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The document discusses how frame-shifting, or accessing and restructuring distinct knowledge domains, underlies comprehending jokes. It analyzes evidence of frame-shifting in spontaneous humor from video-recorded conversations. Frames are collaboratively constructed over conversational turns, and participants use cues like body language and eye gaze to highlight elements and cue necessary conceptual revisions (frame-shifts).
Deskripsi Asli:
What Spontaneous Humor Reveals about Language Comprehension
Ying Choon Wu
Cognitive Science, UCSD
Judul Asli
What Spontaneous Humor Reveals about Language Comprehension Ying Choon Wu Cognitive Science, UCSD
The document discusses how frame-shifting, or accessing and restructuring distinct knowledge domains, underlies comprehending jokes. It analyzes evidence of frame-shifting in spontaneous humor from video-recorded conversations. Frames are collaboratively constructed over conversational turns, and participants use cues like body language and eye gaze to highlight elements and cue necessary conceptual revisions (frame-shifts).
The document discusses how frame-shifting, or accessing and restructuring distinct knowledge domains, underlies comprehending jokes. It analyzes evidence of frame-shifting in spontaneous humor from video-recorded conversations. Frames are collaboratively constructed over conversational turns, and participants use cues like body language and eye gaze to highlight elements and cue necessary conceptual revisions (frame-shifts).
What Spontaneous Humor Reveals about Language Comprehension
Ying Choon Wu Cognitive Science, UCSD Correspondence to: Ying Choon Wu Cognitive Science, Dept. 0515 9500 Gilman Drive La Jolla, CA 92093-0515 USA ywu@cogsci.ucsd.edu fax: 1-858-534-1128 phone: 1-858-822-4037 3 Abstract Getting a joke involves revising initially primed expectations. Coulson (2001) describes the cognitive work underlying such revisions as frame-shifting or accessing and restructuring elements from distinct knowledge in order to draw critical inferences. The present talk examines evidence for frame-shifting in spontaneous humor. Drawing upon video-recorded conversations, I will demonstrate how much of what is treated as invisible, backstage cognition in written joke comprehension can in fact be mapped to visible, overtly executed behaviors in spontaneous jokes. It will be shown how frames are collaboratively constructed over sequences of contributions to the talk in progress. Further, it will be shown how selectively highlighting elements within a given frame is achieved by various semiotic resources such as body orientation, pauses, and eye gaze. Finally, it will be shown how participants accompanying talk and actions serve to cue the required conceptual revisions (frame-shifts). Introduction The study of spontaneous humor in the wild affords the opportunity to investigate the intersection between language and social processes. Drawing from collections of published or well known witticisms, researchers have argued that getting verbal humor frequently requires the integration of information from distinct knowledge domains or schemas (Coulson 2001, Norrick 1986). For example, grasping the joke in a line such as, The diamond is the hardest stone - to get, is contingent upon the projection of relational structure between ones cognitive models of courtship and precious stones. However, as will be demonstrated over the course of this discussion, analysis of the actual production of spontaneous jokes in everyday dyadic interaction suggests that joke comprehension involves an additional form of conceptual work namely, the participants must re-construe the mutual focus of their interaction. Consider the following example: Two long-standing friends (a man and a woman) are sitting outside facing one another as they discuss crab bait. In response to the mans query as to why she uses turkey legs, the woman responds, Because I have turkey legs. 4 The man replies, I know you have turkey legs, and glances ostensively at her legs. Just as dual senses of hitting a home run are brought to bear in the previous example, so the mans remark in the present case invites a semantic reanalysis of the sense of turkey legs suggested by the womans statement. However, for all other parties involved, understanding that a joke has been made involves not only reanalysis at the linguistic level; it is also necessary to demarcate the remark as distinct from the preceding strip of activity with respect to the participants goals, attitudes, standards of conduct, and so forth. Whereas the talk preceding the mans reference to turkey legs appears to be motivated at least in part by the opportunity for the earnest exchange of information, his response to the woman does not seem designed to express any sort of sincere opinion about the nature of her legs. For example, it would be markedly odd if, construing his statement as such, the woman were to respond with additional leg-related exposition, as though the topic of the conversation had simply shifted abruptly from crab bait to human limbs. It would also be unexpected if she were to take deep offense at the negative implications of his comment. In other words, knowing that the man is joking entails not only semantic reanalysis, but also revising the backdrop of assumed motivations and potential next moves informing the ways in which his remark is to be interpreted relative to what has already transpired in the exchange. These two forms of conceptual revision