14th Amendment Treatise

1559
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS GUARANTEED
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENSHIP,
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
CONTENTS
Page
Secti on 1. Ri ghts Guaranteed ................................................................................................... 1565
Ci ti zens of the Uni ted States ............................................................................................ 1565
Pri vi l eges and I mmuni ti es ................................................................................................. 1568
Due Process of Law ............................................................................................................ 1572
The Devel opment of Substanti ve Due Process .......................................................... 1572
Persons Defi ned ................................................................................................. 1578
Pol i ce Power Defi ned and Li mi ted ...................................................................... 1579
Li berty ................................................................................................................ 1581
Li berty of Contract ...................................................................................................... 1581
Regul atory Labor Laws General l y ...................................................................... 1581
Laws Regul ati ng Hours of Labor ........................................................................ 1586
Laws Regul ati ng Labor i n Mi nes ........................................................................ 1586
Laws Prohi bi ti ng Empl oyment of Chi l dren i n Hazardous Occupati ons .......... 1587
Laws Regul ati ng Payment of Wages .................................................................. 1587
Mi ni mum Wage Laws .......................................................................................... 1587
Workers Compensati on Laws ............................................................................. 1588
Col l ecti ve Bargai ni ng ........................................................................................... 1591
Regul ati on of Busi ness Enterpri ses: Rates, Charges, and Condi ti ons of Servi ce .. 1594
Busi ness Affected Wi th a Publ i c I nterest ....................................................... 1594
Nebbia v. New York .............................................................................................. 1596
Judi ci al Revi ew of Publ i cl y Determi ned Rates and Charges ................................... 1597
Devel opment ......................................................................................................... 1597
Li mi tati ons on Judi ci al Revi ew ........................................................................... 1600
The Ben Avon Case .............................................................................................. 1602
Hi story of the Val uati on Questi on ...................................................................... 1603
Regul ati on of Publ i c Uti l i ti es (Other Than Rates) ................................................... 1607
I n General ............................................................................................................. 1607
Compul sory Expendi tures: Grade Crossi ngs, and the Li ke .............................. 1608
Compel l abl e Servi ces ........................................................................................... 1610
Safety Regul ati ons Appl i cabl e to Rai l roads ....................................................... 1612
Statutory Li abi l i ti es and Penal ti es Appl i cabl e to Rai l roads ............................ 1613
Regul ati on of Corporati ons, Busi ness, Professi ons, and Trades .............................. 1614
Corporati ons ......................................................................................................... 1614
Busi ness i n General ............................................................................................. 1615
Laws Prohi bi ti ng Trusts, Di scri mi nati on, Restrai nt of Trade ......................... 1615
Laws Preventi ng Fraud i n Sal e of Goods and Securi ti es ................................. 1616
Banki ng, Wage Assi gnments and Garni shment ................................................ 1618
I nsurance .............................................................................................................. 1619
Mi scel l aneous Busi nesses and Professi ons ........................................................ 1622
Protecti on of State Resources ..................................................................................... 1624
1560 AMENDMENT 14 RI GHTS GUARANTEED
Secti on 1. Ri ghts Guaranteed Conti nued
Due Process of Law Conti nued
Oi l and Gas ........................................................................................................... 1624
Protecti on of Property and Agri cul tural Crops .................................................. 1625
Water ..................................................................................................................... 1626
Fi sh and Game ..................................................................................................... 1627
Ownershi p of Real Property: Li mi tati ons, Ri ghts .................................................... 1628
Zoni ng and Si mi l ar Acti ons ................................................................................. 1628
Estates, Successi on, Abandoned Property .......................................................... 1630
Heal th, Safety, and Moral s ......................................................................................... 1632
Safety Regul ati ons ............................................................................................... 1632
Sani tati on ............................................................................................................. 1633
Food, Drugs, Mi l k ................................................................................................ 1633
I ntoxi cati ng Li quor .............................................................................................. 1634
Regul ati on of Motor Vehi cl es and Carri ers ........................................................ 1634
Protecti ng Moral i ty .............................................................................................. 1636
Vested Ri ghts, Remedi al Ri ghts, Pol i ti cal Candi dacy .............................................. 1636
Control of Local Uni ts of Government ....................................................................... 1637
Taxi ng Power ............................................................................................................... 1637
General l y ............................................................................................................... 1637
Publ i c Purpose ...................................................................................................... 1638
Other Consi derati ons Affecti ng Val i di ty: Excessi ve Burden; Rati o of
Amount Of Benefi t Recei ved ............................................................................ 1638
Estate, Gi ft and I nheri tance Taxes .................................................................... 1639
I ncome Taxes ........................................................................................................ 1640
Franchi se Taxes ................................................................................................... 1640
Severance Taxes ................................................................................................... 1640
Real Property Taxes ............................................................................................. 1641
Juri sdi cti on to Tax ...................................................................................................... 1642
Sal es/Use Taxes .................................................................................................... 1643
Land ...................................................................................................................... 1643
Tangi bl e Personal ty ............................................................................................. 1643
I ntangi bl e Personal ty ........................................................................................... 1646
Transfer (I nheri tance, Estate, Gi ft) Taxes ......................................................... 1650
Corporate Pri vi l ege Taxes ................................................................................... 1654
I ndi vi dual I ncome Taxes ..................................................................................... 1655
Corporate I ncome Taxes: Forei gn Corporati ons ................................................ 1656
I nsurance Company Taxes .................................................................................. 1657
Procedure i n Taxati on ................................................................................................. 1659
General l y ............................................................................................................... 1659
Noti ce and Heari ng i n Rel ati on to Taxes ........................................................... 1659
Noti ce and Heari ng i n Rel ati on to Assessments ............................................... 1660
Col l ecti on of Taxes ............................................................................................... 1662
Suffi ci ency and Manner of Gi vi ng Noti ce ........................................................... 1664
Suffi ci ency of Remedy .......................................................................................... 1665
Laches ................................................................................................................... 1665
Emi nent Domai n ......................................................................................................... 1666
Substanti ve Due Process and Noneconomi c Li berty ................................................ 1666
Aborti on ................................................................................................................ 1669
Pri vacy: I ts Consti tuti onal Di mensi ons .............................................................. 1679
Fami l y Rel ati onshi ps ........................................................................................... 1688
Li berty I nterests of Retarded and Mental l y I l l : Commi tment and Treat-
ment ................................................................................................................... 1690
Secti on 1. Ri ghts Guaranteed Conti nued
Due Process of Law Conti nued
Ri ght to Di e ....................................................................................................... 1692
Procedural Due Process: Ci vi l ................................................................................................... 1693
Some General Cri teri a ................................................................................................ 1693
Anci ent Use and Uni formi ty ............................................................................... 1693
Equal i ty ................................................................................................................. 1694
Due Process, Judi ci al Process, and Separati on of Powers ................................ 1694
Power of the States to Regul ate Procedure ............................................................... 1695
General l y ............................................................................................................... 1695
Commencement of Acti ons .................................................................................. 1696
Pl eas i n Abatement .............................................................................................. 1696
Defenses ................................................................................................................ 1697
Amendments and Conti nuances ......................................................................... 1697
Costs, Damages, and Penal ti es ........................................................................... 1698
Statutes of Li mi tati on .......................................................................................... 1699
Evi dence and Presumpti ons ................................................................................ 1701
Jury Tri al s ............................................................................................................ 1704
Appeal s .................................................................................................................. 1704
Juri sdi cti on .................................................................................................................. 1705
General l y ............................................................................................................... 1705
I n Personam Proceedi ngs Agai nst I ndi vi dual s .................................................. 1707
Suabi l i ty of Forei gn Corporati ons ....................................................................... 1710
Acti ons i n Rem: Proceedi ngs Agai nst Land ....................................................... 1716
Acti ons i n Rem: Attachment Proceedi ngs .......................................................... 1718
Acti ons i n Rem: Estates, Trusts, Corporati ons .................................................. 1720
Noti ce: Servi ce of Process .................................................................................... 1722
The Procedure Whi ch I s Due Process ........................................................................ 1723
The I nterests Protected: Enti tl ements and Posi ti vi st Recogni ti on .................. 1723
Proceedi ngs i n Whi ch Procedural Due Process Must Be Observed ................. 1732
When I s Process Due ........................................................................................... 1735
The Requi rements of Due Process ...................................................................... 1740
Procedural Due Process: Cri mi nal ........................................................................................... 1745
General l y ...................................................................................................................... 1745
The El ements of Due Process ..................................................................................... 1747
Cl ari ty i n Cri mi nal Statutes: The Voi d-for-Vagueness Doctri ne ..................... 1747
Other Aspects of Statutory Noti ce ...................................................................... 1749
Entrapment .......................................................................................................... 1750
Cri mi nal I denti fi cati on Process ........................................................................... 1752
I ni ti ati on of the Prosecuti on ................................................................................ 1753
Fai r Tri al .............................................................................................................. 1753
Gui l ty Pl eas .......................................................................................................... 1757
Prosecutori al Mi sconduct ..................................................................................... 1758
Proof, Burden of Proof, and Presumpti ons ......................................................... 1761
Sentenci ng ............................................................................................................ 1765
The Probl em of the I ncompetent or I nsane Defendant or Convi ct .................. 1769
Correcti ve Process: Appeal s and Other Remedi es ............................................. 1770
Ri ghts of Pri soners ............................................................................................... 1772
Probati on and Parol e ........................................................................................... 1776
The Probl em of the Juveni l e Offender ............................................................... 1780
The Probl em of Ci vi l Commi tment ..................................................................... 1783
Equal Protecti on of the Laws ................................................................................................... 1786
Scope and Appl i cati on ........................................................................................................ 1786
Equal Protecti on of the Laws Conti nued
Scope and Appl i cati on Conti nued
State Acti on ................................................................................................................. 1786
Persons ...................................................................................................................... 1802
Wi thi n I ts Juri sdi cti on ............................................................................................. 1803
Equal Protecti on: Judgi ng Cl assi fi cati ons by Law .......................................................... 1804
Tradi ti onal Standard: Restrai ned Revi ew ................................................................. 1805
The New Standards: Acti ve Revi ew ........................................................................... 1809
Testi ng Faci al l y Neutral Cl assi fi cati ons Whi ch I mpact on Mi nori ti es .......................... 1815
Tradi ti onal Equal Protecti on: Economi c Regul ati on and Rel ated Exerci ses of the Pol i ce
Powers ..................................................................................................................................... 1821
Taxati on .............................................................................................................................. 1821
Cl assi fi cati on for Purpose of Taxati on ....................................................................... 1821
Forei gn Corporati ons and Nonresi dents .................................................................... 1824
I ncome Taxes ............................................................................................................... 1825
I nheri tance Taxes ........................................................................................................ 1826
Motor Vehi cl e Taxes .................................................................................................... 1826
Property Taxes ............................................................................................................. 1827
Speci al Assessment ..................................................................................................... 1828
Pol i ce Power Regul ati on .................................................................................................... 1829
Cl assi fi cati on ............................................................................................................... 1829
Other Busi ness and Empl oyment Rel ati ons ..................................................................... 1834
Labor Rel ati ons ........................................................................................................... 1834
Monopol i es and Unfai r Trade Practi ces .................................................................... 1835
Admi ni strati ve Di screti on ........................................................................................... 1835
Soci al Wel fare .............................................................................................................. 1836
Puni shment of Cri me .................................................................................................. 1838
Equal Protecti on and Race ........................................................................................................ 1839
Overvi ew .............................................................................................................................. 1839
Educati on ............................................................................................................................ 1840
Devel opment and Appl i cati on of Separate But Equal ........................................... 1840
Brown v. Board of Educati on ..................................................................................... 1842
Browns Aftermath ...................................................................................................... 1843
I mpl ementati on of School Desegregati on .................................................................. 1845
Northern School s: I nter- and I ntradi stri ct Desegregati on ....................................... 1847
Efforts to Curb Busi ng and Other Desegregati on Remedi es ................................... 1852
Termi nati on of Court Supervi si on ............................................................................. 1853
Juri es ................................................................................................................................... 1854
Capi tal Puni shment ........................................................................................................... 1857
Housi ng ............................................................................................................................... 1858
Other Areas of Di scri mi nati on .......................................................................................... 1859
Transportati on ............................................................................................................. 1859
Publ i c Faci l i ti es ........................................................................................................... 1859
Marri age ....................................................................................................................... 1860
Judi ci al System ........................................................................................................... 1860
Publ i c Desi gnati on ...................................................................................................... 1861
Publ i c Accommodati ons .............................................................................................. 1861
El ecti ons ....................................................................................................................... 1861
Permi ssi bl e Remedi al Uti l i zati on of Raci al Cl assi fi cati ons ............................................ 1861
The New Equal Protecti on ........................................................................................................ 1869
Cl assi fi cati ons Meri ti ng Cl ose Scruti ny ............................................................................ 1869
Al i enage and Nati onal i ty ............................................................................................ 1869
Sex ................................................................................................................................ 1875
The New Equal Protecti on Conti nued
Cl assi fi cati ons Meri ti ng Cl ose Scruti ny Conti nued
I l l egi ti macy .................................................................................................................. 1886
Fundamental I nterests: The Pol i ti cal Process ................................................................. 1892
Voter Qual i fi cati ons .................................................................................................... 1893
Access to the Bal l ot ..................................................................................................... 1897
Apporti onment and Di stri cti ng .................................................................................. 1902
Wei ghi ng of Votes ........................................................................................................ 1911
The Ri ght to Travel ............................................................................................................ 1911
Durati onal Resi dency Requi rements ......................................................................... 1911
Marri age and Fami l i al Rel ati ons ...................................................................................... 1914
Poverty and Fundamental I nterests: The I ntersecti on of Due Process and Equal Pro-
tecti on .............................................................................................................................. 1916
General l y ...................................................................................................................... 1916
Cri mi nal Procedure ..................................................................................................... 1918
The Cri mi nal Sentence ............................................................................................... 1920
Voti ng ........................................................................................................................... 1921
Access to Courts .......................................................................................................... 1922
Educati onal Opportuni ty ............................................................................................ 1923
Aborti on ........................................................................................................................ 1925
Secti on 2. Apporti onment of Representati on ........................................................................... 1926
Secti ons 3 and 4. Di squal i fi cati on and Publ i c Debt ................................................................ 1928
Secti on 5. Enforcement .............................................................................................................. 1928
General l y ............................................................................................................................. 1928
State Acti on ......................................................................................................................... 1929
Congressi onal Defi ni ti on of Fourteenth Amendment Ri ghts .......................................... 1933
1565
1
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 40406, 41718, 41920 (1857).
2
The controversy, pol i ti cal as wel l as consti tuti onal , whi ch thi s case sti rred and
sti l l sti rs, i s exempl i fi ed and anal yzed i n the materi al col l ected i n S. KUTLER, THE
DRED SCOTT DECI SI ON: LAW OR POLI TI CS? (1967).
3
That al l persons born i n the Uni ted States and not subject to any forei gn
power, excl udi ng I ndi ans not taxed, are hereby decl ared to be ci ti zens of the Uni ted
States; and such ci ti zens, of every race and col or, wi thout regard to any previ ous
RIGHTS GUARANTEED
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENSHIP, DUE
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
SECTI ON 1. Al l persons born or natural i zed i n the Uni ted
States, and subject to the juri sdi cti on thereof, are ci ti zens of
the Uni ted States and the State wherei n they resi de. No State
shal l make or enforce any l aw whi ch shal l abri dge the pri vi -
l eges or i mmuni ti es of ci ti zens of the Uni ted States; nor shal l
any State depri ve any person of l i fe, l i berty, or property, wi th-
out due process of l aw; nor deny to any person wi thi n i ts juri s-
di cti on the equal protecti on of the l aws.
CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES
I n the Dred Scott Case,
1
Chi ef Justi ce Taney for the Court
rul ed that Uni ted States ci ti zenshi p was enjoyed by two cl asses of
i ndi vi dual s: (1) whi te persons born i n the Uni ted States as de-
scendents of persons, who were at the ti me of the adopti on of the
Consti tuti on recogni zed as ci ti zens i n the several States and [who]
became al so ci ti zens of thi s new pol i ti cal body, the Uni ted States
of Ameri ca, and (2) those who, havi ng been born outsi de the do-
mi ni ons of the Uni ted States, had mi grated thereto and been nat-
ural i zed therei n. The States were competent, he conti nued, to con-
fer state ci ti zenshi p upon anyone i n thei r mi dst, but they coul d not
make the reci pi ent of such status a ci ti zen of the Uni ted States.
The Negro, or Afri can race, accordi ng to the Chi ef Justi ce, was
i nel i gi bl e to attai n Uni ted States ci ti zenshi p, ei ther from a State or
by vi rtue of bi rth i n the Uni ted States, even as a free man de-
scended from a Negro resi di ng as a free man i n one of the States
at the date of rati fi cati on of the Consti tuti on.
2
Congress, fi rst i n
1 of the Ci vi l Ri ghts Act of 1866
3
and then i n the fi rst sentence
1566
AMENDMENT 14 RI GHTS GUARANTEED
condi ti on of sl avery or i nvol untary servi tude . . . shal l have the same ri ght[s]. . . .
Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
4
The proposed amendment as i t passed the House contai ned no such provi si on,
and i t was deci ded i n the Senate to i ncl ude l anguage l i ke that fi nal l y adopted.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2560, 276869, 2869 (1866). The sponsor of the
l anguage sai d: Thi s amendment whi ch I have offered i s si mpl y decl aratory of what
I regard as the l aw of the l and al ready, that every person born wi thi n the l i mi ts
of the Uni ted States, and subject to thei r juri sdi cti on, i s . . . a ci ti zen of the Uni ted
States. I d. at 2890. The l egi sl ati ve hi story i s di scussed at some l ength i n Afroyi m
v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 28286 (1967) (Justi ce Harl an di ssenti ng).
5
Uni ted States v. Wong Ki m Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 688 (1898).
6
Sl aughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wal l .) 36, 74 (1873).
7
Uni ted States v. Wong Ki m Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
8
I d. at 682.
9
I d. at 68082; El k v. Wi l ki ns, 112 U.S. 94, 99 (1884).
10
Uni ted States v. Gordon, 25 Fed. Cas. 1364 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 15,231);
I n re Look Ti n Si ng, 21 F. 905 (C.C.Cal . 1884); Lam Mow v. Nagl e, 24 F.2d 316
(9th Ci r. 1928).
11
387 U.S. 253 (1967). Though the Court uphel d the i nvol untary expatri ati on
of a woman ci ti zen of the Uni ted States duri ng her marri age to a forei gn ci ti zen
i n Mackenzi e v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915), the subject fi rst recei ved extended judi -
ci al treatment i n Perez v. Brownel l , 356 U.S. 44 (1958), i n whi ch by a fi ve-to-four
deci si on the Court uphel d a statute denatural i zi ng a nati ve-born ci ti zen for havi ng
voted i n a forei gn el ecti on. For the Court, Justi ce Frankfurter reasoned that Con-
gress power to regul ate forei gn affai rs carri ed wi th i t the authori ty to sever the re-
l ati onshi p of thi s country wi th one of i ts ci ti zens to avoi d nati onal i mpl i cati on i n
of 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
4
set asi de the Dred Scott
hol di ng i n a sentence decl aratory of exi sti ng ri ghts, and affi rma-
ti ve of exi sti ng l aw. . . .
5
Whi l e cl earl y establ i shi ng a nati onal rul e on nati onal ci ti zen-
shi p and settl i ng a controversy of l ong standi ng wi th regard to the
deri vati on of nati onal ci ti zenshi p, the Fourteenth Amendment di d
not obl i terate the di sti ncti on between nati onal and state ci ti zen-
shi p, but rather preserved i t.
6
The Court has accorded the fi rst
sentence of 1 a constructi on i n accordance wi th the congressi onal
i ntenti ons, hol di ng that a chi l d born i n the Uni ted States of Chi -
nese parents who themsel ves were i nel i gi bl e to be natural i zed i s
neverthel ess a ci ti zen of the Uni ted States enti tl ed to al l the ri ghts
and pri vi l eges of ci ti zenshi p.
7
Congress i ntent i n i ncl udi ng the
qual i fyi ng phrase and subject to the juri sdi cti on thereof, was ap-
parentl y to excl ude from the reach of the l anguage chi l dren born
of di pl omati c representati ves of a forei gn state and chi l dren born
of al i en enemi es i n hosti l e occupati on, both recogni zed excepti ons
to the common-l aw rul e of acqui red ci ti zenshi p by bi rth,
8
as wel l
as chi l dren of members of I ndi an tri bes subject to tri bal l aws.
9
The
l ower courts have general l y hel d that the ci ti zenshi p of the parents
determi nes the ci ti zenshi p of chi l dren born on vessel s i n Uni ted
States terri tori al waters or on the hi gh seas.
10
I n Afroyim v. Rusk,
11
a di vi ded Court extended the force of
thi s fi rst sentence beyond pri or hol di ngs, rul i ng that i t wi thdrew
1567
acts of that ci ti zen whi ch mi ght embarrass rel ati ons wi th a forei gn nati on. I d. at
6062. Three of the di ssenters deni ed that Congress had any power to denatural i ze.
See di scussi on supra pp. 27276. I n the years before Afroyim, a seri es of deci si ons
had curbed congressi onal power.
12
Afroyi m v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 26263 (1967). Four di ssenters, Justi ces Har-
l an, Cl ark, Stewart, and Whi te, controverted the Courts rel i ance on the hi story and
meani ng of the Fourteenth Amendment and reasserted Justi ce Frankfurters pre-
vi ous reasoni ng i n Perez. I d. at 268.
13
Rogers v. Bel l ei , 401 U.S. 815 (1971). Thi s, too, was a fi ve-to-four deci si on,
Justi ces Bl ackmun, Harl an, Stewart, and Whi te, and Chi ef Justi ce Burger i n the
majori ty, and Justi ces Bl ack, Dougl as, Brennan, and Marshal l di ssenti ng.
14
I nsurance Co. v. New Orl eans, 13 Fed. Cas. 67 (C.C.D.La. 1870). Not bei ng
ci ti zens of the Uni ted States, corporati ons accordi ngl y have been decl ared unabl e to
cl ai m the protecti on of that cl ause of the Fourteenth Amendment whi ch secures the
pri vi l eges and i mmuni ti es of ci ti zens of the Uni ted States agai nst abri dgment or i m-
pai rment by the l aw of a State. Ori ent I ns. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 561 (1869).
Thi s concl usi on was i n harmony wi th the earl i er hol di ng i n Paul v. Vi rgi ni a, 75 U.S.
(8 Wal l .) 168 (1869), to the effect that corporati ons were not wi thi n the scope of the
pri vi l eges and i mmuni ti es cl ause of state ci ti zenshi p set out i n Arti cl e I V, 2. See
also Sel over, Bates & Co. v. Wal sh, 226 U.S. 112, 126 (1912); Berea Col l ege v. Ken-
tucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908); Li berty Warehouse Co. v. Tobacco Growers, 276 U.S. 71,
89 (1928); Grosjean v. Ameri can Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
from the Government of the Uni ted States the power to expatri ate
Uni ted States ci ti zens agai nst thei r wi l l for any reason. [T]he
Amendment can most reasonabl y be read as defi ni ng a ci ti zenshi p
whi ch a ci ti zen keeps unl ess he vol untari l y rel i nqui shes i t. Once
acqui red, thi s Fourteenth Amendment ci ti zenshi p was not to be
shi fted, cancel ed, or di l uted at the wi l l of the Federal Government,
the States, or any other government uni t. I t i s true that the chi ef
i nterest of the peopl e i n gi vi ng permanence and securi ty to ci ti zen-
shi p i n the Fourteenth Amendment was the desi re to protect Ne-
groes. . . . Thi s undeni abl e purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
to make ci ti zenshi p of Negroes permanent and secure woul d be
frustrated by hol di ng that the Government can rob a ci ti zen of hi s
ci ti zenshi p wi thout hi s consent by si mpl y proceedi ng to act under
an i mpl i ed general power to regul ate forei gn affai rs or some other
power general l y granted.
12
I n a subsequent deci si on, however, the
Court hel d that persons who were statutori l y natural i zed by bei ng
born abroad of at l east one Ameri can parent coul d not cl ai m the
protecti on of the fi rst sentence of 1 and that Congress coul d there-
fore i mpose a reasonabl e and non-arbi trary condi ti on subsequent
upon thei r conti nued retenti on of Uni ted States ci ti zenshi p.
13
Be-
tween these two deci si ons there i s a tensi on whi ch shoul d cal l forth
further l i ti gati on efforts to expl ore the meani ng of the ci ti zenshi p
sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Ci ti zens of the Uni ted States wi thi n the meani ng of thi s
Amendment must be natural and not arti fi ci al persons; a corporate
body i s not a ci ti zen of the Uni ted States.
14
1568
15
83 U.S. (16 Wal l .) 36, 71, 7779 (1873).
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
Uni que among consti tuti onal provi si ons, the pri vi l eges and i m-
muni ti es cl ause of the Fourteenth Amendment enjoys the di sti nc-
ti on of havi ng been rendered a practi cal nul l i ty by a si ngl e deci -
si on of the Supreme Court i ssued wi thi n fi ve years after i ts rati fi -
cati on. I n the Slaughter-House Cases,
15
a bare majori ty of the
Court frustrated the ai ms of the most aggressi ve sponsors of thi s
cl ause, to whom was attri buted an i ntenti on to central i ze i n the
hands of the Federal Government l arge powers hi therto exerci sed
by the States wi th a vi ew to enabl i ng busi ness to devel op
uni mpeded by state i nterference. Thi s expansi ve al terati on of the
federal system was to have been achi eved by converti ng the ri ghts
of the ci ti zens of each State as of the date of the adopti on of the
Fourteenth Amendment i nto pri vi l eges and i mmuni ti es of Uni ted
States ci ti zenshi p and thereafter perpetuati ng thi s newl y defi ned
status quo through judi ci al condemnati on of any state l aw chal -
l enged as abri dgi ng any one of the l atter pri vi l eges. To have fos-
tered such i ntenti ons, the Court decl ared, woul d have been to
transfer the securi ty and protecti on of al l the ci vi l ri ghts . . . to the
Federal Government, . . . to bri ng wi thi n the power of Congress
the enti re domai n of ci vi l ri ghts heretofore bel ongi ng excl usi vel y to
the States, and to consti tute thi s court a perpetual censor upon
al l l egi sl ati on of the States, on the ci vi l ri ghts of thei r own ci ti zens,
wi th authori ty to nul l i fy such as i t di d not approve as consi stent
wi th those ri ghts, as they exi sted at the ti me of the adopti on of thi s
amendment. . . . [The effect of] so great a departure from the
structure and spi ri t of our i nsti tuti ons . . . i s to fetter and degrade
the State governments by subjecti ng them to the control of Con-
gress, i n the exerci se of powers heretofore uni versal l y conceded to
them of the most ordi nary and fundamental character. . . . We are
convi nced that no such resul ts were i ntended by the Congress . . .
, nor by the l egi sl atures . . . whi ch rati fi ed thi s amendment, and
that the sol e pervadi ng purpose of thi s and the other War
Amendments was the freedom of the sl ave race.
Conformabl y to these concl usi ons, the Court advi sed the New
Orl eans butchers that the Loui si ana statute, conferri ng on a si ngl e
corporati on a monopol y of the busi ness of sl aughteri ng cattl e, abro-
gated no ri ghts possessed by them as Uni ted States ci ti zens; i nso-
far as that l aw i nterfered wi th thei r cl ai med pri vi l ege of pursui ng
the l awful cal l i ng of butcheri ng ani mal s, the pri vi l ege thus termi -
nated was merel y one of those whi ch bel onged to the ci ti zens of
the States as such. Pri vi l eges and i mmuni ti es of state ci ti zenshi p
1569
16
I d. at 7879.
17
I d. at 79.
18
211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908).
19
Citing Crandal l v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (65 Wal l .) 35 (1868). I t was observed i n
Uni ted States v. Wheel er, 254 U.S. 281, 299 (1920), that the statute at i ssue i n
Crandall was actual l y hel d to burden di rectl y the performance by the Uni ted States
of i ts governmental functi ons. Cf. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 282, 49192
(1849) (Chi ef Justi ce Taney di ssenti ng). Four concurri ng Justi ces i n Edwards v.
Cal i forni a, 314 U.S. 160, 177, 181 (1941), woul d have grounded a ri ght of i nterstate
travel on the pri vi l eges and i mmuni ti es cl ause. More recentl y, the Court decl i ned
to ascri be a source but was content to assert the ri ght to be protected. Uni ted States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966); Shapi ro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 62931
(1969). Three Justi ces ascri bed the source to thi s cl ause i n Oregon v. Mi tchel l , 400
U.S. 112, 28587 (1970) (Justi ces Stewart and Bl ackmun and Chi ef Justi ce Burger,
concurri ng i n part and di ssenti ng i n part).
20
Citing Uni ted States v. Crui kshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
21
Citing Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Wi l ey v. Si nkl er, 179 U.S.
58 (1900). Note Justi ce Dougl as rel i ance on thi s cl ause i n Oregon v. Mi tchel l , 400
U.S. 112, 149 (1970) (concurri ng i n part and di ssenti ng i n part).
had been l eft to the state governments for securi ty and protecti on
and had not been pl aced by thi s cl ause under the speci al care of
the Federal Government. The onl y pri vi l eges whi ch the Four-
teenth Amendment protected agai nst state encroachment were de-
cl ared to be those whi ch owe thei r exi stence to the Federal Gov-
ernment, i ts Nati onal character, i ts Consti tuti on, or i ts l aws.
16
These pri vi l eges, however, had been avai l abl e to Uni ted States ci ti -
zens and protected from state i nterference by operati on of federal
supremacy even pri or to the adopti on of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Slaughter-House Cases, therefore, reduced the pri vi l eges
and i mmuni ti es cl ause to a superfl uous rei terati on of a prohi bi ti on
al ready operati ve agai nst the states.
Al though the Court has expressed a rel uctance to attempt a
defi ni ti ve enumerati on of those pri vi l eges and i mmuni ti es of Uni t-
ed States ci ti zens whi ch are protected agai nst state encroachment,
i t neverthel ess fel t obl i ged i n the Slaughter-House Cases to sug-
gest some whi ch owe thei r exi stence to the Federal Government, i ts
Nati onal character, i ts Consti tuti on, or i ts l aws.
17
Among those
whi ch i t then i denti fi ed were the ri ght of access to the seat of Gov-
ernment and to the seaports, subtreasuri es, l and offi cers, and
courts of justi ce i n the several States, the ri ght to demand protec-
ti on of the Federal Government on the hi gh seas or abroad, the
ri ght of assembl y, the pri vi l ege of habeas corpus, the ri ght to use
the navi gabl e waters of the Uni ted States, and ri ghts secured by
treaty. I n Twining v. New J ersey,
18
the Court recogni zed among
the ri ghts and pri vi l eges of nati onal ci ti zenshi p the ri ght to pass
freel y from State to State,
19
the ri ght to peti ti on Congress for a re-
dress of gri evances,
20
the ri ght to vote for nati onal offi cers,
21
the
1570
22
Citing Uni ted States v. Waddel l , 112 U.S. 76 (1884).
23
Citing Logan v. Uni ted States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
24
Citing I n re Quarl es and Butl er, 158 U.S. 532 (1895).
25
Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 57 (1891).
26
296 U.S. 404 (1935).
27
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 93 (1940).
28
307 U.S. 496, 51018 (1939) (Justi ces Roberts and Bl ack; Chi ef Justi ce
Hughes may or may not have concurred on thi s poi nt. I d. at 532). Justi ces Stone
and Reed preferred to base the deci si on on the due process cl ause. I d. at 518.
29
314 U.S. 160, 17783 (1941).
30
See also Oregon v. Mi tchel l , 400 U.S. 112, 149 (1970) (Justi ce Dougl as); i d.
at 28587 (Justi ces Stewart and Bl ackmun and Chi ef Justi ce Burger).
31
332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948).
ri ght to enter publ i c l ands,
22
the ri ght to be protected agai nst vi o-
l ence whi l e i n the l awful custody of a Uni ted States marshal ,
23
and
the ri ght to i nform the Uni ted States authori ti es of vi ol ati on of i ts
l aws.
24
Earl i er, i n a deci si on not menti oned i n Twining, the Court
had al so acknowl edged that the carryi ng on of i nterstate commerce
i s a ri ght whi ch every ci ti zen of the Uni ted States i s enti tl ed to
exerci se.
25
I n modern ti mes, the Court has conti nued the mi nor rol e ac-
corded to the cl ause, onl y occasi onal l y mani festi ng a di sposi ti on to
enl arge the restrai nt whi ch i t i mposes upon state acti on. Colgate
v. Harvey,
26
whi ch was overrul ed fi ve years l ater,
27
represented
the fi rst attempt by the Court si nce adopti on of the Fourteenth
Amendment to convert the pri vi l eges and i mmuni ti es cl ause i nto a
source of protecti on of other than those i nterests growi ng out of
the rel ati onshi p between the ci ti zen and the nati onal government.
Here, the Court decl ared that the ri ght of a ci ti zen resi dent i n one
State to contract i n another, to transact any l awful busi ness, or to
make a l oan of money, i n any State other than that i n whi ch the
ci ti zen resi des was a pri vi l ege of nati onal ci ti zenshi p whi ch was
abri dged by a state i ncome tax l aw excl udi ng from taxabl e i ncome
i nterest recei ved on money l oaned wi thi n the State. I n Hague v.
CI O,
28
two and perhaps three justi ces thought that freedom to use
muni ci pal streets and parks for the di ssemi nati on of i nformati on
concerni ng provi si ons of a federal statute and to assembl e peace-
ful l y therei n for di scussi on of the advantages and opportuni ti es of-
fered by such act was a pri vi l ege and i mmuni ty of a Uni ted States
ci ti zen, and i n Edwards v. California
29
four Justi ces were prepared
to rel y on the cl ause.
30
I n Oyama v. California,
31
i n a si ngl e sen-
tence the Court agreed wi th the contenti on of a nati ve-born youth
that a state Al i en Land Law, appl i ed to work a forfei ture of prop-
erty purchased i n hi s name wi th funds advanced by hi s parent, a
Japanese al i en i nel i gi bl e for ci ti zenshi p and precl uded from owni ng
l and, depri ved hi m of hi s pri vi l eges as an Ameri can ci ti zen. The
ri ght to acqui re and retai n property had previ ousl y not been set
1571
32
Ci vi l Ri ghts Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, now 42 U.S.C. 1982, as amend-
ed.
33
E.g., Hol den v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 380 (1898) (statute l i mi ti ng hours of
l abor i n mi nes); Wi l l i ams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900) (statute taxi ng the busi -
ness of hi ri ng persons to l abor outsi de the State); Wi l mi ngton Mi ni ng Co. v. Ful ton,
205 U.S. 60, 73 (1907) (statute requi ri ng empl oyment of onl y l i censed mi ne man-
agers and exami ners and i mposi ng l i abi l i ty on the mi ne owner for fai l ure to furni sh
a reasonabl y safe pl ace for workmen); Hei m v. McCal l , 239 U.S. 175 (1915); Crane
v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915) (statute restri cti ng empl oyment on state publ i c
works to ci ti zens of the Uni ted States, wi th a preference to ci ti zens of the State);
Mi ssouri Paci fi c Ry. v. Castl e, 224 U.S. 541 (1912) (statute maki ng rai l roads l i abl e
to empl oyees for i njuri es caused by negl i gence of fel l ow servants and abol i shi ng the
defense of contri butory negl i gence); Western Uni on Tel . Co. v. Mi l l i ng Co., 218 U.S.
406 (1910) (statute prohi bi ti ng a sti pul ati on agai nst l i abi l i ty for negl i gence i n del i v-
ery of i nterstate tel egraph messages); Bradwel l v. I l l i noi s, 83 U.S. (16 Wal l .) 130,
139 (1873); I n re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894) (refusal of state court to l i cense
a woman to practi ce l aw); Ki rtl and v. Hotchki ss, 100 U.S. 491, 499 (1879) (l aw tax-
i ng a debt owed a resi dent ci ti zen by a resi dent of another State and secured by
mortgage of l and i n the debtors State); Bartemeyer v. I owa, 85 U.S. (18 Wal l .) 129
(1874); Mugl er v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Crowl ey v. Chri stensen, 137 U.S. 86,
91 (1890); Gi ozza v. Ti ernan, 148 U.S. 657 (1893) (statutes regul ati ng the manufac-
ture and sal e of i ntoxi cati ng l i quors); I n re Kemml er, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (statute
regul ati ng the method of capi tal puni shment); Mi nor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21
Wal l .) 162 (1875) (statute regul ati ng the franchi se to mal e ci ti zens); Pope v. Wi l -
l i ams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904) (statute requi ri ng persons comi ng i nto a State to make
a decl arati on of i ntenti on to become ci ti zens and resi dents thereof before bei ng per-
mi tted to regi ster as voters); Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry., 258 U.S. 314 (1922)
(statute restri cti ng dower, i n case wi fe at ti me of husbands death i s a nonresi dent,
to l ands of whi ch he di ed sei zed); Wal ker v. Sauvi net, 92 U.S. 90 (1876) (statute
restri cti ng ri ght to jury tri al i n ci vi l sui ts at common l aw); Presser v. I l l i noi s, 116
U.S. 252, 267 (1886) (statute restri cti ng dri l l i ng or paradi ng i n any ci ty by any body
of men wi thout l i cense of the Governor); Maxwel l v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 596, 597
98 (1900) (provi si on for prosecuti on upon i nformati on, and for a jury (except i n cap-
i tal cases) of ei ght persons); New York ex rel . Bryant v. Zi mmerman, 278 U.S. 63,
71 (1928) (statute penal i zi ng the becomi ng or remai ni ng a member of any oathbound
associ ati on (other than benevol ent orders, and the l i ke) wi th knowl edge that the as-
soci ati on has fai l ed to fi l e i ts consti tuti on and membershi p l i sts); Pal ko v. Connecti -
cut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (statute al l owi ng a State to appeal i n cri mi nal cases for
errors of l aw and to retry the accused); Breedl ove v. Suttl es, 302 U.S. 277 (1937)
(statute maki ng the payment of pol l taxes a prerequi si te to the ri ght to vote); Mad-
den v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 9293 (1940), (overrul i ng Col gate v. Harvey, 296 U.S.
404, 430 (1935)) (statute whereby deposi ts i n banks outsi de the State are taxed at
50 per $100); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944) (the ri ght to become a can-
di date for state offi ce i s a pri vi l ege of state ci ti zenshi p, not nati onal ci ti zenshi p);
MacDougal l v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948) (I l l i noi s El ecti on Code requi rement that
a peti ti on to form and nomi nate candi dates for a new pol i ti cal party be si gned by
at l east 200 voters from each of at l east 50 of the 102 counti es i n the State, notwi th-
standi ng that 52% of the voters resi de i n onl y one county and 87% i n the 49 most
popul ous counti es); New York v. ONei l l , 359 U.S. 1 (1959) (Uni form Reci procal
forth i n any of the enumerati ons as one of the pri vi l eges protected
agai nst state abri dgment, al though a federal statute enacted pri or
to the proposal and rati fi cati on of the Fourteenth Amendment di d
confer on al l ci ti zens the same ri ghts to purchase and hol d real
property as whi te ci ti zens enjoyed.
32
I n other respects, however, cl ai ms based on thi s cl ause have
been rejected.
33
1572
State Law to secure attendance of wi tnesses from wi thi n or wi thout a State i n
cri mi nal proceedi ngs); James v. Val ti erra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (a provi si on i n a state
consti tuti on to the effect that l ow-rent housi ng projects coul d not be devel oped, con-
structed, or acqui red by any state governmental body wi thout the affi rmati ve vote
of a majori ty of those ci ti zens parti ci pati ng i n a communi ty referendum).
34
Hi bben v. Smi th, 191 U.S. 310, 325 (1903).
35
Carrol l v. Greenwi ch I ns. Co., 199 U.S. 401, 410 (1905). See also French v.
Barber Asphal t Pavi ng Co., 181 U.S. 324, 328 (1901).
36
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857), i s the excepti on.
37
83 U.S. (16 Wal l .) 36, 8081 (1873).
38
94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877).
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
The Development of Substantive Due Process
Al though many years after rati fi cati on the Court ventured the
not very i nformati ve observati on that the Fourteenth Amendment
operates to extend . . . the same protecti on agai nst arbi trary state
l egi sl ati on, affecti ng l i fe, l i berty and property, as i s offered by the
Fi fth Amendment,
34
and that ordi nari l y i f an act of Congress i s
val i d under the Fi fth Amendment i t woul d be hard to say that a
state l aw i n l i ke terms was voi d under the Fourteenth,
35
the si g-
ni fi cance of the due process cl ause as a restrai nt on state acti on ap-
pears to have been grossl y underesti mated by l i ti gants no l ess than
by the Court i n the years i mmedi atel y fol l owi ng i ts adopti on. From
the outset of our consti tuti onal hi story due process of l aw as i t oc-
curs i n the Fi fth Amendment had been recogni zed as a restrai nt
upon government, but, wi th the conspi cuous excepti on of the Dred
Scott deci si on,
36
onl y i n the narrower sense that a l egi sl ature must
provi de due process for the enforcement of l aw.
Thus, i n the Slaughter-House Cases,
37
i n whi ch the cl ause was
i nvoked by a group of butchers chal l engi ng the val i di ty of a Loui si -
ana statute whi ch conferred upon one corporati on the excl usi ve
pri vi l ege of butcheri ng cattl e i n New Orl eans, the Court decl ared
that the prohi bi ti on agai nst a depri vati on of property has been i n
the Consti tuti on si nce the adopti on of the Fi fth Amendment, as a
restrai nt upon the Federal power. I t i s al so to be found i n some
forms of expressi on i n the consti tuti on of nearl y al l the States, as
a restrai nt upon the power of the States. . . . We are not wi thout
judi ci al i nterpretati on, therefore, both State and Nati onal , of the
meani ng of thi s cl ause. And i t i s suffi ci ent to say that under no
constructi on of that provi si on that we have ever seen, or any that
we deem admi ssi bl e, can the restrai nt i mposed by the State of Lou-
i si ana upon the exerci se of thei r trade by the butchers of New Orl e-
ans be hel d to be a depri vati on of property wi thi n the meani ng of
that provi si on. Four years l ater, i n Munn v. I llinois,
38
the Court
agai n refused to i nterpret the due process cl ause as i nval i dati ng
1573
39
96 U.S. 97, 10304 (1878).
state l egi sl ati on regul ati ng the rates charged for the transportati on
and warehousi ng of grai n. Rejecti ng contenti ons that such l egi sl a-
ti on effected an unconsti tuti onal depri vati on of property by pre-
venti ng the owner from earni ng a reasonabl e compensati on for i ts
use and by transferri ng to the publ i c an i nterest i n a pri vate enter-
pri se, Chi ef Justi ce Wai te emphasi zed that the great offi ce of stat-
utes i s to remedy defects i n the common l aw as they are devel oped.
. . . We know that thi s power [of rate regul ati on] may be abused;
but that i s no argument agai nst i ts exi stence. For protecti on
agai nst abuses by l egi sl atures the peopl e must resort to the pol l s,
not to the courts.
Depl ori ng such attempts, nul l i fi ed consi stentl y i n the precedi ng
cases, to convert the due process cl ause i nto a substanti ve restrai nt
on the powers of the States, Justi ce Mi l l er i n Davidson v. New Or-
leans,
39
obl i quel y counsel ed agai nst a departure from the conven-
ti onal appl i cati on of the cl ause, al bei t he acknowl edged the di f-
fi cul ty of arri vi ng at a preci se, al l -i ncl usi ve defi ni ti on thereof. I t
i s not a l i ttl e remarkabl e, he observed, that whi l e thi s provi si on
has been i n the Consti tuti on of the Uni ted States, as a restrai nt
upon the authori ty of the Federal government, for nearl y a century,
and whi l e, duri ng al l that ti me, the manner i n whi ch the powers
of that government have been exerci sed has been watched wi th
jeal ousy, and subjected to the most ri gi d cri ti ci sm i n al l i ts
branches, thi s speci al l i mi tati on upon i ts powers has rarel y been
i nvoked i n the judi ci al forum or the more enl arged theatre of publ i c
di scussi on. But whi l e i t has been part of the Consti tuti on, as a re-
strai nt upon the power of the States, onl y a very few years, the
docket of thi s court i s crowded wi th cases i n whi ch we are asked
to hol d that state courts and state l egi sl atures have depri ved thei r
own ci ti zens of l i fe, l i berty, or property wi thout due process of l aw.
There i s here abundant evi dence that there exi sts some strange
mi sconcepti on of the scope of thi s provi si on as found i n the Four-
teenth Amendment. I n fact, i t woul d seem, from the character of
many of the cases before us, and the arguments made i n them, that
the cl ause under consi derati on i s l ooked upon as a means of bri ng-
i ng to the test of the deci si on of thi s court the abstract opi ni ons of
every unsuccessful l i ti gant i n a State court of the justi ce of the de-
ci si on agai nst hi m, and of the meri ts of the l egi sl ati on on whi ch
such a deci si on may be founded. I f, therefore, i t were possi bl e to
defi ne what i t i s for a State to depri ve a person of l i fe, l i berty, or
property wi thout due process of l aw, i n terms whi ch woul d cover
every exerci se of power thus forbi dden to the State, and excl ude
1574
40
110 U.S. 516, 528, 532, 536 (1884).
those whi ch are not, no more useful constructi on coul d be furni shed
by thi s or any other court to any part of the fundamental of l aw.
But, apart from the i mmi nent ri sk of a fai l ure to gi ve any def-
i ni ti on whi ch woul d be at once perspi cuous, comprehensi ve, and
sati sfactory, there i s wi sdom . . . i n the ascertai ni ng of the i ntent
and appl i cati on of such an i mportant phrase i n the Federal Con-
sti tuti on, by the gradual process of judi ci al i ncl usi on and excl usi on,
as the cases presented for deci si on shal l requi re. . . .
A bare hal f-dozen years l ater, i n agai n reachi ng a resul t i n
harmony wi th past precedents, the Justi ces gave fai r warni ng of
the i mmi nence of a modi fi cati on of thei r vi ews. After noti ng that
the due process cl ause, by reason of i ts operati on upon al l the
powers of government, l egi sl ati ve as wel l as executi ve and judi ci al ,
coul d not be apprai sed sol el y i n terms of the sancti on of settl ed
usage, Justi ce Mathews, speaki ng for the Court i n Hurtado v.
California,
40
decl ared that [a]rbi trary power, enforci ng i ts edi cts
to the i njury of the persons and property of i ts subjects, i s not l aw,
whether mani fested as the decree of a personal monarch or of an
i mpersonal mul ti tude. And the l i mi tati ons i mposed by our consti tu-
ti onal l aw upon the acti on of the governments, both state and na-
ti onal , are essenti al to the preservati on of publ i c and pri vate
ri ghts, notwi thstandi ng the representati ve character of our pol i ti cal
i nsti tuti ons. The enforcement of these l i mi tati ons by judi ci al proc-
ess i s the devi ce of sel f-governi ng communi ti es to protect the ri ghts
of i ndi vi dual s and mi nori ti es, as wel l agai nst the power of num-
bers, as agai nst the vi ol ence of publ i c agents transcendi ng the l i m-
i ts of l awful authori ty, even when acti ng i n the name and wi el di ng
the force of the government. Thus were the States put on noti ce
that every speci es of state l egi sl ati on, whether deal i ng wi th proce-
dural or substanti ve ri ghts, was subject to the scruti ny of the Court
when the questi on of i ts essenti al justi ce was rai sed.
What i nduced the Court to di smi ss i ts fears of upsetti ng the
bal ance i n the di stri buti on of powers under the federal system and
to enl arge i ts own supervi sory powers over state l egi sl ati on was the
i ncreasi ng number of cases seeki ng protecti on of property ri ghts
agai nst the remedi al soci al l egi sl ati on States were enacti ng i n the
wake of i ndustri al expansi on. At the same ti me, the added empha-
si s on the due process cl ause afforded the Court an opportuni ty to
compensate for i ts earl i er vi rtual nul l i fi cati on of the pri vi l eges and
i mmuni ti es cl ause of the Amendment. So far as such modi fi cati on
of i ts posi ti on needed to be justi fi ed i n l egal terms, theori es con-
cerni ng the rel ati on of government to pri vate ri ghts were avai l abl e
1575
41
94 U.S. 113, 14148 (1877).
42
123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
43
83 U.S. (16 Wal l .) 36, 11314, 116, 122 (1873).
44
Loan Associ ati on v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wal l .) 655, 662 (1875). There are
. . . ri ghts i n every free government beyond the control of the State. . . . There are
l i mi tati ons on [governmental power] whi ch grow out of the essenti al nature of al l
free governments. I mpl i ed reservati ons of i ndi vi dual ri ghts, wi thout whi ch the soci al
compact coul d not exi st. . . .
45
Ri ghts to l i fe, l i berty, and the pursui t of happi ness are equi val ent to the
ri ghts of l i fe, l i berty, and property. These are fundamental ri ghts whi ch can onl y
be taken away by due process of l aw, and whi ch can onl y be i nterfered wi th, or the
enjoyment of whi ch can onl y be modi fi ed, by l awful regul ati ons necessary or proper
for the mutual good of al l . . . . Thi s ri ght to choose ones cal l i ng i s an essenti al part
of that l i berty whi ch i t i s the object of government to protect; and a cal l i ng, when
chosen, i s a mans property ri ght. . . . A l aw whi ch prohi bi ts a l arge cl ass of ci ti zens
from adopti ng a l awful empl oyment, or from fol l owi ng a l awful empl oyment pre-
vi ousl y adopted, does depri ve them of l i berty as wel l as property, wi thout due proc-
ess of l aw. Sl aughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wal l .) 36, 116, 122 (1873) (Justi ce
Bradl ey di ssenti ng).
to demonstrate the i mpropri ety of l eavi ng to the state l egi sl atures
the same ampl e range of pol i ce power they had enjoyed pri or to the
Ci vi l War. Prel i mi nary to thi s consummati on, however, the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases and Munn v. I llinois had to be overrul ed at l east
i n part, and the vi ews of the di ssenti ng Justi ces i n those cases con-
verted i nto majori ty doctri ne.
About twenty years were requi red to compl ete thi s process, i n
the course of whi ch the restri cted vi ew of the pol i ce power ad-
vanced by Justi ce Fi el d i n hi s di ssent i n Munn v. I llinois,
41
name-
l y, that i t i s sol el y a power to prevent i njury, was i n effect rati fi ed
by the Court i tsel f. Thi s occurred i n Mugler v. Kansas,
42
where the
power was defi ned as embraci ng no more than the power to pro-
mote publ i c heal th, moral s, and safety. Duri ng the same i nterval ,
i deas embodyi ng the soci al compact and natural ri ghts, whi ch had
been espoused by Justi ce Bradl ey i n hi s di ssent i n the Slaughter-
House Cases,
43
had been transformed tentati vel y i nto consti tu-
ti onal l y enforceabl e l i mi tati ons upon government.
44
The con-
sequence was that the States i n exerci si ng thei r pol i ce powers
coul d foster onl y those purposes of heal th, moral s, and safety whi ch
the Court had enumerated, and coul d empl oy onl y such means as
woul d not unreasonabl y i nterfere wi th the fundamental l y natural
ri ghts of l i berty and property, whi ch Justi ce Bradl ey had equated
wi th freedom to pursue a l awful cal l i ng and to make contracts for
that purpose.
45
So havi ng narrowed the scope of the states pol i ce power i n def-
erence to the natural ri ghts of l i berty and property, the Court next
proceeded to read i nto the concepts currentl y accepted theori es of
laissez faire economi cs, rei nforced by the doctri ne of Soci al Darwi n-
i sm as el aborated by Herbert Spencer, to the end that l i berty, i n
1576
46
143 U.S. 517, 551 (1892).
47
See Fl etcher v. Peck, 10. U.S. (6 Cr.) 87, 128 (1810).
48
94 U.S. 113, 123, 182 (1877).
49
123 U.S. 623 (1887).
50
I d. at 662. We cannot shut out of vi ew the fact, wi thi n the knowl edge of al l ,
that the publ i c heal th, the publ i c moral s, and the publ i c safety, may be endangered
by the general use of i ntoxi cati ng dri nks; nor the fact . . . that . . . pauperi sm, and
cri me . . . are, i n some degree, at l east, traceabl e to thi s evi l .
51
127 U.S. 678, 685 (1888).
parti cul ar, became synonymous wi th governmental hands-off i n the
fi el d of pri vate economi c rel ati ons. I n Budd v. New York,
46
Justi ce
Brewer i n di ctum decl ared: The paternal theory of government i s
to me odi ous. The utmost possi bl e l i berty to the i ndi vi dual , and the
ful l est possi bl e protecti on to hi m and hi s property, i s both the l i mi -
tati on and duty of government. And to i mpl ement thi s poi nt of
vi ew the Court next undertook to water down the accepted maxi m
that a state statute must be presumed to be val i d unti l cl earl y
shown to be otherwi se.
47
The fi rst step was taken wi th opposi te i n-
tenti on. Thi s occurred i n Munn v. I llinois,
48
where the Court, i n
sustai ni ng the l egi sl ati on before i t, decl ared: For our purposes we
must assume that, i f a state of facts coul d exi st that woul d justi fy
such l egi sl ati on, i t actual l y di d exi st when the statute now under
consi derati on was passed. Ten years l ater, i n Mugler v. Kansas,
49
thi s procedure was i mproved upon, and a state-wi de anti -l i quor l aw
was sustai ned on the basi s of the proposi ti on that del eteri ous soci al
effects of the excessi ve use of al cohol i c l i quors were suffi ci entl y no-
tori ous for the Court to be abl e to take noti ce of them, that i s to
say, for the Court to revi ew and apprai se the consi derati on whi ch
had i nduced the l egi sl ature to enact the statute i n the fi rst pl ace.
50
However, i n Powell v. Pennsylvania,
51
deci ded the fol l owi ng year,
the Court, confronted wi th a si mi l ar act i nvol vi ng ol eomargari ne,
concerni ng whi ch i t was unabl e to cl ai m a l i ke measure of common
knowl edge, fel l back upon the doctri ne of presumed val i di ty and
sustai ned the measure, decl ari ng that i t does not appear upon the
face of the statute, or from any of the facts of whi ch the Court must
take judi ci al cogni zance, that i t i nfri nges ri ghts secured by the fun-
damental l aw.
I n contrast to the presumed val i di ty rul e, under whi ch the
Court ordi nari l y i s not obl i ged to go beyond the record of evi dence
submi tted by the l i ti gants i n determi ni ng the val i di ty of a statute,
the judi ci al noti ce pri nci pl e, as devel oped i n Mugler v. Kansas, car-
ri ed the i nference that unl ess the Court, i ndependentl y of the
record, i s abl e to ascertai n the exi stence of justi fyi ng facts acces-
si bl e to i t by the rul es governi ng judi ci al noti ce, i t wi l l be obl i ged
to i nval i date a pol i ce power regul ati on as beari ng no reasonabl e or
adequate rel ati on to the purposes to be subserved by the l atter;
1577
52
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
53
Wi l l i amson v. Lee Opti cal Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
54
I d. at 487, 491.
55
The Court has pronounced a stri ct hands-off standard of judi ci al revi ew,
whether of congressi onal or state l egi sl ati ve efforts to structure and accommodate
the burdens and benefi ts of economi c l i fe. Such l egi sl ati on i s to be accorded the tra-
di ti onal presumpti on of consti tuti onal i ty general l y accorded economi c regul ati ons
and i s to be uphel d absent proof of arbi trari ness or i rrati onal i ty on the part of Con-
gress. That the accommodati on among i nterests whi ch the l egi sl ati ve branch has
struck may have profound and far-reachi ng consequences . . . provi des al l the more
reason for thi s Court to defer to the congressi onal judgment unl ess i t i s demon-
strabl y arbi trary or i rrati onal . Duke Power Co. v. Carol i na Envi ronmental Study
Group, 438 U.S. 59, 8384 (1978). See also Usery v. Turner El khorn Mi ni ng Co.,
namel y, heal th, moral s, or safety. For apprai si ng state l egi sl ati on
affecti ng nei ther l i berty nor property, the Court found the rul e of
presumed val i di ty qui te servi ceabl e, but for i nval i dati ng l egi sl ati on
consti tuti ng governmental i nterference i n the fi el d of economi c re-
l ati ons, and, more parti cul arl y, l abor-management rel ati ons, the
Court found the pri nci pl e of judi ci al noti ce more advantageous.
Thi s advantage was enhanced by the di sposi ti on of the Court, i n
l i ti gati on embraci ng the l atter type of l egi sl ati on, to shi ft the bur-
den of proof from the l i ti gant chargi ng unconsti tuti onal i ty to the
State seeki ng enforcement. To the State was transferred the task
of demonstrati ng that a statute i nterferi ng wi th the natural ri ght
of l i berty or property was i n fact authori zed by the Consti tuti on,
and not merel y that the l atter di d not expressl y prohi bi t enactment
of the same.
I n 1934 the Court i n Nebbia v. New York
52
di scarded thi s ap-
proach to economi c l egi sl ati on, and has not si nce returned to i t.
The modern approach was evi denced i n a 1955 deci si on reversi ng
a l ower courts judgment i nval i dati ng a state statutory scheme reg-
ul ati ng the sal e of eyegl asses to the advantage of ophthal mol ogi sts
and optometri sts i n pri vate professi onal practi ce and adversel y to
opti ci ans and to those empl oyed by or usi ng space i n busi ness es-
tabl i shments. The day i s gone when thi s Court uses the Due Proc-
ess Cl ause of the Fourteenth Amendment to stri ke down state
l aws, regul atory of busi ness and i ndustri al condi ti ons, because they
may be unwi se, i mprovi dent, or out of harmony wi th a parti cul ar
school of thought. . . . We emphasi ze agai n what Chi ef Justi ce
Wai te sai d i n Munn v. I llinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134, For protecti on
agai nst abuses by l egi sl atures the peopl e must resort to the pol l s,
not to the courts.
53
Yet the Court went on to assess the reasons
whi ch mi ght have justi fi ed the l egi sl ature i n prescri bi ng the regu-
l ati on at i ssue, l eavi ng open the possi bi l i ty that some regul ati on
mi ght be found unreasonabl e.
54
More recent deci si ons, however,
have l i mi ted i nqui ry to whether the l egi sl ati on i s arbi trary or i rra-
ti onal , and have not addressed reasonabl eness.
55
1578
428 U.S. 1, 1420 (1976); Hodel v. I ndi ana, 452 U.S. 314, 333 (1981); New Motor
Vehi cl e Bd. v. Orri n W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 10608 (1978); Exxon Corp. v. Gov-
ernor of Maryl and, 437 U.S. 117, 12425 (1978); Brotherhood of Locomoti ve Fi remen
v. Chi cago, R.I . & P. R.R., 393 U.S. 129, 143 (1968); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726, 730, 733 (1963).
56
See Graham, The Conspiracy Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE
L. J. 371 (1938).
57
Munn v. I l l i noi s, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). I n a case ari si ng under the Fi fth Amend-
ment, deci ded al most at the same ti me, the Court expl i ci tl y decl ared the Uni ted
States equal l y wi th the States . . . are prohi bi ted from depri vi ng persons or cor-
porati ons of property wi thout due process of l aw. Si nki ng Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700,
71819 (1879).
58
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522, 526 (1898); Kentucky Co. v. Paramount
Exch., 262 U.S. 544, 550 (1923); Li ggett Co. v. Bal dri dge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
59
Northwestern Li fe I ns. Co. v. Ri ggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906); Western Turf
Assn v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907); Pi erce v. Soci ety of Si sters, 268 U.S.
510, 535 (1925). Earl i er, i n Northern Securi ti es Co. v. Uni ted States, 193 U.S. 197,
362 (1904), a case i nterpreti ng the federal anti trust l aw, Justi ce Brewer, i n a con-
curri ng opi ni on, had decl ared that a corporati on . . . i s not endowed wi th the i n-
al i enabl e ri ghts of a natural person.
60
Grosjean v. Ameri can Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) (a corporati on i s
a person wi thi n the meani ng of the equal protecti on and due process of l aw
cl auses). I n Fi rst Natl Bank of Boston v. Bel l otti , 435 U.S. 765 (1978), faced wi th
the val i di ty of state restrai nts upon expressi on by corporati ons, the Court di d not
determi ne that corporati ons have Fi rst Amendment l i berty ri ghts and other con-
sti tuti onal ri ghts but deci ded i nstead that expressi on was protected, i rrespecti ve of
the speaker, because of the i nterests of the l i steners. See i d. at 778 n.14 (reservi ng
questi on). But see i d. at 809, 822 (Justi ces Whi te and Rehnqui st di ssenti ng) (cor-
porati ons as creatures of the state have the ri ghts state gi ves them).
61
Yi ck Wo v. Hopki ns, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197,
216 (1923). See Hel l eni c Li nes v. Rhodeti s, 398 U.S. 306, 309 (1970).
Persons Defi ned. Notwi thstandi ng the hi stori cal con-
troversy that has been waged concerni ng whether the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment i ntended the word person to mean
onl y natural persons, or whether the word was substi tuted for the
word ci ti zen wi th a vi ew to protecti ng corporati ons from oppres-
si ve state l egi sl ati on,
56
the Supreme Court, as earl y as the Grang-
er Cases,
57
deci ded i n 1877, uphel d on the meri ts vari ous state
l aws wi thout rai si ng any questi on as to the status of rai l way cor-
porati on pl ai nti ffs to advance due process contenti ons. There i s no
doubt that a corporati on may not be depri ved of i ts property wi th-
out due process of l aw,
58
and al though pri or deci si ons had hel d
that the l i berty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment i s the
l i berty of natural , not arti fi ci al , persons,
59
neverthel ess a news-
paper corporati on was sustai ned, i n 1936, i n i ts objecti on that a
state l aw depri ved i t of l i berty of press.
60
As to the natural persons
protected by the due process cl ause, these i ncl ude al l human bei ngs
regardl ess of race, col or, or ci ti zenshi p.
61
Ordi nari l y, the mere i nterest of an offi ci al as such, i n contrast
to an actual i njury sustai ned by a natural or arti fi ci al person
through i nvasi on of personal or property ri ghts, has not been
1579
62
Penni e v. Rei s, 132 U.S. 464 (1889); Tayl or and Marshal l v. Beckham (No.
1), 178 U.S. 548 (1900); Tyl er v. Judges of Court of Regi strati on, 179 U.S. 405, 410
(1900); Straus v. Foxworth, 231 U.S. 162 (1913); Col umbus & G. Ry. v. Mi l l er, 283
U.S. 96 (1931).
63
Ci ty of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oi l Co., 250 U.S. 394 (1919); Ci ty of Trenton
v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923); Wi l l i ams v. Mayor of Bal ti more, 289 U.S. 36
(1933). But see Madi son School Di st. v. WERC, 429 U.S. 167, 175 n.7 (1976) (reserv-
i ng questi on whether muni ci pal corporati on as an empl oyer has a Fi rst Amendment
ri ght assertabl e agai nst State).
64
Col eman v. Mi l l er, 307 U.S. 433, 441, 442, 443, 445 (1939); Boynton v. Hutch-
i nson Gas Co., 291 U.S. 656 (1934); South Carol i na Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwel l Bros.,
303 U.S. 177 (1938).
The converse i s not true, however, and the i nterest of a state offi ci al i n vi ndi cat-
i ng the Consti tuti on gi ves hi m no l egal standi ng to attack the consti tuti onal i ty of
a state statute i n order to avoi d compl i ance wi th i t. Smi th v. I ndi ana, 191 U.S. 138
(1903); Braxton County Court v. West Vi rgi ni a, 208 U.S. 192 (1908); Marshal l v.
Dye, 231 U.S. 250 (1913); Stewart v. Kansas Ci ty, 239 U.S. 14 (1915). See also Col e-
man v. Mi l l er, 307 U.S. 433, 43746 (1939).
65
Long ago Chi ef Justi ce Marshal l descri bed the pol i ce power as that i mmense
mass of l egi sl ati on, whi ch embraces every thi ng wi thi n the terri tory of a State, not
surrendered to the general government. Gi bbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
202 (1824). See Cal i forni a Reducti on Co. v. Sani tary Works, 199 U.S. 306, 318
(1905); Chi cago B. & Q. Ry. v. Drai nage Commrs, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906); Bacon
v. Wal ker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907); Eubank v. Ri chmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912);
Schmi di nger v. Chi cago, 226 U.S. 578 (1913); Sl i gh v. Ki rkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 58
59 (1915); Nebbi a v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Nashvi l l e, C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Wal ters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935). See also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. Ci ty of New
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (pol i ce power encompasses preservati on of hi stori c l and-
marks; l and-use restri cti ons may be enacted to enhance the qual i ty of l i fe by pre-
servi ng the character and aestheti c features of ci ty); Ci ty of New Orl eans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297 (1976); Young v. Ameri can Mi ni Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
deemed adequate to enabl e hi m to i nvoke the protecti on of the
Fourteenth Amendment agai nst state acti on.
62
Si mi l arl y, muni ci -
pal corporati ons are vi ewed as havi ng no standi ng to i nvoke the
provi si ons of the Fourteenth Amendment i n opposi ti on to the wi l l
of thei r creator, the State.
63
However, state offi cers are acknowl -
edged to have an i nterest, despi te thei r not havi ng sustai ned any
pri vate damage, i n resi sti ng an endeavor to prevent the enforce-
ment of l aws i n rel ati on to whi ch they have offi ci al duti es, and,
accordi ngl y, may appl y to federal courts for the revi ew of deci si ons
of state courts decl ari ng state statutes whi ch [they] seek to enforce
to be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
64
Pol i ce Power Defi ned and Li mi ted. The pol i ce power of a
State today embraces regul ati ons desi gned to promote the publ i c
conveni ence or the general prosperi ty as wel l as those to promote
publ i c safety, heal th, and moral s, and i s not confi ned to the sup-
pressi on of what i s offensi ve, di sorderl y, or unsani tary, but extends
to what i s for the greatest wel fare of the state.
65
Because the pol i ce power i s the l east l i mi tabl e of the exerci ses
of government, such l i mi tati ons as are appl i cabl e are not readi l y
defi nabl e. These l i mi tati ons can be determi ned, therefore, onl y
1580
66
Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908); Eubank v. Ri chmond,
226 U.S. 137, 142 (1912); Eri e R.R. v. Wi l l i ams, 233 U.S. 685, 699 (1914); Sl i gh v.
Ki rkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 5859 (1915); Hadacheck v. Sebasti an, 239 U.S. 394 (1915);
Hal l v. Gei ger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Panhandl e Eastern Pi pel i ne Co. v.
Hi ghway Commn, 294 U.S. 613, 622 (1935).
67
Atl anti c Coast Li ne R.R. v. Gol dsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914).
68
Li ggett Co. v. Bal dri dge, 278 U.S. 105, 11112 (1928); Trei gl e v. Acme Home-
stead Assn, 297 U.S. 189, 197 (1936).
69
Pennsyl vani a Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Wel ch v. Swasey, 214
U.S. 91, 107 (1909). See also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. Ci ty of New York, 438
U.S. 104 (1978); Agi ns v. Ci ty of Ti buron, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). See supra, pp. 1382
95.
70
Nobl e State Bank v. Haskel l , 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911).
71
Eri e R.R. v. Wi l l i ams, 233 U.S. 685, 700 (1914).
72
New Orl eans Publ i c Servi ce v. New Orl eans, 281 U.S. 682, 687 (1930).
73
Abi e State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 776 (1931).
through appropri ate regard to the subject matter of the exerci se of
that power.
66
I t i s settl ed [however] that nei ther the contract
cl ause nor the due process cl ause had the effect of overri di ng the
power of the state to establ i sh al l regul ati ons that are reasonabl y
necessary to secure the heal th, safety, good order, comfort, or gen-
eral wel fare of the communi ty; that thi s power can nei ther be abdi -
cated nor bargai ned away, and i s i nal i enabl e even by express
grant; and that al l contract and property [or other vested] ri ghts
are hel d subject to i ts fai r exerci se.
67
I nsofar as the pol i ce power
i s uti l i zed by a State, the means empl oyed to effect i ts exerci se can
be nei ther arbi trary nor oppressi ve but must bear a real and sub-
stanti al rel ati on to an end whi ch i s publ i c, speci fi cal l y, the publ i c
heal th, publ i c safety, or publ i c moral s, or some other phase of the
general wel fare.
68
A general rul e often i nvoked i s that i f a pol i ce power regul ati on
goes too far, i t wi l l be recogni zed as a taki ng of property for whi ch
compensati on must be pai d.
69
Yet where mutual advantage i s a
suffi ci ent compensati on, an ul teri or publ i c advantage may justi fy a
comparati vel y i nsi gni fi cant taki ng of pri vate property for what i n
i ts i mmedi ate purpose seems to be a pri vate use.
70
On the other
hand, mere cost and i nconveni ence (di fferent words, probabl y, for
the same thi ng) woul d have to be very great before they coul d be-
come an el ement i n the consi derati on of the ri ght of a state to exert
i ts reserved power or i ts pol i ce power.
71
Moreover, i t i s el emen-
tary that enforcement of uncompensated obedi ence to a regul ati on
passed i n the l egi ti mate exerti on of the pol i ce power i s not a taki ng
wi thout due process of l aw.
72
Si mi l arl y, i ni ti al compl i ance wi th a
regul ati on whi ch i s val i d when adopted occasi ons no forfei ture of
the ri ght to protest when that regul ati on subsequentl y l oses i ts va-
l i di ty by becomi ng confi scatory i n i ts operati on.
73
1581
74
See the tentati ve effort i n Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 &
n.23 (1976), apparentl y to expand upon the concept of l i berty wi thi n the meani ng
of the Fi fth Amendments due process cl ause and necessari l y therefore the Four-
teenths.
75
See the substanti al confi nement of the concept i n Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215 (1976); and Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976), i n whi ch the Court ap-
pl i ed to i ts determi nati on of what i s a l i berty i nterest the enti tl ement doctri ne de-
vel oped i n property cases, i n whi ch the i nterest i s made to depend upon state rec-
ogni ti on of the i nterest through posi ti ve l aw, an approach contrary to previ ous due
process-l i berty anal ysi s. Cf. Morri ssey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). For more
recent cases, see DeShaney v. Wi nnebago County Soci al Servs. Dept, 489 U.S. 189
(1989) (no Due Process vi ol ati on for fai l ure of state to protect an abused chi l d from
hi s parent, even though abuse had been detected by soci al servi ce agency); Col l i ns
v. Ci ty of Harker Hei ghts, 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992) (fai l ure of ci ty to warn i ts empl oy-
ees about workpl ace hazards does not vi ol ate due process; the due process cl ause
does not i mpose a duty on the ci ty to provi de empl oyees wi th a safe worki ng envi -
ronment).
76
83 U.S. (16 Wal l .) 36 (1873).
77
165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). The l i berty menti oned i n that [Fourteenth] Amend-
ment means not onl y the ri ght of the ci ti zen to be free from the mere physi cal re-
strai nt of hi s person, as by i ncarcerati on, but the term i s deemed to embrace the
ri ght of the ci ti zen to be free i n the enjoyment of al l hi s facul ti es, to be free to use
them i n al l l awful ways; to l i ve and work where he wi l l ; to earn hi s l i vel i hood by
any l awful cal l i ng; to pursue any l i vel i hood or avocati on, and for that purpose to
enter i nto al l contracts whi ch may be proper, necessary and essenti al to hi s carryi ng
out to a successful concl usi on the purposes above menti oned.
78
236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915).
Li berty. The l i berty guaranteed by the due process cl ause
has been vari ousl y defi ned by the Court, as wi l l be seen herei n-
after. I n general , i n the earl y years, i t meant al most excl usi vel y
l i berty of contract, but wi th the demi se of l i berty of contract came
a general broadeni ng of l i berty to i ncl ude personal , pol i ti cal and
soci al ri ghts and pri vi l eges.
74
Nonethel ess, the Court i s general l y
chary of expandi ng the concept absent statutori l y recogni zed
ri ghts.
75
Liberty of Contract
Regul atory Labor Laws General l y. Li berty of contract, a
concept ori gi nal l y advanced by Justi ces Bradl ey and Fi el d i n the
Slaughter-House Cases,
76
was el evated to the status of accepted
doctri ne i n Allgeyer v. Louisiana.
77
Appl i ed repeatedl y i n subse-
quent cases as a restrai nt on federal and state power, freedom of
contract was al so al l uded to as a property ri ght, as i s evi dent i n
the l anguage of the Court i n Coppage v. Kansas.
78
I ncl uded i n the
ri ght of personal l i berty and the ri ght of pri vate property partak-
i ng of the nature of each i s the ri ght to make contracts for the ac-
qui si ti on of property. Chi ef among such contracts i s that of per-
sonal empl oyment, by whi ch l abor and other servi ces are ex-
changed for money or other forms of property. I f thi s ri ght be
1582
79
Chi cago, B. & Q. R.R. v. McGui re, 219 U.S. 549, 567, 570 (1911). See also
Wol ff Packi ng Co. v. I ndustri al Court, 262 U.S. 522, 534 (1923).
