more signicantly, has ac-
cess to an estimated two dozen commer-
cial vessels. Tis eet has been mainly
used in the smuggling of narcotics from
Afghanistan. Many of the vessels that Al
Qaida currently uses are either owned
outright by front businesses, or operate
under the inuence and funding of its
supporters.
Te MV Limburg bombing, o the
coast of Yemen in 2003, was also coordi-
nated through Bin Laden. Following the
Cole attack, the U.S. and Yemeni govern-
ments were acting together in the war
on terror. Shortly after the Limburg inci-
dent, a Yemeni leader of Al Qaida, and a
suspect in the Cole incident, Qaid Salim
Talib Sinan al-Harathi, was killed near
Marib by a U.S. missile strike. Tis cross
border liaison is not always as clean as
it should be. Politics and counter terror-
ism investigators are often pulling in op-
posite directions. Te USS Cole provides
the paradigm. Te Yemeni government,
who knew Bin Laden was behind the
bombing, wanted to execute the jailed
conspirators. Te U.S. authorities, of
course, needed more investigative inter-
views to link the attack back to Al Qaida
leadership. Te problem with this inves-
tigative trail, it would also link senior
members of the Yemeni establishment
with Al Qaida. Tere have been rumors
since 9-11 that Bin Laden may be head-
ing from Afghanistan to Yemen to es-
tablish an operating base. For maritime
operations, this would make absolute
sense, and it would facilitate command
of piracy incidents in the region.
In the maritime business, every inci-
dent involves more than one country. For
example, an attack on a British-owned
vessel registered in the Bahamas, with a
Malaysian crew, traveling from Rotter-
dam to West Africa, involves a number
of countries, even if the ship is in neutral
waters when the incident occurs. In this
day and age, media teams arrive quickly,
broadcasting the story to the world in
minutes, and providing the attackers
with the global exposure they so desper-
ately seek. Te dierences between gov-
ernments (legalities, strategies, ethics)
and the way each deals with crimes at sea
and terrorism, creates a divisiveness that
terrorists rejoice in, and a weakness that
Al Qaida exploits to the fullest.
Te marine asymmetric aggressor
will use one of seven options, or a com-
bination thereof;
A Surface Approach. A surface at-
tack, road or sea access into ports,
surface swimming or small craft us-
ing blind arcs or jetties in harbors.
An Underwater Attack. Using swim-
mers, mini-subs, or remotely oper-
ated vehicles.
Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs). Truck bombs alongside a ves-
sel, water borne IEDs at sea, or oat-
ing/moored mines, or limpet mines
alongside a vessel.
The hull damage caused by the terrorist attack on the USS Cole.
Vol. 37, No. 2, The Detonator 46
CBRN. Ingestion, absorption or ex-
plosion.
Aerial. UAVs, suicide attack air-
frames, microlights, or small RC air-
craft containing explosives.
Cyber warfare or Psyops. Bin Laden
declared mastering high technology
a religious duty.
Use of Novel Technology and Novel
Explosives.
Te greatest challenge for the ag-
gressor is eective penetration of a ships
hull. A waterborne IED could success-
fully blast a hole though the hull, but
the resulting damage and injury would
be small, and it would be unlikely that
the vessel would actually sink. A stand-
o attack using an RPG, would require
proximity and likely result in relatively
few casualties. However, if an explosive
charge could be successfully placed be-
low decks, the results could be devastat-
ing, achieving what the terrorist wants
most; major damage with debilitating
after-eects and signicant injury and
loss of life.
In September 1991, two Islamic Ji-
had members were arrested after po-
lice found rockets, launchers, and other
weapons hidden in their vehicles as they
arrived at Nuweiba in the Sinai Penin-
sula. Tey reportedly planned to carry
out attacks against U.S. ships traveling
through the Suez canal, and admitted
that their action was meant to under-
mine American-Egyptian ties and tour-
ism, as well as security and stability in
Egypt. Tey allegedly also intended to
attack cruise ships on the Nile. Although
a stando attack from the banks of the
canal would have been possible, cross-
ing the Sinai and approaching the canal
would have been dicult, unless they
had a seemingly legitimate reason.
On 19 August 2005, three 107mm
HE artillery rounds were launched from
a warehouses second oor window in
the industrial area of Aqaba, Jordan. Te
weapons used were homemade launch
tubes, bastardized 107mm Type 63.
(Tese are the same weapons found on
the small, fast-attack craft used by the
IRGCN in the Persian Gulf, and, by the
LTTE Sea Tigers, who use a two tube
version. Tese events, and their com-
mon denominators, are evidence that
information is being freely exchanged
between both state and non-state actors,
and that terrorists learn from and imitate
each other.) On this occasion, the three
tubes were wired into a timing circuit.
Te rst rocket passed over the bow of
the USS Ashland, and exploded 30 me-
ters from the bow of the USS Kearsarge.
