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Workers, Firms, and the Dominant Ideology: Hegemony and Consciousness in the Monopoly

Core
Author(s): Steven Peter Vallas
Source: The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 61-83
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WORKERS, FIRMS,
AND
THE DOMINANT IDEOLOGY:
Hegemony
and Consciousness
in the
Monopoly
Core
Steven Peter Vallas*
Georgia
Institute of
Technology
Theorists of work and class relations have
argued
that
organizational processes
within
the
monopoly
'core' induce
employees
to
identify
with the firm and consent to the
social relations of
production.
The
adequacy
of this
'hegemony'
thesis is evaluated
using
data from two Bell
operating companies,
whose workers hold
relatively high-
paying primary
sector
jobs
and are
exposed
to a
strong corporate
culture.
Although
these factors should favor the thesis of
managerial hegemony,
the data
provide only
limited
support.
In
fact,
an
oppositional
consciousness is
fairly
common
among
the
workers,
but with marked variations between
occupational groups.
The data indicate
that
hegemony theory
inflates the role of
ideological
mechanisms in the
reproduction
of
managerial
control and underestimates workers'
capacity
to form a critical con-
sciousness of the
employment relationship.
Worker consent should be viewed as
prob-
lematic-that
is,
as
exceptional, occurring only
under
specific
social and
organiza-
tional conditions.
INTRODUCTION
In recent decades industrial
sociologists
have
spent
much time
seeking
to
identify
the
social mechanisms that
underpin managerial
control over the
production process.
Labor
process
theorists
argue
that shifts in the distribution of technical
knowledge
maintain the
subordination of
labor.1
Other theorists
emphasize ideological
influences within the
firm,
contending
that
organizational processes
within the
monopoly
'core' induce workers to
take the
existing authority
structure for
granted.
Some attribute
management's ideological
hegemony
to internal labor
markets,
which foster individualistic career orientations
(see
Edwards
1975, 1979;
Offe
1974;
Cornfield
1987). Workplace games
and
rituals,
others
suggest,
foster a culture of
adaptation
on the
shop
floor,
inducing
workers to
participate
in
and
implicitly
consent to their own
exploitation (see especially Burawoy
1979, 1985).
In
any case,
advocates of the
hegemony
thesis characterize
monopoly
core firms as
ideologi-
cal terrains
primarily management
dominated.
*Direct
all
correspondence
to: Steven Peter
Vallas, Department
of
History, Technology,
and
Society, Georgia
Institute of
Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332.
The
Sociological Quarterly, Volume 32, Number 1, pages 61-83.
Copyright
C
1991 by JAI Press, Inc.
All
rights of
reproduction in any form reserved.
ISSN: 0038-0253.
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62
THE SOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
Vol. 32/No. 1/1991
Although
the
hegemony
thesis resonates with
long-standing images
of the modem
corporation,
from
Whyte (1941)
to Kanter
(1977),
there have been few direct evaluations
of its claims. This article will evaluate the
expectations
of
hegemony theory using
inter-
view and
survey
data from a case
study
of two Bell
operating companies
in the North-
eastern U.S.
(see
Vallas
1987, 1988).
As these firms manifest
many
essential features of
primary
sector firms
(high wages,
stable
employment patterns,
internal labor
markets,
and
a
strong corporate culture), they
afford a reasonable test of
hegemony theory's
claims.
After a critical review of the
hegemony
thesis and
drawing
on both
in-depth
interviews
and
surveys
of Bell workers in New
Jersey
and New
York,
findings presented
here raise
important questions
about the
theory's validity. Contrary
to its
claims,
many
if not most
workers manifest an acute awareness of the conflictual character of the
manage-
ment/worker
relationship
and a
distinctly oppositional
consciousness.
Moreover,
workers'
consciousness cannot be viewed in terms of a
single overarching ideological tendency,
for
clear and consistent
occupational
differences
emerge
in workers'
responsiveness
to mana-
gerial ideology.
The
study
shows that
although hegemony theory represents
an advance
over models based
purely
on the labor
process,
it inflates the role of
ideological
influences
in the
reproduction
of
managerial
control.
THE DOMINANT IDEOLOGY AT WORK
Hegemony theory
traces its
lineage
to Marx and
Engels'
The German
Ideology, parts
of
which stress the
power
of
ruling
ideas in
maintaining
the subordination of the lower
classes
(see
Marx and
Engels 1969,
pp. 57-67). Developing
this
reasoning
two
genera-
tions
later,
Antonio Gramsci
(1971)
theorized that the defeat of the workers' movements
after World War I was due to socialist
parties'
failure to
challenge
the moral and cultural
dominance of the
bourgeoisie (see
Anderson
1976).
With the rise of fascism and the
stabilization of the Western
capitalist nations,
members of the
Frankfurt School bemoaned
the
growing strength
of
bourgeois rationality,
which
they
felt had
spread
into
every
corner
of
society.2
None of these formulations of
hegemony theory emphasizes
the direct role of the
commodity production process.
In recent
years, however,
students of work have "indus-
trialized" the
theory,
in effect
rooting
the
production
of
working
class consent within the
labor
process
itself. Thus while Marx believed that
commodity production processes
would nurture a
challenge
to the
ideology
of the dominant
class,
recent theorists of
managerial hegemony
invert this
prediction, arguing
that the social relations of
production
help explain
the failure of the workers' movements in the advanced
capitalist
world
(Burawoy 1979,
pp. 29-30; 1985). They
hold that the
organization
of
production
within
monopoly
core firms secretes an
ideology
that
effectively prevents
workers from
develop-
ing
class consciousness and binds them to the status
quo.
Edwards's discussion of bureaucratic control
(1979,
ch.
8)
and
Burawoy's (1979, 1985)
theory
of
working
class consent offer two of the most
important
formulations of the
theory
(see also Offe 1974; Joyce 1980; Cornfield 1987). Edwards
recognizes
the coexistence of
multiple systems
of control within
contemporary capitalism,
some of which
originated
during
earlier historical
periods. However, he holds that a new
system
of control
specific
to the
monopoly
core has evolved. This bureaucratic control
system
rests on two
proper-
ties of core firms: formalization of
managerial authority
and
proliferation
of internal labor
markets (cf. Kalleberg
and Sorensen 1979; Kalleberg
and
Berg 1987). Edwards views the
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Workers, Firms,
and the Dominant
Ideology
63
latter as
pivotal,
for it fosters an individualistic career orientation
among
workers that
virtually
dissolves
solidarity among
their ranks.
Simply put,
bureaucratic control encour-
ages
workers to
identify
more
closely
with the
firm
than with their social class: "workers
begin
to use the first
person plural differently:
'we' now means 'we the
firm,'
not 'we the
workers' "
(Edwards 1979,
p. 148).
Edwards is careful to
suggest
that the
precise workings
of bureaucratic control
vary
at
different
organizational
levels
(1979,
pp. 147-152). However,
he believes that
key
to its
effectiveness are the
ideological
constraints it
imposes
on
virtually
all
monopoly
core
workers:
"[T]he
new
system [has]
transcended its white collar
origins"
and now encom-
passes
both manual and mental
employees
within the
monopoly capitalist
firm
(Edwards
1979,
p. 132).
Burawoy presents
a somewhat different but
parallel conception
of
managerial
hegemony.
His
early
work asked
why
"notions of
exploitation
and
unpaid
labor are even
more removed from
everyday
life on the
shop
floor
today
than
they
were in Marx's time"
(1979, p. 29)
and concluded that the
political economy
of
contemporary capitalism-later
termed the nature of
"factory
regimes"--has
fundamentally changed. Owing
to increased
state intervention in the
capitalist economy (including
the rise of the welfare
state),
the
emergence
of
monopoly corporations,
as well as
legal
constraints on accumulation
pro-
cesses,
managerial
control no
longer
rests
purely
on coercion but instead stresses worker
consent
(Burawoy 1985,
p. 126).