80
169 U.S. 366 (1898).
81
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
82
127 U.S. 678 (1888).
83
123 U.S. 623 (1887).
84
169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898).
struck down or arbi trari l y i nterfered wi th, there i s a substanti al
i mpai rment of l i berty i n the l ong-establ i shed consti tuti onal sense.
By a process of reasoni ng that was al most compl etel y di scarded
duri ng the Depressi on, the Court was neverthel ess abl e, pri or
thereto, to sustai n state amel i orati ve l egi sl ati on by acknowl edgi ng
that freedom of contract was a qual i fi ed and not an absol ute ri ght.
. . . Li berty i mpl i es the absence of arbi trary restrai nt, not i mmu-
ni ty from reasonabl e regul ati ons and prohi bi ti ons i mposed i n the
i nterest of the communi ty. . . . I n deal i ng wi th the rel ati on of the
empl oyer and empl oyed, the l egi sl ature has necessari l y a wi de fi el d
of di screti on i n order that there may be sui tabl e protecti on of
heal th and safety, and that peace and good order may be promoted
through regul ati ons desi gned to i nsure whol esome condi ti ons of
work and freedom from oppressi on.
79
Whi l e conti nui ng to acknowl edge i n abstract terms that free-
dom of contract i s not absol ute, the Court i n fact was commi tted
to the pri nci pl e that freedom of contract i s the general rul e and
that l egi sl ati ve authori ty to abri dge i t coul d be justi fi ed onl y by ex-
cepti onal ci rcumstances. To mai ntai n such abri dgments at a mi ni -
mum, the Court i ntermi ttentl y empl oyed the rul e of judi ci al noti ce
i n a manner best exempl i fi ed by a compari son of the earl y cases
of Holden v. Hardy
80
and Lochner v. New York,
81
deci si ons whi ch
bear the same rel ati on to each other as Powell v. Pennsylvania
82
and Mugler v. Kansas.
83
I n Holden v. Hardy,
84
the Court, i n rel i ance upon the pri nci pl e
of presumed val i di ty, al l owed the burden of proof to remai n wi th
those attacki ng the val i di ty of a statute and uphel d a Utah act l i m-
i ti ng the peri od of l abor i n mi nes to ei ght hours per day. Taki ng
cogni zance of the fact that l abor bel ow the surface of the earth was
attended by ri sk to person and to heal th and for these reasons had
l ong been the subject of state i nterventi on, the Court regi stered i ts
wi l l i ngness to sustai n a l i mi tati on on freedom of contract whi ch a
state l egi sl ature had adjudged necessary for the preservati on of
heal th of empl oyees, and for whi ch there were reasonabl e
grounds for bel i evi ng that . . . [i t was] supported by the facts.
Seven years l ater, however, a radi cal l y al tered Court was pre-
di sposed i n favor of the doctri ne of judi ci al noti ce, and appl i ed that
1583
85
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
86
I d. at 5859.
87
I d. at 71, 74 (quoti ng Atki n v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 223 (1903)).
doctri ne to concl ude i n Lochner v. New York
85
that a l aw restri ct-
i ng empl oyment i n bakeri es to ten hours per day and 60 hours per
week was an unconsti tuti onal i nterference wi th the ri ght of adul t
l aborers, sui juris, to contract for thei r means of l i vel i hood. Deny-
i ng that i n so hol di ng the Court was i n effect substi tuti ng i ts own
judgment for that of the l egi sl ature, Justi ce Peckham neverthel ess
mai ntai ned that whether the act was wi thi n the pol i ce power of the
State was a questi on that must be answered by the Court, and
then, i n di sregard of the accumul ated medi cal evi dence proffered i n
support of the act, uttered the fol l owi ng observati on. I n l ooki ng
through stati sti cs regardi ng al l trades and occupati ons, i t may be
true that the trade of a baker does not appear to be as heal thy as
some trades, and i s al so vastl y more heal thy than sti l l others. To
the common understandi ng the trade of a baker has never been re-
garded as an unheal thy one. . . . I t mi ght be safel y affi rmed that
al most al l occupati ons more or l ess affect the heal th. . . . But are
we al l , on that account, at the mercy of the l egi sl ati ve majori -
ti es?
86
Two di ssenti ng opi ni ons were fi l ed i n the case. Justi ce Harl an,
poi nti ng to the abundance of medi cal testi mony tendi ng to show
that the l i fe expectancy of bakers was bel ow average, that thei r ca-
paci ty to resi st di seases was l ow, and that they were pecul i arl y
prone to suffer i rri tati ons of the eyes, l ungs, and bronchi al pas-
sages, concl uded that the very exi stence of such evi dence l eft the
reasonabl eness of the measure open to di scussi on and that the l at-
ter fact of i tsel f put the statute wi thi n l egi sl ati ve di screti on. The
responsi bi l i ty therefor rests upon the l egi sl ators, not upon the
courts. No evi l s ari si ng from such l egi sl ati on coul d be more far
reachi ng than those that mi ght come to our system of government
i f the judi ci ary, abandoni ng the sphere assi gned to i t by the fun-
damental l aw, shoul d enter the domai n of l egi sl ati on, and upon
grounds merel y of justi ce or reason or wi sdom annul statutes that
had recei ved the sancti on of the peopl es representati ves. . . . [T]he
publ i c i nterests i mperati vel y demand that l egi sl ati ve enactments
shoul d be recogni zed and enforced by the courts as embodyi ng the
wi l l of the peopl e, unl ess they are pl ai nl y and pal pabl y, beyond al l
questi on, i n vi ol ati on of the fundamental l aw of the Consti tu-
ti on.
87
The second di ssenti ng opi ni on, wri tten by Justi ce Hol mes, has
recei ved the greater measure of attenti on because the vi ews ex-
pressed therei n were a forecast of the l i ne of reasoni ng to be fol -
1584
88
198 U.S. at 7576 (1905).
l owed by the Court some decades l ater. Thi s case i s deci ded upon
an economi c theory whi ch a l arge part of the country does not en-
tertai n. I f i t were a questi on whether I agreed wi th that theory, I
shoul d desi re to study i t further and l ong before maki ng up my
mi nd. But I do not concei ve that to be my duty, because I strongl y
bel i eve that my agreement or di sagreement has nothi ng to do wi th
the ri ght of a majori ty to embody thei r opi ni ons i n l aw. I t i s settl ed
by vari ous deci si ons of thi s court that state consti tuti ons and state
l aws may regul ate l i fe i n many ways whi ch we as l egi sl ators mi ght
thi nk as i njudi ci ous or i f you l i ke as tyranni cal as thi s, and whi ch
equal l y wi th thi s i nterfere wi th the l i berty to contract. . . . The
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencers So-
cial Statics. . . . But a consti tuti on i s not i ntended to embody a
parti cul ar economi c theory, whether of paternal i sm and the organi c
rel ati ons of the ci ti zen to the state or of laissez faire. I t i s made
for peopl e of fundamental l y di fferi ng vi ews, and the acci dent of our
fi ndi ng certai n opi ni ons natural and fami l i ar or novel and even
shocki ng ought not to concl ude our judgment upon the questi on
whether statutes embodyi ng them confl i ct wi th the Consti tuti on.
. . . I thi nk that the word l i berty i n the Fourteenth Amendment i s
perverted when i t i s hel d to prevent the natural outcome of a domi -
nant opi ni on, unl ess i t can be sai d that a rati onal and fai r man
necessari l y woul d admi t that the statute proposed woul d i nfri nge
fundamental pri nci pl es as they have been understood by the tradi -
ti ons of our peopl e and our l aw.
88
I n part, Justi ce Hol mes cri ti ci sm of hi s col l eagues was unfai r,
for hi s rati onal and fai r man coul d not functi on i n a vacuum, and,
i n apprai si ng the consti tuti onal i ty of state l egi sl ati on, coul d no
more avoi d bei ng gui ded by hi s preferences or economi c predi -
l ecti ons than were the Justi ces consti tuti ng the majori ty. I nsofar
as he accepted the broader concepti on of due process of l aw i n pref-
erence to the hi stori cal concept thereof as pertai ni ng to the enforce-
ment rather than the maki ng of l aw, and di d not affi rmati vel y ad-
vocate a return to the maxi m that the possi bi l i ty of abuse i s no ar-
gument agai nst possessi on of a power, Justi ce Hol mes, whether
consci ousl y or not, was thus prepared to observe, al ong wi th hi s op-
ponents i n the majori ty, the very practi ces whi ch were deemed to
have rendered i nevi tabl e the assumpti on by the Court of a perpet-
ual censorshi p over state l egi sl ati on. The basi c di sti ncti on, there-
fore, between the posi ti ons taken by Justi ce Peckham for the ma-
jori ty and Justi ce Hol mes, for what was then the mi nori ty, was the
1585
89
243 U.S. 426 (1917).
90
208 U.S. 412 (1908).
91
I d.
92
Adki ns v. Chi l drens Hospi tal , 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Stettl er v. OHara, 243
U.S. 629 (1917); Morehead v. New York ex rel . Ti pal do, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
93
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parri sh, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Thus the Nati onal
Labor Rel ati ons Act was decl ared not to i nterfere wi th the normal exerci se of the
ri ght of the empl oyer to sel ect i ts empl oyees or to di scharge them. However, re-
strai nt of the empl oyer for the purpose of preventi ng an unjust i nterference wi th
the correl ati ve ri ght of hi s empl oyees to organi ze was decl ared not to be arbi trary.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughl i n Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 44, 4546 (1937).
espousal of the confl i cti ng doctri nes of judi ci al noti ce by the former
and of presumed val i di ty by the l atter.
Al though the Hol mes di ssent bore frui t i n ti me i n the form of
the Bunting v. Oregon
89
and Muller v. Oregon
90
deci si ons modi fy-
i ng Lochner, the doctri nal approach empl oyed i n the earl i er of
these by Justi ce Brewer conti nued to prevai l unti l the Depressi on
i n the 1930s. I n vi ew of the shi ft i n the burden of proof whi ch ap-
pl i cati on of the pri nci pl e of judi ci al noti ce entai l ed, counsel defend-
i ng the consti tuti onal i ty of soci al l egi sl ati on devel oped the practi ce
of submi tti ng vol umi nous factual bri efs repl ete wi th medi cal or
other sci enti fi c data i ntended to establ i sh beyond questi on a sub-
stanti al rel ati onshi p between the chal l enged statute and publ i c
heal th, safety, or moral s. Whenever the Court was di sposed to up-
hol d measures pertai ni ng to i ndustri al rel ati ons, such as l aws l i m-
i ti ng hours of work,
91
i t general l y i nti mated that the facts thus
submi tted by way of justi fi cati on had been authenti cated suffi -
ci entl y for i t to take judi ci al cogni zance thereof. On the other hand,
whenever i t chose to i nval i date comparabl e l egi sl ati on, such as en-
actments establ i shi ng mi ni mum wage for women and chi l dren,
92
i t
brushed asi de such supporti ng data, procl ai med i ts i nabi l i ty to per-
cei ve any reasonabl e connecti on between the statute and the l egi ti -
mate objecti ves of heal th or safety, and condemned the statute as
an arbi trary i nterference wi th freedom of contract.
Duri ng the great Depressi on, however, the laissez faire tenet of
sel f-hel p was suppl anted by the bel i ef that i t i s pecul i arl y the duty
of government to hel p those who are unabl e to hel p themsel ves. To
sustai n remedi al l egi sl ati on enacted i n conformi ty wi th the l atter
phi l osophy, the Court had to revi se extensi vel y i ts previ ousl y for-
mul ated concepts of l i berty under the due process cl ause. Not
onl y di d the Court take judi ci al noti ce of the demands for rel i ef
ari si ng from the Depressi on when i t overturned pri or hol di ngs and
sustai ned mi ni mum wage l egi sl ati on,
93
but, i n uphol di ng state l eg-
i sl ati on desi gned to protect workers i n thei r efforts to organi ze and
bargai n col l ecti vel y, the Court had to reconsi der the scope of an
1586
94
Mi l l er v. Wi l son, 236 U.S. 373 (1915) (statute l i mi ti ng work to 8 hours/day,
48 hours/week); Bosl ey v. McLaughl i n, 236 U.S. 385 (1915) (same restri cti ons for
women worki ng as pharmaci sts or student nurses). See also Mul l er v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908) (10 hours/day as appl i ed to work i n l aundri es); Ri l ey v. Massachu-
setts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914) (vi ol ati on of l unch hour requi red to be posted).
95
See, e.g., Hol den v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (statute l i mi ti ng the hours of
l abor i n mi nes and smel ters to ei ght hours per day); Bunti ng v. Oregon, 243 U.S.
426 (1917) (statute l i mi ti ng to ten hours per day, wi th the possi bi l i ty of 3 hours per
day of overti me at ti me-and-a-hal f pay, work i n any mi l l , factory, or manufacturi ng
establ i shment).
96
Atki n v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903).
97
St. Loui s Consol . Coal Co. v. I l l i noi s, 185 U.S. 203 (1902).
98
Wi l mi ngton Mi ni ng Co. v. Ful ton, 205 U.S. 60 (1907).
99
Barrett v. I ndi ana, 229 U.S. 26 (1913).
empl oyers l i berty of contract and recogni ze a correl ati ve l i berty of
empl oyees that state l egi sl atures coul d protect.
To the extent that i t acknowl edged that l i berty of the i ndi vi d-
ual may be i nfri nged by the coerci ve conduct of other i ndi vi dual s
no l ess than by the arbi trary acti on of publ i c offi ci al s, the Court i n
effect transformed the due process cl ause i nto a source of encour-
agement to state l egi sl atures to i ntervene affi rmati vel y to mi ti gate
the effects of such coerci on. By such modi fi cati on of i ts vi ews, l i b-
erty, i n the consti tuti onal sense of freedom resul ti ng from restrai nt
upon government, was repl aced by the ci vi l l i berty whi ch an i ndi -
vi dual enjoys by vi rtue of the restrai nts whi ch government, i n hi s
behal f, i mposes upon hi s nei ghbors.
Laws Regul ati ng Hours of Labor. Even duri ng the
Lochner era, the due process cl ause was construed as permi tti ng
enactment by the States of maxi mum hours l aws appl i cabl e to
women workers
94
and to workers i n speci fi ed l i nes of work thought
to be physi cal l y demandi ng or otherwi se worthy of speci al protec-
ti on.
95
Because of the al most pl enary powers of the State and i ts
muni ci pal subdi vi si ons to determi ne the condi ti ons for work on
publ i c projects, statutes l i mi ti ng the hours of l abor on publ i c works
were al so uphel d at a rel ati vel y earl y date.
96
Laws Regul ati ng Labor i n Mi nes. The regul ati on of mi nes
bei ng patentl y wi thi n the pol i ce power, States duri ng thi s peri od
were al so uphel d i n the enactment of l aws provi di ng for appoi nt-
ment of mi ni ng i nspectors and requi ri ng payment of thei r fees by
mi ne owners,
97
compel l i ng empl oyment of onl y l i censed mi ne man-
agers and mi ne exami ners, and i mposi ng upon mi ne owners l i abi l -
i ty for the wi l l ful fai l ure of thei r manager and exami ner to furni sh
a reasonabl y safe pl ace for workmen.
98
Other si mi l ar regul ati ons
whi ch have been sustai ned have i ncl uded l aws requi ri ng that un-
derground passageways meet or exceed a mi ni mum wi dth,
99
that
boundary pi l l ars be i nstal l ed between adjoi ni ng coal properti es as
1587
100
Pl ymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsyl vani a, 232 U.S. 531 (1914).
101
Booth v. I ndi ana, 237 U.S. 391 (1915).
102
Sturges & Burn v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320 (1913).
103
Knoxvi l l e I ron Co. v. Harbi son, 183 U.S. 13 (1901); Dayton Coal and I ron Co.
v. Barton, 183 U.S. 23 (1901); Keokee Coke Co. v. Tayl or, 234 U.S. 224 (1914).
104
Eri e R.R. v. Wi l l i ams, 233 U.S. 685 (1914).
105
St. Loui s, I . Mt. & S.P. Ry. v. Paul , 173 U.S. 404 (1899).
106
Rai l Coal Co. v. Ohi o I ndustri al Commn, 236 U.S. 338 (1915). See also
McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (1909).
107
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parri sh, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overrul i ng Adki ns v.
Chi l drens Hospi tal , 261 U.S. 525 (1923), a Fi fth Amendment case); Morehead v.
New York ex rel . Ti pal do, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
a protecti on agai nst fl ood i n case of abandonment,
100
and that
washhouses be provi ded for empl oyees.
101
Law Prohi bi ti ng Empl oyment of Chi l dren i n Hazardous
Occupati ons. To make effecti ve i ts prohi bi ti on agai nst the em-
pl oyment of persons under 16 years of age i n dangerous occupa-
ti ons, a State has been hel d to be competent to requi re empl oyers
at thei r peri l to ascertai n whether thei r empl oyees are i n fact
bel ow that age.
102
Laws Regul ati ng Payment of Wages. No unconsti tuti onal
depri vati on of l i berty of contract was deemed to have been occa-
si oned by a statute requi ri ng redempti on i n cash of store orders or
other evi dences of i ndebtedness i ssued by empl oyers i n payment of
wages.
103
Nor was any consti tuti onal defect di scerni bl e i n l aws re-
qui ri ng rai l roads to pay thei r empl oyees semi monthl y
104
and to
pay them on the day of di scharge, wi thout abatement or reducti on,
any funds due them.
105
Si mi l arl y, freedom of contract was hel d not
to be i nfri nged by an act requi ri ng that mi ners, whose compensa-
ti on was fi xed on the basi s of wei ght, be pai d accordi ng to coal i n
the mi ne car rather than at a certai n pri ce per ton for coal
screened after i t has been brought to the surface, and condi ti oni ng
such payment on the presence of no greater percentage of di rt or
i mpuri ti es than that ascertai ned as unavoi dabl e by the State I n-
dustri al Commi ssi on.
106
Mi ni mum Wage Laws. The theory that a l aw prescri bi ng
mi ni mum wages for women and chi l dren vi ol ates due process by
i mpai ri ng freedom of contract was fi nal l y di scarded i n 1937.
107
The
modern theory of the Court, parti cul arl y when l abor i s the bene-
fi ci ary of l egi sl ati on, was stated by Justi ce Dougl as for a majori ty
of the Court, i n the fol l owi ng terms: Our recent deci si ons make
pl ai n that we do not si t as a superl egi sl ature to wei gh the wi sdom
of l egi sl ati on nor to deci de whether the pol i cy whi ch i t expresses
offends the publ i c wel fare. The l egi sl ati ve power has l i mi ts. . . .
But the state l egi sl atures have consti tuti onal authori ty to experi -
ment wi th new techni ques; they are enti tl ed to thei r own standard
1588
108
Day-Bri te Li ghti ng, I nc. v. Mi ssouri , 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
109
I d. at 42425. See also Dean v. Gadsden Ti mes Pub. Co., 412 U.S. 543 (1973)
(sustai ni ng statute provi di ng that empl oyee excused for jury duty shoul d be enti tl ed
to ful l compensati on from empl oyer, l ess jury servi ce fee).
110
New York Cent. R.R. v. Whi te, 243 U.S. 188, 200 (1917).
of the publ i c wel fare; they may wi thi n extremel y broad l i mi ts con-
trol practi ces i n the busi ness-l abor fi el d, so l ong as speci fi c con-
sti tuti onal prohi bi ti ons are not vi ol ated and so l ong as confl i cts
wi th val i d and control l i ng federal l aws are avoi ded.
108
Proceedi ng
from thi s basi s the Court sustai ned a Mi ssouri statute gi vi ng em-
pl oyees the ri ght to absent themsel ves four hours on el ecti on day,
between the openi ng and cl osi ng of the pol l s, wi thout deducti on of
wages for thei r absence.
I t was admi tted that thi s was a mi ni mum wage l aw, but, sai d
Justi ce Dougl as, the protecti on of the ri ght of suffrage under our
scheme of thi ngs i s basi c and fundamental , and hence wi thi n the
pol i ce power. Of course, the Justi ce added, many forms of regul a-
ti on reduce the net return of the enterpri se. . . . Most regul ati ons
of busi ness necessari l y i mpose fi nanci al burdens on the enterpri se
for whi ch no compensati on i s pai d. Those are part of the costs of
our ci vi l i zati on. Extreme cases are conjured up where an empl oyer
i s requi red to pay wages for a peri od that has no rel ati on to the
l egi ti mate end. Those cases can awai t deci si on as and when they
ari se. The present l aw has no such i nfi rmi ty. I t i s desi gned to
el i mi nate any penal ty for exerci si ng the ri ght of suffrage and to re-
move a practi cal obstacl e to getti ng out the vote. The publ i c wel fare
i s a broad and i ncl usi ve concept. The moral , soci al , economi c, and
physi cal wel l -bei ng of the communi ty i s one part of i t; the pol i ti cal
wel l -bei ng, another. The pol i ce power whi ch i s adequate to fi x the
fi nanci al burden for one i s adequate for the other. The judgment
of the l egi sl ature that ti me out for voti ng shoul d cost the empl oyee
nothi ng may be a debatabl e one. I t i s i ndeed conceded by the oppo-
si ti on to be such. But i f our recent cases mean anythi ng, they l eave
debatabl e i ssues as respects busi ness, economi c, and soci al affai rs
to l egi sl ati ve deci si on. We coul d stri ke down thi s l aw onl y i f we re-
turned to the phi l osophy of the Lochner, Coppage, and Adkins
cases.
109
Workers Compensati on Laws. Thi s court repeatedl y has
uphel d the authori ty of the States to establ i sh by l egi sl ati on depar-
tures from the fel l ow-servant rul e and other common-l aw rul es af-
fecti ng the empl oyers l i abi l i ty for personal i njuri es to the em-
pl oyee.
110
These deci si ons have establ i shed the proposi ti ons that
the rul es of l aw concerni ng the empl oyers responsi bi l i ty for per-
sonal i njury or death of an empl oyee ari si ng i n the course of em-
1589
111
Ari zona Empl oyers Li abi l i ty Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 41920 (1919).
112
I n determi ni ng what occupati ons may be brought under the desi gnati on of
hazardous, the l egi sl ature may carry the i dea to the vani shi ng poi nt. Ward &
Gow v. Kri nsky, 259 U.S. 503, 520 (1922).
113
New York Central R.R. v. Whi te, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Mountai n Ti mber Co.
v. Washi ngton, 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
114
Ari zona Empl oyers Li abi l i ty Cases, 250 U.S. 400 (1919).
115
Usery v. Turner El khorn Mi ni ng Co., 428 U.S. 1, 1420 (1976). But see i d.
at 38 (Justi ce Powel l concurri ng).
pl oyment are not beyond al terati on by l egi sl ati on i n the publ i c i n-
terest; that no person has a vested ri ght enti tl i ng hi m to have
these any more than other rul es of l aw remai n unchanged for hi s
benefi t; and that, i f we excl ude arbi trary and unreasonabl e
changes, l i abi l i ty may be i mposed upon the empl oyer wi thout faul t,
and the rul es respecti ng hi s responsi bi l i ty to one empl oyee for the
negl i gence of another and respecti ng contri butory negl i gence and
assumpti on of ri sk are subject to l egi sl ati ve change.
111
Accord-
i ngl y, a state statute whi ch provi ded an excl usi ve system to govern
the l i abi l i ti es of empl oyers and the ri ghts of empl oyees and thei r
dependents to compensati on for di sabl i ng i njuri es and death caused
by acci dent i n certai n hazardous occupati ons,
112
was hel d not to
work a deni al of due process i n renderi ng the empl oyer l i abl e i rre-
specti ve of the doctri nes of negl i gence, contri butory negl i gence, as-
sumpti on of ri sk, and negl i gence of fel l ow-servants, nor i n depri v-
i ng the empl oyee or hi s dependents of the hi gher damages whi ch,
i n some cases, mi ght be rendered under these doctri nes.
113
Li ke-
wi se, an act whi ch al l owed an i njured empl oyee an el ecti on of rem-
edi es permi tti ng restri cted recovery under a compensati on l aw al -
though gui l ty of contri butory negl i gence, and ful l compensatory
damages under the Empl oyers Li abi l i ty Act, di d not depri ve an
empl oyer of hi s property wi thout due process of l aw.
114
The i mposi ti on upon coal mi ne operators, and ul ti matel y coal
consumers, of the l i abi l i ty of compensati ng former empl oyees who
termi nated work i n the i ndustry before passage of the l aw for bl ack
l ung di sabi l i ti es contracted i n the course of thei r work was sus-
tai ned by the Court as a rati onal measure to spread the costs of
the empl oyees di sabi l i ti es to those who have profi ted from the
frui ts of thei r l abor.
115
Legi sl ati on readjusti ng ri ghts and burdens
i s not unl awful sol el y because i t upsets otherwi se settl ed expecta-
ti ons, but i t must take account of the real i ti es previ ousl y exi sti ng,
i .e., that the danger may not have been known or appreci ated, or
that acti ons mi ght have been taken i n rel i ance upon the current
state of the l aw; therefore, l egi sl ati on i mposi ng l i abi l i ty on the
basi s of deterrence or of bl ameworthi ness mi ght not have passed
muster.
1590
116
Chi cago, B. & Q. R.R. v. McGui re, 219 U.S. 549 (1911).
117
Al aska Packers Assn v. I ndustri al Acci dent Commn, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
118
Thornton v. Duffy, 254 U.S. 361 (1920).
119
Booth Fi sheri es v. I ndustri al Commn, 271 U.S. 208 (1926).
120
Staten I sl and Ry. v. Phoeni x Co., 281 U.S. 98 (1930).
121
Sheehan Co. v. Shul er, 265 U.S. 371 (1924); New York State Rys. v. Shul er,
265 U.S. 379 (1924).
122
New York Cent. R.R. v. Bi anc, 250 U.S. 596 (1919). Attorneys are not de-
pri ved of property or thei r l i berty of contract by restri cti on i mposed by the State
Contracts l i mi ti ng l i abi l i ty for i njuri es, consummated i n ad-
vance of the i njury recei ved, may be prohi bi ted by the l egi sl ature,
whi ch may further sti pul ate that subsequent acceptance of benefi ts
under such contracts shal l not consti tute sati sfacti on of a cl ai m for
i njuri es thereafter sustai ned.
116
Al so, as appl i ed to a nonresi dent
al i en empl oyee hi red wi thi n the State but i njured outsi de, an act
forbi ddi ng any contracts exempti ng empl oyers from l i abi l i ty for i n-
juri es outsi de the State has been construed as not denyi ng due
process to the empl oyer.
117
The fact that a State, after havi ng al -
l owed empl oyers to cover thei r l i abi l i ty wi th a pri vate i nsurer, sub-
sequentl y wi thdrew that pri vi l ege and requi red them to contri bute
to a state i nsurance fund was hel d to effect no unconsti tuti onal
depri vati on as appl i ed to an empl oyer who had obtai ned protecti on
from an i nsurance company before thi s change went i nto effect.
118
As l ong as the ri ght to come under a workmens compensati on stat-
ute i s opti onal wi th an empl oyer, the l atter, havi ng chosen to ac-
cept benefi ts thereof, i s estopped from attempti ng to escape i ts bur-
dens by chal l engi ng the consti tuti onal i ty of a provi si on thereof
whi ch makes the fi ndi ng of fact of an i ndustri al commi ssi on concl u-
si ve i f supported by any evi dence regardl ess of i ts preponder-
ance.
119
When, by the terms of a workers compensati on statute, the
wrongdoer, i n case of wrongful death, i s obl i ged to i ndemni fy the
empl oyer or the i nsurance carri er of the empl oyer of the decedent,
i n the amount whi ch the l atter were requi red under the act to con-
tri bute i nto speci al compensati on funds, no unconsti tuti onal depri -
vati on of the wrongdoers property was di scerni bl e.
120
By the same
course of reasoni ng nei ther the empl oyer nor the carri er was hel d
to have been deni ed due process by another provi si on i n an act re-
qui ri ng payments by them, i n case an i njured empl oyee di es wi th-
out dependents, i nto speci al funds to be used for vocati onal reha-
bi l i tati on or di sabi l i ty compensati on of i njured workers of other es-
tabl i shments.
121
Compensati on al so need not be based excl usi vel y
on l oss of earni ng power, and an award authori zed by statute for
i njuri es resul ti ng i n di sfi gurement of the face or head, i ndependent
of compensati on for i nabi l i ty to work, has been conceded to be nei -
ther an arbi trary nor oppressi ve exerci se of the pol i ce power.
122
1591
on the fees whi ch they may charge i n cases ari si ng under the workmens compensa-
ti on l aw. Yei ser v. Dysart, 267 U.S. 540 (1925).
123
Justi ce Bl ack i n Li ncol n Federal Labor Uni on v. Northwestern I ron & Metal
Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535 (1949). I n hi s concurri ng opi ni on, contai ned i n the compani on
case of AFL v. Ameri can Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 54344 (1949), Justi ce
Frankfurter summari zed the now obsol ete doctri nes empl oyed by the Court to stri ke
down state l aws fosteri ng uni oni zati on. [U]ni oni zati on encountered the shi bbol eths
of a premachi ne age and these were refl ected i n juri di cal assumpti ons that survi ved
the facts on whi ch they were based. Adam Smi th was treated as though hi s gen-
eral i zati ons had been i mparted to hi m on Si nai and not as a thi nker who addressed
hi msel f to the el i mi nati on of restri cti ons whi ch had become fetters upon i ni ti ati ve
and enterpri se i n hi s day. Basi c human ri ghts expressed by the consti tuti onal con-
cepti on of l i berty were equated wi th theori es of laissez faire. The resul t was that
economi c vi ews of confi ned val i di ty were treated by l awyers and judges as though
the Framers had enshri ned them i n the Consti tuti on. . . . The atti tude whi ch re-
garded any l egi sl ati ve encroachment upon the exi sti ng economi c order as i nfected
wi th unconsti tuti onal i ty l ed to di srespect for l egi sl ati ve attempts to strengthen the
wage-earners bargai ni ng power. Wi th that atti tude as a premi se, Adai r v. Uni ted
States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), fol l owed
l ogi cal l y enough; not even Truax v. Corri gan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), coul d be consi d-
ered unexpected.
I n Adair and Coppage the Court voi ded statutes outl awi ng yel l ow dog con-
tracts whereby, as a condi ti on of obtai ni ng empl oyment, a worker had to agree not
to joi n or to remai n a member of a uni on; these l aws, the Court rul ed, i mpai red the
empl oyers freedom of contract the empl oyers unrestri cted ri ght to hi re and fi re.
I n Truax, the Court on si mi l ar grounds i nval i dated an Ari zona statute whi ch deni ed
the use of i njuncti ons to empl oyers seeki ng to restrai n pi cketi ng and vari ous other
communi cati ve acti ons by stri ki ng empl oyees. And i n Wol ff Co. v. I ndustri al Court,
262 U.S. 522 (1923); 267 U.S. 552 (1925) and Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286
(1924), the Court had al so rul ed that a statute compel l i ng empl oyers and empl oyees
to submi t thei r controversi es over wages and hours to state arbi trati on was uncon-
sti tuti onal as part of a system compel l i ng empl oyers and empl oyees to conti nue i n
busi ness on terms not of thei r own maki ng.
124
301 U.S. 486 (1937).
125
Prudenti al I ns. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922). I n conjuncti on wi th i ts
approval of thi s statute, the Court al so sancti oned judi ci al enforcement of a l ocal
pol i cy rul e whi ch rendered i l l egal an agreement of several i nsurance compani es hav-
i ng a l ocal monopol y of a l i ne of i nsurance, to the effect that no company woul d em-
pl oy wi thi n two years anyone who had been di scharged from, or l eft, the servi ce of
any of the others.
Col l ecti ve Bargai ni ng. Duri ng the 1930s, l i berty, as trans-
l ated i nto what one Justi ce l abel ed the Allgeyer-Lochner-Adair-
Coppage doctri ne,
123
l ost i ts potency as an obstacl e to l egi sl ati on
cal cul ated to enhance the bargai ni ng capaci ty of workers as agai nst
that al ready possessed by thei r empl oyers. Pri or to the mani festa-
ti on, i n Senn v. Tile Layers Union,
124
of a greater wi l l i ngness to
defer to l egi sl ati ve judgment as to the wi sdom and need of such en-
actments, the Court had, on occasi on, sustai ned measures affecti ng
the empl oyment rel ati onshi p, e.g., a statute requi ri ng every cor-
porati on to furni sh, upon request by any empl oyee bei ng di s-
charged or l eavi ng i ts servi ce, a l etter, si gned by the superi ntend-
ent or manager, setti ng forth the nature and durati on of the em-
pl oyees servi ce and the true cause for l eavi ng.
125
Added provi si ons
that such l etters shoul d be on pl ai n paper sel ected by the em-
1592
126
Chi cago, R.I . & P. Ry. v. Perry, 259 U.S. 548 (1922).
127
Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926).
128
301 U.S. 468 (1937).
129
257 U.S. 312 (1921).
130
Cases di sposi ng of the contenti on that restrai nts on pi cketi ng amount to a
deni al of freedom of speech and consti tute therefore a depri vati on of l i berty wi thout
due process of l aw have been set forth under the Fi rst Amendment. See pp. 1102,
1121, supra.
pl oyee, si gned i n i nk and seal ed, and free from superfl uous fi gures
and words, were al so sustai ned as not amounti ng to any unconsti -
tuti onal depri vati on of l i berty and property.
126
On the ground that
the ri ght to stri ke i s not absol ute, the Court i n a si mi l ar manner
uphel d a statute under whi ch a l abor uni on offi ci al was puni shed
for havi ng ordered a stri ke for the purpose of coerci ng an empl oyer
to pay a wage cl ai m of a former empl oyee.
127
The si gni fi cance of Senn v. Tile Layers Union
128
as an i ndi ca-
tor of the range of the al terati on of the Courts vi ews concerni ng
the consti tuti onal i ty of state l abor l egi sl ati on, deri ves i n part from
the fact that the statute uphel d therei n was not appreci abl y di f-
ferent from that voi ded i n Truax v. Corrigan.
129
Both statutes
wi thhel d the remedy of i njuncti on. Because, however, the i nval i -
dated act di d not contai n the more l i beral and al so more preci se
defi ni ti on of a l abor di spute set forth i n the sustai ned enactment
and, above al l , di d not affi rmati vel y purport to sancti on peaceful
pi cketi ng onl y, the Court was enabl ed to mai ntai n that Truax v.
Corrigan, i nsofar as the statute there i n questi on was . . . appl i ed
to l egal i ze conduct whi ch was not si mpl y peaceful pi cketi ng, was
di sti ngui shabl e. The statute uphel d i n Senn authori zed the gi vi ng
of publ i ci ty to l abor di sputes, decl ared peaceful pi cketi ng and pa-
trol l i ng l awful , and prohi bi ted the granti ng of i njuncti ons agai nst
such conduct; the statute was appl i ed to deny an i njuncti on to a
ti l i ng contractor bei ng pi cketed by a uni on because he refused to
si gn a cl osed shop agreement contai ni ng a provi si on requi ri ng hi m
to abstai n from worki ng i n hi s own busi ness as a ti l e l ayer or hel p-
er. I nasmuch as the enhancement of job opportuni ti es for members
of the uni on was a l egi ti mate objecti ve, the State was hel d com-
petent to authori ze the fosteri ng of that end by peaceful pi cketi ng,
and the fact that the sustai ni ng of the uni on i n i ts efforts at peace-
ful persuasi on mi ght have the effect of preventi ng Senn from con-
ti nui ng i n busi ness as an i ndependent entrepreneur was decl ared
to present an i ssue of publ i c pol i cy excl usi vel y for l egi sl ati ve deter-
mi nati on.
130
Years l ater, the pol i cy of many state l egi sl atures had evol ved
i n the di recti on of attempti ng to control the abuse of the enormous
economi c power that previ ousl y enacted protecti ve measures had
1593
131
Rai l way Mai l Assn v. Corsi , 326 U.S. 88, 94 (1945). Justi ce Frankfurter, con-
curri ng, decl ared that the i nsi stence by i ndi vi dual s of thei r pri vate prejudi ces . . .,
i n rel ati ons l i ke those now before us, ought not to have a hi gher consti tuti onal sanc-
ti on than the determi nati on of a State to extend the area of nondi scri mi nati on be-
yond that whi ch the Consti tuti on i tsel f exacts. I d. at 98.
132
335 U.S. 525 (1949).
133
335 U.S. 538 (1949).
134
335 U.S. 525, 534, 537. I n a l engthy opi ni on, i n whi ch he regi stered hi s con-
currence wi th both deci si ons, Justi ce Frankfurter set forth extensi ve stati sti cal data
cal cul ated to prove that l abor uni ons not onl y were possessed of consi derabl e eco-
nomi c power but by vi rtue of such power were no l onger dependent on the cl osed
shop for survi val . He woul d therefore l eave to the l egi sl atures the determi nati on
whether i t i s preferabl e i n the publ i c i nterest that trade uni ons shoul d be subjected
to state i nterventi on or l eft to the free pl ay of soci al forces, whether experi ence has
di scl osed uni on unfai r l abor practi ces, and i f so, whether l egi sl ati ve correcti on i s
more appropri ate than sel f-di sci pl i ne and pressure of publ i c opi ni on. . . . I d. at 538,
54950.
135
336 U.S. 245 (1949).
enabl ed l abor uni ons to amass, and here too the Court found re-
stri cti ons consti tuti onal . Thus the Court uphel d appl i cati on of a
state prohi bi ti on on raci al di scri mi nati on by uni ons, rejecti ng
cl ai ms that the measure i nterfered unl awful l y wi th the uni ons
ri ght to choose i ts members and abri dged i ts property ri ghts, and
l i berty of contract. I nasmuch as the uni on [hel d] i tsel f out to rep-
resent the general busi ness needs of empl oyees and functi oned
under the protecti on of the State, the uni on was deemed to have
forfei ted the ri ght to cl ai m exempti on from l egi sl ati on protecti ng
workers agai nst di scri mi natory excl usi on.
131
Si mi l arl y approved as consti tuti onal i n Lincoln Federal Labor
Union v. Northwestern I ron & Metal Co.
132
and AFL v. American
Sash & Door Co.
133
were state l aws outl awi ng the cl osed shop.
When l abor uni ons i nvoked i n thei r own defense the freedom of
contract doctri ne that hi therto had been empl oyed to nul l i fy l egi sl a-
ti on i ntended for thei r protecti on, the Court, speaki ng through Jus-
ti ce Bl ack, announced i ts refusal to return . . . to . . . [a] due proc-
ess phi l osophy that has been del i beratel y di scarded. . . . The due
process cl ause, i t mai ntai ned, does not forbi d a State to pass l aws
cl earl y desi gned to safeguard the opportuni ty of nonuni on workers
to get and hol d jobs, free from di scri mi nati on agai nst them because
they are nonuni on workers.
134
Al so i n harmony wi th the l ast men-
ti oned pai r of cases i s UAW v. WERB,
135
uphol di ng enforcement of
the Wi sconsi n Empl oyment Peace Act to proscri be as an unfai r
l abor practi ce efforts of a uni on, after col l ecti ve bargai ni ng negoti a-
ti ons had become deadl ocked, to coerce an empl oyer through a
sl ow-down i n producti on achi eved by the frequent, i rregul ar, and
unannounced cal l i ng of uni on meeti ngs duri ng worki ng hours. No
one, decl ared the Court, can questi on the States power to pol i ce
coerci on by . . . methods whi ch i nvol ve consi derabl e i njury to
1594
136
I d. at 253.
137
336 U.S. 490 (1949). Other recent cases regul ati ng pi cketi ng are treated
under the Fi rst Amendment. See pp. 117379, supra.
138
94 U.S. 113 (1877).
139
Chi cago, M. & St.P. Ry. v. Mi nnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
property and i nti mi dati on of other empl oyees by threats.
136
Fi -
nal l y, i n Giboney v. Empire Storage Co.,
137
the Court acknowl -
edged that no vi ol ati on of the Consti tuti on resul ts when a state l aw
forbi ddi ng agreements i n restrai nt of trade i s construed by state
courts as forbi ddi ng members of a uni on of i ce peddl ers from peace-
ful l y pi cketi ng a whol esal e i ce di stri butors pl ace of busi ness for the
sol e purpose of i nduci ng the l atter not to sel l to nonuni on peddl ers.
Regulation of Business Enterprises: Rates, Charges, and
Conditions of Service
Busi ness Affected Wi th a Publ i c I nterest I n endeavori ng
to measure the i mpact of the due process cl ause upon efforts by the
States to control the charges exacted by vari ous busi nesses for
thei r servi ces, the Supreme Court, al most from the i ncepti on of the
Fourteenth Amendment, devoted i tsel f to the exami nati on of two
questi ons: (1) whether the cl ause precl uded that ki nd of regul ati on
of certai n types of busi ness, and (2) the nature of the restrai nt, i f
any, whi ch thi s cl ause i mposed on state control of rates i n the case
of busi nesses as to whi ch such control exi sted. For a bri ef i nterval
fol l owi ng the rati fi cati on of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Su-
preme Court appears to have underesti mated the si gni fi cance of
the due process cl ause as a substanti ve restrai nt on the power of
States to fi x rates chargeabl e by an i ndustry deemed appropri atel y
subject to such control s. Thus, i n Munn v. I llinois,
138
the fi rst of
the Granger Cases, i n whi ch maxi mum charges establ i shed by a
state l egi sl ature for Chi cago grai n el evator compani es were chal -
l enged, not as bei ng confi scatory i n character, but rather as a regu-
l ati on beyond the power of any state agency to i mpose, the Court,
i n an opi ni on that was l argel y di ctum, decl ared that the due proc-
ess cl ause di d not operate as a safeguard agai nst oppressi ve rates,
that i f regul ati on was permi ssi bl e, the severi ty thereof was wi thi n
l egi sl ati ve di screti on and coul d be amel i orated onl y by resort to the
pol l s. Not much ti me el apsed, however, before the Court effected a
compl ete wi thdrawal from thi s posi ti on. By 1890
139
i t had ful l y
converted the due process cl ause i nto a posi ti ve restri cti on whi ch
the judi ci al branch was duty bound to enforce whenever state agen-
ci es sought to i mpose rates whi ch, i n i ts esti mati on, were arbi trary
or unreasonabl e.
1595
140
Wol ff Packi ng Co. v. I ndustri al Court, 262 U.S. 522, 53536 (1923).
141
Munn v. I l l i noi s, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 546
(1892); Brass v. North Dakota ex rel . Stoesser, 153 U.S. 391 (1894).
142
Cotti ng v. Kansas Ci ty Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79 (1901).
143
Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441 (1937).
144
German Al l i ance I ns. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389 (1914); Aetna I nsurance
Co. v. Hyde, 275 U.S. 440 (1928).
145
OGorman & Young v. Hartford I ns. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931).
I n contrast to the speed wi th whi ch the Court arri ved at those
above menti oned concl usi ons, more than fi fty years were to el apse
before i t devel oped i ts currentl y appl i cabl e formul a for determi ni ng
the propri ety of subjecti ng speci fi c busi nesses to state regul ati on of
thei r pri ces or charges. Pri or to 1934, unl ess a busi ness was af-
fected wi th a publ i c i nterest, control of i ts pri ces, rates, or condi -
ti ons of servi ce was vi ewed as an unconsti tuti onal depri vati on of
l i berty and property wi thout due process of l aw. Duri ng the peri od
of i ts appl i cati on, however, thi s standard, busi ness affected wi th
a publ i c i nterest, never acqui red any preci se meani ng, and as a
consequence l awyers were never abl e to i denti fy al l those qual i ti es
or attri butes whi ch i nvari abl y di sti ngui shed a busi ness so affected
from one not so affected. The most coherent effort by the Court was
the fol l owi ng cl assi fi cati on prepared by Chi ef Justi ce Taft.
140
(1)
Those [busi nesses] whi ch are carri ed on under the authori ty of a
publ i c grant of pri vi l eges whi ch ei ther expressl y or i mpl i edl y i m-
poses the affi rmati ve duty of renderi ng a publ i c servi ce demanded
by any member of the publ i c. Such are the rai l roads, other common
carri ers and publ i c uti l i ti es. (2) Certai n occupati ons, regarded as
excepti onal , the publ i c i nterest attachi ng to whi ch, recogni zed from
earl i est ti mes, has survi ved the peri od of arbi trary l aws by Par-
l i ament or Col oni al l egi sl atures for regul ati ng al l trades and
cal l i ngs. Such are those of the keepers of i nns, cabs and gri st mi l l s.
. . . (3) Busi nesses whi ch though not publ i c at thei r i ncepti on may
be fai rl y sai d to have ri sen to be such and have become subject i n
consequence to some government regul ati on. They have come to
hol d such a pecul i ar rel ati on to the publ i c that thi s i s super-
i mposed upon them. I n the l anguage of the cases, the owner by de-
voti ng hi s busi ness to the publ i c use, i n effect grants the publ i c an
i nterest i n that use and subjects hi msel f to publ i c regul ati on to the
extent of that i nterest al though the property conti nues to bel ong to
i ts pri vate owner and to be enti tl ed to protecti on accordi ngl y.
Through appl i cati on of thi s now outmoded formul a the Court
found i t possi bl e to sustai n state l aws regul ati ng charges made by
grai n el evators,
141
stockyards,
142
and tobacco warehouses,
143
and
fi re i nsurance rates
144
and commi ssi ons pai d to fi re i nsurance
agents.
145
Voi ded, because the busi nesses sought to be control l ed
1596
146
Wi l l i ams v. Standard Oi l Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929).
147
Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
148
New State I ce Co. v. Li ebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). See also Adams v. Tan-
ner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917); Weaver v. Pal mer Bro., 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
149
Nebbi a v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 53132, 53537, 539 (1934). I n reachi ng
thi s concl usi on the Court mi ght be sai d to have el evated to the status of prevai l i ng
doctri ne the vi ews advanced i n previ ous deci si ons by di ssenti ng Justi ces. Thus, Jus-
ti ce Stone, di ssenti ng i n Ri bni k v. McBri de, 277 U.S. 350, 35960 (1928), had de-
cl ared: Pri ce regul ati on i s wi thi n the States power whenever any combi nati on of
ci rcumstances seri ousl y curtai l s the regul ati ve force of competi ti on so that buyers
or sel l ers are pl aced at such a di sadvantage i n the bargai ni ng struggl e that a l egi s-
l ature mi ght reasonabl y anti ci pate seri ous consequences to the communi ty as a
whol e. I n hi s di ssenti ng opi ni on i n New State I ce Co. v. Li ebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
30203 (1932), Justi ce Brandei s had al so observed: The noti on of a di sti nct category
of busi ness affected wi th a publ i c i nterest empl oyi ng property devoted to a publ i c
use rests upon hi stori cal error. I n my opi ni on the true pri nci pl e i s that the States
power extends to every regul ati on of any busi ness reasonabl y requi red and appro-
pri ate for the publ i c protecti on. I fi nd i n the due process cl ause no other l i mi tati on
upon the character or the scope of regul ati on permi ssi bl e.
were deemed to be not so affected, were state statutes fi xi ng the
pri ce at whi ch gasol i ne may be sol d,
146
or at whi ch ti cket brokers
may resel l ti ckets purchased from theatres,
147
and l i mi ti ng com-
peti ti on i n the manufacture and sal e of i ce through the wi thhol di ng
of l i censes to engage therei n.
148
Nebbia v. New York. I n uphol di ng, by a vote of fi ve-to-four,
a depressi on-i nduced New York statute fi xi ng pri ces at whi ch fl ui d
mi l k mi ght be sol d, the Court i n 1934 fi nal l y shel ved the concept
of a busi ness affected wi th a publ i c i nterest.
149
Ol der deci si ons,
i nsofar as they negati ved a power to control pri ces i n busi nesses
found not to be cl othed wi th a publ i c use were now vi ewed as
resti ng, fi nal l y, upon the basi s that the requi rements of due proc-
ess were not met because the l aws were found arbi trary i n thei r
operati on and effect. Pri ce control , l i ke any other form of regul a-
ti on, i s [now] unconsti tuti onal onl y i f arbi trary, di scri mi natory, or
demonstrabl y i rrel evant to the pol i cy the l egi sl ature i s free to
adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted i nterference
wi th i ndi vi dual l i berty. Concedi ng that the dai ry i ndustry i s not,
i n the accepted sense of the phrase, a publ i c uti l i ty, that i s, a
busi ness affected wi th a publ i c i nterest, the Court i n effect de-
cl ared that pri ce control henceforth i s to be vi ewed merel y as an
exerci se by the government of i ts pol i ce power, and as such i s sub-
ject onl y to the restri cti ons whi ch due process i mposes on arbi trary
i nterference wi th l i berty and property. Nor was the Court di s-
turbed by the fact that a sci enti fi c val i di ty had been cl ai med for
the theori es of Adam Smi th rel ati ng to the pri ce that wi l l cl ear the
market. However much the mi nori ty mi ght stress the
unreasonabl eness of any arti fi ci al state regul ati on i nterferi ng wi th
1597
150
Justi ce McReynol ds, speaki ng for the di ssenti ng Justi ces, l abel l ed the con-
trol s i mposed by the chal l enged statute as a fanci ful scheme to protect the farmer
agai nst undue exacti ons by prescri bi ng the pri ce at whi ch mi l k di sposed of by hi m
at wi l l may be resol d. I nti mati ng that the New York statute was as effi caci ous as
a safety regul ati on whi ch requi red househol ders to pour oi l on thei r roofs as a
means of curbi ng the spread of a nei ghborhood fi re, Justi ce McReynol ds i nsi sted
that thi s Court must have regard to the wi sdom of the enactment, and must deter-
mi ne whether the means proposed have reasonabl e rel ati on to somethi ng wi thi n
l egi sl ati ve power. 291 U.S., 556, 558 (1934).
151
313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941).
152
277 U.S. 350 (1928). Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917), was di sapproved
i n Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), and Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S.
418 (1927), was effecti vel y overrul ed i n Gol d v. Di Carl o, 380 U.S. 520 (1965), wi th-
out the Court heari ng argument on i t.
153
94 U.S. 113 (1877). See also Pei k v. Chi cago & Nw. Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1877).
154
Rate-maki ng i s deemed to be one speci es of pri ce fi xi ng. FPC v. Natural Gas
Pi pel i ne Co., 315 U.S. 575, 603 (1942).
the determi nati on of pri ces by natural forces,
150
the majori ty was
content to note that the due process cl ause makes no menti on of
pri ces and that the courts are both i ncompetent and unauthori zed
to deal wi th the wi sdom of the pol i cy adopted or the practi cabi l i ty
of the l aw enacted to forward i t.
Havi ng thus concl uded that i t i s no l onger the nature of the
busi ness that determi nes the val i di ty of a regul ati on of i ts rates or
charges but sol el y the reasonabl eness of the regul ati on, the Court
had l i ttl e di ffi cul ty i n uphol di ng, i n Olsen v. Nebraska,
151
a state
l aw prescri bi ng the maxi mum commi ssi on whi ch pri vate empl oy-
ment agenci es may charge. Rejecti ng the contenti ons of the empl oy-
ment agenci es that the need for such protecti ve l egi sl ati on had not
been shown, the Court hel d that di fferences of opi ni on as to the
wi sdom, need, or appropri ateness of the l egi sl ati on suggest a
choi ce whi ch shoul d be l eft to the States; and that there was no
necessi ty for the State to demonstrate before us that evi l s persi st
despi te the competi ti on between publ i c, chari tabl e, and pri vate
empl oyment agenci es. The ol der case of Ribnik v. McBride,
152
whi ch had i nval i dated si mi l ar l egi sl ati on upon the now obsol ete
concept of a busi ness affected wi th a publ i c i nterest, was ex-
pressl y overrul ed.
J udicial Review of Publicly Determined Rates and Charges
Devel opment. I n Munn v. I llinois,
153
i ts i ni ti al hol di ng con-
cerni ng the appl i cabi l i ty of the Fourteenth Amendment to govern-
mental pri ce fi xi ng,
154
the Court not onl y asserted that govern-
mental regul ati on of rates charged by publ i c uti l i ti es and al l i ed
busi nesses was wi thi n the States pol i ce power, but added that the
determi nati on of such rates by a l egi sl ature was concl usi ve and not
subject to judi ci al revi ew or revi si on. Expandi ng the range of per-
1598
155
Nebbi a v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934).
156
96 U.S. 97 (1878). See also Chi cago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chi cago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897).
157
116 U.S. 307 (1886).
mi ssi bl e governmental fi xi ng of pri ces, the Court i n Nebbia
155
de-
cl ared that pri ces establ i shed for busi ness i n general woul d i nvi te
judi ci al condemnati on onl y i f arbi trary, di scri mi natory, or demon-
strabl y i rrel evant to the pol i cy the l egi sl ature i s free to adopt. The
l atter standard of judi ci al apprai sal , as wi l l be subsequentl y noted,
represents l ess of a departure from the pri nci pl e enunci ated i n the
Munn case than that whi ch the Court evol ved, i n the years fol l ow-
i ng 1877, to measure the val i di ty of state i mposed publ i c uti l i ty
rates, and thi s di fference i n the judi ci al treatment of pri ces and
rates accordi ngl y warrants an expl anati on at the outset. Unl i ke op-
erators of publ i c uti l i ti es who, i n return for the grant of certai n ex-
cl usi ve, vi rtual l y monopol i sti c pri vi l eges by the governmental uni t
enfranchi si ng them, must assume an obl i gati on to provi de conti nu-
ous servi ce, propri etors of other busi nesses are i n recei pt of no
si mi l ar speci al advantages and accordi ngl y are unrestri cted i n the
exerci se of thei r ri ght to l i qui date and cl ose thei r establ i shments.
Owners of ordi nary busi nesses, therefore, at l i berty to escape by
di ssol uti on the consequences of publ i cl y i mposed charges deemed to
be oppressi ve, have thus far been unabl e to convi nce the courts
that they too, no l ess than publ i c uti l i ti es, are i n need of protecti on
through judi ci al revi ew.
Consi stentl y wi th i ts i ni ti al pronouncement i n the Munn case
that reasonabl eness of compensati on al l owed under permi ssi bl e
rate regul ati on presented a l egi sl ati ve rather than a judi ci al ques-
ti on, the Court, i n Davidson v. New Orleans,
156
al so rejected the
contenti on that, by vi rtue of the due process cl ause, busi nesses
were neverthel ess enti tl ed to just compensati on for l osses resul t-
i ng from pri ce control s. Less than a decade was to el apse, however,
before the Court, appal l ed perhaps by prospecti ve consequences of
l eavi ng busi ness at the mercy of the majori ty of the l egi sl ature,
began to reverse i tsel f. Thus, i n 1886, Chi ef Justi ce Wai te, i n the
Railroad Commission Cases,
157
warned that thi s power to regu-
l ate i s not a power to destroy; [and] the State cannot do that i n
l aw whi ch amounts to a taki ng of property for publ i c use wi thout
just compensati on or wi thout due process of l aw; i n other words,
a confi scatory rate coul d not be i mposed. By treati ng due process
of l aw and just compensati on as equi val ents, the Court, contrary
to i ts earl i er hol di ng i n Davidson v. New Orleans, was i n effect as-
serti ng that the i mposi ti on of a rate so l ow as to damage or di mi n-
i sh pri vate property ceased to be an exerci se of a States pol i ce
1599
158
Dow v. Bei del man, 125 U.S. 680 (1888).
159
134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890).
160
Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892).
161
154 U.S. 362, 397 (1894).
162
I nsofar as judi ci al i nterventi on resul ti ng i n the i nval i dati on of l egi sl ati vel y
i mposed rates has i nvol ved carri ers, i t shoul d be noted that the successful compl ai n-
ant i nvari abl y has been the carri er, not the shi pper.
163
169 U.S. 466 (1898). Of course the val i di ty of rates prescri bed by a State for
servi ces whol l y wi thi n i ts l i mi ts must be determi ned whol l y wi thout reference to the
i nterstate busi ness done by a publ i c uti l i ty. Domesti c busi ness shoul d not be made
to bear the l osses on i nterstate busi ness and vi ce versa. Thus a State has no power
to requi re the haul i ng of l ogs at a l oss or at rates that are unreasonabl e, even i f
a rai l road recei ves adequate revenues from the i ntrastate l ong haul and the i nter-
power and became one of emi nent domai n. Neverthel ess, even the
added measure of protecti on afforded by the doctri ne of the Rail-
road Commission Cases proved i nadequate to sati sfy publ i c uti l i -
ti es; the doctri ne al l owed courts to i ntervene onl y to prevent l egi s-
l ati ve i mposi ti on of a confi scatory rate, a rate so l ow as to be pro-
ducti ve of a l oss and to amount to taki ng of property wi thout just
compensati on. The uti l i ti es sought nothi ng l ess than a judi ci al ac-
knowl edgment that courts coul d revi ew the reasonabl eness of l eg-
i sl ati ve rates. Al though as l ate as 1888 the Court doubted that i t
possessed the requi si te power,
158
i t fi nal l y acceded to the wi shes
of the uti l i ti es i n 1890, and, i n Chicago, M. & St.P. Railway v. Min-
nesota
159
rul ed as fol l ows: The questi on of the reasonabl eness of
rates . . . , i nvol vi ng as i t does the el ement of reasonabl eness both
as regards the company and as regards the publ i c, i s emi nentl y a
questi on for judi ci al i nvesti gati on, requi ri ng due process of l aw for
i ts determi nati on. I f the company i s depri ved of the power of charg-
i ng rates for the use of i ts property, and such depri vati on takes
pl ace i n the absence of an i nvesti gati on by judi ci al machi nery, i t
i s depri ved of the l awful use of i ts property, and thus, i n substance
and effect, of the property i tsel f, wi thout due process of l aw. . . .
Despi te a l ast-di tch attempt to reconci l e Munn wi th Chicago,
M. & St.P. Railway by confi ni ng appl i cati on of the l atter deci si on
to cases i n whi ch rates had been fi xed by a commi ssi on and deny-
i ng i ts perti nence to rates di rectl y i mposed by a l egi sl ature,
160
the
Court i n Reagan v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co.
161
set at rest al l
l i ngeri ng doubts over the scope of judi ci al i nterventi on by decl ari ng
that, i f a carri er, i n the absence of a l egi sl ati ve rate, attempted
to charge a shi pper an unreasonabl e sum, the Court, i n accordance
wi th common l aw pri nci pl es, wi l l pass on the reasonabl eness of i ts
rates, and has juri sdi cti on . . . to award the shi pper any amount
exacted . . . i n excess of a reasonabl e rate. . . . The provi nce of the
courts i s not changed, nor the l i mi t of judi ci al i nqui ry al tered, be-
cause the l egi sl ature i nstead of a carri er prescri bes the rates.
162
Rei terati ng vi rtual l y the same pri nci pl e i n Smyth v. Ames,
163
the
1600
state l umber haul taken together. On the other hand, i n determi ni ng whether i ntra-
state passenger rai l way rates are confi scatory, al l parts of the system wi thi n the
State (i ncl udi ng sl eepi ng, parl or, and di ni ng cars) shoul d be embraced i n the com-
putati on, and the unremunerati ve parts shoul d not be excl uded because bui l t pri -
mari l y for i nterstate traffi c or not requi red to suppl y l ocal transportati on needs. See
Mi nnesota Rate Cases (Si mpson v. Shepard), 230 U.S. 352, 43435 (1913); Chi cago,
M. & St.P. Ry. v. Publ i c Uti l . Commn, 274 U.S. 344 (1927); Groesbeck v. Dul uth,
S.S. & A. Ry., 250 U.S. 607 (1919). The maxi m that a l egi sl ature cannot del egate
l egi sl ati ve power i s qual i fi ed to permi t creati on of admi ni strati ve boards to appl y
to the myri ad detai l s of rate schedul es the regul atory pol i ce power of the State. To
prevent a hol di ng of i nval i d del egati on of l egi sl ati ve power, the l egi sl ature must con-
strai n the board wi th a certai n course of procedure and certai n rul es of deci si on i n
the performance of i ts functi ons, wi th whi ch the agency must substanti al l y compl y
to val i date i ts acti on. Wi chi ta R.R. v. Publ i c Uti l . Commn, 260 U.S. 48 (1922).
164
Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 154, U.S. 362, 397 (1894).
165
I CC v. I l l i noi s Cent. R.R., 215 U.S. 452, 470 (1910). Thi s statement, made
i n the context of federal ratemaki ng, appears to be equal l y appl i cabl e to judi ci al re-
vi ew of state agency acti ons.
Court not onl y obl i terated the di sti ncti on between confi scatory and
unreasonabl e rates but contri buted the addi ti onal observati on that
the requi rements of due process are not met unl ess a court not onl y
revi ews the reasonabl eness of a rate but al so determi nes whether
the rate permi ts the uti l i ty to earn a fai r return on a fai r val uati on
of i ts i nvestment.
Li mi tati ons on J udi ci al Revi ew. Even whi l e revi ewi ng the
reasonabl eness of rates the Court recogni zed some l i mi ts on judi -
ci al revi ew. As earl y as 1894, the Court asserted: The courts are
not authori zed to revi se or change the body of rates i mposed by a
l egi sl ature or a commi ssi on; they do not determi ne whether one
rate i s preferabl e to another, or what under al l ci rcumstances
woul d be fai r and reasonabl e as between the carri ers and the shi p-
pers; they do not engage i n any mere admi ni strati ve work; . . .
[however, there can be no doubt] of thei r power and duty to i nqui re
whether a body of rates . . . i s unjust and unreasonabl e . . . and
i f found so to be, to restrai n i ts operati on.
164
And l ater, i n 1910,
the Court made a si mi l ar observati on that courts may not, under
the gui se of exerti ng judi ci al power, usurp merel y admi ni strati ve
functi ons by setti ng asi de an order of the commi ssi on wi thi n the
scope of the power del egated to such commi ssi on, upon the ground
that such power was unwi sel y or expedi entl y exerci sed.
165
Al so i nferabl e from these earl y hol di ngs, and effecti ve to re-
stri ct the bounds of judi ci al i nvesti gati on, i s a di sti ncti on between
factual questi ons that rel ate onl y to the wi sdom or expedi ency of
a rate order, and are unrevi ewabl e, and other factual determi na-
ti ons that bear on a commi ssi ons power to act and are i nseparabl e
from the consti tuti onal i ssue of confi scati on, hence are revi ewabl e.
Thi s di sti ncti on was accorded adequate emphasi s by the Court i n
1601
166
231 U.S. 298, 31013 (1913).
167
Des Moi nes Gas Co. v. Des Moi nes, 238 U.S. 153 (1915).
168
Mi nnesota Rate Cases (Si mpson v. Shepard), 230 U.S. 352, 452 (1913).
169
Knoxvi l l e v. Water Co., 212 U.S. 1 (1909).
170
Smi th v. I l l i noi s Bel l Tel . Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926).
171
Wi l l cox v. Consol i dated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1909).
172
174 U.S. 739, 750, 754 (1899). See also Mi nnesota Rate Cases (Si mpson v.
Shepard), 230 U.S. 352, 433 (1913).
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Garrett,
166
i n whi ch i t decl ared that
the appropri ate questi on for the courts i s si mpl y whether a com-
mi ssi on, i n establ i shi ng a rate, acted wi thi n the scope of i ts
power and di d not vi ol ate consti tuti onal ri ghts . . . by i mposi ng
confi scatory requi rements. The carri er contesti ng the rate was not
enti tl ed to have a court al so pass upon a questi on of fact regardi ng
the reasonabl eness of a hi gher rate the carri er charged pri or to the
order of the commi ssi on. Al l that need concern a court, i t sai d, i s
the fai rness of the proceedi ng whereby the commi ssi on determi ned
that the exi sti ng rate was excessi ve, but not the expedi ency or wi s-
dom of the commi ssi ons havi ng superseded that rate wi th a rate
regul ati on of i ts own.
Li kewi se, wi th a vi ew to di mi ni shi ng the number of opportuni -
ti es courts have for i nval i dati ng rate regul ati ons of state commi s-
si ons, the Court pl aced vari ous obstacl es i n the path of the com-
pl ai ni ng l i ti gant. Thus, not onl y must a person chal l engi ng a rate
assume the burden of proof,
167
but he must present a case of
mani fest consti tuti onal i nval i di ty;
168
i f, notwi thstandi ng thi s ef-
fort, the questi on of confi scati on remai ns i n doubt, no rel i ef wi l l be
granted.
169
Moreover, even though a publ i c uti l i ty whi ch has peti -
ti oned a commi ssi on for rel i ef from al l egedl y confi scatory rates
need not awai t i ndefi ni tel y for the commi ssi ons deci si on before ap-
pl yi ng to a court for equi tabl e rel i ef,
170
the court ought not to
i nterfere i n advance of any experi ence of the practi cal resul t of
such rates.
171
I n the course of ti me, however, a di sti ncti on emerged between
ordi nary factual determi nati ons by state commi ssi ons and factual
determi nati ons whi ch were found to be i nseparabl e from the l egal
and consti tuti onal i ssue of confi scati on. I n two ol der cases ari si ng
from proceedi ngs begun i n l ower federal courts to enjoi n rates, the
Court i ni ti al l y adopted the posi ti on that i t woul d not di sturb fi nd-
i ngs of fact i nsofar as these were supported by substanti al evi -
dence. Thus, i n San Diego Land Company v. National City,
172
the
Court decl ared that after a l egi sl ati ve body had fai rl y and ful l y i n-
vesti gated and acted, by fi xi ng what i t bel i eved to be reasonabl e
rates, the courts cannot step i n and set asi de the acti on due to a
di fferent concl usi on about the reasonabl eness of the rates. Judi ci al
1602
173
San Di ego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U.S. 439, 441, 442 (1903). See
also Van Dyke v. Geary, 244 U.S. 39 (1917); Georgi a Ry. v. Rai l road Commn, 262
U.S. 625, 634 (1923).
174
For i ts current posi ti on, see Crowel l v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
175
222 U.S. 541, 54748 (1912). See also I CC v. I l l i noi s Cent. R.R., 215 U.S.
452, 470 (1910).
i nterference shoul d never occur unl ess the case presents, cl earl y
and beyond al l doubt, such a fl agrant attack upon the ri ghts of
property under the gui se of regul ati on as to compel the court to say
that the rates prescri bed wi l l necessari l y have the effect to deny
just compensati on for pri vate property taken for the publ i c use.
And i n a si mi l ar l ater case
173
the Court expressed even more cl ear-
l y i ts rel uctance to reexami ne ordi nary factual determi nati ons. I t
i s not bound to reexami ne and wei gh al l the evi dence . . . or to
proceed accordi ng to . . . [i ts] i ndependent opi ni on as to what are
proper rates. I t i s enough i f . . . [the Court] cannot say that i t was
i mpossi bl e for a fai r-mi nded board to come to the resul t whi ch was
reached.
Moreover, i n revi ewi ng orders of the I nterstate Commerce
Commi ssi on, the Court, at l east i n earl i er years,
174
chose to be
gui ded by approxi matel y the same standards i t had ori gi nal l y for-
mul ated for exami ni ng regul ati ons of state commi ssi ons. The fol -
l owi ng excerpt from i ts hol di ng i n I CC v. Union Pacific R.R.
175
rep-
resents an adequate summati on of the l aw as i t stood pri or to 1920:
[Q]uesti ons of fact may be i nvol ved i n the determi nati on of ques-
ti ons of l aw, so that an order, regul ar on i ts face, may be set asi de
i f i t appears that the rate i s so l ow as to be confi scatory . . . ; or
i f the Commi ssi on acted so arbi trari l y and unjustl y as to fi x rates
contrary to evi dence, or wi thout evi dence to support i t; or i f the au-
thori ty therei n i nvol ved has been exerci sed i n such an unreason-
abl e manner as to cause i t to be wi thi n the el ementary rul e that
the substance, and not the shadow, determi nes the val i di ty of the
exerci se of the power. . . . I n determi ni ng these mi xed questi ons of
l aw and fact, the Court confi nes i tsel f to the ul ti mate questi on as
to whether the Commi ssi on acted wi thi n i ts power. I t wi l l not con-
si der the expedi ency or wi sdom of the order, or whether, on l i ke
testi mony, i t woul d have made a si mi l ar rul i ng . . . [The Commi s-
si ons] concl usi on, of course, i s subject to revi ew, but when sup-
ported by evi dence i s accepted as fi nal ; not that i ts deci si on . . .
can be supported by a mere sci nti l l a of proof but the courts wi l l
not exami ne the facts further than to determi ne whether there was
substanti al evi dence to sustai n the order.
The Ben Avon Case. These standards of revi ew were
abruptl y rejected by the Court i n Ohio Valley Co. v. Ben Avon Bor-
1603
176
253 U.S. 287 (1920).
177
I d. at 289. I n i njuncti ve proceedi ngs, evi dence i s freshl y i ntroduced whereas
i n the cases recei ved on appeal from state courts, the evi dence i s found wi thi n the
record.
178
231 U.S. 298 (1913).
179
253 U.S. 287, 291, 295 (1920).
180
94 U.S. 113 (1877). Because some of these methods or formul as, no l onger
requi red as a matter of consti tuti onal l aw, may conti nue to be used by state commi s-
si ons i n drafti ng rate orders, a survey i s provi ded bel ow.
(1) Fair Value. On the premi se that a uti l i ty i s enti tl ed to demand a rate
schedul e that wi l l yi el d a fai r return upon the val ue of the property whi ch i t em-
pl oys for publ i c conveni ence, the Court i n Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 54647
ough,
176
as bei ng no l onger suffi ci ent to sati sfy the requi rements
of due process. Unl i ke previ ous confi scatory rate l i ti gati on, whi ch
had devel oped from rul i ngs of l ower federal courts i n i njuncti ve
proceedi ngs, thi s case reached the Supreme Court by way of appeal
from a state appel l ate tri bunal ;
177
al though the state court had i n
fact revi ewed the evi dence and ascertai ned that the state commi s-
si ons fi ndi ngs of fact were supported by substanti al evi dence, i t
al so construed the statute provi di ng for revi ew as denyi ng to state
courts the power to pass upon the wei ght of such evi dence. Large-
l y on the strength of thi s i nterpretati on of the appl i cabl e state stat-
ute, the Court hel d that when the order of a l egi sl ature, or of a
commi ssi on, prescri bi ng a schedul e of maxi mum future rates i s
chal l enged as confi scatory, the State must provi de a fai r oppor-
tuni ty for submi tti ng that i ssue to a judi ci al tri bunal for deter-
mi nati on upon i ts own i ndependent judgment as to both l aw and
facts; otherwi se the order i s voi d because i n confl i ct wi th the due
process cl ause, Fourteenth Amendment.
Wi thout departi ng from the rul i ng previ ousl y enunci ated i n
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Garrett,
178
that the fai l ure of a State
to grant a statutory ri ght of judi ci al appeal from a commi ssi ons
regul ati on i s not vi ol ati ve of due process as l ong as rel i ef i s obtai n-
abl e by a bi l l i n equi ty for i njuncti on, the Court al so hel d that the
al ternati ve remedy of i njuncti on expressl y provi ded by state l aw
di d not afford an adequate opportuni ty for testi ng judi ci al l y a con-
fi scatory rate order. I t conceded the pri nci pl e stressed by the di s-
senti ng Justi ces that where a State offers a l i ti gant the choi ce of
two methods of judi ci al revi ew, of whi ch one i s both appropri ate
and unrestri cted, the mere fact that the other whi ch the l i ti gant
el ects i s l i mi ted, does not amount to a deni al of the consti tuti onal
ri ght to a judi ci al revi ew.
179
Hi story of the Val uati on Questi on. For al most fi fty years
the Court wandered through a maze of confl i cti ng formul as for val -
ui ng publ i c servi ce corporati on property onl y to emerge therefrom
i n 1944 at a poi nt not very far removed from Munn v. I llinois.
180
1604
(1898), hel d that determi nati on of such val ue necessi tated consi derati on of at l east
such factors as the ori gi nal cost of constructi on, the amount expended i n perma-
nent i mprovements, the amount and market val ue of . . . [the uti l i tys] bonds and
stock, the present as compared wi th the ori gi nal cost of constructi on, [repl acement
cost], the probabl e earni ng capaci ty of the property under parti cul ar rates pre-
scri bed by statute, and the sum requi red to meet operati ng expenses.
(2) Reproduction Cost. Pri or to the demi se i n 1944 of the Smyth v. Ames fai r
val ue formul a, two of the components thereof were accorded speci al emphasi s wi th
the second qui ckl y surpassi ng the fi rst i n measure of i mportance. These were: (1)
the actual cost of the property (the ori gi nal cost of constructi on together wi th the
amount expended i n permanent i mprovements) and (2) reproducti on costs (the
present as compared wi th the ori gi nal cost of constructi on). For vari ed appl i cati on
of the reproducti on cost formul a, see San Di ego Land Co. v. Nati onal Ci ty, 174 U.S.
