Germany:

__ - - -
A New History
. " _-
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r d cambridge, ~ a s a c h u wu
University hndm, England
Press
i
beliewd that things could hardly get worse. Hitler's cons
backers took an optimistic view of the future, They we= cr
i
that Hitler was "hemmed in" with c~nservative cabinet minis
1
i
would keep him in linc. Papen told one of his friends, Wh a I
worried about? I have Hindenburg's full confidence. In two
wc'll have Hitler backed into a corner and whimpering.''
In order to understand the tenor of such remarks in re
one must keep in mind that in assessing the National Socialist
in 1933 Hider's coritemporaries had no experience to
Second World War and Auschwitz were still covered by the
time, and the few popl e who had read Mein Kamp!: Hitle
nouncement of his futurc program, tended not to take it s
Experience had shown that in general there was a large gap he
ideological declarations of principle and practical political
Furthermore the reversion to an authoritarian regime did n
as a shock. From 1930 on Germans became inured to the i
parliamentary control over political developments was tenu
best, and if they looked around the rest of Europe, things di
pear all that different elsewhere. Governments were headed b
tors in most countries, and where that was not the case,
last analysis he had only one goal:
popular front government in France, domestic political unres
rld dominance for a
such a that i t hardly servcd as an advertisement f or d
"superior lace" over the dead bod-
There wa3 a ~ i d e s ~ r c a d perception that the Great Depressi
ors."Hr never took
, - xie;en,iiiciir"&g~ a: whc, p-
hausted democratic go\:ernmenu, and that the immediate fut
E.s bha,8w knotlomi Iiis eyes off this aim, although he
longed to thc strong men of every countr?
I ~bn, and io-raim a n form
often kept it concealed behind a
t i ~i : imp?i$ 11- faumrc. Anyme
Mussolini in Italy was a prime example, a dictator wh
lo w,o he b ~ ~ d mr 01 veil of tactical maneu~ers.
I kr e , the kev ih cpns ihe
received openly admiring commentary even from libera
To reach it, Hitler first had to
dor Wolff, editor-in-chief of the Berlina Tagieblotc, and socialis
=iwaokne%. bi wi l i and mer" lHit establish Kationaf Socialist rule ir-
Kurt Hiller. If Hitler was totally mi judged by the public,
reversibly and makc the party a
cause he was in fact not an ordinary politician but an ide
ominant presence eveq-where in thc country What is usually re-
natic and revolutionary. The traditional concepts of Europe
ferred t o as the "seizure of power"was in reality a process that took a
were foreign to him; they meant nothing to him in any c
a r and a half t o complete. 'The first step consisted of eliminating the
246 German Megol omani a German Megol omani o 247
mained for nonconforn~ing w~ i t -
ers and artists until the outbrcak
C C ~ Y O) -mcer' ex&ted,
Of WJI.
The battle for hearts and minds
continued. At the universities, m-
5 b. 4 ~oi i ona! j oc i ni ; ~~ je congenial prokssors and faci~lty
lone dkh h d i m i a n r ond
0-4 Ge:mnr prsesed lhe .rm
members wcre dismissed and of-
hot endd i hcn lo rule ihe
ten folred out of the ct)unti-):
vho leacalkd M oompioa
,mn,, ruc;ol
while no small nuinbcr of their
iecde-itscommandad
cr~lleagues hastened t o place the
H:mmlei, Himm!ei guve h15
:i .ha oddsoral name of institutions of higher learning,
( m o w bi k o d ahowed
which had once existed far from
1s for "pnrilive"
the tumult of day-to-day politic.,
at thc disposal of the new rulers in
broiir, shirts. Similar devclopmellb occurred within the churches. In
Lutheran Church the German Christian movcment flourished,
ich took its orientation from the racist-nationalist ideology and
ircr-principle of the Nazis. At the Barmen Synod held in May i 934
opponents formed the Confessing Church, whose members
.lc:-cly attacked the National Socialis~s despite government repri-
'iiitl arrests. Sympathy for the new regimc was not lacking among
e Catholic cl era, especially after the concortlat signctl with the
tican on July 20, 1933. Yet resistance also increased within thc Ro-
an Catholic Chui-ch as news spread of the Nazis' euthanasia plans,
its height with issuance of thc papal encyclical Mir brenncridcr
rge (With deep anxiety) in 1937.