Te second rocket hit the outer wall of a
hospital, and the third exploded in Israel.
Tis type of rocket produces over 1000
fragments upon detonation, causing ex-
tensive destruction of property and life.
Te use of enhanced-blast explo-
sives, particularly volumetric explosives,
are also likely to catch the asymmetric
attackers attention in the near future.
Volumetric explosives, or munitions,
generally take advantage of the mixing
of explosive reactants or products with
the surrounding volume of air, to eect
deagration or detonation reactions.
Enhanced-blast explosives deliver more
energy on target than traditional or-
ganic compounds such as TNT, RDX, or
HMX. Following are four types of recog-
nized enhanced-blast explosives. Earlier
I mentioned the diculty in penetrating
a ships hull. Ethylene and propylene ox-
ides used in some blast munitions are ex-
tremely toxic. Even if the round failed to
detonate, exposure to the droplets alone
would be enough to cause moderate to
severe irritation that could incapacitate
and render helpless a ships crew.
In reference to the latest claim by Al
Qaida, to choke the worlds maritime
trade, the type of attacks that could
be carried out eectively to close the
Mandab Strait are very limited. In fact,
so limited there is only one method that
could achieve the aim successfully and
with any chance of sustainability that
is the use of asymmetric mining.
Conventional mines are unlikely to
be laid by the asymmetric, non-state ac-
tor. He is likely to opt for the homemade
version. A fty-ve-gallon drum would
be an eective disguise, as its pres-
ence would not arouse suspicion and it
could contain several hundred pounds
of explosive. Te LTTE and Palestin-
ian groups have successfully used these
types of mines. With a simple breath-
ing device fashioned from a baby feed-
ing bottle, and truck shop absorbers as
horns, this is an unsophisticated, but
deadly, weapon of choice that can be
drifted below the surface, or moored
at various depths. Te Iraqis developed
their own version which we have nick-
named the Hoover, Moody or bicycle
wheel mine.
A further option would be to lay
oating contact mines, hidden in harm-
less-looking otsam. Hidden in ships
garbage and thrown overboard, this
technique could successfully disrupt
port operations. Hiding thirty pounds of
explosive in a car inner tube is easy. If an
attacker could get 700 pounds of explo-
sive to detonate under the keel of a tank-
er, this could result in a headline-making
terrorist act with a huge environmental
impact. Having proved their capability,
the group could then follow up this act
with the threat of mining, causing tem-
porary closures (with the corresponding
economic loss) of sea lanes and narrow
channels into ports. It has been done be-
fore.
On Jan 9, 1980, there was a bomb
threat to the Russian freighter Karamzin
as she took on corn in the Port of Sac-
ramento. A group called Patriotic Scuba
Divers of America claimed they had
mined a 30-mile-long channel near Sac-
ramento. Te Coast Guard ordered the
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channel and port closed for several days.
Te Navy sent a mine sweeper to the
area, and although no mines were found,
the resulting economic disruption and
psychological impact of the threat was
substantial.
Te eect of this type of threat was
not lost on the Provisional IRA, who
used this tactic frequently during the
1980s in the U.K. and Northern Ireland.
Tere has been little evidence to date of
this being a Jihadist tactic. It is, howev-
er, a tactic that certainly ts neatly into
asymmetric planning.
Tere is absolutely no doubt that
maritime infrastructure is the soft un-
derbelly of all nation states. It can be at-
tacked with little expense or endeavor.
Tis three dimensional domain pres-
ents not only a medium by which these
threats can move and hide weapons and
operators, but also oers an array of ex-
citing potential targets that t the terror-
ists operational objectives of achieving
mass casualties and maximum media
attention, while inicting catastrophic
economic harm.
Disparate groups are increasingly
adopting a combination of sea-borne
tactics and weapons, originally designed
for land use, but when improvised, and
turned to face the ocean, or bolted to the
deck of a small boat, they can become a
highly-ecient naval weapon system. It
is a threat of global proportions, originat-
ing from both state, non-state and non-
traditional organizations, that cannot
be assumed to conduct their operations
for rational reasons. In the asymmetric
world, it is often disruption rather than
eruption that yields dividendsthe aim
being not to sink, but rather force the
target to maneuver and launch a stand-
o attack. Te threat of improvised min-
ing would accomplish this goal.
Asymmetric attackers, such as Al
Qaida, have time and again demon-
strated their ability to pick themselves
up, brush themselves o, learn from
their mistakes, and emulate successful
tactics from groups outside their own
umbrella. As security gets tighter in one
area, the asymmetric terrorist seeks out
alternative targets. Te maritime envi-
ronment presents the opportunity with
myriad bolt holes, covers and other hid-
ing places available in inshore waterways
and ports. Te strategic signicance of
the gulf straits to the worlds oil supply
will oer a high-potential target to both
the terrorist, or a state such as Iran. Of
all transportation modes, shipping is the
most essential for global trade, and also
the most vulnerable.
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