739, 757 (1899); San Di ego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U.S. 439, 443 (1903);
Wi l l cox v. Consol i dated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 52 (1909); Mi nnesota Rate Cases
(Si mpson v. Shepard), 230 U.S. 352 (1913); Gal veston El ec. Co. v. Gal veston, 258
U.S. 388, 392 (1922); Mi ssouri ex rel . Southwestern Bel l Tel . Co. v. Publ i c Serv.
Commn, 262 U.S. 276 (1923); Bl uefi el d Co. v. Publ i c Serv. Commn, 262 U.S. 679
(1923); Georgi a Ry. v. Rai l road Commn, 262 U.S. 625, 630 (1923); McCardl e v. I ndi -
anapol i s Co., 272 U.S. 400 (1926); St Loui s & OFal l on Ry. v. Uni ted States, 279
U.S. 461 (1929).
(3) Prudent I nvestment (Versus Reproducti on Cost). Thi s method of val uati on,
champi oned by Justi ce Brandei s i n a separate opi ni on i n Mi ssouri ex rel . Southwest-
ern Bel l Tel . Co. v. Publ i c Serv. Commn, 262 U.S. 276, 29192, 302, 30607 (1923),
was defi ned as fol l ows: The compensati on whi ch the Consti tuti on guarantees an op-
portuni ty to earn i s the reasonabl e cost of conducti ng the busi ness. Cost i ncl udes
not onl y operati ng expenses, but al so capi tal charges. Capi tal charges cover the al -
l owance, by way of i nterest, for the use of capi tal . . . the al l owance for the ri sk
i ncurred; and enough more to attract capi tal . . . . Where the fi nanci ng has been
proper, the cost to the uti l i ty of the capi tal , requi red to construct, equi p and operate
i ts pl ant, shoul d measure the rate of return whi ch the Consti tuti on guarantees op-
portuni ty to earn. Advantages to be deri ved from adopti on of the amount pru-
dentl y i nvested as the rate base and the amount of the capi tal charge as the meas-
ure of the rate of return woul d, accordi ng to Justi ce Brandei s, be nothi ng l ess than
the attai nment of a basi s for deci si on whi ch i s certai n and stabl e. The rate base
woul d be ascertai ned as a fact, not determi ned as a matter of opi ni on. I t woul d not
fl uctuate wi th the market pri ce of l abor, or materi al s, or money.
As a method of val uati on, the prudent i nvestment theory was not accorded any
acceptance unti l the Depressi on of the 1930s. The sharp decl i ne i n pri ces whi ch oc-
curred duri ng thi s peri od doubtl ess contri buted to the l oss of affecti on for reproduc-
ti on costs. I n Los Angel es Gas Co. v. Rai l road Commn, 289 U.S. 287 (1933) and
Rai l road Commn v. Paci fi c Gas Co., 302 U.S. 388, 399, 405 (1938), the Court uphel d
respecti vel y a val uati on from whi ch reproducti on costs had been excl uded and an-
other i n whi ch hi stori cal cost served as the rate base. Later, i n 1942, when i n FPC
v. Natural Gas Pi pel i ne Co., 315 U.S. 575, the Court further emphasi zed i ts aban-
donment of the reproducti on cost factor, there devel oped momentari l y the prospect
that prudent i nvestment mi ght be substi tuted. Thi s possi bi l i ty was qui ckl y
negati ved, however, by the Hope Gas case, (FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S.
591 (1944)), whi ch di spensed wi th the necessi ty of rel yi ng upon any formul a for the
purpose of fi xi ng val i d rates.
(4) Depreciation. No l ess i ndi spensabl e to the determi nati on of the fai r val ue
menti oned i n Smyth v. Ames was the amount of depreci ati on to be al l owed as a de-
ducti on from the measure of cost empl oyed, whether the l atter be actual cost, repro-
ducti on cost, or any other form of cost determi nati on. Al though not menti oned i n
Smyth v. Ames, the Court gave thi s i tem consi derati on i n Knoxvi l l e v. Water Co.,
212 U.S. 1, 910 (1909); but notwi thstandi ng i ts earl y recogni ti on as an al l owabl e
i tem of deducti on i n determi ni ng val ue, depreci ati on conti nued to be the subject of
controversy ari si ng out of the di ffi cul ty of ascertai ni ng i t and of computi ng annual
1605
al l owances to cover the same. I ndi cati ve of such controversy was the di sagreement
as to whether annual al l owances shal l be i n such amount as wi l l permi t the repl ace-
ment of equi pment at current costs, i .e., present val ue, or at ori gi nal cost. I n the
Hope Gas case, 320 U.S. at 606, the Court reversed Uni ted Rai l ways v. West, 280
U.S. 234, 253254 (1930), i nsofar as that hol di ng rejected ori gi nal cost as the basi s
of annual depreci ati on al l owances.
(5) Going Concern Value and Good Will. Whether i ntangi bl es were to be i n-
cl uded i n val uati on was not passed upon i n Smyth v. Ames, but shortl y thereafter,
i n Des Moi nes Gas Co. v. Des Moi nes, 238 U.S. 153, 165 (1915), the Court decl ared
i t to be sel f-evi dent that there i s an el ement of val ue i n an assembl ed and estab-
l i shed pl ant, doi ng busi ness and earni ng money, over one not thus advanced, . . .
[and that] thi s el ement of val ue i s a property ri ght, and shoul d be consi dered i n de-
termi ni ng the val ue of the property, upon whi ch the owner has a ri ght to make a
fai r return. . . . General l y descri bed as goi ng concern val ue, thi s el ement has never
been preci sel y defi ned by the Court. I n i ts l atest pronouncement on the subject, ut-
tered i n FPC v. Natural Gas Pi pel i ne Co., 315 U.S. 575, 589 (1942), the Court de-
ni ed that there i s any consti tuti onal requi rement that goi ng concern val ue, even
when i t i s an appropri ate el ement to be i ncl uded i n a rate base, must be separatel y
stated and apprai sed as such. . . . [Val uati ons have often been sustai ned] wi thout
separate apprai sal of the goi ng concern el ement. . . . When that has been done, the
burden rests on the regul ated company to show that thi s i tem has nei ther been ade-
quatel y covered i n the rate base nor recouped from pri or earni ngs of the busi ness.
Franchi se val ue and good wi l l , on the other hand, have been consi stentl y excl uded
from val uati on; the l atter presumabl y because a uti l i ty i nvari abl y enjoys a monopol y
and consumers have no choi ce i n the matter of patroni zi ng i t. The l atter proposi ti on
has been devel oped i n the fol l owi ng cases: Wi l l cox v. Consol i dated Gas Co., 212 U.S.
19 (1909); Des Moi nes Gas Co. v. Des Moi nes, 238 U.S. 153, 16364 (1915); Gal -
veston El ec. Co. v. Gal veston, 258 U.S. 388 (1922); Los Angel es Gas Co. v. Rai l road
Commn, 289 U.S. 287, 313 (1933).
(6) Salvage Value. I t i s not a consti tuti onal error to di sregard theoreti cal re-
producti on cost for a pl ant whi ch no responsi bl e person woul d thi nk of reproduc-
i ng. Accordi ngl y, where, due to adverse condi ti ons, a street-surface rai l road had
l ost al l val ue except for scrap or sal vage, i t was permi ssi bl e for a commi ssi on, as
the Court hel d i n Market Street Ry. v. Rai l road Commn, 324 U.S. 548, 562, 564
(1945), to use as a rate the pri ce at whi ch the uti l i ty offered to sel l i ts property to
a ci ti zen. Moreover, the Commi ssi ons order was not i nval i d even through under the
prescri bed rate the uti l i ty woul d operate at a l oss; for the due process cl ause cannot
be i nvoked to protect a publ i c uti l i ty agai nst busi ness hazards, such as the l oss of,
or fai l ure to obtai n patronage. On the other hand, i n the case of a water company
whose franchi se has expi red, but where there i s no other source of suppl y, i ts pl ant
shoul d be val ued as actual l y i n use rather than at what the property woul d bri ng
for some other use i n case the ci ty shoul d bui l d i ts own pl ant. Denver v. Denver
Uni on Water Co., 246 U.S. 178 (1918).
(7) Past Losses and Gains. The Consti tuti on [does not] requi re that the l osses
of . . . [a] busi ness i n one year shal l be restored from future earni ngs by the devi ce
of capi tal i zi ng the l osses and addi ng them to the rate base on whi ch a fai r return
and depreci ati on al l owance i s to be earned. FPC v. Natural Gas Pi pel i ne Co., 315
U.S. 575, 590 (1942). Nor can past l osses be used to enhance the val ue of the prop-
erty to support a cl ai m that rates for the future are confi scatory, Gal veston El ec.
Co. v. Gal veston, 258 U.S. 388 (1922), any more than profi ts of the past can be used
to sustai n confi scatory rates for the future Newton v. Consol i dated Gas Co., 258
U.S. 165, 175 (1922); Board of Commrs v. New York Tel . Co., 271 U.S. 23, 3132
(1926).
181
315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942).
By hol di ng i n FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,
181
that the Con-
sti tuti on does not bi nd rate-maki ng bodi es to the servi ce of any si n-
gl e formul a or combi nati on of formul as, and i n FPC v. Hope Natu-
1606
182
320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944). Al though thi s and the previ ousl y ci ted deci si on
arose out of controversi es i nvol vi ng the Nati onal Gas Act of 1938, the pri nci pl es l ai d
down therei n are bel i eved to be appl i cabl e to the revi ew of rate orders of state com-
mi ssi ons, except i nsofar as the l atter operate i n obedi ence to l aws contai ni ng uni que
standards or procedures.
183
Ohi o Val l ey Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
184
I n FPC v. Natural Gas Pi pel i ne Co., 315 U.S. 575, 599 (1942), Justi ces
Bl ack, Dougl as, and Murphy, i n a concurri ng opi ni on, proposed to travel the road
al l the way back to Munn v. I l l i noi s, and depri ve courts of the power to voi d rates
si mpl y because they deem the l atter to be unreasonabl e. I n a concurri ng opi ni on,
i n Dri scol l v. Edi son Co., 307 U.S. 104, 122 (1939), Justi ce Frankfurter temporari l y
adopted a si mi l ar posi ti on; he decl ared that the onl y rel evant functi on of l aw . . .
[i n rate controversi es] i s to secure observance of those procedural safeguards i n the
exerci se of l egi sl ati ve powers whi ch are the hi stori c foundati ons of due process.
However, i n hi s di ssent i n FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 625 (1944),
he di sassoci ated hi msel f from thi s proposal , and asserted that i t was deci ded [more
than fi fty years ago] that the fi nal say under the Consti tuti on l i es wi th the judi ci -
ary.
185
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944), See also Wi sconsi n
v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294, 299, 317, 326 (1963), wherei n the Court tentati vel y approved
an area rate approach, that i s the determi nati on of fai r pri ces for gas, based on
reasonabl e fi nanci al requi rements of the i ndustry, for . . . the vari ous produci ng
areas of the country, and wi th rates bei ng establ i shed on an area basi s rather than
on an i ndi vi dual company basi s. Four di ssenters, Justi ces Cl ark, Bl ack, Brennan,
and Chi ef Justi ce Warren, l abel l ed area pri ci ng a wi l d goose chase, and stated
that the Commi ssi on had acted i n an arbi trary and unreasonabl e manner enti rel y
outsi de tradi ti onal concepts of admi ni strati ve due process. Area rates were approved
i n Permi an Basi n Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
186
Duquesne Li ght Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 316 (1989) (rejecti ng taki ngs
chal l enge to Pennsyl vani a rul e preventi ng uti l i ti es from amorti zi ng costs of cancel ed
nucl ear pl ants).
ral Gas Co.,
182
that i t i s the resul t reached not the method em-
pl oyed whi ch i s control l i ng, . . . [that] i t i s not the theory but the
i mpact of the rate order whi ch counts, [and that] i f the total effect
of the rate order cannot be sai d to be unjust and unreasonabl e, ju-
di ci al i nqui ry under the Act i s at an end, the Court, i n effect, abdi -
cated from the posi ti on assumed i n the Ben Avon case.
183
Wi thout
surrenderi ng the judi ci al power to decl are rates unconsti tuti onal on
ground of a substanti ve depri vati on of due process,
184
the Court
announced that i t woul d not overturn a resul t i t deemed to be just
si mpl y because the method empl oyed [by a commi ssi on] to reach
that resul t may contai n i nfi rmi ti es. . . . [A] Commi ssi ons order
does not become suspect by reason of the fact that i t i s chal l enged.
I t i s the product of expert judgment whi ch carri es a presumpti on
of val i di ty. And he who woul d upset the rate order . . . carri es the
heavy burden of maki ng a convi nci ng showi ng that i t i s i nval i d be-
cause i t i s unjust and unreasonabl e i n i ts consequences.
185
The
Court recentl y reaffi rmed Hope Natural Gass emphasi s on the bot-
tom l i ne: [t]he Consti tuti on wi thi n broad l i mi ts l eaves the States
free to deci de what rate-setti ng methodol ogy best meets thei r needs
i n bal anci ng the i nterests of the uti l i ty and the publ i c.
186
1607
187
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (ci ti ng Chi cago G.T.
Ry. v. Wel l man, 143 U.S. 339, 34546 (1892)); Mi ssouri ex rel . Southwestern Bel l
Tel . Co. v. Publ i c Serv. Commn, 262 U.S. 276, 291 (1923).
188
Atl anti c Coast Li ne R.R. v. Corporati on Commn, 206 U.S. 1, 19 (1907) (ci t-
i ng Chi cago, B. & Q. R.R. v. I owa, 94 U.S. 155 (1877)). See also Prenti s v. Atl anti c
Coast Li ne, 211 U.S. 210 (1908); Denver & R.G. R.R. v. Denver, 250 U.S. 241 (1919).
189
Chi cago & G.T. Ry. v. Wel l man, 143 U.S. 339, 344 (1892); Mi ssi ssi ppi R.R.
Commn v. Mobi l e & Ohi o R.R., 244 U.S. 388, 391 (1917). See also Mi ssouri Paci fi c
Ry. v. Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196 (1910); Nashvi l l e, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wal ters, 294 U.S.
405, 415 (1935).
190
Cl evel and El ectri c Ry. v. Cl evel and, 204 U.S. 116 (1907).
191
Detroi t Uni ted Ry. v. Detroi t, 255 U.S. 171 (1921). See also Denver v. New
York Trust Co., 229 U.S. 123 (1913).
192
Los Angel es v. Los Angel es Gas Corp., 251 U.S. 32 (1919).
I n di spensi ng wi th the necessi ty of observi ng the ol d formul as
for rate computati on, the Court di d not arti cul ate any substi tute
gui dance for ascertai ni ng whether a so-cal l ed end resul t i s unrea-
sonabl e. I t di d i nti mate that rate-maki ng i nvol ves a bal anci ng of
the i nvestor and consumer i nterests, whi ch does not, however, i n-
sure that the busi ness shal l produce net revenues. . . . From the
i nvestor or company poi nt of vi ew i t i s i mportant that there be
enough revenue not onl y for operati ng expenses but al so for the
capi tal costs of the busi ness. These i ncl ude servi ce on the debt and
di vi dends on the stock. . . . By that standard the return to the eq-
ui ty owner shoul d be commensurate wi th returns on i nvestments
i n other enterpri ses havi ng correspondi ng ri sks. That return, more-
over, shoul d be suffi ci ent to assure confi dence i n the fi nanci al i n-
tegri ty of the enterpri se, so as to mai ntai n i ts credi t and to attract
capi tal .
187
Regulation of Public Utilities (Other Than Rates)
I n General . By vi rtue of the nature of the busi ness they
carry on and the publ i cs i nterest i n i t, publ i c uti l i ti es are subject
to state regul ati on exerted ei ther di rectl y by the l egi sl ature or by
dul y authori zed admi ni strati ve bodi es.
188
But because the property
of publ i c uti l i ti es remai ns under the ful l protecti on of the Consti tu-
ti on, i t fol l ows that whenever the state regul ates i n a manner that
i nfri nges the ri ght of ownershi p i n what the Court consi ders to be
an arbi trary or unreasonabl e way, due process i s vi ol ated.
189
Thus, a ci ty cannot take possessi on of the equi pment of a street
rai l way company, the franchi se of whi ch has expi red,
190
al though
i t may subject the company to the al ternati ve of accepti ng an i nad-
equate pri ce for i ts property or of ceasi ng operati ons and removi ng
i ts property from the streets.
191
Li kewi se, a ci ty desi rous of estab-
l i shi ng a l i ghti ng system of i ts own may not remove, wi thout com-
pensati on, the fi xtures of a l i ghti ng company al ready occupyi ng the
streets under a franchi se,
192
al though i t may compete wi th a com-
1608
193
Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561 (1904). See also
Skaneatel es Water Co. v. Skaneatel es, 184 U.S. 354 (1902); Hel ena Water Works
Co. v. Hel ena, 195 U.S. 383 (1904); Madera Water Works v. Madera, 228 U.S. 454
(1913).
194
Western Uni on Tel . Co. v. Ri chmond, 224 U.S. 160 (1912).
195
Pi erce Oi l Corp. v. Phoeni x Ref. Co., 259 U.S. 125 (1922).
196
Atl anti c Coast Li ne R.R. v. Gol dsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914). See also
Chi cago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chi cago, 166 U.S. 226, 255 (1897); Chi cago, B. & Q. Ry.
v. Drai nage Commrs, 200 U.S. 561, 59192 (1906); New Orl eans Pub. Serv. v. New
Orl eans, 281 U.S. 682 (1930).
197
Consumers Co. v. Hatch, 224 U.S. 148 (1912).
198
Panhandl e Eastern Pi pe Li ne Co. v. Hi ghway Commn, 294 U.S. 613 (1935).
199
New Orl eans Gas Co. v. Drai nage Commn, 197 U.S. 453 (1905).
pany that has no excl usi ve charter.
193
The property of a tel egraph
company i s not i l l egal l y taken, however, by a muni ci pal ordi nance
that demands, as a condi ti on for the establ i shment of pol es and
condui ts i n ci ty streets, that the ci tys wi res be carri ed free of
charge, and whi ch provi des for the movi ng of the condui ts, when
necessary, at company expense.
194
And, the fact that a State, by mere l egi sl ati ve or admi ni stra-
ti ve fi at, cannot convert a pri vate carri er i nto a common carri er
wi l l not protect a forei gn corporati on whi ch has el ected to enter a
State the consti tuti on and l aws of whi ch requi re that i t operate i ts
l ocal pri vate pi pe l i ne as a common carri er. Such forei gn corpora-
ti on i s vi ewed as havi ng wai ved i ts consti tuti onal ri ght to be secure
agai nst i mposi ti on of condi ti ons whi ch amount to a taki ng of prop-
erty wi thout due process of l aw.
195
Compul sory Expendi tures: Grade Crossi ngs, and the
Li ke. General l y, the enforcement of uncompensated obedi ence to
a regul ati on for the publ i c heal th and safety i s not an unconsti tu-
ti onal taki ng of property wi thout due process of l aw.
196
Thus,
where the appl i cabl e rul e so requi red at the ti me of the granti ng
of i ts charter, a water company may be compel l ed to furni sh con-
necti ons at i ts own expense to one resi di ng on an ungraded street
i n whi ch i t vol untari l y l ai d i ts l i nes.
197
However, i f pi pe and tel e-
phone l i nes are l ocated on a ri ght of way owned by a pi pel i ne com-
pany, the l atter cannot, wi thout a deni al of due process, be re-
qui red to rel ocate such equi pment at i ts own expense,
198
but i f i ts
pi pes are l ai d under ci ty streets, a gas company val i dl y may be ob-
l i gated to assume the cost of movi ng them to accommodate a mu-
ni ci pal drai nage system.
199
To requi re a turnpi ke company, as a condi ti on of i ts taki ng
tol l s, to keep i ts road i n repai r and to suspend col l ecti on thereof,
conformabl y to a state statute, unti l the road i s put i n good order,
does not take property wi thout due process of l aw, notwi thstandi ng
the fact that present patronage does not yi el d revenue suffi ci ent to
1609
200
Norfol k Turnpi ke Co. v. Vi rgi ni a, 225 U.S. 264 (1912).
201
I nternati onal Bri dge Co. v. New York, 254 U.S. 126 (1920).
202
Chi cago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Nebraska, 170 U.S. 57 (1898).
203
Chi cago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Drai nage Commn, 200 U.S. 561 (1906); Chi cago &
Al ton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915); Lake Shore & Mi ch. So. Ry. v. Cl ough,
242 U.S. 375 (1917).
204
Paci fi c Gas Co. v. Pol i ce Court, 251 U.S. 22 (1919).
205
Chi cago, St. P., Mo. & O. Ry. v. Hol mberg, 282 U.S. 162 (1930).
206
Nashvi l l e, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wal ters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935). See also Lehi gh
Val l ey R.R. v. Commi ssi oners, 278 U.S. 24, 35 (1928) (uphol di ng i mposi ti on of grade
crossi ng costs on a rai l road al though near the l i ne of reasonabl eness, and rei terat-
i ng that unreasonabl y extravagant requi rements woul d be struck down).
207
Atchi son T. & S.F. Ry. v. Publ i c Uti l . Commn, 346 U.S. 346, 352 (1953).
mai ntai n the road i n proper condi ti on.
200
Nor i s a rai l road bri dge
company unconsti tuti onal l y depri ved of i ts property when, i n the
absence of proof that the addi ti on wi l l not yi el d a reasonabl e re-
turn, i t i s ordered to wi den i ts bri dge by i ncl usi on of a pathway for
pedestri ans and a roadway for vehi cl es.
201
Si mi l arl y uphel d agai nst due process/taki ng cl ai ms were re-
qui rements that rai l roads repai r a vi aduct under whi ch they oper-
ate,
202
or reconstruct a bri dge or provi de means for passi ng water
for drai nage through thei r embankment,
203
or spri nkl e that part of
the street occupi ed by them.
204
On the other hand, a requi rement
that an underground cattl e-pass i s be constructed, not as a safety
measure but as a means of spari ng the farmer the i nconveni ence
attendant upon the use of an exi sti ng and adequate grade crossi ng,
was hel d to be a prohi bi ted taki ng of the rai l roads property for pri -
vate use.
205
As to grade crossi ng el i mi nati on, the rul e i s wel l es-
tabl i shed that the state may exact from rai l roads the whol e, or
such part, of the cost thereof as i t deems appropri ate, even though
commerci al hi ghway users, who make no contri buti on whatsoever,
benefi t from such i mprovements.
Whi l e the power of the State i n thi s respect i s not unl i mi ted,
and an arbi trary and unreasonabl e i mposi ti on may be set asi de,
the Courts modern approach to substanti ve due process anal ysi s
makes thi s possi bi l i ty far l ess l i kel y than i t once was. Di sti ngui sh-
i ng a 1935 case i nval i dati ng a statutori l y mandated 50% cost shar-
i ng whi ch i n effect prevented parti cul ari zed fi ndi ngs of reasonabl e-
ness (and whi ch contai ned l anguage suggesti ng that rai l roads coul d
not fai rl y be requi red to subsi di ze competi ti ve transportati on
modes),
206
the Court i n 1953 rul ed that the costs of grade separa-
ti on i mprovements need not be al l ocated sol el y on the basi s of ben-
efi ts that woul d accrue to rai l road property.
207
Whi l e the Court
cauti oned that al l ocati on of costs must be fai r and reasonabl e, i t
al so took an approach very deferenti al to l ocal governmental deci -
si ons, stati ng that i n the exerci se of the pol i ce power to meet trans-
portati on, safety, and conveni ence needs of a growi ng communi ty,
1610
208
Uni ted Gas Co. v. Rai l road Commn, 278 U.S. 300, 30809 (1929). See also
New York ex rel . Woodhaven Gas Li ght Co. v. Publ i c Serv. Commn, 269 U.S. 244
(1925); New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCal l , 245 U.S. 345 (1917).
209
Mi ssouri Pac. Ry. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 262 (1910); Chesapeake & Ohi o Ry.
v. Publ i c Serv. Commn, 242 U.S. 603 (1917); Fort Smi th Tracti on Co. v. Bourl and,
267 U.S. 330 (1925).
210
Chesapeake & Ohi o Ry. v. Publ i c Serv. Commn, 242 U.S. 603, 607 (1917);
Brooks-Scanl on Co. v. Rai l road Commn, 251 U.S. 396 (1920); Rai l road Commn v.
Eastern Tex. R.R., 264 U.S. 79 (1924); Broad Ri ver Co. v. South Carol i na ex rel .
Dani el , 281 U.S. 537 (1930).
211
Atchi son, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Rai l road Commn, 283 U.S. 380, 39495 (1931).
212
Mi nneapol i s & St. L. R.R. v. Mi nnesota, 193 U.S. 53 (1904).
213
Gl adson v. Mi nnesota, 166 U.S. 427 (1897).
214
Mi ssouri Pac. Ry. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 262 (1910).
215
Chesapeake & Ohi o Ry. v. Publ i c Serv. Commn, 242 U.S. 603 (1917).
216
Lake Eri e & W. R.R. v. Publ i c Uti l . Commn, 249 U.S. 422 (1919); Western
& Atl anti c R.R. v. Publ i c Commn, 267 U.S. 493 (1925).
the cost of such i mprovements may be al l ocated al l to the rai l -
roads.
Compel l abl e Servi ces. The pri mary duty of a publ i c uti l i ty
bei ng to serve on reasonabl e terms al l those who desi re the servi ce
i t renders, i t fol l ows that a company cannot pi ck and choose and
el ect to serve onl y those porti ons of i ts terri tory whi ch i t fi nds most
profi tabl e, l eavi ng the remai nder to get al ong wi thout the servi ce
whi ch i t al one i s i n a posi ti on to gi ve. Compel l i ng a gas company
to conti nue servi ng speci fi ed ci ti es as l ong as i t conti nues to do
busi ness i n other parts of the State entai l s therefore no unconsti tu-
ti onal depri vati on.
208
Li kewi se, a rai l way may be compel l ed to con-
ti nue the servi ce of a branch or part of a l i ne al though the oper-
ati on i nvol ves a l oss.
209
But even though a uti l i ty, as a condi ti on
of enjoyment of powers and pri vi l eges granted by the State, i s
under a conti nui ng obl i gati on to provi de reasonabl y adequate serv-
i ce, and even though that obl i gati on cannot be avoi ded merel y be-
cause performance occasi ons fi nanci al l oss, yet i f a company i s at
l i berty to surrender i ts franchi se and di sconti nue operati ons, i t can-
not be compel l ed to conti nue at a l oss.
210
Pursuant to the pri nci pl e that a State may requi re rai l roads to
provi de adequate faci l i ti es sui tabl e for the conveni ence of the com-
muni ti es they serve,
211
such carri ers have been obl i gated to estab-
l i sh stati ons at proper pl aces for the conveni ence of patrons,
212
to
stop al l thei r i ntrastate trai ns at county seats,
213
to run a regul ar
passenger trai n i nstead of a mi xed passenger and frei ght trai n,
214
to furni sh passenger servi ce on a branch l i ne previ ousl y devoted ex-
cl usi vel y to carryi ng frei ght,
215
to restore a si di ng used pri nci pal l y
by a parti cul ar pl ant but avai l abl e general l y as a publ i c track, and
to conti nue, even though not profi tabl e by i tsel f, si detrack
216
as
wel l as the upkeep of a swi tch track l eadi ng from i ts mai n l i ne to
1611
217
Al ton R.R. v. I l l i noi s Commerce Commn, 305 U.S. 548 (1939).
218
Mi ssouri Paci fi c Ry. v. Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196 (1910).
219
Chesapeake & Ohi o Ry. v. Publ i c Serv. Commn, 242 U.S. 603, 607 (1917).
220
Great Northern Ry. v. Mi nnesota, 238 U.S. 340 (1915); Great Northern Ry.
Co. v. Cahi l l , 253 U.S. 71 (1920).
221
Chi cago, M. & St. P. R.R. v. Wi sconsi n, 238 U.S. 491 (1915).
i ndustri al pl ants.
217
However, a statute requi ri ng a rai l road wi th-
out i ndemni fi cati on to i nstal l swi tches on the appl i cati on of owners
of grai n el evators erected on i ts ri ght-of-way was hel d voi d.
218
Whether a state order requi ri ng transportati on servi ce i s to be
vi ewed as reasonabl e may necessi tate consi derati on of such facts as
the l i kel i hood that pecuni ary l oss wi l l resul t to the carri er, the na-
ture, extent and producti veness of the carri ers i ntrastate busi ness,
the character of the servi ce requi red, the publ i c need for i t, and i ts
effect upon servi ce al ready bei ng rendered.
219
Requi rements for
servi ce havi ng no substanti al rel ati on to transportati on have been
voi ded, as i n the case of an order requi ri ng rai l roads to mai ntai n
cattl e scal es to faci l i tate tradi ng i n cattl e,
220
and a prohi bi ti on
agai nst l etti ng down an unengaged upper berth whi l e the l ower
berth was occupi ed.
221
Si nce the deci si on i n Wisconsin, M. & P.R. Co. v. J acobson,
179 U.S. 287 (1900), there can be no doubt of the power of a State,
acti ng through an admi ni strati ve body, to requi re rai l road compa-
ni es to make track connecti ons. But mani festl y that does not mean
that a Commi ssi on may compel them to bui l d branch l i nes, so as
to connect roads l yi ng at a di stance from each other; nor does i t
mean that they may be requi red to make connecti ons at every
poi nt where thei r tracks come cl ose together i n ci ty, town and
country, regardl ess of the amount of busi ness to be done, or the
number of persons who may uti l i ze the connecti on i f bui l t. The
questi on i n each case must be determi ned i n the l i ght of al l the
facts and wi th a just regard to the advantage to be deri ved by the
publ i c and the expense to be i ncurred by the carri er. . . . I f the
order i nvol ves the use of property needed i n the di scharge of those
duti es whi ch the carri er i s bound to perform, then, upon proof of
the necessi ty, the order wi l l be granted, even though the furni sh-
i ng of such necessary faci l i ti es may occasi on an i nci dental pecu-
ni ary l oss. . . . Where, however, the proceedi ng i s brought to com-
pel a carri er to furni sh a faci l i ty not i ncl uded wi thi n i ts absol ute
duti es, the questi on of expense i s of more control l i ng i mportance.
I n determi ni ng the reasonabl eness of such an order the Court must
consi der al l the facts the pl aces and persons i nterested, the vol -
1612
222
Washi ngton ex rel . Oregon R.R. & Nav. Co. v. Fai rchi l d, 224 U.S. 510, 528
29 (1912). See also Mi chi gan Cent. R.R. v. Mi chi gan R.R. Commn, 236 U.S. 615
(1915); Seaboard Ai r Li ne R.R. v. Georgi a R.R. Commn, 240 U.S. 324, 327 (1916).
223
Loui svi l l e & Nashvi l l e R.R. v. Stock Yards Co., 212 U.S. 132 (1909).
224
Mi chi gan Cent. R.R. v. Mi chi gan R.R. Commn, 236 U.S. 615 (1915).
225
Chi cago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. I owa, 233 U.S. 334 (1914).
226
Chi cago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Mi nneapol i s Ci vi c Assn, 247 U.S. 490 (1918).
Nor are rai l roads deni ed due process when they are forbi dden to exact a greater
charge for a shorter di stance than for a l onger di stance. Loui svi l l e & Nashvi l l e R.R.
v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503, 512 (1902); Mi ssouri Paci fi c Ry. v. McGrew Coal Co., 244
U.S. 191 (1917).
227
Wadl ey Southern Ry. v. Georgi a, 235 U.S. 651 (1915).
228
Rai l road Co. v. Ri chmond, 96 U.S. 521 (1878).
229
Atl anti c Coast Li ne R.R. v. Gol dsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914).
230
Great Northern Ry. v. Mi nnesota ex rel . Cl ara Ci ty, 246 U.S. 434 (1918).
231
Denver & R. G. R.R. v. Denver, 250 U.S. 241 (1919).
232
Nashvi l l e, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Whi te, 278 U.S. 456 (1929).
ume of busi ness to be affected, the savi ng i n ti me and expense to
the shi pper, as agai nst the cost and l oss to the carri er.
222
Al though a carri er i s under a duty to accept goods tendered at
i ts stati on, i t cannot be requi red, upon payment si mpl y for the
servi ce of carri age, to accept cars offered at an arbi trary connecti on
poi nt near i ts termi nus by a competi ng road seeki ng to reach and
use the formers termi nal faci l i ti es. Nor may a carri er be requi red
to del i ver i ts cars to connecti ng carri ers wi thout adequate protec-
ti on from l oss or undue detenti on or compensati on for thei r use.
223
But a carri er may be compel l ed to i nterchange i ts frei ght cars wi th
other carri ers under reasonabl e terms,
224
and to accept, for
reshi pment over i ts l i nes to poi nts wi thi n the State, cars al ready
l oaded and i n sui tabl e condi ti on.
225
Due process i s not deni ed when two carri ers, who whol l y own
and domi nate a smal l connecti ng rai l road, are prohi bi ted from ex-
acti ng hi gher charges from shi ppers accepti ng del i very over sai d
connecti ng road than are col l ected from shi ppers taki ng del i very at
the termi nal s of sai d carri ers.
226
Nor i s i t unreasonabl e or arbi -
trary to requi re a rai l road to desi st from demandi ng advance pay-
ment on merchandi se recei ved from one carri er whi l e i t accepts
merchandi se of the same character at the same poi nt from another
carri er wi thout such prepayment.
227
Safety Regul ati ons Appl i cabl e to Rai l roads. Govern-
mental power to regul ate rai l roads i n the i nterest of safety has
l ong been conceded. The fol l owi ng regul ati ons have been uphel d: a
prohi bi ti on agai nst operati on on certai n streets,
228
restri cti ons on
speed, operati ons, and the l i ke, i n busi ness secti ons,
229
requi re-
ment of constructi on of a si dewal k across a ri ght of way,
230
or re-
moval of a track crossi ng at a thoroughfare,
231
compel l i ng the pres-
ence of a fl agman at a crossi ng notwi thstandi ng that automati c de-
vi ces mi ght be cheaper and better,
232
compul sory exami nati on of
1613
233
Nashvi l l e, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Al abama, 128 U.S. 96 (1888).
234
Chi cago, R.I . & P. Ry. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911); St. Loui s, I . Mt.
& So. Ry. v. Arkansas, 240 U.S. 518 (1916); Mi ssouri Paci fi c R.R. v. Norwood, 283
U.S. 249 (1931); Fi remen v. Chi cago, R.I . & P.R.R. 393 U.S. 129 (1968).
235
Atl anti c Coast Li ne R.R. v. Georgi a, 234 U.S. 280 (1914).
236
Eri e R.R. v. Sol omon, 237 U.S. 427 (1915).
237
New York, N.H. and H.R.R. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628 (1897).
238
Chi cago & N.W. Ry. v. Nye Schnei der Fowl er Co., 260 U.S. 35 (1922). See
also Yazoo & Mi ss. V.R.R. v. Jackson Vi negar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912); cf. Adams
Express Co. v. Croni nger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913).
239
Atl anti c Coast Li ne R.R. v. Gl enn, 239 U.S. 388 (1915).
240
St. Loui s & San Franci sco Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1 (1897).
241
Chi cago & N.W. Ry. v. Nye Schnei der Fowl er Co., 260 U.S. 35 (1922).
242
Kansas Ci ty Ry. v. Anderson, 233 U.S. 325 (1914).
243
St. Loui s, I . Mt. & So. Ry. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354 (1912). See also Chi cago,
M. & St. P. Ry. v. Pol t, 232 U.S. 165 (1914).
empl oyees for col or bl i ndness,
233
ful l crews on certai n trai ns,
234
speci fi cati on of a type of l ocomoti ve headl i ght,
235
safety appl i ance
regul ati ons,
236
and a prohi bi ti on on the heati ng of passenger cars
from stoves or furnaces i nsi de or suspended from the cars.
237
Statutory Li abi l i ti es and Penal ti es Appl i cabl e to Rai l -
roads. A statute maki ng the i ni ti al carri er,
238
or the connecti ng
or del i veri ng carri er,
239
l i abl e to the shi pper for the nondel i very of
goods i s not unconsti tuti onal ; nor i s a l aw whi ch provi des that a
rai l road shal l be responsi bl e i n damages to the owner of property
i njured by fi re communi cated by i ts l ocomoti ve engi nes and whi ch
grants the rai l road an i nsurabl e i nterest i n such property al ong i ts
route and authori ty to procure i nsurance agai nst such l i abi l i ty.
240
Equal l y consi stent wi th the requi rements of due process are the fol -
l owi ng two enactments: the fi rst, i mposi ng on al l common carri ers
a penal ty for fai l ure to settl e wi thi n a reasonabl e speci fi ed peri od
cl ai ms for frei ght l ost or damaged i n shi pment and condi ti oni ng
payment of that penal ty upon recovery by the cl ai mant i n a subse-
quent sui t of more than the amount tendered,
241
and the second,
l evyi ng doubl e damages and an attorneys fee upon a rai l road for
fai l ure to pay wi thi n a reasonabl e ti me after demand the amount
cl ai med by an owner for stock i njured or ki l l ed. However, the Court
subsequentl y l i mi ted i ts approval of the l atter statute to cases i n
whi ch the pl ai nti ff had not demanded more than he recovered i n
court;
242
when the penal ty i s exacted i n a case i n whi ch the pl ai n-
ti ff i ni ti al l y demanded more than he sued for and recovered, a de-
fendant rai l road i s arbi trari l y depri ved of i ts property for refusi ng
to meet the i ni ti al excessi ve demand.
243
Al so i nval i dated duri ng thi s peri od of hei ghtened judi ci al scru-
ti ny was a penal ty i mposed on a carri er that had col l ected trans-
portati on charges i n excess of establ i shed maxi mum rates; the pen-
al ty of $500 l i qui dated damages pl us a reasonabl e attorneys fee
1614
244
Mi ssouri Paci fi c Ry. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340 (1913).
245
St. Loui s, I . Mt. & So. Ry. v. Wi l l i ams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919).
246
Mi ssouri Paci fi c Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885); Mi nneapol i s Ry. v.
Beckwi th, 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
247
Chi cago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Cram, 228 U.S. 70 (1913).
248
Southwestern Tel . Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482 (1915).
1
New Orl eans Debenture Redempti on Co. v. Loui si ana, 180 U.S. 320 (1901).
was di sproporti onate to actual damages and was exacted under
condi ti ons not affordi ng the carri er an adequate opportuni ty to
safel y test the val i di ty of the rates before l i abi l i ty attached.
244
Where the carri er di d have an opportuni ty to test the reasonabl e-
ness of the rate, however, and col l ecti on of an overcharge di d not
proceed from any bel i ef that the rate was i nval i d, the Court i ndi -
cated that the val i di ty of the penal ty i mposed need not be tested
by compari son wi th the amount of the overcharge. I nasmuch as a
penal ty i s i mposed as puni shment for vi ol ati on of l aw, the l egi sl a-
ture may adjust i ts amount to the publ i c wrong rather than the
pri vate i njury, and the onl y l i mi tati on whi ch the Fourteenth
Amendment i mposes i s that the penal ty prescri bed shal l not be so
severe and oppressi ve as to be whol l y di sproporti oned to the offense
and obvi ousl y unreasonabl e. I n accordance wi th the l atter stand-
ard, a statute granti ng an aggri eved passenger (who recovered
$100 for an overcharge of 60 cents) the ri ght to recover i n a ci vi l
sui t not l ess than $50 nor more than $300 pl us costs and a reason-
abl e attorneys fee was uphel d.
245
For l i ke reasons, the Court al so uphel d a statute requi ri ng rai l -
roads to erect and mai ntai n fences and cattl e guards, and maki ng
them l i abl e i n doubl e the amount of damages for thei r fai l ure to
so mai ntai n them,
246
and another l aw that establ i shed a mi ni mum
rate of speed for del i very of l i vestock and that requi red every car-
ri er vi ol ati ng the requi rement to pay the owner of the l i vestock the
sum of $10 per car per hour.
247
On the other hand, the Court
struck down as arbi trary and oppressi ve assessment of fi nes of
$100 per day (and aggregati ng $3,600) on a tel ephone company
that, i n accordance wi th i ts establ i shed and uncontested regul a-
ti ons, suspended the servi ce of a patron i n arrears.
248
Regulation of Corporations, Business, Professions, and
Trades
Corporati ons. Al though a corporati on i s the creati on of a
State, whi ch reserves the power to amend or repeal corporate char-
ters, the retenti on of such power wi l l not support the taki ng of cor-
porate property wi thout due process of l aw. To termi nate the l i fe
of a corporati on by annul l i ng i ts charter i s not to confi scate i ts
property but to turn i t over to the stockhol ders after l i qui dati on.
1
1615
2
Nati onal Counci l U.A.M. v. State Counci l , 203 U.S. 151, 16263 (1906).
3
Munday v. Wi sconsi n Trust Co., 252 U.S. 499 (1920).
4
State Farm I ns. Co. v. Duel , 324 U.S. 154 (1945).
5
Watson v. Empl oyers Li abi l i ty Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
6
Asbury Hospi tal v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207 (1945).
7
Nebbi a v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 52728 (1934). See also New Motor Vehi cl e
Bd. v. Orri n W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 10608 (1978) (uphol di ng regul ati on of fran-
chi se rel ati onshi p).
Forei gn (out-of-state) corporati ons al so enjoy the protecti on
whi ch the due process cl ause affords, but such protecti on does not
enti tl e them to the uncondi ti onal ri ght to enter another State or,
once havi ng been permi tted to enter, to conti nue to do busi ness
therei n. There i s l anguage i n the earl y cases suggesti ng that the
power of a State to excl ude or to expel a forei gn corporati on i s al -
most pl enary.
2
Whi l e modern doctri nes of the negati ve commerce
cl ause constrai n states authori ty to di scri mi nate agai nst forei gn
corporati ons i n favor of l ocal commerce, i t has al ways been ac-
knowl edged that states may subject corporate entry or conti nued
operati on to reasonabl e, non-di scri mi natory condi ti ons. Thus, a
state l aw whi ch requi res the fi l i ng of arti cl es wi th a l ocal offi ci al
as a condi ti on prerequi si te to the val i di ty of conveyances of l ocal
real ty to such corporati ons i s not vi ol ati ve of due process.
3
Al so
val i d are statutes whi ch requi re a forei gn i nsurance company, as
part of the pri ce of entry, to mai ntai n reserves computed by a spe-
ci fi c percentage of premi ums, i ncl udi ng membershi p fees, recei ved
i n al l States,
4
or to consent to di rect acti ons fi l ed agai nst i t by per-
sons i njured i n the State by tort-feasors whom i t i nsures.
5
Si mi -
l arl y a statute requi ri ng corporati ons to di spose of farm l and not
necessary to the conduct of thei r busi ness was not i nval i d as ap-
pl i ed to a forei gn hospi tal corporati on, even though the l atter, be-
cause of changed economi c condi ti ons, was unabl e to recoup i ts
ori gi nal i nvestment from the sal e whi ch i t i s thus compel l ed to
make.
6
Busi ness i n General . The Consti tuti on does not guarantee
the unrestri cted pri vi l ege to engage i n a busi ness or to conduct i t
as one pl eases. Certai n ki nds of busi ness may be prohi bi ted; and
the ri ght to conduct a busi ness, or to pursue a cal l i ng, may be con-
di ti oned. . . . Statutes prescri bi ng the terms upon whi ch those con-
ducti ng certai n busi nesses may contract, or i mposi ng terms i f they
do enter i nto agreements, are wi thi n the States competency.
7
Laws Prohi bi ti ng Trusts, Di scri mi nati on, Restrai nt of
Trade. Even duri ng the peri od when the Court was measuri ng
statutes by substanti ve due process l i berty of contract pri nci pl es, i t
recogni zed the ri ght of states to l i mi t l i berty of contract by prohi b-
i ti ng combi nati ons i n restrai nt of trade. Thus, states coul d prohi bi t
1616
8
Smi l ey v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447 (1905). See Waters Pi erce Oi l Co. v. Texas, 212
U.S. 86 (1909); Nati onal Cotton Oi l Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115 (1905), al so uphol d-
i ng anti trust l aws.
9
I nternati onal Harvester Co. v. Mi ssouri , 234 U.S. 199 (1914). See also Amer-
i can Machi ne Co. v. Kentucky, 236 U.S. 660 (1915).
10
Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mi ssi ssi ppi , 217 U.S. 433 (1910).
11
Ai kens v. Wi sconsi n, 195 U.S. 194 (1904).
12
Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157 (1912). But cf. Fai rmont
Co. v. Mi nnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927) (i nval i dati ng on l i berty of contract grounds si mi -
l ar statute puni shi ng deal ers i n cream who pay hi gher pri ces i n one l ocal i ty than
i n another, the Court fi ndi ng no reasonabl e rel ati on between the statutes sancti ons
and the anti ci pated evi l ).
13
Ol d Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936); Pep Boys v. Pyroi l ,
299 U.S. 198 (1936).
14
Safeway Stores v. Okl ahoma Grocers, 360 U.S. 334 (1959).
agreements to pool and fi x pri ces, di vi de net earni ngs, and prevent
competi ti on i n the purchase and sal e of grai n.
8
Nor, the Court
hel d, does the Fourteenth Amendment precl ude a State from adopt-
i ng a pol i cy agai nst al l combi nati ons of competi ng corporati ons and
enforci ng i t even agai nst combi nati ons whi ch may have been i n-
duced by good i ntenti ons and from whi ch benefi t and no i njury may
have resul ted.
9
Al so uphel d were a statute that prohi bi ted retai l
l umber deal ers from uni ti ng i n an agreement not to purchase mate-
ri al s from whol esal ers sel l i ng di rectl y to consumers i n the retai l ers
l ocal i ti es,
10
and another l aw puni shi ng combi nati ons for mal i -
ci ousl y i njuri ng a ri val i n the same busi ness, professi on, or
trade.
11
Si mi l arl y, a prohi bi ti on of unfai r di scri mi nati on for the pur-
pose of i ntenti onal l y destroyi ng competi ti on of any other regul ar
deal er i n the same commodi ty by maki ng sal es thereof at a l ower
rate i n one secti on of the State than i n another, after equal i zati on
for di stance, effects no i nval i d depri vati on of property or i nter-
ference wi th freedom of contract.
12
A l aw sancti oni ng contracts re-
qui ri ng that commodi ti es i denti fi ed by trademark wi l l not be sol d
by the vendee or subsequent vendees except at pri ces sti pul ated by
the ori gi nal vendor does not vi ol ate the due process cl ause.
13
Al so
uphel d as not depri vi ng a company of due process was appl i cati on
of an unfai r sal es act to enjoi n a retai l grocery company from sel l -
i ng bel ow statutory cost i n vi ol ati on of a state unfai r sal es act, even
though i ts competi tors were sel l i ng at unl awful pri ces. There i s no
consti tuti onal ri ght to empl oy retal i ati on agai nst acti on outl awed
by a State, and appel l ant had avai l abl e a remedy whereby i t coul d
enjoi n i l l egal acti vi ty of i ts competi tors.
14
Laws Preventi ng Fraud i n Sal e of Goods and Securi -
ti es. Laws and ordi nances tendi ng to prevent frauds and requi r-
i ng honest wei ghts and measures i n the sal e of arti cl es of general
consumpti on have l ong been consi dered l awful exerti ons of the po-
1617
15
Schmi di nger v. Ci ty of Chi cago, 226 U.S. 578, 588 (1913) (ci ti ng McLean v.
Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 550 (1909)).
16
Merchants Exchange v. Mi ssouri , 248 U.S. 365 (1919).
17
Hauge v. Ci ty of Chi cago, 299 U.S. 387 (1937).
18
Lemi eux v. Young, 211 U.S. 489 (1909); Ki dd, Dater Co. v. Mussel man Grocer
Co., 217 U.S. 461 (1910).
19
Paci fi c States Co. v. Whi te, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
20
Schmi di nger v. Ci ty of Chi cago, 226 U.S. 578 (1913).
21
Petersen Baki ng Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.S. 570 (1934) (tol erances not to exceed
three ounces to a pound of bread and requi ri ng that the bread mai ntai n the statu-
tory mi ni mum wei ght for not l ess than 12 hours after cool i ng). But cf. Burns Baki ng
Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (tol erance of onl y two ounces i n excess of the mi n-
i mum wei ght per l oaf i s unreasonabl e, gi ven fi ndi ng that i t was i mpossi bl e to manu-
facture good bread wi thout frequentl y exceedi ng the prescri bed tol erance).
22
Armor & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U.S. 510 (1916).
23
Heath & Mi l l i gan Co. v. Worst, 207 U.S. 338 (1907); Corn Products Ref. Co.
v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427 (1919); Nati onal Ferti l i zer Assn v. Bradl ey, 301 U.S. 178
(1937).
l i ce power.
15
Thus, a prohi bi ti on on the i ssuance or sal e by other
than an authori zed wei gher of any wei ght certi fi cate for grai n
wei ghed at any warehouse or el evator where state wei ghers are
stati oned i s not unconsti tuti onal .
16
Nor i s a muni ci pal ordi nance
requi ri ng that commodi ti es sol d i n l oad l ots by wei ght be wei ghed
by a publ i c wei ghmaster wi thi n the ci ty i nval i d as appl i ed to one
del i veri ng coal from state-tested scal es at a mi ne outsi de the ci ty.
17
A statute requi ri ng merchants to record sal es i n bul k not made i n
the regul ar course of busi ness i s al so wi thi n the pol i ce power.
18
Si mi l arl y, the power of a State to prescri be standard contai n-
ers to protect buyers from decepti on as wel l as to faci l i tate tradi ng
and to preserve the condi ti on of the merchandi se i s not open to
questi on. Accordi ngl y, an admi ni strati ve order i ssued pursuant to
an authori zi ng statute and prescri bi ng the di mensi ons, form, and
capaci ty of contai ners for strawberri es and raspberri es i s not arbi -
trary i nasmuch as the form and di mensi ons bore a reasonabl e rel a-
ti on to the protecti on of the buyers and the preservati on i n transi t
of the frui t.
19
Si mi l arl y, an ordi nance fi xi ng standard si zes i s not
unconsti tuti onal .
20
Regul ati ons i ssued i n furtherance of a statutory
authori zati on whi ch i mposed a rate of tol erance for the mi ni mum
wei ght for a l oaf of bread were uphel d.
21
Li kewi se, a l aw requi ri ng
that l ard not sol d i n bul k shoul d be put up i n contai ners hol di ng
one, three, or fi ve pounds wei ght, or some whol e mul ti pl e of these
numbers, does not depri ve sel l ers of thei r property wi thout due
process of l aw.
22
The ri ght of a manufacturer to mai ntai n secrecy as to hi s com-
pounds and processes must be hel d subject to the ri ght of the
State, i n the exerci se of the pol i ce power and i n the promoti on of
fai r deal i ng, to requi re that the nature of the product be fai rl y set
forth.
23
1618
24
Advance-Rumel y Co. v. Jackson, 287 U.S. 283 (1932).
25
Rast v. Van Deman & Lewi s, 240 U.S. 342 (1916); Tanner v. Li ttl e, 240 U.S.
369 (1916); Pi tney v. Washi ngton, 240 U.S. 387 (1916).
26
Hal l v. Gei ger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Cal dwel l v. Si oux Fal l s Stock
Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merri ck v. Hal sey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
27
Booth v. I l l i noi s, 184 U.S. 425 (1902).
28
Oti s v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 (1903).
29
Brodnax v. Mi ssouri , 219 U.S. 285 (1911).
30
House v. Mayes, 219 U.S. 270 (1911).
31
Nobl e State Bank v. Haskel l , 219 U.S. 104 (1911); Shal l enberger v. Fi rst
State Bank, 219 U.S. 114 (1911); Assari a State Bank v. Dol l ey, 219 U.S. 121 (1911);
Abi e State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765 (1931).
A statute provi di ng that the purchaser of harvesti ng or thresh-
i ng machi nery for hi s own use shal l have a reasonabl e ti me after
del i very for i nspecti ng and testi ng i t, and permi tti ng reci ssi on of
the contract i f the machi nery does not prove reasonabl y adequate,
and further decl ari ng any agreement contrary to i ts provi si ons to
be agai nst publ i c pol i cy and voi d, does not vi ol ate the due process
cl ause.
24
A prohi bi ti ve l i cense fee upon the use of tradi ng stamps
i s not unconsti tuti onal .
25
I n the exerci se of i ts power to prevent fraud and i mposi ti on,
a State may regul ate tradi ng i n securi ti es wi thi n i ts borders, re-
qui re a l i cense of those engagi ng i n such deal i ng, make i ssuance
of a l i cense dependent on a publ i c offi cers bei ng sati sfi ed of the
good repute of the appl i cants, and permi t the offi cer, subject to ju-
di ci al revi ew of hi s fi ndi ngs, to revoke the l i cense.
26
A State may
forbi d the gi vi ng of opti ons to sel l or buy at a future ti me any grai n
or other commodi ty.
27
I t may al so forbi d sal es on margi n for future
del i very,
28
and may prohi bi t the keepi ng of pl aces where stocks,
grai n, and the l i ke, are sol d but not pai d for at the ti me, unl ess
a record of the same be made and a stamp tax pai d.
29
Maki ng
cri mi nal any deducti on by the purchaser from the actual wei ght of
grai n, hay, seed, or coal under a cl ai m of ri ght by reason of any
custom or rul e of a board of trade i s val i d exerci se of the pol i ce
power and does not depri ve the purchaser of hi s property wi thout
due process of l aw nor i nterfere wi th hi s l i berty of contract.
30
Banki ng, Wage Assi gnments and Garni shment. Regul a-
ti on of banks and banki ng has al ways been consi dered wel l wi thi n
the pol i ce power of states, and the Fourteenth Amendment di d not
el i mi nate thi s regul atory authori ty. A vari ety of regul ati ons has
been uphel d over the years. For exampl e, state banks are not de-
pri ved of property wi thout due process by a statute subjecti ng them
to assessments for a deposi tors guaranty fund.
31
Al so, a l aw re-
qui ri ng savi ngs banks to turn over to the State deposi ts i nacti ve
for thi rty years (when the deposi tor cannot be found), wi th provi -
si on for payment to the deposi tor or hi s hei rs on establ i shment of
1619
32
Provi dent Savi ngs I nst. v. Mal one, 221 U.S. 660 (1911); Anderson Natl Bank
v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944). When a bank conservator appoi nted pursuant to
a new statute has al l the functi ons of a recei ver under the ol d l aw, one of whi ch
i s the enforcement on behal f of deposi tors of stockhol ders l i abi l i ty, whi ch l i abi l i ty
the conservator can enforce as cheapl y as coul d a recei ver appoi nted under the pre-
exi sti ng statute, i t cannot be sai d that the new statute, i n suspendi ng the ri ght of
a deposi tor to have a recei ver appoi nted, arbi trari l y depri ves a deposi tor of hi s rem-
edy or destroys hi s property wi thout the due process of l aw. The deposi tor has no
property ri ght i n any parti cul ar form of remedy. Gi bbes v. Zi mmerman, 290 U.S.
326 (1933).
33
Doty v. Love, 295 U.S. 64 (1935).
34
Farmers Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U.S. 649 (1923).
35
Gri ffi th v. Connecti cut, 218 U.S. 563 (1910).
36
Mutual Loan Co. v. Martel l , 222 U.S. 225 (1911).
37
La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919); Sti pi ch v. I nsurance Co., 277
U.S. 311, 320 (1928).
38
German Al l i ance I ns. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
39
OGorman & Young v. Hartford I ns. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931).
the ri ght, does not effect an i nval i d taki ng of the property of sai d
banks; nor does a statute requi ri ng banks to turn over to the pro-
tecti ve custody of the State deposi ts that have been i nacti ve ten or
twenty-fi ve years (dependi ng on the nature of the deposi t).
32
The consti tuti onal ri ghts of credi tors i n an i nsol vent bank i n
the hands of l i qui dators are not vi ol ated by a l ater statute permi t-
ti ng re-openi ng under a reorgani zati on pl an approved by the court,
the l i qui dati ng offi cer, and by three-fourths of the credi tors.
33
Si mi l arl y, a Federal Reserve bank i s not unl awful l y depri ved of
busi ness ri ghts of l i berty of contract by a l aw whi ch al l ows state
banks to pay checks i n exchange when presented by or through a
Federal Reserve bank, post offi ce, or express company and when
not made payabl e otherwi se by a maker.
34
I n fi xi ng maxi mum rates of i nterest on money l oaned wi thi n
i ts borders, a State i s acti ng cl earl y wi thi n i ts pol i ce power; and the
detai l s are wi thi n l egi sl ati ve di screti on i f not unreasonabl y or arbi -
trari l y exerci sed.
35
Equal l y val i d as an exerci se of a States pol i ce
power i s a requi rement that assi gnments of future wages as secu-
ri ty for debts of l ess than $200, to be val i d, must be accepted i n
wri ti ng by the empl oyer, consented to by the assi gnors, and fi l ed
i n publ i c offi ce. Such a requi rement depri ves nei ther the borrower
nor the l ender of hi s property wi thout due process of l aw.
36
I nsurance. The general rel ati ons of those engaged i n the i n-
surance busi ness
37
as wel l as the busi ness i tsel f have been pecu-
l i arl y subject to supervi si on and control .
38
Even duri ng the
Lochner era the Court recogni zed that government may fi x i nsur-
ance rates and regul ate the compensati on of i nsurance agents,
39
and over the years the Court has uphel d a wi de vari ety of regul a-
ti on. A state may i mpose a fi ne on any person who shal l act i n
any manner i n the negoti ati on or transacti on of unl awful i nsurance
1620
40
Nutti ng v. Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 553, 556 (1902) (di sti ngui shi ng Al l geyer
v. Loui si ana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)). See also Hoper v. Cal i forni a, 155 U.S. 648 (1895).
41
Dani el v. Fami l y I ns. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949).
42
Osborn v. Ozl i n, 310 U.S. 53, 6869 (1940). Di ssenti ng from the concl usi on,
Justi ce Roberts decl ared that the pl ai n effect of the Vi rgi ni a l aw i s to compel a non-
resi dent to pay a Vi rgi ni a resi dent for servi ces whi ch the l atter does not i n fact
render.
43
Cal i forni a Auto. Assn v. Mal oney, 341 U.S. 105 (1951).
44
Al l geyer v. Loui si ana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
45
New York Li fe I ns. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
46
Nati onal I ns. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71 (1922).
. . . wi th a forei gn i nsurance company not admi tted to do busi ness
[wi thi n sai d State].
40
A state may forbi d l i fe i nsurance compani es
and thei r agents to engage i n the undertaki ng busi ness and under-
takers to serve as l i fe i nsurance agents.
41
Forei gn casual ty and
surety i nsurers were not depri ved of due process, the Court hel d,
by a Vi rgi ni a l aw whi ch prohi bi ted the maki ng of contracts of cas-
ual ty or surety i nsurance except through regi stered agents, whi ch
requi red that such contracts appl i cabl e to persons or property i n
the State be countersi gned by a regi stered l ocal agent, and whi ch
prohi bi ted such agents from shari ng more than 50% of a commi s-
si on wi th a nonresi dent broker.
42
And just as al l banks may be re-
qui red to contri bute to a deposi tors guaranty fund, so may al l
automobi l e l i abi l i ty i nsurers be requi red to submi t to the equi tabl e
apporti onment among them of appl i cants who are i n good fai th en-
ti tl ed to, but are fi nanci al l y unabl e to, procure such i nsurance
through ordi nary methods.
43
However, a statute whi ch prohi bi ted the i nsured from contract-
i ng di rectl y wi th a mari ne i nsurance company outsi de the State for
coverage of property wi thi n the State was hel d i nval i d as a depri -
vati on of l i berty wi thout due process of l aw.
44
For the same reason,
the Court hel d, a State may not prevent a ci ti zen from concl udi ng
a pol i cy l oan agreement wi th a forei gn l i fe i nsurance company at
i ts home offi ce whereby the pol i cy on hi s l i fe i s pl edged as col l at-
eral securi ty for a cash l oan to become due upon defaul t i n pay-
ment of premi ums, i n whi ch case the enti re pol i cy reserve mi ght
be appl i ed to di scharge the i ndebtedness. Authori ty to subject such
an agreement to the confl i cti ng provi si ons of domesti c l aw i s not
deduci bl e from the power of a State to l i cense a forei gn i nsurance
company as a condi ti on of i ts doi ng busi ness therei n.
45
A sti pul ati on that pol i ci es of hai l i nsurance shal l take effect
and become bi ndi ng twenty-four hours after the hour i n whi ch an
appl i cati on i s taken and further requi ri ng noti ce by tel egram of re-
jecti on of an appl i cati on was uphel d.
46
No unconsti tuti onal re-
strai nt was i mposed upon the l i berty of contract of surety compa-
ni es by a statute provi di ng that, after enactment, any bond exe-
1621
47
Hartford Acci dent Co. v. Nel son Co., 291 U.S. 352 (1934).
48
Merchants Li abi l i ty Co. v. Smart, 267 U.S. 126 (1925).
49
Ori ent I ns. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 577 (1899) (the statute was i n effect when
the contract at i ssue was si gned).
50
Hooperston Co. v. Cul l en, 318 U.S. 313 (1943).
51
German Al l i ance I ns. Co. v. Hal e, 219 U.S. 307 (1911). See also Carrol l v.
Greenwi ch I ns. Co., 199 U.S. 401 (1905).
52
Li fe & Casual ty Co. v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566 (1934).
53
Northwestern Li fe I ns. Co. v. Ri ggs, 203 U.S. 243 (1906).
54
Whi tfi el d v. Aetna Li fe I ns. Co., 205 U.S. 489 (1907).
cuted for the fai thful performance of a bui l di ng contract shal l i nure
to the benefi t of materi al men and l aborers, notwi thstandi ng any
provi si on of the bond to the contrary.
47
Li kewi se consti tuti onal was
a l aw requi ri ng that a motor vehi cl e l i abi l i ty pol i cy shal l provi de
that bankruptcy of the i nsured does not rel ease the i nsurer from
l i abi l i ty to an i njured person.
48
There al so i s no deni al of due process for a state to requi re
that casual ty compani es, i n case of total l oss, pay the total amount
for whi ch the property was i nsured, l ess depreci ati on between the
ti me of i ssui ng the pol i cy and the ti me of the l oss, rather than the
actual cash val ue of the property at the ti me of l oss.
49
Moreover, even though i t had i ts attorney-i n-fact l ocated i n I l l i -
noi s, si gned al l i ts contracts there, and forwarded therefrom al l
checks i n payment of l osses, a reci procal i nsurance associ ati on cov-
eri ng real property l ocated i n New York coul d be compel l ed to com-
pl y wi th New York regul ati ons whi ch requi red mai ntenance of an
offi ce i n that State and the countersi gni ng of pol i ci es by an agent
resi dent therei n.
50
Al so, to di scourage monopol i es and to encourage
rate competi ti on, a State consti tuti onal l y may i mpose on al l fi re i n-
surance compani es connected wi th a tari ff associ ati on fi xi ng rates
a l i abi l i ty or penal ty to be col l ected by the i nsured of 25% i n excess
of actual l oss or damage, sti pul ati ons i n the i nsurance contract to
the contrary notwi thstandi ng.
51
A state statute by whi ch a l i fe i nsurance company, i f i t fai l s
to pay upon demand the amount due under a pol i cy after death of
the i nsured, i s made l i abl e i n addi ti on for fi xed damages, reason-
abl e i n amount, and for a reasonabl e attorneys fee i s not unconsti -
tuti onal even though payment i s resi sted i n good fai th and upon
reasonabl e grounds.
52
I t i s al so proper by l aw to cut off a defense
by a l i fe i nsurance company based on fal se and fraudul ent state-
ments i n the appl i cati on, unl ess the matter mi srepresented actu-
al l y contri buted to the death of the i nsured.
53
A provi si on that sui -
ci de, unl ess contempl ated when the appl i cati on for a pol i cy was
made, shal l be no defense i s equal l y val i d.
54
When a cooperati ve
l i fe i nsurance associ ati on i s reorgani zed so as to permi t i t to do a
l i fe i nsurance busi ness of every ki nd, pol i cyhol ders are not depri ved
1622
55
Pol k v. Mutual Reserve Fund, 207 U.S. 310 (1907).
56
Nebl ett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297 (1938).
57
Brazee v. Mi chi gan, 241 U.S. 340 (1916). Wi th four Justi ces di ssenti ng, the
Court i n Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917), struck down a state l aw absol utel y
prohi bi ti ng mai ntenance of pri vate empl oyment agenci es. Commenti ng on the con-
sti tuti onal phi l osophy thereof i n Li ncol n Federal Labor Uni on v. Northwestern I ron
& Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535 (1949), Justi ce Bl ack stated that Ol sen v. Nebraska,
313 U.S. 236 (1941), cl earl y undermi ned Adams v. Tanner.
58
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
59
North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyders Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156
(1973). I n the course of the deci si on, the Court overrul ed Li ggett Co. v. Bal dri dge,
278 U.S. 105 (1928), i n whi ch i t had voi ded a l aw forbi ddi ng a corporati on to own
any drug store, unl ess al l i ts stockhol ders were l i censed pharmaci sts, as appl i ed to
a forei gn corporati on, al l of whose stockhol ders were not pharmaci sts, whi ch sought
to extend i ts busi ness i n the State by acqui ri ng and operati ng therei n two addi ti onal
stores.
of thei r property wi thout due process of l aw.
55
Si mi l arl y, when the
method of l i qui dati on provi ded by a pl an of rehabi l i tati on of a mu-
tual l i fe i nsurance company i s as favorabl e to di ssenti ng pol i cy-
hol ders as woul d have been the sal e of assets and pro rata di stri bu-
ti on to al l credi tors, the di ssenters are unabl e to show any taki ng
wi thout due process. Di ssenti ng pol i cyhol ders have no consti tu-
ti onal ri ght to a parti cul ar form of remedy.
56
Mi scel l aneous Busi nesses and Professi ons. An act i mpos-
i ng l i cense fees for operati ng empl oyment agenci es and prohi bi ti ng
them from sendi ng appl i cants to an empl oyer who has not appl i ed
for l abor does not deny due process of l aw.
57
Al so, a state l aw pro-
hi bi ti ng operati on of a debt pool i ng or a debt adjustment busi -
ness except as an i nci dent to the l egi ti mate practi ce of l aw i s a
val i d exerci se of l egi sl ati ve di screti on.
58
The Court has sustai ned a l aw establ i shi ng as a qual i fi cati on
for obtai ni ng or retai ni ng a pharmacy operati ng permi t that one ei -
ther be a regi stered pharmaci st i n good standi ng or that the cor-
porati on or associ ati on have a majori ty of i ts stock owned by reg-
i stered pharmaci sts i n good standi ng who were acti vel y and regu-
l arl y empl oyed i n and responsi bl e for the management, super-
vi si on, and operati on of such pharmacy.
59
The Court al so uphel d
a state l aw forbi ddi ng (1) sol i ci tati on of the sal e of frames, mount-
i ngs, or other opti cal appl i ances, (2) sol i ci tati on of the sal e of eye-
gl asses, l enses, or pri sms by use of adverti si ng medi a, (3) retai l ers
from l easi ng, or otherwi se permi tti ng anyone purporti ng to do eye
exami nati ons or vi sual care to occupy space i n a retai l store, and
(4) anyone, such as an opti ci an, to fi t l enses, or repl ace l enses or
other opti cal appl i ances, except upon wri tten prescri pti on of an op-
tometri st or opthal mol ogi st l i censed i n the State i s not i nval i d. A
State may treat al l who deal wi th the human eye as members of
a professi on that shoul d refrai n from merchandi si ng methods to ob-
1623
60
Wi l l i amson v. Lee Opti cal Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
61
McNaughton v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 344, 349 (1917). See also Dent v. West Vi r-
gi ni a, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); Reetz v.
Mi chi gan, 188 U.S. 505 (1903); Watson v. Maryl and, 218 U.S. 173 (1910); Barsky
v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) sustai ni ng a New York l aw authori zi ng
suspensi on for si x months of the l i cense of a physi ci an who had been convi cted of
cri me i n any juri sdi cti on, i n thi s i nstance, contempt of Congress under 2 U.S.C.
192. Three Justi ces, Bl ack, Dougl as, and Frankfurter, di ssented.
62
Col l i ns v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288 (1912); Hayman v. Gal veston, 273 U.S. 414
(1927).
63
Seml er v. Dental Exami ners, 294 U.S. 608, 611 (1935). See also Dougl as v.
Nobl e, 261 U.S. 165 (1923); Graves v. Mi nnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 427 (1926).
64
Ol sen v. Smi th, 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
65
Nashvi l l e, C. & St. L. R.R. v. Al abama, 128 U.S. 96 (1888).
66
Smi th v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914). See DeVeau v. Brai sted, 363 U.S. 144,
15760 (1960), sustai ni ng New York l aw barri ng from offi ce i n l ongshoremens
uni on persons convi cted of fel ony and not thereafter pardoned or granted a good
conduct certi fi cate from a parol e board.
67
Western Turf Assn v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907).
68
W.W. Cargi l l Co. v. Mi nnesota, 180 U.S. 452 (1901).
69
Lehon v. Atl anta, 242 U.S. 53 (1916).
70
Gundl i ng v. Chi cago, 177 U.S. 183, 185 (1900).
71
Bourjoi s, I nc. v. Chapman, 301 U.S. 183 (1937).
72
Wel l er v. New York, 268 U.S. 319 (1925).
73
Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
tai n customers, and that shoul d choose l ocati ons that reduce the
temptati ons of commerci al i sm; a state may al so concl ude that eye
exami nati ons are so cri ti cal that every change i n frame and dupl i -
cati on of a l ens shoul d be accompani ed by a prescri pti on.
60
The practi ce of medi ci ne, usi ng thi s word i n i ts most general
sense, has l ong been the subject of regul ati on.
61
A State may ex-
cl ude osteopathi c physi ci ans from hospi tal s mai ntai ned by i t or i ts
muni ci pal i ti es,
62
may regul ate the practi ce of denti stry by prescri b-
i ng qual i fi cati ons that are reasonabl y necessary, requi ri ng l i censes,
establ i shi ng a supervi sory admi ni strati ve board, and prohi bi ti ng
certai n adverti si ng regardl ess of i ts truthful ness.
63
But whi l e stat-
utes requi ri ng pi l ots to be l i censed
64
and setti ng reasonabl e com-
petency standards (e.g., that rai l road engi neers pass col or bl i nd-
ness tests) have been sustai ned,
65
an act maki ng i t a mi sdemeanor
for a person to act as a rai l way passenger conductor wi thout hav-
i ng had two years experi ence as a frei ght conductor or brakeman
was i nval i dated as not rati onal l y di sti ngui shi ng between those
competent and those not competent to serve as conductor.
66
The Court has al so uphel d a vari ety of other l i censi ng or regu-
l atory l egi sl ati on appl i cabl e to pl aces of amusement,
67
grai n el e-
vators,
68
detecti ve agenci es,
69
the sal e of ci garettes
70
or cosmet-
i cs,
71
and the resal e of theatre ti ckets.
72
Restri cti ons on adverti s-
i ng have al so been uphel d, i ncl udi ng absol ute bans on the adverti s-
i ng of ci garettes,
73
or the use of a representati on of the Uni ted
1624
74
Hal ter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
75
McCl oskey v. Tobi n, 252 U.S. 107 (1920).
76
Natal v. Loui si ana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891).
77
Murphy v. Cal i forni a, 225 U.S. 623 (1912).
78
Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 260 (1912).
79
Thompson v. Consol i dated Gas Co., 300 U.S. 55, 7677 (1937) (ci ti ng Ohi o Oi l
Co. v. I ndi ana (No. 1), 177 U.S. 190 (1900)); Li ndsl ey v. Natural Carboni c Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61 (1911); Okl ahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
80
Champl i n Ref. Co. v. Corporati on Commn, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
81
Rai l road Commn v. Rowan & Ni chol s Oi l Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940). See also
Rai l road Commn v. Rowan & Ni chol s Oi l Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941); Rai l road
Commn v. Humbl e Oi l & Ref. Co., 311 U.S. 578 (1941).
States fl ag on an adverti si ng medi um.
74
Si mi l arl y consti tuti onal
were prohi bi ti ons on the sol i ci tati on by a l ayman of the busi ness
of col l ecti ng and adjusti ng cl ai ms,
75
the keepi ng of pri vate markets
wi thi n si x squares of a publ i c market,
76
the keepi ng of bi l l i ard
hal l s except i n hotel s,
77
or the purchase by junk deal ers of wi re,
copper, and other i tems, wi thout ascertai ni ng the sel l ers ri ght to
sel l .
78
Protection of State Resources
Oi l and Gas. To prevent waste, producti on of oi l and gas
may be prorated; the prohi bi ti on of wasteful conduct, whether pri -
mari l y i n behal f of the owners of oi l and gas i n a common reservoi r
or because of the publ i c i nterests i nvol ved, i s consi stent wi th the
Consti tuti on.