For
Burawoy,
the
despotic regimes
of
competitive
capitalism
have
given way
to
hegemonic regimes
that elicit workers' consent to their own
exploitation.
Burawoy's
most
developed
account of
hegemonic regimes
is
Manufacturing
Consent,
a
qualitative study
of a machine tool
shop Roy (1952)
studied a
generation
before.
Although
workers'
jobs
were tedious and
physically demanding, management
made
remarkably
few
direct efforts to control their
performance:
Control was exercised
indirectly, through
a
piece-rate payment system affording
considerable discretion over one's work
pace.
This
combination of
occupational conditions-meaningless tasks,
coupled
with freedom from
direct
control-encouraged
workers to define their work as a
game, infusing meaning
and
drama into an otherwise onerous situation. Workers able to "make out"-to earn
good
wages
even when
paid
low
rates-publicly displayed
an
ability
to master the
system
of
work and thus
gained standing among
their
peers.
While the
game
of
"making
out"
enabled workers to survive their
working days, Burawoy
finds that it induced them to take
its
underlying
rules for
granted
and
actively
collude in their own
exploitation.
There are
important
differences between these two variants of
hegemony theory.
For
example,
Edwards stresses the formal
properties
of the modem
corporation,
while Bur-
awoy points
to informal social
processes
as critical to
managerial hegemony.
In
addition,
Edwards believes that
monopoly
core
layoffs (as during periods
of
austerity) engender
worker
disillusionment,
weakening
bureaucratic control.
Burawoy, by contrast,
believes
that
managerial hegemony persists
even under adverse economic
conditions,
enabling
employers
to demand concessions in the name of the firm's
well-being.
While these
differences are
important, they
should not be overstated. Both theorists hold that
ideologi-
cal mechanisms are critical to
monopoly
core
managerial
control and that
employers
dominate workers' consciousness.
A number of criticisms can be made of the
hegemony
thesis. Some theorists and
researchers
question
its
validity, arguing
that consensual views of the social order
(whether Marxist or functionalist in
character) exaggerate
elites'
ability
to
impose
values
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64
THE SOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
Vol. 32/No. 1/1991
on subordinate
groups
and classes.
They argue
that
although
subordinates' weakness is
often attributed to cultural and
ideological forces,
it
may actually
reflect
economic,
political,
and
organizational
conditions rather than
any hegemonic ideology
or value
consensus as such
(Abercrombie, Hill,
and
Turner
1980;
Scott
1986;
Vanneman and
Cannon
1987; Wellman
1988).
Recent studies of social and
political
consciousness in the U.S. at least
partially support
this criticism
(see
Hamilton
1968;
Huber and Form
1973;
Jackman and Jackman
1983;
Vanneman and Cannon
1987;
Plutzer
1987). Using varying
constructs and
measures,
these
studies
suggest
that members of subordinate classes have not
uncritically
embraced the
tenets of the dominant
ideology; rather,
they regard
its
premises
with
great skepticism.
Thus Huber and Form
(1973, p. 10)
find that while members of
privileged
classes com-
monly
"believe that both the normative and
empirical
statements in the dominant
ideology
are
true,"
most of the lower classes do not
(cf.
Jackman and Jackman
1983).
This
implies
much
greater
class differences in values and attitudes than
hegemony
theorists allow.
The latter studies use much broader
populations
than
hegemony
theorists
intend,
how-
ever,
and
operate
at some distance from concrete
workplace
relations. Yet two studies that
do examine attitudes toward
management
within the
monopoly
'core' also stands at odds
with the
hegemony
thesis
(Hodson
and Sullivan
1985;
Halle
1984).
Hodson and Sullivan's
study
of Wisconsin workers finds commitment to the firm
actually
lower in
nationally-
based firms
(where
internal labor markets are most well
developed)
than in
smaller,
peripheral companies. Similarly,
Halle's
study
of chemical workers in New
Jersey
un-
earths a culture of muted defiance rather than of consent: workers
sharply
criticized
management's
behavior on health and
safety
issues and used their
informally-generated
technical
knowledge
to limit or resist
managerial authority.
More
important, they
com-
monly spoke
of inherent conflict between the
propertied
classes and "the
working
man,"
suggesting
an
oppositional
consciousness not
easily squared
with the
hegemony
thesis.
Like labor
process
theorists before
them,
hegemony
theorists
may
have
exaggerated
or
reified
management's ability
to dominate workers' lives.
A further
potential
weakness in the
theory
stems from its
tendency
to characterize core
firm workers' consciousness in terms of a
single,
uniform
pattern.
As does the literature
on economic
segmentation
and industrial
dualism,
hegemony theory ignores
within-firm
occupational
divisions. Yet a number of studies
suggest
that such divisions
produce
salient
ideological
differences
among
workers. Friedman
(1977, 1990)
shows that the
core/pe-
riphery
distinction
applies
to workers within
particular
firms,
generating
distinct
ideologi-
cal inclinations
among
workers
subject
to
differing occupational
conditions.
Likewise,
Crompton
and Jones
(1984),
Parcel and Sickmeier
(1988),
and Kaufman and
colleagues
(1988)
find
sharp occupational
variations in both work situations and attitudes within
firms. If these studies
generalize
to core firms more
broadly,
then the
question
is which
occupational groups
exhibit
greater responsiveness
to
managerial ideology
and
why.
RESEARCH STRATEGY
This research
grows
out of a
larger study
of work and
power
in the communications
industry, historically
the
privileged
domain of AT&T (see Vallas
forthcoming).
In certain
respects,
this
industry provides
an
appropriate
terrain for the
purposes
at hand. First,
despite
the AT&T
break-up,
this
industry's
workers
enjoy highly
favorable
wages,
bene-
fits, and other conditions of
employment
that
epitomize primary segment employment.3
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Workers, Firms,
and the Dominant
Ideology
65
Second,
Bell workers have
historically
known a
strong corporate
culture that seeks to
foster commitment to the firm.
Indeed,
during
the first half of this
century
AT&T
spawned
a
paternalistic
work
regime,
based on a
system
of
company unions,
intended to transmit
managerial
values to its
workforce.4
Moreover,
seeking
to enlist workers as
public repre-
sentatives of the firm's
good will,
Bell
companies
have
long supported employees'
in-
volvements in a host of
community
service
efforts,
involving groups
such as the
Telephone
Pioneers of America and the United
Way (see
Greenwald
1980,
p. 229). Finally,
Bell
companies
and AT&T have
recently sought
to cultivate harmonious
relationships
with
their workers
by establishing
a
widespread
network of
Quality
of Work Life teams
(see
Hechscher
1989;
cf. Grenier
1988).
Bell
companies
thus
present
most of this charac-
teristics that theorists view as
constituting managerial hegemony.
In
fact,
hegemony
theorists often
point
to AT&T as a firm that illustrates the
very processes they
have in mind
(e.g.,
see Edwards
1979;
Cornfield
1987;
Batten and Schoonmaker
1987).
In other
respects,
this
study's
reliance on the case
study design
limits the
type
of
analysis possible. Ideally,
an
empirical
test of the
hegemony
thesis could
compare
work-
ers' attitudes across core and
peripheral
firms. Inasmuch as the data are limited to
monop-
oly
core
workers,
such a
comparison obviously
cannot be made. An alternative
strategy,
adopted here, however,
explores
the
degree
to which workers'
conceptions
of
wage
labor
conform to the
'hegemonic'
model as such.
Bell
operating companies' occupational composition
is
fairly heterogeneous,
encom-
passing
a
variety
of both white- and blue-collar
jobs.