Where attempts to silence intellectual leaders did not suffice, state
rror set in. It is associated ahove all with thc names Heinrich
or music declared "un-German" and attacked a? "degene
lmler and Reinhard Heydrich, and with the SS (Schurasraffel, de-
ter). From September 1933 on, cultural life in Germany
enst: Formation); this elite Natioiial Socialist "security unit" became
manipulated and made to serve the needs of the Nation
e supreme police force of the Third Reich, an all-powerful inswu-
state by Joseph Goehbels, minister of propaganda, through
nt for punishing, terrori~,in% and purging the population of unde-
created National Chamber of Culture, although some latitn
Sirable elements. Its headquarters on Prince Albrecht Sweet in Berlin
252 Gsrmon Megol omani a
housed adn~inistrative ofEces and
~crlabohnl in t he~ermun
turture chambers, the main ofice
19"'
Pions lor suprhi j hwqr be
of the Gestapo (the shortened A~~, , , , n,odai d-1
form of CEheime STAuuPOlizei, Se- ie0" weirmr
con~n~c! ~on of he Br t t uuiobu
cret State Police), and the hcad to run lrom amb burg lo ~a
uor inlerrupld ay (ha Greo
office of Keich Security. The cam-
ihe Nuiionoi Social,sxr, ,h,,of
paign against enemies of the re- P"~S Osc'n p r d d conrl
turned them alo a speooculur
gilne was managed from Prince p,q(iiam in 1936 O S ~ U 120.
iylbrecht ~ t ~ ~ . ~ t : political, ideo. we* e" ' pl vd on pqm. and
visors p ~ , ~ a s h / d i r p l n k wwi l
logical, and racial enemies, mean- in cedar e gi w wen mere ,no
mtltlory lind drcl qi c voiue of ih
inp first and foremost Jews. TIC SS
lo ili3 srnoil, i,,
spread its nets all over the country,
' 930s the om*dnlol
s i n s
conrliuclion woa red&. 30 Ihal
rrom police (lepartments to the
h , , .,j , , m, , w io! sc.ou id be in
sinister world of tlie concentratio~l
indualiy
camps. The SS also contained a sprxial unit at the personal disposa
the Fiihrer that latrr formed the core of the wartime i vg
(Armed SS) and maintained tics with the Race anil Kesettl
I leadquarters, the lmreaucratic division formed to carry out
racial policies.
The muddletl Manichean racial rluc~-ine of National So
quired as a foil for "Aryans," thc bringers of light and redc
group of people who merely by belonging to a particular "ra
hodicd everything evil, bad, and deviant. The National Social'
no difficulty in identifying a group t o occupy the position of o
givcn Europe's thousand-yea= t~ndition in this rcspect: It
Je.u,s. The persecution of the Jews was not planned and prepar
in advance; it depended on circumstances both abroad and w
country, but it always constituted one of the regime's ul aching fevcr pitch with the Keichskrinallnochc, the night of shattered
logical aims. The campaign madc use of terror and propa glass, on Noven~ber 9, 1938.
tions designed by the party to appear as if they had erupted s In alternation with such tactic-5, the government imposed new laws
ously from the population, "from below:'beginning with th from above." Among the very first was the Law for Restoration of the
of Jewish merchants organized by Gocbbels on April 1, 19 rofcssional Civil Service, which empowered the government to dis-
. .
. .
. . ,.