79
Thus, the Court uphel d agai nst due process chal -
l enge a statute whi ch defi ned waste as i ncl udi ng, i n addi ti on to i ts
ordi nary meani ng, economi c waste, surface waste, and producti on
i n excess of transportati on or marketi ng faci l i ti es or reasonabl e
market demands, and whi ch l i mi ted each producers share to a pro-
rated porti on of the total producti on that can be taken from the
common source wi thout waste.
80
Whether a system of prorati on
based on hourl y potenti al i s as fai r as one based upon esti mated
recoverabl e reserves or some other combi nati on of factors i s a ques-
ti on for admi ni strati ve and not judi ci al judgment. I n a domai n of
knowl edge sti l l shi fti ng and growi ng, i t has been hel d to be pre-
sumptuous for courts, on the basi s of confl i cti ng expert testi mony,
to i nval i date an oi l prorati on order, promul gated by an admi ni stra-
ti ve commi ssi on i n executi on of a regul atory scheme i ntended to
conserve a States oi l resources.
81
On the other hand, where the
evi dence showed that an order, purporti ng to l i mi t dai l y total pro-
ducti on of a gas fi el d and to prorate the al l owed producti on among
several wel l s, had for i ts real purpose, not the preventi on of waste
nor the undue drai nage from the reserves of other wel l owners, but
rather the compel l i ng of pi pel i ne owners to furni sh a market to
those who had no pi pel i ne connecti ons, the order was hel d voi d as
1625
82
Thompson v. Consol i dated Gas Co., 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
83
Ci ti es Servi ce Co. v. Peerl ess Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950); Phi l l i ps Petrol eum Co.
v. Okl ahoma, 340 U.S. 190 (1950).
84
Wal l s v. Mi dl and Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920). See also Henderson Co.
v. Thompson, 300 U.S. 258 (1937).
85
Bandi ni Co. v. Superi or Court, 284 U.S. 8 (1931).
86
Gant v. Okl ahoma Ci ty, 289 U.S. 98 (1933).
87
Pennsyl vani a Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). On the taki ng juri s-
prudence that has stemmed from thi s case, see supra, pp. 138284.
a taki ng of pri vate property for pri vate benefi t.
82
Al so sustai ned as
conservati on measures were orders of the Okl ahoma Corporati on
Commi ssi on, premi sed on a fi ndi ng that exi sti ng l ow fi el d pri ces for
natural gas were resul ti ng i n economi c and physi cal waste, fi xi ng
a mi ni mum pri ce for gas and requi ri ng one producer to take gas
ratabl y from another producer i n the same fi el d at the di ctated
pri ce.
83
Even though carbon bl ack i s more val uabl e than the gas from
whi ch i t i s extracted, and notwi thstandi ng a resul ti ng l oss of i n-
vestment i n a pl ant for the manufacture of carbon bl ack, a State,
i n the exerci se of i ts pol i ce power, may forbi d the use of natural
gas for products, such as carbon bl ack, i n the producti on of whi ch
such gas i s burned wi thout ful l y uti l i zi ng for other manufacturi ng
or domesti c purposes the heat therei n contai ned.
84
Li kewi se, for
the purpose of regul ati ng and adjusti ng coexi sti ng ri ghts of surface
owners to underl yi ng oi l and gas, i t i s wi thi n the power of a State
to prohi bi t the operators of wel l s from al l owi ng natural gas, not
conveni entl y necessary for other purposes, to come to the surface
wi thout the l i fti ng power havi ng been uti l i zed to produce the great-
est qual i ty of oi l i n proporti on.
85
Protecti on of Property and Agri cul tural Crops. An ordi -
nance condi ti oni ng the ri ght to dri l l for oi l and gas wi thi n the ci ty
l i mi ts upon the fi l i ng of a bond i n the sum of $200,000 for each
wel l , to secure payment of damages from i njuri es to any persons
or property resul ti ng from the dri l l i ng operati on, or mai ntenance of
any wel l or structure appurtenant thereto, i s consi stent wi th due
process of l aw and i s not rendered unreasonabl e by the requi re-
ment that the bond be executed, not by personal sureti es, but by
a bondi ng company authori zed to do busi ness i n the State.
86
On
the other hand, a Pennsyl vani a statute, whi ch forbade the mi ni ng
of coal under pri vate dwel l i ngs or streets of ci ti es by a grantor that
had reserved the ri ght to mi ne, was vi ewed as restri cti ng the use
of pri vate property too much and hence as a deni al of due process
and a taki ng wi thout compensati on.
87
Years l ater, however, a
qui te si mi l ar Pennsyl vani a statute was uphel d, the Court fi ndi ng
that the new l aw no l onger i nvol ved merel y a bal anci ng of pri vate
1626
88
Keystone Bi tumi nous Coal Assn v. DeBenedi cti s, 480 U.S. 470, 488 (1987).
The Court i n Pennsylvania Coal had vi ewed that case as one of a si ngl e pri vate
house. 260 U.S. at 413.
89
Gol dbl att v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
90
Mi l l er v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277, 279 (1928).
91
Sl i gh v. Ki rkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915).
92
Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 35657 (1908).
93
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel . Dougl as, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). See also Ci ty of
Al tus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), affd per curiam, 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
94
See, e.g., Perl ey v. North Carol i na, 249 U.S. 510 (1919) (uphol di ng l aw requi r-
i ng the removal of ti mber refuse from the vi ci ni ty of a watershed to prevent the
spread of fi re and consequent damage to such watershed).
economi c i nterests, but i nstead promoted such i mportant publ i c
i nterests as conservati on, protecti on of water suppl i es, and preser-
vati on of l and val ues for taxati on.
88
Al so di sti ngui shed from Penn-
sylvania Coal was a chal l enge to an ordi nance prohi bi ti ng sand and
gravel excavati on near the water tabl e and i mposi ng a duty to refi l l
any exi sti ng excavati on bel ow that l evel . The ordi nance was
uphel d; the fact that i t prohi bi ted a busi ness that had been con-
ducted for over 30 years di d not gi ve ri se to a taki ng i n the absence
of proof that the l and coul d not be used for other l egi ti mate pur-
poses.
89
A statute requi ri ng the destructi on of cedar trees wi thi n two
mi l es of appl e orchards i n order to prevent damage to the orchards
caused by cedar rust was uphel d as not unreasonabl e even i n the
absence of compensati on. Appl e growi ng bei ng one of the pri nci pal
agri cul tural pursui ts i n Vi rgi ni a and the val ue of cedar trees
throughout the State bei ng smal l as compared wi th that of appl e
orchards, the State was consti tuti onal l y competent to requi re the
destructi on of one cl ass of property i n order to save another whi ch,
i n the judgment of i ts l egi sl ature, was of greater val ue to the pub-
l i c.
90
Si mi l arl y, Fl ori da was hel d to possess consti tuti onal author-
i ty to protect the reputati on of one of i ts major i ndustri es by penal -
i zi ng the del i very for shi pment i n i nterstate commerce of ci trus
frui ts so i mmature as to be unfi t for consumpti on.
91
Water. A statute maki ng i t unl awful for a ri pari an owner to
di vert water i nto another State was hel d not to depri ve the owner
of property wi thout due process of l aw. The consti tuti onal power
of the State to i nsi st that i ts natural advantages shal l remai n
uni mpai red by i ts ci ti zens i s not dependent upon any ni ce esti mate
of the extent of present use or specul ati on as to future needs. . . .
What i t has i t may keep and gi ve no one a reason for i ts wi l l .
92
Thi s hol di ng has si nce been di sapproved, but on i nterstate com-
merce rather than due process grounds.
93
States may, however,
enact and enforce a vari ety of conservati on measures for the protec-
ti on of watersheds.
94
1627
95
Baysi de Fi sh Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422, 426 (1936).
96
Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891); Geer v. Connecti cut, 161
U.S. 519 (1896).
97
Mi l l er v. McLaughl i n, 281 U.S. 261, 264 (1930).
98
Baysi de Fi sh Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936). See also New York ex rel .
Si l z v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31 (1908) (uphol di ng l aw proscri bi ng possessi on duri ng
the cl osed season of game i mported from abroad).
99
See, e.g., Foster-Fountai n Packi ng Co. v. Haydel , 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (i nval i dat-
i ng Loui si ana statute prohi bi ti ng transportati on outsi de the state of shri mp taken
i n state waters, unl ess the head and shel l had fi rst been removed); Toomer v.
Wi tsel l , 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (i nval i dati ng l aw di scri mi nati ng agai nst out-of-state
commerci al fi shermen); Dougl as v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977)
(state coul d not di scri mi nate i n favor of i ts resi dents agai nst out-of-state fi shermen
i n federal l y l i censed shi ps).
100
441 U.S. 322 (1979) (formal l y overrul i ng Geer).
101
I d. at 336, 33839.
102
Bal dwi n v. Montana Fi sh and Game Commn, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
Fi sh and Game. A State has suffi ci ent control over fi sh and
wi l d game found wi thi n i ts boundari es
95
that i t may regul ate or
prohi bi t fi shi ng and hunti ng.
96
For the effecti ve enforcement of
such restri cti ons, a state may al so forbi d the possessi on wi thi n i ts
borders of speci al i nstruments of vi ol ati ons, such as nets, traps,
and sei nes, regardl ess of the ti me of acqui si ti on or the protesta-
ti ons of l awful i ntenti ons on the part of a parti cul ar possessor.
97
The Court al so uphel d a state l aw, desi gned to conserve for food
fi sh found wi thi n i ts waters, restri cti ng a commerci al reducti on
pl ant from accepti ng more fi sh than i t coul d process wi thout dete-
ri orati on, waste, or spoi l age, and appl yi ng such restri cti on to fi sh
i mported i nto the State.
98
The Courts earl y deci si ons rested on the l egal fi cti on that
states owned the fi sh and wi l d game wi thi n thei r borders, hence
coul d reserve these possessi ons sol el y for use by thei r own ci ti zens.
The Court soon backed away from the ownershi p fi cti on,
99
and i n
Hughes v. Oklahoma
100
overrul ed Geer v. Connecticut, i ndi cati ng
i nstead that state conservati on measures di scri mi nati ng agai nst
out-of-state persons were to be measured under the commerce
cl ause. Al though a states concerns for conservati on and protecti on
of wi l d ani mal s were sti l l a l egi ti mate basi s for regul ati on, these
concerns coul d not justi fy di sproporti onate burdens on i nterstate
commerce.
101
More recentl y sti l l , i n the context of recreati onal
rather than commerci al acti vi ty, the Court reached a resul t more
deferenti al to state authori ty, hol di ng that access to recreati onal
bi g game hunti ng i s not wi thi n the category of ri ghts protected by
the Pri vi l eges and I mmuni ti tes Cl ause, and that consequentl y a
state coul d wi thout di fferenti al cost justi fi cati on charge out-of-
staters si gni fi cantl y more than i n-staters for a hunti ng l i cense.
102
Suffi ce i t to say that si mi l ar cases i nvol vi ng a states efforts to re-
serve i ts fi sh and game for i ts own i nhabi tants are l i kel y to be
1628
103
Rei nman v. Ci ty of Li ttl e Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (l ocati on of a l i very sta-
bl e wi thi n a thi ckl y popul ated ci ty i s wel l wi thi n the range of the power of the state
to l egi sl ate for the heal th and general wel fare). See also Fi scher v. St. Loui s, 194
U.S. 361 (1904) (uphol di ng restri cti on on l ocati on of dai ry cow stabl es); Bacon v.
Wal ker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907) (uphol di ng restri cti on on grazi ng of sheep near habi -
tati ons).
104
Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moi nes, 239 U.S. 486 (1916). For a case em-
braci ng a rather speci al set of facts, see Dobbi ns v. Los Angel es, 195 U.S. 223 (1904).
105
Hadacheck v. Sebasti an, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
106
Cf. Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427 (1978).
107
Vi l l age of Eucl i d v. Ambl er Real ty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Zahn v. Board
of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); Nectow v. Ci ty of Cambri dge, 277 U.S. 183
(1928); Cusack Co. v. Ci ty of Chi cago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); St. Loui s Poster Adv.
Co. v. Ci ty of St. Loui s, 249 U.S. 269 (1919).
chal l enged under commerce or pri vi l eges and i mmuni ti es pri n-
ci pl es, rather than under substanti ve due process.
Ownership of Real Property: Limitations, Rights
Zoni ng and Si mi l ar Acti ons. That states and muni ci pal
subdi vi si ons may zone l and for desi gnated uses i s now a wel l estab-
l i shed aspect of the pol i ce power. Zoni ng authori ty gai ned judi ci al
recogni ti on earl y i n the 20th century. I ni ti al l y, anal ogy was drawn
to publ i c nui sance l aw, the Court recogni zi ng that States and thei r
muni ci pal subdi vi si ons may decl are that i n parti cul ar ci r-
cumstances and i n parti cul ar l ocal i ti es speci fi c busi nesses, whi ch
are not nui sances per se, are to be deemed nui sances i n fact and
i n l aw.
103
Thus, a State may decl are the emi ssi on of dense smoke
i n popul ous areas a nui sance and restrai n i t; regul ati ons to that ef-
fect are not i nval i d even though they affect the use of property or
subject the owner to the expense of compl yi ng wi th thei r terms.
104
So too, the Court uphel d an ordi nance that prohi bi ted bri ckmaki ng
i n a desi gnated area, even though the l and contai ned val uabl e cl ay
deposi ts whi ch coul d not profi tabl y be removed for processi ng el se-
where, was far more val uabl e for bri ckmaki ng than for any other
purpose, had been acqui red before i t was annexed to the muni ci pal -
i ty, and had l ong been used as a bri ckyard.
105
Wi th i ncreasi ng urbani zati on and consequent broadeni ng of
the phi l osophy of regul ati on of l and use to protect not onl y heal th
and safety but al so the ameni ti es of modern l i vi ng,
106
the Court
has recogni zed the di screti on of government, wi thi n the l oose con-
fi nes of the due process cl ause, to zone i n many ways and for many
purposes. The Court wi l l uphol d a chal l engened l and-use pl an un-
l ess i t determi nes that the pl an i s cl earl y arbi trary and unreason-
abl e and has no substanti al rel ati on to the publ i c heal th, safety, or
general wel fare,
107
or unl ess the pl an as appl i ed amounts to a tak-
1629
108
See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carol i na Coastal Counci l , 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992),
and di scussi on of the Fi fth Amendments emi nent domai n power, supra pp. 1382
95.
109
Vi l l age of Eucl i d v. Ambl er Real ty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
110
Vi l l age of Bel l e Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
111
431 U.S. 494 (1977). A pl ural i ty of the Court struck down the ordi nance as
a vi ol ati on of substanti ve due process, an i nfri ngment of fami l y l i vi ng arrangements
whi ch are a protected l i berty i nterest, i d. at 498506, whi l e Justi ce Stevens con-
curred on the ground that the ordi nance was arbi trary and unreasonabl e. I d. at 513.
Four Justi ces di ssented. I d. at 521, 531, 541.
112
Buchanan v. Warl ey, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
113
Wel ch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
114
Gori eb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
115
Agi ns v. Ci ty of Ti buron, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
116
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. Ci ty of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
117
Eubank v. Ci ty of Ri chmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
i ng of property wi thout just compensati on.
108
Appl yi ng these pri n-
ci pl es, the Court has hel d that the creati on of a resi denti al di stri ct
i n a vi l l age and the excl usi on therefrom of apartment houses, retai l
stores, and bi l l boards i s a permi ssi bl e exerci se of muni ci pal
power.
109
So too, a muni ci pal i ty restri cti ng housi ng i n a commu-
ni ty to one-fami l y dwel l i ngs, i n whi ch any number of persons rel at-
ed by bl ood, adopti on, or marri age coul d occupy a house but onl y
two unrel ated persons coul d do so, was sustai ned i n the absence of
any showi ng that i t was ai med at the depri vati on of a fundamen-
tal i nterest.
110
Such a fundamental i nterest was found i mpai red
by a zoni ng ordi nance i n Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
111
whi ch
restri cted housi ng occupancy to a si ngl e fami l y but so defi ned fam-
i l y that a grandmother who had been l i vi ng wi th her two
grandsons of di fferent chi l dren was i n vi ol ati on of the ordi nance.
Si mi l arl y, bl ack persons cannot be forbi dden to occupy houses i n
bl ocks where the greater number of houses are occupi ed by whi te
persons, or vi ce versa.
112
But asi de from such basi c constrai nts, a
wi de range of regul ati on i s permi ssi bl e. Government may regul ate
the hei ght of bui l di ngs
113
and establ i sh bui l di ng setback requi re-
ments.
114
The preservati on of open spaces, through densi ty con-
trol s and restri cti ons on the numbers of houses,
115
and the preser-
vati on of hi stori c structures
116
are al so permi ssi bl e uti l i zati ons of
the zoni ng power.
I n one aspect of zoni ng the degree to whi ch such deci si ons
may be del egated to pri vate persons the Court has not attai ned
consi stency. Thus, i t i nval i dated a ci ty ordi nance whi ch conferred
the power to establ i sh bui l di ng setback l i nes upon the owners of
two thi rds of the property abutti ng any street,
117
and, subse-
quentl y, i t struck down an ordi nance whi ch permi tted the estab-
l i shment of phi l anthropi c homes for the aged i n resi denti al areas
but onl y upon the wri tten consent of the owners of two-thi rds of
1630
118
Washi ngton ex rel . Seattl e Ti tl e Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
119
Thomas Cusack Co. v. Ci ty of Chi cago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917). The Court
thought the case di fferent from Eubank, because i n that case the ordi nance estab-
l i shed no rul e but gave to deci si on of a narrow segment of the communi ty the force
of l aw, whereas i n Cusack the ordi nance barred the erecti on of any bi l l boards but
permi tted the prohi bi ti on to be modi fi ed by the persons most affected. I d. at 531.
120
Ci ty of Eastl ake v. Forest Ci ty Enterpri ses, 426 U.S. 668 (1976). Such
referenda do, however, rai se equal protecti on probl ems. See i nfra, p. 1858.
121
Larki n v. Grendel s Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
122
I rvi ng Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 564 (1942).
the property wi thi n 400 feet of the proposed faci l i ty.
118
I n a deci -
si on fal l i ng chronol ogi cal l y between these two, i t sustai ned an ordi -
nance whi ch permi tted property owners to wai ve a muni ci pal re-
stri cti on prohi bi ti ng the constructi on of bi l l boards.
119
I n i ts most
recent deci si on, uphol di ng a ci ty charter provi si on permi tti ng the
peti ti oni ng to ci tywi de referendum of zoni ng changes and vari ances
by the ci ty pl anni ng commi ssi on and necessi tati ng a 55% approval
vote i n the referendum to sustai n the commi ssi ons deci si on, the
Court di sti ngui shed between del egati ng to a smal l group of affected
l andowners such a deci si on rel ati ng to other peopl e and the peo-
pl es retenti on of the ul ti mate l egi sl ati ve power i n themsel ves
whi ch for conveni ence they had del egated to a l egi sl ati ve body.
120
The zoni ng power may not be del egated to a church, the Court i n-
val i dati ng under the Establ i shment Cl ause a state l aw permi tti ng
any church to bl ock i ssuance of a l i quor l i cense for a faci l i ty to be
operated wi thi n 500 feet of the church.
121
Estates, Successi on, Abandoned Property. The Court
uphel d a New York Decedent Estate Law that granted to a survi v-
i ng spouse a ri ght of el ecti on to take as i n i ntestacy, as appl i ed to
a wi dow who, before enactment of the l aw, had wai ved any ri ght
to her husbands estate. I mpai rment of the wi dows wai ver by sub-
sequent l egi sl ati on di d not depri ve the husbands estate of property
wi thout due process of l aw. Because ri ghts of successi on to property
are of statutory creati on, the Court expl ai ned, New York coul d
have condi ti oned any further exerci se of testamentary power upon
the gi vi ng of ri ght of el ecti on to the survi vi ng spouse regardl ess of
any wai ver however formal l y executed.
122
Even after the creati on of a testamentary trust, a State retai ns
the power to devi se new and reasonabl e di recti ons to the trustee
to meet new condi ti ons ari si ng duri ng i ts admi ni strati on, especi al l y
such as the Depressi on presented to trusts contai ni ng mortgages.
Accordi ngl y, no consti tuti onal ri ght i s vi ol ated by the retroacti ve
appl i cati on to an estate on whi ch admi ni strati on had al ready begun
of a statute whi ch had the effect of taki ng away a remai ndermans
ri ght to judi ci al exami nati on of the trustees computati on of i ncome.
Under the pecul i ar facts of the case, however, the remai ndermans
1631
123
Demorest v. Ci ty Bank Co., 321 U.S. 36, 4748 (1944).
124
Connecti cut I ns. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948). Justi ces Jackson and
Dougl as di ssented on the ground that New York was attempti ng to escheat un-
cl ai med funds not actual l y or constructi vel y l ocated i n New York, and whi ch were
the property of benefi ci ari es who may never have been ci ti zens or resi dents of New
York.
125
341 U.S. 428 (1951).
126
454 U.S. 516 (1982).
ri ght had been created by judi ci al rul es promul gated after the
death of the decedent, so the case i s not precedent for a broad rul e
of retroacti vi ty.
123
States have several juri sdi cti onal bases for appl i cati on of es-
cheat and abandoned property l aws to out-of-state corporati ons.
Appl i cati on of New Yorks Abandoned Property Law to i nsurance
pol i ci es on the l i ves of New York resi dents i ssued by forei gn cor-
porati ons di d not depri ve such compani es of property wi thout due
process, where the i nsured persons had conti nued to be New York
resi dents and the benefi ci ari es were resi dent at the maturi ty date
of the pol i ci es. The rel ati onshi p between New York and i ts resi -
dents who abandon cl ai ms agai nst forei gn i nsurance compani es,
and between New York and forei gn i nsurance compani es doi ng
busi ness therei n, i s suffi ci entl y cl ose to gi ve New York juri sdi c-
ti on.
124
I n Standard Oil Co. v. New J ersey,
125
a di vi ded Court hel d
that due process i s not vi ol ated by a statute escheati ng to the State
shares of stock i n a domesti c corporati on and unpai d di vi dends de-
cl ared thereon, even though the l ast known owners were non-
resi dents and the stock was i ssued and the di vi dends were hel d i n
another State. The States power over the debtor corporati on gi ves
i t power to sei ze the debts or demands represented by the stock
and di vi dends.
The l arge di screti on the States possess to defi ne abandoned
property and to provi de for i ts di sposi ti on i s reveal ed i n Texaco v.
Short.
126
There uphel d was an I ndi ana statute whi ch termi nated
i nterests i n coal , oi l , gas, or other mi neral s whi ch have not been
used for twenty years and whi ch provi ded for reversi on to the
owner of the i nterest out of whi ch the mi ni ng i nterests had been
carved. Wi th respect to i nterests exi sti ng at the ti me of enactment,
the statute provi ded a two-year grace peri od i n whi ch owners of
mi neral i nterests that were then unused and subject to l apse coul d
preserve those i nterests by fi l i ng a cl ai m i n the recorders offi ce.
The use of a mi neral i nterest whi ch coul d prevent i ts exti ncti on
i ncl uded the actual or attempted extracti on of mi neral s, the pay-
ment of rents or royal ti es, and any payment of taxes. Merel y fi l i ng
a cl ai m wi th the l ocal recorder woul d preserve the i nterest. The
statute provi ded no noti ce, save for i ts own publ i cati on, to owners
1632
127
I d. at 538. The four di ssenters thought that some speci fi c noti ce was re-
qui red for persons hol di ng before enactment. I d. at 540.
128
See, e.g., Mugl er v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887), and di scussi on supra
p. 1575.
129
Pi erce Oi l Corp. v. Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919).
130
Standard Oi l Co. v. Marysvi l l e, 279 U.S. 582 (1929).
131
Barbi er v. Connol l y, 113 U.S. 27 (1885); Soon Hi ng v. Crowl ey, 113 U.S. 703
(1885).
132
Magui re v. Reardon, 225 U.S. 271 (1921).
of i nterests, nor di d i t requi re surface owners to noti fy owners of
mi neral i nterests that the i nterests were about to expi re. By a nar-
row margi n, the Court sustai ned the statute, hol di ng that the
States i nterest i n encouragi ng producti on, securi ng ti mel y noti ces
of property ownershi p, and settl i ng property ti tl es provi ded a basi s
for enactment, and fi ndi ng that due process di d not requi re any ac-
tual noti ce to hol ders of unused mi neral i nterests. Property owners
are charged wi th mai ntai ni ng knowl edge of the l egal condi ti ons of
property ownershi p. The act provi ded a grace peri od and speci fi ed
several acti ons whi ch were suffi ci ent to avoi d exti ngui shment. The
State may i mpose on an owner of a mi neral i nterest the burden
of usi ng that i nterest or fi l i ng a current statement of i nterests and
i t may si mi l arl y i mpose on hi m the l esser burden of keepi ng i n-
formed of the use or nonuse of hi s own property.
127
Health, Safety, and Morals
Even under the narrowest concept of the pol i ce power as l i m-
i ted by substanti ve due process, i t was general l y conceded that
states coul d exerci se the power to protect the publ i c heal th, safety,
and moral s.
128
I l l ustrati ve cases are noted bel ow.
Safety Regul ati ons. A vari ety of measures desi gned to re-
duce fi re hazards have been uphel d. These i ncl ude muni ci pal ordi -
nances that prohi bi t the storage of gasol i ne wi thi n 300 feet of any
dwel l i ng,
129
or requi re that al l tanks wi th a capaci ty of more than
ten gal l ons, used for the storage of gasol i ne, be buri ed at l east
three feet under ground,
130
or whi ch prohi bi t washi ng and i roni ng
i n publ i c l aundri es and wash houses, wi thi n defi ned terri tori al l i m-
i ts from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m.
131
Equal l y sancti oned by the Fourteenth
Amendment i s the demol i ti on and removal by ci ti es of wooden
bui l di ngs erected wi thi n defi ned fi re l i mi ts contrary to regul ati ons
i n force at the ti me.
132
Constructi on of property i n ful l compl i ance
wi th exi sti ng l aws, however, does not confer upon the owner an i m-
muni ty agai nst exerci se of the pol i ce power. Thus, a 1944 amend-
ment to a Mul ti pl e Dwel l i ng Law, requi ri ng i nstal l ati on of auto-
mati c spri nkl ers i n l odgi nghouses of non-fi reproof constructi on
erected pri or to sai d enactment, does not, as appl i ed to a
l odgi nghouse constructed i n 1940 i n conformi ty wi th al l l aws then
1633
133
Queensi de Hi l l s Co. v. Saxl , 328 U.S. 80 (1946).
134
Cal i forni a Reducti on Co. v. Sani tary Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905).
135
Hutchi nson v. Ci ty of Val dosta, 227 U.S. 303 (1913).
136
Sl i gh v. Ki rkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 5960 (1915).
137
Powel l v. Pennsyl vani a, 127 U.S. 678 (1888); Magnano v. Hami l ton, 292 U.S.
40 (1934).
138
North Ameri can Storage Co. v. Ci ty of Chi cago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
139
Adams v. Ci ty of Mi l waukee, 228 U.S. 572 (1913).
140
Baccus v. Loui si ana, 232 U.S. 334 (1914).
141
Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337 (1929).
142
Mi nnesota ex rel . Whi ppl e v. Marti nson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921).
143
Hutchi nson I ce Cream Co. v. I owa, 242 U.S. 153 (1916).
144
Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297 (1919).
145
Pri ce v. I l l i noi s, 238 U.S. 446 (1915).
appl i cabl e, depri ve the owner of due process, even though compl i -
ance entai l s an expendi ture of $7,500 on a property worth onl y
$25,000.
133
Sani tati on. An ordi nance for i nci nerati on of garbage and
refuse at a desi gnated pl ace as a means of protecti ng publ i c heal th
i s not taki ng of pri vate property wi thout just compensati on even
though such garbage and refuse may have some el ements of val ue
for certai n purposes.
134
Compel l i ng property owners to connect
wi th a publ i cl y mai ntai ned system of sewers and enforci ng that
duty by cri mi nal penal ti es does not vi ol ate the due process
cl ause.
135
Food, Drugs, Mi l k. The power of the State to . . . prevent
the producti on wi thi n i ts borders of i mpure foods, unfi t for use, and
such arti cl es as woul d spread di sease and pesti l ence, i s wel l estab-
l i shed.
136
Statutes forbi ddi ng or regul ati ng the manufacture of
ol eomargari ne have been uphel d as a val i d exerci se of such
power.
137
For the same reasons, statutes orderi ng the destructi on
of unsafe and unwhol esome food,
138
and prohi bi ti ng the sal e and
authori zi ng confi scati on of i mpure mi l k
139
have been sustai ned,
notwi thstandi ng that such arti cl es had a val ue for purposes other
than food. There al so can be no questi on of the authori ty of the
State, i n the i nterest of publ i c heal th and wel fare, to forbi d the sal e
of drugs by i ti nerant vendors
140
or the sal e of spectacl es by an es-
tabl i shment not i n charge of a physi ci an or optometri st.
141
Nor i s
i t any l onger possi bl e to doubt the val i di ty of state regul ati ons per-
tai ni ng to the admi ni strati on, sal e, prescri pti on, and use of dan-
gerous and habi t-formi ng drugs.
142
Equal l y val i d as pol i ce power regul ati ons are l aws forbi ddi ng
the sal e of i ce cream not contai ni ng a reasonabl e proporti on of but-
ter fat
143
or of condensed mi l k made from ski mmed mi l k rather
than whol e mi l k
144
or of food preservati ves contai ni ng bori c
aci d.
145
Si mi l arl y, a statute whi ch prohi bi ts the sal e of mi l k to
whi ch has been added any fat or oi l other than a mi l k fat, and
1634
146
Sage Stores Co. v. Kansas, 323 U.S. 32 (1944).
147
Weaver v. Pal mer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
148
Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1878); Mugl er v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887); Ki dd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888); Puri ty Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226
U.S. 192 (1912); Cl ark Di sti l l i ng Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917);
Barbour v. Georgi a, 249 U.S. 454 (1919).
149
Mugl er v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 671 (1887).
150
Hawes v. Georgi a, 258 U.S. 1 (1922); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465
(1926).
151
Stephenson v. Bi nford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932).
152
Stanl ey v. Publ i c Uti l i ti es Commn, 295 U.S. 76 (1935).
153
Stephenson v. Bi nford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932).
whi ch has, as one of i ts purposes, the preventi on of fraud and de-
cepti on i n the sal e of mi l k products, does not, when appl i ed to
fi l l ed mi l k havi ng the taste, consi stency, and appearance of whol e
mi l k products, vi ol ate the due process cl ause. Fi l l ed mi l k i s i nferi or
to whol e mi l k i n i ts nutri ti onal content and cannot be served to
chi l dren as a substi tute for whol e mi l k wi thout produci ng a di etary
defi ci ency.
146
However, a statute forbi ddi ng the sal e of beddi ng
made wi th shoddy, even when steri l i zed and therefore harml ess to
heal th, was hel d to be arbi trary and therefore i nval i d.
147
I ntoxi cati ng Li quor. [O]n account of thei r wel l -known nox-
i ous qual i ti es and the extraordi nary evi l s shown by experi ence to
be consequent upon thei r use, a State . . . [i s competent] to pro-
hi bi t [absol utel y the] manufacture, gi ft, purchase, sal e, or transpor-
tati on of i ntoxi cati ng l i quors wi thi n i ts borders. . . .
148
And to i m-
pl ement such prohi bi ti on, a State has the power to decl are that
pl aces where l i quor i s manufactured or kept shal l be deemed com-
mon nui sances,
149
and even to subject an i nnocent owner to the
forfei ture of hi s property for the acts of a wrongdoer.
150
Regul ati on of Motor Vehi cl es and Carri ers. The hi ghways
of a State are publ i c property, the pri mary and preferred use of
whi ch i s for pri vate purposes; thei r uses for purposes of gai n may
general l y be prohi bi ted by the l egi sl ature or condi ti oned as i t sees
fi t.
151
I n l i mi ti ng the use of i ts hi ghways for i ntrastate transpor-
tati on for hi re, a State reasonabl y may provi de that carri ers who
have furni shed adequate, responsi bl e, and conti nuous servi ce over
a gi ven route from a speci fi ed data i n the past shal l be enti tl ed to
l i censes as a matter of ri ght but that the l i censi ng of those whose
servi ce over the route began l ater than the date speci fi ed shal l de-
pend upon publ i c conveni ence and necessi ty.
152
To requi re pri vate
contract carri ers for hi re to obtai n a certi fi cate of conveni ence and
necessi ty, whi ch i s not granted i f the servi ce of common carri ers i s
i mpai red thereby, and to fi x mi ni mum rates appl i cabl e thereto,
whi ch are not l ess than those prescri bed for common carri ers, i s
val i d as a means of conservi ng hi ghways,
153
but any attempt to
1635
154
Mi chi gan Pub. Uti l s. Commn v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925).
155
Frost Trucki ng v. Rai l road Commn, 271 U.S. 583 (1926); Smi th v. Cahoon,
283 U.S. 553 (1931).
156
Bradl ey v. Publ i c Uti l s. Commn, 289 U.S. 92 (1933).
157
Sprol es v. Bi nford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932).
158
Rai l way Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
159
Rei tz v. Meal ey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941); Kesl er v. Department of Pub. Safety,
369 U.S. 153 (1962). But see Perez v. Campbel l , 402 U.S. 637 (1971). Procedural due
process must, of course be observed. Bel l v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). A non-
resi dent owner who l oans hi s automobi l e i n another state, by the l aw of whi ch he
i s i mmune from l i abi l i ty for the borrowers negl i gence and who was not i n the state
at the ti me of the acci dent, i s not subjected to any unconsti tuti onal depri vati on by
a l aw thereof, i mposi ng l i abi l i ty on the owner for the negl i gence of one dri vi ng the
car wi th the owners permi ssi on. Young v. Masci , 289 U.S. 253 (1933).
160
Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933). See also Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S.
140 (1924); Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163 (1928); Hodge Co. v. Ci nci nnati , 284
U.S. 335 (1932); Conti nental Baki ng Co. v. Woodri ng, 286 U.S. 352 (1932).
convert pri vate carri ers i nto common carri ers,
154
or to subject them
to the burdens and regul ati ons of common carri ers, wi thout ex-
pressl y decl ari ng them to be common carri ers, i s vi ol ati ve of due
process.
155
I n the absence of l egi sl ati on by Congress, a State may,
i n protecti on of the publ i c safety, deny an i nterstate motor carri er
the use of an al ready congested hi ghway.
156
I n exerci si ng i ts authori ty over i ts hi ghways, on the other
hand, a State i s not l i mi ted merel y to the rai si ng of revenue for
mai ntenance and reconstructi on or to regul ati ng the manner i n
whi ch vehi cl es shal l be operated, but may al so prevent the wear
and hazards due to excessi ve si ze of vehi cl es and wei ght of l oad.
Accordi ngl y, a statute l i mi ti ng to 7,000 pounds the net l oad permi s-
si bl e for trucks i s not unreasonabl e.
157
No l ess consti tuti onal i s a
muni ci pal traffi c regul ati on whi ch forbi ds the operati on i n the
streets of any adverti si ng vehi cl e, excepti ng vehi cl es di spl ayi ng
busi ness noti ces or adverti sements of the products of the owner
and not used mai nl y for adverti si ng; and such regul ati on may be
val i dl y enforced to prevent an express company from sel l i ng adver-
ti si ng space on the outsi de of i ts trucks. I nasmuch as i t i s the judg-
ment of l ocal authori ti es that such adverti si ng affects publ i c safety
by di stracti ng dri vers and pedestri ans, courts are unabl e to hol d
otherwi se i n the absence of evi dence refuti ng that concl usi on.
158
Any appropri ate means adopted to i nsure compl i ance and care
on the part of l i censees and to protect other hi ghway users bei ng
consonant wi th due process, a State may al so provi de that a dri ver
who fai l s to pay a judgment for negl i gent operati on shal l have hi s
l i cense and regi strati on suspended for three years, unl ess, i n the
meanti me, the judgment i s sati sfi ed or di scharged.
159
Compul sory
automobi l e i nsurance i s so pl ai nl y val i d as to present no federal
consti tuti onal questi on.
160
1636
161
LHote v. New Orl eans, 177 U.S. 587 (1900).
162
Ah Si n v. Wi ttman, 198 U.S. 500 (1905).
163
Marvi n v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212 (1905).
164
Stone v. Mi ssi ssi ppi , 101 U.S. 814 (1880); Dougl as v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488
(1897).
165
See, e.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944) (ri ght to become a candi date
for state offi ce i s a pri vi l ege onl y, hence an unl awful deni al of such ri ght i s not a
deni al of a ri ght of property). Cases under the equal protecti on cl ause now man-
date a di fferent resul t. See Hol t Ci vi c Cl ub v. Ci ty of Tuscal oosa, 439 U.S. 60, 75
(1978) (seemi ng to confl ate due process and equal protecti on standards i n pol i ti cal
ri ghts cases).
166
Angl e v. Chi cago, St. Paul , M. & D. Ry., 151 U.S. 1 (1894).
167
Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 442, 448 (1932).
168
Gi bbes v. Zi mmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 (1933). See Duke Power Co. v.
Carol i na Envtl . Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (l i mi tati on of common-l aw l i abi l i ty
of pri vate i ndustry nucl ear acci dents i n order to encourage devel opment of energy
a rati onal acti on, especi al l y when combi ned wi th congressi onal pl edge to take nec-
essary acti on i n event of acci dent; whether l i mi tati on woul d have been of questi on-
abl e val i di ty i n absence of pl edge uncertai n but unl i kel y).
169
Shri ver v. Woodbi ne Bank, 285 U.S. 467 (1932).
Protecti ng Moral i ty. Unl ess effecti ng a cl ear, unmi stakabl e
i nfri ngement of ri ghts secured by fundamental l aw, l egi sl ati on sup-
pressi ng prosti tuti on
161
or gambl i ng wi l l be uphel d by the Court as
concededl y wi thi n the pol i ce power of a State.
162
Accordi ngl y, a
state statute may provi de that, i n the event a judgment i s obtai ned
agai nst a party wi nni ng money, a l i en may be had on the property
of the owner of the bui l di ng where the gambl i ng transacti on was
conducted when the owner knowi ngl y consented to the gam-
bl i ng.
163
For the same reason, l otteri es, i ncl udi ng those operated
under a l egi sl ati ve grant, may be forbi dden, i rrespecti ve of any par-
ti cul ar equi ti es.
164
Vested Rights, Remedial Rights, Political Candidacy
I nasmuch as the Due Process Cl ause protects agai nst arbi trary
depri vati on of property, pri vi l eges not consti tuti ng property are
not enti tl ed to protecti on.
165
Because an exi sti ng ri ght of acti on to
recover damages for an i njury i s property, that ri ght of acti on i s
protected by the cl ause.
166
Thus, the retroacti ve repeal of a provi -
si on whi ch made di rectors l i abl e for moneys embezzl ed by corporate
offi cers, by preventi ng enforcement of a l i abi l i ty whi ch al ready had
ari sen, depri ved certai n credi tors of thei r property wi thout due
process of l aw.
167
But whi l e a vested cause of acti on i s property,
a person has no consti tuti onal l y protected property i nterest i n any
parti cul ar form of remedy and i s guaranteed onl y the preservati on
of a substanti al ri ght to redress by any effecti ve procedure.
168
Ac-
cordi ngl y, a statute creati ng an addi ti onal remedy for enforci ng
stockhol ders l i abi l i ty i s not, as appl i ed to stockhol ders then hol d-
i ng stock, vi ol ati ve of due process.
169
Nor i s a l aw whi ch l i fts a
statute of l i mi tati ons and makes possi bl e a sui t, theretofore barred,
1637
170
Chase Securi ti es Corp. v. Donal dson, 325 U.S. 304, 31516 (1945).
171
Sol i ah v. Heski n, 222 U.S. 522 (1912); Ci ty of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262
U.S. 182 (1923). The equal protecti on cl ause has been empl oyed, however, to l i mi t
a States di screti on wi th regard to certai n matters. I nfra, pp. 18921911.
172
Ci ty of Chi cago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313 (1911).
173
Loui si ana ex rel . Fol som v. Mayor of New Orl eans, 109 U.S. 285, 289 (1883).
174
Mi chi gan ex rel . Ki es v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233 (1905).
175
Hunter v. Pi ttsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
176
Stewart v. Kansas Ci ty, 239 U.S. 14 (1915).
for the val ue of certai n securi ti es. The Fourteenth Amendment
does not make an act of state l egi sl ati on voi d merel y because i t has
some retrospecti ve operati on. . . . Some rul es of l aw probabl y coul d
not be changed retroacti vel y wi thout hardshi p and oppressi on . . . .
Assumi ng that statutes of l i mi tati on, l i ke other types of l egi sl ati on,
coul d be so mani pul ated that thei r retroacti ve effects woul d offend
the consti tuti on, certai nl y i t cannot be sai d that l i fti ng the bar of
a statute of l i mi tati on so as to restore a remedy l ost through mere
l apse of ti me i s per se an offense agai nst the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
170
Control of Local Units of Government
The Fourteenth Amendment does not depri ve a State of the
power to determi ne what duti es may be performed by l ocal offi cers,
and whether they shal l be appoi nted or popul arl y el ected.
171
Thus,
a statute requi ri ng ci ti es to i ndemni fy owners of property damaged
by mobs or duri ng ri ots effects no unconsti tuti onal depri vati on of
the property even i n ci rcumstances when the ci ty coul d not have
prevented the vi ol ence.
172
Li kewi se, a person obtai ni ng a judgment
agai nst a muni ci pal i ty for damages resul ti ng from a ri ot i s not de-
pri ved of property wi thout due process of l aw by an act whi ch so
l i mi ts the muni ci pal i tys taxi ng power as to prevent col l ecti on of
funds adequate to pay i t. As l ong as the judgment conti nues as an
exi sti ng l i abi l i ty no unconsti tuti onal depri vati on i s experi enced.
173
Local uni ts of government obl i ged to surrender property to
other uni ts newl y created out of the terri tory of the former cannot
successful l y i nvoke the due process cl ause,
174
nor may taxpayers
al l ege any unconsti tuti onal depri vati on as a resul t of changes i n
thei r tax burden attendant upon the consol i dati on of conti guous
muni ci pal i ti es.
175
Nor i s a statute requi ri ng counti es to rei mburse
ci ti es of the fi rst cl ass but not other cl asses for rebates al l owed for
prompt payment of taxes i n confl i ct wi th the due process cl ause.
176
Taxing Power
General l y. I t was not contempl ated that the adopti on of the
Fourteenth Amendment woul d restrai n or cri ppl e the taxi ng power
1638
1
Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U.S. 389 (1901); Cass Farm Co. v. Detroi t, 181 U.S.
396 (1901).
2
Southwestern Oi l Co. v. Texas, 217 U.S. 114, 119 (1910).
3
Loan Associ ati on v. Ci ty of Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wal l .) 655 (1875) (voi di ng tax
empl oyed by ci ty to make a substanti al grant to a bri dge manufacturi ng company
to i nduce i t to l ocate i ts factory i n the ci ty). See also Ci ty of Parkersburg v. Brown,
106 U.S. 487 (1882) (pri vate purpose bonds not authori zed by state consti tuti on).
4
Carmi chael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 515 (1937). I n appl y-
i ng the Fi fth Amendment Due Process Cl ause the Court has sai d that di screti on as
to what i s a publ i c purpose bel ongs to Congress, unl ess the choi ce i s cl earl y wrong,
a di spl ay of arbi trary power, not an exerci se of judgment. Hel veri ng v. Davi s, 301
U.S. 619, 640 (1937); Uni ted States v. Butl er, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936). That payment
may be made to pri vate i ndi vi dual s i s now i rrel evant. Carmichael, supra, at 518.
Cf. Usery v. Turner El khorn Mi ni ng Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (sustai ni ng tax i mposed
on mi ne compani es to compensate workers for bl ack l ung di sabi l i ti es, i ncl udi ng
those contracti ng di sease before enactment of tax, as way of spreadi ng cost of em-
pl oyee l i abi l i ti es).
5
Jones v. Ci ty of Portl and, 245 U.S. 217 (1917).
6
Green v. Frazi er, 253 U.S. 233 (1920).
7
Ni cchi a v. New York, 254 U.S. 228 (1920).
8
Mi l hei m v. Moffat Tunnel Di st., 262 U.S. 710 (1923).
9
Cochran v. Board of Educati on, 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
10
Carmi chael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 300 U.S. 644 (1937).
11
Fox v. Standard Oi l Co., 294 U.S. 87, 99 (1935).
of the States.
1
Rather, the purpose of the amendment was to ex-
tend to the resi dents of the States the same protecti on agai nst ar-
bi trary state l egi sl ati on affecti ng l i fe, l i berty, and property as was
afforded agai nst Congress by the Fi fth Amendment.
2
Publ i c Purpose. As a general matter, publ i c moneys cannot
be expended for other than publ i c purposes. Some earl y cases ap-
pl i ed thi s pri nci pl e by i nval i dati ng taxes judged to be i mposed to
rai se money for purel y pri vate rather than publ i c purposes.
3
How-
ever, modern noti ons of publ i c purpose have expanded to the poi nt
where the l i mi tati on has l i ttl e practi cal i mport. Whether a use i s
publ i c or pri vate, whi l e i t i s ul ti matel y a judi ci al questi on, i s a
practi cal questi on addressed to the l aw-maki ng department, and i t
woul d requi re a pl ai n case of departure from every publ i c purpose
whi ch coul d reasonabl y be concei ved to justi fy the i nterventi on of
a court.
4
Taxes l evi ed for each of the fol l owi ng purposes have been
hel d to be for a publ i c use: a ci ty coal and fuel yard,
5
a state bank,
a warehouse, an el evator, a fl ourmi l l system, homebui l di ng
projects,
6
a soci ety for preventi ng cruel ty to ani mal s (dog l i cense
tax),
7
a rai l road tunnel ,
8
books for school chi l dren attendi ng pri -
vate as wel l as publ i c school s,
9
and rel i ef of unempl oyment.
10
Other Consi derati ons Affecti ng Val i di ty: Excessi ve Bur-
den; Rati o of Amount of Benefi t Recei ved. When the power to
tax exi sts, the extent of the burden i s a matter for the di screti on
of the l awmakers,
11
and the Court wi l l refrai n from condemni ng a
1639
12
Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewi s, 294 U.S. 550 (1935). See also Kel l y v. Ci ty
of Pi ttsburgh, 104 U.S. 78 (1881); Chapman v. Zobel ei n, 237 U.S. 135 (1915); Al aska
Fi sh Sal ti ng & By-Products Co. v. Smi th, 255 U.S. 44 (1921); Magnano Co. v. Ham-
i l ton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934); Ci ty of Pi ttsburgh v. Al co Parki ng Corp., 417 U.S. 369
(1974).
13
Nashvi l l e, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wal l ace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933); Carmi chael v.
Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937). A taxpayer therefore cannot contest
the i mposi ti on of an i ncome tax on the ground that, i n operati on, i t returns to hi s
town l ess i ncome tax than he and i ts other i nhabi tants pay. Dane v. Jackson, 256
U.S. 589 (1921).
14
Stebbi ns v. Ri l ey, 268 U.S. 137, 140, 141 (1925).
15
Cahen v. Brewster, 203 U.S. 543 (1906).
16
Keeney v. New York, 222 U.S. 525 (1912).
17
Cool i dge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582 (1931).
18
Bi nney v. Long, 299 U.S. 280 (1936); Ni ckel v. Col e, 256 U.S. 222 (1921). See
also Sal omon v. State Tax Commn, 278 U.S. 484 (1929) (conti ngent remai nder); and
Orr v. Gi l man, 183 U.S. 278 (1902) (power of appoi ntment).
tax sol el y on the ground that i t i s excessi ve.
12
Nor can the con-
sti tuti onal i ty of taxati on be made to depend upon the taxpayers
enjoyment of any speci al benefi ts from use of the funds rai sed by
taxati on.
13
Estate, Gi ft, and I nheri tance Taxes. The power of testa-
mentary di sposi ti on and the pri vi l ege of i nheri tance bei ng l egi ti -
mate subjects of taxati on, a State may appl y i ts i nheri tance tax to
ei ther the transmi ssi on, or the exerci se of the l egal power of trans-
mi ssi on, of property by wi l l or descent, or to the l egal pri vi l ege of
taki ng property by devi se or descent.
14
Accordi ngl y, an i nheri tance
tax l aw, enacted after the death of a testator but before the di s-
tri buti on of hi s estate, consti tuti onal l y may be i mposed on the
shares of l egatees, notwi thstandi ng that under the l aw of the State
i n effect on the date of such enactment, ownershi p of the property
passed to the l egatees upon the testators death.
15
Equal l y consi st-
ent wi th due process i s a tax on an inter vivos transfer of property
by deed i ntended to take effect upon the death of the grantor.
16
When remai nders i ndi sputabl y vest at the ti me of the creati on
of a trust and a successi on tax i s enacted thereafter, the i mposi ti on
of the tax on the transfer of such remai nder i s unconsti tuti onal .
17
But where the remai ndermens i nterests are conti ngent and do not
vest unti l the donors death subsequent to the adopti on of the stat-
ute, the tax i s val i d.
18
The Court has noted that i nsofar as retroacti ve taxati on of
vested gi fts has been voi ded, the justi fi cati on therefor has been
that the nature or amount of the tax coul d not reasonabl y have
been anti ci pated by the taxpayer at the ti me of the parti cul ar vol -
untary act whi ch the [retroacti ve] statute l ater made the taxabl e
event. . . . Taxati on . . . of a gi ft whi ch . . . [the donor] mi ght wel l
1640
19
Wel ch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938).
20
New York ex rel . Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313 (1937).
21
I d. See also Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 4952 (1920); and Travi s v. Yal e
& Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920) (states may tax the i ncome of nonresi dents
deri ved from property or acti vi ty wi thi n the state).
22
See, e.g., Stockdal e v. I nsurance Compani es, 87 U.S. (20 Wal l .) 323 (1874);
Uni ted States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498 (1937); Uni ted States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S.
292 (1981).
23
Wel ch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938) (uphol di ng i mposi ti on i n 1935 of tax l i -
abi l i ty for 1933 tax year; due to the schedul i ng of l egi sl ati ve sessi ons, thi s was the
l egi sl atures fi rst opportuni ty to adjust revenues after obtai ni ng i nformati on of the
nature and amount of the i ncome generated by the ori gi nal tax). Si nce [t]axati on
i s nei ther a penal ty i mposed on the taxpayer nor a l i abi l i ty whi ch he assumes by
contract, the Court expl ai ned, i ts retroacti ve i mposi ti on does not necessari l y i n-
fri nge due process. I d. at 14647.
24
Puget Sound Co. v. Seattl e, 291 U.S. 619 (1934).
25
New York Tel . Co. v. Dol an, 265 U.S. 96 (1924).
26
Barwi se v. Sheppard, 299 U.S. 33 (1936).
have refrai ned from maki ng had he anti ci pated the tax . . . [i s]
thought to be so arbi trary . . . as to be a deni al of due process.
19
I ncome Taxes. The authori ty of states to tax i ncome i s uni -
versal l y recogni zed.
20
Years ago the Court expl ai ned that
[e]njoyment of the pri vi l eges of resi dence i n the state and the at-
tendant ri ght to i nvoke the protecti on of i ts l aws are i nseparabl e
from responsi bi l i ty for shari ng the costs of government. . . . A tax
measured by the net i ncome of resi dents i s an equi tabl e method of
di stri buti ng the burdens of government among those who are pri vi -
l eged to enjoy i ts benefi ts.
21
Al so, a tax on i ncome i s not consti tu-
ti onal l y suspect because retroacti ve. The routi ne practi ce of maki ng
taxes retroacti ve for the enti re year of the l egi sl ati ve sessi on i n
whi ch the tax i s enacted has l ong been uphel d,
22
and there are
al so si tuati ons i n whi ch courts have uphel d retroacti ve appl i cati on
to the precedi ng year or two.
23
Franchi se Taxes. A ci ty ordi nance i mposi ng annual l i cense
taxes on l i ght and power compani es i s not vi ol ati ve of the due proc-
ess cl ause merel y because the ci ty has entered the power busi ness
i n competi ti on wi th such compani es.
24
Nor does a muni ci pal char-
ter authori zi ng the i mposi ti on upon a l ocal tel egraph company of
a tax upon the l i nes of the company wi thi n i ts l i mi ts at the rate
at whi ch other property i s taxed but upon an arbi trary val uati on
per mi l e, depri ve the company of i ts property wi thout due process
of l aw, i nasmuch as the tax i s a mere franchi se or pri vi l ege tax.
25
Severance Taxes. A state exci se tax on the producti on of oi l
whi ch extends to the royal ty i nterest of the l essor as wel l as to the
i nterest of the l essee engaged i n the acti ve work of producti on, the
tax bei ng apporti oned between these parti es accordi ng to thei r re-
specti ve i nterest i n the common venture, i s not arbi trary as appl i ed
to the l essor, but consi stent wi th due process.
26
1641
27
Nashvi l l e, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browni ng, 310 U.S. 362 (1940).
28
Paddel l v. Ci ty of New York, 211 U.S. 446 (1908).
29
Hagar v. Recl amati on Di st., 111 U.S. 701 (1884).
30
Butters v. Ci ty of Oakl and, 263 U.S. 162 (1923).
31
Mi ssouri Pac. R.R. v. Road Di stri ct, 266 U.S. 187 (1924). See also Roberts v.
I rri gati on Di st., 289 U.S. 71 (1933), i n whi ch i t was al so stated that an assessment
to pay the general i ndebtedness of an i rri gati on di stri ct i s val i d, even though i n ex-
cess of the benefi ts recei ved.
32
Houck v. Li ttl e Ri ver Di st., 239 U.S. 254 (1915).
33
Road Di st. v. Mi ssouri Pac. R.R., 274 U.S. 188 (1927).
34
Kansas Ci ty Ry. v. Road Di st., 266 U.S. 379 (1924).
Real Property Taxes. The mai ntenance of a hi gh assess-
ment i n the face of decl i ni ng val ue i s merel y another way of achi ev-
i ng an i ncrease i n the rate of property tax. Hence, an
overassessment consti tutes no depri vati on of property wi thout due
process of l aw.
27
Li kewi se, l and subject to mortgage may be taxed
for i ts ful l val ue wi thout deducti on of the mortgage debt from the
val uati on.
28
A State may defray the enti re expense of creati ng, devel opi ng,
and i mprovi ng a pol i ti cal subdi vi si on ei ther from funds rai sed by
general taxati on or by apporti oni ng the burden among the muni ci -
pal i ti es i n whi ch the i mprovements are made or by creati ng, or au-
thori zi ng the creati on of, tax di stri cts to meet sancti oned outl ays.
29
Where a state statute authori zes muni ci pal authori ti es to defi ne
the di stri ct to be benefi ted by a street i mprovement and to assess
the cost of the i mprovement upon the property wi thi n the di stri ct
i n proporti on to benefi ts, thei r acti on i n establ i shi ng the di stri ct
and i n fi xi ng the assessments on i ncl uded property, after due hear-
i ng of the owners as requi red by the statute cannot, when not arbi -
trary or fradul ent, be revi ewed under the Fourteenth Amendment
upon the ground that other property benefi ted by the i mprovement
was not i ncl uded.
30
I t i s al so proper to i mpose a speci al assessment for the prel i mi -
nary expenses of an abandoned road i mprovement, even though the
assessment exceeds the amount of the benefi t whi ch the assessors
esti mated the property woul d recei ve from the compl eted work.
31
Li kewi se a l evy upon al l l ands wi thi n a drai nage di stri ct of a tax
of twenty-fi ve cents per acre to defray prel i mi nary expenses does
not unconsti tuti onal l y take the property of l andowners wi thi n that
di stri ct who may not be benefi ted by the compl eted drai nage
pl ans.
32
On the other hand, when the benefi t to be deri ved by a
rai l road from the constructi on of a hi ghway wi l l be l argel y offset
by the l oss of l ocal frei ght and passenger traffi c, an assessment
upon such rai l road i s vi ol ati ve of due process,
33
whereas any gai ns
from i ncreased traffi c reasonabl y expected to resul t from a road i m-
provement wi l l suffi ce to sustai n an assessment thereon.
34
Al so the
1642
35
Loui svi l l e & Nashvi l l e R.R. v. Barber Asphal t Co., 197 U.S. 430 (1905).
36
Myl es Sal t Co. v. I beri a Drai nage Di st., 239 U.S. 478 (1916).
37
Wagner v. Bal ti more, 239 U.S. 207 (1915).
38
Charl otte Harbor Ry. v. Wel l es, 260 U.S. 8 (1922).
39
112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
fact that the onl y use made of a l ot abutti ng on a street i mprove-
ment i s for a rai l way ri ght of way does not make i nval i d, for l ack
of benefi ts, an assessment thereon for gradi ng, curbi ng, and pav-
i ng.
35
However, when a hi gh and dry i sl and was i ncl uded wi thi n
the boundari es of a drai nage di stri ct from whi ch i t coul d not be
benefi tted di rectl y or i ndi rectl y, a tax i mposed on the i sl and l and
by the di stri ct was hel d to be a depri vati on of property wi thout due
process of l aw.
36
Fi nal l y, a State may l evy an assessment for spe-
ci al benefi ts resul ti ng from an i mprovement al ready made
37
and
may val i date an assessment previ ousl y hel d voi d for want of au-
thori ty.
38
J urisdiction to Tax
The operati on of the Due Process Cl ause as a l i mi tati on on the
taxi ng power of the states has been an i ssue i n a vari ety of di f-
ferent contexts, but most i nvol ve one of the other of two basi c i s-
sues, fi rst, the rel ati onshi p between the state exerci si ng taxi ng
power and the object of that exerci se of power, and second, whether
the degree of contact i s suffi ci ent to justi fy the states i mposi ti on
of a parti cul ar obl i gati on. Often these i ssues ari se i n conjuncti on
wi th cl ai ms that the states acti ons are al so vi ol ati ve of the Com-
merce Cl ause. I l l ustrati ve of the factual setti ngs i n whi ch such i s-
sues ari se are 1), determi ni ng the scope of the busi ness acti vi ty of
a mul ti juri sdi cti onal enti ty that i s subject to a states taxi ng power,
2) appl i cati on of weal th transfer taxes to gi fts or bequests of non-
resi dents, 3) al l ocati on of the i ncome of mul ti juri sdi cti onal enti ti es
for tax purposes, 4) the scope of state authori ty to tax the i ncome
of nonresi dents, and 5) col l ecti on of state use taxes.
The Courts opi ni ons i n these cases have often di scussed due
process and Commerce Cl ause i ssues as i f they were i ndi sti ngui sh-
abl e. The recent deci si on i n Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,
39
how-
ever, uti l i zed a two-ti er anal ysi s that found suffi ci ent contact to
sati sfy due process but not Commerce Cl ause requi rements. Quill
may be read as i mpl yi ng that the more stri ngent Commerce Cl ause
standard subsumes due process juri sdi cti onal i ssues, and that con-
sequentl y these due process i ssues need no l onger be separatel y
consi dered. Thi s i nterpretati on has yet to be confi rmed, however,
and a detai l ed revi ew of due process precedents may prove useful .
1643
40
112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
41
The Court had previ ousl y hel d that the requi rement i n terms of a benefi t i s
mi ni mal . Commonweal th Edi son Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 62223 (1982),
(quoti ng Carmi chael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 52123 (1937)). I t
i s sati sfi ed by a mi ni mal connecti on between the i nterstate acti vi ti es and the tax-
i ng State and a rati onal rel ati onshi p between the i ncome attri buted to the State and
the i ntrastate val ues of the enterpri se. Mobi l Oi l Corp. v. Commi ssi oner of Taxes,
445 U.S. 425, 43637 (1980); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bai r, 437 U.S. 267, 27273
(1978). See especi al l y Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419
U.S. 560, 562 (1975); Nati onal Geographi c Soci ety v. Cal i forni a Bd. of Equal i zati on,
430 U.S. 551 (1977).
42
Qui l l Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. at 191116 (refusi ng to overrul e the
Commerce Cl ause rul i ng i n Nati onal Bel l as Hess v. Department of Revenue, 386
U.S. 753, 756 (1967)). See also Tri nova Corp. v. Mi chi gan Dept of Treasury, 498
U.S. 358 (1991) (nei ther the Commerce Cl ause nor the Due Process Cl ause i s vi o-
l ated by appl i cati on of a busi ness tax, measured on a val ue added basi s, to a com-
pany that manufactures goods i n another state, but that operates a sal es offi ce and
conducts sal es wi thi n state).
43
Uni on Transi t Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 204 (1905). See also Loui svi l l e
& Jeffersonvi l l e Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903).
44
Carstai rs v. Cochran, 193 U.S. 10 (1904); Hanni s Di sti l l i ng Co. v. Bal ti more,
216 U.S. 285 (1910); Fri ck v. Pennsyl vani a, 268 U.S. 473 (1925); Bl odgett v. Si l ber-
man, 277 U.S. 1 (1928).
Sal es/Use Taxes. I n Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,
40
the
Court struck down a state statute requi ri ng an out-of-state mai l
order company wi th nei ther outl ets nor sal es representati ves i n the
state to col l ect and transmi t use taxes on sal es to state resi dents,
but di d so on Commerce Cl ause rather than due process grounds.
Taxati on of an i nterstate busi ness does not offend due process, the
Court hel d, i f that busi ness purposeful l y avai l s i tsel f of the bene-
fi ts of an economi c market i n the [taxi ng] State . . . even i f i t has
no physi cal presence i n the State.
41
A physi cal presence wi thi n
the state i s necessary, however, under Commerce Cl ause anal ysi s
appl i cabl e to taxati on of mai l order sal es.
42
Land. Even pri or to the rati fi cati on of the Fourteenth
Amendment, i t was a settl ed pri nci pl e that a State coul d not tax
l and si tuated beyond i ts l i mi ts; subsequentl y el aborati ng upon that
pri nci pl e the Court has sai d that, we know of no case where a l eg-
i sl ature has assumed to i mpose a tax upon l and wi thi n the juri sdi c-
ti on of another State, much l ess where such acti on has been de-
fended by a court.
43
I nsofar as a tax payment may be vi ewed as
an exacti on for the mai ntenance of government i n consi derati on of
protecti on afforded, the l ogi c sustai ni ng thi s rul e i s sel f-evi dent.
Tangi bl e Personal ty. As l ong as tangi bl e personal property
has a si tus wi thi n i ts borders, a State val i dl y may tax the same,
whether di rectl y through an ad valorem tax or i ndi rectl y through
death taxes, i rrespecti ve of the resi dence of the owner.
44
By the
same token, i f tangi bl e personal property makes onl y occasi onal i n-
cursi ons i nto other States, i ts permanent si tus remai ns i n the State
1644
45
New York ex rel . New York Cent. R.R. v. Mi l l er, 202 U.S. 584 (1906). As to
the competence of States to tax equi pment of forei gn carri ers whi ch enter thei r ju-
ri sdi cti on i ntermi ttentl y, see supra, pp. 22733.
46
Wheel i ng Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 20910 (1936); Uni on Transi t Co.
v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 207 (1905); Johnson Oi l Co. v. Okl ahoma, 290 U.S. 158
(1933).
47
Uni on Transi t Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905). Justi ce Bl ack, i n Central
R.R. v. Pennsyl vani a, 370 U.S. 607, 61921 (1962), had hi s doubts about the use
of the Due Process Cl ause to . . . [i nval i date State taxes]. The modern use of due
process to i nval i date State taxes rests on two doctri nes: (1) that a State i s wi thout
juri sdi cti on to tax property beyond i ts boundari es, and (2) that mul ti pl e taxati on
of the same property by di fferent States i s prohi bi ted. Nothi ng i n the l anguage or
the hi story of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, i ndi cates any i ntenti on to es-
tabl i sh ei ther of these two doctri nes . . . And i n the fi rst case [Rai l road Co. v. Jack-
son, 74 U.S. (7 Wal l .) 262 (1869)] stri ki ng down a State tax for l ack of judi sdi cti on
to tax after the passage of that Amendment, nei ther the Amendment nor i ts Due
Process Cl ause . . . was ever menti oned. He al so mai ntai ned that Justi ce Hol mes
shared thi s vi ew i n Uni on Transi t Co. v. Kentucky, supra, at 211.
48
Southern Paci fi c Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911).
49
Ol d Domi ni on Steamshi p Co. v. Vi rgi ni a, 198 U.S. 299 (1905).
50
199 U.S. 194 (1905). See also Central R.R. v. Pennsyl vani a, 370 U.S. 607,
61117 (1962).
of ori gi n, and, subject to certai n excepti ons, i s taxabl e onl y by the
l atter.
45
The anci ent maxi m, mobilia sequuntur personam, whi ch
had i ts ori gi n when personal property consi sted i n the mai n of arti -
cl es appertai ni ng to the person of the owner, yi el ded i n modern
ti mes to the l aw of the pl ace where the property i s kept and used.
The tendency has been to treat tangi bl e personal property as hav-
i ng a si tus of i ts own for the purpose of taxati on, and correl ati vel y
to . . . exempt [i t] at the domi ci l e of i ts owner.
46
When rol l i ng
stock i s permanentl y l ocated and empl oyed i n the prosecuti on of a
busi ness outsi de the boundari es of a domi ci l i ary State, the l atter
has no juri sdi cti on to tax i t.
47
Vessel s, however, i nasmuch as they
merel y touch bri efl y at numerous ports, never acqui re a taxabl e
si tus at any one of them, and are taxabl e by the domi ci l e of thei r
owners or not at al l ,
48
unl ess of course, the shi ps operate whol l y
on the waters wi thi n one State, i n whi ch event they are taxabl e
there and not at the domi ci l e of the owners.
49
Ai rpl anes have been
treated i n a si mi l ar manner for tax purposes. Noti ng that the en-
ti re fl eet of ai rpl anes of an i nterstate carri er were never conti nu-
ousl y wi thout the [domi ci l i ary] State duri ng the whol e tax year,
that such ai rpl anes al so had thei r home port i n the domi ci l i ary
State, and that the company mai ntai ned i ts pri nci pal offi ce therei n,
the Court sustai ned a personal property tax appl i ed by the domi -
ci l i ary State to al l the ai rpl anes owned by the taxpayer. No other
State was deemed abl e to accord the same protecti on and benefi ts
as the taxi ng State i n whi ch the taxpayer had both i ts domi ci l e and
i ts busi ness si tus; the doctri nes of Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky,
50
as to the taxabi l i ty of permanentl y l ocated tangi bl es, and that of
1645
51
Pul l mans Car Co. v. Pennsyl vani a, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
52
Northwest Ai rl i nes v. Mi nnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 29497, 307 (1944). The case
was sai d to be governed by New York ex rel . New York Cent. R.R. v. Mi l l er, 202
U.S. 584, 596 (1906). As to the probl em of mul ti pl e taxati on of such ai rpl anes, whi ch
had i n fact been taxed proporti onatel y by other States, the Court decl ared that the
taxabi l i ty of any part of thi s fl eet by any other State, than Mi nnesota, i n vi ew of
the taxabi l i ty of the enti re fl eet by that State, i s not now before us. Justi ce Jack-
son, i n a concurri ng opi ni on, woul d treat Mi nnesotas ri ght to tax as excl usi vel y of
any si mi l ar ri ght el sewhere.
53
Johnson Oi l Co. v. Okl ahoma, 290 U.S. 158 (1933).
54
Pi ttsburgh C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (1894).
55
Wal l ace v. Hi nes, 253 U.S. 66 (1920). For exampl e, the rati o of track mi l eage
wi thi n the taxi ng State to total track mi l eage cannot be empl oyed i n eval uati ng that
porti on of total rai l way property found i n the State when the cost of the l i nes i n
the taxi ng State was much l ess than i n other States and the most val uabl e termi -
nal s of the rai l road were l ocated i n other States. See also Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S.
490 (1904); Uni on Tank Li ne Co. v. Wri ght, 249 U.S. 275 (1919).
56
Great Northern Ry. v. Mi nnesota, 278 U.S. 503 (1929).
57
I l l i noi s Cent. R.R. v. Mi nnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940).
apporti onment, for i nstrumental i ti es engaged i n i nterstate com-
merce
51
were hel d to be i nappl i cabl e.
52
Conversel y, a nondomi ci l i ary State, al though i t may not tax
property bel ongi ng to a forei gn corporati on whi ch has never come
wi thi n i ts borders, may l evy on movabl es whi ch are regul arl y and
habi tual l y used and empl oyed therei n. Thus, whi l e the fact that
cars are l oaded and rel oaded at a refi nery i n a State outsi de the
owners domi ci l e does not fi x the si tus of the enti re fl eet i n that
State, the l atter may neverthel ess tax the number of cars whi ch on
the average are found to be present wi thi n i ts borders.
53
Moreover,
i n assessi ng that part of a rai l road wi thi n i ts l i mi ts, a State need
not treat i t as an i ndependent l i ne, di sconnected from the part
wi thout, and pl ace upon the property wi thi n the State onl y a val ue
whi ch coul d be gi ven to i t i f operated separatel y from the bal ance
of the road. The State may ascertai n the val ue of the whol e l i ne
as a si ngl e property and then determi ne the val ue of the part wi th-
i n on a mi l eage basi s, unl ess there be speci al ci rcumstances whi ch
di sti ngui sh between condi ti ons i n the several States.
54
But no
property of an i nterstate carri er can be taken i nto account unl ess
i t can be seen i n some pl ai n and fai rl y i ntel l i gi bl e way that i t adds
to the val ue of the road and the ri ghts exerci sed i n the State.
55
Al so, a state property tax on rai l roads, whi ch i s measured by gross
earni ngs apporti oned to mi l eage, i s not unconsti tuti onal i n the ab-
sence of proof that i t exceeds what woul d be l egi ti mate as an ordi -
nary tax on the property val ued as part of a goi ng concern or that
i t i s rel ati vel y hi gher than taxes on other ki nds of property.
56
The
tax reaches onl y revenues deri ved from l ocal operati ons, and the
fact that the apporti onment formul a does not resul t i n mathemati -
cal exacti tude i s not a consti tuti onal defect.
57
1646
58
Howard, State J urisdiction to Tax I ntangibles: A Twelve Year Cycle, 8 MO. L.
REV. 155, 16062 (1943); Rawl i ns, State J urisdiction to Tax I ntangibles: Some Mod-
ern Aspects, 18 TEX. L. REV. 196, 31415 (1940).
59
Ki rtl and v. Hotchki ss, 100 U.S. 491, 498 (1879).
60
Savi ngs Soci ety v. Mul tnomah County, 169 U.S. 421 (1898).
61
Bri stol v. Washi ngton County, 177 U.S. 133, 141 (1900).
62
Fi del i ty & Col umbi a Trust Co. v. Loui svi l l e, 245 U.S. 54 (1917).
63
Rogers v. Hennepi n County, 240 U.S. 184 (1916).
I ntangi bl e Personal ty. To determi ne whether a State, or
States, may tax i ntangi bl e personal property, the Court has appl i ed
the fi cti on, mobilia sequuntur personam and has al so recogni zed
that such property may acqui re, for tax purposes, a busi ness or
commerci al si tus where permanentl y l ocated, but i t has never
cl earl y di sposed of the i ssue whether mul ti pl e personal property
taxati on of i ntangi bl es i s consi stent wi th due process. I n the case
of corporate stock, however, the Court has obl i quel y acknowl edged
that the owner thereof may be taxed at hi s own domi ci l e, at the
commerci al si tus of the i ssui ng corporati on, and at the l atters
domi ci l e; consti tuti onal l awyers specul ated whether the Court
woul d sustai n a tax by al l three juri sdi cti ons, or by onl y two of
them, and, i f the l atter, whi ch two, the State of the commerci al
si tus and of the i ssui ng corporati ons domi ci l e, or the State of the
owners domi ci l e and that of the commerci al si tus.
58
Thus far, the Court has sustai ned the fol l owi ng personal prop-
erty taxes on i ntangi bl es:
(1) A debt hel d by a resi dent agai nst a nonresi dent, evi denced
by a bond of the debtor and secured by a mortgage on real estate
i n the State of the debtors resi dence.
59
(2) A mortgage owned and kept outsi de the State by a non-
resi dent but on l and wi thi n the State.
60
(3) I nvestments, i n the form of l oans to a resi dent, made by a
resi dent agent of a nonresi dent credi tor, are taxabl e to the non-
resi dent credi tor.
61
(4) Deposi ts of a resi dent i n a bank i n another State, where he
carri es on a busi ness and from whi ch these deposi ts are deri ved,
but bel ongi ng absol utel y to hi m and not used i n the busi ness, are
subject to a personal property tax i n the ci ty of hi s resi dence,
whether or not they are subject to tax i n the State where the busi -
ness i s carri ed on. The tax i s i mposed for the general advantage
of l i vi ng wi thi n the juri sdi cti on (benefi t-protecti on theory), and may
be measured by reference to the ri ches of the person taxed.
62
(5) Membershi p owned by a nonresi dent i n a domesti c ex-
change, known as a chamber of commerce.