correspond to two distinct notions of frame-based knowledge. On the one hand, knowing the kinds of legs denoted by the phrase turkey legs when attributed either to humans or fowl requires that ones knowledge of both leg types be sufficiently structured so that one can re- conceptualize one leg type (human) in terms of the other (turkey). Many current theories on the nature of such knowledge structure are based at least in part on notions of frames and schemas formulated in the 1970s by researchers in the fields of Artificial Intelligence and cognitive psychology (Minsky 1975, Schank & Abelson 1977, Bobrow & Norman 1975, Rumelhart & Ortony 1977). On the other hand, knowing that the man is only kidding with his comment requires that one re- conceptualize what was previously a serious form of activity as now having turned to 5 play. The premises and perspectives necessary for the members of a culture to perform this kind of interpretive shift has also been termed frames by sociologists (Goffman 1974, Bateson 1972). The present discussion will explore how these two types of frame-based reanalysis complement one another. In particular, it will be shown that when studied in the context of face-to-face exchanges, the comprehension processes treated by some humor researchers as purely mental events confined to the minds of individual readers are in fact in coordination with and perhaps scaffolded by overt behavioral cues (eye gaze, body orientation, pauses, and so forth) which serve to organize the ongoing strip of activity in which the humorous utterance is lodged. In other words, because situated verbal jokes require some form of reanalysis both with respect to the semantic domain afforded by the language of the joke itself as well as with respect to the participants construals of the interchange in progress, a situation emerges whereby the environmentally grounded resources which speakers draw upon in order to evoke the understanding that they have made a joke facilitate the conceptual revisions necessary to grasp the implicit humor. This finding bears significance not only to the realm of verbal wit; it speaks to the broader question of the interrelationship between social cognition and the conceptualization processes necessary for language comprehension. As will be shown, constructing a mental model of an interlocuters intended message depends not only on the scope and organization of ones semantic knowledge; it is also determined by the participants dynamically shifting understandings of the purposes and protocols which inform their talk in progress. Background Frames and Frame-shifting in Written Jokes A frame in the present sense of the term is an abstract construct postulated in the attempt to account for peoples ability to draw upon prior experience in order to arrive at inferences about new objects and events encountered in the environment. If one sees a dining room chair partially occluded by a table, for example, one expects 6 by default that it has four legs even though they may not all be visible. Similarly, ones familiarity with the procedures, or scripts (Schank & Abelson 1977) involved in restaurant dining enables the following two sentences to be construed as cohesive and intelligible, even though no intervening explanation of the manager or the intention to order beer was made available: 1) John and Frank went out for pizza after work. 1) The manager turned out to be one of Johns neighbors, and gave them a free pitcher of beer. What is at stake, in essence, is the individuals ability to supplement his representation of current input with relevant pre-existing knowledge in order to arrive at an enriched understanding of the situation at hand. The idea of frames or schemas was developed in order to describe the architecture of a memory system capable of mediating this precisely kind of integration between stored and incoming information. Specifically, frames and schemas are conceptualized as data structures which are stored in long-term memory and represent the essential constituents and relations comprising a stereotyped situation, object, action, event or sequence. In the case of a restaurant frame, for example, core constituents might include the patrons, the waiter/waitress, and the meal around which their interaction hinges. Core relations are illustrated in the intuition that the meal be consumed by the patrons and served by a waiter or waitress, as well as in the temporal order of the steps in the transaction (patrons are seated by the waiter and given menus; beverages are ordered; beverages are served and entrees are ordered, and so forth). In addition to representing what is most characteristic about a given category of experience, frames and schemas are also proposed to possess variables, or slot/filler structure, which can be specified by novel instantiations of that category. Receiving (1) and (1) as input, for instance, is presumed to activate a restaurant frame with John and Frank being mapped as fillers of something like a PATRON slot, and the pizza, as a filler for the MEAL slot. Slots which are not specified by the information available are said to be filled by default values. We assume, for example, that the two gentleman receive their pizza from a food server rather than 7 fetching it out of the kitchen themselves, even though no references to an agent for a putative FOODSERVER slot was made. In a similar fashion, it is the default values within an individuals chair frame which allow him to predict that there are four legs beneath a specific