Most of the latter fall into two
occupational categories:
central
office craftworkers,
who test and
repair
electronic switch-
ing systems;
and outside
craftworkers,
charged
with
installing
and
maintaining
the
trunks,
cables,
and
loops
that link the various
system parts together.
White-collar workers are of
three
major types:
clerical
workers,
who
input, process,
or transmit information about
subscriber accounts or the
system's functioning;
customer service
representatives ("reps"),
who
process
subscriber orders and
accounts;
and
operators,
who
provide
either
directory
or
call-completion
assistance.
Despite
affirmative action
programs
and consent
decrees,
employment
is
sharply sex-segregated:
more than 90% of all
operators
are
female,
while an
even
larger proportion
of manual crafts workers are male. In the
regions
of this
study,
most
of these workers are
represented by
Communications Workers of
America, AFL-CIO,
a
large
and active industrial union formed from the remnants of the old
company
union
structure,
but since
earning
a
reputation
as a
strong
and
progressive
labor
organization.
The
findings reported
below are based on data collected from workers
employed
at two
Bell
operating companies during
a
three-year period beginning
in 1984. The initial wave
of data collection involved a small number of
in-depth
interviews
(55),
most of which
were
taped
and transcribed. Two distinct
surveys-one "regional,"
one
"local"--fol-
lowed,
beginning
in 1985. The former drew a random
sample
of workers
(802)
in all the
major non-exempt occupations throughout
New
Jersey
and New
York,
stratified
by
work-
place
size, area,
and
organizational
division. The latter was more
intensive,
based on a
random
sample
of craft and clerical workers
(175) represented by
a
single
local union in
suburban New York, stratified
by occupation.
In both cases the
response
rate was
fairly
low-50.3% in the
regional,
and 56.8% in the local
survey.
While such
relatively
low
response
rates cause some concern, little
suggests
that
non-respondents
held different
attitudes toward
management
than
respondents.
In the local
survey,
for
example, respon-
dents
grouped by
the return date
(early, late, and
only
after
repeated follow-ups)
showed
no attitudinal or
demographic
differences.
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66
THE SOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
Vol. 32/No. 1/1991
The
regional survey
of
telephone
workers includes a
battery
of items that focus on
workers' views of the
capitalist enterprise
and their
place
within it. The local
survey
also
devotes considerable
space
to the measurement of worker consciousness. I limit
my
presentation
here to a few items
concerning
workers'
perceptions
of
management's
use of
new
technologies.
While it is
important
to
keep
the limits of forced-choice items
firmly
in
mind when
studying
class
perceptions (see Glaberman 1980; Femia 1975),
such
quan-
titative data can reveal the
patterns
of belief and
perception
within definite
groups
and
classes.
ANALYSIS
Hegemony
theorists contend that
organizational processes
within
monopoly
firms dissolve
or
uproot
the basis of
'working-class
consciousness'5
among employees
such as these. I
test this claim with both
open-end
and forced-choice
questions designed
to elicit workers'
perceptions
of
management
and their interests as
wage
earners.
It is not difficult to locate workers who do indeed consent to the exercise of
managerial
authority
or even
identify
with the firm as such. Sometimes such consent seems infused
with elements of
deference.
Said one retired
craftworker,
first
employed mopping
floors
but later in the
top-paying craft,
"In the entire 28
years
I've worked
here,
I've
always
been
grateful
to the
company
for
providing
me with a
living,
even with
my
limited
education." This worker
accepted
his low
standing
in the labor market
and,
with
it,
his
unequal relationship
with
management.
In other
cases,
workers'
acceptance
stemmed
from a more
pragmatic alignment
of
perceived
interests. Thus a cable
splicer explained
his view of
wage
labor,
"You do
your job,
don't make
any problems,
and
everything
should be
okay.
I
mean,
the
stronger
the
company,
the better the chance that there won't
be
any layoffs, right?"
Another worker took this
alignment
of interests even further.
Pete: I've said this at a lot of
meetings,
but
people
better start
waking up!
I
mean,
today
it's like
your
own business. You
gotta go
out and
you gotta
talk New
York
Tel,
because there are a lot of areas where
people
can
go
to the
competition....
SPV: So the
breakup
has made
you,
in
effect,
a
spokesman
for the
company?
Pete:
Absolutely.
Sometimes I even look to make sales for the
company [although
he
works in the Plant
department].
I'll
give you
an
example. My
wife has a
job
in
an office in
Manhattan,
and her boss was
considering
an inferior
company
for
their
telephone
service. It was
going
to be a
$160,000
contract. And what I did
was,
I made sure that New York
Telephone got
some
people
down there to
make that
sale,
and
they
did.
However
internally
rational this consensual consciousness
may
be,
it is
clearly
the
excep-
tion rather than the norm.
By
far the more common world-view is conflictual or
opposi-
tional,
prompting
workers to voice their resentment at
being
treated as mere commodities
and to view the
company
as an
opposing
force with whose interests
they
often collide.
A conflictual consciousness is
especially
common
among operators,
who are
subjected
to the closest
supervision
of all workers in Bell
companies
and
bitterly
resent
manage-
ment's constant concern with
improving productivity.
For
example,
when asked how she
viewed the relation between
management
and workers, an
operator
in her late forties
responded slowly
and with
great emphasis:
"In
my job management
will use
you
for what
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Workers, Firms,
and the Dominant
Ideology
67
they
can
get
from
you.
If
they
can
get
blood out of
you, they'll get
blood out of
you.
And
they
don't care how." Her co-workers underscored their
agreement.
One recalled that
when the
air-conditioning
broke down in their
office,
her
manager brought
in
large
electric
fans. "But
they
aimed them at the
computers. They just
wanted to
keep
the machines
cool.
They
didn't care about us
overheating."
Similar
patterns
of resentment were ex-
pressed by
a male
operator
in his late twenties. When asked an
open-end question
about
what he disliked the most about his
job,
he
replied,
I dislike the most that
they
think I'm a machine.
They say they try
to
improve
the
technology,
to make it easier for us.
They're
not
tryin'
to make it easier for us!
They're
trying
to make us
go
faster! Because the faster we
go,
the more
money they're
making.
Such views are
hardly
limited to
operators. Indeed,
craftworkers manifest an even more
strongly
conflictual outlook and take care to detail
precisely
where conflicts of interest
between
management
and workers
begin
and end.
Thus,
asked whether
top management
really
cared about workers'
needs,
one craftworker
replied,
I don't think
top management
has
any respect
at all for the
workers,
to be truthful.
Middle
management,
lower
management, yes.
But
top management,
no.
An outside craft
worker,
asked the same
question, interrupted,
Top management?
You mean
Ferguson?
Salerno?
[Top
officers of
NYNEX]
These are
the
guys
that
force
us to
go
out on strike.
They
don't even care about lower
management!
A clerical worker in her late forties
put
it this
way:
First-line
management
is
just dealing
with the
everyday problems.
But the
higher
management.
....
They're
the ones who are
looking
at a
profit-and-loss
sheet.
They're
the ones who are
reaping
the rewards.
Such remarks were sometimes surrounded
by
a web of
qualifications,
as if workers felt
at least some normative constraints in
expressing
such views. Thus one switchman imme-
diately
voiced
sharp
but
wavering
resentment at how
technology
had
changed
his
job:
It's like
they
have a collar on
you
at all times now.
[Pauses, reflects.]
Of
course,
you're working
for
them,
and
they're paying you. [Now
shakes his
head.]
But for them
to
use,
to abuse these
technologies
. . . to have to hear their snide
remarks,
it's
just
not
right.
Interestingly,
this worker shifted between two distinct moral codes-one based on de-
fiance and
indignation,
the other on a more deferential, acquiescent
set of
expectations.
Even in such cases as this, intimating
a
contradictory consciousness, the more defiant,
oppositional aspect
of worker consciousness
prevails.