63
1647
64
Ci ti zens Nati onal Bank v. Durr, 257 U.S. 99, 109 (1921).
65
Hawl ey v. Mal den, 232 U.S. 1, 12 (1914).
66
Fi rst Bank Corp. v. Mi nnesota, 301 U.S. 234, 241 (1937).
67
Schuyl ki l l Trust Co. v. Pennsyl vani a, 302 U.S. 506 (1938).
68
I nternati onal Harvester Co. v. Department of Taxati on, 322 U.S. 435 (1944).
(6) Membershi p by a resi dent i n a stock exchange l ocated i n
another State. Doubl e taxati on the Court observed by one and
the same State i s not prohi bi ted by the Fourteenth Amendment;
much l ess i s taxati on by two States upon i denti cal or cl osel y rel at-
ed property i nterest fal l i ng wi thi n the juri sdi cti on of both, forbi d-
den.
64
(7) A resi dent owner may be taxed on stock hel d i n a forei gn
corporati on that does no busi ness and has no property wi thi n the
taxi ng State. The Court al so added that undoubtedl y the State i n
whi ch a corporati on i s organi zed may . . . [tax] al l of i ts shares
whether owned by resi dents or nonresi dents.
65
(8) Stock i n a forei gn corporati on owned by another forei gn cor-
porati on transacti ng i ts busi ness wi thi n the taxi ng State. The
Court attached no i mportance to the fact that the shares were al -
ready taxed by the State i n whi ch the i ssui ng corporati on was dom-
i ci l ed and mi ght al so be taxed by the State i n whi ch the stock
owner was domi ci l ed, or at any rate di d not fi nd i t necessary to
pass upon the val i di ty of the l atter two taxes. The present l evy was
deemed to be tenabl e on the basi s of the benefi t-protecti on theory,
namel y, the economi c advantages real i zed through the protecti on
at the pl ace . . . [of busi ness si tus] of the ownershi p of ri ghts i n
i ntangi bl es. . . .
66
(9) Shares owned by nonresi dent sharehol ders i n a domesti c
corporati on, the tax bei ng assessed on the basi s of corporate assets
and payabl e by the corporati on ei ther out of i ts general fund or by
col l ecti on from the sharehol der. The shares represent an al i quot
porti on of the whol e corporate assets, and the property ri ght so rep-
resented ari ses where the corporati on has i ts home, and i s there-
fore wi thi n the taxi ng juri sdi cti on of the State, notwi thstandi ng
that ownershi p of the stock may al so be a taxabl e subject i n an-
other State.
67
(10) A tax on the di vi dends of a corporati on may be di stri buted
ratabl y among stockhol ders regardl ess of thei r resi dence outsi de
the State, the stockhol ders bei ng the ul ti mate benefi ci ari es of the
corporati ons acti vi ti es wi thi n the taxi ng State and protected by the
l atter and subject to i ts juri sdi cti on.
68
Thi s tax, though col l ected by
the corporati on, i s on the transfer to a stockhol der of hi s share of
1648
69
Wi sconsi n Gas Co. v. Uni ted States, 322 U.S. 526 (1944).
70
New York ex rel . Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152 (1907).
71
Grani tevi l l e Mfg. Co. v. Query, 283 U.S. 376 (1931).
72
Buck v. Beach, 206 U.S. 392 (1907).
73
Brooke v. Ci ty of Norfol k, 277 U.S. 27 (1928).
74
Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486, 49697 (1947).
75
277 U.S. 27 (1928).
76
280 U.S. 83 (1929).
corporate di vi dends wi thi n the taxi ng State and i s deducted from
sai d di vi dend payments.
69
(11) Stamp taxes on the transfer wi thi n the taxi ng State by
one nonresi dent to another of stock certi fi cates i ssued by a forei gn
corporati on,
70
and upon promi ssory notes executed by a domesti c
corporati on, al though payabl e to banks i n other States.
71
These
taxes, however, were deemed to have been l ai d, not on the prop-
erty, but upon an event, the transfer i n one i nstance, and executi on
i n the l atter whi ch took pl ace i n the taxi ng State.
The fol l owi ng personal property taxes on i ntangi bl es have been
i nval i dated:
(1) Debts evi denced by notes i n safekeepi ng wi thi n the taxi ng
State, but made and payabl e and secured by property i n a second
State and owned by a resi dent of a thi rd State.
72
(2) A property tax sought to be col l ected from a l i fe benefi ci ary
on the corpus of a trust composed of property l ocated i n another
State and as to whi ch the benefi ci ary had nei ther control nor pos-
sessi on, apart from the recei pt of i ncome therefrom.
73
However, a
personal property tax may be col l ected on one-hal f of the val ue of
the corpus of a trust from a resi dent who i s one of the two trustees
thereof, not wi thstandi ng that the trust was created by the wi l l of
a resi dent of another State i n respect of i ntangi bl e property l ocated
i n the l atter State, at l east where i t does not appear that the trust-
ee i s exposed to the danger of other ad valorem taxes i n another
State.
74
The fi rst case, Brooke v. Norfolk,
75
i s di sti ngui shabl e by
vi rture of the fact that the property tax therei n voi ded was l evi ed
upon a resi dent benefi ci ary rather than upon a resi dent trustee i n
control of nonresi dent i ntangi bl es. Di fferent too i s Safe Deposit &
T. Co. v. Virginia,
76
where a property tax was unsuccessful l y de-
manded of a nonresi dent trustee wi th respect to nonresi dent i ntan-
gi bl es under i ts control .
(3) A tax, measured by i ncome, l evi ed on trust certi fi cates hel d
by a resi dent, representi ng i nterests i n vari ous parcel s of l and
(some i nsi de the State and some outsi de), the hol der of the certi fi -
cates, though wi thout a voi ce i n the management of the property,
1649
77
Seni or v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422 (1935).
78
Wheel i ng Steel Corp v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936). See also Memphi s Gas Co.
v. Beel er, 315 U.S. 649, 652 (1942).
79
Adams Express Co. v. Ohi o, 165 U.S. 194 (1897).
80
Al pha Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925).
81
Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U.S. 325 (1920).
82
Newark Fi re I ns. Co. v. State Board, 307 U.S. 313, 318, 324 (1939). Al though
the ei ght Justi ces affi rmi ng thi s tax were not i n agreement as to the reasons to be
assi gned i n justi fi cati on of thi s resul t, the hol di ng appears to be i n l i ne wi th the
di ctum uttered by Chi ef Justi ce Stone i n Curry v. McCanl ess, 307 U.S. 357, 368
(1939), to the effect that the taxati on of a corporati on by a State where i t does busi -
ness, measured by the val ue of the i ntangi bl es used i n i ts busi ness there, does not
precl ude the State of i ncorporati on from i mposi ng a tax measured by al l i ts i ntangi -
bl es.
bei ng enti tl ed to a share i n the net i ncome and, upon sal e of the
property, to the proceeds of the sal e.
77
A State i n whi ch a forei gn corporati on has acqui red a commer-
ci al domi ci l e and i n whi ch i t mai ntai ns i ts general busi ness offi ces
may tax the l atters bank deposi ts and accounts recei vabl e even
though the deposi ts are outsi de the State and the accounts recei v-
abl e ari se from manufacturi ng acti vi ti es i n another State.
78
Si mi -
l arl y, a nondomi ci l i ary State i n whi ch a forei gn corporati on di d
busi ness can tax the corporate excess ari si ng from property em-
pl oyed and busi ness done i n the taxi ng State.
79
On the other hand,
when the forei gn corporati on transacts onl y i nterstate commerce
wi thi n a State, any exci se tax on such excess i s voi d, i rrespecti ve
of the amount of the tax.
80
A domi ci l i ary State, however, may tax
the excess of market val ue of outstandi ng capi tal stock over the
val ue of real and personal property and certai n i ndebtedness of a
domesti c corporati on even though thi s corporate excess arose
from property l ocated and busi ness done i n another State and was
there taxabl e. Moreover, thi s resul t fol l ows whether the tax i s con-
si dered as one on property or on the franchi se.
81
Al so a domi ci l i ary
State, whi ch i mposes no franchi se tax on a stock fi re i nsurance cor-
porati on, val i dl y may assess a tax on the ful l amount of i ts pai d-
i n capi tal stock and surpl us, l ess deducti ons for l i abi l i ti es, notwi th-
standi ng that such domesti c corporati on concentrates i ts executi ve,
accounti ng, and other busi ness offi ces i n New York, and mai ntai ns
i n the domi ci l i ary State onl y a requi red regi stered offi ce at whi ch
l ocal cl ai ms are handl ed. Despi te the vi ci ssi tudes whi ch the so-
cal l ed juri sdi cti on-to-tax doctri ne has encountered . . . , the pre-
sumpti on persi sts that i ntangi bl e property i s taxabl e by the State
of ori gi n.
82
But a property tax on the capi tal stock of a domesti c
company whi ch i ncl udes i n the apprai sal thereof the val ue of coal
mi ned i n the taxi ng State but l ocated i n another State awai ti ng
sal e depri ves the corporati on of i ts property wi thout due process of
1650
83
Del aware, L. & W.P.R.R. v. Pennsyl vani a, 198 U.S. 341 (1905).
84
Loui svi l l e & Jeffersonvi l l e Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903).
85
Stebbi ns v. Ri l ey, 268 U.S. 137, 14041 (1925).
86
199 U.S. 194 (1905). I n di ssenti ng i n State Tax Commn v. Al dri ch, 316 U.S.
174, 185 (1942), Justi ce Jackson asserted that a reconsi derati on of thi s pri nci pl e had
become ti mel y.
87
268 U.S. 473 (1925). See also Trei chl er v. Wi sconsi n, 338 U.S. 251 (1949); Ci ty
Bank Co. v. Schnader, 293 U.S. 112 (1934).
88
240 U.S. 635, 631 (1916). A deci si on rendered i n 1926 whi ch i s seemi ngl y i n
confl i ct was Wachovi a Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U.S. 567 (1926), i n whi ch
North Carol i na was prevented from taxi ng the exerci se of a power of appoi ntment
through a wi l l executed therei n by a resi dent, when the property was a trust fund
i n Massachusetts created by the wi l l of a resi dent of the l atter State. One of the
reasons assi gned for thi s resul t was that by the l aw of Massachusetts the property
i nvol ved was treated as passi ng from the ori gi nal donor to the appoi ntee. However,
thi s hol di ng was overrul ed i n Graves v. Schmi dl app, 315 U.S. 657 (1942).
l aw.
83
Al so voi d for the same reason i s a state tax on the franchi se
of a domesti c ferry company whi ch i ncl udes i n the val uati on there-
of the worth of a franchi se granted to the sai d company by another
State.
84
Transfer (I nheri tance, Estate, Gi ft) Taxes. Bei ng com-
petent to regul ate exerci se of the power of testamentary di sposi ti on
and the pri vi l ege of i nheri tance, a State may base i ts successi on
taxes upon ei ther the transmi ssi on or an exerci se of the l egal
power of transmi ssi on, of property by wi l l or by descent, or the en-
joyment of the l egal pri vi l ege of taki ng property by devi se or de-
scent.
85
But whatever may be the justi fi cati on of thei r power to
l evy such taxes, States have consi stentl y found themsel ves re-
stri cted by the rul e, establ i shed as to property taxes i n 1905 i n
Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky,
86
and subsequentl y rei terated i n
Frick v. Pennsylvania
87
i n 1925, whi ch precl udes i mposi ti on of
transfer taxes upon tangi bl e personal property by any State other
than the one i n whi ch such tangi bl es are permanentl y l ocated or
have an actual si tus. I n the case of i ntangi bl es, however, the Court
has osci l l ated i n uphol di ng, then rejecti ng, and agai n currentl y sus-
tai ni ng the l evy by more than one State of death taxes upon i ntan-
gi bl es compri si ng the estate of a decedent.
Unti l 1930, transfer taxes upon i ntangi bl es l evi ed by both the
domi ci l i ary as wel l as nondomi ci l i ary, or si tus State, were wi th
rare excepti ons approved. Thus, i n Bullen v. Wisconsin,
88
the domi -
ci l i ary State of the creator of a trust was hel d competent to l evy
an i nheri tance tax, upon the death of the settl or, on hi s trust fund
consi sti ng of stocks, bonds, and notes kept and admi ni stered i n an-
other State and as to whi ch the settl or reserved the ri ght to control
di sposi ti on and to di rect payment of i ncome for l i fe, such reserved
powers bei ng equi val ent to a fee. Cogni zance was taken of the fact
that the State i n whi ch these i ntangi bl es had thei r si tus had al so
1651
89
233 U.S. 434 (1914).
90
Rhode I sl and Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U.S. 69 (1926).
91
277 U.S. 1 (1928).
92
Fi rst Natl Bank v. Mai ne, 284 U.S. 312 (1932); Bei dl er v. South Carol i na Tax
Commn, 282 U.S. 1 (1930); Bal dwi n v. Mi ssouri , 281 U.S. 586 (1930); Farmers
Loan Co. v. Mi nnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
93
Fi rst Nati onal Bank v. Mai ne, 284 U.S. 312, 33031 (1932).
94
307 U.S. 357, 363, 36668, 372 (1939).
taxed the trust. Levy of an i nheri tance tax by a nondomi ci l i ary
State was sustai ned on si mi l ar grounds i n Wheeler v. New York,
wherei n i t was hel d that the presence of a negoti abl e i nstrument
was suffi ci ent to confer juri sdi cti on upon the State seeki ng to tax
i ts transfer.
89
On the other hand, the mere ownershi p by a forei gn
corporati on of property i n a nondomi ci l i ary State was hel d i nsuffi -
ci ent to support a tax by that State on the successi on to shares of
stock i n that corporati on owned by a nonresi dent decedent.
90
Al so
agai nst the trend was Blodgett v. Silberman,
91
wherei n the Court
defeated col l ecti on of a transfer tax by the domi ci l i ary State by
treati ng coi ns and bank notes deposi ted by a decedent i n a safe de-
posi t box i n another State as tangi bl e property, al bei t i t conceded
that the domi ci l i ary State coul d tax the transfer of books and cer-
ti fi cates of i ndebtness found i n that safe deposi t box as wel l as the
decedents i nterest i n a forei gn partnershi p.
I n the course of about two years fol l owi ng the Depressi on, the
Court handed down a group of four deci si ons whi ch pl aced the
stamp of di sapproval upon mul ti pl e transfer and by i nference
other mul ti pl e taxati on of i ntangi bl es.
92
Asserti ng, as i t di d i n one
of these cases, that practi cal consi derati ons of wi sdom, conven-
i ence and justi ce al i ke di ctate the desi rabi l i ty of a uni form rul e
confi ni ng the juri sdi cti on to i mpose death transfer taxes as to i n-
tangi bl es to the State of the [owners] domi ci l e,
93
the Court,
through consi stent appl i cati on of the maxi m, mobilia sequuntur
personam, proceeded to deny the ri ght of nondomi ci l i ary States to
tax and to reject as i nadequate juri sdi cti onal cl ai ms of the l atter
founded upon such bases as control , benefi t, and protecti on or
si tus. Duri ng thi s i nterval , 19301932, mul ti pl e transfer taxati on of
i ntangi bl es came to be vi ewed, not merel y as undesi rabl e, but as
so arbi trary and unreasonabl e as to be prohi bi ted by the due proc-
ess cl ause.
Whi l e the Court expressl y overrul ed onl y one of these four de-
ci si ons condemni ng mul ti pl e successi on taxati on of i ntangi bl es, be-
gi nni ng wi th Curry v. McCanless
94
i n 1939, i t announced a depar-
ture from the doctri ne, of recent ori gi n, that the Fourteenth
Amendment precl udes the taxati on of any i nterest i n the same i n-
tangi bl e i n more than one State. . . . Taki ng cogni zance of the fact
1652
95
308 U.S. 313 (1939).
that thi s doctri ne had never been extended to the fi el d of i ncome
taxati on or consi stentl y appl i ed i n the fi el d of property taxati on,
the Court decl ared that a correct i nterpretati on of consti tuti onal re-
qui rements woul d di ctate the fol l owi ng concl usi ons: From the be-
gi nni ng of our consti tuti onal system control over the person at the
pl ace of hi s domi ci l e and hi s duty there, common to al l ci ti zens, to
contri bute to the support of government have been deemed to af-
ford an adequate consti tuti onal basi s for i mposi ng on hi m a tax on
the use and enjoyment of ri ghts i n i ntangi bl es measured by thei r
val ue. . . . But when the taxpayer extends hi s acti vi ti es wi th re-
spect to hi s i ntangi bl es, so as to avai l hi msel f of the protecti on and
benefi t of the l aws of another State, i n such a way as to bri ng hi s
person or . . . [hi s i ntangi bl es] wi thi n the reach of the tax gatherer
there, the reason for a si ngl e pl ace of taxati on no l onger obtai ns,
. . . [However], the State of domi ci l e i s not depri ved, by the tax-
payers acti vi ti es, el sewhere, of i ts consti tuti onal juri sdi cti on to
tax. I n accordance wi th thi s l i ne of reasoni ng, Tennessee, where
a decedent di ed domi ci l ed, and Al abama, where a trustee, by con-
veyance from sai d decedent, hel d securi ti es on speci fi c trusts, were
both deemed competent to i mpose a tax on the transfer of these se-
curi ti es passi ng under the wi l l of the decedent. I n effecti ng her
purposes, the testatri x was vi ewed as havi ng brought some of the
l egal i nterests whi ch she created wi thi n the control of one State by
sel ecti ng a trustee there, and others wi thi n the control of the other
State, by maki ng her domi ci l e there. She had found i t necessary
to i nvoke the ai d of the l aw of both States and her l egatees were
subject to the same necessi ty.
These statements represented a bel ated adopti on of the vi ews
advanced by Chi ef Justi ce Stone i n di ssenti ng or concurri ng opi n-
i ons whi ch he fi l ed i n three of the four deci si ons duri ng 19301932.
By the l i ne of reasoni ng taken i n these opi ni ons, i f protecti on or
control was extended to, or exerci sed over, i ntangi bl es or the per-
son of thei r owner, then as many States as afforded such protecti on
or were capabl e of exerti ng such domi ni on shoul d be pri vi l eged to
tax the transfer of such property. On thi s basi s, the domi ci l i ary
State woul d i nvari abl y qual i fy as a State competent to tax as
woul d a nondomi ci l i ary State, so far as i t coul d l egi ti matel y exer-
ci se control or coul d be shown to have afforded a measure of protec-
ti on that was not tri vi al or i nsubstanti al .
On the authori ty of Curry v. McCanless, the Court, i n Pearson
v. McGraw,
95
al so sustai ned the appl i cati on of an Oregon transfer
tax to i ntangi bl es handl ed by an I l l i noi s trust company and never
1653
96
307 U.S. 383 (1939).
97
I d. at 386.
98
315 U.S. 657, 660, 661 (1942).
99
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 429 (1819).
100
319 U.S. 94 (1943).
physi cal l y present i n Oregon. Juri sdi cti on to tax was vi ewed as de-
pendent, not on the l ocati on of the property i n the State, but on
control over the owner who was a resi dent of Oregon. I n Graves v.
Elliott,
96
the Court uphel d the power of New York, i n computi ng
i ts estate tax, to i ncl ude i n the gross estate of a domi ci l ed decedent
the val ue of a trust of bonds managed i n Col orado by a Col orado
trust company and al ready taxed on i ts transfer by Col orado, whi ch
trust the decedent had establ i shed whi l e i n Col orado and concern-
i ng whi ch he had never exerci sed any of hi s reserved powers of rev-
ocati on or change of benefi ci ari es. I t was observed that the power
of di sposi ti on of property i s the equi val ent of ownershi p, . . . and
i ts exerci se i n the case of i ntangi bl es i s . . . [an] appropri ate sub-
ject of taxati on at the pl ace of the domi ci l e of the owner of the
power. Rel i nqui shment at death, i n consequence of the nonexerci se
i n l i fe, of a power to revoke a trust created by a decedent i s l i ke-
wi se an appropri ate subject of taxati on.
97
Consi stent appl i cati on
of the pri nci pl e enunci ated i n Curry v. McCanless i s al so di scern-
i bl e i n two l ater cases i n whi ch the Court sustai ned the ri ght of a
domi ci l i ary State to tax the transfer of i ntangi bl es kept outsi de i ts
boundari es, notwi thstandi ng that i n some i nstances they may be
subject to taxati on i n other juri sdi cti ons, to whose control they are
subject and whose l egal protecti on they enjoyed. I n Graves v.
Schmidlapp,
98
an estate tax was l evi ed upon the val ue of the sub-
ject of a general testamentary power of appoi ntment effecti vel y ex-
erci sed by a resi dent donee over i ntangi bl es hel d by trustees under
the wi l l of a nonresi dent donor of the power. Vi ewi ng the transfer
of i nterest i n the i ntangi bl es by exerci se of the power of appoi nt-
ment as the equi val ent of ownershi p, the Court quoted from
McCulloch v. Maryland
99
to the effect that the power to tax i s an
i nci dent of soverei gnty, and i s coextensi ve wi th that to whi ch i t i s
an i nci dent. Agai n, i n Central Hanover Bank Co. v. Kelly,
100
the
Court approved a New Jersey transfer tax i mposed on the occasi on
of the death of a New Jersey grantor of an i rrevocabl e trust exe-
cuted, and consi sti ng of securi ti es l ocated i n New York, and provi d-
i ng for the di sposi ti on of the corpus to two nonresi dent sons.
The costl i ness of mul ti pl e taxati on of estates compri si ng i ntan-
gi bl es i s appreci abl y aggravated when each of several States founds
i ts tax not upon di fferent events or property ri ghts but upon an
i denti cal basi s, namel y that the decedent di ed domi ci l ed wi thi n i ts
1654
101
306 U.S. 398 (1939). Resort to the Supreme Courts ori gi nal juri sdi cti on was
necessary because i n Worcester County Trust Co. v. Ri l ey, 302 U.S. 292 (1937), the
Court, proceedi ng on the basi s that i nconsi stent determi nati ons by the courts of two
States as to the domi ci l e of a taxpayer do not rai se a substanti al federal consti tu-
ti onal questi on, hel d that the El eventh Amendment precl uded a sui t by the estate
of the decedent to establ i sh the correct State of domi ci l e. I n Cal i forni a v. Texas, 437
U.S. 601 (1978), a case on al l poi nts wi th Texas v. Florida, the Court deni ed l eave
to fi l e an ori gi nal acti on to adjudi cate a di spute between the two States about the
actual domi ci l e of Howard Hughes, a number of Justi ces suggesti ng that Worcester
County no l onger was good l aw. Subsequentl y, the Court reaffi rmed Worcester Coun-
ty, Cory v. Whi te, 457 U.S. 85 (1982), and then permi tted an ori gi nal acti on to pro-
ceed, Cal i forni a v. Texas, 457 U.S. 164 (1982), several Justi ces taki ng the posi ti on
that nei ther Worcester County nor Texas v. Florida was any l onger vi abl e.
102
Kansas Ci ty Ry. v. Kansas, 240 U.S. 227 (1916); Kansas Ci ty, M. & B. R.R.
v. Sti l es, 242 U.S. 111 (1916).
103
Schwab v. Ri chardson, 263 U.S. 88 (1923).
borders. Not onl y i s an estate then threatened wi th excessi ve con-
tracti on but the contesti ng States may di scover that the assets of
the estate are i nsuffi ci ent to sati sfy thei r cl ai ms. Thus, i n Texas v.
Florida,
101
the State of Texas fi l ed an ori gi nal peti ti on i n the Su-
preme Court, i n whi ch i t asserted that i ts cl ai m, together wi th
those of three other States, exceeded the val ue of the estate, that
the porti on of the estate wi thi n Texas al one woul d not suffi ce to
di scharge i ts own tax, and that i ts efforts to col l ect i ts tax mi ght
be defeated by adjudi cati ons of domi ci l e by the other States. The
Supreme Court di sposed of thi s controversy by sustai ni ng a fi ndi ng
that the decedent had been domi ci l ed i n Massachusetts, but i nti -
mated that thereafter i t woul d take juri sdi cti on i n l i ke si tuati ons
onl y i n the event that an estate di d not exceed i n val ue the total
of the confl i cti ng demands of several States and that the l atter
were confronted wi th a prospecti ve i nabi l i ty to col l ect.
Corporate Pri vi l ege Taxes. Si nce the tax i s l evi ed not on
property but on the pri vi l ege of doi ng busi ness i n corporate form,
a domesti c corporati on may be subjected to a pri vi l ege tax grad-
uated accordi ng to pai d-up capi tal stock, even though the l atter
represents capi tal not subject to the taxi ng power of the State.
102
By the same token, the val i di ty of a franchi se tax, i mposed on a
domesti c corporati on engaged i n forei gn mari ti me commerce and
assessed upon a proporti on of the total franchi se val ue equal to the
rati o of l ocal busi ness done to total busi ness, i s not i mpai red by the
fact that the total val ue of the franchi se was enhanced by property
and operati ons carri ed on beyond the l i mi ts of the State.
103
How-
ever, a State, under the gui se of taxi ng the pri vi l ege of doi ng an
i ntrastate busi ness, cannot l evy on property beyond i ts borders;
therefore, as appl i ed to forei gn corporati ons, a l i cense tax based on
1655
104
Western Uni on Tel . Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910); Pul l man Co. v. Kansas,
216 U.S. 56 (1910); Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S. 178 (1917); I nternati onal Paper
Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 135 (1918).
105
Cudahy Co. v. Hi nkl e, 278 U.S. 460 (1929).
106
St. Loui s S. W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350 (1914).
107
Atl anti c Refi ni ng Co. v. Vi rgi ni a, 302 U.S. 22 (1937).
108
Ameri can Mfg. Co. v. St. Loui s, 250 U.S. 459 (1919). Nor does a state l i cense
tax on the producti on of el ectri ci ty vi ol ate the due process cl ause because i t may
be necessary, to ascertai n, as an el ement i n i ts computati on, the amounts del i vered
i n another juri sdi cti on. Utah Power & Li ght Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932).
109
James v. Dravo Contracti ng Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
110
Great Atl anti c & Paci fi c Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937).
111
Lawrence v. State Tax Commn, 286 U.S. 276 (1932).
112
Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920); Travi s v. Yal e & Towne Mfg. Co., 252
U.S. 60 (1920).
authori zed capi tal stock i s voi d,
104
even though there be a maxi -
mum to the fee,
105
unl ess apporti oned accordi ng to some method,
as, for exampl e, a franchi se tax based on such proporti on of out-
standi ng capi tal stock as i t represented by property owned and
used i n busi ness transacted i n the taxi ng State.
106
An entrance
fee, on the other hand, col l ected onl y once as the pri ce of admi ssi on
to do an i ntrastate busi ness, i s di sti ngui shabl e from a tax and ac-
cordi ngl y may be l evi ed on a forei gn corporati on on the basi s of a
sum fi xed i n rel ati on to the amount of authori zed capi tal stock (i n
thi s i nstance, a $5,000 fee on an authori zed capi tal of
$100,000,000).
107
A muni ci pal l i cense tax i mposed as a percentage of the recei pts
of a forei gn corporati on deri ved from the sal es wi thi n and wi thout
the State of goods manufactured i n the ci ty i s not a tax on busi ness
transacti ons or property outsi de the ci ty and therefore does not vi o-
l ate the due process cl ause.
108
But a State l acks juri sdi cti on to ex-
tend i ts pri vi l ege tax to the gross recei pts of a forei gn contracti ng
corporati on for work done outsi de the taxi ng State i n fabri cati ng
equi pment l ater i nstal l ed i n the taxi ng State. Unl ess the acti vi ti es
whi ch are the subject of the tax are carri ed on wi thi n i ts terri tori al
l i mi ts, a State i s not competent to i mpose such a pri vi l ege tax.
109
A tax on chai n stores, at a rate per store determi ned by the
number of stores both wi thi n and wi thout the State i s not unconsti -
tuti onal as a tax i n part upon thi ngs beyond the juri sdi cti on of the
State.
110
I ndi vi dual I ncome Taxes. Consi stent wi th due process of
l aw, a State annual l y may tax the enti re net i ncome of resi dent i n-
di vi dual s from whatever source recei ved,
111
and that porti on of a
nonresi dents net i ncome deri ved from property owned, and from
any busi ness, trade, or professi on carri ed on, by hi m wi thi n i ts bor-
ders.
112
Juri sdi cti on, i n the case of resi dents, i s founded upon the
ri ghts and pri vi l eges i nci dent to domi ci l e, and, i n the case of non-
1656
113
New York ex rel . Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937).
114
Magui re v. Trefy, 253 U.S. 12 (1920).
115
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Vi rgi ni a, 305 U.S. 19, 23 (1938).
116
New York ex. rel . Whi tney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366 (1937).
117
Underwood Typewri ter Co. v. Chamberl ai n, 254 U.S. 113 (1920); Bass,
Ratcl i ff & Gretton Ltd. v. Tax Commn 266 U.S. 271 (1924). The Court has recentl y
consi dered and expanded the abi l i ty of the States to use apporti onment formul ae to
al l ocate to each State for taxi ng purposes a fracti on of the i ncome earned by an i nte-
grated busi ness conducted i n several States as wel l as abroad. Moorman Mfg. Co.
v. Bai r, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); Mobi l Oi l Corp. v. Commi ssi oner of Taxes, 445 U.S.
425 (1980); Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980). Exxon re-
fused to permi t a uni tary busi ness to use separate accounti ng techni ques that di -
vi ded i ts profi ts among i ts vari ous functi onal departments to demonstrate that a
States formul ary apporti onment taxes extraterri tori al i ncome i mproperl y. Bair,
supra, at 27680, i mpl i ed that a showi ng of actual mul ti pl e taxati on was a nec-
essary predi cate to a due process chal l enge but mi ght not be suffi ci ent.
118
Hans Rees Sons v. North Carol i na, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
resi dents, upon domi ni on over ei ther the recei ver of the i ncome or
the property or acti vi ty from whi ch i t i s deri ved and upon the obl i -
gati on to contri bute to the support of a government whi ch renders
secure the col l ecti on of such i ncome. Accordi ngl y, a State may tax
resi dents on i ncome from rents of l and l ocated outsi de the State
and from i nterest on bonds physi cal l y wi thout the State and se-
cured by mortgage upon l ands si mi l arl y si tuated
113
and from a
trust created and admi ni stered i n another State, and not di rectl y
taxabl e to the trustee.
114
The fact that another State has l awful l y
taxed i denti cal i ncome i n the hands of trustees operati ng therei n
does not necessari l y destroy a domi ci l i ary States ri ght to tax the
recei pt of i ncome by a resi dent benefi ci ary. The taxi ng power of a
state i s restri cted to her confi nes and may not be exerci sed i n re-
spect of subjects beyond them.
115
Li kewi se, even though a non-
resi dent does no busi ness wi thi n a State, the l atter may tax the
profi ts real i zed by the nonresi dent upon hi s sal e of a ri ght appur-
tenant to membershi p i n a stock exchange wi thi n i ts borders.
116
Corporate I ncome Taxes: Forei gn Corporati ons. A tax
based on the i ncome of a forei gn corporati on may be determi ned by
al l ocati ng to the State a proporti on of the total .
117
However, such
a basi s may work an unconsti tuti onal resul t i f the i ncome thus at-
tri buted to the State i s out of al l appropri ate proporti on to the
busi ness there transacted by the corporati on. Evi dence may al ways
be submi tted whi ch tends to show that a State has appl i ed a meth-
od whi ch, al bei t fai r on i ts face, operates so as to reach profi ts
whi ch are i n no sense attri butabl e to transacti ons wi thi n i ts
juri sdi cati on.
118
Neverthel ess, a forei gn corporati on i s i n error
when i t contends that due process i s deni ed by a franchi se tax
measured by i ncome, whi ch i s l evi ed, not upon net i ncome from
i ntrastate busi ness al one, but on net i ncome justl y attri butabl e to
al l cl asses of busi ness done wi thi n the State, i nterstate and forei gn,
1657
119
Matson Nav. Co. v. State Board, 297 U.S. 441 (1936).
120
Wi sconsi n v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 44849 (1940). Di ssenti ng, Jus-
ti ce Roberts, al ong wi th Chi ef Justi ce Hughes and Justi ces McReynol ds and Reed,
stressed the fact that the use and di sbursement by the corporati on at i ts home offi ce
of i ncome deri ved from operati ons i n many States does not depend on and cannot
be control l ed by, any l aw of Wi sconsi n. The act of di sbursi ng such i ncome as di vi -
dends, he contended i s one whol l y beyond the reach of Wi sconsi ns soverei gn power,
one whi ch i t cannot effecti vel y command, or prohi bi t or condi ti on. The assumpti on
that a proporti on of the di vi dends di stri buted i s pai d out of earni ngs i n Wi sconsi n
for the year i mmedi atel y precedi ng payment i s arbi trary and not borne out by the
facts. Accordi ngl y, i f the exacti on i s an i ncome tax i n any sense i t i s such upon
the stockhol ders (many of whom are nonresi dents) and i s obvi ousl y bad. See also
Wi sconsi n v. Mi nnesota Mi ni ng Co., 311 U.S 452 (1940).
121
Equi tabl e Li fe Socy v. Pennsyl vani a, 238 U.S. 143 (1915).
122
Provi dent Savi ngs Assn v. Kentucky, 239 U.S. 103 (1915).
123
State Bd. of I ns. v. Todd Shi pyards, 370 U.S. 451 (1962).
as wel l as i ntrastate busi ness.
119
I nasmuch as the pri vi l ege grant-
ed by a State to a forei gn corporati on of carryi ng on l ocal busi ness
supports a tax by that State on the i ncome deri ved from that busi -
ness, i t fol l ows that the Wi sconsi n pri vi l ege di vi dend tax, consi st-
ent wi th the due process cl ause, may be appl i ed to a Del aware cor-
porati on, havi ng i ts pri nci pal offi ces i n New York, hol di ng i ts meet-
i ngs and voti ng i ts di vi dends i n New York, and drawi ng i ts di vi -
dend checks on New York bank accounts. The tax i s i mposed on the
pri vi l ege of decl ari ng and recei vi ng di vi dends out of i ncome de-
ri ved from property l ocated and busi ness transacted i n the State,
equal to a speci fi ed percentage of such di vi dends, the corporati on
bei ng requi red to deduct the tax from di vi dends payabl e to resi dent
and nonresi dent sharehol ders and pay i t over to the State.
120
I nsurance Company Taxes. A pri vi l ege tax on the gross
premi ums recei ved by a forei gn l i fe i nsurance company at i ts home
offi ce for busi ness wri tten i n the State does not depri ve the com-
pany of property wi thout due process,
121
but a tax i s bad when the
company has wi thdrawn al l i ts agents from the State and has
ceased to do busi ness, merel y conti nui ng to be bound to pol i cy-
hol ders resi dent therei n and recei vi ng at i ts home offi ce the re-
newal premi ums.
122
Al so vi ol ati ve of due process i s a state gross
premi um tax i mposed on a nonresi dent fi rm, doi ng busi ness i n the
taxi ng juri sdi cti on, whi ch purchased coverage of property l ocated
therei n from an unl i censed out-of-state i nsurer whi ch con-
summated the contract, servi ced the pol i cy, and col l ected the pre-
mi ums outsi de that taxi ng juri sdi cti on.
123
Di sti ngui shabl e there-
from i s the fol l owi ng tax whi ch was construed as havi ng been l ev-
i ed, not upon annual premi ums nor upon the pri vi l ege merel y of
doi ng busi ness duri ng the peri od that the company actual l y was
wi thi n the State, but upon the pri vi l ege of enteri ng and engagi ng
i n busi ness, the percentage on the annual premi ums to be pai d
1658
124
Conti nental Co. v. Tennessee, 311 U.S. 5, 6 (1940) (emphasi s added).
125
Pal metto I ns. Co. v. Connecti cut, 272 U.S. 295 (1926).
126
St. Loui s Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922).
127
Connecti cut General Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
128
Metropol i tan Li fe I ns. Co. v. Ci ty of New Orl eans, 205 U.S. 395 (1907).
129
Orl eans Pari sh v. New York Li fe I ns. Co., 216 U.S 517 (1910).
130
Li verpool & L. & G. I ns. Co. v. Orl eans Assessors, 221 U.S. 346 (1911).
throughout the l i fe of the pol i ci es i ssued. By reason of thi s di f-
ference a State may conti nue to col l ect such tax even after the com-
panys wi thdrawal from the State.
124
A State whi ch taxes the i nsuri ng of property wi thi n i ts l i mi ts
may l awful l y extend i ts tax to a forei gn i nsurance company whi ch
contracts wi th an automobi l e sal es corporati on i n a thi rd State to
i nsure i ts customers agai nst l oss of cars purchased through i t, so
far as the cars go i nto possessi on of a purchaser wi thi n the taxi ng
State.
125
On the other hand, a forei gn corporati on admi tted to do
a l ocal busi ness, whi ch i nsures i ts property wi th i nsurers i n other
States who are not authori zed to do busi ness i n the taxi ng State,
cannot consti tuti onal l y be subjected to a 5% tax on the amount of
premi ums pai d for such coverage.
126
Li kewi se a Connecti cut l i fe i n-
surance corporati on, l i censed to do busi ness i n Cal i forni a, whi ch
negoti ated rei nsurance contracts i n Connecti cut, recei ved payment
of premi ums thereon i n Connecti cut, and was there l i abl e for pay-
ment of l osses cl ai med thereunder, cannot be subjected by Cal i for-
ni a to a pri vi l ege tax measured by gross premi ums deri ved from
such contracts, notwi thstandi ng that the contracts rei nsured other
i nsurers authori zed to do busi ness i n Cal i forni a and protected pol i -
ci es effected i n Cal i forni a on the l i ves of resi dents therei n. The tax
cannot be sustai ned whether as l ai d on property, busi ness done, or
transacti ons carri ed on, wi thi n Cal i forni a, or as a tax on a pri vi l ege
granted by that State.
127
When pol i cy l oans to resi dents are made by a l ocal agent of a
forei gn i nsurance company, i n the servi ci ng of whi ch notes are
si gned, securi ty taken, i nterest col l ected, and debts are pai d wi thi n
the State, such credi ts are taxabl e to the company, notwi thstandi ng
that the promi ssory notes evi denci ng such credi ts are kept at the
home offi ce of the i nsurer.
128
But when a resi dent pol i cyhol ders
l oan i s merel y charged agai nst the reserve val ue of hi s pol i cy,
under an arrangement for exti ngui shi ng the debt and i nterest
thereon by deducti on from any cl ai m under the pol i cy, such credi t
i s not taxabl e to the forei gn i nsurance company.
129
Premi ums due
from resi dents on whi ch an extensi on has been granted by forei gn
compani es al so are credi ts on whi ch the l atter may be taxed by the
State of the debtors domi ci l e;
130
the mere fact that the i nsurers
1659
131
Ori ent I ns. Co. v. Assessors of Orl eans, 221 U.S. 358 (1911).
132
Turpi n v. Lemon, 187 U.S. 51, 58 (1902); Gl i dden v. Harri ngton, 189 U.S.
255 (1903).
133
McMi l l en v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 42 (1877).
134
Bel l s Gap R.R. v. Pennsyl vani a, 134 U.S. 232, 239 (1890).
135
Hodge v. Muscati ne County, 196 U.S. 276 (1905).
charge these premi ums to l ocal agents and gi ve no credi t di rectl y
to pol i cyhol ders does not enabl e them to escape thi s tax.
131
Procedure in Taxation
General l y. Exactl y what due process requi res i n the assess-
ment and col l ecti on of general taxes has never been deci ded by the
Supreme Court. Whi l e i t was hel d that noti ce to the owner at
some stage of the proceedi ngs, as wel l as an opportuni ty to defend,
i s essenti al for i mposi ti on of speci al taxes, i t has al so rul ed that
l aws for assessment and col l ecti on of general taxes stand upon a
di fferent footi ng and are to be construed wi th the utmost l i beral i ty,
even to the extent of acknowl edgi ng that no noti ce whatever i s nec-
essary.
132
Due process of l aw as appl i ed to taxati on does not mean
judi ci al process;
133
nei ther does i t requi re the same ki nd of noti ce
as i s requi red i n a sui t at l aw, or even i n proceedi ngs for taki ng
pri vate property under the power of emi nent domai n.
134
I f a tax-
payer i s gi ven an opportuni ty to test the val i di ty of a tax at any
ti me before i t i s fi nal , whether the proceedi ngs for revi ew take
pl ace before a board havi ng a quasi -judi ci al character, or before a
tri bunal provi ded by the State for the propose of determi ni ng such
questi ons, due process of l aw i s not deni ed.
135
Noti ce and Heari ng i n Rel ati on to Taxes. Of the di f-
ferent ki nds of taxes whi ch the State may i mpose, there i s a vast
number of whi ch, from thei r nature, no noti ce can be gi ven to the
taxpayer, nor woul d noti ce be of any possi bl e advantage to hi m,
such as pol l taxes, l i cense taxes (not dependent upon the extent of
hi s busi ness), and general l y, speci fi c taxes on thi ngs, or persons, or
occupati ons. I n such cases the l egi sl ature, i n authori zi ng the tax,
fi xes i ts amount, and that i s the end of the matter. I f the tax be
not pai d, the property of the del i nquent may be sol d, and he be
thus depri ved of hi s property. Yet there can be no questi on that the
proceedi ng i s due process of l aw, as there i s no i nqui ry i nto the
wei ght of evi dence, or other el ement of a judi ci al nature, and noth-
i ng coul d be changed by heari ng the taxpayer. No ri ght of hi s i s,
therefore, i nvaded. Thus, i f the tax on ani mal s be a fi xed sum per
head, or on arti cl es a fi xed sum per yard, or bushel , or gal l on, there
i s nothi ng the owner can do whi ch can affect the amount to be col -
l ected from hi m. So, i f a person wi shes a l i cense to do busi ness of
a parti cul ar ki nd, or at a parti cul ar pl ace, such as keepi ng a hotel
1660
136
Hagar v. Recl amati on Di st., 111 U.S. 701, 70910 (1884).
137
I d. at 710.
138
139
State Rai l road Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 610 (1876).
140
Ni ckey v. Mi ssi ssi ppi , 292 U.S. 393, 396 (1934). See also Cl ement Natl Bank
v. Vermont, 231 U.S. 120 (1913).
141
Pi ttsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (1894).
or a restaurant, or sel l i ng l i quors, or ci gars, or cl othes, he has onl y
to pay the amount requi red by l aw and go i nto the busi ness. There
i s no need i n such cases for noti ce or heari ng. So, al so, i f taxes are
i mposed i n the shape of l i censes for pri vi l eges, such as those on for-
ei gn corporati ons for doi ng busi ness i n the State, or on domesti c
corporati ons for franchi ses, i f the parti es desi re the pri vi l ege, they
have onl y to pay the amount requi red. I n such cases there i s no
necessi ty for noti ce or heari ng. The amount of the tax woul d not
be changed by i t.
136
Noti ce and Heari ng i n Rel ati on to Assessments. But
where a tax i s l evi ed on property not speci fi cal l y, but accordi ng to
i ts val ue, to be ascertai ned by assessors appoi nted for that purpose
upon such evi dence as they may obtai n, a di fferent pri nci pl e comes
i n. The offi cers i n esti mati ng the val ue act judi ci al l y; and i n most
of the States provi si on i s made for the correcti on of errors commi t-
ted by them, through boards of revi si on or equal i zati on, si tti ng at
desi gnated peri ods provi ded by l aw to hear compl ai nts respecti ng
the justi ce of the assessments. The l aw i n prescri bi ng the ti me
when such compl ai nts wi l l be heard, gi ves al l the noti ce requi red,
and the proceedi ngs by whi ch the val uati on i s determi ned, though
i t may be fol l owed, i f the tax be not pai d, by a sal e of the
del i nquents property, i s due process of l aw.
137
Neverthel ess, i t has never been consi dered necessary to the va-
l i di ty of a tax that the party charged shal l have been present, or
had an opportuni ty to be present, i n some tri bunal when he was
assessed.
138
Where a tax board has i ts ti me of si tti ng fi xed by l aw
and where i ts sessi ons are not secret, no obstacl e prevents the ap-
pearance of any one before i t to assert a ri ght or redress a wrong
and i n the busi ness of assessi ng taxes, thi s i s al l that can be rea-
sonabl y asked.
139
Nor i s there any consti tuti onal command that
noti ce of an assessment as wel l as an opportuni ty to contest i t be
gi ven i n advance of the assesment. I t i s enough that al l avai l abl e
defenses may be presented to a competent tri bunal duri ng a sui t
to col l ect the tax and before the demand of the State for remi ttance
becomes fi nal .
140
A heari ng before judgment, wi th ful l opportuni ty
to submi t evi dence and arguments bei ng al l that can be adjudged
vi tal , i t fol l ows that reheari ngs and new tri al s are not essenti al to
due process of l aw.
141
One heari ng i s suffi ci ent to consti tute due
1661
142
Mi chi gan Central R.R. v. Powers, 201 U.S. 245, 302 (1906).
143
Pi ttsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Board of Pub. Works, 172 U.S. 32, 45 (1898).
144
St. Loui s Land Co. v. Kansas Ci ty, 241 U.S. 419, 430 (1916); Paul sen v. Port-
l and, 149 U.S. 30, 41 (1893); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 590 (1897).
145
Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U.S. 389, 391 (1901).
146
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
147
Wi thnel l v. Ruecki ng Constr. Co., 249 U.S. 63, 68 (1919); Browni ng v. Hoo-
per, 269 U.S. 396, 405 (1926). Li kewi se, the commi tti ng to a board of county super-
vi sors of authori ty to determi ne, wi thout noti ce or heari ng, when repai rs to an exi st-
i ng drai nage system are necessary cannot be sai d to deny due process of l aw to
l andowners i n the di stri ct, who, by statutory requi rement, are assessed for the cost
thereof i n proporti on to the ori gi nal assessment. Brei hol z v. Board of Supervi sors,
257 U.S. 118 (1921).
148
Fal l brook I rri gati on Di st. v. Bradl ey, 164 U.S. 112, 168, 175 (1896); Brown-
i ng v. Hooper, 269 U.S. 396, 405 (1926).
149
Utl ey v. Petersburg, 292 U.S. 106, 109 (1934); French v. Barber Asphal t Pav-
i ng Co., 181 U.S. 324, 341 (1901). See also Sol i ah v. Heski n, 222 U.S. 522 (1912).
150
Hi bben v. Smi th, 191 U.S. 310, 321 (1903).
process,
142
and the requi rements of due process are al so met i f a
taxpayer, who had no noti ce of a heari ng, does recei ve noti ce of the
deci si on reached there and i s pri vi l eged to appeal i t and, on appeal ,
to present evi dence and be heard on the val uati on of hi s prop-
erty.
143
However, when speci al assessments are made by a pol i ti cal
subdi vi si on, a taxi ng board or court, accordi ng to speci al benefi ts,
the property owner i s enti tl ed to be heard as to the amount of hi s
assessments and upon al l questi ons properl y enteri ng i nto that de-
termi nati on.
144
The heari ng need not amount to a judi ci al i n-
qui ry,
145
but a mere opportuni ty to submi t objecti ons i n wri ti ng,
wi thout the ri ght of personal appearance, i s not suffi ci ent.
146
I f an
assessment for a l ocal i mprovement i s made i n accordance wi th a
fi xed rul e prescri bed by l egi sl ati ve act, the property owner i s not
enti tl ed to be heard i n advance on the questi on of benefi ts.
147
On
the other hand, i f the area of the assessment di stri ct was not deter-
mi ned by the l egi sl ature, a l andowner does have the ri ght to be
heard respecti ng benefi ts to hi s property before i t can be i ncl uded
i n the i mprovement di stri ct and assessed, but due process i s not
deni ed i f, i n the absence of actual fraud or bad fai th, the deci si on
of the agency vested wi th the i ni ti al determi nati on of benefi ts i s
made fi nal .
148
The owner has no consti tuti onal ri ght to be heard
i n opposi ti on to the l aunchi ng of a project whi ch may end i n assess-
ment, and once hi s l and has been dul y i ncl uded wi thi n a benefi t
di stri ct, the onl y pri vi l ege whi ch he thereafter enjoys i s to a hear-
i ng upon the apporti onment, that i s, the amount of the tax whi ch
he has to pay.
149
Nor can he ri ghtful l y compl ai n because the stat-
ute renders concl usi ve, after a heari ng, the determi nati on as to ap-
porti onment by the same body whi ch l evi ed the assessment.
150
1662
151
Hancock v. Muskogee, 250 U.S. 454, 458 (1919). Li kewi se, a taxpayer does
not have a ri ght to a heari ng before a state board of equal i zati on prel i mi nary to i s-
suance by i t of an order i ncreasi ng the val uati on of al l property i n a ci ty by 40%.
Bi -Metal l i c Co. v. Col orado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
152
Ci ty of Detroi t v. Parker, 181 U.S. 399 (1901).
153
Paul sen v. Portl and, 149 U.S. 30, 38 (1893).
154
Bankers Trust Co. v. Bl odgett, 260 U.S. 647 (1923).
155
Nati onal Safe Deposi t Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58 (1914).
156
Pi erce Oi l Corp. v. Hopki ns, 264 U.S. 137 (1924).
157
Carstai rs v. Cochran, 193 U.S. 10 (1904); Hanni s Di sti l l i ng Co. v. Bal ti more,
216 U.S. 285 (1910).
158
Travi s v. Yal e & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 75, 76 (1920).
More speci fi cal l y, where the mode of assessment resol ves i tsel f
i nto a mere mathemati cal cal cul ati on, there i s no necessi ty for a
heari ng.
151
Statutes and ordi nances provi di ng for the pavi ng and
gradi ng of streets, the cost thereof to be assessed on the front foot
rul e, do not, by thei r fai l ure to provi de for a heari ng or revi ew of
assessments, general l y depri ve a compl ai ni ng owner of property
wi thout due process of l aw.
152
I n contrast, when an attempt i s
made to cast upon parti cul ar property a certai n proporti on of the
constructi on cost of a sewer not cal cul ated by any mathemati cal
formul a, the taxpayer has a ri ght to be heard.
153
Col l ecti on of Taxes. To reach property whi ch has escaped
taxati on, a State may tax estates of decedents for a peri od pri or to
death and grant proporti onate deducti ons for al l pri or taxes whi ch
the personal representati ve can prove to have been pai d.
154
Col l ec-
ti on of an i nheri tance tax al so may be expedi ted by a statute re-
qui ri ng the seal i ng of safe deposi t boxes for at l east ten days after
the death of the renter and obl i gi ng the l essor to retai n assets
found therei n suffi ci ent to pay the tax that may be due the
State.
155
Moreover, wi th a vi ew to achi evi ng a l i ke resul t i n the
case of gasol i ne taxes, a State may compel retai l ers to col l ect such
taxes from consumers and, under penal ty of a fi ne for del i nquency,
to remi t monthl y the amounts thus col l ected.
156
Li kewi se, a tax on
the tangi bl e personal property of a nonresi dent owner may be col -
l ected from the custodi an or possessor of such property, and the
l atter, as an assurance of rei mbursement, may be granted a l i en
on such property.
157
I n col l ecti ng personal i ncome taxes, however,
most States requi re empl oyers to deduct and wi thhol d the tax from
the wages of empl oyees, but the duty thereby i mposed on the em-
pl oyer has never been vi ewed as depri vi ng hi m of property wi thout
due process of l aw, nor has the adjustment of hi s system of ac-
counti ng and payi ng sal ari es whi ch wi thhol di ng entai l s been
vi ewed as an unreasonabl e regul ati on of the conduct of hi s busi -
ness.
158
1663
159
I nternati onal Harvester Corp. v. Goodri ch, 350 U.S. 537 (1956).
160
League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156 (1902).
161
Pal mer v. McMahon, 133 U.S. 660, 669 (1890).
162
Scotti sh Uni on & Natl I ns. Co. v. Bowl and, 196 U.S. 611 (1905).
163
Ki ng v. Mul l i ns, 171 U.S. 404 (1898); Chapman v. Zobel ei n, 237 U.S. 135
(1915).
164
Lei gh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79 (1904).
165
Davi dson v. Ci ty of New Orl eans, 96 U.S. 97, 107 (1878).
166
Dewey v. Des Moi nes, 173 U.S. 193 (1899).
Moreover, no unconsti tuti onal depri vati on of the property
ri ghts of vendors of trucks, sol d under condi ti onal sal es contract to
a carri er, resul ts when a State asserts agai nst such trucks a pri or
l i en for hi ghway use taxes l evi ed agai nst the carri er and (1) accru-
i ng from the operati on by the carri er of trucks, other than those
sol d by the vendors, ei ther before or duri ng the ti me the carri er op-
erated the vendors trucks, or (2) ari si ng from assessments agai nst
the carri er, after vendors repossessed thei r trucks, and based upon
the carri ers operati ons precedi ng such repossessi on. A vendor i s
not pri vi l eged to contend that the l i en asserted must be l i mi ted to
taxes attri butabl e sol el y to operati on of i ts own trucks; for the wear
on the hi ghways occasi oned by the carri ers operati on i s i n no way
al tered by the vendors retenti on of ti tl e.
159
As a State may provi de i n advance that taxes shal l bear i nter-
est from the ti me they become due, i t may wi th equal val i di ty sti p-
ul ate that taxes whi ch have become del i nquent shal l bear i nterest
from the ti me the del i nquency commenced. A State may adopt new
remedi es for the col l ecti on of taxes and appl y these remedi es to
taxes al ready del i nquent.
160
After l i abi l i ty of a taxpayer has been
fi xed by appropri ate procedure, col l ecti on of a tax by di stress and
sei zure of hi s person does not depri ve hi m of l i berty wi thout due
process of l aw.
161
Nor i s a forei gn i nsurance company deni ed due
process of l aw when i ts personal property i s di strai ned to sati sfy
unpai d taxes.
162
The requi rements of due process are ful fi l l ed by a statute
whi ch, i n conjuncti on wi th affordi ng an opportuni ty to be heard,
provi des for the forfei ture of ti tl es to l and for fai l ure to l i st and pay
taxes thereon for certai n speci fi ed years.
163
No l ess consti tuti onal ,
as a means of faci l i tati ng col l ecti on, i s an in rem proceedi ng, to
whi ch the l and al one i s made a party, whereby tax l i ens on l and
are forecl osed and al l preexi sti ng ri ghts or l i ens are el i mi nated by
a sal e under a decree.
164
On the other hand, whi l e the conversi on
of an unpai d speci al assessment i nto both a personal judgment
agai nst the owner as wel l as a charge on the l and i s consi stent
wi th the Fourteenth Amendment,
165
a judgment i mposi ng personal
l i abi l i ty agai nst a nonresi dent taxpayer over whom the state court
acqui red no juri sdi cti on i s voi d.
166
Apart from such restrai nts,
1664
167
League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156, 158 (1902). See also Straus v. Foxworth, 231
U.S. 162 (1913).
168
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). See also Kentucky Rai l road Tax
Cases, 115 U.S. 321, 331 (1885); Wi nona & St. Peter Land Co. v. Mi nnesota, 159
U.S. 526, 537 (1895); Merchants Bank v. Pennsyl vani a, 167 U.S. 461, 466 (1897);
Gl i dden v. Harri ngton, 189 U.S. 255 (1903).
169
Corry v. Bal ti more, 196 U.S. 466, 478 (1905).
170
Lei gh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79, 9293 (1904).
171
Ontari o Land Co. v. Yordy, 212 U.S. 152 (1909). See also Longyear v. Tool an,
209 U.S. 414 (1908).
172
Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956).
however, a State i s free to adopt new remedi es for the col l ecti on
of taxes and even to appl y new remedi es to taxes al ready del i n-
quent.
167
Suffi ci ency and Manner of Gi vi ng Noti ce. Noti ce, i nsofar
as i t i s requi red, may be ei ther personal , or by publ i cati on, or by
statute fi xi ng the ti me and pl ace of heari ng.
168
A state statute,
consi stent wi th due process, may desi gnate a corporati on as the
agent of a nonresi dent stockhol der to recei ve noti ce and to rep-
resent hi m i n proceedi ngs for correcti ng assessment.
169
Al so
where the State . . . [desi res] to sel l l and for taxes upon proceed-
i ngs to enforce a l i en for the payment thereof, i t may proceed di -
rectl y agai nst the l and wi thi n the juri sdi cti on of the court, and a
noti ce whi ch permi ts al l i nterested, who are so mi nded, to ascer-
tai n that i t i s to be subjected to sal e to answer for taxes, and to
appear and be heard, whether to be found wi thi n the juri sdi cti on
or not, i s due process of l aw wi thi n the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. . .
170
A descri pti on, even though i t not be techni cal l y cor-
rect, whi ch i denti fi es the l and wi l l sustai n an assessment for taxes
and a noti ce of sal e therefor when del i nquent. I f the owner knows
that the property so descri bed i s hi s, he i s not, by reason of the i n-
suffi ci ent descri pti on, depri ved of hi s property wi thout due process.
Where tax proceedi ngs are in rem, owners are bound to take noti ce
thereof, and to pay taxes on thei r property, even i f assessed to un-
known or other persons, and i f an owner stands by and sees hi s
property sol d for del i nquent taxes, he i s not thereby wrongful l y de-
pri ved of hi s property.
171
However, due process was deemed not to have been accorded
an i ncompetent taxpayer, for whom a guardi an had not yet been
appoi nted, but who was wel l known to town offi ci al s to be fi nan-
ci al l y responsi bl e, when, i n accordance wi th statutory procedure,
noti ce of a real property tax del i nquency was mai l ed to her and
publ i shed i n l ocal papers as wel l as posted i n the town post offi ce,
and thereafter, wi thout appearance on her part, the property was
forecl osed and deeded to the town.
172
On the other hand, due proc-
ess was not deni ed to appel l ants when, through derel i cti on of thei r
1665
173
Nel son v. New York Ci ty, 352 U.S. 103 (1956).
174
Bri nkerhoff-Fari s Co. v. Hi l l , 281 U.S. 673 (1930).
175
Central of Georgi a Ry. v. Wri ght, 207 U.S. 127 (1907).
176
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930). See also Ward v. Love County, 253
U.S. 17 (1920).
177
McKesson Corp. v. Fl ori da Al cohol & Tobacco Di v., 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
178
I d.
179
Farncomb v. Denver, 252 U.S. 7 (1920).
bookkeeper, they were not appri sed of the recei pt of mai l ed noti ces,
and thus were unabl e to avert forecl osure of l i ens for unpai d water
charges outstandi ng agai nst two parcel s of l and hel d by them i n
trust; thi s concl usi on i s unaffected by the di spari ty between the
val ue of the l and taken and the amount owed nor by the fact that
the ci ty, i n one i nstance, retai ned the proceeds of sal e after l apse
of ti me to redeem. Havi ng i ssued appropri ate noti ces, the ci ty can-
not be hel d responsi bl e for the negl i gence of the bookkeeper and
the managi ng trustee i n overl ooki ng arrearages on tax bi l l s, nor i s
i t obl i gated to i nqui re why appel l ants regul arl y pai d real estate
taxes on thei r property.
173
Suffi ci ency of Remedy. When no other remedy i s avai l abl e,
due process i s deni ed by a judgment of a state court wi thhol di ng
a decree i n equi ty to enjoi n col l ecti on of a di scri mi natory tax.
174
Requi rements of due process are si mi l arl y vi ol ated by a statute
whi ch l i mi ts a taxpayers ri ght to chal l enge an assessment to cases
of fraud or corrupti on,
175
and by a state tri bunal whi ch prevents
a recovery of taxes i mposed i n vi ol ati on of the Consti tuti on and
l aws of the Uni ted States by i nvoki ng a state l aw l i mi ti ng sui ts to
recover taxes al l eged to have been assessed i l l egal l y to taxes pai d
at the ti me and i n the manner provi ded by sai d l aw.
176
I n thi s as
i n other areas, the state must provi de procedural safeguards
agai nst i mposi ti on of an unconsti tuti onal tax. These procedures
need not appl y predeprivation, but a state that deni es
predepri vati on remedy by requi ri ng that tax payments be made be-
fore objecti ons are heard must provi de a postdeprivation rem-
edy.
177
I n the case of a tax hel d unconsti tuti onal as a di scri mi na-
ti on agai nst i nterstate commerce and not i nval i dated i n i ts en-
ti rety, the state has several al ternati ves for equal i zi ng i nci dence of
the tax: i t may pay a refund equal to the di fference between the
tax pai d and the tax that woul d have been due under rates af-
forded to i n-state competi tors; i t may assess and col l ect back taxes
from those competi tors; or i t may combi ne the two approaches.
178
Laches. Persons fai l i ng to avai l themsel ves of an opportuni ty
to object and be heard cannot thereafter compl ai n of assessments
as arbi trary and unconsti tuti onal .
179
Li kewi se a car company,
whi ch fai l ed to report i ts gross recei pts as requi red by statute, has
1666
180
Pul l man Co. v. Knott, 235 U.S. 23 (1914).
181
For anal ysi s of the l aw of emi nent domai n, see supra, pp. 136995.
182
262 U.S. 390 (1923). Justi ces Hol mes and Sutherl and entered a di ssent, ap-
pl i cabl e to Meyer, i n Bartel s v. I owa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923).
183
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
184
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Pi erce v. Soci ety of Si sters, 268
U.S. 510, 531, 533, 534 (1928).
no further ri ght to contest the state comptrol l ers esti mate of those
recei pts and hi s addi ng thereto the 10 percent penal ty permi tted
by l aw.
180
Eminent Domain
The due process cl ause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
hel d to requi re that when a state or l ocal governmental body, or
a pri vate body exerci si ng del egated power, takes pri vate property
i t must provi de just compensati on and take onl y for a publ i c pur-
pose. Appl i cabl e pri nci pl es are di scussed under the Fi fth Amend-
ment.
181
Substantive Due Process and Noneconomic Liberty
At the heyday of economi c substanti ve due process, the Court
rul ed i n two cases whi ch, whi l e they al so i nvol ved property, prom-
i sed substanti al l y to extend judi ci al supervi si on of the reasonabl e-
ness of l egi sl ati on. Thi s promi se was not real i zed, but l ater cases
brought forth an aval anche of exposi ti on. I n Meyer v. Nebraska,
182
the Court struck down a state l aw forbi ddi ng the teachi ng i n any
school i n the State, publ i c or pri vate, of any modern forei gn l an-
guage, other than Engl i sh, to any chi l d who had not successful l y
fi ni shed the ei ghth grade; i n Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
183
i t de-
cl ared unconsti tuti onal a state l aw whi ch requi red publ i c school
educati on of chi l dren aged ei ght to si xteen. Both cases i nvol ved, as
noted, property ri ghts whi ch the Court asserted were protected; the
statute i n Meyer i nterfered wi th the occupati on of a teacher of Ger-
man who had been convi cted of teachi ng that l anguage, whi l e the
pri vate school pl ai nti ffs i n Pierce were threatened wi th destructi on
of thei r busi nesses and the val ues of thei r properti es.
184
Yet i n
both cases the Court al so permi tted these persons adversel y af-
fected i n thei r property i nterests to represent the i nterests of par-
ents and chi l dren i n the asserti on of other aspects of l i berty of
whi ch they coul d not be deni ed.
Wi thout doubt, Justi ce McReynol ds sai d, l i berty denotes not
merel y freedom from bodi l y restrai nt but al so the ri ght of the i ndi -
vi dual to contract, to engage i n any of the common occupati ons of
l i fe, to acqui re useful knowl edge, to marry, establ i sh a home and
bri ng up chi l dren, to worshi p God accordi ng to the di ctates of hi s
1667
185
262 U.S. at 399.
186
I d. at 400.
187
268 U.S. at 53435.
188
E.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Zucht v. Ki ng, 260 U.S.
174 (1922) (compul sory vacci nati on); Buck v. Bel l , 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (sexual steri -
l i zati on of i nmates of state i nsti tuti ons found to be affl i cted wi th heredi tary forms
of i nsani ty or i mbeci l i ty); Mi nnesota v. Probate Court ex rel . Pearson, 309 U.S. 270
(1940) (i nsti tuti onal i zati on of habi tual sexual offenders as psychopathi c personal -
i ti es).
189
See also Ski nner v. Okl ahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (marri age and
procreati on are among the basi c ci vi l ri ghts of man); Pri nce v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (care and nurture of chi l dren by the fami l y are wi thi n the pri -
vate real m of fami l y l i fe whi ch the state cannot enter).
190
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
191
I ndeed, i n Gri swol d v. Connecti cut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965), Justi ce Dougl as
rei nterpreted Meyer and Pierce as havi ng been based on the Fi rst Amendment. Note
that i n Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968), and Ti nker v. Des Moi nes
School Di stri ct, 393 U.S. 503, 50607 (1969), Justi ce Fortas for the Court approv-
i ngl y noted the due process basi s of Meyer and Pierce whi l e deci di ng both cases on
Fi rst Amendment grounds.
192
367 U.S. 497, 522, 53945 (1961). Justi ce Dougl as, al so di ssenti ng, rel i ed on
a due process anal ysi s, whi ch began wi th the texts of the fi rst ei ght Amendments
own consci ence, and general l y to enjoy those pri vi l eges l ong recog-
ni zed at common l aw as essenti al to the orderl y pursui t of happi -
ness by free men.
185
The ri ght of the parents to have thei r chi l -
dren i nstructed i n a forei gn l anguage was wi thi n the l i berty of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment.
186
Meyer was rel i ed on i n Pierce by the
Court i n asserti ng that the statute there unreasonabl y i nterferes
wi th the l i berty of parents and guardi ans to di rect the upbri ngi ng
and educati on of chi l dren under thei r control . . . . The chi l d i s not
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture hi m and di rect
hi s desti ny have the ri ght, coupl ed wi th the hi gh duty, to recogni ze
and prepare hi m for addi ti onal obl i gati ons.
187
Other asserti ons of the l i berty to be free from compul sory state
provi si ons proved unsuccessful ,
188
al though di cta i n these cases
conti nued to broadl y defi ne l i berty.
189
And i n Loving v. Vir-
ginia,
190
a statute prohi bi ti ng i nterraci al marri age was hel d to
deny due process. Marri age was termed one of the basi c ci vi l
ri ghts of man and a fundamental freedom. The freedom to
marry has l ong been recogni zed as one of the vi tal personal ri ghts
essenti al to the orderl y pursui t of happi ness by free men. The cl as-
si fi cati on of marri age ri ghts on a raci al basi s was unsupportabl e.
But the expansi on of the Bi l l of Ri ghts to restri ct state acti on, espe-
ci al l y the rel i gi on and free expressi on provi si ons of the Fi rst
Amendment, afforded the Court an opportuni ty to base certai n de-
ci si ons voi di ng state pol i ci es on these grounds rather than on due
process.
191
I n Poe v. Ullman,
192
Justi ce Harl an advocated the appl i cati on
of a due process standard of reasonabl eness the same standard he
1668
as the basi s of fundamental due process and conti nued i nto the emanati ons from
thi s as al so protected. I d. at 509.
193
We do not si t as a super-l egi sl ature to determi ne the wi sdom, need, and
propri ety of l aws that touch economi c probl ems, busi ness affai rs, or soci al condi -
ti ons. Gri swol d v. Connecti cut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (opi ni on of Court by Jus-
ti ce Dougl as).
194
Supra, pp. 150405.
195
381 U.S. at 499, 502.
196
Ei senstadt v. Bai rd, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), i s the pri nci pal case. See also Stan-
l ey v. I l l i noi s, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
197
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
woul d have appl i ed to test economi c l egi sl ati on to a Connecti cut
statute banni ng the use of contracepti ves, even by marri ed coupl es.
Accordi ng to the Justi ce, due process i s l i mi ted nei ther to proce-
dural guarantees nor restri cted to the ri ghts enumerated i n the
fi rst ei ght Amendments of the Bi l l of Ri ghts, but i s rather a di s-
crete concept whi ch subsi sts as an i ndependent guaranty of l i berty
and procedural fai rness, more general and i ncl usi ve than the spe-
ci fi c prohi bi ti ons. The l i berty protected by the cl ause i s a rati onal
conti nuum whi ch, broadl y speaki ng, i ncl udes a freedom from al l
substanti al arbi trary i mposi ti ons and purposel ess restrai nts . . .
and whi ch al so recogni zes, what a reasonabl e and sensi ti ve judg-
ment must, that certai n i nterests requi re parti cul arl y careful scru-
ti ny of the state needs asserted to justi fy thei r abri dgment. Appl y-
i ng a l engthy anal ysi s, he concl uded that the statute i nfri nged
upon a fundamental l i berty wi thout the showi ng of a justi fi cati on
whi ch woul d support the i ntrusi on. Yet, when the same i ssue re-
turned to the Court, a majori ty of the Justi ces, rejecti ng rel i ance
on substanti ve due process,
193
deci ded i t on the basi s of the stat-
utes i nvasi on of pri vacy, a penumbral ri ght protected by a matri x
of consti tuti onal provi si ons.
194
The anal ysi s, however, approached
the matter i n terms, and i n rel i ance on cases, remi ni scent of sub-
stanti ve due process, al though the separate concurrences of Jus-
ti ces Harl an and Whi te speci fi cal l y based on substanti ve due proc-
ess,
195
i ndi cates that the majori tys posi ti on was at l east defi ni ti on-
al l y di fferent. Subsequent cases, functi onal l y grounded i n equal
protecti on anal ysi s, rel i ed i n great degree upon a vi ew of rati onal -
i ty and reasonabl eness not too di fferent from Justi ce Harl ans di s-
sent i n Poe v. Ullman.
196
The Court remai ns di vi ded over how broadl y to defi ne a l i berty
i nterest. I n Bowers v. Hardwick,
197
for exampl e, the Court major-
i ty found no ri ght to engage i n homosexual sodomy, and rejected
the di ssents suggesti on that focus shoul d i nstead be pl aced on a
ri ght to pri vacy and autonomy i n matters of sexual i nti macy. Si mi -
l ar di sagreement over the appropri ate l evel of general i ty for defi ni -
ti on of a l i berty i nterest was evi dent i n Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
1669
198
491 U.S. 110 (1989). Fi ve Justi ces agreed that a l i berty i nterest was i mpl i -
cated, but the Court rul ed that Cal i forni as procedures for establ i shi ng paterni ty di d
not unconsti tuti onal l y i mpi nge on that i nterest.
199
I d. at 128 n.6.
200
I d. at 142.
201
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). A compani on case was Doe v. Bol ton, 410
U.S. 179 (1973). The opi ni on by Justi ce Bl ackman was concurred i n by Justi ces
Dougl as, Brennan, Stewart, Marshal l , and Powel l , and Chi ef Justi ce Burger. Jus-
ti ces Whi te and Rehnqui st di ssented, i d. at 171, 221, argui ng that the Court shoul d
fol l ow the tradi ti onal due process test of determi ni ng whether a l aw has a rati onal
rel ati on to a val i d state objecti ve and that so judged the statute was val i d. Justi ce
Rehnqui st was wi l l i ng to consi der an absol ute ban on aborti ons even when the
mothers l i fe i s i n jeopardy to be a deni al of due process, i d. at 173, whi l e Justi ce
Whi te l eft the i ssue open. I d. at 223.
i nvol vi ng the ri ghts of an adul terous bi ol ogi cal father to establ i sh
paterni ty and to associ ate wi th hi s chi l d.
198
Justi ce Scal i a, joi ned
onl y by Chi ef Justi ce Rehnqui st i n thi s part of the pl ural i ty deci -
si on, argued for the most speci fi c l evel at whi ch a rel evant tradi -
ti on protecti ng, or denyi ng protecti on to, the asserted ri ght can be
i denti fi ed.
199
Di ssenti ng Justi ce Brennan, joi ned by two others,
rejected the emphasi s on tradi ti on, and argued i nstead that the
Court shoul d ask whether the speci fi c parent-chi l d rel ati onshi p
under consi derati on i s cl ose enough to the i nterests that we al ready
have protected [as] an aspect of l i berty.
200
The resurgence of
substanti ve due process reasoni ng became evi dent upon the Courts
confrontati on wi th cases rai si ng the consti tuti onal i ty of l aws pro-
scri bi ng or l i mi ti ng aborti ons.
Aborti on. Laws l i mi ti ng or prohi bi ti ng aborti ons i n prac-
ti cal l y al l the States, the Di stri ct of Col umbi a, and the terri tori es
were i nval i dated by a rul i ng recogni zi ng a ri ght of personal pri vacy
protected by the due process cl ause that i ncl uded a qual i fi ed ri ght
of a woman to determi ne whether or not to bear a chi l d. On the
basi s of i ts anal ysi s of the competi ng i ndi vi dual ri ghts and state i n-
terests, the Court i n Roe v. Wade
201
di scerned a three-stage bal -
anci ng of ri ghts and i nterests extendi ng over the ful l ni ne-month
term of pregnancy.
(a) For the stage pri or to approxi matel y the end of the fi rst
tri mester, the aborti on deci si on and i ts effectuati on must be l eft to
the medi cal judgment of the pregnant womans attendi ng physi -
ci an.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approxi matel y the end of the
fi rst tri mester, the State, i n promoti ng i ts i nterest i n the heal th of
the mother, may, i f i t chooses, regul ate the aborti on procedure i n
ways that are reasonabl y rel ated to maternal heal th.