chair within his field of vision even when they are occluded by a table. Although frame-based models have received apt criticism for their inability to represent the breadth and subtlety of commonsense human knowledge (see Dreyfus (1997) for a discussion), some core tenets of the theory have found empirical support. Bower, Black, & Turner (1979), for example, demonstrate that after reading short vignettes narrating habitual activities or events (e.g. a trip to the doctor), participants recalled and falsely recognized actions which were not overtly described in the text, but nevertheless implied by the organization of the routines motivating each story. Sanford & Garrod (1981) had individuals read short passages which either evoked a well defined scenario, such as a trial in court, or a more generic form of interaction (e.g. telling a lie). Appropriate scenario Title: In court Fred was being questioned (by a lawyer). He had been accused of murder. Target: The lawyer was trying to prove his innocence. Inappropriate scenario Title: Telling a lie Fred was being questioned (by a lawyer). He couldnt tell the truth. Target: The lawyer was trying to prove his innocence. They observed that target sentences referring to entities who would figure prominently in the appropriate well-defined scenario required less reading time precisely when cues suggesting that scenario were present. These findings suggest that situation specific knowledge including representations of characteristic roles, relations, settings, material objects, and so forth is accessed during the 8 comprehension of the texts utilized in these experiments. If titles such as, In court, and phrases such as ...accused of murder do indeed serve to activate something along the lines of a court trial frame, with pre-specified slots for legal counsel and defendants, we would expect references to components of that frame to exact a reduced processing cost relative to cases where a court trial frame was not cued. Likewise, if descriptions of habitual activities are encoded in long term memory as instantiations of generalized action schemas, then we would expect memory tests to yield intrusions and false recognition of actions specified by the underlying schema, but glossed over in the text. On the basis of arguments such as these, Sanford & Garrod conclude that reading (and perhaps language comprehension in general) fundamentally involves accessing applicable domains of stored knowledge and building a mental representation of the message encoded in the text by means of the structure which they provide. Coulson (2001) argues that the importance of underlying frames to comprehension is particularly apparent in the appreciation of joke. Consider the following example: The replacement player hit a home run with my Understanding this partially completed sentence requires that the reader integrate the information cued by the linguistic items with preexisting knowledge about baseball. To know that hit refers to forceful physical contact between a ball and a bat demands knowledge about typical practices and props involved in the game. Similarly, to know that a home run is a fortuitous event and that a replacement player is not a regular team member demands knowledge about rules governing how points are scored and teams, composed. In essence, then, the readers stored knowledge about baseball can be said to constitute a structured representation, or frame, on the basis of which he can draw inferences about how to conceptually model what is linguistically encoded in the sentence. Now consider the following joke completion: The replacement player hit a home run with my girl. 9 In this case, grasping the gist that the speakers girlfriend has cheated on or left him requires the reader to access an entirely different knowledge domain namely, that associated with romantic relationships. Significantly, though, this frame-shift from baseball to romance is accomplished by means of relational similarities between elements within each domain. Just as hitting a home run in baseball entails scoring points which increase the likelihood of winning the game, so hitting a home run in a new encounter involves positive interaction between two parties such that the likelihood of future encounters is increased. Likewise, just as a replacement player in the baseball frame temporarily takes the place of a regular team member, so the replacement player in the romance frame supplants the regular boyfriend. What is necessary to get this joke, then, is not only accessing the relevant knowledge domains, but also effecting a shift whereby initial presuppositions are reanalyzed and causal and relational mappings between distinct knowledge domains are drawn. Certainly, the notion that jokes involve the frustration of initial expectations and a shift between contrasting conceptual domains has been proposed in previous research (Norrick 1986, Kreitler, Drechsler, & Kreitler 1988). Koestler (1964) describes this shift in terms of the notion of bisociation: The pattern underlying both [funny] stories is the perceiving of a situation or idea...in two self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference... (p. 35) What Coulson raises with respect to this line of thinking is the possibility that the habitually incompatible frames of reference may not be so incompatible after all. In keeping with research by Kreitler et al, the shift in focus from baseball to romance may play an essential role in the perceived funniness of the joke. However, the joke is comprehensible