254 Ger mon Megal omani a , .." ,:&
miss Jewish officials, followed by the l)di:nse Law of May 21 ayl)(:als to tradition played a major role in this success, on occasions
excluding Jr:ws from military service. The remaining rights of je,., sc;:h as I'otsdam Day on kpril2 1,1933, when the governing coalition
were greatly recluad with the proclalnation of thc Nu~~emberg L ~ > ~ ~ 1)ctwcen revolutionary National Socialists and Yrussian-cot~servative
on September 15, 1935, which made proof of Aryan descel~t Gernian Nationalists was ccle1)rated by a manipulatory but effective
requisite ibr exercising the rights of citizens or holding elective invocation of the spirit of Frederick the Great, ox- when the annual
they deprived J<:tr,s of full citizenship, and prohilited ma t,arvest thanksgiving was celebrated on the Biickeberg in Wesq>halia
tween Jews and non-Jews. These measures, a twisted perve ,?.ith splendid tributes to old agricultural customs that helped bind
the rule oflaw, created a juridical foundation for permanent d the loyalties of the agrarian middle class to the new state.
nation and persecution of German Jows. The staging of political events, the transformation of slogans into
Persecution and violence were one side of the regime, en magnificent theater, and the insertion of potent symbolism into ev-
and fascination the other. It began with the fact that hardly pryday l i f c r he s e were techniques the government had perfected as
group, political interest, or collective hope existed that the N never before in German history. From the Olyorpic Games in Berlin
Soaalists dirl not promote or furnish with some benefit. Blue in 1936 t o the annual party rallies in Nurcmberg, the National Social-
workers were impressed by spectacular job-a-eation program ist regime celebrated the gi-andeor of the nation and the indissoluble
the construction of the autobahns, improvements in workers' hen hands of comrnuniq- with precisely choreographed mass parades,
fits, and frre-time activities provided hy the party's own rccreat ceremonies reminiscent of religious services, and magic rituals of re-
department, whose slogan was Kroji u'urch Frende, strength througl dcmption that affected the participants deeply. Not even the British
joyment. Retail mcrchants profited from the fact that their co ambassador Sir Nevile Henclerson could resist their spell completely;
tion, the despised big departmcnt stores, were required to pay hc reported from Nuremherg that he found one performance "both
taxes, and rnrmhers of the skilled trades appreciated the s solemn and beautiful,"anrl the cfkct ol'thc: light show "\ as something
measul-es limiting the oumb?~ of new master's licenses that m likc being inside a cathedral of ice."
issncd. Farmers welcomed protcctivc tariffs and domestic price 'She "cathedral of ice'created with dozens of antiaircdt spotlights
ports, whilc industrialists were grateful for the abolition of workers' revealed, more than any other symbol, the dual character of the Nwi
pal-ticipaticm in decision-making, the absence of conflicts with labor appeal to the emotions: the last word in modern technology coupled
unions over wages, and d ~ e rising number ot' p>~cmment con ~i i t h archaic ritual. This contrast was typical or the way the Third
particularly in the arrnarnents industry. Muchthe same applie Reich presented itself, with autobalins, the Silver Arrow model Mer-
tually cl,ery profession, class, and type of organization. Almo cedes Benz, the first inexpensive radio receiver, the affoi-dahle Volks-
"member of the national community" benefited in some way, n wagen, and the world's first jet-propelled plane, on the one hand, and
materially, hut-what was perhaps more important-in ter Germanic sagas, castles of the Teutonic knights where the Nazi elite
ideals a111 a sense of solidarit).. was educated, and solstice celebrations on the other. The newest in-
The latter lay at the heart of the National Socialists' succ ventions and invocatio~~ of the spirits of thc dead flowed together.
the country. Unlike democracy, which had been perceived as austere The undeniable approval felt by the majority of die population for
and rationalistic, the dictatorship satidicd pcople's emotions. Skillfill the Hidcr regime was increased by its successes in foreign affairs, a
f the Reichrwel~r that his policy woukl be "conquest of new Lcbenrroum
,he East and its ruthless Germanization": unfortunatelv we know
rg about how the generals responded. In a tactically cle
signaled German \\,illingncss to seek rapprochement
:ver move
with for-
,ign powers; this muted the hostile responsc t o his sei7.ure of power in
the Western democracies, while all the time he was pushing forward
111 a plebiscite on January 13, 1935, the inhabitants of the Saar dis-
voted to rejoin the Reich, and on June 18 a British-German
asreement on the size of their respective na~ral fleets was signed; both
tIa.se events tcnded to show Hider $1 the light of a su(r~essfu1 politi-
cian, while the western powers appeared willing to retreat. Rounding
li' this impression was Hider's announcement on Mal-ch 16 that
compu1x)ry military service would bc rcintraduced in Germany in
conjunction with rearmament, in violation of thc Treaty of Versaillcs.