(c) For the stage subsequent to vi abi l i ty, the State i n promot-
i ng i ts i nterest i n the potenti al i ty of human l i fe may, i f i t chooses,
1670
202
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 16465 (1973).
203
I d. at 12947.
204
I d. at 15659.
205
I d. at 15253.
206
I d.
207
I d. at 152, 15556. The compel l i ng state i nterest test i n equal protecti on
cases i s revi ewed i nfra, pp. 180914.
208
410 U.S. at 14752, 15963.
regul ate, and even proscri be, aborti on except where i t i s necessary,
i n appropri ate medi cal judgment, for the preservati on of the l i fe or
heal th of the mother.
202
A l engthy hi story of the medi cal and l egal vi ews of aborti on ap-
parentl y convi nced the Court that the prohi bi ti on of aborti on
l acked the sol i d foundati on necessary to preserve such prohi bi ti ons
from consti tuti onal revi ew.
203
Si mi l arl y, a revi ew of the concept of
person as protected i n the due process cl ause and i n other provi -
si ons of the Consti tuti on establ i shed to the Courts sati sfacti on that
the word person di d not i ncl ude the unborn, and therefore that
the unborn l acked federal consti tuti onal protecti on.
204
Wi thout
treati ng the questi on i n more than summary fashi on, the Court an-
nounced that a ri ght of personal pri vacy, or a guarantee of certai n
areas or zones of pri vacy, does exi st i n the Consti tuti on and that
i t i s founded i n the Fourteenth Amendments concept of personal
l i berty and restri cti ons upon state acti on.
205
Thi s ri ght of pri vacy
. . . i s broad enough to encompass a womans deci si on whether or
not to termi nate her pregnancy.
206
Moreover, thi s ri ght of pri vacy
i s fundamental and, drawi ng upon the stri ct standard of revi ew
i n equal protecti on l i ti gati on, the Court hel d that the due process
cl ause requi red that the regul ati ons l i mi ti ng thi s fundamental
ri ght may be justi fi ed onl y by a compel l i ng state i nterest and
must be narrowl y drawn to express onl y the l egi ti mate state i nter-
ests at stake.
207
Assessi ng the possi bl e i nterests of the States, the
Court rejected as unsupported i n the record and i l l -served by the
l aws i n questi on justi fi cati ons rel ati ng to the promoti on of moral i ty
and the protecti on of women from the medi cal hazards of aborti ons.
The state i nterest i n protecti ng the l i fe of the fetus was hel d to be
l i mi ted by the l ack of a soci al consensus wi th regard to the i ssue
when l i fe begi ns. Two val i d state i nterests were recogni zed, how-
ever. [T]he State does have an i mportant and l egi ti mate i nterest
i n preservi ng and protecti ng the heal th of the pregnant woman . . .
[and] i t has sti l l another i mportant and l egi ti mate i nterest i n pro-
tecti ng the potenti al i ty of human l i fe. These i nterests are separate
and di sti nct. Each grows i n substanti al i ty as the woman ap-
proaches term and, at a poi nt duri ng pregnancy, each becomes
compel l i ng.
208
1671
209
I d. at 163.
210
I d.
211
I d. at 163164. A fetus becomes vi abl e when i t i s potenti al l y abl e to l i ve
outsi de the mothers womb, al bei t wi th arti fi ci al ai d. Vi abi l i ty i s usual l y pl aced at
about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earl i er, even at 24 weeks. I d. at 160
(footnotes omi tted).
212
Doe v. Bol ton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
213
I d. at 192200.
214
I d. at 200. The cl ause i s Arti cl e I V, 2. See supra, pp. 86777.
Thi s approach l ed to the three-stage concept quoted above. Be-
cause medi cal data i ndi cated that aborti on pri or to the end of the
fi rst tri mester i s rel ati vel y safe, the mortal i ty rate bei ng l ower
than the rates for normal chi l dbi rth, and because the fetus has no
capabi l i ty of meani ngful l i fe outsi de the mothers womb, the State
has no compel l i ng i nterest i n the fi rst tri mester and the attend-
i ng physi ci an, i n consul tati on wi th hi s pati ent, i s free to determi ne,
wi thout regul ati on by the State, that, i n hi s medi cal judgment, the
pati ents pregnancy shoul d be termi nated.
209
I n the i ntermedi ate
tri mester, the danger to the woman i ncreases and the State may
therefore regul ate the aborti on procedure to the extent that the
regul ati on reasonabl y rel ates to the preservati on and protecti on of
maternal heal th, but the fetus i s sti l l not abl e to survi ve outsi de
the womb, and consequentl y the actual deci si on to have an aborti on
cannot be otherwi se i mpeded.
210
Wi th respect to the States i m-
portant and l egi ti mate i nterest i n potenti al l i fe, the compel l i ng
poi nt i s at vi abi l i ty. Thi s i s so because the fetus then presumabl y
has the capabi l i ty of meani ngful l i fe outsi de the mothers womb.
State regul ati on protecti ve of fetal l i fe after vi abi l i ty thus has both
l ogi cal and bi ol ogi cal justi fi cati ons. I f the State i s i nterested i n pro-
tecti ng fetal l i fe after vi abi l i ty, i t may go so far as to proscri be
aborti on duri ng that peri od, except when i t i s necessary to preserve
the l i fe or heal th of the mother.
211
I n a compani on case, the Court struck down three procedural
provi si ons of a permi ssi ve state aborti on statute.
212
These requi red
that the aborti on be performed i n a hospi tal accredi ted by a pri vate
accredi ti ng organi zati on, that the operati on be approved by the
hospi tal staff aborti on commi ttee, and that the performi ng physi -
ci ans judgment be confi rmed by the i ndependent exami nati on of
the pati ent by two other l i censed physi ci ans. These provi si ons were
hel d not to be justi fi ed by the States i nterest i n maternal heal th
because they were not reasonabl y rel ated to that i nterest.
213
And
a resi dency provi si on was struck down as vi ol ati ng the pri vi l eges
and i mmuni ti es cl ause.
214
But a cl ause maki ng the performance of
an aborti on a cri me except when i t i s based upon the doctors best
cl i ni cal judgment that an aborti on i s necessary was uphel d agai nst
vagueness attack and was further hel d to benefi t women seeki ng
1672
215
410 U.S. at 19192. [T]he medi cal judgment may be exerci sed i n the l i ght
of al l factors physi cal , emoti onal , psychol ogi cal , fami l i al , and the womans age rel -
evant to the wel l -bei ng of the pati ent. Al l these factors may rel ate to heal th. I d.
at 192. Presumabl y thi s di scussi on appl i es to the Courts rul i ng i n Roe hol di ng that
even i n the thi rd tri mester the woman may not be forbi dden to have an aborti on
i f i t i s necessary to preserve her heal th as wel l as her l i fe, 410 U.S. at 16364, a
hol di ng whi ch i s unel aborated i n the opi ni on. See also Uni ted States v. Vui tch, 402
U.S. 62 (1971).
216
Pl anned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See also Bel l otti v.
Bai rd, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (parental consent to mi nors aborti on); Col autti v. Frank-
l i n, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (i mposi ti on on doctor determi nati on of vi abi l i ty of fetus and
obl i gati on to take l i fe-savi ng steps); Si ngl eton v. Wul ff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (stand-
i ng of doctors to l i ti gate ri ght of pati ents to Medi cai d-fi nanced aborti ons); Bi gel ow
v. Vi rgi ni a, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (ban on newspaper ads for aborti ons); Connecti cut
v. Meni l l o, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) (state ban on performance of aborti on by any person
may consti tuti onal l y be appl i ed to prosecute nonphysi ci ans performi ng aborti ons).
217
Pl anned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 6772 (1976). The Court rec-
ogni zed the husbands i nterests and the state i nterest i n promoti ng mari tal har-
mony. But the l atter was deemed not served by the requi rement, and, si nce when
the spouses di sagree on the aborti on deci si on one has to prevai l , the Court thought
the person who bears the chi l d and who i s the more di rectl y affected shoul d be the
one to prevai l . Justi ces Whi te and Rehnqui st and Chi ef Justi ce Burger di ssented.
I d. at 92.
218
I d. at 7275. Mi nors have ri ghts protected by the Consti tuti on, but the
States have broader authori ty to regul ate thei r acti vi ti es than those of adul ts. Here,
the Court percei ved no state i nterest served by the requi rement that overcomes the
womans ri ght to make her own deci si on; i t emphasi zed that i t was not hol di ng that
every mi nor, regardl ess of age or maturi ty, coul d gi ve effecti ve consent for an abor-
ti on. Justi ce Stevens joi ned the other di ssenters on thi s part of the hol di ng. I d. at
101. I n Bel l otti v. Bai rd, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), ei ght Justi ces agreed that a parental
consent l aw, appl i ed to a mature mi nor, found to be capabl e of maki ng, and havi ng
made, an i nformed and reasonabl e deci si on to have an aborti on, was voi d but spl i t
on the reasoni ng. Four Justi ces woul d hol d that nei ther parents nor a court coul d
be gi ven an absol ute veto over a mature mi nors deci si on, whi l e four others woul d
hol d that i f parental consent i s requi red the State must afford an expedi ti ous access
to court to revi ew the parental determi nati on and set i t asi de i n appropri ate cases.
I n H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), the Court uphel d, as appl i ed to an
unemanci pated mi nor l i vi ng at home and dependent on her parents, a statute re-
qui ri ng a physi ci an, i f possi bl e, to noti fy the parents or guardi ans of a mi nor seek-
i ng an aborti on. The deci si ons l eave open a vari ety of questi ons, addressed by some
concurri ng and di ssenti ng Justi ces, deal i ng wi th when i t woul d not be i n the mi nors
aborti ons i nasmuch as the doctor coul d uti l i ze hi s best cl i ni cal
judgment i n l i ght of al l the attendant ci rcumstances.
215
These deci si ons were reaffi rmed and extended when the Court
was faced wi th a restri cti ve state statute enacted after Roe maki ng
access to aborti ons conti ngent upon spousal or parental consent
and i mposi ng restrai nts upon methods.
216
Stri ki ng down al l the
substanti al l i mi tati ons, the Court hel d (1) that the spousal consent
provi si on was an attempt by the State to del egate a veto power
over the deci si on of the woman and her doctor that the State i tsel f
coul d not exerci se,
217
(2) that no si gni fi cant state i nterests justi fi ed
the i mposi ti on of a bl anket parental consent requi rement as a con-
di ti on of the obtai ni ng of an aborti on by an unmarri ed mi nor dur-
i ng the fi rst 12 weeks of pregnancy,
218
and (3) that a cri mi nal pro-
1673
best i nterest to avoi d noti fyi ng her parents and wi th the al ternati ves to parental
noti fi cati on and consent. I n two 1983 cases the Court appl i ed the Bellotti v. Baird
standard for determi ni ng whether judi ci al substi tutes for parental consent requi re-
ments permi t a pregnant mi nor to demonstrate that she i s suffi ci entl y mature to
make her own deci si on on aborti on. Compare Ci ty of Akron v. Akron Center for Re-
producti ve Heal th, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (no opportuni ty for case-by-case determi na-
ti ons); with Pl anned Parenthood Assn v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (adequate
i ndi vi dual i zed consi derati on).
219
Pl anned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 8184 (1976). A l aw requi ri ng
a doctor, subject to penal sancti on, to determi ne i f a fetus i s vi abl e or may be vi abl e
and to take steps to preserve the l i fe and heal th of vi abl e fetuses was hel d to be
unconsti tuti onal l y vague. Col autti v. Frankl i n, 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
220
Pl anned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 7579 (1976).
221
Ci ty of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproducti ve Heal th, 462 U.S. 416, 438
(1983); Accord, Pl anned Parenthood Assn v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983). The
Court i n Akron rel i ed on evi dence that di l ati on and evacuati on (D&E) aborti ons
performed i n cl i ni cs cost l ess than hal f as much as hospi tal aborti ons, and that com-
mon use of the D&E procedure had i ncreased dramati cal l y the safety of second
tri mester aborti ons i n the 10 years si nce Roe v. Wade. 462 U.S. at 43536.
222
Si mopoul os v. Vi rgi ni a, 462 U.S. 506, 516 (1983).
223
45 (1983); Thornburgh v. Ameri can Col l ege of Obstetri ci ans and Gynecol ogi sts, 476
U.S. 747 (1986).
vi si on requi ri ng the attendi ng physi ci an to exerci se al l care and
di l i gence to preserve the l i fe and heal th of the fetus wi thout regard
to the stage of vi abi l i ty was i nconsi stent wi th Roe.
219
Sustai ned
were provi si ons that requi red the womans wri tten consent to an
aborti on wi th assurances that i t i s i nformed and freel y gi ven, and
provi si ons mandati ng reporti ng and recordkeepi ng for publ i c heal th
purposes wi th adequate assurances of confi denti al i ty. A provi si on
that barred the use of the most commonl y used method of aborti on
after the fi rst 12 weeks of pregnancy was decl ared unconsti tuti onal
si nce i n the absence of another comparabl y safe techni que i t di d
not qual i fy as a reasonbl e protecti on of maternal heal th and i t i n-
stead operated to deny the vast majori ty of aborti ons after the fi rst
12 weeks.
220
I n other rul i ngs appl yi ng Roe, the Court struck down some re-
qui rements and uphel d others. A requi rement that al l aborti ons
performed after the fi rst tri mester be performed i n a hospi tal was
i nval i dated as i mposi ng a heavy, and unnecessary, burden on
womens access to a rel ati vel y i nexpensi ve, otherwi se accessi bl e,
and [at l east duri ng the fi rst few weeks of the second tri mester]
safe aborti on procedure.
221
A state may, however, requi re that
aborti ons be performed i n hospi tal s or l i censed outpati ent cl i ni cs,
as l ong as l i censi ng standards do not depart from accepted medi cal
practi ce.
222
Vari ous i nformed consent requi rements were struck
down as i ntrudi ng upon the di screti on of the physi ci an, and as
bei ng ai med at di scouragi ng aborti ons rather than at i nformi ng the
pregnant womans deci si on;
223
whi l e the state has a l egi ti mate i n-
1674
224
Ci ty of Akron, 462 U.S. 416, 44849 (1983).
225
51 (1983). But see Hodgson v. Mi nnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (uphol di ng a 48-hour
wai ti ng peri od fol l owi ng noti fi cati on of parents by a mi nor).
226
Pl anned Parenthood Assn v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 48690 (1983).
227
I d. at 48286, 505.
228
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harri s v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
See also Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (states are not requi red by federal l aw
to fund aborti ons); Harri s v. McRae, supra, at 30611 (same). The state restri cti on
i n Maher supra at 466, appl i ed to nontheraputi c aborti ons, whereas the federal l aw
barred fundi ng for most medi cal l y necessary aborti ons as wel l , a di sti ncti on the
Court deemed i rrel evant, Harris, at supra, 323, al though i t provi ded Justi ce Stevens
wi th the basi s for reachi ng di fferent resul ts. I d. at 349 (di ssenti ng).
229
Maher, 432 U.S. at 469 & n.5; Harri s, 448 U.S. at 31218.
terest i n ensuri ng that the womans consent i s i nformed, the Court
expl ai ned, i t may not demand of the physi ci an a reci tati on of an
i nfl exi bl e l i st of i nformati on unrel ated to the parti cul ar pati ents
heal th, and, for that matter, may not demand that the physi ci an
rather than some other qual i fi ed person render the counsel i ng.
224
The Court al so i nval i dated a 24-hour wai ti ng peri od fol l owi ng a
womans wri tten, i nformed consent.
225
On the other hand, the
Court uphel d a requi rement that ti ssue removed i n cl i ni c aborti ons
be submi tted to a pathol ogi st for exami nati on, si nce the same re-
qui rements were i mposed for i n-hospi tal aborti ons and for al most
al l other i n-hospi tal surgery.
226
Al so, the Court uphel d a requi re-
ment that a second physi ci an be present at aborti ons performed
after vi abi l i ty i n order to assi st i n savi ng the l i fe of the fetus.
227
The Court refused to extend Roe to the area of publ i c fundi ng
to pay for aborti ons for the pregnant i ndi gent, hol di ng that nei ther
due process nor equal protecti on requi res government to use publ i c
funds for thi s purpose.
228
Due process, the Court hel d, does not ob-
l i gate the States to pay the pregnancy-rel ated medi cal expenses of
i ndi gent women, even though both aborti on and the ri ght to bear
the chi l d to bi rth are fundamental ri ghts.
229
But the more cri ti cal
questi on was the equal protecti on restrai nt i mposed when govern-
ment does provi de publ i c funds for medi cal care to i ndi gents; may
i t accord di fferenti al treatment to aborti on and chi l dbi rth and pre-
fer the l atter? The States may do so, the Court conti nued, because
i t i s rati onal l y rel ated to a l awful purpose to encourage normal
chi l dbi rth. The use of the rati onal basi s test requi red a rejecti on of
the compel l i ng state i nterest test i n the fol l owi ng manner. Fi rst,
the more severe test was not acti vated by a cl assi fi cati on i mpacti ng
on a suspect cl ass, nei ther weal th nor i ndi gency bei ng such a cl ass.
Second, and most si gni fi cant for aborti on adjudi cati on, the Court
hel d that state refusal to pay for aborti ons di d not i mpi nge upon
a fundamental ri ght. Pri or state restri cti ons whi ch had been i nval i -
dated, the Court conti nued, had created absol ute obstacl es to the
1675
230
Maher, 432 U.S. at 46974 (the quoted sentence i s at 474); Harri s, 448 U.S.
at 32126. Justi ces Brennan, Marshal l , and Bl ackmun di ssented i n both cases and
Justi ce Stevens joi ned them i n Harris.
231
Poel ker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
232
20 (1983). I n refusi ng to overrul e Roe v. Wade, the Court merel y ci ted the pri nci pl e
of stare decisis. Justi ce Powel l s opi ni on of the Court was joi ned by Chi ef Justi ce
Burger, and by Justi ces Brennan, Marshal l , Bl ackmun, and Stevens. Justi ce OCon-
nor, joi ned by Justi ces Whi te and Rehnqui st, di ssented, voi ci ng di sagreement wi th
the tri mester approach and suggesti ng i nstead that throughout pregnancy the test
shoul d be the same: whether state regul ati on consti tutes undul y burdensome i nter-
ference wi th [a womans] freedom to deci de whether to termi nate her pregnancy.
462 U.S. at 452, 461. I n the 1986 case of Thornburgh v. Ameri can Col l ege of Obste-
tri ci ans and Gynecol ogi sts, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), Justi ce Whi te, joi ned by Justi ce
Rehnqui st, advocated overrul i ng of Roe v. Wade, Chi ef Justi ce Burger thought Roe
v. Wade had been extended to the poi nt where i t shoul d be reexami ned, and Justi ce
OConnor repeated mi sgi vi ngs expressed i n her Akron di ssent.
233
492 U.S. 490 (1989).
obtai ni ng of an aborti on. Whi l e a state-created obstacl e need not be
absol ute to be i mpermi ssi bl e, i t must at a mi ni mum undul y bur-
den the ri ght to termi nate a pregnancy. To al l ocate publ i c funds
so as to further a state i nterest i n normal chi l dbi rth does not cre-
ate an absol ute obstacl e to obtai ni ng an aborti on nor does i t undul y
burden the ri ght. The condi ti on i ndi gency that i s the barri er to
getti ng an aborti on was not created by government nor does the
State add to the burden that exi sts al ready. An i ndi gent woman
who desi res an aborti on suffers no di sadvantage as a consequence
of Connecti cuts deci si on to fund chi l dbi rth; she conti nues as before
to be dependent on pri vate sources for the servi ces she desi res. The
State may have made chi l dbi rth a more attracti ve al ternati ve,
thereby i nfl uenci ng the womans deci si on, but i t has i mposed no re-
stri cti on on access to aborti ons that was not al ready there.
230
Ap-
pl yi ng the same pri nci pl es, the Court hel d that a muni ci pal hos-
pi tal coul d consti tuti onal l y provi de hospi tal servi ces for i ndi gent
women for chi l dbi rth but deny servi ces for aborti on.
231
I n 1983 the Court expressl y reaffi rmed Roe v. Wade,
232
and
conti nued to appl y i ts pri nci pl es to a vari ety of state statutes at-
tempti ng to regul ate the ci rcumstances of aborti ons. The Courts
1989 deci si on i n Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
233
how-
ever, si gnal l ed a break wi th the past even though Roe v. Wade was
not overrul ed.
Webster uphel d two aspects of Mi ssouri s statute regul ati ng
aborti ons: a prohi bi ti on on the use of publ i c faci l i ti es and empl oy-
ees to perform aborti ons not necessary to save the l i fe of the moth-
er; and a requi rement that a physi ci an, before performi ng an abor-
ti on on a fetus she has reason to bel i eve has reached a gestati onal
1676
234
The Court decl i ned to rul e on several other aspects of Mi ssouri s l aw, i ncl ud-
i ng a preambl e stati ng that l i fe begi ns at concepti on, and a prohi bi ti on on the use
of publ i c funds to encourage or counsel a woman to have a nontherapeuti c aborti on.
235
Ohi o v. Akron Center for Reproducti ve Heal th, 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
236
Hodgson v. Mi nnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
237
492 U.S. at 51920. Di ssenti ng Justi ce Bl ackmun, joi ned by Justi ces Bren-
nan and Marshal l , argued that thi s permi ssi bl y furthers standard compl etel y di s-
regards the i rreduci bl e mi ni mum of Roe . . . that a woman has a l i mi ted fundamen-
tal consti tuti onal ri ght to deci de whether to termi nate a pregnancy, and i nstead
bal ances a l ead wei ght (the States i nterest i n fetal l i fe) agai nst a feather (a
womans l i berty i nterest). I d. at 555, 556 n.11.
238
497 U.S. at 450.
239
492 U.S. at 521. Concurri ng Justi ce OConnor agreed that no deci si on of
thi s Court has hel d that the State may not di rectl y promote i ts i nterest i n potenti al
l i fe when vi abi l i ty i s possi bl e. I d. at 528.
age of 20 weeks, make an actual vi abi l i ty determi nati on.
234
I n two
1990 cases the Court then uphel d parental noti fi cati on requi re-
ments. Ohi os requi rement that one parent be noti fi ed of a mi nors
i ntent to obtai n an aborti on, or that the mi nor use a judi ci al bypass
procedure to obtai n the approval of a juveni l e court, was ap-
proved.
235
And, whi l e the Court rul ed that Mi nnesotas requi re-
ment that both parents be noti fi ed was i nval i d standi ng al one, the
statute was saved by a judi ci al bypass al ternati ve.
236
The Webster Court was spl i t i n i ts approach to Mi ssouri s vi a-
bi l i ty determi nati on requi rement, and i n i ts approach to Roe v.
Wade. The pl ural i ty opi ni on by Chi ef Justi ce Rehnqui st, joi ned i n
that part by Justi ces Whi te and Kennedy, was hi ghl y cri ti cal of
Roe, but found no occasi on to overrul e i t. I nstead, the pl ural i tys
approach woul d water down Roe by appl yi ng a l ess stri ngent stand-
ard of revi ew. The vi abi l i ty testi ng requi rement i s val i d, the pl ural -
i ty contended, because i t permi ssi bl y furthers the States i nterest
i n protecti ng potenti al human l i fe.
237
Justi ce OConnor concurred
i n the resul t because i n her vi ew the requi rement di d not i mpose
an undue burden on a womans ri ght to an aborti on, and Justi ce
Scal i a concurred i n the resul t whi l e urgi ng that Roe be overrul ed
outri ght. That Webster may have changed the focus of debate was
i l l ustrated by the Courts approach to the parental noti fi cati on
i ssue. A Court majori ty i n Hodgson i nval i dated Mi nnesotas al ter-
nati ve procedure requi ri ng noti fi cati on of both parents wi thout ju-
di ci al bypass, not because i t burdened a fundamental ri ght, but be-
cause i t di d not reasonabl y further any l egi ti mate state i nter-
est.
238
Roe was not confronted more di rectl y i n Webster because the
vi abi l i ty testi ng requi rement, as characteri zed by the pl ural i ty,
merel y asserted a state i nterest i n protecti ng potenti al human l i fe
from the poi nt of vi abi l i ty, and hence di d not chal l enge Roes tri -
mester framework.
239
Nonethel ess, a majori ty of Justi ces appeared
1677
240
I d. at 519.
241
I d. at 529. Previ ousl y, di ssenti ng i n Ci ty of Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ducti ve Heal th, 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983), Justi ce OConnor had suggested that the
Roe tri mester framework i s cl earl y on a col l i si on course wi th i tsel f. As the medi cal
ri sks of vari ous aborti on procedures decrease, the poi nt at whi ch the State may reg-
ul ate for reasons of maternal heal th i s moved further forward to actual chi l dbi rth.
As medi cal sci ence becomes better abl e to provi de for the separate exi stence of the
fetus, the poi nt of vi abi l i ty i s moved further back toward concepti on.
242
112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992).
243
I d. at 2811.
ready to reject a stri ct tri mester approach. The pl ural i ty asserted
a compel l i ng state i nterest i n protecti ng human l i fe throughout
pregnancy, rejecti ng the noti on that the state i nterest shoul d come
i nto exi stence onl y at the poi nt of vi abi l i ty;
240
Justi ce OConnor
repeated her vi ew that the tri mester approach i s probl emati c;
241
and, as menti oned, Justi ce Scal i a woul d do away wi th Roe al to-
gether.
Three years l ater the Court, i nvoki ng pri nci pl es of stare deci-
sis, reaffi rmed Roes essenti al hol di ng, but restated that hol di ng
i n terms of undue burden and al so abandoned Roes rel i ance on the
tri mester approach. Roes essenti al hol di ng, sai d the Court i n
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
242
has
three parts. Fi rst i s a recogni ti on of the ri ght of a woman to
choose to have an aborti on before vi abi l i ty and to obtai n i t wi thout
undue i nterference from the State. Before vi abi l i ty, the States i n-
terests are not strong enough to support a prohi bi ti on of aborti on
or the i mposi ti on of a substanti al obstacl e to the womans effecti ve
ri ght to el ect the procedure. Second i s a confi rmati on of the States
power to restri ct aborti ons after fetal vi abi l i ty, i f the l aw contai ns
excepti ons for pregnanci es whi ch endanger a womans l i fe or
heal th. And thi rd i s the pri nci pl e that the State has l egi ti mate i n-
terests from the outset of the pregnancy i n protecti ng the heal th
of the woman and the l i fe of the fetus that may become a chi l d.
Thi s restatement of Roes essenti al s, recogni zi ng a l egi ti mate
state i nterest i n protecti ng fetal l i fe throughout pregnancy, nec-
essari l y el i mi nated the ri gi d tri mester anal ysi s permi tti ng al most
no regul ati on i n the fi rst tri mester. Vi abi l i ty sti l l marked the ear-
l i est poi nt at whi ch the States i nterest i n fetal l i fe i s consti tu-
ti onal l y adequate to justi fy a l egi sl ati ve ban on nontherapeuti c
aborti ons,
243
but l ess burdensome regul ati ons coul d be appl i ed be-
fore vi abi l i ty. What i s at stake, the three-Justi ce pl ural i ty as-
serted, i s the womans ri ght to make the ul ti mate deci si on, not a
ri ght to be i nsul ated from al l others i n doi ng so. Regul ati ons whi ch
do no more than create a structural mechani sm by whi ch the State
. . . may express profound respect for the l i fe of the unborn are
permi tted, i f they are not a substanti al obstacl e to the womans ex-
1678
244
I d. at 2821.
245
I d. at 2844.
246
Ci ty of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproducti ve Heal th, 462 U.S. 416 (1983)
(i nval i dati ng i nformed consent and 24-hour wai ti ng peri od); Thornburgh v. Amer-
i can Col l ege of Obstetri ci ans and Gynecol ogi sts, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (i nval i dati ng
i nformed consent requi rement).
erci se of the ri ght to choose. Thus, unl ess an undue burden i s i m-
posed, states may adopt measures desi gned to persuade [a woman]
to choose chi l dbi rth over aborti on.
244
Appl i cati on of these pri nci pl es l ed the Court to uphol d several
aspects of Pennsl yvani as aborti on control l aw, i n the process over-
rul i ng precedent, but to i nval i date what was arguabl y the most re-
stri cti ve provi si on. Four chal l enged provi si ons of the l aw were
uphel d: a defi ni ti on of medi cal emergency control l i ng exempti ons
from the Acts other l i mi tati ons; recordkeepi ng and reporti ng re-
qui rements i mposed on faci l i ti es that perform aborti ons; an i n-
formed consent and 24-hour wai ti ng peri od requi rement; and a pa-
rental consent requi rment, wi th possi bi l i ty for judi ci al bypass, ap-
pl i cabl e to mi nors. I nval i dated as an undue burden on a womans
ri ght to an aborti on was a spousal noti fi cati on requi rement.
I t was a new al i gnment of Justi ces that restated and preserved
Roe. Joi ni ng Justi ce OConnor i n a joi ntl y authored opi ni on adopt-
i ng and appl yi ng Justi ce OConnors undue burden anal ysi s were
Justi ces Kennedy and Souter. Justi ces Bl ackmun and Stevens
joi ned parts of the pl ural i ty opi ni on, but di ssented from other
parts. Justi ce Stevens woul d not have abandoned tri mester anal y-
si s, and woul d have i nval i dated the 24-hour wai ti ng peri od and as-
pects of the i nformed consent requi rement. Justi ce Bl ackmun, au-
thor of the Courts opi ni on i n Roe, asserted that the ri ght to repro-
ducti ve choi ce i s enti tl ed to the ful l protecti on afforded by thi s
Court before Webster,
245
and woul d have i nval i dated al l of the
chal l enged provi si ons. Chi ef Justi ce Rehnqui st, joi ned by Justi ces
Whi te, Scal i a, and Thomas, woul d have overrul ed Roe and uphel d
al l chal l enged aspects of the Pennsyl vani a l aw.
Overrul ed i n Casey were earl i er deci si ons that had struck
down i nformed consent and 24-hour wai ti ng peri ods.
246
Gi ven the
states l egi ti mate i nterests i n protecti ng the l i fe of the unborn and
the heal th of the potenti al mother, and appl yi ng undue burden
anal ysi s, the three-Justi ce pl ural i ty found these requi rements per-
mi ssi bl e. Requi ri ng i nformed consent for medi cal procedures i s both
commonpl ace and reasonabl e, and, i n the absence of any evi dence
of burden, the state coul d requi re that i nformati on rel evant to i n-
formed consent be provi ded by a physi ci an rather than an assi st-
ant. The 24-hour wai ti ng peri od was approved both i n theory (i t
1679
247
112 S. Ct. at 2835.
248
The pl ural i ty Justi ces were joi ned i n thi s part of thei r opi ni on by Justi ces
Bl ackmun and Stevens.
249
I d. at 2831.
250
E.g., the Fourth Amendment.
251
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
bei ng reasonabl e to assume that i mportant deci si ons wi l l be more
i nformed and del i berate i f they fol l ow some peri od of refl ecti on)
and i n practi ce (i n spi te of troubl i ng fi ndi ngs of i ncreased bur-
dens on poorer women who must travel si gni fi cant di stances to ob-
tai n aborti ons, and on al l women who must twi ce rather than once
brave harassment by anti -aborti on protesters).
247
The Court al so
uphel d appl i cati on of an addi ti onal requi rement that women under
age 18 obtai n the consent of one parent or avai l themsel ves of a
judi ci al bypass al ternati ve.
248
di sti ngui shed Pennsyl vani as
spousal noti fi cati on provi si on as consti tuti ng an undue burden on
a womans ri ght to choose an aborti on. A State may not gi ve to
a man the ki nd of domi ni on over hi s wi fe that parents exerci se over
thei r chi l dren (and that men exerci sed over thei r wi ves at common
l aw).
249
Al though there was an excepti on for a woman who be-
l i eved that noti fyi ng her husband woul d subject her to bodi l y i n-
jury, thi s excepti on was not broad enough to cover other forms of
abusi ve retal i ati on, e.g., psychol ogi cal i nti mi dati on, bodi l y harm to
chi l dren, or fi nanci al depri vati on. To requi re a wi fe to noti fy her
husband i n spi te of her fear of such abuse woul d undul y burden
the wi fes l i berty i nterest as an i ndi vi dual to deci de whether to
bear a chi l d.
Pri vacy: I ts Consti tuti onal Di mensi ons. Roe v. Wade and
i ts progeny coul d have had si gni fi cant effect outsi de the aborti on
area i n the general area of personal l i berti es, i nasmuch as the revi -
tal i zati on of substanti ve due process i n the noneconomi c regul ati on
area, overl ai d wi th the compel l i ng state i nterest test, coul d cal l i nto
questi on many governmental restrai nts upon the person. Roes em-
phasi s upon the pri vacy rati onal e seemed to presage an acti ve judi -
ci al rol e i n defi ni ng and protecti ng the i nterests of persons to be
l et al one. Those devel opments have not occurred, however, and the
cases refl ect the i ntenti on of the Court to curb the expansi on of any
doctri nal rami fi cati ons fl owi ng beyond the aborti on cases.
Pri vacy has i n a number of cases been i denti fi ed as a core
val ue of the Bi l l of Ri ghts,
250
but i t was not unti l Griswold v. Con-
necticut
251
that an i ndependent ri ght of pri vacy, deri ved from the
confl uence of several provi si ons of the Bi l l of Ri ghts or di scovered
i n the penumbras of these provi si ons, was expounded by the
1680
252
I n Ei senstadt v. Bai rd, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the court had decl i ned to extend
the Griswold pri nci pl e to the unmarri ed on pri vacy grounds, rel yi ng on an equal
protecti on anal ysi s i nstead.
253
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). See i d. at 16771 (Justi ce Stewart
concurri ng). Justi ce Dougl as conti nued to deny that substanti ve due process i s the
basi s of the deci si ons. Doe v. Bol ton, 410 U.S. 179, 209, 212 n.4 (1973) (concurri ng).
254
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
255
Pari s Adul t Theatre v. Sl aton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1973).
Court and actual l y used to stri ke down a governmental restrai nt.
The aborti on cases extended Griswold many degrees i n several re-
spects. Fi rst, the cases removed any l i ngeri ng possi bi l i ty that the
ri ght i s a mari tal one that depends upon that rel ati onshi p.
252
Sec-
ond, the ri ght of pri vacy was denomi nated a l i berty whi ch found i ts
source and i ts protecti on i n the due process cl ause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
253
Thi rd, by desi gnati ng the ri ght as a fun-
damental ri ght, the Court requi red a governmental restrai nt to be
justi fi ed by a compel l i ng state i nterest. Necessary to assessment
of the effect of thi s devel opment i s a cl ose anal ysi s of the l i mi ts of
the ri ght thus protected as wel l as of i ts contents.
The Consti tuti on does not expl i ci tl y menti on any ri ght of pri -
vacy. I n a l i ne of deci si ons, however, . . . the Court has recogni zed
that a ri ght of personal pri vacy, or a guarantee of certai n areas or
zones of pri vacy, does exi st under the Consti tuti on. . . . These deci -
si ons make i t cl ear that onl y personal ri ghts that can be deemed
fundamental or i mpl i ci t i n the concept of ordered l i berty, Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), are i ncl uded i n thi s guar-
antee of personal pri vacy. They al so make i t cl ear that the ri ght
has some extensi on to acti vi ti es rel ati ng to marri age, Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreati on, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 54142 (1942); contracepti on, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. at 45354; i d. at 460, 46365 (Whi te, J., concurri ng i n resul t);
fami l y rel ati onshi ps, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944); and chi l d reari ng and educati on, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, supra.
254
I n the por-
nography cases deci ded l ater i n the same Term, the Court deni ed
the exi stence of any pri vacy ri ght of customers to vi ew unprotected
materi al i n commerci al establ i shments, repeati ng the above de-
scri pti ve l anguage from Roe, and sayi ng further: the consti tu-
ti onal l y protected pri vacy of fami l y, marri age, motherhood,
procreati on, and chi l d reari ng i s not just concerned wi th a parti cu-
l ar pl ace, but wi th a protected i nti mate rel ati onshi p. Such pro-
tected pri vacy extends to the doctors offi ce, the hospi tal , the hotel
room, or as otherwi se requi red to safeguard the ri ght to i nti macy
i nvol ved.
255
1681
256
Whal en v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598600 (1977).
257
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
258
E.g., Cal i forni a Bankers Assn v. Schul tz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). See also Lai rd
v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Uni ted States v. Uni ted States Di stri ct Court, 407 U.S.
297 (1972); Uni ted States v. Di oni si o, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Zurcher v. Stanford Dai l y,
436 U.S. 547 (1978).
259
425 U.S. 435 (1976). See also Fi sher v. Uni ted States, 425 U.S. 391, 401
(1976); Paul v. Davi s, 424 U.S. 693, 71213 (1976); Uni ted States v. Bi scegl i a, 420
U.S. 141 (1975).
What i s apparent from the Courts approach i n these cases i s
that i ts concept of pri vacy i s descri pti ve rather than anal yti cal ,
maki ng di ffi cul t an assessment of the potenti al of the doctri ne. Pri -
vacy as a concept appears to encompass at l east two di fferent but
rel ated aspects. Fi rst, i t rel ates to the ri ght or the abi l i ty of i ndi -
vi dual s to determi ne how much and what i nformati on about them-
sel ves i s to be reveal ed to others. Second, i t rel ates to the i dea of
autonomy, the freedom of i ndi vi dual s to perform or not perform
certai n acts or subject themsel ves to certai n experi ences.
256
Gov-
ernmental commands to do or not to do somethi ng may wel l i mpl i -
cate one or the other or both of these aspects, and judi ci al deci si on
about the val i di ty of such governmental commands must nec-
essari l y be i nformed by use of an anal yti cal framework bal anci ng
the governmental i nterests agai nst the i ndi vi dual i nterests i n
mai ntai ni ng freedom i n one or both aspects of pri vacy. That frame-
work cannot now be constructed on the basi s of the Courts deci ded
cases.
Griswold v. Connecticut,
257
voi di ng a state statute proscri bi ng
the use of contracepti ves, seems pri mari l y to be based upon a judi -
ci al concept of pri vacy fl owi ng from the fi rst aspect of pri vacy de-
scri bed above. That i s, the predomi nant concern fl owi ng through
the several opi ni ons i s the threat of forced di scl osure about the pri -
vate and i nti mate l i ves of persons through the pervasi ve survei l -
l ance and i nvesti gati ve efforts that woul d be needed to enforce such
a l aw; moreover, the concern was not l i mi ted to the outward pres-
sures upon the confi nes of such provi si ons as the Fourth Amend-
ments search and sei zure cl ause, but extended to techni ques that
woul d have been wi thi n the range of permi ssi bl e i nvesti gati on.
Subsequent cases, however, have returned to Fourth and Fi fth
Amendment pri nci pl es to regul ate offi ci al i nvasi ons of pri vacy.
258
For exampl e, i n United States v. Miller,
259
the Court eval uated
i n Fourth Amendment terms the ri ght of pri vacy of deposi tors i n
restri cti ng Government access to thei r cancel l ed checks mai ntai ned
by the bank as requi red by the Bank Secrecy Act. The cancel l ed
checks, the Court hel d, were busi ness records of the bank i n whi ch
the deposi tors had no expectati on of pri vacy and therefore no
1682
260
425 U.S. 391 (1976).
261
I d. at 399.
262
I d. at 401.
263
See Buckl ey v. Val eo, 424 U.S. 1, 6082 (1976); Whal en v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
601 n.27, 604 n.32 (1977); Uni ted States v. Mi l l er, 425 U.S. 435, 444 n.6 (1976). The
Court conti nues to reserve the questi on of the [s]peci al probl ems of pri vacy whi ch
mi ght be presented by subpoena of a personal di ary. Fi sher v. Uni ted States, 425
U.S. 391, 401 n.7 (1976).
264
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
Fourth Amendment standi ng to chal l enge government l egal process
di rected to the bank, and thi s status was unchanged by the fact
that the banks kept the records under government mandate i n the
fi rst pl ace. And i n Fisher v. United States,
260
the Court deni ed that
the Fi fth Amendments sel f-i ncri mi nati on cl ause operated i n any
way to prevent the I RS from obtai ni ng by summons i ncome tax
records prepared by accountants and i n the hands of ei ther the tax-
payer or hi s attorney, no matter how i ncri mi nati ng, because the
Amendment onl y protects agai nst compel l ed testi moni al sel f-i n-
cri mi nati on. [T]he Court has never suggested that every i nvasi on
of pri vacy vi ol ates the pri vi l ege. Wi thi n the l i mi ts i mposed by the
l anguage of the Fi fth Amendment, whi ch we necessari l y observe,
the pri vi l ege trul y serves pri vacy i nterests; but the Court has never
on any ground, personal pri vacy i ncl uded, appl i ed the Fi fth Amend-
ment to prevent the otherwi se proper acqui si ti on or use of evi dence
whi ch, i n the Courts vi ew, di d not i nvol ve compel l ed testi moni al
sel f-i ncri mi nati on of some sort.
261
Further, [w]e cannot cut the
Fi fth Amendment compl etel y l oose from the moori ngs of i ts l an-
guage, and make i t serve as a general protector of pri vacy a word
not menti oned i n i ts text and a concept di rectl y addressed i n the
Fourth Amendment.
262
The Fi rst Amendment i tsel f affords some
l i mi tati on upon governmental acqui si ti on of i nformati on but here
agai n the gravamen i s a vi ol ati on of speech or associ ati on or the
l i ke concomi tant wi th exposure of personal i nformati on, and not ex-
posure i tsel f.
263
A crypti c opi ni on i n Whalen v. Roe
264
may i ndi cate the Courts
wi l l i ngness to recogni ze pri vacy i nterests as i ndependent consti tu-
ti onal ri ghts. At i ssue was a states pervasi ve regul ati on of pre-
scri pti on drugs that coul d be abused, and the central i zed record-
keepi ng through computers of al l such prescri pti ons i denti fyi ng the
pati ents. The scheme was attacked on the basi s that i t i nvaded pri -
vacy i nterests agai nst di scl osure and pri vacy i nterests i nvol vi ng
autonomy of persons i n choosi ng whether to have the medi cati on.
The Court appeared to agree that both i nterests are protected, but
because the scheme was surrounded wi th extensi ve securi ty protec-
ti on agai nst di scl osure beyond that necessary to achi eve the pur-
poses of the program i t was not thought to pose a suffi ci entl y
1683
265
I d. at 598604. The Court cauti oned that i t had deci ded nothi ng about the
pri vacy i mpl i cati ons of the accumul ati on and di scl osure of vast amounts of i nforma-
ti on i n data banks. Safeguardi ng such i nformati on from di scl osure arguabl y has i ts
roots i n the Consti tuti on, at l east i n some ci rcumstances, the Court seemed to i n-
di cate. I d. at 605. Compare i d. at 606 (Justi ce Brennan concurri ng). What the
Courts careful ci rcumscri pti on of the pri vacy i ssue through bal anci ng does to the
concept i s uncl ear after Ni xon v. Admi ni strator of General Servi ces, 433 U.S. 425,
45565 (1977), but note the di ssents. I d. at 504, 52536 (Chi ef Justi ce Burger), and
545 n.1 (Justi ce Rehnqui st).
266
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 148 (1972). Addi ti onal l y, i f the purpose of the
statute was to deter i l l i ci t sexual conduct, the l aw was overbroad si nce i t i ncl uded
both unmarri ed and marri ed women. Thi s moral i ty rati onal e al so fel l afoul of
overi ncl usi on and underi ncl usi on i n Ei senstadt v. Bai rd, 405 U.S. 438, 47750
(1972).
267
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
gri evous threat to ei ther i nterest to establ i sh a consti tuti onal vi ol a-
ti on.
265
Not the method of enforcement but the fact of enforcement was
the i ssue i n Roe and Doe. That i s, the power of the State to deny
women al l access to aborti ons, the power to proscri be effectuati on
of the wi l l and desi re of women to termi nate pregnancy, was at
i ssue. Because the Court determi ned that the wi l l and desi re con-
sti tuted a protected l i berty, the State was requi red to justi fy i ts
proscri pti on by a compel l i ng i nterest. Once the questi on of the
personhood of the fetus was resol ved, the Court confronted i n effect
onl y two asserted state i nterests. Protecti ng the heal th of the moth-
er was recogni zed as a val i d i nterest, the Court thereby departi ng
from a laissez faire free wi l l approach to i ndi vi dual autonomy. A
state i nterest i n moral i ty was menti oned by the Court, not because
the State had rai sed i t, but si mpl y to defer deci di ng i t; however,
the noted moral i ty i ssue i nvol ved not the moral i ty of aborti on, but
i nstead the promoti on of sexual moral i ty through maki ng aborti on
unavai l abl e.
266
Stanley v. Georgia,
267
hol di ng that government may not make
pri vate possessi on of obscene materi al s for pri vate use a cri me, ap-
proached a judi ci al recogni ti on of the autonomy aspect of pri vacy.
True i t i s that the possessi on there was i n Stanl eys home, a fact
heavi l y rel i ed on by the Court, but the pol i ce had l awful l y i nvaded
hi s pri vacy upon the authori ty of a val i d warrant and a subsi di ary
Fourth Amendment i ssue that was avai l abl e for deci si on was
passed over i n favor of a broader resol uti on. I nasmuch as the mate-
ri al s were obscene, they were outsi de the scope of Fi rst Amend-
ment protecti on. But the Court premi sed i ts deci si on upon ones
protected ri ght to recei ve what i nformati on and i deas he wi shed
and upon ones protected ri ght to be free, except i n very l i mi ted
ci rcumstances, from unwanted governmental i ntrusi ons i nto ones
1684
268
I d. at 56465.
269
Uni ted States v. Rei del , 402 U.S. 351, 35456 (1971); Uni ted States v. Thi r-
ty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 37576 (1971).
270
Pari s Adul t Theatre v. Sl aton, 413 U.S. 49, 5763, 6364, 6869 (1973); and
see i d. at 68 n.15.
pri vacy.
268
These ri ghts were hel d superi or to the i nterests Geor-
gi a asserted to overri de them. That i s, fi rst, the State was hel d to
have no authori ty to protect an i ndi vi dual s mi nd from the effects
of obsceni ty, to promote the moral content of ones thoughts. Sec-
ond, the States asserti on that exposure to obsceni ty may l ead to
devi ant sexual behavi or was rejected on the basi s of a l ack of em-
pi ri cal support and, more i mportant, on the basi s that l ess i ntru-
si ve deterrents were avai l abl e. Thus, a ri ght to be free of govern-
mental regul ati on i n thi s area was cl earl y recogni zed.
Stanley was qui ckl y restri cted to i ts facts, to possessi on of por-
nography i n the home.
269
But i n i ts i mportant reconsi derati on of
and reaffi rmati on of governmental i nterests i n the control of por-
nography, the Court went beyond thi s restri cti on and recogni zed
governmental i nterests that i ncl uded the promoti on of publ i c mo-
ral i ty, protecti on of the i ndi vi dual s psychol ogi cal heal th, and i m-
provi ng the qual i ty of l i fe. I t i s argued that i ndi vi dual free wi l l
must govern, even i n acti vi ti es beyond the protecti on of the Fi rst
Amendment and other consti tuti onal guarantees of pri vacy, and
that government cannot l egi ti matel y i mpede an i ndi vi dual s desi re
to see or acqui re obscene pl ays, movi es, and books. We do i ndeed
base our soci ety on certai n assumpti ons that peopl e have the capac-
i ty for free choi ce. Most exerci ses of i ndi vi dual free choi ce those
i n pol i ti cs, rel i gi on, and expressi on of i deas are expl i ci tl y pro-
tected by the Consti tuti on. Total l y unl i mi ted pl ay for free wi l l ,
however, i s not al l owed i n our or any other soci ety. . . . [Many l aws
are enacted] to protect the weak, the uni nformed, the unsuspecti ng,
and the gul l i bl e from the exerci se of thei r own vol i ti on. Further-
more, conti nued the Court: Our Consti tuti on establ i shes a broad
range of condi ti ons on the exerci se of power by the States, but for
us to say that our Consti tuti on i ncorporates the proposi ti on that
conduct i nvol vi ng consenti ng adul ts i s al ways beyond state regul a-
ti on i s a step we are unabl e to take. . . . The i ssue i n thi s context
goes beyond whether someone, or even the majori ty, consi ders the
conduct depi cted as wrong or si nful . The States have the power
to make a moral l y neutral judgment that publ i c exhi bi ti on of ob-
scene materi al , or commerce i n such materi al , has a tendency to i n-
jure the communi ty as a whol e, to endanger the publ i c safety, or
to jeopardi ze . . . the States ri ght . . . to mai ntai n a decent soci -
ety.
270
1685
271
478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986).
272
478 U.S. at 19596. Di ssenti ng Justi ce Bl ackmun chal l enged the Courts
characteri zati on of Stanley, suggesti ng that i t had rested as much on the Fourth as
on the Fi rst Amendment, and that the ri ght of an i ndi vi dual to conduct i nti mate
rel ati onshi ps i n . . . hi s or her own home [i s] at the heart of the Consti tuti ons pro-
tecti on of pri vacy. I d. at at 20708.
273
I d. at 66 n.13. See also Paul v. Davi s, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
274
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
275
I d. at 68491. The opi ni on of the Court on the general pri nci pl es drew the
support of Justi ces Brennan, Stewart, Marshal l , Bl ackmun, and Stevens. Justi ce
Whi te concurred i n the resul t i n the voi di ng of the ban on access to adul ts whi l e
not expressi ng an opi ni on on the Courts general pri nci pl es. I d. at 702. Justi ce Pow-
el l agreed the ban on access to adul ts was voi d but concurred i n an opi ni on si gni fi -
cantl y more restrai ned than the opi ni on of the Court. I d. at 703. Chi ef Justi ce Burg-
er, i d. at 702, and Justi ce Rehnqui st, i d. at 717, di ssented.
Stanley was further di sti ngui shed i n Bowers v. Hardwick as
bei ng fi rml y grounded i n the Fi rst Amendment.
271
Thus, the
Court hel d i n Bowers, there i s no protected ri ght to engage i n ho-
mosexual sodomy i n the pri vacy of the home, and Stanley di d not
i mpl i ci tl y create protecti on for vol untary sexual conduct [i n the
home] between consenti ng adul ts.
272
Evi dentl y, then, the fundamental ri ght of pri vacy that i s pro-
tected by the due process cl ause i s one functi onal l y rel ated to fam-
i l y, marri age, motherhood, procreati on, and chi l d reari ng.
273
Even
so l i mi ted, the concept can have numerous si gni fi cant aspects occa-
si oni ng major consti tuti onal deci si ons. Thus, i n Carey v. Population
Services I nternational,
274
the Griswold-Baird l i ne of cases was si g-
ni fi cantl y extended so as to make the deci si on whether or not to
beget or bear a chi l d a consti tuti onal l y protected ri ght of pri vacy
i nterest that government may not forbi d or burden wi thout justi fy-
i ng the l i mi tati on by a compel l i ng state i nterest and by a regul a-
ti on narrowl y drawn to express onl y that i nterest or i nterests. Thi s
consti tuti onal protecti on of i ndi vi dual autonomy i n matters of
chi l dbeari ng l ed the Court to i nval i date a state statute that
banned the di stri buti on of contracepti ves to adul ts except by l i -
censed pharmaci sts and that forbade any person to sel l or di stri b-
ute contracepti ves to a mi nor under 16.
275
The l i mi tati on of the
number of outl ets to adul ts i mposes a si gni fi cant burden on the
ri ght of the i ndi vi dual s to use contracepti ves i f they choose to do
so and was unjusti fi ed by any i nterest put forward by the State.
The prohi bi ti on on sal e to mi nors was judged not by the compel l i ng
state i nterest test, but i nstead by i nqui ri ng whether the restri c-
ti ons serve any si gni fi cant state i nterest . . . that i s not present
i n the case of an adul t. Thi s test i s apparentl y l ess ri gorous than
the test used wi th adul ts, a di sti ncti on justi fi ed by the greater gov-
ernmental l ati tude i n regul ati ng the conduct of chi l dren and the
l esser capabi l i ty of chi l dren i n maki ng i mportant deci si ons. The at-
1686
276
I d. at 69199. Thi s porti on of the opi ni on was supported by onl y Justi ces
Brennan, Stewart, Marshal l , and Bl ackmun. Justi ces Whi te, Powel l , and Stevens
concurred i n the resul t, i d. at 702, 703, 712, each on more narrow grounds than the
pl ural i ty. Agai n, Chi ef Justi ce Burger and Justi ce Rehnqui st di ssented. I d. at 702,
717.
277
478 U.S. 186 (1986). The Courts opi ni on was wri tten by Justi ce Whi te, and
joi ned by Chi ef Justi ce Burger and by Justi ces Powel l , Rehnqui st, and OConnor.
The Chi ef Justi ce and Justi ce Powel l added bri ef concurri ng opi ni ons. Justi ce
Bl ackmun di ssented, joi ned by Justi ces Brennan, Marshal l , and Stevens, and Jus-
ti ce Stevens, joi ned by Justi ces Brennan and Marshal l , added a separate di ssenti ng
opi ni on.
278
[N]one of the ri ghts announced i n those cases bears any resembl ance to the
cl ai med consti tuti onal ri ght of homosexual s to engage i n acts of sodomy. 478 U.S.
at 19091.
279
I d. at 191. The Court asserted that Carey v. Popul ati on Servi ces I ntl , 431
U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977), whi ch had reserved deci si on on the i ssue, had establ i shed
that the pri vacy ri ght di d not reach so far.
280
478 U.S. at 191.
281
I n the Courts vi ew, homosexual sodomy i s nei ther a fundamental l i berty
i mpl i ci t i n the concept of ordered l i berty nor i s i t deepl y rooted i n thi s Nati ons
hi story and tradi ti on. I d. at at 19192.
282
I d. Chi ef Justi ce Burgers bri ef concurri ng opi ni on ampl i fi ed on thi s theme,
concl udi ng that consti tuti onal protecti on for the act of homosexual sodomy . . .
woul d . . . cast asi de mi l l enni a of moral teachi ng. I d. at at 197. Justi ce Powel l cau-
ti oned that Ei ghth Amendment proporti onal i ty pri nci pl es mi ght l i mi t the severi ty
wi th whi ch states can puni sh the practi ces (Hardwi ck had been charged but not
prosecuted, and had i ni ti ated the acti on to have the statute under whi ch he had
been charged decl ared unconsti tuti onal ). I d.
tempted justi fi cati on for the ban was rejected. Doubti ng the per-
mi ssi bi l i ty of a ban on access to contracepti ves to deter mi nors sex-
ual acti vi ty, the Court even more doubted, because the State pre-
sented no evi dence, that l i mi ti ng access woul d deter mi nors from
engagi ng i n sexual acti vi ty.
276
I n Bowers v. Hardwick,
277
the Court by 54 vote roundl y re-
jected the suggesti on that the pri vacy cases protecti ng fami l y,
marri age, or procreati on extend any protecti on for pri vate consen-
sual homosexual sodomy,
278
and al so rejected the more comprehen-
si ve cl ai m that the cases stand for the proposi ti on that any ki nd
of pri vate sexual conduct between consenti ng adul ts i s consti tu-
ti onal l y i nsul ated from state proscri pti on.
279
Moreover, the Court
refused to create any such fundamental ri ght. Justi ce Whi tes opi n-
i on for the Court i n Hardwick sounded the same opposi ti on to an-
nounci ng ri ghts not readi l y i denti fi abl e i n the Consti tuti ons text
that underl ay hi s di ssents i n the aborti on cases.
280
I n addi ti on, the
Court concl uded that rati onal es rel i ed upon i n the earl i er pri vacy
cases do not extend a fundamental ri ght to homosexual s to engage
i n acts of consensual sodomy.
281
Heavy rel i ance was pl aced on the
fact that prohi bi ti ons on sodomy have anci ent roots, and on the
fact that hal f of the states sti l l prohi bi t the practi ces.
282
The pri -
vacy of the home does not i mmuni ze al l behavi or from state regul a-
ti on, and the Court was unwi l l i ng to start down [the] road of i m-
1687
283
The Court voi ced concern that i t woul d be di ffi cul t . . . to l i mi t the cl ai med
ri ght to homosexual conduct whi l e l eavi ng exposed to prosecuti on adul tery, i ncest,
and other sexual cri mes even though they are commi tted i n the home. I d. at 195
96. Di ssenti ng Justi ces Bl ackmun (i d. at 209 n.4) and Stevens (i d. at 21718) sug-
gested that these cri mes are readi l y di sti ngui shabl e.
284
I d. at 199. The Georgi a statute at i ssue, l i ke most sodomy statutes, prohi bi ts
the practi ces regardl ess of the sex or mari tal status of the parti ci pants. See I d. at
188 n.1. Justi ce Stevens too focused on thi s aspect, suggesti ng that the earl i er pri -
vacy cases cl earl y bar a state from prohi bi ti ng sodomous acts by marri ed coupl es,
and that Georgi a had not justi fi ed sel ecti ve appl i cati on to homosexual s. I d. at 219.
285
I d. at 20406.
286
The Court reserved thi s questi on i n Carey, 431 U.S., 694 n.17 (pl ural i ty
opi ni on), al though Justi ces Whi te, Powel l , and Stevens i n concurrence seemed to see
no barri er to state prohi bi ti on of sexual rel ati ons by mi nors. I d. at 702, 703, 712.
287
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). The l anguage i s quoted i n ful l i n
Carey, supra, 431 U.S. 68485.
288
San Antoni o School Di stri ct v. Rodri guez, 411 U.S. 1, 3334 (1973). That thi s
restri cti on i s not hol di ng wi th respect to equal protecti on anal ysi s or due process
anal ysi s can be di scerned easi l y. Compare Zabl ocki v. Redhai l , 434 U.S. 374 (1978)
(opi ni on of Court), with i d. at 391 (Justi ce Stewart concurri ng), and i d. at 396 (Jus-
ti ce Powel l concurri ng).
muni zi ng vol untary sexual conduct between consenti ng adul ts.
283
Justi ce Bl ackmuns di ssent was cri ti cal of the Courts phrasi ng of
the i ssue as one of homosexual sodomy,
284
and asserted that the
basi c i ssue was the i ndi vi dual s pri vacy ri ght to be l et al one. The
pri vacy cases are not l i mi ted to protecti on of the fami l y and the
ri ght to procreati on, he asserted, but i nstead stand for the broader
pri nci pl e of i ndi vi dual autonomy and choi ce i n matters of sexual i n-
ti macy.
285
Si mi l arl y, the extent to whi ch governmental regul ati on of the
sexual acti vi ti es of mi nors i s subject to consti tuti onal scruti ny i s of
great and conti nui ng i mportance.
286
Anal ysi s of these questi ons i s
hampered because the Court has not tol d us what about the par-
ti cul ar facets of human rel ati onshi ps marri age, fami l y,
procreati on gi ves ri se to a protected l i berty and what does not,
and how i ndeed these factors vary si gni fi cantl y enough from other
human rel ati onshi ps to resul t i n di fferi ng consti tuti onal treatment.
The Courts observati on i n the aborti on cases that onl y personal
ri ghts that can be deemed fundamental are i ncl uded i n thi s guar-
antee of personal pri vacy, occasi oni ng justi fi cati on by a compel -
l i ng i nterest,
287
l i ttl e el uci dates the answers i nasmuch as i n the
same Term the Court si gni fi cantl y restri cted i ts equal protecti on
doctri ne of fundamental i nterests compel l i ng i nterest justi fi ca-
ti on by hol di ng that the key to di scoveri ng whether an i nterest
or a rel ati onshi p i s a fundamental one i s whether i t i s expl i ci tl y
or i mpl i ci tl y guaranteed by the Consti tuti on.
288
Whether an i ndependent, di screte concept of pri vacy, i n ei ther
of i ts major aspects, emerges from devel opi ng judi ci al doctri nes i s
l argel y probl emati cal . There appears to be a tendency to desi gnate
1688
289
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pi erce v. Soci ety of Si sters, 268 U.S.
510 (1928).
290
Moore v. Ci ty of East Cl evel and, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (pl ural i ty). Con-
ti nui ng the l i mi tati on of the ri ght of pri vacy to fami l y-rel ated acti vi ti es i s Bowers
v. Hardwi ck, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
291
Smi th v. Organi zati on of Foster Fami l i es, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977).
292
Zabl ocki v. Redhai l , 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
293
Lovi ng v. Vi rgi ni a, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Gri swol d v. Connecti cut, 381 U.S.
479, 486 (1965); Cl evel and Bd. of Educati on v. LaFl eur, 414 U.S. 632, 63940
(1974); Zabl ocki v. Redhai l , 434 U.S. 374, 38387 (1978).
294
Zabl ocki v. Redhai l , 434 U.S. 374 (1978). The majori ty of the Court deemed
the statute to fai l under equal protecti on, whereas Justi ces Stewart and Powel l
found the due process cl ause to be vi ol ated. I d. at 391, 396. Compare Cal i fano v.
Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
as a ri ght of pri vacy a ri ght or i nterest whi ch extensi ons of prece-
dent or appl i cati ons of l ogi cal anal ysi s have l ed the Court to con-
cl ude to protect. Because thi s protecti on i s now settl ed to be a l i b-
erty whi ch the due process cl ause i ncl udes, the anal yti cal val i di ty
of denomi nati ng the parti cul ar ri ght or i nterest as an el ement of
pri vacy rather than as an el ement of l i berty seems open to ques-
ti on.
Fami l y Rel ati onshi ps. Whi l e the pri vacy basi s of auton-
omy seems to be defi ni ti onal l y based, the Courts drawi ng on the
l i ne of cases si nce Meyer and Pierce
289
has establ i shed that the
Consti tuti on protects the sancti ty of the fami l y preci sel y because
the i nsti tuti on of the fami l y i s deepl y rooted i n thi s Nati ons hi s-
tory and tradi ti on.
290
Recogni ti on of the protected l i berty of the
fami l i al rel ati onshi p affords the Court a pri nci pl ed and doctri nal
basi s of revi ew of governmental regul ati ons that adversel y i mpact
upon the abi l i ty to enter i nto the rel ati onshi p, to mai ntai n i t, to
termi nate i t, and to resol ve confl i cts wi thi n the rel ati onshi p. Thi s
l i berty, unl i ke the i nterest i n property whi ch has i ts source i n stat-
utory l aw, spri ngs from the base of i ntri nsi c human ri ghts, as they
have been understood i n thi s Nati ons hi story and tradi ti on.
291
Bei ng of fundamental i mportance, the fami l i al rel ati onshi p i s ordi -
nari l y subject onl y to regul ati on that can survi ve ri gorous judi ci al
scruti ny, al though reasonabl e regul ati ons that do not si gni fi cantl y
i nterfere wi th deci si ons to enter i nto the mari tal rel ati onshi p may
l egi ti matel y be i mposed.
292
Recent deci si ons cast l i ght i n al l areas
of the fami l y rel ati onshi p.
Because the ri ght to marry i s a fundamental ri ght protected by
the due process cl ause,
293
a state may not deny the ri ght to marry
to someone who has fai l ed to meet a chi l d support obl i gati on, there
bei ng no l egi ti mate state i nterest compel l i ng enough to justi fy the
prohi bi ti on.
294
There i s a consti tuti onal ri ght to l i ve together as a
1689
295
I f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural fami l y, over
the objecti ons of the parents and thei r chi l dren, wi thout some showi ng of unfi tness
and for the sol e reason that to do so was thought to be i n the chi l drens best i nter-
est, I shoul d have l i ttl e doubt that the State woul d have i ntruded i mpermi ssi bl y on
the pri vate real m of fami l y l i fe whi ch the state cannot enter. Smi th v. Organi za-
ti on of Foster Fami l i es, 431 U.S. 816, 86263 (1977) (Justi ce Stewart concurri ng),
cited with approval in Qui l l oi n v. Wal cott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
296
Moore v. Ci ty of East Cl evel and, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (pl ural i ty opi ni on). The
fi fth vote, deci si ve to the i nval i di ty of the ordi nance, was on other grounds. I d. at
513.
297
Smi th v. Organi zati on of Foster Fami l i es, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). The natural
fami l y, the Court observed, di d not have i ts source i n statutory l aw, whereas the
ti es that devel op between foster parent and foster chi l d have thei r ori gi ns i n an ar-
rangement whi ch the State brought about. But some l i berty i nterests do ari se from
posi ti ve l aw, al though the expectati ons and enti tl ements are thereby l i mi ted as wel l
by state l aw. And such a l i berty i nterest may not be recogni zed wi thout derogati ng
from the substanti ve l i berty i nterests of the natural parents. Thus, the i nterest of
foster parents must be qui te l i mi ted and attenuated, but Smith does not defi ne what
i t i s. I d. at 84247.
298
See Qui l l oi n v. Wal cott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
299
Mi chael H. v. Geral d D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). There was no opi ni on of the
Court. A majori ty of Justi ces (Brennan, Marshal l , Bl ackmun, Stevens, Whi te) was
wi l l i ng to recogni ze that the bi ol ogi cal father has a l i berty i nterest i n a rel ati onshi p
wi th hi s chi l d, but Justi ce Stevens voted wi th the pl ural i ty (Scal i a, Rehnqui st,
OConnor, Kennedy) because he bel i eved that the statute at i ssue adequatel y pro-
tected that i nterest.
300
The cl earest confl i ct presented to date rai sed the i ssue of gi vi ng a veto to
parents over thei r mi nor chi l drens ri ght to have an aborti on. Pl anned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Pl anned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992). See also Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (parental rol e i n commi tment
of chi l d for treatment of mental i l l ness).
fami l y,
295
one not l i mi ted to the nucl ear fami l y. Thus, a ci ty ordi -
nance whi ch zoned for si ngl e fami l y occupancy and so defi ned fam-
i l y as to bar extended fami l y rel ati onshi ps was found to vi ol ate the
due process cl ause as appl i ed to prevent a grandmother from hav-
i ng i n her househol d two grandchi l dren of di fferent chi l dren.
296
And the concept of fami l y may extend beyond the bi ol ogi cal , bl ood
rel ati onshi p of extended fami l i es to the si tuati on of foster fami l i es,
al though the Court has acknowl edged that such a cl ai m to consti tu-
ti onal l y protected l i berty i nterests rai ses compl ex and novel ques-
ti ons.
297
I n the confl i ct between natural and foster fami l i es, other
di ffi cul t questi ons i nhere and i t may wel l be that a properl y con-
sti tuted process under state l aw of determi ni ng the best i nterests
of the chi l d wi l l be deferred to.
298
has hel d, the presumpti on of l egi ti macy accorded to a chi l d born to
a marri ed woman l i vi ng wi th her husband i s val i d even to defeat
the ri ght of the chi l ds bi ol ogi cal father to establ i sh paterni ty and
vi si tati on ri ghts.
299
The Court has merel y touched upon but not deal t defi ni ti vel y
wi th the compl ex and novel questi ons rai sed by possi bl e confl i cts
between parental ri ghts and chi l drens ri ghts.
300
1690
301
These pri nci pl es have no appl i cati on to persons not hel d i n custody by the
state. DeShaney v. Wi nnebago County Soci al Servs. Dept, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (no
Due Process vi ol ati on for fai l ure of state to protect an abused chi l d from hi s parent,
even when the soci al servi ce agency had been noti fi ed of possi bl e abuse, and possi -
bi l i ty had been substanti ated through vi si ts by soci al worker).
302
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 31416 (1982). See Jackson v. I ndi ana,
406 U.S. 715 (1972); OConnor v. Donal dson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Vi tek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480, 49194 (1980).
303
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314316 (1982). Thus, personal securi ty
consti tutes a hi stori c l i berty i nterest protected substanti vel y by the due process
cl ause. I ngraham v. Wri ght, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (l i berty i nterest i n bei ng free
from undeserved corporal puni shment i n school ); Greenhol tz v. Nebraska Penal I n-
mates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Justi ce Powel l concurri ng) (Li berty from bodi l y re-
strai nt al ways has been recogni zed as the core of the l i berty protected by the Due
Process Cl ause from arbi trary governmental acti ons).
304
The word habi l i tati on i s commonl y used to refer to programs for the men-
tal l y retarded because mental retardati on i s . . . a l earni ng di sabi l i ty and trai ni ng
i mpai rment rather than an i l l ness. [T]he pri nci pal focus of habi l i tati on i s upon
trai ni ng and devel opment of needed ski l l s. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309
n.1 (1982) (quoti ng ami cus bri ef for Ameri can Psychi atri c Associ ati on).
305
I n Jackson v. I ndi ana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972), the Court had sai d that
due process requi res that the nature and durati on of commi tment bear some rea-
sonabl e rel ati on to the purpose for whi ch the i ndi vi dual i s commi tted. Reasoni ng
that i f commi tment i s for treatment and betterment of i ndi vi dual s, i t must be ac-
compani ed by adequate treatment, several l ower courts recogni zed a due process
ri ght. E.g., Wyatt v. Sti ckney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D.Al a), enforced, 334 F. Supp.
1341 (1971), suppl emented, 334 F. Supp. 373 and 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D.Al a. 1972),
affd i n part, reserved i n part, and remanded, sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderhol t, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Ci r. 1974); Donal dson v. OConnor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Ci r. 1974), vacated
on other grounds, 432 U.S. 563 (1975).
Li berty I nterests of Retarded and Mental l y I l l : Commi t-
ment and Treatment. Potenti al l y a major devel opment i n sub-
stanti ve due process i s the formul ati on of a l i berty ri ght of those
retarded or handi capped i ndi vi dual s who are i nvol untari l y commi t-
ted or who vol untari l y seek commi tment to publ i c i nsti tuti ons. The
States pursuant to thei r parens patriae power have a substanti al
i nterest i n i nsti tuti onal i zi ng persons i n need of care, both for thei r
own protecti on and for the protecti on of others.
301
Each i ndi vi dual ,
on the other hand, has a due process protected i nterest i n freedom
from confi nement and personal restrai nt; an i nterest i n reduci ng
the degree of confi nement conti nues even for those i ndi vi dual s who
are properl y commi tted.
302
Li ttl e controversy has attended the
gradual accreti on of case l aw, now confi rmed by the Supreme
Court, that due process guarantees freedom from undue physi cal
restrai nt and from unsafe condi ti ons of confi nement.
303
Whether i t
al so guarantees a consi derabl e ri ght to treatment, to habi l i -
tati on,
304
i s the focus of the cases now bei ng l i ti gated, and whi l e
the ri ght has been strongl y recogni zed by a number of i nfl uenti al
l ower court deci si ons
305
i ts treatment i n the Supreme Court i s as
yet tentati ve. Thus, Youngberg v. Romeo recogni zed a l i berty ri ght
to mi ni mal l y adequate or reasonabl e trai ni ng to ensure safety and
1691
306
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982).
307
I d. at 318 n.23.
308
I d. at 31718. Concurri ng, Justi ces Bl ackmun, Brennan, and OConnor, ar-
gued that due process guaranteed pati ents at l east that trai ni ng necessary to pre-
vent them from l osi ng the ski l l s they entered the i nsti tuti on wi th and probabl y
more. I d. at 325. Chi ef Justi ce Burger rejected any protected i nterest i n trai ni ng.
I d. at 329. The Court had al so avoi ded a deci si on on a ri ght to treatment i n OCon-
nor v. Donal dson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975), vacati ng and remandi ng a deci si on rec-
ogni zi ng the ri ght and thus depri vi ng the deci si on of precedenti al val ue. Chi ef Jus-
ti ce Burger expressl y rejected the ri ght there al so. I d. at 578. But just four days
l ater the Court deni ed certi orari to another panel deci si on from the same ci rcui t re-
l yi ng on i ts Donaldson deci si on to establ i sh such a ri ght, l eavi ng the pri nci pl e al i ve
i n that ci rcui t. Burnham v. Department of Publ i c Heal th, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Ci r.
1974), cert. deni ed, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975). See also Al l en v. I l l i noi s, 478 U.S. 364,
373 (1986) (di ctum that person ci vi l l y commi tted as sexual l y dangerous person
mi ght be enti tl ed to protecti on under the sel f-i ncri mi nati on cl ause i f he coul d show
that hi s confi nement i s essenti al l y i denti cal to that i mposed upon fel ons wi th no
need for psychi atri c care).
309
I d. at 323.
310
E.g., Ohl i nger v. Watson, 652 F. 2d 775, 779 (9th Ci r. 1980); Wel sch v.
Li ki ns, 550 F.2d 1122, 1132 (8th Ci r. 1977). Of course, l ack of fundi ng wi l l create
probl ems wi th respect to i njuncti ve rel i ef as wel l . Cf. New York State Assn for Re-
tarded Chi l dren v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162, 163 (2d Ci r. 1980). I t shoul d be noted that
the Supreme Court has l i mi ted the i njuncti ve powers of the federal courts i n si mi l ar
si tuati ons al so.
freedom from undue restrai nt.