precisely because the readers knowledge of these two topics is sufficiently similar in structure. Hitting a home run with a girl makes sense as a description of romantic success because our conceptualization of a play in baseball involves procedures (pitch, swing, run), contingencies (hit, fly, strike), and outcomes (score, out), which can be mapped metaphorically to what is conceptualized as regular in the early stages of a courtship (procedures associated with going on a first 10 date, the resulting impressions which one makes, the outcome of getting a second date or not, and so forth). Frames and Frame-shifting in Spontaneous Conversational Jokes When studying verbal humor as it is produced between two or more individuals, it is necessary not only to account for the mental processes which enable them to grasp what is funny in a linguistically encoded message, but also to account for the processes which enable them to infer the consequences of that message for the shape of the interaction in progress. Bateson (1972) formulated this problem in terms of the metacommunicative signals necessary for any type of animals engaged in play to understand the non-serious nature of their activity. The playful nip, he writes, denotes the bite, but it does not denote what would be denoted by the bite (p. 180). Goffman (1974) incorporates this idea of metacommunicative signaling into his use of the term key, which he defines as follows: I refer here to the set of conventions by which a given activity, one already meaningful in terms of some primary framework, is transformed into something patterned on this activity but seen by the participants to be something quite else (p.43). Here, primary frameworks can be understood as the information which an individual draws upon in order to make sense out of his subjective experience of events and to organize his own behavior in response. As an illustration, individuals are capable of co-constructing sustained collaborative activities, such as a game of checkers, in part because they share common background understandings of goals and procedures, of behaviors that should be construed as meaningful or ignored, of signals for opening and closing the activity, as well as for demarcating it form other concurrent activities, and so forth. However, it is also possible through keying to produce an activity which exhibits features of a checkers game, such as compliance with certain procedures and the use of certain material artifacts, but which is differently framed insofar as it is motivated by different goals and demarcated in different ways and hence associated with different patterns of regulated behavior 11 on the parts of both players and observers as in the case of a demonstration of a checkers game, or a contest, or a staged game occurring in a play. Frames in the sense of the term developed here (to be called interactive frames from here on) are similar in some regards to the concept of frames discussed in the previous section (to be called knowledge schemas from here on) even to the point of overlapping. For example, at least some of the knowledge which Goffman claims necessary to recognize a checkers game in progress such as knowledge of the procedures for playing would comprise essentially the same stored data structure which Artificial Intelligence research might describe as a checkers frame. However, interactive frames differ from knowledge schemas on the crucial point that they are fundamentally relational: they are brought to bear whenever a person enters into a relationship with another object, person, group, or event. Knowledge schemas, by contrast, reflect structure which is not contingent upon the presence of any external entity. An important implication of this distinction is that interactive frames are constituted not only by the background understanding which participants bring to the interaction, but also by the ways in which they regulate and tune their behavior (see Kendon 1990 for a discussion). In the checkers example, the participants shared recognition of the game derives not only from the kinds of knowledge described in the preceding paragraph, but also from the ways that they make visible to one another their compliance with this knowledge, as in the case of following a strict turn taking sequence and making only legal moves. For the remainder of this discussion, my goal is to demonstrate how the metalinguistic cues, or keys, which speakers use in order to signal a switch from serious to joking conversation also influence the course of conceptual processing relative to the content of the joke itself. In particular, it will be shown how pauses, eye gaze, and body orientation modulate the following kinds of conceptual work necessary to joke comprehension: 1) drawing correspondences between structurally analogous elements of distinct knowledge schemas 2) selecting contextually relevant mental representations of messages from a range of possibilities 12 The implications of these findings are two-fold. First, within the province of humor studies, they suggest a critical role for timing and orientation in the delivery of spontaneous jokes. Secondly, within the broader arena of language related research in general, they represent an attempt to integrate the methodologies applied in conversation analysis with theoretical developments within the field of cognitive linguistics. While conversation analysts have studied in considerable detail the organization of talk and interaction, relatively little attention has been devoted to