The distribution of
responses
to forced-choice items often used to measure levels of
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68
THE SOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
Vol. 32/No. 1/1991
class consciousness
gauges
the relative
predominance
of consensual and
oppositional
forms of
consciousness.6
Among
workers asked a standard item that
compares
the
cap-
italist
enterprise
to a
sports
team
("Do managers
and workers
belong
to the same
team,
or... to two different and
opposing teams?"), nearly
three
quarters (73.5%) reported
that
management
and workers
belong
to different and
opposing
sides. Two-thirds of the
workers
(64.2%)
believed that
management "only
cares about
profits, regardless
of what
workers want or need."
Roughly
the same
proportion (67.5%)
felt that "the
people
who
run
large corporations
will
try
to take
advantage
of the workers if
you give
them the
chance."
Finally,
the
largest proportion
seemed
willing
to
engage
in militant
behavior,
should events so
require:
should
management
demand worker
concessions,
45.4% re-
ported willingness
to strike.7
It
is of course difficult to
project
how workers would behave
in real-life situations.
Still,
these are not the
responses
of workers who have
uncritically
accepted managerial
control as 'natural' or
legitimate.
It
might
be
objected
that the
survey
items
tap
abstract
perceptions
that
may
or
may
not
be linked to concrete events.
Partly
for this
reason,
I
applied
the classical
question,
cui
bono?-who benefits?-to the issue of
technological change,
an
aspect
of workers'
experiences especially
relevant here both
practically,
because
technological change
is a
constant feature of their
work,
and
theoretically,
because observers have
argued
that
ideologies
of
"progress"
obscure the role of social choice and human
agency
in tech-
nological development.8
The
question
here is whether workers have embraced such ide-
ologies
of
technological change.
Some have. As one tester
put it,
"I didn't come to work in a horse and
buggy.
It's the
same
thing
here. We have to
adjust
to the new
technologies
or we'll be left behind."
Likewise,
a clerical worker saw electronic information
management systems
as
simply
"more efficient than
wading through papers
and line records and
yards
and
yards
of index
cards. It's
obviously
a more efficient
way
to do
things."
Still other workers believe that the
underlying
factor
guiding technological change
is
simply
service
improvement. Again,
however,
such a
benign
view of new
technology
is
clearly
the
minority.
An item from the 1987 "local"
survey queried
"who benefitted the most from the use
of
computers
and other advanced
technologies." Specifically,
it asked
respondents
who
had first-hand
experience
of
technological change
whether workers benefitted the
most,
management
and workers about
equally,
or
management
the most. The
great majority
of
respondents (72.3%)
felt that
management,
not
workers,
benefits from new
technologies,
and a
quarter (26.5%)
felt that such
changes
benefits them
equally.9
One of two considerations
guides
workers'
responses.
The first centers on economic
consequences
of new
technology, specifically
its labor
displacing
effects:
"They just
want
to do
away
with
everybody. They
either automate
you
or else contract the work
out,
do
away
with
you
that
way." "Top management
benefits
[from technological change].
...
They're
the ones who are
reaping
the
rewards,
by getting
rid
of people.
"
The
second,
equally
common focus is on
political consequences, expressed
in
explicitly
Orwellian
language.
Thus one worker
explained management's
motives for
introducing
new technol-
ogies by noting
that
"Big
Brother can watch us all that
way."
Another observed that
"they
can
keep
track of
you
better and know where
you
are at all times"; and still another, that
"Big
Brother is here. . . .
They
use the
computers
to watch us all the time." Such
workers have neither
uncritically accepted
a
managerial
definition of
technology
as
prog-
ress nor lost
sight
of their
enduring
conflicts with the
company.
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Workers, Firms,
and the Dominant
Ideology
69
SOURCES OF VARIATION IN WORKING-CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS
Thus far our
analysis
indicates that
hegemony theory
offers little basis for
depicting
the
attitudes of the
sample
as a whole.
Although
further
study suggests
that workers in some
occupational categories-customer
service
reps
and to a lesser extent clerical em-
ployees-are managerially
inclined,
most-especially
those in outside crafts and
oper-
ators-assume a conflictual or
proletarian
attitude. Thus workers
differentially respond
to
managerial ideology, depending
on their locations within the firm.
A set of indices constructed to measure levels of
working-class
consciousness
explores
the nature and sources of these
occupational
variations. The
analysis distinguishes
four
separate
dimensions of class consciousness:
(1)
identification with the
working-class, (2)
adherence to a dichotomous or conflictual
image
of the
firm, (3) support
for
greater
workers' control over the
production process,
and
(4) willingness
to strike in defense of
these ends. 10 Results of a factor
analysis using
indicators of these dimensions are shown
in Table 1. While the factor
loadings
conform to the
expected pattern, they
show a need to
revise the
conceptual
schema discussed above.
Rather than four
factors,
only
three
emerge: (1) support
for workers'
control, (2)
militancy,
and
(3)
a dichotomous
image
of the firm.
Contrary
to
expectations,
class
identification does not
emerge
as a distinct factor and instead loads
highly
on the third
(though
somewhat less
clearly
than its other
components).
This
pattern suggests that,
for
these workers at
least,
working-class
identification describes more than class location. In
addition,
it reflects a
particular
view of the social relation between workers and their
employers.
These three dimensions
distinguish
workers
according
to levels of class consciousness.
A
high
score on all three dimensions shows a
relatively high
level of
working-class
consciousness,
and a low
score,
a
managerial
or middle-class
ideology
that betokens
consent to the social relations of
production
at work.
Table 1
Factor
Analysis
of Items
Measuring Working
Class Consciousness
(Varimax Rotation)
Rotated Factor
Loadings
Variable 1 2 3
Communality
Class identificationa -.209 .032 .418 .219
Managers
and workers are on same/different teams .106 -.033 .694 .494
Corporations
take
advantage
of their workers .267 .380 .694 .698
All
management
cares about is
profits
.336 .247 .726 .702
If workers could make
decisions,
products
would
improve
.887 .038 .040 .790
Workers would make better decisions than
supervisors
.852 .068 .153 .755
Would strike to defend benefits .127 .784 .078 .637
Would strike to defend income
protection plan
-.075 .827 -.007 .689
Would strike in
sympathy
with
aggrieved
workers
elsewhere in the Bell
System
-.053 .489 .185 .276
Eigenvalue
2.778 1.434 1.050
% of total variance 30.9 15.9 11.7
Note: aMiddle class
=
0, working
class
=
1.
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70
THE SOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
Vol. 32/No. 1/1991
Respondents'
scores on these three dimensions of class consciousness are
predicted
using regression equations
with
dummy
variables for each
occupational category, using
the outside craft
group
as the referent
category
and
controlling
for
age.
Table 2
(A)
presents
the
resulting
coefficients. The most
consistently
class-conscious workers are the
two craft
groups, closely
followed
by operators.
We find no
significant
differences in
consciousness between the inside craftworkers and the referent
category. Moreover,
oper-
ators view the firm in much the same conflictual manner as their craft
counterparts,
and
equally support
demands for
greater
workers' control.
Only
in
willingness
to strike are
operators significantly
less class conscious than the outside craft
group."
Table 2
(A)
further indicates that customer service
reps,
and to a lesser extent
clerks,
manifest
significantly
lower levels of
working-class
consciousness. Clerical workers
per-
ceive the firm in less dichotomous terms than outside
craftworkers,
and are more reluctant
to strike as well. Clerks do not balk at demands for
greater
worker
control, however,
perhaps reflecting
their
responsiveness
to notions of worker
participation. Finally,
we find
that customer service
employees
are more
managerially
inclined than
any
others and
significantly
less class conscious than outside craftworkers on all three dimensions.
They
hold a less conflictual
image
of the
firm,
are
relatively unsupportive
of worker
control,
and are more reluctant to strike than their co-workers in outside crafts.12
Inspecting
each
group's responses
to
particular
class-consciousness indicators reveals
the
meaning
of these
ideological
differences more
fully.