306
Whi l e the l ower court had
passed upon and agreed wi th pl ai nti ffs theory of enti tl ement to
such treatment as wi l l afford a reasonabl e opportuni ty to acqui re
and mai ntai n those l i fe ski l l s necessary to cope as effecti vel y as
[hi s] capaci ti es permi t,
307
the Supreme Court thought that before
i t pl ai nti ff had reduced hi s theory to one of trai ni ng rel ated to
safety and freedom from restrai nt.
308
But the Courts concern for
federal i sm, i ts rel uctance to approve judi ci al acti vi sm i n super-
vi si ng i nsti tuti ons, i ts recogni ti on that budgetary constrai nts i nter-
fered wi th state provi si on of servi ces caused i t to requi re the l ower
federal courts to defer to professi onal deci si onmaki ng i n determi n-
i ng what care was adequate. Professi onal deci si ons are presump-
ti vel y val i d and l i abi l i ty can be i mposed onl y when the deci si on by
the professi onal i s such a substanti al departure from accepted pro-
fessi onal judgment, practi ce, or standards as to demonstrate that
the person responsi bl e actual l y di d not base the deci si on on such
a judgment.
309
Presumabl y, however, the di fference between l i -
abi l i ty for damages and i njuncti ve rel i ef wi l l sti l l afford federal
courts consi derabl e l ati tude i n enjoi ni ng i nsti tuti ons to better thei r
servi ces i n the future, even i f they cannot award damages for past
fai l ures.
310
Sti l l other i ssues awai t pl umbi ng. The whol e area of the ri ghts
of commi tted i ndi vi dual s wi l l l i kel y be expl ored under a sub-
1692
311
See Developments in the Law Civil Commitment of the Mentally I ll, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1974). I n Mi l l s v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), the Court had
before i t the i ssue of the due process ri ght of commi tted mental pati ents at state
hospi tal s to refuse admi ni strati on of anti psychoti c drugs. An i nterveni ng deci si on of
the States hi ghest court had measurabl y strengthened the pati ents ri ghts under
both state and federal l aw and the Court remanded for reconsi derati on i n l i ght of
the state court deci si on. See also Renni e v. Kl ei n, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Ci r. 1981).
312
Devel opmental l y Di sabl ed Assi stance and Bi l l of Ri ghts Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94103, 89 Stat. 486, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 6000 et seq., as to whi ch see
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Hal derman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Mental Heal th
Systems Act, 94 Stat. 1565, 42 U.S.C. 9401 et seq.
313
See, e.g., Mi l l s v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299300 (1982). And see i nfra, pp.
172332 (procedural due process).
314
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
315
I d. at 286.
316
I d. at 28182.
317
I d. at 279.
318
See 497 U.S. at 287 (OConnor, concurri ng); i d. at 30405 (Brennan, joi ned
by Marshal l and Bl ackmun, di ssenti ng); i d. at 331 (Stevens, di ssenti ng).
stanti ve and procedural due process anal ysi s.
311
Addi ti onal l y, fed-
eral l egi sl ati on i s becomi ng extensi ve,
312
and state l egi sl ati ve and
judi ci al devel opment of l aw i s hi ghl y i mportant because the Su-
preme Court l ooks to thi s l aw as one source of the i nterests whi ch
the due process cl ause protects.
313
Ri ght to Di e. I n Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept of
Health,
314
the Court uphel d Mi ssouri s requi rement that, before
nutri ti on and hydrati on may be wi thdrawn from a person i n a per-
si stent vegetati ve state, i t must be demonstrated by cl ear and con-
vi nci ng evi dence that such acti on i s consi stent wi th the pati ents
previ ousl y mani fested wi shes. The Due Process Cl ause does not re-
qui re that the state rel y on the judgment of the fami l y, the guard-
i an, or anyone but the pati ent hersel f i n maki ng thi s deci si on, the
Court concl uded.
315
Thus, i n the absence of cl ear and convi nci ng
evi dence that the pati ent hersel f had expressed an i nterest not to
be sustai ned i n a persi stent vegetati ve state, or that she had ex-
pressed a desi re to have a surrogate make such a deci si on for her,
the state may refuse to al l ow wi thdrawal of nutri ti on and hydra-
ti on. A State i s enti tl ed to guard agai nst potenti al abuses that
can occur i f fami l y members do not protect a pati ents best i nter-
ests, and may properl y decl i ne to make judgments about the qual -
i ty of l i fe that a parti cul ar i ndi vi dual may enjoy, and [i nstead] si m-
pl y assert an unqual i fi ed i nterest i n the preservati on of human l i fe
to be wei ghed agai nst the . . . i nterests of the i ndi vi dual .
316
The Courts opi ni on i n Cruzan assume[d] that a competent
person has a consti tuti onal l y protected ri ght to refuse l i fesavi ng
hydrati on and nutri ti on.
317
More i mportant, however, a majori ty of
Justi ces separatel y decl ared that such a l i berty i nterest exi sts.
318
Thus, the Court appears commi tted to the posi ti on that the ri ght
1693
1
Hagar v. Recl amati on Di st., 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884); Hurtado v. Cal i forni a,
110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884).
to refuse nutri ti on and hydrati on i s subsumed i n the broader ri ght
to refuse medi cal treatment. Al so bl urred i n the Courts anal ysi s
was any di sti ncti on between termi nal l y i l l pati ents and those
whose condi ti on has stabi l i zed; there was testi mony that the pa-
ti ent i n Cruzan coul d be kept al i ve for about 30 years i f nutri ti on
and hydrati on were conti nued.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: CIVIL
Some General Criteria
What due process of l aw means i n the procedural context de-
pends on the ci rcumstances. I t vari es wi th the subject matter and
the necessi ti es of the si tuati on. Due process of l aw i s a process
whi ch, fol l owi ng the forms of l aw, i s appropri ate to the case and
just to the parti es affected. I t must be pursued i n the ordi nary
mode prescri bed by l aw; i t must be adapted to the end to be at-
tai ned; and whenever necessary to the protecti on of the parti es, i t
must gi ve them an opportuni ty to be heard respecti ng the justi ce
of the judgment sought. Any l egal proceedi ng enforced by publ i c
authori ty, whether sancti oned by age or custom or newl y devi sed
i n the di screti on of the l egi sl ati ve power, whi ch regards and pre-
serves these pri nci pl es of l i berty and justi ce, must be hel d to be
due process of l aw.
1
Anci ent Use and Uni formi ty. The requi rements of due
process may be ascertai ned i n part by an exami nati on of those set-
tl ed usages and modes of proceedi ngs exi sti ng i n the common and
statutory l aw of Engl and duri ng col oni al ti mes, and not unsui ted
to the ci vi l and pol i ti cal condi ti ons i n thi s country. A process of l aw
not otherwi se forbi dden may be taken to be due process of l aw i f
i t has been sancti oned by settl ed usage both i n Engl and and i n thi s
country. I n other words, the anti qui ty of a procedure i s a fact of
wei ght i n i ts behal f. However, i t does not fol l ow that a procedure
settl ed i n Engl i sh l aw and adopted i n thi s country i s, or remai ns,
an essenti al el ement of due process of l aw. I f that were so, the pro-
cedure of the fi rst hal f of the seventeenth century woul d be fas-
tened upon Ameri can juri sprudence l i ke a strai t jacket, onl y to be
unl oosed by consti tuti onal amendment. Fortunatel y, the States are
not ti ed down by any provi si on of the Consti tuti on to the practi ce
and procedure whi ch exi sted at the common l aw, but may avai l
1694
2
Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899); Hurtado v. Cal i forni a, 110
U.S. 516, 529 (1884); Twi ni ng v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908); Anderson
Natl Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 244 (1944).
3
Marchant v. Pennsyl vani a R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894).
4
Bal l ard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 255 (1907); Pal mer v. McMahon, 133 U.S.
660, 668 (1890).
5
6
Rai l road Commn v. Rowan & Ni chol s Oi l Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941) (oi l fi el d
prorati on order). See also Rai l road Commn v. Rowan & Ni chol s Oi l Co., 310 U.S.
573 (1940) (courts shoul d not second-guess regul atory commi ssi ons i n eval uati ng ex-
pert testi mony).
7
Dreyer v. I l l i noi s, 187 U.S. 71, 8384 (1902).
8
New York ex rel . Li eberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 562, (1905).
9
Ohi o ex rel . Bryant v. Akron Park Di st., 281 U.S. 74, 79 (1930).
10
Carfer v. Cal dwel l , 200 U.S. 293, 297 (1906).
themsel ves of the wi sdom gathered by the experi ence of the coun-
try to make changes deemed to be necessary.
2
Equal i ty. I f due process i s to be secured, the l aws must oper-
ate al i ke upon al l and not subject the i ndi vi dual to the arbi trary
exerci se of governmental power unrestrai ned by establ i shed pri n-
ci pl es of pri vate ri ghts and di stri buti ve justi ce. Where a l i ti gant
has the benefi t of a ful l and fai r tri al i n the state courts, and hi s
ri ghts are measured, not by l aws made to affect hi m i ndi vi dual l y,
but by general provi si ons of l aw appl i cabl e to al l those i n l i ke con-
di ti on, he i s not depri ved of property wi thout due process of l aw,
even i f he can be regarded as depri ved of hi s property by an ad-
verse resul t.
3
Due Process, J udi ci al Process, and Separati on of Pow-
ers. Due process of l aw does not al ways mean a proceedi ng i n
court.
4
Proceedi ngs to rai se revenue by l evyi ng and col l ecti ng taxes
are not necessari l y judi ci al , nor are admi ni strati ve and executi ve
proceedi ngs, yet thei r val i di ty i s not thereby i mpai red.
5
Moreover,
the due process cl ause does not requi re de novo judi ci al revi ew of
the factual concl usi ons of state regul atory agenci es.
6
Nor does the Fourteenth Amendment prohi bi t a State from
conferri ng upon nonjudi ci al bodi es certai n functi ons that may be
cal l ed judi ci al , or from del egati ng to a court powers that are l egi s-
l ati ve i n nature. For exampl e, state statutes vesti ng i n a parol e
board certai n judi ci al functi ons,
7
or conferri ng di screti onary power
upon admi ni strati ve boards to grant or wi thhol d permi ssi on to
carry on a trade,
8
or vesti ng i n a probate court authori ty to ap-
poi nt park commi ssi oners and establ i sh park di stri cts
9
are not i n
confl i ct wi th the due process cl ause and present no federal ques-
ti on. Whether l egi sl ati ve, executi ve, and judi ci al powers of a State
shal l be kept al together di sti nct and separate, or whether they
shoul d i n some parti cul ars be merged, i s for the determi nati on of
the State.
10
1695
11
Hol mes v. Conway, 241 U.S. 624, 631 (1916); Loui svi l l e & Nashvi l l e R.R. v.
Schmi dt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900).
12
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); West v. Loui si ana, 194
U.S. 258, 263 (1904); Chi cago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chi cago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Jordan
v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912). See Boddi e v. Connecti cut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971), for one recent l i mi tati on. The power of a State to determi ne the l i mi ts of
the juri sdi cti on of i ts courts and the character of the controversi es whi ch shal l be
heard i n them and to deny access to i ts courts i s al so subject to restri cti ons i mposed
by the contract, ful l fai th and credi t, and pri vi l eges and i mmuni ti es cl auses of the
Consti tuti on. Angel v. Bul l i ngton, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
13
I nsurance Co. v. Gl i dden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931); I owa Central Ry. v.
I owa, 160 U.S. 389, 393 (1896): Honeyman v. Hanan, 302 U.S. 375 (1937). See also
Li ndsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
14
Ci nci nnati Street Ry. v. Snel l , 193 U.S. 30, 36 (1904).
15
Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 112 (1921). Thus the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not constrai n the States to accept modern doctri nes of equi ty, or adopt
a combi ned system of l aw and equi ty procedure, or di spense wi th al l necessi ty for
form and method i n pl eadi ng, or gi ve untrammel l ed l i berty to amend pl eadi ngs.
Note that the Supreme Court di d once grant revi ew to determi ne whether due proc-
ess requi red the States to provi de some form of post-convi cti on remedy to assert fed-
eral consti tuti onal vi ol ati ons, a revi ew whi ch was mooted when the State enacted
such a process. Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965). When a State, however,
through i ts l egal system exerts a monopol y over the paci fi c settl ement of pri vate di s-
putes, as wi th the di ssol uti on of marri age, due process may wel l i mpose affi rmati ve
obl i gati ons on that State. Boddi e v. Connecti cut, 401 U.S. 371, 37477 (1971).
16
Whi l e thi s statement i s more general l y true i n the context of cri mi nal cases,
i n whi ch the appel l ate process and post-convi cti on remedi al process have been sub-
ject to consi derabl e revi si on i n the treatment of i ndi gents, some requi rements have
al so been i mposed i n ci vi l cases. Boddi e v. Connecti cut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Li ndsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 7479 (1972); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Re-
Power of the States to Regulate Procedure
General l y. The due process cl ause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not control mere forms of procedure i n state courts or
regul ate practi ce therei n.
11
A State i s free to regul ate procedure
of i ts courts i n accordance wi th i t own concepti on of pol i cy and fai r-
ness unl ess i n so doi ng i t offends some pri nci pl e of justi ce so rooted
i n the tradi ti ons and consci ence of our peopl e as to be ranked as
fundamental .
12
Pursuant to such power, the States have regul ated
the manner i n whi ch ri ghts may be enforced and wrongs rem-
edi ed,
13
and i n connecti on therewi th have created courts and en-
dowed them wi th such juri sdi cti on as, i n the judgment of thei r l eg-
i sl atures, seemed appropri ate.
14
Whether l egi sl ati ve acti on i n such
matters i s deemed to be wi se or proves effi ci ent, whether i t works
a parti cul ar hardshi p on a parti cul ar l i ti gant, or perpetuates or
suppl ants anci ent forms of procedure, are i ssues whi ch can ordi -
nari l y gi ve ri se to no confl i ct wi th the Fourteenth Amendment, i n-
asmuch as i ts functi on i s negati ve rather than affi rmati ve and i n
no way obl i gates the States to adopt speci fi c measures of reform.
15
More recent deci si ons, however, have i mposed some restri cti ons on
state procedures that requi re substanti al reori entati on of proc-
ess.
16
1696
vi ew has, however, been restrai ned wi th regard to detai l s. See, e.g., Li ndsey v.
Normet, supra, 6469.
17
Cohen v. Benefi ci al Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Nor was the retroacti ve
appl i cati on of thi s statutory requi rement to acti ons pendi ng at the ti me of i ts adop-
ti on vi ol ati ve of due process as l ong as no new l i abi l i ty for expenses i ncurred before
enactment was i mposed thereby and the onl y effect thereof was to stay such pro-
ceedi ngs unti l the securi ty was furni shed.
18
Boddi e v. Connecti cut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). See also Li ttl e v. Streater, 452
U.S. 1 (1981) (state-mandated paterni ty sui t); Lassi ter v. Department of Soci al Serv-
i ces, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (parental status termi nati on proceedi ng); Santosky v. Kra-
mer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (permanent termi nati on of parental custody).
19
Young Co. v. McNeal -Edwards Co., 283 U.S. 398 (1931); Adam v. Saenger,
303 U.S. 59 (1938).
20
Jones v. Uni on Guano Co., 264 U.S. 171 (1924).
Commencement of Acti ons. A state may i mpose certai n con-
di ti ons on the ri ght to i nsti tute l i ti gati on. Access to the courts has
been deni ed to persons i nsti tuti ng stockhol ders deri vati ve acti ons
unl ess reasonabl e securi ty for the costs and fees i ncurred by the
corporati on i s fi rst tendered.
17
But, at l east i n those si tuati ons i n
whi ch the State has monopol i zed the avenues of settl ement of di s-
putes between persons by prescri bi ng judi ci al resol uti on, and where
the di spute i nvol ves such a fundamental i nterest as marri age and
i ts di ssol uti on, no State may deny to those persons unabl e to pay
i ts fees access to those judi ci al avenues.
18
I t must be consi dered,
then, that forecl osure of al l access to the courts, at l east through
fi nanci al barri ers and perhaps through other means as wel l , i s sub-
ject to federal consti tuti onal scruti ny and must be justi fi ed by ref-
erence to a state i nterest of sui tabl e i mportance. I n ol der cases, not
questi oned by the more recent ones, i t was hel d that a State, as
the pri ce of openi ng i ts tri bunal s to a nonresi dent pl ai nti ff, may
exact the condi ti on that the nonresi dent stand ready to answer al l
cross acti ons fi l ed and accept any in personam judgments obtai ned
by a resi dent defendant through servi ce of process or appropri ate
pl eadi ng upon the pl ai nti ffs attorney of record.
19
and for si mi l ar
reasons, a requi rement, wi thout excl udi ng other evi dence, of a
chemi cal anal ysi s as a condi ti on precedent to a sui t to recover for
damages resul ti ng to crops from al l egedl y defi ci ent ferti l i zers i s not
deemed to be arbi trary or unreasonabl e.
20
Pl eas i n Abatement. State l egi sl ati on whi ch forbi ds a de-
fendant to come i nto court and chal l enge the val i di ty of servi ce
upon hi m i n a personal acti on wi thout thereby surrenderi ng hi m-
sel f to the juri sdi cti on of the court, but whi ch does not restrai n hi m
from protecti ng hi s substanti ve ri ghts agai nst enforcement of a
judgment rendered wi thout servi ce of process i s consti tuti onal and
does not depri ve hi m of property wi thout due process of l aw. Such
a defendant, i f he pl eases, may i gnore the proceedi ngs as whol l y i n-
effecti ve, and set up the i nval i di ty of the judgment i f and when an
1697
21
York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890); Kauffman v. Wootters, 138 U.S. 285, 287
(1891).
22
Grant Ti mber & Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 236 U.S. 133 (1915).
23
Li ndsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 6469 (1972). See also Bi anchi v. Moral es,
262 U.S. 170 (1923) (uphol di ng mortgage l aw provi di ng for summary forecl osure of
a mortgage wi thout al l owi ng any defense except payment).
24
Bowersock v. Smi th, 243 U.S. 29, 34, (1917); Chi cago, R.I . & P. Ry. v. Col e,
251 U.S. 54, 55 (1919); Herron v. Southern Paci fi c Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931). See also
Marti nez v. Cal i forni a, 444 U.S. 277, 28083 (1980) (State i nterest i n fashi oni ng i ts
own tort l aw permi ts i t to provi de i mmuni ty defenses for i ts empl oyees and thus
defeat recovery).
25
Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
26
Sawyer v. Pi per, 189 U.S. 154 (1903).
attempt i s made to take hi s property thereunder. However, i f he
desi res to contest the val i di ty of the proceedi ngs i n the court i n
whi ch i t i s i nsti tuted, so as to avoi d even a sembl ance of a judg-
ment agai nst hi m, i t i s wi thi n the power of a State to decl are that
he shal l do thi s subject to the ri sk of bei ng obl i ged to submi t to the
juri sdi cti on of the court to hear and determi ne the meri ts, i f the
objecti on rai sed by hi m as to i ts juri sdi cti on over hi s person shal l
be overrul ed.
21
Defenses. Just as a State may condi ti on the ri ght to i nsti tute
l i ti gati on, so may i t establ i sh terms for the i nterposi ti on of certai n
defenses. I t may val i dl y provi de that one sued i n a possessory ac-
ti on cannot bri ng an acti on to try ti tl e unti l after judgment i s ren-
dered and after he has pai d that judgment, i f i t so provi des.
22
A
State may l i mi t the defense i n an acti on to evi ct tenants for
nonpayment of rent to the i ssue of payment and l eave the tenants
to other remedi al acti ons at l aw on a cl ai m that the l andl ord had
fai l ed to mai ntai n the premi ses.
23
A State may al so provi de that
the doctri nes of contri butory negl i gence, assumpti on of ri sk, and
fel l ow servant do not bar recovery i n certai n empl oyment-rel ated
acci dents. No person has a vested ri ght i n such defenses.
24
Si mi l arl y, a nonresi dent defendant i n a sui t begun by forei gn
attachment, even though he has no resources or credi t other than
the property attached, cannot chal l enge the val i di ty of a statute
whi ch requi res hi m to gi ve bai l or securi ty for the di scharge of the
sei zed property before permi tti ng hi m an opportuni ty to appear
and defend.
25
Amendments and Conti nuances. Amendment of pl eadi ngs
i s l argel y wi thi n the di screti on of the tri al court, and unl ess a gross
abuse of di screti on i s shown, there i s no ground for reversal . Ac-
cordi ngl y, where the defense sought to be i nterposed i s wi thout
meri t, a cl ai m that due process woul d be deni ed by rendi ti on of a
forecl osure decree wi thout l eave to fi l e a suppl ementary answer i s
utterl y wi thout foundati on.
26
1698
27
Bal l ard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 259 (1907).
28
Mi ssouri , Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642, 650 (1914).
29
Wal ters v. Nati onal Assn of Radi ati on Survi vors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (l i mi ta-
ti on of attorneys fees to $10 i n veterans benefi t proceedi ngs does not vi ol ate cl ai m-
ants Fi fth Amendment due process ri ghts absent a showi ng of probabi l i ty of error
i n the proceedi ngs that presence of attorneys woul d sharpl y di mi ni sh). See also
Uni ted States Dept of Labor v. Tri pl ett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990) (uphol di ng regul ati ons
under the Bl ack Lung Benefi ts Act prohi bi ti ng contractual fee arrangements).
30
Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81 (1896). Consi der, however, the possi bl e beari ng
of Gi acci o v. Pennsyl vani a, 382 U.S. 399 (1966) (statute al l owi ng jury to i mpose
costs on acqui tted defendant, but contai ni ng no standards to gui de di screti on, vi o-
l ates due process).
31
Yazoo & Mi ss. R.R. v. Jackson Vi negar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912); Chi cago &
Northwestern Ry. v. Nye Schnei der Fowl er Co., 260 U.S. 35, 4344 (1922); Hartford
Li fe I ns. Co. v. Bl i ncoe, 255 U.S. 129, 139 (1921); Li fe & Casual ty Co. v. McCray,
291 U.S. 566 (1934).
32
Pi zi tz Co. v. Yel del l , 274 U.S. 112, 114 (1927).
33
Paci fi c Mut. Li fe I ns. Co. v. Hasl i p, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
34
I d. (fi ndi ng suffi ci ent constrai nts on jury di screti on i n jury i nstructi ons and
i n post-verdi ct revi ew).
Costs, Damages, and Penal ti es. What costs are al l owed by
l aw i s for the court to determi ne; an erroneous judgment of what
the l aw al l ows does not depri ve a party of hi s property wi thout due
process of l aw.
27
Nor does a statute provi di ng for the recovery of
reasonabl e attorneys fees i n acti ons on smal l cl ai ms subject unsuc-
cessful defendants to any unconsti tuti onal depri vati on.
28
Congress
may severel y restri ct attorneys fees i n an effort to keep an admi n-
i strati ve cl ai ms proceedi ng i nformal .
29
Equal l y consi stent wi th the
requi rements of due process i s a statutory procedure whereby a
prosecutor of a case i s adjudged l i abl e for costs, and commi tted to
jai l i n defaul t of payment thereof, whenever the court or jury, after
accordi ng hi m an opportuni ty to present evi dence of good fai th,
fi nds that he i nsti tuted the prosecuti on wi thout probabl e cause and
from mal i ci ous moti ves.
30
Al so, as a reasonabl e i ncenti ve for
prompt settl ement wi thout sui t of just demands of a cl ass recei vi ng
speci al l egi sl ati ve treatment, such as common carri ers and i nsur-
ance compani es together wi th thei r patrons, a State may permi t
harassed l i ti gants to recover penal ti es i n the form of attorneys fees
or damages.
31
To deter carel ess destructi on of human l i fe, a State
by l aw may al l ow puni ti ve damages to be assessed i n acti ons
agai nst empl oyers for deaths caused by the negl i gence of thei r em-
pl oyees,
32
and may al so al l ow puni ti ve damages for fraud per-
petrated by empl oyees.
33
Al so consti tuti onal i s the tradi ti onal com-
mon l aw approach for measuri ng puni ti ve damages, granti ng the
jury wi de but not unl i mi ted di screti on to consi der the gravi ty of the
offense and the need to deter si mi l ar offenses.
34
By vi rtue of i ts pl enary power to prescri be the character of the
sentence whi ch shal l be awarded agai nst those found gui l ty of
cri me, a State may provi de that a publ i c offi cer embezzl i ng publ i c
1699
35
Coffey v. Harl an County, 204 U.S. 659, 663, 665 (1907).
36
Nati onal Uni on v. Arnol d, 348 U.S. 37 (1954) (the judgment debtor had re-
fused to post a supersedeas bond or to compl y wi th reasonabl e orders desi gned to
safeguard the val ue of the judgment pendi ng deci si on on appeal ).
37
Wheel er v. Jackson, 137 U.S. 245, 258 (1890); Kentucky Uni on Co. v. Ken-
tucky, 219 U.S. 140, 156 (1911). Cf. Logan v. Zi mmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
437 (1982) (di scussi ng di screti on of States i n erecti ng reasonabl e procedural requi re-
ments for tri ggeri ng or forecl osi ng the ri ght to an adjudi cati on).
38
Bl i nn v. Nel son, 222 U.S. 1 (1911).
39
Turner v. New York, 168 U.S. 90, 94 (1897).
money shal l , notwi thstandi ng that he has made resti tuti on, suffer
not onl y i mpri sonment but al so pay a fi ne equal to doubl e the
amount embezzl ed, whi ch shal l operate as a judgment for the use
of persons whose money was embezzl ed. Whatever thi s fi ne i s
cal l ed, whether a penal ty, or puni shment, or ci vi l judgment, i t
comes to the convi ct as the resul t of hi s cri me.
35
On the other
hand, when appel l ant, by i ts refusal to surrender certai n assets,
was adjudged i n contempt for frustrati ng enforcement of a judg-
ment obtai ned agai nst i t, di smi ssal of i ts appeal from the fi rst
judgment was not a penal ty i mposed for the contempt, but merel y
a reasonabl e method for sustai ni ng the effecti veness of the States
judi ci al process.
36
Statutes of Li mi tati on. A statute of l i mi tati ons does not de-
pri ve one of property wi thout due process of l aw, unl ess, i n i ts ap-
pl i cati on to an exi sti ng ri ght of acti on, i t unreasonabl y l i mi ts the
opportuni ty to enforce the ri ght by sui t. By the same token, a State
may shorten an exi sti ng peri od of l i mi tati on, provi ded a reasonabl e
ti me i s al l owed for bri ngi ng an acti on after the passage of the stat-
ute and before the bar takes effect. What i s a reasonabl e peri od,
however, i s dependent on the nature of the ri ght and parti cul ar ci r-
cumstances.
37
Thus, an i nterval of onl y one year i s not so unreasonabl e as
to be wanti ng i n due process when appl i ed to bar acti ons rel ati ve
to the property of an absentee i n i nstances when the recei ver for
such property has not been appoi nted unti l 13 years after the
formers di sappearance.
38
When a State, by l aw, suddenl y pro-
hi bi ts, unl ess brought wi thi n si x months after i ts passage, al l ac-
ti ons to contest tax deeds whi ch have been of record for two years,
no unconsti tuti onal depri vati on i s effected.
39
No l ess val i d i s a
statute, appl i cabl e to wi l d l ands, whi ch provi des that when a per-
son has been i n possessi on under a recorded deed conti nuousl y for
20 years and had pai d taxes thereon duri ng the same, the former
owner i n that i nterval payi ng nothi ng, no acti on to recover such
l and shal l be entertai ned unl ess commenced wi thi n 20 years, or be-
fore the expi rati on of fi ve years fol l owi ng enactment of sai d provi -
1700
40
Soper v. Lawrence Brothers, 201 U.S. 359 (1906). Nor i s a former owner who
had not been i n possessi on for fi ve years after and fi fteen years before sai d enact-
ment thereby depri ved of any property wi thout due process.
41
Mattson v. Department of Labor, 293 U.S. 151, 154 (1934).
42
Campbel l v. Hol t, 115 U.S. 620, 623, 628 (1885).
43
Chase Securi ti es Corp. v. Donal dson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945).
44
Gange Lumber Co. v. Rowl ey, 326 U.S. 295 (1945).
45
Campbel l v. Hol t, 115 U.S. 620, 623 (1885). See also Stewart v. Keyes, 295
U.S. 403, 417 (1935).
46
Home I ns. Co. v. Di ck, 281 U.S. 397, 398 (1930).
si on.
40
Si mi l arl y, an amendment to a workmens compensati on act,
l i mi ti ng to three years the ti me wi thi n whi ch a case may be re-
opened for readjustment of compensati on on account of aggravati on
of a di sabi l i ty, does not deny due process to one who sustai ned hi s
i njury at a ti me when the statute contai ned no l i mi tati on. A l i mi ta-
ti on i s deemed to affect the remedy onl y, and the peri od of i ts oper-
ati on i n thi s i nstance was vi ewed as nei ther arbi trary nor oppres-
si ve.
41
Moreover, as l ong as no agreement of the parti es i s vi ol ated,
a State may extend as wel l as shorten the ti me i n whi ch sui ts may
be brought i n i ts courts and may even enti rel y remove a statutory
bar to the commencement of l i ti gati on. As appl i ed to acti ons for
personal debts, a repeal or extensi on of a statute of l i mi tati ons af-
fects no unconsti tuti onal depri vati on of property of a debtor-defend-
ant i n whose favor such statute had al ready become a defense. A
ri ght to defeat a just debt by the statute of l i mi tati on . . . [not
bei ng] a vested ri ght, such as i s protected by the Consti tuti on, ac-
cordi ngl y no offense agai nst the Fourteenth Amendment i s commi t-
ted by revi val , through an extensi on or repeal , of an acti on on an
i mpl i ed obl i gati on to pay a chi l d for the use of her property,
42
or
a sui t to recover the purchase pri ce of securi ti es sol d i n vi ol ati on
of a Bl ue Sky Law,
43
or a ri ght of an empl oyee to seek, on account
of the aggravati on of a former i njury, an addi ti onal award out of
a state-admi ni stered fund.
44
However, as respects sui ts to recover
real and personal property, when the ri ght of acti on has been
barred by a statute of l i mi tati ons and ti tl e as wel l as real owner-
shi p have become vested i n the defendant, any l ater act removi ng
or repeal i ng the bar woul d be voi d as attempti ng an arbi trary
transfer of ti tl e.
45
Al so unconsti tuti onal i s the appl i cati on of a stat-
ute of l i mi tati on to extend a peri od that parti es to a contract have
agreed shoul d l i mi t thei r ri ght to remedi es under the contract.
When the parti es to a contract have expressl y agreed upon a ti me
l i mi t on thei r obl i gati on, a statute whi ch i nval i dates . . . [sai d]
agreement and di rects enforcement of the contract after . . . [the
agreed] ti me has expi red unconsti tuti onal l y i mposes a burden i n
excess of that contracted.
46
1701
47
Hawki ns v. Bl eakl y, 243 U.S. 210, 214 (1917); James-Di cki nson Co. v. Harry,
273 U.S. 119, 124 (1927). Congress power to provi de rul es of evi dence and stand-
ards of proof i n the federal courts stems from i ts power to create such courts. Vance
v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 26467 (1980); Usery v. Turner El khorn Mi ni ng Co., 428
U.S. 1, 31 (1976). I n the absence of congressi onal gui dance, the Court has deter-
mi ned the evi denti ary standard i n certai n statutory acti ons. Ni shi kawa v. Dul l es,
356 U.S. 129 (1958); Woodby v. I NS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
48
Addi ngton v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoti ng I n re Wi nshi p, 397
U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Justi ce Harl an concurri ng)).
49
Mathews v. El dri dge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
50
Addi ngton v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
51
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Four Justi ces di ssented, argui ng
that consi dered as a whol e the statutory scheme comported wi th due process. I d.
at 770 (Justi ces Rehnqui st, Whi te, OConnor, and Chi ef Justi ce Burger). Appl i cati on
of the tradi ti onal preponderance of the evi dence standard i s permi ssi bl e i n paterni ty
acti ons. Ri vera v. Mi nni ch, 483 U.S. 574 (1987).
52
Stanl ey v. I l l i noi s, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (presumpti on that unwed fathers are
unfi t parents). But see Mi chael H. v. Geral d D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (statutory pre-
sumpti on of l egi ti macy accorded to a chi l d born to a marri ed woman l i vi ng wi th her
husband defeats the ri ght of the chi l ds bi ol ogi cal father to establ i sh paterni ty and
vi si tati on ri ghts).
Evi dence and Presumpti ons. The establ i shment of pre-
sumpti ons and rul es respecti ng the burden of proof i s cl earl y wi th-
i n the domai n of the l egi sl ati ve branch of government.
47
Nonethe-
l ess, the due process cl ause does i mpose l i mi tati ons upon the power
to provi de for the depri vati on of l i berty or property by a standard
of proof too l ax to make reasonabl e assurance of accurate factfi nd-
i ng. Thus, [t]he functi on of a standard of proof, as that concept i s
embodi ed i n the Due Process Cl ause and i n the real m of factfi nd-
i ng, i s to i nstruct the factfi nder concerni ng the degree of con-
fi dence our soci ety thi nks he shoul d have i n the correctness of fac-
tual concl usi ons for a parti cul ar type of adjudi cati on.
48
Appl yi ng
the formul a i t has worked out for determi ni ng what process i s due
i n a parti cul ar si tuati on,
49
the Court has hel d that i n a ci vi l pro-
ceedi ng to commi t an i ndi vi dual i nvol untari l y to a state mental
hospi tal for an i ndefi ni te peri od, a standard at l east as stri ngent
as cl ear and convi nci ng evi dence i s requi red.
50
Because the i nter-
est of parents i n retai ni ng custody of thei r chi l dren i s fundamental ,
the State may not termi nate parental ri ghts through rel i ance on a
standard of preponderance of the evi dence the proof necessary to
award money damages i n an ordi nary ci vi l acti on but must prove
by cl ear and convi nci ng evi dence that the parents are unfi t.
51
Unfi tness of a parent may not si mpl y be presumed because of some
purported assumpti on about general characteri sti cs, but must be
establ i shed.
52
As l ong as a presumpti on i s not unreasonabl e and i s not con-
cl usi ve of the ri ghts of the person agai nst whom rai sed, however,
i t does not vi ol ate the due process cl ause. Legi sl ati ve fi at may not
take the pl ace of fact, though, i n the determi nati on of i ssues i nvol v-
1702
53
Presumpti ons were voi ded i n Bai l ey v. Al abama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (anyone
breachi ng personal servi ces contract gui l ty of fraud); Manl ey v. Georgi a, 279 U.S.
1 (1929) (every bank i nsol vency deemed fraudul ent); Western & Atl anti c R.R. v.
Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929) (col l i si on between trai n and auto at grade crossi ng
consti tutes negl i gence by rai l way company); Carel l a v. Cal i forni a, 491 U.S. 263
(1989) (concl usi ve presumpti on of theft and embezzl ement upon proof of fai l ure to
return a rental vehi cl e).
54
Presumpti ons sustai ned i ncl ude Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898)
(person convi cted of fel ony unfi t to practi ce medi ci ne); Hawes v. Georgi a, 258 U.S.
1 (1922) (person occupyi ng property presumed to have knowl edge of sti l l found on
property); Bandi ni Co. v. Superi or Court, 284 U.S. 8 (1931) (rel ease of natural gas
i nto the ai r from wel l presumed wasteful ); Atl anti c Coast Li ne R.R. v. Ford, 287
U.S. 502 (1933) (rebuttabl e presumpti on of rai l road negl i gence for acci dent at grade
crossi ng). See also Morri son v. Cal i forni a, 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
55
The approach was not unprecedented, some ol der cases havi ng voi ded tax l eg-
i sl ati on that presumed concl usi vel y an ul ti mate fact. Schl esi nger v. Wi sconsi n, 270
U.S. 230 (1926) (deemi ng any gi ft made by decedent wi thi n si x years of death to
be a part of estate deni es estates ri ght to prove gi ft was not made i n contempl ati on
of death); Hei ner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Hoeper v. Tax Commn, 284 U.S.
206 (1931).
56
405 U.S. 645 (1972).
57
Cl evel and Bd. of Educ. v. LaFl eur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
i ng l i fe, l i berty, or property, and a statute creati ng a presumpti on
whi ch i s enti rel y arbi trary and whi ch operates to deny a fai r oppor-
tuni ty to repel i t or to present facts perti nent to ones defense i s
voi d.
53
On the other hand, i f there i s a rati onal connecti on between
what i s proved and what i s i nferred, l egi sl ati on decl ari ng that the
proof of one fact or group of facts shal l consti tute pri ma faci e evi -
dence of a mai n or ul ti mate fact wi l l be sustai ned.
54
For a bri ef peri od, the Court uti l i zed what i t cal l ed the
i rrebuttabl e presumpti on doctri ne to curb the l egi sl ati ve tendency
to confer a benefi t or to i mpose a detri ment, dependi ng for i ts ap-
pl i cati on upon the establ i shment of certai n characteri sti cs from
whi ch the exi stence of other characteri sti cs are presumed.
55
Thus,
as noted, i n Stanley v. I llinois,
56
the Court found i nval i d a con-
structi on of the state statute that presumed i l l egi ti mate fathers to
be unfi t parents and that prevented them from objecti ng to state
wardshi p. Mandatory materni ty l eave rul es of school boards requi r-
i ng pregnant teachers to take unpai d materni ty l eave fi ve and four
months respecti vel y pri or to the date of the expected bi rths of thei r
babi es were voi ded as creati ng a concl usi ve presumpti on that every
pregnant teacher who reaches a parti cul ar poi nt of pregnancy be-
comes physi cal l y i ncapabl e of teachi ng.
57
Major controversy devel -
oped over appl i cati on of the doctri ne i n benefi ts cases. Thus, whi l e
a State may requi re that nonresi dents must pay hi gher tui ti on
charges at state col l eges than resi dents, and whi l e the Court as-
sumed that a durati onal resi dency requi rement woul d be permi s-
si bl e as a prerequi si te to qual i fy for the l ower tui ti on, i t was hel d
i mpermi ssi bl e for the State to presume concl usi vel y that because
1703
58
Vl andi s v. Kl i ne, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
59
Department of Agri cul ture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
60
Thus, on the some day Murry was deci ded, a si mi l ar food stamp qual i fi cati on
was struck down on equal protecti on grounds. Department of Agri cul ture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528 (1973).
61
422 U.S. 749 (1975).
62
Stanley and LaFleur were di sti ngui shed as i nvol vi ng fundamental ri ghts of
fami l y and chi l dbeari ng, i d. at 771, and Murry was di sti ngui shed as i nvol vi ng an
i rrati onal cl assi fi cati on. I d. at 772. Vlandis, sai d Justi ce Rehnqui st for the Court,
meant no more than that when a State fi xes resi dency as the qual i fi cati on i t may
not deny to one meeti ng the test of resi dency the opportuni ty so to establ i sh i t. I d.
at 771. But see i d. at 80203 (Justi ce Brennan di ssenti ng).
63
I d. at 76870, 77577, 785 (uti l i zi ng Dandri dge v. Wi l l i ams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970), Ri chardson v. Bel cher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971), and si mi l ar cases).
the l egal address of a student was outsi de the State at the ti me of
appl i cati on or at some poi nt duri ng the precedi ng year he was a
nonresi dent as l ong as he remai ned a student. The due process
cl ause requi red that the student be afforded the opportuni ty to
show that he i s or has become a bona fi de resi dent enti tl ed to the
l ower tui ti on.
58
Moreover, a food stamp program provi si on maki ng i nel i gi bl e
any househol d that contai ned a member age 18 or over who was
cl ai med as a dependent for federal i ncome tax purposes the pri or
tax year by a person not hi msel f el i gi bl e for stamps was voi ded on
the ground that i t created a concl usi ve presumpti on that fai rl y
often coul d be shown to be fal se i f evi dence coul d be presented.
59
The rul e whi ch emerged for subjecti ng persons to detri ment or
qual i fyi ng them for benefi ts was that the l egi sl ature may not pre-
sume the exi stence of the deci si ve characteri sti c upon a gi ven set
of facts, unl ess i t can be shown that the defi ned characteri sti cs do
i n fact encompass al l persons and onl y those persons that i t was
the purpose of the l egi sl ature to reach. The doctri ne i n effect af-
forded the Court the opportuni ty to choose between resort to the
equal protecti on cl ause or to the due process cl ause i n judgi ng the
val i di ty of certai n cl assi fi cati ons,
60
and i t precl uded Congress and
l egi sl atures from maki ng general cl assi fi cati ons that avoi ded the
admi ni strati ve costs of i ndi vi dual i zati on i n many areas.
Uti l i zati on of the doctri ne was curbed, i f not hal ted, i n Wein-
berger v. Salfi,
61
i n whi ch the Court uphel d the val i di ty of a Soci al
Securi ty provi si on requi ri ng as a qual i fi cati on of recei pt of benefi ts
as a spouse of a covered wage earner that one must have been mar-
ri ed to the wage earner for at l east ni ne months pri or to hi s death.
Purporti ng to approve but to di sti ngui sh the pri or cases i n the
l i ne,
62
the Court rather i mported tradi ti onal equal protecti on anal -
ysi s i nto consi derati ons of due process chal l enges to statutory cl as-
si fi cati ons.
63
Extensi ons of the pri or cases to government enti tl e-
ment cl assi fi cati ons, such as the Soci al Securi ty Act qual i fi cati on
1704
64
Wei nberger v. Sal fi , 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975).
65
Vlandis, whi ch was approved but di sti ngui shed, i s onl y margi nal l y i n thi s
doctri nal area, i nvol vi ng as i t does a ri ght to travel feature, but i t i s l i ke Salfi and
Murry i n i ts benefi t context and order of presumpti on. The Court has avoi ded deci d-
i ng whether to overrul e, retai n, or further l i mi t Vlandis. El ki ns v. Moreno, 435 U.S.
647, 65862 (1978).
66
I n Turner v. Department of Empl oyment Securi ty, 423 U.S. 44 (1975), deci ded
after Salfi, the Court voi ded under the doctri ne a statute maki ng pregnant women
i nel i gi bl e for unempl oyment compensati on for a peri od extendi ng from 12 weeks be-
fore the expected bi rth unti l si x weeks after chi l dbi rth. But see Usery v. Turner El k-
horn Mi ni ng Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1977) (provi si on granti ng benefi ts to mi ners
i rrebuttabl y presumed to be di sabl ed i s merel y a way of gi vi ng benefi ts to al l those
wi th the condi ti on tri ggeri ng the presumpti on); Cal i fano v. Bol es, 443 U.S. 282,
28485 (1979) (Congress must fi x general categori zati on; case-by-case determi nati on
woul d be prohi bi ti vel y costl y).
67
Wal ker v. Sauvi net, 92 U.S. 90 (1876); New York Central R.R. v. Whi te, 243
U.S. 188, 208 (1917).
68
Marvi n v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 226 (1905).
69
I n re Del gado, 140 U.S. 586, 588 (1891).
70
Wi l son v. North Carol i na, 169 U.S. 586 (1898); Foster v. Kansas, 112 U.S.
201, 206 (1884).
71
Long I sl and Water Suppl y Co. v. Brookl yn, 166 U.S. 685, 694 (1897).
72
Montana Co. v. St. Loui s M. & M. Co., 152 U.S. 160, 171 (1894).
73
See Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912).
74
See Maxwel l v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 602 (1900).
75
Li ndsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972) (ci ti ng cases).
standard before i t, woul d, sai d the Court, turn the doctri ne of
those cases i nto a vi rtual engi ne of destructi on for countl ess l egi sl a-
ti ve judgments whi ch have heretofore been thought whol l y consi st-
ent wi th the Fi fth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Consti tu-
ti on.
64
Whether the Court wi l l now l i mi t the doctri ne to the det-
ri ment area onl y, excl usi ve of benefi t programs, whether i t wi l l
l i mi t i t to those areas whi ch i nvol ve fundamental ri ghts or suspect
cl assi fi cati ons, i n the equal protecti on sense of those expressi ons,
65
or whether i t wi l l si mpl y permi t the doctri ne to pass from the scene
remai ns unsettl ed, but i t i s noteworthy that i t now rarel y appears
on the Courts docket.
66
J ury Tri al s. Tri al by jury i n ci vi l tri al s, unl i ke the case i n
cri mi nal tri al s, has not been deemed essenti al to due process, and
the Fourteenth Amendment has not been hel d to restrai n the
States i n retai ni ng or abol i shi ng ci vi l juri es.
67
Thus, abol i ti on of ju-
ri es i n proceedi ngs to enforce l i ens,
68
mandamus
69
and quo
warranto
70
acti ons, and i n emi nent domai n
71
and equi ty
72
pro-
ceedi ngs has been approved. States are free to adopt i nnovati ons
respecti ng sel ecti on and number of jurors. Verdi cts rendered by ten
out of twel ve jurors may be substi tuted for the requi rement of una-
ni mi ty,
73
and peti t juri es contai ni ng ei ght rather than the conven-
ti onal number of twel ve members may be establ i shed.
74
Appeal s. I f a ful l and fai r tri al on the meri ts i s provi ded, due
process does not requi re a State to provi de appel l ate revi ew.
75
But
1705
76
I d. at 7479 (condi ti oni ng appeal i n evi cti on acti on upon tenant posti ng bond,
wi th two sureti es, i n twi ce the amount of rent expected to accrue pendi ng appeal ,
i s i nval i d when no si mi l ar provi si on i s appl i ed to other cases). Cf. Bankers Li fe &
Casual ty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988) (assessment of 15% penal ty on party
who unsuccessful l y appeal s from money judgment meets rati onal basi s test under
equal protecti on chal l enge, si nce i t appl i es to pl ai nti ffs and defendants al i ke and
does not si ngl e out one cl ass of appel l ants).
77
95 U.S. 714 (1878).
78
I d. at 722.
79
Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court J urisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV.
241, 25262.
80
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 73335 (1878). The due process cl ause and the
remai nder of the Fourteenth Amendment had not been rati fi ed at the ti me of the
entry of the state-court judgment gi vi ng ri se to the case. Thi s i nconveni ent fact does
not detract from the subsequent settl ed uti l i zati on of thi s consti tuti onal foundati on.
Pennoyer deni ed ful l fai th and credi t to the judgment because the state l acked juri s-
di cti on.
81
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878); Scott v. McNeal , 154 U.S. 34, 64
(1894).
82
Nati onal Exchange Bank v. Wi l ey, 195 U.S. 257, 270 (1904); I ron Cl i ffs Co.
v. Negaunee I ron Co., 197 U.S. 463, 471 (1905).
i f an appeal i s afforded, the State must not so structure i t as to
arbi trari l y deny to some persons the ri ght or pri vi l ege avai l abl e to
others.
76
J urisdiction
General l y. Juri sdi cti on may be defi ned as the power to cre-
ate l egal i nterests. I n the famous case of Pennoyer v. Neff,
77
the
Court enunci ated two pri nci pl es of juri sdi cti on respecti ng the
States i n a federal system. Fi rst, every State possesses excl usi ve
juri sdi cti on and soverei gnty over persons and property wi thi n i ts
terri tory, and, second, no State can exerci se di rect juri sdi cti on
and authori ty over persons or property wi thout i ts terri tory.
78
Al -
though these two pri nci pl es were drawn from the wri ti ngs of Jo-
seph Story refi ni ng the theori es of conti nental juri sts,
79
the con-
sti tuti onal basi s for them was deemed to be i n the due process
cl ause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
80
From these begi nni ngs,
the Court devel oped a compl ex set of rul es defi ni ng when juri sdi c-
ti on physi cal power coul d be exerted over persons through in
personam acti ons and over thi ngs, general l y, through acti ons in
rem.
81
I n proceedi ngs in personam to determi ne l i abi l i ty of a defend-
ant, no property havi ng been subjected by such l i ti gati on to the
control of the court, juri sdi cti on over the defendants person i s a
condi ti on prerequi si te to the renderi ng of any effecti ve decree.
82
That condi ti on i s ful fi l l ed, that i s, a State i s deemed capabl e of ex-
erti ng juri sdi cti on over an i ndi vi dual i f he i s physi cal l y present
wi thi n the terri tory of the State, i f he i s domi ci l ed i n the State al -
though temporari l y absent therefrom, or i f he has consented to the
1706
83
Arndt v. Gri ggs, 134 U.S. 316, 321 (1890); Granni s v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385
(1914); Penni ngton v. Fourth Natl Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917).
84
Goodri ch v. Ferri s, 214 U.S. 71, 80 (1909).
85
Penni ngton v. Fourth Natl Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917); Harri s v. Bal k,
198 U.S. 215 (1905).
86
The juri sdi cti onal requi rements for renderi ng a val i d di vorce decree are con-
si dered under the ful l fai th and credi t cl ause. Supra, pp. 84050.
87
The fi rst pri nci pl e, that a State may assert juri sdi cti on over anyone or any-
thi ng physi cal l y wi thi n i ts borders, no matter how bri efl y there the so-cal l ed tran-
si ent rul e of juri sdi cti on McDonal d v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917), remai ns
val i d, al though i n Shaffer v. Hei tner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977), the Courts di cta ap-
peared to assume i t i s not.
88
326 U.S. 310 (1945). As the Court expl ai ned i n McGee v. I nternati onal Li fe
I ns. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957), [w]i th thi s i ncreasi ng nati onal i zati on of com-
merce has come a great i ncrease i n the amount of busi ness conducted by mai l across
state l i nes. At the same ti me modern transportati on and communi cati on have made
i t much l ess burdensome for a party sued to defend hi msel f i n a State where he
engages i n economi c acti vi ty. See Worl d-Wi de Vol kswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
89
Shaffer v. Hei tner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Worl d-Wi de Vol kswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Kul ko v. Su-
peri or Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
exerci se of juri sdi cti on over hi m. I n acti ons in rem, however, a
State coul d val i dl y proceed to settl e controversi es wi th regard to
ri ghts or cl ai ms agai nst property wi thi n i ts borders, notwi thstand-
i ng that control of the defendant was never obtai ned. Accordi ngl y,
by reason of i ts i nherent authori ty over ti tl es to l and wi thi n i ts ter-
ri tori al confi nes, a State coul d proceed through i ts courts to judg-
ment respecti ng the ownershi p of such property, even though i t
l acked a consti tuti onal competence to reach cl ai mants of ti tl e who
resi ded beyond i ts borders.
83
By the same token, probate
84
and
garni shment of forei gn attachment
85
proceedi ngs, bei ng i n the na-
ture of in rem acti ons for the di sposi ti on of property, or quasi in
rem, mi ght be prosecuted to concl usi on wi thout requi ri ng the pres-
ence of al l parti es i n i nterest.
86
Over a l ong peri od of ti me, the mobi l i ty of Ameri can soci ety
and the i ncreasi ng compl exi ty of commerce l ed to attenuati on of
the second pri nci pl e of Pennoyer,
87
and begi nni ng wi th I nter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington,
88
the Court establ i shed the mod-
ern standard of obtai ni ng in personam juri sdi cti on based upon the
nature and the qual i ty of contacts that i ndi vi dual s and corpora-
ti ons have wi th a State; thi s mi ni mum contacts test permi ts the
courts of a State through process to obtai n power over out-of-state
defendants. I n recent cases, the mi ni mum contacts test has been
hel d appl i cabl e to al l asserti ons of juri sdi cti on, so that in rem and
quasi-in-rem proceedi ngs must now be eval uated i n the context of
the defendants rel ati onshi p to the State i n whi ch the sui t i s bei ng
brought.
89
1707
90
I nternati onal Shoe Co. v. Washi ngton, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 317 (1945); Travel -
ers Heal th Assn v. Vi rgi ni a ex rel . State Corp. Comm., 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950);
Shaffer v. Hei tner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
91
I nternati onal Shoe Co. v. Washi ngton, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945); Hanson v.
Denckl a, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
92
Worl d-Wi de Vol kswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
93
I d. at 294 (i nternal quotati on from I nternati onal Shoe Co. v. Washi ngton, 326
U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
94
McDonal d v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). Cf. Mi chi gan Trust Co. v. Ferry,
228 U.S. 346 (1913). The rul e has been strongl y cri ti ci zed but persi sts. Ehrenzwei g,
The Transient Rule of Personal J urisdiction: The Power Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 YALE L. J. 289 (1956). But i n Burnham v. Superi or Court, 495 U.S.
604 (1990), the Court hel d that servi ce of process on a nonresi dent physi cal l y
present wi thi n the state sati sfi es due process regardl ess of the durati on or purpose
of the nonresi dents vi si t.
Basi s for the terri tori al concept of juri sdi cti on promul gated i n
Pennoyer and modi fi ed over the years i s a two-fol d constructi on of
due process: a concern for fai r pl ay and substanti al justi ce i n-
vol ved i n requi ri ng defendants to l i ti gate cases agai nst them far
from thei r home or pl ace of busi ness
90
and, more i mportant, a
concern for the preservati on of federal i sm.
91
The Framers, the
Court has asserted, whi l e i ntendi ng to ti e the States together i nto
a Nati on, al so i ntended that the States retai n many essenti al at-
tri butes of soverei gnty, i ncl udi ng, i n parti cul ar, the soverei gn
power to try causes i n thei r courts. The soverei gnty of each State,
i n turn, i mpl i ed a l i mi tati on on the soverei gnty of al l i ts si ster
States a l i mi tati on express or i mpl i ci t i n both the ori gi nal scheme
of the Consti tuti on and the Fourteenth Amendment.
92
Thus, the
federal i sm pri nci pl e i s preemi nent. [T]he Due Process Cl ause does
not contempl ate that a state may make bi ndi ng a judgment in per-
sonam agai nst an i ndi vi dual or corporate defendant wi th whi ch the
state has no contacts, ti es, or rel ati ons. . . . Even i f the defendant
woul d suffer mi ni mal or no i nconveni ence from bei ng forced to l i ti -
gate before the tri bunal s of another State; even i f the forum State
has a strong i nterest i n appl yi ng i ts l aw to the controversy; even
i f the forum State i s the most conveni ent l ocati on for l i ti gati on, the
Due Process Cl ause, acti ng as an i nstrument of i nterstate federal -
i sm, may someti mes act to di vest the State of i ts power to render
a val i d judgment.
93
In Personam Proceedi ngs Agai nst I ndi vi dual s. As has
been noted, presence wi thi n the State wi th servi ce of process i s suf-
fi ci ent to create personal juri sdi cti on over an i ndi vi dual .
94
I n the
case of a resi dent, absence al one wi l l not defeat the processes of
courts i n the State of hi s domi ci l e; domi ci l e al one i s deemed to be
suffi ci ent to keep hi m wi thi n reach of the state courts for purposes
of a personal judgment, whether obtai ned by means of appropri ate,
substi tuted servi ce or by actual personal servi ce on the resi dent
1708
95
Mi l l i ken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
96
McDonal d v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
97
Rees v. Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wal l .) 107 (1874); Coe v. Armour Ferti l i zer
Works, 237 U.S. 413, 423 (1915); Gri ffi n v. Gri ffi n, 327 U.S. 220 (1946).
98
Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U.S. 524 (1889); Ri versi de Mi l l s v. Menefee, 237 U.S.
189, 193 (1915); Hess v. Pawl oski , 274 U.S. 352, 355 (1927). See also Harkness v.
Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1879); Wi l son v. Sel i gman, 144 U.S. 41 (1892).
99
Loui svi l l e & Nashvi l l e R.R. v. Schmi dt, 177 U.S. 230 (1900); Western Loan
& Savi ngs Co. v. Butte & Boston Mi n. Co., 210 U.S. 368 (1908); Houston v. Ormes,
252 U.S. 469 (1920). See also Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938) (pl ai nti ff sui ng
defendants deemed to have consented to juri sdi cti on wi th respect to countercl ai ms
asserted agai nst hi m).
100
York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890); Kauffman v. Wootters, 138 U.S. 285
(1891); Western I ndemni ty Co. v. Rupp, 235 U.S. 261 (1914).
101
Hess v. Pawl oski , 274 U.S. 352 (1927): Wuchter v. Pi zzutti , 276 U.S. 13
(1928); Ol berdi ng v. I l l i noi s Central R. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953).
102
Hess v. Pawl oski , 274 U.S. 352, 35657 (1927).
outsi de the State.
95
However, i f the defendant, al though tech-
ni cal l y domi ci l ed therei n, has l eft the State wi th no i ntenti on to re-
turn, servi ce by publ i cati on, as compared to a summons l eft at hi s
l ast and usual pl ace of abode where hi s fami l y conti nued to resi de,
i s i nadequate, i nasmuch as i t i s not reasonabl y cal cul ated to gi ve
actual noti ce of the proceedi ngs and opportuni ty to be heard.
96
Wi th respect to a nonresi dent, i t i s cl earl y establ i shed that no
person can be depri ved of property ri ghts by a decree i n a case i n
whi ch he nei ther appeared nor was served or effecti vel y made a
party.
97
The earl y cases hel d that the process of a court of one
State coul d not run i nto another and summon a party there domi -
ci l ed to respond to proceedi ngs agai nst hi m, when nei ther hi s per-
son nor hi s property was wi thi n the juri sdi cti on of the court ren-
deri ng the judgment.
98
The attenuati on of the rul e proceeded i n
steps. Consent was, of course, suffi ci ent to create juri sdi cti on, even
i n the absence of any other connecti on between the l i ti gati on and
the forum, and for exampl e, the appearance of the defendant for
any purpose other than to chal l enge the juri sdi cti on of the court
was deemed a vol untary submi ssi on to the courts power,
99
and
even a speci al appearance may be treated as consensual submi s-
si on to the court.
100
Constructi ve consent, therefore, was sei zed
upon as a basi s for obtai ni ng juri sdi cti on, and, wi th the advent of
the automobi l e, States were permi tted, under the fi cti on of condi -
ti oni ng the use of thei r hi ghways on recei pt of consent to be sued
i n state courts for acci dents or other transacti ons ari si ng out of
such use, to desi gnate a state offi ci al as a proper person to recei ve
servi ce of process i n such l i ti gati on, provi ded onl y that the offi ci al
recei vi ng noti ce i s obl i gated to communi cate i t to the person
sued.
101
Al though the Court verbal i zed the resul t i n consent terms,
the basi s was real l y the States power to regul ate l ocal acts dan-
gerous to l i fe or property.
102
Thi s extensi on was necessary i n order
1709
103
I d. at 355. See Fl exner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289, 293 (1919).
104
Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
105
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
106
436 U.S. 84 (1978).
107
Kul ko had vi si ted the State twi ce, seven and si x years respecti vel y before
i ni ti ati on of the present acti on, hi s marri age occurri ng i n Cal i forni a on the second
vi si t, but nei ther the vi si ts nor the marri age was suffi ci ent or rel evant to juri sdi c-
ti on. I d. at 9293.
108
I d. at 92.
109
I d. at 9698.
to permi t States to assume juri sdi cti on over i ndi vi dual s doi ng
busi ness wi thi n the State, i nasmuch as the State coul d not wi th-
hol d from nonresi dent i ndi vi dual s the ri ght of doi ng busi ness sub-
ject to consent to be sued.
103
Thus, the Court soon recogni zed that
doi ng busi ness wi thi n a State was i tsel f a suffi ci ent basi s for ju-
ri sdi cti on over a nonresi dent i ndi vi dual , at l east where the busi -
ness done was excepti onal enough to create a strong state i nterest
i n regul ati on, and servi ce coul d be effectuated wi thi n the State on
an agent appoi nted to carry out the busi ness.
104
Cul mi nati on of the trend was, of course, the promul gati on i n
I nternational Shoe Co. v. Washington,
105
a corporati ons case, of the
mi ni mum contacts test of juri sdi cti on. I n the context of in perso-
nam juri sdi cti on over i ndi vi dual s, the test i s i l l ustrated by Kulko
v. Superior Court,
106
i n whi ch the Court hel d that Cal i forni a coul d
not obtai n personal juri sdi cti on over a New York resi dent whose
sol e rel evant contact wi th the State was to send hi s daughter to
l i ve wi th her mother i n Cal i forni a.
107
Li ke any standard that re-
qui res a determi nati on of reasonabl eness, the mi ni mum contacts
test . . . i s not suscepti bl e of mechani cal appl i cati on; rather, the
facts of each case must be wei ghed to determi ne whether the req-
ui si te affi l i ati ng ci rcumstances are present.
108
Wi thout deci di ng
that the standard was rel evant, the Court noted that the effects
test of contacts, that Kul ko had caused an effect i n the State by
avai l i ng hi msel f of the benefi ts and protecti ons of Cal i forni as l aws
and by deri vi ng an economi c benefi t i n the l essened expense of
mai ntai ni ng the daughter i n New York, was not appl i cabl e; i t was
deemed by the Court to i nvol ve wrongful acti vi ty outsi de a State
whi ch causes i njury wi thi n the State or commerci al acti vi ty affect-
i ng state resi dents, factors not present i n thi s case. Any economi c
benefi t to Kul ko was deri ved i n New York and not i n Cal i forni a.
109
As wi th many such cases, the deci si on was narrowl y l i mi ted to i ts
facts and does l i ttl e to cl ari fy the standards appl i cabl e to state ju-
ri sdi cti on over nonresi dents.
1710
110
Cf. Bank of Augusta v. Earl e, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839) (corporati on
has no l egal exi stence outsi de the boundari es of the State charteri ng i t).
111
Lafayette I ns. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855); St. Cl ai r v. Cox,
196 U.S. 350 (1882); Commerci al Mutual Acci dent Co. v. Davi s, 213 U.S. 245 (1909);
Si mon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915); Pennsyl vani a Fi re I ns. Co. v. Gol d
I ssue Mi ni ng & Mi l l i ng Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
112
Presence was fi rst i ndependentl y used to sustai n juri sdi cti on i n I nter-
nati onal Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914), al though the possi bi l i ty
was suggested as earl y as St. Cl ai r v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882). See also Phi l adel -
phi a & Readi ng Ry. v. McKi bbi n, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917) (Justi ce Brandei s for
Court).
113
E.g., Pennsyl vani a Fi re I ns. Co. v. Gol d I ssue Mi ni ng & Mi l l i ng Co., 243 U.S.
93 (1917); St. Loui s S. W. Ry. v. Al exander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913).
114
E.g., Ol d Wayne Li fe Assn v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907); Si mon v.
Southern Rai l way, 236 U.S. 115, 129130 (1915); Green v. Chi cago, B. & Q. Ry.,
205 U.S. 530 (1907); Rosenberg Co. v. Curti s Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923); Davi s
v. Farmers Co-operati ve Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923); Hel i copteros Naci onal es de Col om-
bi a v. Hal l , 466 U.S. 408 (1984). Conti nuous operati ons were someti mes suffi ci entl y
substanti al and of a nature to warrant asserti ons of juri sdi cti on. St. Loui s S. W. Ry.
v. Al exander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913).
Suabi l i ty of Forei gn Corporati ons. Because of the curi ous
status of corporati ons i n Ameri can l aw,
110
the basi s of the asser-
ti on of juri sdi cti on of the courts of a State over a forei gn corpora-
ti on has been even more uncertai n than that wi th respect to i ndi -
vi dual s, al though the terms have been common. Fi rst, i t was as-
serted that i nasmuch as a corporati on coul d not carry on busi ness
i n a State wi thout the States permi ssi on, the State coul d condi ti on
i ts permi ssi on upon the corporati ons consent to submi t to the juri s-
di cti on of the States courts, ei ther by appoi ntment of someone to
recei ve process or i n the absence of such desi gnati on.
111
Second,
the corporati on by doi ng busi ness i n a State was deemed to be
present there and thus subject to servi ce of process and sui t be-
cause i t was present.
112
Presence confl i cted wi th the prevai l i ng
i dea of corporati ons as havi ng no exi stence outsi de thei r State of
i ncorporati on, but the theory was nonethel ess accepted that a cor-
porati on doi ng busi ness i n a State to a suffi ci ent degree was
present for servi ce of process upon i ts agents i n the State who
carri ed out that busi ness.
113
General l y, wi th rare excepti ons, even
conti nuous acti vi ty of some sort by a forei gn corporati on wi thi n a
State di d not suffi ce to render i t amenabl e to sui ts therei n unre-
l ated to that acti vi ty. Wi thout the protecti on of such a rul e, i t was
mai ntai ned, forei gn corporati ons woul d be exposed to the mani fest
hardshi p and i nconveni ence of defendi ng, i n any State i n whi ch
they happened to be carryi ng on busi ness, sui ts for torts wherever
commi tted and cl ai ms on contracts wherever made.
114
And i f the
corporati on stopped doi ng busi ness i n the forum State before sui t
agai nst i t was commenced, i t mi ght wel l escape juri sdi cti on al to-
1711
115
Robert Mi tchel l Furn. Co. v. Sel den Breck Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 213 (1921):
Chi pman, Ltd. v. Thomas B. Jeffery Co., 251 U.S. 373, 379 (1920). On a consent
theory, juri sdi cti on woul d conti nue. Washi ngton ex rel Bond & Goodwi n & Tucker
v. Superi or Court, 289 U.S. 361, 364 (1933).
116
Sol i ci tati on of busi ness al one was i nadequate to consti tute doi ng busi ness,
Green v. Chi cago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907), but when connected wi th other
acti vi ti es woul d suffi ce to confer juri sdi cti on. I nternati onal Harvester Co. v. Ken-
tucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). See the survey of cases by Judge Hand i n Hutchi nson
v. Chase and Gi l bert, 45 F.2d 139, 14142 (2d Ci r. 1930).
117
E.g. Gol dey v. Morni ng News, 156 U.S. 518 (1895); Conl ey v. Mathi eson Al -
kal i Works, 190 U.S. 406 (1903); Ri versi de Mi l l s v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 195
(1915). But see Connecti cut Mutual Li fe I ns. Co. v. Spratl ey, 172 U.S. 602 (1899).
118
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
119
Thi s departure was recogni zed by Justi ce Rutl edge subsequentl y i n Ni ppert
v. Ci ty of Ri chmond, 327 U.S. 416, 422 (1946). I nasmuch as I nternati onal Shoe, i n
addi ti on to havi ng i ts agents sol i ci t orders, al so permi tted them to rent quarters for
the di spl ay of merchandi se, the Court coul d have uti l i zed I nternati onal Harvester
Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914), to fi nd i t was present i n the State.
gether.
115
The i ssue of the degree of acti vi ty requi red, i n parti cul ar
the degree of sol i ci tati on necessary to consti tute doi ng busi ness by
a forei gn corporati on, was much di sputed and l ed to very
parti cul ari sti c hol di ngs.
116
I n the absence of enough acti vi ty to
consti tute doi ng busi ness, the mere presence wi thi n i ts terri tori al
l i mi ts of an agent, offi cer, or stockhol der, upon whom servi ce mi ght
readi l y be had, was not effecti ve to enabl e a State to acqui re juri s-
di cti on over the forei gn corporati on.
117
The rati onal es and premi ses of these cases were swept away
i n I nternational Shoe Co. v. Washington,
118
al though, of course, the
resul ts i n many of them woul d stand on the basi s of the mi ni mum
contacts anal ysi s there adopted. I nternati onal Shoe, a forei gn cor-
porati on, had not been i ssued a l i cense to do busi ness i n the State,
but i t systemati cal l y and conti nuousl y empl oyed a force of sal es-
men, resi dents thereof, to canvass for orders therei n, and was hel d
suabl e i n Washi ngton for unpai d unempl oyment compensati on con-
tri buti ons i n respect to such sal esmen. Servi ce of the noti ce of as-
sessment personal l y upon one of i ts l ocal sal es sol i ci tors pl us the
forwardi ng of a copy thereof by regi stered mai l to the corporati ons
pri nci pal offi ce i n Mi ssouri was deemed suffi ci ent to appri se the
corporati on of the proceedi ng.
To reach thi s concl usi on the Court not onl y overturned pri or
hol di ngs to the effect that mere sol i ci tati on of patronage does not
consti tute doi ng of busi ness i n a state suffi ci ent to subject a forei gn
corporati on to the juri sdi cti on thereof,
119
but al so rejected the
presence test as beggi ng the questi on to be deci ded. . . . The
terms present or presence, accordi ng to Chi ef Justi ce Stone, are
used merel y to symbol i ze those acti vi ti es of the corporati ons agent
wi thi n the State whi ch courts wi l l deem to be suffi ci ent to sati sfy
the demands of due process. . . . Those demands may be met by
1712
120
I nternati onal Shoe Co. v. Washi ngton, 326 U.S. 310, 31617 (1945).
121
I d. at 319.
122
Travel ers Heal th Assn v. Vi rgi ni a ex rel . State Corp. Commn, 339 U.S. 643
(1950). The deci si on was 5-to4 wi th one of the majori ty Justi ces al so contri buti ng
a concurri ng opi ni on. I d. at 651 (Justi ce Dougl as). The possi bl e si gni fi cance of the
concurrence i s that i t appears to di sagree wi th the i mpl i cati on of the majori ty opi n-
i on, i d. at 64748, that a States l egi sl ati ve juri sdi cti on and i ts judi ci al juri sdi cti on
are coextensi ve. I d. at 65253 (di sti ngui shi ng between the use of the States judi ci al
power to enforce i ts l egi sl ati ve powers and the judi ci al juri sdi cti on when a pri vate
party i s sui ng). See id. at 659 (di ssent).
such contacts of the corporati on wi th the State of the forum as
make i t reasonabl e, i n the context of our federal system . . . , to
requi re the corporati on to defend the parti cul ar sui t whi ch i s
brought there; [and] . . . that the mai ntenance of the sui t does not
offend tradi ti onal noti ons of fai r pl ay and substanti al justi ce. . . .
An esti mate of the i nconveni ences whi ch woul d resul t to the cor-
porati on from a tri al away from i ts home or pri nci pal pl ace of
busi ness i s rel evant i n thi s connecti on.
120
As to the scope of appl i -
cati on to be accorded thi s fai r pl ay and substanti al justi ce doc-
tri ne, the Court, at l east verbal l y, concl uded that so far as . . .
[corporate] obl i gati ons ari se out of or are connected wi th acti vi ti es
wi thi n the State, a procedure whi ch requi res the corporati on to re-
spond to a sui t brought to enforce them can, i n most i nstances,
hardl y be sai d to be undue.
121
Read l i teral l y, these statements
coupl ed wi th the terms of the new doctri ne l ead to a reversal of
former deci si ons whi ch: (1) nul l i fi ed the exerci se of juri sdi cti on by
the forum State over acti ons ari si ng outsi de the State and brought
by a resi dent pl ai nti ff agai nst a forei gn corporati on doi ng busi ness
therei n wi thout havi ng been l egal l y admi tted and wi thout havi ng
consented to servi ce of process of a resi dent agent; and (2) exempt-
ed a forei gn corporati on, whi ch has been l i censed by the forum
State to do busi ness therei n and has consented to the appoi ntment
of a l ocal agent to accept process, from sui t on an acti on not ari si ng
i n the forum State and not rel ated to acti vi ti es pursued therei n.
By an extended appl i cati on of the l ogi c of the posi ti on, a major-
i ty of the Court rul ed that, notwi thstandi ng that i t sol i ci ted busi -
ness i n Vi rgi ni a sol el y through recommendati ons of exi sti ng mem-
bers and was represented therei n by no agents whatsoever, a for-
ei gn mai l order i nsurance company had through i ts pol i ci es devel -
oped such contacts and ti es wi th Vi rgi ni a resi dents that the State,
by forwardi ng noti ce to the company by regi stered mai l onl y, coul d
i nsti tute enforcement proceedi ngs under i ts Bl ue Sky Law l eadi ng
to a decree orderi ng cessati on of busi ness pendi ng compl i ance wi th
that act.
122
The due process cl ause was decl ared not to forbi d a
State to protect i ts ci ti zens from such i njusti ce of havi ng to fi l e
sui ts on thei r cl ai ms at a far di stant home offi ce of such company,
1713
123
I d. at 64749. The hol di ng i n Mi nnesota Commerci al Mens Assn v. Benn,
261 U.S. 140 (1923), that a si mi l ar mai l order i nsurance company coul d not be
vi ewed as doi ng busi ness i n the forum State and that the ci rcumstances under
whi ch i ts contracts wi th forum State ci ti zens, executed and to be performed i n i ts
State of i ncorporati on, were consummated coul d not support an i mpl i cati on that the
forei gn company had consented to be sued i n the forum State, was di sti ngui shed
rather than formal l y overrul ed. 339 U.S. at 647. I n any event, Benn, al though
unmenti oned i n the opi ni on, coul d not survi ve McGee v. I nternati onal Li fe I ns. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957).