the effects of such organization on the conceptual and linguistic processes mediating language comprehension. Of course, the difficulty of collecting on-line indices of such processes during spontaneous, natural conversation prohibits certain forms of investigation. However, with the present discussion I hope to demonstrate that building an ecologically valid theory of language comprehension requires the acknowledgement that such comprehension never transpires in a vacuum. In the context of face-to-face interaction, a range of extras-linguistic resources are available for facilitating communication, such as gesture, visible displays of directed attention, and the purposeful manipulation of material artifacts. Ultimately, accounting for how individuals alter each others mental representations through speaking entails accounting for how they have framed their encounter, and how they attribute meaning not only to the linguistic elements of their utterances, but also to the broad range of additional cues utilized in talk. Procedures Approximately three hours of natural conversation were recorded among individuals engaged in a range of collaborative activities (farm chores, chatting in the shade after cutting firewood, telling stories during a party). All participants gave informed consent to be videotaped. Humorous utterances were identified on the basis of listener reactions, such as laughter or facetious responses, and transcriptions were made of the strips of interaction in which these utterances were embedded. For the purposes of the present analysis, an attempt was made to include in the transcript the following three segments: the joke itself, the participants reactions to these 13 jokes, and the history of antecedent exchanges preceding the joke and extending back to the most recent topic shift. The excerpts below comprise two of the three instances of verbal jokes involving frame-shifts (in the sense of the term explicated by Coulson (2001)) observed in the data. Mosquito bites and horse bites Figure 1 theres these little gnats that have been ( 3) biting her again The following excerpt was recorded while Karen and her daughter, Angela, tend to their two horses, Kate and Koley. Karen has finished applying insect repellant lotion from squeezable bottle onto Koleys back, and is waiting while Angela brushes gnats away from the horses face. Kate is in the adjacent pasture. The point of central interest is lines 10 and 11, where Karen builds upon the syntactic structure of Angelas utterance in order to create a new unit with somewhat different semantic properties and implications. 14 Angela appears to have construed Karens addition in line 11 as a joke rather than an expression of bona fide concern: she echoes Karen (Except for Kate. Yeah.) with simultaneous overtones of laughter, rather than making any acknowledgement of the potentially problematic nature of this circumstance. What enables her to apprehend Karens statement as funny? The conceptual reanalysis triggered by Karens retrospective inclusion of Kate within the category of biters is certainly one relevant factor. In line 10 (There. nothing can bite you now.), Angelas use of bite seems to denote the specific kind of biting performed by parasitic insects that is the kind of biting which usually results in mild discomfort and superficial damage, which is performed for parasitic purposes, which often occurs without the recipients awareness, and so on. Furthermore, the scope of nothing does not seem intended to encompass all organisms capable of biting, but rather, seems delimited precisely to that class of 15 organisms which bite in the manner described above. Significantly, since there are no overt linguistic cues in her utterance suggesting this type of interpretation, it is necessary to consider the string of overlapping actions preceding line as the motivation for these intuitions. First, with respect to the material environment, both participants are engaged in purposeful activities at the outset of the segment: Angela is brushing away gnats (lines 1-8), and Karen is reading the label on the bottle of insect repellent (lines 5-11). Part of what enables one to identify these tasks as such is the participants visible displays of body orientation and directed attention: Karen is holding the bottle almost upright at chest height and has fixed her gaze on some location on its surface; Angelas body orientation shifts in synchrony with the horses head movements, allowing her to continually re-establish contact with the area around its eyes. Furthermore, both participants reveal through their talk something of their own construal of the purpose of their actions: Karen describes properties of the lotion which she presumably learned from the label (It even repels ticks (1) and mosquitoes); Angela states in lines 1-2 , We:ll theres these little gnats that have been (3) biting her. Im just wiping em off. In sum, then, simply attending to the situation of a speakers body within his immediate surround and to the content of his talk enables an observer or interlocuter to draw critical inferences about the focus of that persons activity and it is this kind of awareness which is proposed to constrain the interpretation of bite in line to an insect-specific representation. In addition to the observable activities in which Karen and Angela are engaged, a second way in which their prior interaction constrains the interpretation of line 10 is the conceptual activity which they index through their talk. In particular, the exchanges in