\,car latcr the army, now renamed the Wohrinacht, occupied the
Rilineland, and Britain ancl France offcrcd no more than formal pro-
tests. That same year the Rome-Berlin Ads was created and the
Antj-Cornintcrn I'act signed with Japan, both of then1 alliances with
an t,xpressly anti-Soviet thrust.
Youth Serve$ the Fohier
sharp contrast from the record of
; KM' ~<, C U '9391 IIitlcr leiled to achieve the desirctl rapprochement wit11 Brit-
T 4 HiibrYo.lh, which war pr
its unfortunate democratic prede- olhcGl .r.;.le organirot
air?, however, first of all because Joachim von Ribhcntrop, ihe Ger-
cessors. ~h~ general Public failed
cl ew+ exploited the on(jngs o mall ambassador in London and later foreign minister, was pursuing
dien and yomg pepk ia occ
t o recognize the broader aims Hit- group rind ianoa.ic mmpli:e ex
pcnly anti-English policies, and s ca~nd becausc the German-Japa-
ler was his fOreip
:" I940 membe:rhip in he Hibc Yo
nest: alliance thrcatcned British interests in the Far Eart. Relations
mr,erponding Aaiacioi.c~~ d &man
policy, however: From his first k c m e mondoioy liitle: expbined
coaled still further after Germany intervened in d1c Spanish Civil
$ion d the Hide You* 01 !he pa
day as chancellor he wanted wa,; ,935: .h vi l l ,hejung
\Val; where it could test the prq~aredness of its air force, the Lufrwafi.
&rough he intended not Folk7 codeir uili w!e: the H: At the same time the German Foreign Office noted with interest the
t l q wi i rew, for dury in he
only t o reverse the results of the .,d the graupJ ~d he SA
egrec to which the British seemed anxious to avoid being drawn into
?ieaty ill^^ but to expand men *"I1 d d ~ Y'epO"'a onflia on the Continent. Hitlcr had reason t o assume he would
Cq r . cnd in lese ocganirosoni thw
the borders of Germany and estab- mobre into r?'dien of we pope."
ave a largcly free hand in carrying out his plans to expand Germany's
lish world dominance for the Aryan race. Only four day5 after his a
,,.
., .,,
pointment he announced with co~nplete candor to the comma$
By 1936 prcparatiom for the coming war were in full wing. Hitler
258 German Megol emoni o Germon Megal amani o 259
,...ene. The German populatiort I-cacted with jul)ilation t o the an-
of Austria, and so did the majority of Austrians. The separa-
of 1866 hall heen overcome; Great Germany, the goal that both
liberals in the German il'ational Assembly of 1848 and the Soda1
emocrab of the 1919 National Assembly in Weimar had supported,
s now a reality. The nightmarish character of this reality was per-
d at first only by a minority of Austrian Jews, liberals, commit-
d Catholics, and sot:ialists who had failed to leave the country in
~ c ; they were swiftly rounded up in unannounced raids and ar-
The success of the ;lnschh$ showed Hider that he had Iittlc t o fear
om the Westcrn powers, and so only two weeks later, on March 28,
he made the deasion to annex Czechoslovakia as well. Two days after
Grorlh d Nazi Pa? Mem
he sent orders to the U'chrmocht to preparc to crush C~echoslo\,a-
wrote a memorandum creating l91%l945
a; the date of the iuwasion was set for October 1, 1938. Once again
a bur-year plan, saying that the
o,,he
?stern rcsistanrr was we& and limited to diplomatic protests in a
German economy must be ready
0150 i l the qu-her
ring in Munich on Septemhel- 29, Britain, France, and Italy ac-
ted German annexation of the Sudetenland-a ring-shaped terri-
i nc r c ai i ~ rlawtya'ier '928. or
tor) complising virtually the entire Crech-German border region,
tion were s~~borclinated t o this and ecol;>nic ciisa wrrsned. o
hich had a large German-speaking population--in order t o avoid
sesirly oiler lte Nciir come to
goal. Yet in a meeting with the for-
iC33, ihr ornDalon
ar. A British-Gcrman nonaggression pact signetl the next day hy
British I'rirnc Minister Neville Chamberlain and Hider strengthened
the armed forces on November 5,
.,< ,,, hYod SV i945 a c gencral conviction in the Western countries that Hider would be
I 937, a of which is con-
cdul: Gcc~onf -0s 0 renbe,
ontcnt with a compromise and accept an offer of "colonial appease-
tained in thc "Mossbach Protocol: Hitlcr's plans for expa
ent" meaning restoration to Germany of its former colonies.
