Diminishing Iran's Regional Influence

July 18, 2012 | 0633 GMT

The Wall Street Journal reported Tuesday that the United States is building a missile-
defense radar station at an undisclosed location in Qatar to defend Washington's regional
allies against Iranian missiles. It will also organize the United States' most comprehensive
mine sweeping exercises in the Persian Gulf in September. Elsewhere in the region, Syrian
Information Minister Omran Zoabi downplayed opposition claims of a major rebel offensive
in and around Damascus. Zoabi said that security forces had prevented a limited number of
rebels from infiltrating the city. The Syrian regime's top spokesman was responding to
claims that a large group of rebels from the Free Syrian Army had begun a major campaign
and had triggered fierce fighting that forced the military to use gunship helicopters in the
capital.

Most observers are treating these two developments as if they were unrelated. Stratfor
contends that both are parts of the U.S.-led international effort to roll back Iranian influence
in the region, which grew considerably as a result of Washington's efforts to effect regime
change in Iraq in 2003. The moves to topple the Alawite-dominated Baathist regime in Syria
and the U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf are single facets of a broader U.S. effort.
Specifically, Washington is trying to manage the consequences of the fall of the Sunni-
dominated Baathist regime in Iraq, a development that allowed Iran to establish a
contiguous sphere of influence stretching from western Afghanistan to the Mediterranean
Sea.

Iran consolidated its influence in Iraq in December 2010, after it aligned rival Shiite factions
to establish the government even though the Sunni-backed centrist al-Iraqiya bloc had won
elections. Less than three weeks later, Hezbollah -- Tehran's premier non-state actor proxy -
- engineered the fall of the pro-Western and pro-Saudi government in Lebanon and installed
a Cabinet in which elements favoring Syria and Iran had the upper hand. For the next three
months, Iran's regional capabilities were at their peak; Tehran was pleased to see popular
unrest creating turmoil across the Arab world.

With its western flank secure, the Iranians had hoped to focus their attention southward
across the Persian Gulf. Unrest had reached the kingdom of Bahrain, where the uprising led
by the Shiite majority against a Sunni minority provided Iran with an opportunity to
significantly weaken Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the Iranians were anticipating the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in December 2011. Iran hoped that the absence of U.S.
troops would help Tehran expand its geopolitical footprint on the Arabian Peninsula, where
the uprising in Yemen was complicating matters for the Saudis.

The sequence of events favoring Iran came to a halt in March 2011, when Arab unrest
spread to Syria. Regime collapse in Damascus would leave a critical gap in the Iranian arc of
influence stretching across the northern rim of the Middle East. The Iranians initially took
comfort in the unwillingness of the United States and its allies to risk a military intervention
in Syria similar to that seen in Libya. Tehran also hoped that the robustness of the Syrian
state, along with assistance from the Islamic republic, would allow Damascus to contain the
uprising.

The Iranians have been disappointed by their Syrian allies; meanwhile, Washington and its
regional partners have found a way around the problems associated with foreign military
intervention. By financing, arming, training and providing logistical support to the
opposition, the United States and its partners have established a strategy for undermining
the Syrian regime. They hope to trigger a coup against Syrian President Bashar al Assad that
would eventually lead to Sunni empowerment in the country. At the very least, Washington
hopes to create a situation where the Iranians (as well as the Russians) would be willing to
agree to a new power-sharing arrangement between the opposition and the Alawite-
Baathist establishment in Damascus.

Meanwhile, the United States has been steadily increasing pressure on Iran on the nuclear
front. Fostering a global consensus in favor of sharply reducing imports of Iranian crude has
been a key accomplishment of U.S. President Barack Obama's administration. But
significantly tightening the sanctions regime did not force Iran to compromise on the
nuclear issue, largely because Iran's option to close the Strait of Hormuz gives it major
leverage. In an effort to limit that option, the United States has arranged its minesweeping
vessels and enhanced its military position in the Persian Gulf. By doing so, Washington is
letting Iran know that the threat to close the strait is a hollow one -- the United States is
well prepared to engage in countermeasures if necessary. As Stratfor has stated over the
years, preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear-weapons technology is only one variable in
the United States' overall need to prevent a surge of Iranian influence in the region.

For this to happen, Sunni empowerment in Syria must be facilitated. Not only would this
lead to a reduction of Iran's influence in the Levant, it would also weaken Tehran's position
in Iraq. An Iran once again struggling to ensure the security of its western flank would not be
able to project much power in the Persian Gulf region. The military buildup and the
weakening of the Syrian regime are therefore a significant part of the United States' effort
to force Iran to negotiate.



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