lines 1-6 show that the two women have collaboratively delineated an ad hoc category (Barsalou 1986) of insects which are affected by the repellent. A few turns later, in line 10, the properties of biting associated with this specific class of entities are still likely to be more strongly activated by the term bite than other aspects of ones knowledge of biting; and hence, one would expect a bias for an insect-specific interpretation. In other words, it is being argued that through talk, Angela and Karen jointly establish a class of entities which share certain 16 features of relevance to the immediate situation and the process of doing so affects the kinds of semantic activation elicited by subsequent exchanges. Thus far, it has been shown how environmentally grounded, publicly visible activity, as well as conceptual activity indexed by talk, can serve as a context which biases interpretation. Given this assumption, understanding Karens remark in line 11 (except maybe Kate) entails a frame-shift whereby the scope of nothing must be expanded beyond the category of parasitic insects, and an insect-biased construal of bite is revised according to stored-knowledge about horse-instigated biting (e.g. a visible action executed by means of the jaws and teeth, manifesting aggression, and potentially inflicting harm). As suggested by empirical studies of authentic and modified jokes rated for degrees of funniness (Kreitler et al 1988), it is this unexpected shift from a contextually biased domain which affords her comment comic connotations. Yet, as argued at the outset of this paper, this conceptual shift and ultimately, the success of her joke is mediated not only by the incompatibility between horse- and insect-biased biting schemas, but also by physically perceivable cues which enable Karens comment to be construed as play. Of course, a variety of such cues can be identified, including elements of voice quality, posture, and facial expression which signal a calm emotional state in spite of the potentially troublesome nature of the situation to which she alludes. However, for present purposes, the analysis will focus on those cues which demarcate her comment as distinct from the immediately preceding activity. One example can be found in the temporal alignment between Karens articulation of line 11 and her subsequent removal of the insect repellant bottle from her primary field of vision an act which overtly signals a shift of attention away from the contents of its label. A second example can be found in her orientation to the participation framework established by Angelas preceding turn. Angela utters line 10 ( there. nothing can bite you now.) while leaning in towards Koley at eye level and tugging on the halter; her use of the second person pronoun as the object of bite implicates the horse as the addressee. By contrast, Karens attention seems to be focused on the insect repellant 17 bottle at the point of uttering line 11 (except maybe Kate), since she continues to hold it in front of her at an angle suitable for reading. Furthermore, she makes no attempt to integrate her body position or the formulation of her talk with the dyad- like framework which her daughter has established relative to the horse and through this course of action, the inference is made available that the goals and attitudes motivating her utterance of line 11 are discontinuous from those motivating Angelas utterance of line 10. A final example of information which signals discontinuous motivations is the one second pause separating lines 10 and 11. As can be seen in the transcript, the preceding talk (lines 6-9) comprises two pairs of short turns which are executed in rapid succession, interspersed by pauses of approximately 15 milliseconds or less. This tight temporal coordination can be argued to index the participants reciprocal attunement to the activity presently mediated by their talk. For example, Goodwin (1992) shows how syntactic and prosodic regularities associated with the production of assessments allows for sequential overlap between participants respective contributions. Consider the following example: Figure 2 there. nothing can bite you now 18 Dianne: Jeff made en asparagus pie it wz s : : so : goo:d Clacia: I love it. Goodwin (1992) argues that the presence of the intensifier and the noticeable lengthening of the sounds which comprise it enable Clacia to construe Diannes immediate talk as the opening of a collaborative assessment activity, and thus to produce her own evaluation of the same material even before Dianne has finished. This claim has important implications for the idea developed by Goffman (1963) that in certain forms of interaction (or face engagement) participants join each other openly in maintaining a single focus of cognitive and visual attention what is sensed as a single mutual activity, entailing preferential communication rights (p. 89). In Goodwins (1992) example, the single focus of cognitive...attention, or the shared sense of a single mutual activity is proposed to be the assessment of asparagus pie and evidence that this sense of shared focus or mutual activity genuinely is shared is proposed to be found in the overlap between Dianne and Clacias utterances. Clacia is able to express her own evaluation with respect to the topic early because she knows that Diannes talk is directed toward a similar purpose. With respect to Angela and Karen, it appears that their rapid succession of turns in lines 6-10 signals a similar sense of shared understanding with respect