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Emotion Review
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DOI: 10.1177/1754073910374670
2010 2: 383 Emotion Review
Carroll E. Izard
More Meanings and More Questions for the term ''Emotion''

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Emotion Review
Vol. 2, No. 4 (October 2010) 383385

2010 SAGE Publications and

The International Society
for Research on Emotion
ISSN 1754-0739
DOI: 10.1177/1754073910374670
er.sagepub.com
More Meanings and More Questions for the
term Emotion
Carroll E. Izard
Department of Psychology, University of Delaware, USA
Abstract
I am very appreciative of those who wrote comments on my article. They
raised some interesting and some quite challenging questions. Their responses
seem quite in synchrony with my focus and intentto reveal some problems
that we need to address in advancing emotion science. The authors of the
commentaries reflected some of the same sort of differences among them-
selves as I found among the emotion scientists whom I surveyed in search
of a definition of emotion. Like the emotion scientists who responded to my
survey, most of the authors of the commentaries were generally in agreement
on the significance of research in the emotion domain but not in agreement
on the meaning of the term emotion. I briefly discuss the noteworthy ques-
tion (raised in one of the commentaries) as to whether and when discrete
emotion concepts might someday share the same fate as the general term
emotion and disappear from emotion science.
Keywords
distinguished scientists, emotion, interactive processes, operational definition
I interpreted my data (mostly from psychological scientists) on
the meaning of the term emotion as justifying the inference that
at best its usefulness in science is doubtful. I also suggested that
it is potentially confusing, perhaps particularly so for students
and lay readers, when the term emotion is not followed by an
operational definition.
I think Widen and Russell (2010) went straight to the heart
of the issue I intended to address in The Many Meanings/
Aspects of Emotion (Izard, 2010)the status of the term
emotion in scientific research. I agree that the term emotion may
have a fate in psychological science similar to the term constel-
lation in the science of astronomy. In contemporary astronomy
constellation no longer refers to a beautiful pattern of bright stars
(as in common parlance) but to a segment of the celestial sphere.
I am less sanguine (though not entirely in an inflexible state
of total disbelief) about Widen and Russells conclusion that
discrete emotions identified by English words such as joy, sad-
ness, anger, and fear will have a similar fate in emotion science
as the term emotion. My view in regard to the scientific usefulness
of discrete emotion concepts stems in part from the relatively
long history of my work with these constructs, and in part by
the proposition that they can be operationally defined or at least
delimited for conducting experiments. However, my position is
also influenced by the current and ongoing research of many
other emotion scientists and by results of recent discrete
emotions-based intervention research that I will describe later.
If Widen and Russell (2010) are correct in proposing that
discrete emotion terms will someday lose their status as scien-
tific concepts, I think it will be a relatively long time from now.
For discrete emotion terms to lose their standing as useful con-
cepts in scientific research, theorists and researchers will have
to develop effective ways to conduct experiments on the moti-
vational processes that I and many other emotion scientists
assume are represented in concepts like interest, joy, sadness,
anger, and fear.
In the other commentaries, several of the authors correctly
noted some limitations of my empirical data, particularly with
respect to my sample of respondents. I deliberately chose a
sample of distinguished scientists rather than a random or more
broadly representative sample, because the purpose of my
survey was to see how the term emotion would be defined by
prominent researchers who have contributed to the literature on
emotions. The commentaries also add interesting insights and
suggestions related to the topic of the target article.
The array of disparate definitions of emotion led Zachar
(2010) to make an interesting suggestion of a similarity in the
potentially imminent dissolution of the term emotion and the
relatively recent dissolution of the term gene in biological
sciences. However, I have difficulty in seeing what Zachar
assumed to be a similarity of my position and that of B. F. Skinner
(1953) regarding the term emotion. I assumed that my survey of
scientists on the meanings of the term emotion could potentially
have a positive impact on the field. I see Skinners position as
having had the opposite effect, though I am aware that I am
subject to positive bias in interpreting remarks on the importance
Corresponding author: Carroll E. Izard, Department of Psychology, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, USA. Email: izard@psych.udel.edu
Author Reply
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384 Emotion Review Vol. 2 No. 4
of the study of emotions. In any case, I see Skinner as the
towering strength of mid-20th century behaviorism and a capa-
ble and effective advocate for making psychology a science. Yet
I also see Skinner as one whose work probably delayed the
evolution of emotion science. (For an extensive elaboration of
this point, see Panksepp, 2010.)
Landreth (2010) is correct in noting that I did not report data
to support my conclusion regarding the possible confusion and
costs created by current use to the term emotion. That was
indeed an inference based on the data that the emotion scientists
provided. An attempt to assess the cost might prove a useful
undertaking.
In commenting on the relatively strong agreement among
the participating scientists on the structures and functions of
emotion, Landreth correctly noted that such agreement does not
provide a conventional definition of the term emotion. I reso-
nate with Landreths observation that the scientists agreement
on emotion structures and functions should facilitate the growth
of a meaningful body of empirical research on these assumed
aspects of emotion. Yet I still think that the noun emotion
remains problematic when it is not qualified or followed by an
operational definition.
In regard to questions about research design raised by White
(2010), I have already noted the limitations and reasons for my
sampling procedure and acknowledged that it is clearly not
representative of all who study and write about aspects of emo-
tion. I deliberately chose to ascertain the thinking of a group of
distinguished scientists who had done emotion-related research.
This choice of emotion scientists as participants in my study
and my focus on implications of the findings for emotion sci-
ence does not seem compatible with the view taken by White
that my article is in the tradition of auto ethnography or folk
psychology (cf. Widen & Russell, 2010).
Gendron (2010) correctly observed that the problem of