Europe ran into resistance. The fore@ minister, Baron
It was the furthest thing from Hitlcr's mind. ;it the same time he
von Neurah, pointed to the international risks, and Baro as ~fiscussin~ peace with Chamherlain, the ''2 plan" was being de-
von Fritsch, commander-in-chief oC the army, doubted
loped to Luikl up a fleet to attack England. On March 15, 1939,
he Wehrmachr occupied tlle ''1-ump Czech state:' dcmonstratiug the
take extensive military operations. A year later both critics
thlessness of diplomatic agreements between the Western de-
[>laced by mure accommodating men.
ocracies and the Hitler dictatorship. Only now did ~r i t ai n rousc it-
On March 12, 1938, the German Pi4hchrmochr marclled into
if t o take counter-measures hy guaranteeing Polislr independence
after assurances had been received that Britain and Italy wo
d beyond that attempting to revive the old preu,ar British-Russian
260 Germon Megolomania German Megolomonia 261
li!ri,o Bnuac f4urenbeig, S!J:mei Verlog ' 936)
Paris for German Soldiers
Nelioaal Socio'iit antSemitisn wor mwe i:ble ior we?; ieo~cr:ureof he moderr v
gbml t h o eoiliei loins: idlgious I.oilrlb! to
made h m :ed onxious. Fo: .his iec
almost reached his goal. He could
On me 22, lG4C. the Geimn b!i:zkriw
ward Jews a: 'ear: adni:led ihe pubi l i h. o! c:crd. Jews hod .o 0+ "~pcrmted 1.0
F , ~ ~ ~ ~ vros bi , on crrrisice,
not conceive of the possibility that
ccnvenion, and c;ilwol horiil,iy the psibiiity vian comn.nihj ' :he Nozj
ske f-r o;iei FnrceGerrnan am-
d assimilation. Hiilcii o?l6emit:im, hy cq- rrer I"Pne Qorm Trcopei*j spcr m, d o
the Western powers would pre-
y%ri mrlie. in the io:eit of Cam-
!,asi, riigno;izeo an enhs grcup on the borts wri i c~orl y bmcl mo primilive form
e!n F,cnce ond i h br el w vent him &om carving up Poland
of usotleiob;e dorocterrliis: A v n e wb~i e
Lmi!ic o.opcgaodo: its pistishers in
ei wsie picceri er:der Germon niii.
foieoeom had p c l k e d Judaism .emoined :nes &ig hiwght oo: on i!luur~& e d k
dmiirlltra~io2, ~ c d he again. According to report of
copcrk*; a jmu, and !he obiect cf hozi i p-3- w:ided Ti cv ke'neii Fuchr od arbn
of F.ancs \vur ywemed by o
ncld deluriau. 'iil!er imogned thd jewi ,+,ere :&:ern Jud bi s e f m id! VTiiit ro i o ~
the Carl Jacob Burckhardt, High
lnco odnroiriioho~ wdrr ivlasihal
ai w,rk evey~l er e undemi.ing !he l ai i l c- gee" heali. ono no Je-uon h;s wtn"]. ,?. iih/ , , I polis, u n d e r ~ ma n Conimissioner of the League of
tiorr d ~ ~ i e b ond he consciered.bvs iesoon.