to the primary focus or foci (in Goffmans sense of the term) of their talk. Furthermore, the pause before line 11 is proposed to signal a disintegration of this joint attunement. Insofar as Karen is no longer concerned with addressing Koleys vulnerability to insect bites, but is attempting to make a joke, a new mutual activity is being introduced and must be accommodated to by Angela. Thus far, the discussion has sought to show how subtle elements of speakers behavior during focused encounters can suggest a shift in how their interaction is to be framed, or construed. In the present case, these elements include Karens coordination of her utterance with actions which signal the coda of a previously 19 relevant activity, her maintainence of physical distance from the object of Angelas visual attention (i.e. Koley), and her creation of temporal distance between her current turn in progress and the immediately antecedent talk. Clearly, sensitivity to cues such as these is important for Angelas ability to know that their talk has shifted to a form of play which, though coherent with their earlier exchanges, is no longer seriously directed toward the collaborative resolution of a problem and which therefore, warrants a certain kind of appropriate response (laughter as opposed to concern). However, as argued at the outset of this discussion, these cues also facilitate the conceptualization processes necessary to get Karens joke. Her pause before uttering line 11, for example, allows for decay of the insect-biased construal of bite conjectured to be activated in line 10 and in this way, the likelihood of this construal of being re-analyzed in a manner consonant with Karens joke is increased. Furthermore, sensitivity to cues which signal a new trajectory of focus is proposed to result in a re-allocation of cognitive resources from maintaining attunement with the current activity to framing the parameters of the new one. Again, this proposed re- allocation of resources is likely to result in the decay of conceptual models elicited by just prior talk, and hence increase the likelihood of a new construal at the opportunity for re-analysis introduced at line 11. Turkey Legs This segment was recorded during a visit from John to his friend, Lucy. In lines 5-6, the apparent focus of their conversation changes course from crab bait to the effectuation of a jibe about Lucys legs. In a manner similar to the horse biting joke, Johns remark in line 5 echoes the syntactic structure of Lucys preceding utterance, though intending a different sense of what it means to have turkey legs. John makes these communicative intentions visible by consistently directing his gaze towards Lucys legs until she produces overt signs of having accomplished the desired re-analysis (Are you talking about my legs?). 20 Figure 3 well I kn ow you have turkey legs 21 The conceptual work mediating this re-analysis is another example of frame- shifting. Building a mental model of the situation described in Lucys statement (but I have turkey legs) presumably involves access to stored knowledge about features of turkey legs which make them suitable as crab bait (e.g. edible, small enough to fit in the trap, readily available, and so forth). Given this kind of information, one is likely to infer that Lucy is using the phrase turkey legs to refer to a specific portion of turkey meat and bone typically purchased in the grocery store and processed by a butcher from the original legs of live turkeys. Furthermore, to have turkey legs in this context is likely to be interpreted in the sense of alienable possession one assumes that they are somewhere accessible to Lucy, but not necessarily present on her person. On the other hand, grasping the alternative meaning suggested in Joes response ( well I know you have turkey legs) demands that have be attributed a sense of inalienable possession and that turkey legs be treated as a descriptive reference to Lucys legs. By analogy to the baseball joke analyzed earlier, the negative connotations implicit in this remark emerge from relational mappings between the two contrasting knowledge schemas made available in this exchange. One must know, for example, which parts of the butchered meat product correspond to the ankle, shin, and thigh regions of a human leg; which parts correspond to flesh and which, to bone; and so forth. Through the process of conceptual integration (Fauconnier & Turner 1998, 2002), it is possible to imaginatively represent a human leg with soft tissue distributed in a manner resembling a turkey leg. 22 Yet, this blended representation does not appear to be available to Lucy until line 7, when she is visibly smiling after Joe has erupted in laughter. Her aborted question (what dyou use fer- ) in line 6 suggests that before this point, she treats the entire strip of interaction as a conversation devoted primarily to crab bait. Since, presumably, her question was intended to ask about Joes crab catching practices, this utterance is in keeping with the topic of their earlier exchanges. Furthermore, her choice of lexical items and syntactic structure parallels that of Joes question in line 1, and she turns to face him before speaking in much the same manner as in lines 2 and 4. In sum then, her conceptual, linguistic, and physical orientation is coherent with patterns established during earlier turns as they first began discussing the issue. By contrast, insofar as line 5 constitutes a reference to Lucys legs with playfully negative connotations, Joe has introduced an abrupt