While the clear
majority
of the
outside craftworkers
(67.7%)
view themselves as
working class,
only
a third of the service
reps (34.6%)
do.13
Likewise,
50.5% of the former would
reportedly
walk off their
jobs
in
sympathy
with other
telephone
workers "even if it meant
breaking
the
law,"
but
only
11.9% of the latter would take such a militant
step.
Albeit the
managerial hegemony
thesis
poorly
describes the
sample overall,
it does seem to
apply
to service
reps
and to a lesser
extent clerical workers. What social and
organizational
factors, then,
produce working-
class consciousness
among
some
groups
of workers and
managerial
inclinations
among
others?
The literature
provides
at least three
arguments
that
might help
account for these
ideological
variations. One focuses on differences in the
degree
of
autonomy
or control
that workers
enjoy
over their
labor;
a second on labor markets and the
opportunity
structure within the
firm;
and a third on differences in
occupational
conditions such as
job
security
and
patterns
of
supervision,
often more favorable for office than blue collar
workers.
Autonomy
And Control
Workplace autonomy
is often invoked to
explain
the character of worker consciousness.
As we have
seen,
Burawoy (1979)
views workers' relative
autonomy
within the
produc-
tion
process
as decisive in the
reproduction
of
managerial hegemony.
In
differing ways,
authors such as Blauner
(1964),
Montgomery (1979),
and Friedman
(1977)
also stress the
importance
of
workplace autonomy
in the
formation of worker consciousness.
Might
not
the
ideological
variations observed here stem from differences in
management's degree
of
control over workers' labor?
This
'autonomy' hypothesis generates
three
empirical predictions: first, that the most
managerially
inclined workers (service reps) enjoy greater
work freedom than others;
second, that such relative
autonomy
exercises a
moderating
or
'integrative'
effect on
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0
(p
CL
rn
0
Q.
cb
o
0
C,
_. .
Table 2
Dimensions of Class Consciousness
Regressed
on
Occupational Categorya
and Selected
Occupational
Conditions
(unstandardized coefficients,
with standard errors in
parentheses)
A B
Dependent Image of
the
Support for Image of
the
Support for
Variable: Firm Worker Control
Militancy
Firm Worker Control
Militancy
Predictor
Age -.03*
-.02** -.02* -.01*
-.01** -.01*
(.01) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.01)
Operators
-.24 -.34 -
.41"*
-
1.30*** -.23
-
.74***
(.35) (.24) (.20) (.37) (.26) (.24)
Inside Crafts -.05 -.42 .15 -.32 -.26 .32
(.33) (.23) (.19) (.33) (.23) (.20)
Clerical -1.16*** -.04
-.52**
-
1.24*** -.09**
-.50**
Workers
(.29) (.20) (.17) (.27) (.19) (.17)
Reps
-1.43*** -.71*** -1.15*** -1.37*** -.65** -1.13***
(.37) (.26) (.22) (.34) (.24) (.22)
Autonomy
-
.08* .03
-.03"
(.03) (.02) (.01)
Perceived -
.39*** -.15 -.02
Opportunity (.12) (.09) (.10)
Experience
of
.13 .13 .10
Promotion
(.20) (. 14) (.13)
Job
Security -3.22*** -2.00*** -.34
(log) (.62) (.45) (.40)
Supervisory -.20***
-.11***
.07"*
Treatment
(.04) (.03) (.02)
Constant
11.11 7.73 7.73 5.96 4.65 6.22
R2
.056***
.052"**
.076*** .238*** .166*** .110**
N
(518) (518) (518) (518) (518) (518)
Notes: aOutside crafts defined as referent
category.
*p
< .05.
**p
< .01.
***p
< .001.
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72
THE SOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
Vol. 32/No. 1/1991
them;
and
third,
that
ideological
differences between service
reps
and other workers will
either
disappear
or
appreciably
decline when levels of
managerial
control are
partialed
out. The data do in fact reveal
significant
variations in
managerial
control between the
different
occupations,
but these do not conform to the
pattern
the
'autonomy'
thesis
expects.14 To begin with,
reps' workplace autonomy
lies
significantly
below the
sample
mean:
they
have less freedom in their work roles than craftworkers
(not shown).
And
although
craftworkers
enjoy
the
greatest
control over their own
work,
they
do not lose
sight
of class tensions or
antagonisms. Autonomy,
therefore,
poorly explains
service
rep's
managerial
inclinations.
Further,
differences in consciousness between the
occupational
categories
remain undiminished even when we introduce
managerial
control into the
equation.
This last
point
becomes clear in Table 2
(B),
which includes several
occupational
conditions as
predictors (among
them work
autonomy)
in addition to the variables
present-
ed in
(A).
Levels of
managerial
control do
significantly
affect worker
consciousness,
and
in the
expected
direction: Unit increases in work
autonomy give
rise to a less dichotomous
view of the firm and to a lower
propensity
to
strike,
net of the
occupational
dummies. Yet
the service
reps
and clerks remain
significantly
more
managerial
in outlook than outside
craftworkers when levels of
managerial
control are included in the
equation. Ideological
differences across the
occupational groups
thus are not a
simple
function of variations in
levels of work
autonomy.1'5
Mobility
and Internal Labor Markets
A second
explanation
of
occupational
differences focuses on workers'
exposure
to firm
internal labor
markets,
or FILMs
(Doeringer
and Piore
1971;
Edwards
1975, 1979;
Kalleberg
and Sorensen
1979;
and Littler
1983). Organizational provisions
for
mobility
within the
firm-job ladders,
job bidding arrangements,
and other universalistic mecha-
nisms for
job allocation-purportedly engender
a career-conscious outlook
among
em-
ployees
that stresses individual rather than collective interests. This
perspective
contends
that service
reps'
and clerks'
stronger managerial
outlook
may
reflect their location within
a more
fully developed
internal labor
market,
which
encourages
identification with the
firm.
The
objective
or structural
aspect
of this thesis cannot be
disputed.
Patterns of
mobility
within the firm are
quite
different for clerks and service
reps
than
operators
and
craftper-
sons: The former are in fact more
closely
bound
up
with internal labor markets.
However,
for the workers in this
study
at
least,
it is
by
no means clear that internal labor markets
have the
ideological consequences
theorists
expect.
On the basis of
job history
data I have
attempted
to
map
out the structure of both blue
and white collar
employees'
within-firm movements. The
pattern
that obtains is
presented
in
Figure
1. Most
noteworthy
is the near absence of
mobility among
the manual crafts. For
the most
part,
these workers are hired from external labor markets and remain in their
job
titles for their career duration. Thus
nearly
two-thirds of the outside craftworkers
(64.4%)
are still
employed
in the
job
for which first hired. The mean tenure of workers in craft
job
titles
(just
under 13
years)
is
greater
than in
any
other
occupational category.
As
Figure 1
further shows, operators
are somewhat more
fully integrated
into an
internal labor market.
Particularly during
earlier
periods
of economic
growth,
lower-level
clerical
jobs
were often filled from the ranks of
operators.
In fact, many
of the workers
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Workers, Firms,
and the Dominant
Ideology
73
Manual
Mental
Inside Crafts
Outside Crafts
Customer
Skilled Clerical
Service
a)Switching
Inst. &
Repair/
Jobs
Representatives
Technician
Cable Splicers/
(MA's Admin./
Lineworkers
Assign.)
b)Frame
t
ELM
Administrator
Routine Clerical
Jobs
ELM
- (RSAs, Service or
Data Entry Clerks)
ELM
ELM
Operators
Note: ELM = External Labor Market.
I
ELM
Figure
1.