cmmand, p o d u olrodive D
Nations in Danzig, in a meeting on
idizrs t1.01 $!rid regulo~ionr had lo
sued to i:mr virits by membersol the August 1 1 , 1939, Hitler spoke to
alliance. However, Hitler got the jump on them. Foreign Minis e
him openly about his purpose in all
Ribbentrop and Stalin signed an agreement creating a Nazi
is: 411 he wanted was to subject Russia. But if the West was too
nonaggression pact on .4ugust 23. In a secret protocol Hitler an
lix~cllcrl to support him, he would make terms with Russia, defeat the
lin divided eastern Europe into two spheres of influence; the li
Vat, and attack the Soviet Union afterward.
demarcation ran through the middle of Poland. Hitler believed h
On September 1, 1939, German troops marched into Poland, and
262 German Megal omoni o German Megol omoni o 263
.O ~aord for NSDAP Announcwnentr. German v i c t o ~ over Poland,
re in Aparhenf Hourer and
aided by the Soviet in~zasion, was
,,me on ti?, 01- iF331
achieved in only five weeks. Ger-
Gemoy ).he seie. the pan/, ond
xopla
rupaoreo te lev ood be many and the Soxpiet union di-
m.. fie ?' f l f aund' T% e re&
vided Poland along the Bug River,
ddrwr +a enhre paa'olioa. In fhs
1039 he Nazi P ~ Y divided ~ecnon.,
and while the SS and Gestapo and
the Soviet NKVD (the People's
>e Ipcpcser, to iephce he ircdi~ooal
nO pr9,in- Bslow b &ue. the Commissariat for Internal Affairs)
.,hi o:gonimjian war subdivided info dir.
crL,,
established control in their respec-
vsl 'b!ockr,' to which filh, houss tive the ~ ~ j ~ h turned
o:!e~ bd i ~ve di i i i c ~. ~ ob-oining
its military might ag.?inst wester~i
o w n on he p;ivate l i b 6 amv
Europc. Reginning on itpril 9,
n llleir n w : hq could keep on eyr
~oaulo,on'i lovullv ihs iegirne art? 1940, Gcl.man troops bcgan occu-
ticipating British and French plans
o scud n.oops to thcir defense; this sccured Germany's northern
ank frorn attack and gave dic Germans direct access to the Atlantic.
n atttack on the Ketherlands, Belgium, and France follo\\,ed on May
seventeen days later the Red Arnly crossed the R~lish border
10. lb the surprise of military experts, including the lradcrs of the
east. In contrast to 1914, the rnood ofthe German public, an
Cl;chrmnch~, thc western campaign proved a triumph for Hitlcr's saat-
the Reichsiog delcgates in their Nazi Party uniiorms, was soln
gj-, This success not only placed him at the peak of his
in
of them belicved that this military advcnt u~ wonid end we
Germany l>nt also silenccd opposition within the army officers' corps.
War-y to Ijitler's expectations, the Western po\vcrs did n
c had pi ned unlimited authority in military affairs, and whatever
back but dedal-ed war on Gcrmany instead. The Second W
esistance t o the regime still existed xithin Germany bccame dis-
had begun, intentionally provoked by Ilitler's desire for con
triggered hy Stalin's compliaty, and aided by the West's failure to
The next goal of the war was conquest of Great Britain. Hitler
sis( German aggression until it was too late. Despitc all dle a
,ontinued to hope that the Britishu.ould fall into line, and it I\GJ.S with
and war crimes committed in the following years by all par
reluctance that he gax8c the order to begin the Battle of Britain, which
it is necessary t o keep in mind that decisive responsibility for the out-
d not end in the triumph for the German Lgtwafc that its com-
break of war lay with German leadership, and to a much lesser
ander-in-chief, Herinann Gbring, had promised his Fiihrer. Yet Hit-
with Soviet leaders, while the Western powers engaged in j
r's main goal remained the war against the Soviet Union, as he de-
self-derensc.