change in both the topic and desired outcome of their conversation. In keeping with this new trajectory, he also produces changes in facial expression and gaze orientation much of which appears directed toward effecting this shift in their joint understanding of the focus of their talk (i.e. poking fun at her rather than discussing crab bait). At the end of his turn in line 5, for example, Joe assumes and maintains a persistent grin until Lucy has gotten the joke. Furthermore, in line four, after she states, But I have turkey legs, Joes gaze shifts from Lucys face to her legs and remains fixed there throughout line 5. Also, in the three second silence between lines 5 and 6, he saccades from Lucys eye level (she is just in the process of turning to face him) to her legs; and then, once they establish eye contact as she begins to articulate line 6 (figure 4), Joe initiates a second saccade, which Lucy follows with her own gaze (figure 5), resulting in a coordinated shift of joint attention to her legs. 1 J: wha dyou use fer bait? 6 L: what dyou use fer- 23 24 It is this shift in attention which enables Lucy to grasp the discontinuity between Joes comment and their preceding talk. Her subsequent response after looking up (are you talking about my legs?) indicates that at this point, she has accomplished the targeted semantic reanalysis; the smile which emerges as Joe and the investigator burst out laughing, as well as the heightened displays of joint attunement which follow (e.g. periods of prolonged face-to-face orientation (lines 7- 10) and overlapping turns (lines 9-10) both indicate that she has reframe their previously earnest talk as a form of play. Given this pattern of behaviors, it becomes clear that shifting the focus of their activity from discussing crab bait to making jokes is a collaborative process mediated, in this case, by the participants mutual awareness of their partners gaze and orientation. At the outset of the transcript, bouts of mutual orientation when both participants face each other and secure eye contact (lines 2 & 4) are interspersed with instances when they do not face each other and appear to be fixating on indeterminate loci in anterior space (lines 1 & 3). By contrast, in line 6, Joe establishes eye contact with Lucy, and then while still facing her, saccades to her legs. In other words, he visibly displays that he is redirecting his attention and it is the contrast between this focused display of redirected attention with his previous pattern of alternating face attunement and disengagement which is proposed to constitute a sufficiently significant cue to Lucy that she terminates her utterance midway through and re-channels her gaze along the path of his saccade. Thus, her ability to follow the new course of conversation which Joe introduces with the conceptual content of line 5 depends critically on her sensitivity to cues that his focus of attention has changed. Furthermore, this sensitivity is not only important to understanding changes in the trajectory of their activity; it is also crucial in enabling her to perform the conceptual work necessary to getting Joes joke. Understanding the object of his gaze to be her own legs enables her to draw the cross-domain mappings between the representation of turkey legs elicited by her utterance in line 4 and a representation of human legs in order to arrive at the blended representation implied in Joes use of the term. 25 Conclusion Sanford and Garrod (1981) sought to demonstrate the role of knowledge schemas in language comprehension by testing the amount of time subjects required to read scenarios preceded by titles designed to activate such hypothesized schemas. The goal of the present study has been to show how in spontaneous, every day conversation, physically perceivable cues which participants produce in order to demonstrate their orientation to a particular activity in progress may modulate language comprehension in a manner similar to the titles in Sanford and Garrods (1981) laboratory based reading experiment. In Karen and Angelas exchange, for example, the individual actions which comprise the collaborative activity of grooming Koley, including wiping away gnats, applying, insect repellent, discussing its insect repellent, and reading the label on the bottle, are all proposed to bias listeners to an insect-specific mental representation of the action of biting. It is also argued that in addition to biasing semantic construal, information which indicates a shift in the shared focus of an activity also facilitates the complex reanalysis processes necessary for joke comprehension. In Karens case, the temporal and spatial distance (relative to the immediately preceding talk) associated with her utterance of the phrase, Except for Kate, are argued to signal the possibility of a decrease in her attunement to the focus of the current talk in progress and hence the potential for the introduction of a new trajectory. At the same time, these cues are also hypothesized to promote the decay of the mental representation activated by Angelas use of the term bite, and thus to increase the likelihood of new, horse- rather than insect-biased construal of the term being activated by Karens joke. Similarly, in the turkey legs example, Joes visible shift of gaze is argued both to prompt the understanding that the focus of their conversation has changed, but also to enable Lucy to revise her conceptualization of the referent of the phrase, turkey legs. 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