Mobility
Paths
among
Manual and Mental
Occupations
presently employed
at such routine
clerical
jobs
were
initially operators. Nonetheless,
the
overwhelming majority
of
operators
remain in their
jobs indefinitely:
80.8% have never
been
promoted,
and their mean tenure
(12.2 years)
is
only slightly
lower than craft-
workers'. The difference is that most craftworkers
prefer
to
stay
where
they are,
while
operators
do not.
16
Compared
with craftworkers and
operators,
somewhat
greater mobility prevails among
clerical workers and service
reps.
In
part
this reflects the
sharper
division of labor
among
the office
occupations, especially among
clerks: the
great specialization
in clerical
jobs
creates more
positions
between which to move
(Stone 1975).
The firm's
partial
reliance
upon
external sources of labor
power (e.g.,
workers with some
college education)
con-
strains
promotion
into service
rep jobs.
But at least until
recently, reps enjoyed
fair
chances of movement
upward
into first-level
supervision.
Hence it seems clear that clerks
and
reps
have indeed been more
directly
involved with the
workings
of internal labor
markets than
operators
and craftworkers. Can this
explain
the
ideological
variations
observed?
To see the effect of internal labor market
processes
on worker
consciousness,
I use two
distinct indicators of the firm's
provisions
for worker
mobility.
The first bears
upon
the
past experience
of
mobility-whether
workers have ever been
promoted
since
being
hired;
the second
upon
future
prospects-the
amount of
opportunity
workers
perceive
in
their own
departments.
In
retrospect,
these measures are less than
optimal,
as their
individual-level character little reveals the more structural effect of internal labor markets.
Still,
if the
ideological
effect of internal labor markets is
real,
the
experience
of
mobility
or the
perception
of
opportunity
should
discernibly
affect worker consciousness.
The
findings prompt
two observations.
First,
some evidence does
emerge
that
perceived
opportunity
inhibits the formation of
working-class consciousness,
net of the other
equa-
tion variables
[see
Table 2
(B)]:
It reduces the
perception
of conflict between workers and
management
and diminishes
support
for worker control. The actual
experience
of
promo-
tion has no effect.
Second, however,
inclusion of these measures fails to
explain
the
occupational
variations in worker consciousness: In
particular, reps' managerial
inclina-
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74
THE SOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
Vol. 32/No. 1/1991
tions remain
significant
even with levels of
opportunity
and the other
job
characteristics
adjusted.
Interestingly,
service
reps
and clerical workers
actually report significantly
less
oppor-
tunity
than their co-workers: While
roughly
two-thirds of the former believe "not
very
much
opportunity
at
all"
exists in their
departments,
less than half of the workers in the
other
occupations
are so
pessimistic. Likewise,
they
are more
likely
than others to feel
that their
opportunities
for
promotion
have eroded in recent
years. Apparently,
these
differences flow from their
higher expectations. Having traditionally enjoyed prospects
for
within-firm
mobility,
these workers feel
especially deprived
when these erode. Yet even
though
their career
prospects
have
declined, they
continue to
align
their interests with
management.
In contrast with Edwards' belief that unfavorable
changes
in workers' situa-
tions foster disillusionment with
management (a
renewed crisis of
control),
little
suggests
that the
changing
fortunes of these white collar
groups
creates a different relation toward
management.
The Distribution of
Organizational
Rewards
A third
explanation argues
that the
managerial
inclinations of the service
reps
and
clerical
group may
stem from their
enjoyment
of
organizational
rewards
quite apart
from
autonomy
or
opportunity.
This view is often
developed
in studies of white collar em-
ployees,
such as the classic works
by
Mills
(1951),
Lockwood
(1958),
and Crozier
(1971).
Conceivably,
the attitude of the clerks and
reps
stems from their
exposure
to more
favorable
patterns
of
supervision
or
greater job security,
relative to their blue collar craft
counterparts.
To test this
explanation,
items
bearing
on
perceived job security
and the nature of
supervisory relationships
were used to
develop
indices
reflecting
these
job
charac-
teristics.17 Much as it would
expect, fairly
marked variations in both
job security
and
supervisory relationships
exist across the
occupational categories (not shown).
Service
reps
do
enjoy significantly greater job security,
as well as more favorable
relationships
with their
supervisors,
than the
sample
overall.
However,
clerical workers
enjoy
no such
advantage: they
are at the mean on both characteristics.
Finally, although job security
and
supervisory relationships
do indeed affect class
consciousness,
occupational
differences in
worker consciousness
again
remain
significant
when these work
aspects
are introduced
into the
equation.
Thus,
Table 2
(B)
shows that the two
organizational
rewards do
predict
worker con-
sciousness.
Increasing
levels of
job security produce
a
significantly
less dichotomous
perception
of the firm as well as weaker
support
for workers'
control,
net of
age
and the
other
predictors. Similarly,
benevolent
patterns
of
supervision yield significant
reductions
in all three dimensions of consciousness.
Again, however,
the more
managerial
inclina-
tions of the clerical workers and service
reps
are not affected when we
adjust
for
organiza-
tional reward effects.
Thus,
if
job security
and
patterns
of
supervision
affect worker
consciousness, they
do not
explain
the
occupational
variations observed.
In sum, while these
job
characteristics-work
autonomy, opportunity
for
mobility,
and
organizational
rewards-do bear on the formation of
working-class consciousness, they
do not
explain
the
strength
of
managerial ideology among
the service
rep
and clerical
groups
nor of
working-class
consciousness
among
the craft
groups.
What then
explains
these
occupational
differences in worker consciousness? The interview data and field
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Workers, Firms,
and the Dominant
Ideology
75
observations
suggest
that two additional considerations
hegemony
theorists do not or-
dinarily consider-gender ideology, coupled
with variations in the
ecology
of work-are
relevant. Because the role
played by
these factors is not
easily
tested in
quantitative
terms,
our remarks should be read with
caution.1'8
Gender
We have little reason to infer that traditional
conceptions
of
femininity,
which histor-
ically
have
encouraged conformity
and
submissiveness,
encourage
the
reps
and clerical
employees
to consent to
managerial authority.
For
one,
recent studies have uncovered
numerous cases in which such
ideologies actually favor
resistance
against managerial
authority.
For
example,
Costello's
(1985) study
of office
employees
in an insurance
company
finds that women's common
experiences
as women enable them to resist what
they
define as unfair treatment at the hands of male
managers.
Much the
same,
West-
wood's
(1982) study
of
hosiery
workers shows that women invoke traditional definitions
of
femininity
as a barrier
against
their
predominantly
male
managers, effectively denying
their bosses
entry
to their
shopfloor
culture.
Finally, although operators
are an over-
whelmingly
female
group, they
manifest little inclination to submit to
managerial
authori-
ty: They
have
historically
led the
struggle
for unionism in this
industry (Norwood 1984;
Greenwald
1980;
Vallas
forthcoming)
and continue to harbor attitudes that resemble those
of their male craft
counterparts.
It therefore seems reasonable to
reject
the notion that the
ideology
of
femininity necessarily engenders
worker consent.
Yet,
combined with other
influences, gender ideology
does seem to
encourage
male
workers' defiance of
management.
Workers in the most militant
group,
the outside craft-
workers,
also
perform
the most
dangerous
work
(climbing poles
and
ladders,
or descend-
ing
into
manholes),
a fact
they
define as central to their
occupational identity. Splicers
in
particular
define themselves as different from and more
manly
than other
workers,
at least
partly
due to their
willingness
to
engage
in
dangerous
and
dirty
work
(Epstein
1988).
Proud of their
rough-hewn
character,
outside craftworkers are
especially prone
to maintain
a defiant
posture
toward
management.
Asked which
groups
were the most militant and
why,
a former middle
manager recalled,
"Splicers
were the
toughest,
then
switchers,
then
testers. It almost went
by physical strength.