dared t o the leaders of the Wehrmocht on July 31, 1940. Utlable to
Wall," a line of defense that would run from Archangelsk to
pian Sea, he intended to seal ofrhis huge realm from .Anglo-A
attack through bastions in the Middle East and northwest Afi
German Megolomonio 267
In western Europe, military occupation ibllowcd tllr classic
orcetl to spend time together in bomb shelters. All these factors
a large extent, although the Gestapo and Security Service
ded to wear down class distinctions, and the population grew
dienstFHeydrich's intelligence organization-comrnitte
ore homogeneous, as millions of people listened t o the same slo-
tacks against the civilian population, contrary to interna I
pns from the ndio, stood in line for rationed goods, and took in the
their pursuit of partisans and also in actions t o round up
insipid entertainment off~:red on the radio and in movie theatcrs as a
gypsies. In the east the SS left the population in no dou
stnction from the xZat What remained for individuals was remeat
what it could expect in thc event of a German victory. Poland offere,
om the private sphere, while they avoided contact with the outside
an opportunity t o convert racist ideolugy into decds. The Polish,
rld as much as possible and concentrated on the most urgent task:
per classes were systematically killed and millions of Jews d
nding ways to surlive.
from their homes to malie room for ethnic Gerlxans fi-o
Meanwhile, the regime was making pians for the futul-e. A massive!.
Europe. Migration on a huge scale was set in motion, prec
project to rel~uilrl the capital of the Reich was undrrtaken in thc
of 1945. Similar events took place in the occupied port
midst of the war, in preparation for the final victory: A gigantic world
viet Union. Behind the German lines, the Wehrnrnch capital city, Germania, would arise on thc site of the old Berlin. con^
sorted t o tactics prohibited by international conventions far
structioil of a broad-gauge railway network was begun in Europe that
ten than it did in the west; it also bad the support of the
was to stretch t o the Llrals arid make thc PI-evious railroads looL like
Servim. The latter executed Soviet pcditical officials (con1
toga. SS architects created plans for gargantuan monuments io the
without any pretense of formalities and systematically bunt
dead that woilld also serve as "border foruessesnin Africa and on the
Jews. Russian prisoners of war were crammed into camps whe
ditions wcrc designed t o give the vast majority no chance of sur
.ff~e regime's main plans, howe\,er, concentrated on systematic
For the German population in hese years thc u-ar
elimination of its declared enemy, the Jews of Europe. Hitler had al-
widespread hunger, as had been the case in the First World
y a ~ n o u ~ ~ c r d on January 30, 1939, that a world war u,ould result
1944 no serious food shortages existed, for the occupicd
11 "the destruction of the Jewish race in Europe." His war was not a
we1.e ruthlessly stripped of t bdr own resources. But th
battle for hegemony of thc type Enropc had known from time imme-
tensified the tendencies of the totalitarian state, bringing \.
morial; it was a racial war. Hitier believed only select, hon~ogencons
militarization of public life, increasing organization of the
p~:oples were capable of establishing a lasting empire, and that the
private sphere, and social leveling. When rationing w
ryan race was hindered in its pursuit of one through the divisive and
the government understood how to exploit envy and dars diffe
corrupting nature of its age-old adversary, thc Jews. The Weimar Re-
for its own purposes. There were appeals t o solidarity withi
ublic and We$tern democracies, he was convinced, had in large
"commnnity of the people"; party and state organizations
easure succumbed to this "rot" (Zersetzungl, which broke down
ated that included virtually every citizen in the cnd; block
ealthy racial communities the way bacteria attacked a healthy body.
kept an eye on their neighborhoods, and neighbors were enc
e S o ~ e t Union had the first go\.ernment supposedly permeated by
to spy on one another. When the Allicd air raids began, peopl
ewish influence, representing a source of infection for the rest of the
270 German Megolomania
aorld. In Hitler's sick logic it folhnved incscapahiy that the Jews must
bc removed from the healthy German racial community, the "body of
d ~ c people," and that tlic Germans must seek Lehcnsraum in the wide
expanses of eastern Europe, space t o which their superiority entitled
them. There they would play the role of masters, while the Slavs, an-
other allegedly inferior race, would take the pnrt of colonial slaves.
The world war had to be Sought, according to this demented logic, in
order t o exterminate the Jews.