defining emotion has a long history. I also agree with her that
the finding of considerable agreement among emotion scientists
on the structures and functions of emotions may be sufficient to
foster and help guide a continuation of the rapid rate of research
on various aspects of emotions. I also expect to see increasing
attention to the idea that emotions and cognition are highly
interactive and very often (though in my view not always)
inseparable (Izard, Krauthamer-Ewing, Woodburn, Finlon, &
Rosen, 2009).
Perhaps most of my differences with Wierzbicka stem from
our different goals. Her concern seems focused on an ordinary
English-language definition of the word emotion whereas my
concern was with its scientific definition. The difference
between these two types of definition is similar to the distinc-
tion between descriptive (folk language) and prescriptive
(scientific) definitions as drawn by Widen and Russell (2010).
I agree with Wierzbicka (2010) that it is possible to give the
term emotion an operational definition and I advocated such a
step in my article. However, operational definitions can vary
widely and they do not constitute a general definition.
The definitional model that Wierzbicka offered in her com-
mentary will be considered by some scientists as one that does
not qualify as an operational definition. Yet I found aspects of
her definition interesting. Her definitional model begins with
thinking. I consider cognition as perhaps the most frequently
occurring component in emotion activation processes in
humans. However, cognition is by no means the only activator
of emotions, and it is of highly limited utility in studying human
infants and nonhuman animals. Emotions can be activated by at
least four different multi-aspect systems or processes, including
some that begin with physiological activities that also work in
prelingual infants and nonhuman animals (Izard, 1993).
Wierzbickas implication of the efficacy of cognition alone
as an activator of emotions may be compromised by findings
from neuroscientists showing that emotion and cognition inter-
act virtually continuously (Lewis, 2005; Pessoa, 2008; Phelps,
2006). The idea of emotion or affect influencing cognition fre-
quently (if not continuously) dates back to Plato and Aristotle
and was clearly evident in the thinking of 17th-century philoso-
phers (cf. Izard, 2007; Langer, 1967). Theory and evidence
strongly suggest that although Wierzbickas model for emotion
activation may be an effective one, neither it nor any other
lock-step formulaic model can explain all instances of emotion
activation (Izard, 1993).
Wierzbickas critique of discrete emotions theory and her
proposal that emotion feelings are nondiscrete are controver-
sial. There is a large and growing body of empirical literature
ranging from neuroscience to social and clinical science that
focuses on constructs like, joy, sadness, anger, disgust, and fear,
and in recent years empirical research on the emotion of interest
has grown rapidly (Silvia, 2006). Also, she may have conflated
the perception of a feeling and its motivational effects on cogni-
tion (and action) with the meaning of words and the conceptu-
alization processes that she apparently conceives as the ultimate
source of motivation. Her position stands in stark contrast to
that epitomized by Tomkins (1962) axiom: cognition without
emotion is impotent, emotion without cognition is blind.
The recent findings of neuroscientists on the interaction of
emotion and cognition as reviewed by Pessoa (2008) place
some limitations on the veracity of Tomkins clever observa-
tion. Yet evidence of the efficacy of emotions to influence
cognition and behavior in a wide variety of situations continues
to mount. In a recent example, Harris (2010) found that disgust
can direct social cognition that leads to dehumanized perception
and subsequent disgust reactions to social outcasts.
1
In contrast to implications in Wierzbickas critique, I have
high respect for the importance of language in emotions and
emotion-related processes. We have recently employed an
emotion-based intervention to increase economically disadvan-
taged young childrens emotion knowledgeunderstanding of
the experiences/feelings, expressions, and functions of emo-
tions. We found that increases in young childrens ability to label
(or name) discrete emotion expressions, and to demonstrate
some understanding of the functions of a few frequently experi-
enced emotions, predicted increases in objective measures
of their social and emotion-related skills and in teachers ratings
of their academic competence (Trentacosta & Izard, 2007).
These data showed that at the psychological (and linguistic)
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Izard Reply to Commentaries 385
level children learn to discriminate among emotions. Moreover,
learning to distinguish among and correctly name or label
joy, sadness, anger, and fear expressions had functional utility
in facilitating the development of emotion regulation and
self-control (Izard et al., 2008).
That even rat and mouse brains are wired for empathy
(Grenier & Lthi, 2010) as demonstrated in bodily response
(freezing on viewing the freezing or fear response in another
member of the species) suggests that responses that assum-
edly involve feelings can be transmitted to other members of
the species and remain functional without the benefit of lan-
guage. This finding and many others (e.g., Mineka & Ohman,
2002) on observational learning (based on perception of
anothers discrete emotion response) appear inconsistent with
Wierzbickas (2010) claim that what is discrete is merely the
meaning of words.
Though emotion language per se has not been a dominant
feature in my theory and research, social communication via
discrete emotion expressions has been an influence. The
research showing empathic responses in nonhuman models
strongly suggests that perception of the fear expression of a
friend or loved one as an alert or a signal of potential danger
is not, as Wierzbicka claims, always based on categories of
modern English language. It is more likely based on the brain
and body processes similar to those in a mouse that freezes
on viewing the freezing response in a conspecific (Grenier &
Lthi, 2010).
Conclusion
The problem discussed in the target article and commentaries is
not that the term emotion has no meaning. The problem is that
emotion has many rather disparate and often unspecified mean-
ings. Furthermore, there is little agreement that any of them
provides the guiding light for further understanding and future
research. Yet this predicament apparently has little or no effect
on the rapidly growing body of interesting research on emo-
tions. It may remain for a future generation of researchers to
achieve perspective on the quality and impact of emotion
research, over the past 40 years and in current times, that used
the unqualified noun emotion in the absence of an operational
definition of the term. Hopefully it will happen sooner.
Note
1 Disgust in this context is more a learned mental/psychological
phenomenon than simply a sensory reaction to putrid matter.
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