The
stronger you
were
physically,
the
tougher
you
were." Even the
language
that workers use to criticize
management
embodies
gender
imagery.
Male workers asked how
supervisors
are chosen often
gave
such
responses
as,
"Supervisors? They're
the ones that kiss ass.
They plow right up
behind their
bosses,"
and "The
guy
that
gets
on his knees is the
guy
that
gets
a foreman's
job
at New York
Telephone." Implied
is that
supervisors
fail to make it on the basis of skill and must
compromise
their manhood in order to
get
ahead. Thus a
supervisor may acquire power,
but
only by trading away
his
ability
to "stand
up
like a man." In
short,
these
working
men
turn
gender ideology
into an
ideological weapon
with which to
challenge
the character of
their
superiors.19
Workplace Ecology
and
Workplace
Culture
A final consideration that
helps
account for variations in worker consciousness lies in
the
ecological
conditions that
shape
the
opportunities
workers have to form an autono-
mous work culture. Most office locations' social
ecology
offers little
opportunity
for
service
reps
or clerical workers to stake out an
oppositional
culture at work. While office
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76 THE SOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
Vol. 32/No. 1/1991
workers do
relatively frequently
contact one
another,
this is
rarely
in a context that
might
support
a culture of resistance.
Reps
and clerks
typically
take breaks and meals in com-
pany lounges,
within
sight
of
supervisors
and
managers.
Most
workplaces develop
so-
cially recognized "supervisors'
tables" distinct from those where
employees
can
just
relax
"with
the
girls."
But voices
carry,
and verbal indiscretions sometimes filter to
managers.
Lunchtime banter therefore revolves around
'safe'
topics
such as
family
events,
vacation
plans,
or which workers have transferred or retired. Hence the
ecology
of office work
inhibits
expression
of conflictual sentiments at work and renders it that much more
difficult for workers to share an
oppositional
set of values.
Matters are
quite
different for craftworkers.
Although they usually
work in isolation
from one
another,
"shooting"
troubles in central offices or out in the
field,
the
uncertainty
of their tasks and the
physical mobility
of their
jobs
enable them to
stray
from
assigned
duties and
congregate. Opportunities
for such evasive tactics are
greatest among
the
outside
craftworkers,
the most
spatially
mobile and
proud
of their
ability
to
defy
their
bosses:
"They [management]
know what we're
supposed
to be
doing,
but
they're
not
running
wires
up through
the trees with us." In
fact,
supervisors
sometimes
spend
consid-
erable time
hunting
down subordinates. "You've hit on a sore
point
with
me,"
one
manager
told me. "Sometimes we
just
don't know where our own
people
are.
Maybe
the
guy's just standing
around somewhere with his
buddies,
talking
about the fish he
caught
over the weekend. You
just
don't know." Sometimes
supervisors grow
determined to rein
in their
workers,
yielding
the industrial
equivalent
of hide-and-seek. Sometimes
they get
the
upper
hand. One
supervisor recently promoted
to foreman claimed that "I know where
they
like to hide. I can still think like a
splicer."
When workers
lose,
they
can be
suspended
without
pay (or
even
fired)
unless a union official can
get
them off the hook.
(One
interview with a local union
president
was
interrupted
to bail out several of his
members who had met at a bar on
company
time: "The
jerks
used to
go
back to the same
place
all the
time!")
Apart
from the risk involved in such outlaw
activities,
most
important
here is their form: their
very
nature as forbidden
congregations
invites workers to chal-
lenge managerial
definitions of their work
situations, actively schooling
them in the values
of defiance.
DISCUSSION
This case
study
of workers' work and consciousness in two Bell
operating companies
aims
to evaluate the
validity
of the
managerial hegemony
thesis. The workers on whom it
focuses
enjoy many
if not most of the
employment
terms and conditions
usually
associ-
ated with
monopoly
core
firms,
and have been
exposed
to a
strong corporate
culture.
Nonetheless,
the data
identify important
limitations in the
managerial hegemony
thesis
and
prompt
a
rethinking
of several of its claims.
First and most
important,
little indicates that
management
has established a
pattern
of
ideological hegemony
over workers. To be
sure,
some workers and
groups
do consent to
and embrace the
existing
distribution of
authority,
but
they
are a distinct
minority.
Most
are
quite
aware of tensions and
antagonisms
between themselves and their
employers,
support
increased worker control over
companies,
and would act on their interests and
orientations should the need arise. In short, these workers do not lack the
ideological
resources to contest
managerial authority.
As one chief steward
put
it
(referring
to a
number of structural trends, including automation), "It's not that we're
fighting any
less.
It's that
they
took the
weapon
out
of
our hands."
Managerial hegemony
theories therefore
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Workers, Firms,
and the Dominant
Ideology
77
inflate the role of
ideological
mechanisms in the maintenance of
managerial
control and
underestimate workers' abilities to form a critical consciousness of the
employment
relationship.
Second,
hegemony
theorists
typically
view workers in core firms in an
overarching
fashion as if all
occupational groups
were
caught up
in the same
ideological
net. This
study
instead finds that even
though they
work within the same core
firm,
workers in
different
occupational categories
exhibit
clearly
distinct
ideological
inclinations. While
some
groups
do consent to the status
quo,
others manifest a
distinctly oppositional
consciousness. Thus
management's ideological
dominance is
by
no means the 'natural'
outcome of work relations within the
monopoly
core: it succeeds
only
under
specific
conditions and with certain
occupational groups.
Moreover,
although
internal labor mar-
kets and such
occupational
conditions as
autonomy
and
organizational
rewards do affect
workers' consciousness
(much
as
hegemony theory predicts),
these variables do not
account for the
occupational
variations in consciousness found.
Rather, qualitative
evi-
dence
points
to the
importance
of other conditions
hegemony
theorists
rarely
address.
Much as Halle
(1984) observes,
the
concept
of the
"working
man"
shapes
craft-
workers'
consciousness,
encouraging
them to define their manliness at least
partly through
defiance of
management (cf.
Willis
1977;
Yarrow
1987).
Oppositional
consciousness also
seems to
depend
on
patterns
of
workplace ecology. Although
craftworkers are unable to
interact as a
group
with
any great frequency,
the outlaw nature of their
congregations
(which
implicitly
seek to win back a measure of freedom from
managerial control)
teaches
them to
challenge managerial
definitions of their work situations. Hence
Burawoy's
view
of industrial
games,
which sees such rituals as
adapting
workers to the
existing
structure
of
authority, may
be too
narrowly
framed.
Although
more
ethnographic
research is needed
on this
point,
the
findings
here
imply
that
workplace games
and rituals often
reinforce,
rather than
weaken,
the conflictual character of workers' consciousness.
Concurring
with other recent studies of
working-class consciousness,
this research finds
an
implicit counter-ideology
common
among many
workers
(cf.
Hamilton
1968;
Huber
and Form
1973;
Vanneman and Cannon
1987),
a
majority viewing
the relation between
management
and workers as
exploitative.
At the same
time, however,
workers' con-
sciousness remains the
product
of influences often
particularistic
and
internally
contradic-
tory.
While
gender ideology
fuels defiant attitudes
among
the
working
men in this
study,
for
example,
it also seems to limit men's
ability
to fashion an alternative
(Epstein 1988).
In one case what
provoked
a
group
of inside craftsmen to
challenge
their bosses was a
supervisor's
harsh and
impersonal
treatment of female clerks. "One
thing you
don't
do,"
one male worker
explained, "you
don't mess with our women.
"
Although
these workers
prevailed, forcing management
to transfer the
supervisor,
their actions served to re-
produce
women's subordinate
position, limiting
the basis on which
working-class
action
might develop.
Hence if the ethos of
masculinity provides
an
ideological weapon
in the
battle
against management,
that
weapon
can at time cut both
ways.20
Likewise,
even the most class-conscious workers' embrace of nationalistic
ideology
sometimes overwhelms their
perception
of conflict between workers and
top managers.