The German leadership thus dk! not see revision of the outcome of
thc First World War as its primary goal in this war, as many of Hitleri
nservative political allies helirvcd and as a number of people still
bic1icr.e today. Nor was the goal political dominance in the sense of
classic European C<.rreign policy, conquest of territo11)- representing
addit.ional economic resources and larger markets, or release of inter-
nai tensions in military undertakings. None of the rationales foor war
own iu thc history of Europe up t o that point apjilics to German ac-
us in World War [I. Instead thc goal was, in Nit1i.l-'s own ~: or ds,
"initiation of the final stage of battle against thc mortal cncmy of
Jc~vish-Bolshevisln" in the Eurasian dominions or National Socialism.
. ~
Ihe whole war effort prior to the campaign against the Soviet
Union had therefore amounted tn nothing more than tactical pvepara-
cs. The attack on Poland was designed t o create a styirig area for
the JVehmmucht's march to the east; the invasion of Francc was intended
eliminate the danger of attack fron~ the rear, as were Hitler's ef-
Group of W e e
l i si x hussbount, 19441
orts to reach accommodation with Great Britain by dividing up the
vorld. As soon as Poland was conquered, the Germans had begun
rounding up millions of Jews and confining them t o ghettos in the ma-
iriendi hel pd iiz artis Felix Nusrbovm yellow rlorlewr wan icrced ia w a
l i BO4: 94J! oh-! his bmi b s hide in ih~r woman I X I X , ~ ~ lhem h o iiswe d ior Polish cities. iust as thev had earlier com~el l ed lews within their
-
poinling he hos 6eoi ctd himself as on o.:hc imp. ihs Ncsbumr ' tdirg place war ie
duxlwr. wih a prqei shad ond yarwike; he pared. o d ,hey were deported to Auahwi!z
own country t o wear i dent ~f yi n~ badges But all these measures werc
riondr belore a cop o, ,which the cnurs d on jub 31. 1944, in he 10.i iionrporl d arir
erely preliminary, a preparation for the next step undertaken in di-
the Luu~an fmnf has been iloced, w:lh o hosd m e i s to reach the camp. n~ .ere killec
raised ar if to war* aii o +irerr~. The txy in ih snot:ty before he rrmp adrri nl raj t r Z I ~ ~ F F ~
ct conjunction with the war on the Soviet Union: the deliberate and
foreground is sl j & ng :he +Is 6 penec~- garring pnwnes in O&r 194
emorseless extermination of the Jews as a prerequisite for the estab-
l dme nt of German world dommation
The Nazis had already acquired some experience in rhc ea7t was knoxm, and hundreds of thousands of soldiers on
the euthanasia program had gone into operation in Oct
leave from tile Russian kont talker1 about mass shootings. At
the course of which some 80,000 people with mental , least the general had to have some suspidons of
been shot, gasscd, or givr.11 fatal injections. The procedure was no,, hat was
but habitual defense mechanisms and falls-
be extended t o the Jcws. It is thought that FIitler gave th us justifications pro\*ed strongcr than consciousness of guilt and re-
the "linal solution" t o thc "Jewish question" in the surnmc
The exact timing is a matter of controversy, for Hitler ten
on criminal directives orally, avoiding their inclusion
ords that mnld later betray him
After about six months of technical and administrat
tions, the heads of the agencies involved inct at a villa by th
a lake in Berlin, the Wnnnsee, on January 20, 1942, t o make tl
arrangements. Organized inass murder had already been unde
for somc time, however. Security Servicc unit? (SD-Einsutzgr
Russia had been carrying out mas exrcutions by firing sq
Lhe Germans had conquered the territory, and the first euth
peru arrived at the Cllelrnuo concentration camp in
to provide "special treatment" to 100,000 ]ews deemed inc
forced labor. Murder began at the Relzrc camp in Octobet
gassing at Auschwitz in January 1942.
The entire orgzanization of the mass-murder industry was
camouflage and deception from the stal-t; after the
had protested against the euthanasia program, the re
its most heinous crimes in secret. Nevcrthcless, the genocid
European Jews would not have been possible without the dire
direct participation of numerous government agenci
and departments, that is to say, a large number of people. Ev
extent of the extermination of the Jews, and the details of i
tion, did not become known during the war, there were enon
ences t o it and information about it t o make the existence of
termination campaign a matter of publichowledge within Ge ma
The dcportations took place in full public view; the transport
274 Germon Megolomania