Thus one chief steward
sharply
criticized
management's
use of new
technologies
to
measure workers'
productivity,
but in the next breath
expressed
fear of
Japanese
market
dominance in
microprocessors
and
memory chips ("What are we
going
to do if we
get
into a war with
Japan?
Where will American
industry
be then?"). His comments remind us
that industrial militance need not
spill
over into a broader
all-encompassing political
critique (Katznelson 1981), and that even as workers resist the
ideological
dominance of
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78
THE SOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
Vol. 32/No. 1/1991
their
employers,
wider obstacles and
prejudices
continue to
shape
their
consciousness,
limiting
their
critique
of the social relations that surround them.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
An earlier version of this
study
was
presented
at the 1989 Southern
Sociological Society
meetings
in
Norfolk,
Virginia.
I wish to thank the Russell
Sage Foundation,
which
provided
material and intellectual
support during
the
writing
of the
manuscript,
and the
members and officials of District I of the Communications Workers of
America, AFL-
CIO,
who underwrote the costs of data collection. I am also
grateful
to
Cynthia
Fuchs
Epstein,
Kai
Erikson,
Howard
Kimeldorf,
Bill
Kornblum,
Irene
Padevic, Ian
Taplin,
and
John
Zipp
for their
encouraging
remarks and
suggestions,
and to Erik Rotto for his
research assistance.
NOTES
1. See
especially
Braverman
(1974),
Shaiken
(1984),
and Noble
(1978, 1984).
For
insightful
discussion,
see Stark
(1980)
and
Thompson (1989, 1990).
2.
Many
other streams of
thought
relate to the
development
of
hegemony theory,
but lie
beyond
the
scope
of the
present
context. For a discussion and
critique
of
Weberian
notions of
legitimacy,
see
Abercrombie, Hill,
and
Turner
(1980)
and
Turner
(1987).
For discussions of
working-class
em-
bourgeoisement
and the labor
aristocracy,
see
Goldthorpe (1969)
and MacKenzie
(1973). Finally,
organizational sociologists
have also
pointed
toward
processes
that
encourage
subordinates to un-
knowingly accept superiors' premises.
For a discussion of such unobtrusive
controls,
see Perrow
(1986, pp. 128-131).
3. On the
break-up
of AT&T see Coll
(1984),
Faulhaber
(1987),
and Kohl
(1982).
4. Bell
paternalism began immediately following
World War I and
quickly expanded
into the
most elaborate
system
of
company
unions in the U.S.
(Brooks 1977;
Norwood
1984;
Schacht
1985).
Sections of the 1935 National Labor Relations Acts that outlawed
company-dominated
unions
specifically
aimed at the Bell
plan.
The effectiveness of Bell's
system
of labor control is seen in the
relative
quiescence
of its workers
during
the CIO
years.
Not until
during
and after World War
II
did
independent
trade unionism
emerge
on a
permanent
basis in the communications
industry (Vallas
forthcoming).
5. This refers to a set of shared sentiments and
perceptions involving
an awareness of the
conflictual character of the
wage
labor
relationship, preference
for a more
egalitarian alternative,
and a
willingness
to
engage
in collective action to realize this end. An
operational
definition of
working-class
consciousness follows.
6. For
varying approaches
to the measurement of class
consciousness,
see
Leggett (1968),
Mann
(1970),
MacKenzie
(1973),
Blackburn and Mann
(1975), Zingraff
and Schulman
(1984),
Leiter
(1986),
and Vallas
(1987).
7.
Only
10.2% hesitated to even consider the strike
option,
while 44.2% voiced
guarded
opposition
to
making
concessions.
8. This theme was
developed by
members of the Frankfurt School
(Marcuse 1964;
Habermas
1971), as well as more
recent students
of
industry
and
technology (see Noble 1978; Webster 1987).
9. Some workers resisted the choices
provided,
and noted no one benefitted.
They
deemed the
new
systems
less effective than the older, manual ones and the
changes largely counterproductive.
These
responses
were
relatively rare, however.
10. In
retrospect,
this
conceptualization seems
insufficiently precise.
A number of different
forms of worker consciousness exist, including
trade union consciousness, craft consciousness; yet
the schema
developed
here classifies them all as class consciousness.
Clearly greater conceptual
and
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Workers, Firms,
and the Dominant
Ideology
79
operational clarity
is needed. The schema suffices for the task at
hand, however,
inasmuch as the
hegemony
thesis
expects
little evidence of
any
forms of
oppositional
consciousness.
11.
I asked one former craftsman how different
groups
of workers behaved
during
strikes. He
recalled that
"operators
... have
always
been some of the most militant workers in the
industry.
Some of these
gals, they'd pick up
rocks and throw them at
anybody
who tried to cross the
picket
line.
They'd say things you
wouldn't have believed.
They
were the
peasants
of the
industry,
and
they
weren't
shy
about
saying
what
they
felt."
12. One union local's
past president reported
"When we were on
strike,
the customer service
people
would drive
right through
our
picket
line. I
mean, they'd try
to run
you
over. You couldn't
even mention union to them.
13. This
finding
reinforces Elinore
Langer's
observations
regarding
service
reps:
"The women
(reps)
do not see themselves as
'workers' in
anything
like the classical sense." See
Langer (1970).
14. An index based on six
self-report
items
involving
workers'
ability
to
determine
their method
and
pace
of work measures levels of worker
autonomy.
Cronbach's
alpha
for the index is .84. For
more detail on the construction of the
autonomy
index see Vallas
(1987, 1988).
15. Note that in Table 2
(B),
an
ideological
difference
emerges
between
operators
and outside
craftworkers not
apparent
in
(A).
Further
analysis suggests
that this is
mainly
due to the inclusion of
work
autonomy
in the
prediction equations. Thus,
levels of work
autonomy may explain
the
relatively
class-conscious attitudes of the
operators.
16. Levels of alienation from work and
job
dissatisfaction
(not shown)
are
dramatically higher
among
the latter.
17. Three items
compose
the index
measuring job security:
how worried workers are that
they
"may
be laid off and have to look for another
job,"
will "have to
accept
a
job
in a lower
classification,
with a cut in
pay,"
and will "have to
accept
a transfer to a distant
job
location." The
distribution of scores is skewed in a
positive direction, requiring
a
logarithmic
transformation. The
index
ranges
from 0.48 to
1.08, higher
scores
indicating greater job security.
Cronbach's
alpha
for
this index is .76. The character of
supervision,
conceived as
lying
on a continuum between
benev-
olent and
coercive,
is assessed
using
an index whose items ask workers how often their immediate
supervisors
are "considerate of the worker's
feelings,"
"able to understand
things
from the worker's
point
of
view,"
and
"easy
to talk to when
things get tough
on
your job."
Cronbach's
alpha
for this
index is .83.
18. For
example,
almost no
gender
variance exists within each
occupation, rendering
statistical
manipulation extremely problematic.
19. For a historical discussion of the
importance
of
maintaining
a
"manly bearing"
toward the
boss,
see
Montgomery (1979,
ch.
2).
For more
contemporary analysis
of
gender
and class con-
sciousness,
see Willis
(1977),
Cockburn
(1983),
Halle
(1984),
and Yarrow
(1987).
20. Male
predominance
in
telephone
workers'
organizations
has a
long history, beginning
with
the exclusion of women from craft
unions,
to ward off the
dangers
of what
they
called
"petticoat
unionism"
(see
Vallas
forthcoming,
ch.
3).
On
patriarchy
and labor
organization
more
generally,
see
Cockburn (1982).
For a discussion of the
bearing Qf gender ideology
on worker consent and
resistance,
see
Epstein's
own
analysis
of
telephone employees.
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