124
McGee v. I nternati onal Li fe I ns. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
125
I d. at 223. The Court al so noti ced the proposi ti on that the i nsured coul d not
bear the cost of l i ti gati on away from home as wel l as the i nsurer. See also Perki ns
v. Benguet Consol i dati ng Mi ni ng Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), a case too atypi cal on
i ts facts to permi t much general i zati on but whi ch does appear to veri fy the i mpl i ca-
ti on of I nternational Shoe that in personam juri sdi cti on may attach to a corporati on
even where the cause of acti on does not ari se out of the busi ness done by defendant
i n the forum State, as wel l as to state, i n di ctum, that the mere presence of a cor-
porate offi ci al wi thi n the State on busi ness of the corporati on woul d suffi ce to create
juri sdi cti on i f the cl ai m arose out of that busi ness and servi ce were made on hi m
wi thi n the State. I d. at 44445. The Court hel d that the State coul d, but was not
requi red to, assert juri sdi cti on over a corporati on owni ng gol d and si l ver mi nes i n
the Phi l i ppi nes but temporari l y (because of the Japanese occupati on) carryi ng on a
part of i ts general busi ness i n the forum State, i ncl udi ng di rectors meeti ngs, busi -
ness correspondence, banki ng, and the l i ke, al though i t owned no mi ni ng properti es
i n the State.
especi al l y i n vi ew of the fact that such sui ts coul d be more conven-
i entl y tri ed i n Vi rgi ni a where cl ai ms of l oss coul d be i nves-
ti gated.
123
Li kewi se, under a Cal i forni a statute, subjecti ng forei gn
mai l order i nsurance compani es to sui t i n Cal i forni a on i nsurance
contracts wi th resi dents thereof, peti ti oner was enabl ed to obtai n
a val i d judgment i n a Cal i forni a court agai nst a Texas i nsurer
served onl y by regi stered mai l .
124
The contract between the com-
pany and the i nsured speci fi ed that Austi n, Texas, was the pl ace
of maki ng and the pl ace where l i abi l i ty shoul d be deemed to
ari se. The company mai l ed premi um noti ces to the i nsured i n Cal i -
forni a, and he mai l ed hi s premi um payments to the company i n
Texas. Acknowl edgi ng that the connecti on of the company wi th
Cal i forni a was tenuous i t had no offi ce or agents i n the State, no
evi dence had been presented that i t had sol i ci ted anyone other
than thi s i nsured for busi ness the Court sustai ned juri sdi cti on on
the basi s that the sui t was on a contract whi ch had a substanti al
connecti on wi th Cal i forni a. The contract was del i vered i n Cal i for-
ni a, the premi ums were mai l ed there and the i nsured was a resi -
dent of that State when he di ed. I t cannot be deni ed that Cal i forni a
has a mani fest i nterest i n provi di ng effecti ve means of redress for
i ts resi dents when thei r i nsurers refuse to pay cl ai ms.
125
Looki ng back over the l ong hi story of l i ti gati on a trend i s
cl earl y di scerni bl e toward expandi ng the permi ssi bl e scope of state
1714
126
McGee v. I nternati onal Li fe I ns. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957). An excepti on
exi sts wi th respect to in personam juri sdi cti on i n domesti c rel ati ons cases, at l east
i n some i nstances. E.g., Vanderbi l t v. Vanderbi l t, 354 U.S. 416 (1957) (hol di ng that
suffi ci ent contacts afforded Nevada i n personam juri sdi cti on over a New York resi -
dent wi fe for purposes of di ssol vi ng the marri age but Nevada di d not have juri sdi c-
ti on to termi nate the wi fes cl ai ms for support).
127
357 U.S. 235 (1958). The deci si on was 5-to4. See i d. at 256 (Justi ce Bl ack
di ssenti ng), 262 (Justi ce Dougl as di ssenti ng).
128
I d. at 251. I n di ssent, Justi ce Bl ack observed that of course we have not
reached the poi nt where state boundari es are wi thout si gni fi cance and I do not
mean to suggest such a vi ew here. I d. at 260.
juri sdi cti on over forei gn corporati ons and other nonresi dents.
126
However, duri ng the same Term, the Court found in personam ju-
ri sdi cti on l acki ng for the fi rst ti me si nce I nternational Shoe, and
after a l ong peri od of decl i ni ng to revi ew the exerci se of state court
juri sdi cti on the Court pronounced fi rm due process l i mi tati ons.
Thus, i n Hanson v. Denckla,
127
the i ssue was whether Fl ori da
courts obtai ned through use of ordi nary mai l and publ i cati on juri s-
di cti on over corporate trustees of property the subject of a contest
over a wi l l ; the wi l l had been entered i nto and probated i n Fl ori da,
the trustees were resi dent i n Del aware and were i ndi spensabl e
parti es wi th cl ai mants who were resi dent i n Fl ori da and who had
been personal l y served. Noti ng the trend i n enl argi ng the abi l i ty of
the States to obtai n in personam juri sdi cti on over absent defend-
ants, the Court deni ed that the States coul d exerci se nati onwi de in
personam juri sdi cti on and sai d that i t woul d be a mi stake to as-
sume that thi s trend heral ds the eventual demi se of al l restri cti ons
on the personal juri sdi cti on of state courts.
128
The Court recog-
ni zed that Fl ori da l aw was the most appropri ate l aw to be appl i ed
i n determi ni ng the val i di ty of the wi l l and that the corporate de-
fendants mi ght be l i ttl e i nconveni enced by havi ng to appear i n
Fl ori da courts, but i t deni ed that ei ther ci rcumstance sati sfi ed the
due process cl ause. The due process restri cti ons di d more than
guarantee i mmuni ty from i nconveni ent or di stant l i ti gati on. They
are consequences of terri tori al l i mi tati ons on the power of the re-
specti ve States. However mi ni mal the burden of defendi ng i n a for-
ei gn tri bunal , a defendant may not be cal l ed upon to do so unl ess
he has the mi ni mum contacts wi th that State that are a pre-
requi si te to i ts exerci se of power over hi m. The onl y contacts the
corporate defendants had i n Fl ori da consi sted of a rel ati onshi p wi th
the i ndi vi dual defendants. The uni l ateral acti vi ty of those who
cl ai m some rel ati onshi p wi th a nonresi dent defendant cannot sat-
i sfy the requi rement of contact wi th the forum State. The appl i ca-
ti on of that rul e wi l l vary wi th the qual i ty and nature of the de-
fendants acti vi ty, but i t i s essenti al i n each case that there be
some act by whi ch the defendant purposeful l y avai l s hi msel f of the
1715
129
I d. at 251, 25354. Justi ce Bl ack argued that the rel ati onshi p of the non-
resi dent defendants, of the subject of the l i ti gati on to the forum State, upon an anal -
ogy of choi ce of l aw and forum non conveniens, made Fl ori da the natural and con-
sti tuti onal basi s for asserti ng juri sdi cti on. I d. at 25859. The Court has numerous
ti mes asserted that contacts suffi ci ent for the purpose of desi gnati ng a parti cul ar
States l aw as appropri ate may be i nsuffi ci ent for the purpose of asserti ng juri sdi c-
ti on. See Shaffer v. Hei tner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977); Kul ko v. Superi or Court, 436
U.S. 84, 98 (1978); Worl d-Wi de Vol kswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294
95 (1980). On the due process l i mi ts on choi ce of l aw deci si ons, see Al l state I nsur-
ance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
130
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
131
I d. at 297.
132
I d. at 299.
pri vi l ege of conducti ng acti vi ti es wi thi n the forum State, thus i n-
voki ng the benefi ts and protecti ons of i ts l aws. . . . The settl ors
executi on i n Fl ori da of her power of appoi ntment cannot remedy
the absence of such an act i n thi s case.
129
I n World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
130
the Court ap-
pl i ed i ts mi ni mum contacts test to precl ude the asserti on of juri s-
di cti on over two forei gn corporati ons that di d no busi ness i n the
forum State. Pl ai nti ffs sustai ned personal i njuri es i n Okl ahoma i n
an acci dent i nvol vi ng an al l eged defect i n thei r automobi l e, whi ch
they had purchased the previ ous year i n New York, whi l e they
were New York resi dents, and whi ch they were dri vi ng through
Okl ahoma on thei r way to a new resi dence i n Ari zona. Defendants
were the automobi l e retai l er and i ts whol esal er, New York corpora-
ti ons that di d no busi ness i n Okl ahoma. The Court found no ci r-
cumstances justi fyi ng asserti on by Okl ahoma courts of juri sdi cti on
over defendants. They (1) carri ed on no acti vi ty i n Okl ahoma, (2)
cl osed no sal es and performed no servi ces there, (3) avai l ed them-
sel ves of none of the benefi ts of the States l aws, (4) sol i ci ted no
busi ness there ei ther through sal espersons or through adverti si ng
reasonabl y cal cul ated to reach the State, and (5) sol d no cars to
Okl ahoma resi dents or i ndi rectl y served or sought to serve the
Okl ahoma market. The uni l ateral acti on of the purchasers i n dri v-
i ng the car to Okl ahoma was i nsuffi ci ent to create the ki nds of req-
ui si te contacts. Whi l e i t mi ght have been foreseeabl e that the auto-
mobi l e woul d travel to Okl ahoma, foreseeabi l i ty i s rel evant onl y i n-
sofar as the defendants conduct and connecti on wi th the forum
State are such that he shoul d reasonabl y anti ci pate bei ng hal ed
i nto court there.
131
Further, whatever margi nal revenues peti -
ti oners may recei ve by vi rtue of the fact that thei r products are ca-
pabl e of use i n Okl ahoma i s far too attenuated a contact to justi fy
that States exerci se of in personam juri sdi cti on over them.
132
Thus, a defendant must, as the Court sai d i n Denckla, purpose-
ful l y [avai l ] i tsel f of the pri vi l ege of conducti ng acti vi ti es wi thi n the
1716
133
Hanson v. Denckl a, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1985), quoted in Worl d-Wi de Vol ks-
wagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
134
I d. at 298. Of the three di ssenters, Justi ce Brennan argued that the mi ni -
mum contacts test was obsol ete and that juri sdi cti on shoul d be predi cated upon the
bal anci ng of the i nterests of the forum State and pl ai nti ffs agai nst the actual bur-
den i mposed on defendant, i d. at 299, whi l e Justi ces Marshal l and Bl ackmun ap-
pl i ed the test and found juri sdi cti on because of the foreseeabi l i ty of defendants that
a defecti ve product of thei rs mi ght cause i njury i n a di stant State and because the
defendants had entered i nto an i nterstate economi c network. I d. at 313. The bal -
anci ng of i nterests test was appl i ed i n Asahi Metal I ndustry Co. v. Superi or Court,
480 U.S. 102 (1987), hol di ng unreasonabl e exerci se of juri sdi cti on by a Cal i forni a
court over an i ndemni ty acti on by a Tai wan ti re manufacturer agai nst a Japanese
manufacturer of ti re val ves, the underl yi ng damage acti on by a Cal i forni a motori st
havi ng been settl ed.
135
Keeton v. Hustl er Magazi ne, 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (hol di ng as wel l that the
forum state may appl y si ngl e publ i cati on rul e maki ng defendant l i abl e for nati on-
wi de damages).
136
Cal der v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (juri sdi cti on over reporter and edi tor
responsi bl e for defamatory arti cl e whi ch they knew woul d be ci rcul ated i n subjects
home state).
137
Burger Ki ng Corp. v. Rudzewi cz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). But cf. Hel i copteros
Naci onal es de Col ombi a v. Hal l , 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (purchases and trai ni ng wi thi n
state, both unrel ated to cause of acti on, are i nsuffi ci ent to justi fy general in perso-
nam juri sdi cti on).
forum State,
133
i f not by carryi ng on busi ness there wi thi n the
consti tuti onal sense, at l east by del i veri ng i ts products i nto the
stream of commerce wi th the expectati on that they wi l l be pur-
chased by consumers i n the forum State.
134
The Court has appl i ed I nternational Shoe pri nci pl es i n several
more si tuati ons. Ci rcul ati on of a magazi ne i n the forum state i s an
adequate basi s for juri sdi cti on over the corporate magazi ne pub-
l i sher i n a l i bel acti on; the fact that the pl ai nti ff has no contact
wi th the forum state i s not di sposi ti ve si nce the i nqui ry focuses on
the rel ati ons among the defendant, the forum, and the l i ti ga-
ti on.
135
On the other hand, damage done to the pl ai nti ffs reputa-
ti on i n hi s home state caused by ci rcul ati on of a defamatory maga-
zi ne arti cl e there may justi fy asserti on of juri sdi cti on that woul d
otherwi se be absent.
136
Whi l e there i s no per se rul e that a con-
tract wi th an out-of-state party automati cal l y establ i shes juri sdi c-
ti on to enforce the contract i n the other partys forum, a franchi see
who has entered i nto a franchi se contract wi th an out-of-state cor-
porati on may be subject to sui t i n the corporati ons home state
where the overal l ci rcumstances (contract terms themsel ves, course
of deal i ngs) demonstrate a del i berate reachi ng out to establ i sh con-
tacts wi th the franchi sor i n the franchi sors home state.
137
Acti ons in Rem: Proceedi ngs Agai nst Land. The basi s of
in rem juri sdi cti on i s the power of a State to determi ne ti tl e to al l
property, whether tangi bl e or i ntangi bl e, l ocated wi thi n i ts bor-
1717
138
Arndt v. Gri ggs, 134 U.S. 316, 32021, 323 (1890); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1878).
139
Boswel l s Lessee v. Oti s, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336, 348 (1850).
140
Ameri can Land Co. v. Zei ss, 219 U.S. 47 (1911); Tyl er v. Judges of the Court
of Regi strati on, 175 Mass. 71, 76, 55 N.E. 812, 814 (Chi ef Justi ce Hol mes), appeal
di smi ssed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900).
141
Hul i ng v. Kaw Val l ey Ry. & I mprovement Co., 130 U.S. 559 (1889).
142
The Confi scati on Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wal l .) 92 (1874).
143
Cl arke v. Cl arke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900); Ri l ey v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S.
343 (1942).
144
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
145
Arndt v. Gri ggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890); Bal l ard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241 (1907);
Securi ty Savi ngs Bank v. Cal i forni a, 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
146
Mul l ane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Wal ker
v. Ci ty of Hutchi nson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Schroeder v. Ci ty of New York, 371 U.S.
208 (1962); Robi nson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972).
147
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
148
I d. at 212.
ders.
138
Unl i ke juri sdi cti on in personam, a judgment entered by a
court wi th in rem juri sdi cti on does not bi nd the defendant person-
al l y but determi nes the ti tl e to or status of onl y the property i n
questi on.
139
Proceedi ngs brought to regi ster ti tl e to l and,
140
to con-
demn
141
or confi scate
142
real or personal property, or to admi n-
i ster a decedents estate
143
are typi cal in rem acti ons. Due process
i s sati sfi ed by sei zure of the res and noti ce to al l who have or may
have i nterests therei n.
144
I t was formal l y the case that i n in rem
acti ons a court coul d acqui re juri sdi cti on over nonresi dents by mere
constructi ve servi ce of process,
145
under the theory that property
was al ways i n possessi on of i ts owners and that sei zure woul d af-
ford them noti ce, i nasmuch as they woul d keep themsel ves ap-
pri sed of the state of thei r property. That thi s was a fi cti on not sat-
i sfyi ng the requi rements of due process has been establ i shed and,
whatever the nature of the proceedi ng, noti ce must be gi ven i n a
manner that actual l y noti fi es the person bei ng sought or that has
a reasonabl e certai nty of resul ti ng i n such noti ce.
146
Al though the Courts hol di ng i n Shaffer v. Heitner
147
that al l
asserti ons of state-court juri sdi cti on must be eval uated accordi ng to
the [mi ni mum contacts] standards set forth i n I nternational
Shoe
148
requi res an assessment of al l deci ded cases based upon
now di savowed tests, i t does not appear that the resul ts wi l l appre-
ci abl y change for in rem juri sdi cti on over property. [T]he presence
of property i n a State may bear on the exi stence of juri sdi cti on by
provi di ng contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the
l i ti gati on. For exampl e, when cl ai ms to the property i tsel f are the
source of the underl yi ng controversy between the pl ai nti ff and the
defendant, i t woul d be unusual for the State where the property i s
l ocated not to have juri sdi cti on. I n such cases, the defendants
cl ai m to property l ocated i n the State woul d normal l y i ndi cate that
1718
149
I d. at 20708 (footnote ci tati ons omi tted). The Court al so suggested that the
State woul d usual l y have juri sdi cti on i n cases such as those ari si ng from i njuri es
suffered on the property of an absentee owner, where the defendants ownershi p of
the property i s conceded but the cause of acti on i s otherwi se rel ated to ri ghts and
duti es growi ng out of that controversy. I d.
150
95 U.S. 714 (1878). Cf. Penni ngton v. Fourth Natl Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271
(1917); Corn Exch. Bank v. Commi ssi oner, 280 U.S. 218, 222 (1930); Endi cott Co.
v. Encycl opedi a Press, 266 U.S. 285, 288 (1924).
151
Thi s theory of noti ce was di savowed sooner than the theory of juri sdi cti on.
Supra, p. 1716.
152
Atki nson v. Superi or Court, 49 Cal . 2d 338, 316 P. 2d 960 (1957), appeal dis-
missed, 357 U.S. 569 (1958) (debt sei zed i n Cal i forni a was owed to a New Yorker,
but i t had ari sen out of transacti ons i n Cal i forni a i nvol vi ng the New Yorker and
the Cal i forni a pl ai nti ff).
153
Sei der v. Roth, 17 N.Y. 2d 111, 269 N.Y.S. 2d 99, 216 N.E. 2d 312 (1966).
he expected to benefi t from the States protecti on of hi s i nterest.
The States strong i nterests i n assuri ng the marketabi l i ty of prop-
erty wi thi n i ts borders and i n provi di ng a procedure for peaceful
resol uti on of di sputes about the possessi on of that property woul d
al so support juri sdi cti on, as woul d the l i kel i hood that i mportant
records and wi tnesses wi l l be found i n the State.
149
Thus, for
true in rem acti ons, the ol d resul ts l i kel y sti l l prevai l .
Acti ons in Rem: Attachment Proceedi ngs. Al though the
practi ce of attachment goes back to col oni al ti mes, Pennoyer v.
Neff
150
was al so the most rel evant case for a l ong ti me respecti ng
the power of a State to permi t an attachment of real and personal
property si tuated wi thi n i ts borders bel ongi ng to a nonresi dent to
sati sfy a debt owed by the nonresi dent to one of i ts ci ti zens or to
settl e a cl ai m for damages founded upon a wrong i nfl i cted on the
ci ti zen by the nonresi dent. Bei ng nei ther present wi thi n the State
nor domi ci l ed therei n, the nonresi dent defendant coul d not be
served personal l y, and any judgment i n money obtai ned agai nst
hi m woul d be unenforceabl e. The sol uti on was a form of in rem pro-
ceedi ng, someti mes cal l ed quasi in rem, i nvol vi ng a l evy of a wri t
of attachment on the l ocal property of the defendant, of whi ch pro-
ceedi ng the non-resi dent need be noti fi ed merel y by publ i cati on,
151
and sati sfacti on of the judgment from the property attached; i f the
attached property was i nsuffi ci ent to sati sfy the cl ai m, the pl ai nti ff
coul d go no further.
Thi s form of proceedi ng rai sed many questi ons. Of course,
there were al ways i nstances i n whi ch i t was fai r to subject a per-
son to sui t on hi s property l ocated i n the forum State, as where the
property was rel ated to the matter sued over.
152
I n others, the
questi on was more di sputed, as i n the famous case i n whi ch the
property subject to attachment was the obl i gati on of the defend-
ants i nsurance company to defend and pay the judgment.
153
But
1719
154
198 U.S. 215 (1905).
155
Compare New York Li fe I ns. Co. v. Dunl evy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916) (acti on pur-
portedl y agai nst property wi thi n State, proceeds of an i nsurance pol i cy, was real l y
an in personam acti on agai nst cl ai mant and, cl ai mant not havi ng been served, the
judgment i s voi d). But see Western Uni on Tel . Co. v. Pennsyl vani a, 368 U.S. 71
(1961).
156
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
157
I d. at 207 (i nternal quotati on from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLI CT OF
LAWS 56, I ntroductory Note (1971)).
158
I d. The characteri zati on of acti ons in rem as bei ng not acti ons agai nst a res
but agai nst persons wi th i nterests merel y refl ects Justi ce Hol mes i nsi ght i n Tyl er
v. Judges of the Court of Regi strati on, 175 Mass. 71, 7677, 55 N.E., 812, 814, ap-
peal dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900).
the extensi on of the pri nci pl e i n Harris v. Balk
154
squarel y rai sed
the i ssue of fai rness and terri tori al i ty. The cl ai mant was a Mary-
l and resi dent who was owed a debt by Bal k, a North Carol i na resi -
dent. Apparentl y adventi ti ousl y, Harri s, al so a North Carol i na resi -
dent and owi ng Bal k an amount of money, was found passi ng
through Maryl and by the Maryl and resi dent and hi s debt to Bal k
was attached to sati sfy the debt owed to the Maryl ander. Bal k had
no noti ce of the acti on and a defaul t judgment was entered, after
whi ch Harri s pai d over the judgment to the Maryl ander. When
Bal k l ater sued Harri s i n North Carol i na to recover on hi s debt,
Harri s defended that he had been rel i eved of any further obl i gati on
by sati sfyi ng the judgment i n Maryl and, and the Supreme Court
sustai ned hi s defense, rul i ng that juri sdi cti on had been properl y
obtai ned and the Maryl and judgment was thus val i d.
155
Harris v. Balk was overrul ed i n Shaffer v. Heitner,
156
i n whi ch
the Court hel d that the mi ni mum contacts test of I nternational
Shoe appl i ed to al l in rem and quasi in rem acti ons. The case arose
under a Del aware sequestrati on statute under whi ch pl ai nti ffs
were authori zed to bri ng acti ons agai nst nonresi dent defendants by
attachi ng thei r property wi thi n Del aware, the property consi sti ng
of shares of corporate stock and opti ons to stock i n the defendant
corporati on, the stock bei ng consi dered to be i n Del aware because
of the i ncorporati on i n Del aware, al though none of the certi fi cates
representi ng the sei zed stocks was physi cal l y present i n Del aware.
The reason for appl yi ng the same test as i s appl i ed i n in personam
cases, the Court sai d, i s si mpl e and strai ghtforward. I t i s premi sed
on recogni ti on that [t]he phrase judi ci al juri sdi cti on over a thi ng,
i s a customary el l i pti cal way of referri ng to juri sdi cti on over the i n-
terests of persons i n a thi ng.
157
Thus, [t]he recogni ti on l eads to
the concl usi on that i n order to justi fy an exerci se of juri sdi cti on in
rem, the basi s for juri sdi cti on must be suffi ci ent to justi fy exerci s-
i ng juri sdi cti on over the i nterests of persons i n a thi ng.
158
1720
159
444 U.S. 320 (1980).
160
I d. 32830. I n di ssent, Justi ces Brennan and Stevens argued that what the
state courts had done was the functi onal equi val ent of di rect-acti on statutes. I d. at
333 (Justi ce Stevens); Worl d-Wi de Vol kswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299
(1980) (Justi ce Brennan). The Court, however, refused so to vi ew the Mi nnesota gar-
ni shment acti on, sayi ng that [t]he States abi l i ty to exert i ts power over the nomi -
nal defendant i s anal yti cal l y prerequi si te to the i nsurers entry i nto the case as a
garni shee. I d. at 33031. Presumabl y, the comment i s not meant to undermi ne the
val i di ty of such di rect-acti on statutes, whi ch was uphel d i n Watson v. Empl oyers Li -
abi l i ty Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), a choi ce-of-l aw case rather than a juri s-
di cti on case.
161
Supra, p. 1718 n.153. See OConner v. Lee-Hy Pavi ng Corp., 579 F.2d 194
(2d Ci r.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978).
162
Goodri ch v. Ferri s, 214 U.S. 71, 80 (1909); McCaughey v. Lyal l , 224 U.S. 558
(1912).
163
Baker v. Baker, Eccl es & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917); Ri l ey v. New York Trust
Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942).
164
I d. at 353.
A further ti ghteni ng of juri sdi cti onal standards occurred i n
Rush v. Savchuk.
159
The pl ai nti ff was i njured i n a one-automobi l e
acci dent i n I ndi ana whi l e a passenger i n an automobi l e dri ven by
defendant. Pl ai nti ff l ater moved to Mi nnesota and sued defendant,
sti l l resi dent i n I ndi ana, i n state court i n Mi nnesota. There were
no contacts between the defendant and Mi nnesota, but defendants
i nsurance company di d busi ness there and pl ai nti ff garni shed the
i nsurance contract, si gned i n I ndi ana, under whi ch the company
was obl i gated to defend defendant i n l i ti gati on and i ndemni fy hi m
to the extent of the pol i cy l i mi ts. The Court refused to permi t juri s-
di cti on to be grounded on the contract; the contacts justi fyi ng juri s-
di cti on must be those of the defendant engagi ng i n purposeful ac-
ti vi ty rel ated to the forum.
160
Rush thus resul ted i n the demi se of
the controversi al Seider v. Roth doctri ne, whi ch l ower courts had
struggl ed to save after Shaffer v. Heitner.
161
Acti ons in Rem: Estates, Trusts, Corporati ons. Probate
admi ni strati on, bei ng i n the nature of a proceedi ng in rem, i s one
to whi ch al l the worl d i s charged wi th noti ce.
162
General l y, probate
wi l l be opened i n the proper court of the decedents domi ci l e, and
as to the assets i n that State the probate judgment i s in rem and
determi nati ve as to al l ; i nsofar as i t affects property, l and or per-
sonal ty, beyond the State, the judgment i s in personam and can
bi nd onl y parti es thereto or thei r pri vi es.
163
That i s, the ful l fai th
and credi t cl ause and statute woul d not prevent an attack i n the
forum of the si tus of the property on the fi rst courts fi ndi ng of
domi ci l e as a predi cate to deci di ng the di sposi ti on of the prop-
erty.
164
The di ffi cul ty of characteri zati on of the exi stence of the res
i n a parti cul ar juri sdi cti on i s i l l ustrated by the in rem aspects of
1721
165
357 U.S. 235 (1957). The in personam aspect of thi s deci si on i s consi dered
supra, p. 1714.
166
I d. at 246.
167
I d. at 24750. The four di ssenters, Justi ces Bl ack, Burton, Brennan, and
Dougl as, bel i eved that the transfer i n Fl ori da of $400,000 made by a domi ci l i ary and
affecti ng benefi ci ari es, al most al l of whom l i ved i n that State, gave ri se to a suffi -
ci ent connecti on wi th Fl ori da to support an adjudi cati on by i ts courts of the effec-
ti veness of the transfer. I d. at 256, 262.
168
Hami l ton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256 (1896); Securi ty Savi ngs Bank v. Cal i for-
ni a, 263 U.S. 282 (1923). See also Voel l er v. Nei l ston Co., 311 U.S. 531 (1941).
169
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Hanson v. Denckla.
165
There, the decedent, whi l e a resi dent of
Pennsyl vani a, created a trust wi th a Del aware corporati on as trust-
ee. She reserved the power to appoi nt the remai nder, after her re-
served l i fe estate, ei ther by testamentary di sposi ti on or by inter
vivos i nstrument. After she moved to Fl ori da, she executed a new
wi l l and a new power of appoi ntment under the trust, whi ch di d
not sati sfy the requi rements for testamentary di sposi ti on under
Fl ori da l aw. Upon her death, di spute arose as to whether the prop-
erty passed pursuant to the terms of the power of appoi ntment or
i n accordance wi th the resi duary cl ause of the wi l l . Whi l e the Fl or-
i da courts had in personam juri sdi cti on over i ndi vi dual defendants,
they attempted to assert in rem juri sdi cti on over the Del aware cor-
porati on. Asserti ng the ol d theory that a courts in rem juri sdi cti on
i s l i mi ted by the extent of i ts power and by the coordi nate author-
i ty of si ster States,
166
i .e., whether the court has juri sdi cti on over
the thi ng, the Court thought i t cl ear that the trust assets that were
the subject of the sui t were l ocated i n Del aware and thus the Fl or-
i da courts had no in rem juri sdi cti on. The Court di d not expressl y
consi der whether the I nternational Shoe test shoul d appl y to such
in rem juri sdi cti on, as i t has now hel d i t general l y must, but i t di d
bri efl y consi der whether Fl ori das i nterests ari si ng from i ts author-
i ty to probate and construe i ts domi ci l i arys wi l l , under whi ch the
forei gn assets mi ght pass, were a suffi ci ent basi s of in rem juri sdi c-
ti on and deci ded they were not.
167
The effort of I nternational Shoe
i n thi s area i s sti l l to be di scerned.
The ol d Pennoyer rul e, that sei zure of property was suffi ci ent
to gi ve noti ce to nonresi dent or absent defendants, was l i kewi se ap-
pl i ed i n statutory proceedi ngs for the forfei ture of abandoned prop-
erty. Judgments i n proceedi ngs to determi ne successi on to property
i n escheat were hel d bi ndi ng on al l when personal servi ce of sum-
mons was made on al l known cl ai mants and constructi ve noti ce by
publ i cati on to al l cl ai mants who were unknown or nonresi dent.
168
But i n Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
169
the Court
hel d that the characteri zati on of an acti on as in rem or in perso-
nam di d not determi ne what process was due i n a statutory proce-
1722
170
Western Uni on Tel egraph Co. v. Pennsyl vani a, 368 U.S. 71 (1961); Texas v.
New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965).
171
There . . . must be a basi s for the defendants amenabi l i ty to servi ce of
summons. Absent consent, thi s means there must be authori zati on for servi ce of
summons on the defendant. Omni Capi tal I ntl v. Rudol ph Wol ff & Co., 484 U.S.
97 (1987).
172
Mul l ane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
173
McDonal d v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1971).
174
Greene v. Li ndsey, 456 U.S. 444, 449 (1982).
dure whereby a bank managi ng a common trust fund i n favor of
nonresi dent as wel l as resi dent benefi ci ari es coul d obtai n a judi ci al
settl ement of accounts whi ch was concl usi ve on al l , wi th the onl y
noti ce bei ng publ i cati on i n a l ocal paper. Such noti ce by publ i cati on
was necessari l y suffi ci ent as to benefi ci ari es whose i nterests or ad-
dresses were unknown to the bank, the Court hel d, but as to those,
resi dent and nonresi dent al i ke, whose whereabouts were known, i t
was feasi bl e to make seri ous efforts to noti fy them at l east by mai l
to thei r addresses on record wi th the bank. The rul e has been ap-
pl i ed i n the escheat si tuati on, and the Court fi ndi ng that a con-
tacts test woul d not be workabl e i n thi s fi el d has hel d that, i nas-
much as due process woul d prevent more than one State from es-
cheati ng a gi ven i tem of property, because of ease of admi ni strati on
rather than l ogi c and juri sdi cti on, the State of resi dence shown by
the l ast known address on a companys books woul d have the au-
thori ty to take by escheat the uncol l ected cl ai ms agai nst a corpora-
ti on l ocated i n a parti cul ar State.
170
Noti ce: Servi ce of Process. I t i s not enough, however, that
a State be potenti al l y capabl e of exerci si ng control over persons
and property. Before a State l egi ti matel y can exerci se such power
to al ter pri vate i nterests, i ts juri sdi cti on must be perfected by the
empl oyment of an appropri ate mode of servi ng process deemed ef-
fecti ve to acquai nt al l parti es of the i nsti tuti on of proceedi ngs cal -
cul ated to affect thei r ri ghts.
171
An el ementary and fundamental
requi rement of due process i n any proceedi ng whi ch i s to be ac-
corded fi nal i ty i s noti ce reasonabl y cal cul ated, under al l the ci r-
cumstances, to appri se i nterested parti es of the pendency of the ac-
ti on and afford them an opportuni ty to present thei r objecti ons.
172
Personal servi ce guarantees actual noti ce of the pendency of a l egal
acti on; i t thus presents the i deal ci rcumstance under whi ch to com-
mence l egal proceedi ngs agai nst a person, and has tradi ti onal l y
been deemed necessary i n acti ons styl ed in personam.
173
But l ess
ri gorous noti ce procedures have been accepted, i n l i ght of hi story
and of the practi cal obstacl es to provi di ng personal servi ce i n every
i nstance, and these procedures do not carry wi th them the same
certai nty of actual noti ce that i nheres i n personal servi ce.
174
But,
whether the acti on be in rem or in personam, there i s a consti tu-
1723
175
I n Greene v. Li ndsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982), the Court hel d that i n l i ght of
substanti al evi dence that noti ces posted on the doors of apartments i n a housi ng
project i n an evi cti on proceedi ng were often torn down by chi l dren and others before
tenants ever saw them, servi ce by posti ng di d not comport wi th due process. Wi th-
out requi ri ng i t, the Court observed that the mai l s provi ded an effi ci ent and i nex-
pensi ve means of communi cati on upon whi ch prudent men coul d rel y and that no-
ti ce by mai l woul d provi de a reasonabl e assurance of noti ce. I d. at 455. See also
Mennoni te Bd. of Mi ssi ons v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983) (personal servi ce or noti ce
by mai l i s requi red for mortgagee of real property subject to tax sal e); Tul sa Profes-
si onal Col l ecti on Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) (noti ce by mai l or other appro-
pri ate means to reasonabl y ascertai nabl e credi tors of probated estate).
176
E.g., McGee v. I nternati onal Li fe I ns. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Travel ers
Heal th Assn ex rel . State Corp. Commn, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
177
See, e.g., G.D. Searl e & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404, 40912 (1982) (di scussi ng
New Jerseys l ong-arm rul e, under whi ch a pl ai nti ff must make every effort to
serve process upon someone wi thi n the State and then onl y i f after di l i gent i nqui ry
and effort personal servi ce cannot be made wi thi n the State, then servi ce may be
made by mai l i ng, by regi stered or certi fi ed mai l , return recei pt requested, a copy
of the summons and compl ai nt to a regi stered agent for servi ce, or to i ts pri nci pal
pl ace of busi ness, or to i ts regi stered offi ce.). Cf. Vel mohos v. Maren Engi neeri ng
Corp., 83 N.J. 282, 416 A.2d 372 (1980), vacated and remanded, 455 U.S. 985 (1982).
178
Phi l l i ps Petrol eum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
179
E.g., Watson v. Empl oyers Li abi l i ty Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) (au-
thori zi ng di rect acti on agai nst i nsurance carri er rather than agai nst the i nsured).
ti onal mi ni mum; i f i t be shown that the noti ce used was not rea-
sonabl y cal cul ated to provi de the necessary i nformati on, i ts age and
hi story wi l l not sustai n i t.
175
The functi on of mai l , i ndeed, as conveyi ng suffi ci ent noti ce, has
become qui te establ i shed,
176
and the devel opment of the abi l i ty of
States, qui te contrary to the Pennoyer theory, to assert in personam
juri sdi cti on extraterri tori al l y upon i ndi vi dual s and corporati ons
havi ng mi ni mum contacts wi th the forum State, resul ted i n the
passage of l ong-arm juri sdi cti onal statutes under whi ch noti ce
was practi cal l y al ways by mai l .
177
I n a cl ass acti on, due process i s
sati sfi ed by noti fi cati on by mai l of out-of-state cl ass members, wi th
opportuni ty to opt out but wi th no requi rement that i ncl usi on i n
the cl ass be conti ngent upon affi rmati ve response.
178
Other servi ce
devi ces, and substi tuti ons, have been pursued and show some
promi se of further l ooseni ng of the concept of terri tori al i ty even
whi l e compl yi ng wi th mi ni mum due process standards of noti ce.
179
The Procedure Which Is Due Process
The I nterests Protected: Enti tl ements and Posi ti vi st Rec-
ogni ti on. The requi rements of procedural due process appl y onl y
to the depri vati on of i nterests encompassed by the Fourteenth
Amendments protecti on of l i berty and property. When protected i n-
terests are i mpl i cated, the ri ght to some ki nd of pri or heari ng i s
paramount. But the range of i nterests protected by procedural due
1724
180
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 56970 (1972). Devel opments under
the Fi fth Amendments due process cl ause have been i nterchangeabl e. Cf. Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
181
Morri ssey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1982).
process i s not i nfi ni te.
180
Whether any procedural protecti ons are
due depends upon an anal ysi s whi ch of whether the nature of the
i nterest i s one wi thi n the contempl ati on of the l i berty or property
l anguage of the Fourteenth Amendment.
181
Tradi ti onal l y, the
Court has accorded due process recogni ti on to ones l i fe, l i berty, or
property as determi ned by reference to common understandi ng, as
embodi ed i n the devel opment of the common l aw. Ones ri ght of l i fe
exi sted i ndependentl y of any formal guarantee of i t and coul d be
taken away onl y by the state pursuant to the formal processes of
l aw for offenses agai nst l aw deemed by a l egi sl ati ve body to be par-
ti cul arl y hei nous. Ones l i berty, ones freedom from bodi l y restrai nt,
was a natural ri ght to be forfei ted onl y pursuant to l aw and stri ct
formal procedures. Ones ownershi p of l ands, chattel s, and other
properti es, to be sure, was hi ghl y dependent upon l egal protecti ons
of ri ghts commonl y associ ated wi th that ownershi p, but i t was a
concept uni versal l y understood i n Angl o-Ameri can countri es.
Expansi on of the understandi ng embodi ed i n the l i berty and
property aspects of the cl ause began i n the 1960s and fol l owed an
i nconsi stent path of accel erati on and rei ni ng-i n to the present. I t
has previ ousl y been noted that the Courts constructi on of l i berty
has l ong been much broader than woul d be encompassed wi thi n
freedom from bodi l y restrai nt; whi l e l i berty of contract met i ts de-
mi se, the ri se of ri ghts of pri vacy, whi ch i ncl uded mari tal and i nti -
mate rel ati onshi ps, i nterests i n ones di gni ty and reputati onal con-
cerns, and the l i ke, conti nues to l ead to enl argement of the com-
pass of the doctri ne. A wi deni ng of the property concept i n the
1960s occurred wi th respect to accordi ng protecti on to such publ i c
benefi ts as wel fare assi stance and other benefi ts and pri vi l eges
that government conferred and that i t coul d wi thdraw al together
for everyone, but as to whi ch i ndi vi dual reci pi ents and cl ai mants
had to be accorded proper procedures before they coul d l ose thei r
enti tl ement. Si mi l arl y, other ki nds of condi ti onal property ri ghts,
such as the i nterest of an i nstal l ment buyer of goods i n retai ni ng
control unti l i t coul d be shown he was i n defaul t, were accorded
greater protecti on.
The key to thi s expansi on may be found i n the i ntertwi ned doc-
tri nal strands of juri sprudenti al theory under whi ch the ri ght-
pri vi l ege di sti ncti on was abandoned and a posi ti vi st concepti on of
enti tl ements arose. The former pri nci pl e, di scussed previ ousl y i n
1725
182
Supra, pp. 108490.
183
McAul i ffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 2d 517, 522
(1892).
184
Bai l ey v. Ri chardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Ci r. 1950), affd by an equal l y di -
vi ded Court, 314 U.S. 918 (1951); Adl er v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
185
Fl emmi ng v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
186
Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
187
Perry v. Si nderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). See Spei ser v. Randal l , 357
U.S. 513 (1958).
188
See Wi l l i am Van Al styne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). Much of the ol d fi ght had to do
wi th i mposi ti on of condi ti ons on admi tti ng corporati ons i nto a State. Cf. Western &
Southern Li fe I ns. Co. v. State Bd. of Equal i zati on, 451 U.S. 648, 65668 (1981) (re-
vi ewi ng the cases). That the ri ght-pri vi l ege di sti ncti on i s not total l y mori bund i s evi -
dent. See Buckl ey v. Val eo, 424 U.S. 1, 10809 (1976) (sustai ni ng as qual i fi cati on
for publ i c fi nanci ng of campai gn agreement to abi de by expendi ture l i mi tati ons oth-
erwi se unconsti tuti onal ); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
189
That i s, Congress or a state l egi sl ature coul d si mpl y take away part or al l
of the benefi t. Ri chardson v. Bel cher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); Uni ted States Rai l road Re-
ti rement Bd. v. Fri tz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980); Logan v. Zi mmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422, 43233 (1982).
the Fi rst Amendment context,
182
was pi thi l y summari zed by Jus-
ti ce Hol mes years ago i n di smi ssi ng a sui t by a pol i ceman protest-
i ng the di smi ssal from hi s job. The peti ti oner may have a consti tu-
ti onal ri ght to tal k pol i ti cs, but he has no consti tuti onal ri ght to be
a pol i ceman.
183
Most often, the asserti on that one had no vested
property i nterest i n somethi ng was made to justi fy the taki ng of
that i nterest or the di sregardi ng of that i nterest wi thout sub-
stanti ve restrai nts bei ng rel evant, but i t was al so true that i t was
sai d that i f somethi ng was onl y a pri vi l ege, such as government
empl oyment
184
or some form of publ i c assi stance,
185
procedural
due process guarantees were al so i nappl i cabl e.
186
I n other words,
i f government need not provi de somethi ng, i t coul d provi de i t wi th
any attached condi ti ons i t mi ght choose. Thi s l i ne of thought was
al ways opposed by the unconsti tuti onal condi ti ons doctri ne, under
whi ch i t was sai d that even though a person has no ri ght to a
val uabl e government benefi t and even though the government may
deny hi m the benefi t for any number of reasons, i t may not do so
on a basi s that i nfri nges hi s consti tuti onal l y protected i nterests
especi al l y, hi s i nterest i n freedom of speech.
187
Nonethel ess, the
two doctri nes coexi sted i n an unstabl e rel ati onshi p, unti l , i n the
1960s and thereafter, the ri ght-pri vi l ege di sti ncti on was l argel y
shel ved.
188
Concurrentl y wi th the vi rtual demi se of the ri ght-pri vi l ege
di sti ncti on, there arose the enti tl ement doctri ne, under whi ch the
Court erected a barri er of procedural but not substanti ve protec-
ti ons agai nst erroneous governmental depri vati on of somethi ng i t
mi ght wi thi n i ts di screti on have bestowed.
189
Thus, the Court
found protected i nterests created by posi ti ve state enactments or
1726
190
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
191
I d. at 26162. See also Mathews v. El dri dge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (Soci al Se-
curi ty benefi ts).
192
Sni adach v. Fami l y Fi nance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
193
Fuentes v. Shevi n, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
194
Bel l v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). Compare Di xon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105
(1977) with Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
practi ces; that i s, the source of a ri ght was ascertai ned not from
tradi ti on or the common l aw or natural ri ghts, but rather a prop-
erty or l i berty i nterest was di scerned i n the governmental statute
or practi ce that gave ri se to i t. I ndeed, for a ti me i t appeared that
thi s posi ti vi st concepti on of ri ghts was goi ng to di spl ace the pre-
vi ous tradi ti onal sources.
That advent of the new doctri ne may be pl aced i n Goldberg v.
Kelly.
190
The Court hel d that, i nasmuch as termi nati on of wel fare
assi stance pendi ng resol uti on of a controversy over el i gi bi l i ty may
depri ve an el i gi bl e reci pi ent of the means of l i vel i hood, government
must provi de a pre-termi nati on evi denti ary heari ng i n whi ch an
i ni ti al determi nati on of the val i di ty of the di spensi ng agencys
grounds for di sconti nuance of payment coul d be made. I t was ob-
served that the state agency di d not contend that procedural due
process i s not appl i cabl e to the termi nati on of wel fare benefi ts.
Such benefi ts are a matter of statutory enti tl ement for persons
qual i fi ed to recei ve them.
191
Provi si ons for l oss of some benefi t or
pri vi l ege upon the establ i shi ng of some ground for taki ng i t away
was percei ved as gi vi ng the hol der a property i nterest enti tl i ng hi m
to proper procedure before termi nati on or revocati on.
Therefore, a wage garni shment statute whi ch fai l ed to provi de
for noti ce to the garni shee and an opportuni ty for the maki ng of
some form of determi nati on that the garni sher i s l i kel y to prevai l
before the garni shee i s depri ved of the use of hi s money, even tem-
porari l y, was hel d not to accord due process.
192
Si mi l arl y voi ded
was a repl even statute whi ch authori zed the authori ti es to sei ze
goods si mpl y upon the fi l i ng of an ex parte appl i cati on and the
posti ng of bond and the al l egati on that the possessor of the prop-
erty was i n arrears on payment on the goods and that they re-
verted to the sel l er.
193
A state motor vehi cl e fi nanci al responsi bi l -
i ty l aw whi ch provi ded that the regi strati on and l i cense of an uni n-
sured motori st i nvol ved i n an acci dent was to be suspended unl ess
he posted securi ty for the amount of damages cl ai med by an ag-
gri eved party wi thout affordi ng the dri ver any opportuni ty to rai se
the i ssue of l i abi l i ty pri or to suspensi on vi ol ated the due process
cl ause.
194
The Courts emphasi s i n these cases upon the i mportance to
the cl ai mant of retenti on of the ri ghts l ed some l ower courts to de-
1727
195
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 56971 (1972).
196
I d. at 577.
197
I d. at 57678. The Court al so hel d that no l i berty i nterest was i mpl i cated,
because i n decl i ni ng to rehi re Roth the State had not made any charges agai nst hi m
or taken any acti ons that woul d damage hi s reputati on or sti gmati ze hi m. I d. at
57275. For an i nstance of protecti on accorded a cl ai mant on the basi s of such an
acti on, see Codd v. Vegl er, 429 U.S. 624 (1977). See also Bi shop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341, 34750 (1976); Vi tek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491494 (1980); Board of Curators
v. Horowi tz, 435 U.S. 78, 8284 (1978).
198
408 U.S. 593 (1972). See Lei s v. Fl ynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979) (fi ndi ng no prac-
ti ce or mutual l y expl i ci t understandi ng creati ng i nterest).
199
416 U.S. 134 (1974).
termi ne the appl i cati on of the due process cl ause by assessi ng the
wei ghts of the i nterests i nvol ved and the harm done to one who
l ost what he was cl ai mi ng. Thi s approach, the Court hel d, was i n-
appropri ate. [W]e must l ook not to the wei ght but to the nature
of the i nterest at stake. . . . We must l ook to see i f the i nterest i s
wi thi n the Fourteenth Amendments protecti on of l i berty and prop-
erty.
195
To have a property i nterest i n the consti tuti onal sense,
the Court hel d, i t was not enough that one have an abstract need
or desi re for a benefi t, that one have onl y a uni l ateral expectati on.
He must rather have a l egi ti mate cl ai m of enti tl ement to the ben-
efi t. Property i nterests, of course, are not created by the Consti tu-
ti on. Rather, they are created and thei r di mensi ons are defi ned by
exi sti ng rul es or understandi ngs that stem from an i ndependent
source such as state l aw rul es or understandi ngs that secure cer-
tai n benefi ts and that support cl ai ms of enti tl ement to those bene-
fi ts.
196
Thus, i n Roth, the Court hel d that the refusal to renew a
teachers contract upon expi rati on of hi s one-year term i mpl i cated
no due process val ues because there was nothi ng i n the publ i c uni -
versi tys contract, regul ati ons, or pol i ci es that created any l egi ti -
mate cl ai m to reempl oyment.
197
On the other hand, i n Perry v.
Sindermann,
198
whi l e there was no contract wi th a tenure provi -
si on nor any statutory assurance of i t, the exi sti ng rul es or under-
standi ngs were deemed to provi de a l egi ti mate expectati on i nde-
pendent of any contract provi si on, so that a professor empl oyed for
several years at a publ i c col l ege, i n whi ch the actual practi ce had
the characteri sti cs of tenure, had a protected i nterest. A statutory
assurance was found i n Arnett v. Kennedy,
199
i n whi ch the ci vi l
servi ce l aws and regul ati ons made the conti nued empl oyment sub-
ject to defeasance onl y for such cause as woul d promote the effi -
ci ency of the servi ce. On the other hand, a pol i ceman who was a
permanent empl oyee under an ordi nance whi ch appeared to af-
ford hi m a conti nui ng posi ti on subject to condi ti ons subsequent was
hel d not to be protected by the due process cl ause because the fed-
eral di stri ct court had i nterpreted the ordi nance as provi di ng onl y
1728
200
Bi shop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). On i ts face, the Court noted, the or-
di nance on whi ch [cl ai mant rel i ed] may fai rl y be read as conferri ng both a prop-
erty i nterest i n empl oyment . . . [and] an enforceabl e expectati on of conti nued pub-
l i c empl oyment. I d. at 34445. The di stri ct courts deci si on had been affi rmed by
an equal l y di vi ded appeal s court and the Supreme Court deferred to the presumed
greater experti se of the l ower court judges i n readi ng the ordi nance. I d. at 345.
201
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Cf. Carey v. Pi phus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978)
(measure of damages for vi ol ati on of procedural due process i n school suspensi on
context). And see Board of Curators v. Horowi tz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (whether l i berty
or property i nterest i mpl i cated i n academi c di smi ssal s and di sci pl i ne, as contrasted
to di sci pl i nary acti ons).
202
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). See also Barry v. Barchi , 443 U.S.
55 (1979) (horse trai ners l i cense); OBannon v. Town Court Nursi ng Center, 447
U.S. 773 (1980) (statutory enti tl ement of nursi ng home resi dents protecti ng them
i n the enjoyment of assi stance and care.)
203
Regents of the Uni versi ty of Mi chi gan v. Ewi ng, 474 U.S. 214 (1985). Al -
though the Court assume[d] the exi stence of a consti tuti onal l y protecti bl e property
i nterest i n . . . conti nued enrol l ment i n a state uni versi ty, thi s l i mi ted consti tu-
ti onal ri ght i s vi ol ated onl y by a showi ng that di smi ssal resul ted from such a sub-
stanti al departure from accepted academi c norms as to demonstrate that the person
or commi ttee responsi bl e di d not actual l y exerci se professi onal judgment. 474 U.S.
at 225.
204
455 U.S. 422 (1982). A di fferent majori ty of the Court al so found an equal
protecti on deni al . I d. at 438, 443.
empl oyment at the wi l l and pl easure of the ci ty and the Supreme
Court chose not to di sturb that i nterpretati on.
200
Beyond empl oyment the Court found l egi ti mate enti tl ements
i n a vari ety of si tuati ons. Thus, because Ohi o i ncl uded wi thi n i ts
statutes a provi si on for free educati on to al l resi dents between fi ve
and 21 years of age and a compul sory-attendance at school requi re-
ment, the State was deemed to have obl i gated i tsel f to accord stu-
dents some due process heari ng ri ghts pri or to suspendi ng them,
even for such a short peri od as ten days.
201
Havi ng chosen to ex-
tend the ri ght to an educati on to peopl e of appel l ees cl ass gen-
eral l y, Ohi o may not wi thdraw that ri ght on grounds of mi s-
conduct, absent fundamental l y fai r procedures to determi ne wheth-
er the mi sconduct has occurred.
202
The Court i s hi ghl y deferen-
ti al , however, to di smi ssal deci si ons based on academi c grounds.
203
The most stri ki ng appl i cati on of such due process anal ysi s, to
date, i s Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
204
i n whi ch a state anti -
di scri mi nati on l aw requi red the enforci ng agency to convene a fact-
fi ndi ng conference wi thi n 120 days of the fi l i ng of the compl ai nt.
I nadvertentl y, the Commi ssi on schedul ed the heari ng after the ex-
pi rati on of the 120 days and the state courts hel d the requi rement
to be juri sdi cti onal , necessi tati ng di smi ssal of the compl ai nt. The
Court hel d that Logan had been deni ed due process. Hi s cause of
acti on was a property i nterest; ol der cases had cl earl y establ i shed
causes of acti on as property and, i n any event, Logans cl ai m was
an enti tl ement grounded i n state l aw and i t coul d be removed onl y
1729
205
I d. at 42833.
206
Memphi s Li ght, Gas & Water Di v. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
207
400 U.S. 433 (1971).
208
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
209
The Court, i d. at 70110, di sti ngui shed Constantineau as bei ng a reputa-
ti on-pl us case. That i s, i t i nvol ved not onl y the sti gmati zi ng of one posted but i t
al so depri ved the i ndi vi dual of a ri ght previ ousl y hel d under state l aw the ri ght
to purchase or obtai n l i quor i n common wi th the rest of the ci ti zenry. I d. at 708.
How the state l aw posi ti vel y di d thi s the Court di d not expl ai n. But, of course, the
reputati on-pl us concept i s now wel l -settl ed. Supra, p. 1727 n.197. And see Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); Si egert v. Gi l l ey, 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
210
Paul v. Davi s, 424 U.S. 693, 71112 (1976). I n a subsequent case, the Court
l ooked to deci si onal l aw and the exi stence of common-l aw remedi es as establ i shi ng
a protected property i nterest. Memphi s Li ght, Gas & Water Di v. v. Craft, 436 U.S.
1, 912 (1978).
for cause. That property i nterest exi sted i ndependentl y of the
120-day ti me peri od and coul d not si mpl y be taken away by agency
acti on or i nacti on.
205
Beyond statutory enti tl ements, the Court has
l ooked to state deci si onal l aw to fi nd that pri vate uti l i ti es may not
termi nate servi ce at wi l l but onl y for cause, for nonpayment of
charges, so that when there was a di spute about payment or the
accuracy of charges, due process requi red the uti l i ty to fol l ow pro-
cedures to resol ve the di spute pri or to termi nati ng servi ce.
206
Wi th respect to l i berty, the Court has fol l owed a somewhat
more meanderi ng path, but i t has arri ved at the same pl ace. I n
Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
207
i t i nval i dated a statutory scheme
by whi ch a person, wi thout any opportuni ty for a heari ng and re-
buttal , coul d be l abel ed an excessi ve dri nker and barred from
pl aces where al cohol was served; wi thout di scussi ng the source of
the enti tl ement, the Court noted that governmental acti on was
sti gmati zi ng the i ndi vi dual s reputati on, honor, and i ntegri ty. But,
i n Paul v. Davis,
208
the Court l ooked excl usi vel y to posi ti ve statu-
tory enactments to determi ne whether a l i berty i nterest was enti -
tl ed to protecti on. Davi s i nvol ved offi ci al defamati on of someone
the pol i ce i ncl uded pl ai nti ffs photograph and name on a l i st of ac-
ti ve shopl i fters ci rcul ated to merchants but the Court hel d that
damage to reputati on al one di d not consti tute a depri vati on of any
i nterest that the due process cl ause protected.
209
Kentucky l aw
does not extend to respondent any l egal guarantee of present enjoy-
ment of reputati on whi ch has been al tered as a resul t of peti ti on-
ers acti ons. Rather, hi s i nterest i n reputati on i s si mpl y one of a
number whi ch the State may protect agai nst i njury by vi rtue of i ts
tort l aw, provi di ng a forum for vi ndi cati on of those i nterest by
means of damage acti ons.
210
A number of l i berty i nterest cases i nvol ve pri soner ri ghts and
are deal t wi th i n the secti on on cri mi nal due process. But i n terms
of the emphasi s upon posi ti ve enti tl ements, i t i s useful to treat
1730
211
427 U.S. 215 (1976). See also Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
212
445 U.S. 480 (1980).
213
Morri ssey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpel l i , 411 U.S. 778
(1973).
214
Greenhol tz v. Nebraska Penal I nmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Connecti cut Bd.
of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981); Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14
(1981). See also Wol ff v. McDonnel l , 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (due process appl i es to for-
fei ture of good-ti me credi ts and other posi ti vi st granted pri vi l eges of pri soners).
them bri efl y here. I n Meachum v. Fano,
211
the Court hel d that a
state pri soner was not enti tl ed to a factfi ndi ng heari ng when he i s
transferred to a di fferent pri son i n whi ch the condi ti ons were sub-
stanti al l y l ess favorabl e to hi m, because (1) the due process cl ause
l i berty i nterest by i tsel f i s sati sfi ed by the i ni ti al val i d convi cti on
whi ch had depri ved hi m of l i berty, and (2) no state l aw guaranteed
hi m the ri ght to remai n i n the pri son to whi ch he was i ni ti al l y as-
si gned, subject to transfer for cause of some sort. Under state l aw,
a pri soner coul d be transferred for any reason or for no reason, and
the due process cl ause di d not mandate a di fferent resul t. The deci -
si on of pri son offi ci al s, therefore, was not dependent upon any state
of facts that woul d be found upon a heari ng. But i n Vitek v.
J ones,
212
a protected enti tl ement i nterest was found. The state
statute at i ssue permi tted transfer of a pri soner to a state mental
hospi tal for treatment, but the transfer coul d be effectuated onl y
upon a fi ndi ng, by a desi gnated physi ci an or psychol ogi st, that the
pri soner suffers from a mental di sease or defect and cannot be
gi ven treatment i n that faci l i ty. Because the transfer was condi -
ti oned upon a cause, the establ i shment of the facts necessary to
show the cause had to be done through fai r procedures.
However, the Vitek Court al so hel d that, i ndependent of the
statutory enti tl ement, the pri soner had a resi duum of l i berty i n
bei ng free from the di fferent confi nement and from the sti gma of
i nvol untary commi tment for mental di sease that the due process
cl ause protected. Thus, the Court has recogni zed, i n thi s case and
i n the cases i nvol vi ng revocati on of parol e or probati on,
213
a l i berty
i nterest that i s separate from a posi ti vi st enti tl ement and that can
be taken away onl y through proper procedures. But wi th respect to
the possi bi l i ty of parol e or commutati on or otherwi se more rapi d
rel ease, no matter how much the expectancy matters to a pri soner,
i n the absence of some form of posi ti ve enti tl ement, the pri soner
may be turned down wi thout observance of procedures.
214
Summa-
ri zi ng i ts pri or hol di ngs, the Court recentl y concl uded that two re-
qui rements must be present before a l i berty i nterest i s created i n
the pri son context: the statute or regul ati on must contai n sub-
stanti ve predi cates l i mi ti ng the exerci se of di screti on, and there
1731
215
Kentucky Dept of Correcti ons v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 45963 (1989)
(pri son regul ati ons l i sti ng categori es of vi si tors who may be excl uded, but not creat-
i ng a ri ght to have a vi si tor admi tted, contai n substanti ve predi cates but l ack
mandatory l anguage).
216
430 U.S. 651 (1977).
217
I d. at 673. The fami l y-rel ated l i berti es di scussed under substanti ve due proc-
ess, as wel l as the associ ati onal and pri vacy ones, no doubt provi de a ferti l e source
of l i berty i nterests for procedural protecti on. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545
(1965) (natural father, wi th vi si tati on ri ghts, must be gi ven noti ce and opportuni ty
to be heard wi th respect to i mpendi ng adopti on proceedi ngs); Stanl ey v. I l l i noi s, 405
U.S. 645 (1972) (unwed father coul d not si mpl y be presumed unfi t to have custody
of hi s chi l dren because hi s i nterest i n hi s chi l dren warrants deference and protec-
ti on). See also Smi th v. Organi zati on of Foster Fami l i es, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Li ttl e
v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981); Lassi ter v. Department of Soci al Servi ces, 452 U.S.
18 (1981); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
218
416 U.S. 134 (1974).
219
I d. at 155 (Justi ces Rehnqui st and Stewart and Chi ef Justi ce Burger).
must be expl i ci t mandatory l anguage requi ri ng a parti cul ar out-
come i f substanti ve predi cates are found.
215
I n I ngraham v. Wright,
216
the Court, unani mousl y, agreed
that freedom from wrongful l y or excessi vel y admi ni stered corporal
puni shment was a l i berty i nterest of school chi l dren protected by
the due process cl ause i rrespecti ve of posi ti ve state protecti on. The
l i berty preserved from depri vati on wi thout due process i ncl uded
the ri ght general l y to enjoy those pri vi l eges l ong recogni zed at
common l aw as essenti al to the orderl y pursui t of happi ness by free
men. . . . Among the hi stori c l i berti es so protected was a ri ght to
be free from, and to obtai n judi ci al rel i ef for, unjusti fi ed i ntrusi ons
on personal securi ty.
217
I n Arnett v. Kennedy,
218
three Justi ces sought to qual i fy the
pri nci pl e l ai d down i n the enti tl ement cases and to restore i n effect
much of the ri ght-pri vi l ege di sti ncti on i n a new formul ati on. Deal -
i ng wi th a federal l aw conferri ng upon empl oyees the ri ght not to
be di scharged except for cause, the Justi ces acknowl edged the pri or
formul ati on that recogni zed that due process ri ghts coul d be cre-
ated through statutory grants of enti tl ements, but they went on to
observe that the same l aw wi thhel d the procedural provi si ons now
contended for; i n other words, the property i nterest whi ch appel l ee
had i n hi s empl oyment was i tsel f condi ti oned by the procedural
l i mi tati ons whi ch had accompani ed the grant of that i nterest.
219
Congress (and state l egi sl atures) coul d qual i fy the conferral of an
i nterest the due process cl ause mi ght otherwi se requi re.
But the other si x Justi ces, whi l e di sagreei ng among themsel ves
i n other respects, rejected thi s attempt so to formul ate the i ssue.
Thi s vi ew mi sconcei ves the ori gi n of the ri ght to procedural due
process, Justi ce Powel l wrote. That ri ght i s conferred not by l egi s-
l ati ve grace but by consti tuti onal guarantee. Whi l e the l egi sl ature
1732
220
I d. at 167 (Justi ces Powel l and Bl ackmun concurri ng). See i d. at 177 (Justi ce
Whi te concurri ng and di ssenti ng), 203 (Justi ce Dougl as di ssenti ng), 206 (Justi ces
Marshal l , Dougl as, and Brennan di ssenti ng).
221
426 U.S. 341 (1976). A fi ve-to-four deci si on, the opi ni on was wri tten by Jus-
ti ce Stevens, repl aci ng Justi ce Dougl as, and was joi ned by Justi ce Powel l , who had
di sagreed wi th the theory i n Arnett. See i d. at 350, 353 n.4, 355 (di ssenti ng opi n-
i ons). The l anguage i s ambi guous and appears at di fferent poi nts to adopt both posi -
ti ons. But see i d. at 345, 347.
222
419 U.S. 565, 57374 (1975). See i d. at 584, 58687 (Justi ce Powel l di ssent-
i ng).
223
Logan v. Zi mmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982) (quoti ng Vi tek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980)).
224
Twi ni ng v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110 (1908); Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.S.
261, 265 (1912).
may el ect not to confer a property i nterest i n federal empl oyment,
i t may not consti tuti onal l y authori ze the depri vati on of such an i n-
terest, once conferred, wi thout appropri ate procedural safe-
guards.
220
Yet, i n Bishop v. Wood,
221
the Court appeared to come
cl ose to adopti ng the three-Justi ce Arnett posi ti on, the di ssenters
accusi ng the majori ty of havi ng repudi ated the majori ty posi ti on i n
Arnett, and i n Goss v. Lopez,
222
whi l e the opi ni on of the Court stat-
ed the expressed formul ati on of Justi ce Powel l i n Arnett, the Jus-
ti ce hi msel f di ssented, usi ng l anguage qui te si mi l ar to the
Rehnqui st Arnett l anguage. More recentl y, however, fi rst i n a l i b-
erty i nterest case and then i n a property i nterest case, the Court
has squarel y hel d that because mi ni mum [procedural ] requi re-
ments [are] a matter of federal l aw, they are not di mi ni shed by the
fact that the State may have speci fi ed i ts own procedures that i t
may deem adequate for determi ni ng the precondi ti ons to adverse
acti on. . . . I ndeed, any other concl usi on woul d al l ow the State to
destroy at wi l l vi rtual l y any state-created property i nterest.
223
Substanti ve enti tl ements, therefore, may owe thei r exi stence to
posi ti ve enactment, but the procedural protecti ons are found i n the
judi ci arys readi ng of the due process cl ause.
Proceedi ngs i n Whi ch Procedural Due Process Must Be
Observed. Whi l e due noti ce and a reasonabl e opportuni ty to be
heard to present ones cl ai m or defense have been decl ared to be
two fundamental condi ti ons al most uni versal l y prescri bed i n al l
systems of l aw establ i shed by ci vi l i zed countri es,
224
there are cer-
tai n proceedi ngs appropri ate for the determi nati on of vari ous ri ghts
i n whi ch the enjoyment of these two condi ti ons has not been
deemed to be consti tuti onal l y necessary. Thus, persons adversel y
affected by a speci fi c l aw cannot chal l enge i ts val i di ty on the
ground that the l egi sl ati ve body or one of i ts commi ttees gave no
noti ce of proposed l egi sl ati on, hel d no heari ngs at whi ch the person
coul d have presented hi s arguments, and gave no consi derati on to
parti cul ar poi nts of vi ew. Where a rul e of conduct appl i es to more
1733
225
Bi -Metal l i c I nvestment Co. v. State Bd. of Equal i zati on, 239 U.S. 441, 445
46 (1915). See also Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 58 (1919). And cf. Logan v. Zi m-
merman Brush Co., 445 U.S. 422, 43233 (1982).
226
Uni ted States v. Fl ori da East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
227
I d. at 245 (di sti ngui shi ng between rul e-maki ng, at whi ch l egi sl ati ve facts are
i n i ssue, and adjudi cati on, at whi ch adjudi cati ve facts are at i ssue, requi ri ng a hear-
i ng i n l atter proceedi ngs but not i n the former). See Londoner v. Ci ty of Denver,
210 U.S. 373 (1908).
228
Anderson Natl Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 24647 (1944).
than a few peopl e i t i s i mpracti cabl e that everyone shoul d have a
di rect voi ce i n i ts adopti on. The Consti tuti on does not requi re al l
publ i c acts to be done i n town meeti ng or an assembl y of the whol e.
General statutes wi thi n the state power are passed that affect the
person or property of i ndi vi dual s, someti mes to the poi nt of rui n,
wi thout gi vi ng them a chance to be heard. Thei r ri ghts are pro-
tected i n the onl y way that they can be i n a compl ex soci ety, by
thei r power, i mmedi ate or remote, over those who make the
rul e.
225
Si mi l arl y, when an admi ni strati ve agency engages i n a
l egi sl ati ve functi on, as, for exampl e, when i n pursuance of statu-
tory authori zati on i t drafts regul ati ons of general appl i cati on af-
fecti ng an unknown number of persons, i t need not, any more than
does a l egi sl ati ve assembl y, afford a heari ng pri or to promul ga-
ti on.
226
On the other hand, i f a regul ati on, someti mes denomi nated
an order, i s of l i mi ted appl i cati on, that i s, affects the property or
i nterests of speci fi c named or nameabl e i ndi vi dual s or an i denti fi -
abl e cl ass of persons, the questi on whether noti ce and heari ng i s
requi red and, i f so, whether i t must precede such acti on becomes
a matter of greater urgency and must be determi ned by eval uati on
of the factors di scussed herei n.
227
I t i s not an i ndi spensabl e requi rement of due process that
every procedure affecti ng the ownershi p or di sposi ti on of property
be excl usi vel y by judi ci al proceedi ng. Statutory proceedi ngs affect-
i ng property ri ghts whi ch, by l ater resort to the courts, secures to
adverse parti es an opportuni ty to be heard, sui tabl e to the occa-
si on, do not deny due process.
228
I n one of the i ni ti al deci si ons
construi ng the due process cl ause (thi s of the Fi fth Amendment),
the Court uphel d the acti ons of the Secretary of the Treasury, act-
i ng pursuant to statute, to obtai n from a col l ector of customs a sub-
stanti al amount of money on whi ch i t was cl ai med he was i n ar-
rears. The Treasury si mpl y i ssued a di stress warrant and sei zed
the col l ectors property, affordi ng hi m no opportuni ty for a heari ng,
and remi tti ng hi m to sui t (the statute wai vi ng the i mmuni ty of the
Uni ted States) for recovery of hi s property upon proof that he had
not wi thhel d funds from the Treasury. Whi l e acknowl edgi ng that
hi story and settl ed practi ce requi red proceedi ngs i n whi ch pl eas,
1734
229
Murrays Lessee v. Hoboken Land & I mprovement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272 (1856).
230
Coffi n Brothers & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
231
Postal Tel egraph Cabl e Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918); Baker v.
Baker, Eccl es & Co., 242 U.S. 294, 403 (1917); Loui svi l l e & Nashvi l l e R.R. v.
Schmi dt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900).
232
Li ndsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 6569 (1972). However, i f one woul d suffer
too severe an i njury between the doi ng and the undoi ng, he may avoi d the al ter-
nati ve means. Stanl ey v. I l l i noi s, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).
233
Ameri can Surety Co. v. Bal dwi n, 287 U.S. 156 (1932). Cf. Logan v. Zi mmer-
man Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 42930, 43233 (1982).
answers, and tri al s were requi si te before property coul d be taken,
the Court observed that the di stress col l ecti on of debts due the
crown had been the excepti on to the rul e i n Engl and and was of
l ong usage i n the Uni ted States, and was thus sustai nabl e.
229
I n
more modern ti mes, the Court uphel d a procedure under whi ch a
state banki ng superi ntendent, after havi ng taken over a cl osed
bank and i ssued noti ces to stockhol ders of thei r assessment, coul d
i ssue executi on for the amounts due, subject to the ri ght of each
stockhol der, by affi davi t of i l l egal i ty, to contest hi s l i abi l i ty for such
an assessment. The fact that the executi on was i ssued i n the fi rst
i nstance by a governmental offi cer and not from a court, fol l owed
by personal noti ce and a ri ght to take the case i nto court, was seen
as unobjecti onabl e.
230
A State may not, consi stent wi th the due process cl ause, en-
force a judgment agai nst a party named i n the proceedi ng wi thout
havi ng gi ven hi m an opportuni ty to be heard someti me before fi nal
judgment i s entered.
231
Wi th regard to the presentati on of every
avai l abl e defense, however, the requi rements of due process do not
necessari l y entai l affordi ng an opportuni ty to do so before entry of
judgment. The person may be remi tted to other acti ons i ni ti ated by
hi m
232
or an appeal may suffi ce. Accordi ngl y, a surety company,
objecti ng to the entry of a judgment agai nst i t on a supersedeas
bond, wi thout noti ce and an opportuni ty to be heard on the i ssue
of l i abi l i ty, was not deni ed due process where the state practi ce
provi ded the opportuni ty for such a heari ng by an appeal from the
judgment so entered. Nor coul d the company found i ts cl ai m of de-
ni al of due process upon the fact that i t l ost thi s opportuni ty for
a heari ng by i nadvertentl y pursui ng the wrong procedure i n the
state courts.
233
On the other hand, where a state appel l ate court
reversed a tri al court and entered a fi nal judgment for the defend-
ant, a pl ai nti ff who had never had an opportuni ty to i ntroduce evi -
dence i n rebuttal to certai n testi mony whi ch the tri al court deemed
i mmateri al but whi ch the appel l ate court consi dered materi al was
1735
234
Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317 (1917).
235
Gol dberg v. Kel l y, 397 U.S. 254, 26263 (1970), (quoti ng Joi nt Anti -Fasci st
Refugee Commi ttee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Justi ce Frankfurter con-
curri ng)).
236
Cafeteri a & Restaurant Workers Uni on v. McEl roy, 367 U.S. 886, 89495
(1961).
237
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
238
397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
239
Mathews v. El dri dge, 424 U.S. 319, 33949 (1976).
hel d to have been depri ved of hi s ri ghts wi thout due process of
l aw.
234
When I s Process Due. The extent to whi ch procedural due
process must be afforded the reci pi ent i s i nfl uenced by the extent
to whi ch he may be condemned to suffer gri evous l oss, . . . and de-
pends upon whether the reci pi ents i nterest i n avoi di ng that l oss
outwei ghs the governmental i nterest i n summary adjudi cati on.
235
The very nature of due process negates any concept of i nfl exi bl e
procedures uni versal l y appl i cabl e to every i magi nabl e si tuati on.
236
Due process appl i cati on, as has been noted, depends upon the na-
ture of the i nterest; the form of the due process to be appl i ed i s de-
termi ned by the wei ght of that i nterest bal anced agai nst the oppos-
i ng i nterests. The currentl y prevai l i ng standard i s that formul ated
i n Mathews v. Eldridge.
237
[I ]denti fi cati on of the speci fi c di ctates
of due process general l y requi res consi derati on of three di sti nct fac-
tors: fi rst, the pri vate i nterest that wi l l be affected by the offi ci al
acti on; second, the ri sk of erroneous depri vati on of such i nterest
through the procedures used, and probabl e val ue, i f any, of addi -
ti onal or substi tute procedural safeguards; and, fi nal l y, the Govern-
ments i nterest, i ncl udi ng the functi on i nvol ved and the fi scal and
admi ni strati ve burdens that the addi ti onal or substi tute procedural
requi rements woul d entai l .
Whereas, i n Goldberg v. Kelly,
238
the effect of termi nati on of
wel fare benefi ts coul d be devastati ng, a matter of l oss of food and
shel ter, thus mandati ng a pre-depri vati on heari ng, the termi nati on
of Soci al Securi ty benefi ts woul d be consi derabl y di fferent, i nas-
much as they are not based on fi nanci al need and a termi nated re-
ci pi ent woul d be abl e to appl y for wel fare i f need be. Moreover, the
determi nati on of i nel i gi bi l i ty for Soci al Securi ty benefi ts more often
turns upon routi ne and uncompl i cated eval uati ons of data, reduc-
i ng the l i kel i hood of error, a l i kel i hood found si gni fi cant i n Gold-
berg. Fi nal l y, the admi ni strati ve burden and other soci etal costs i n-
vol ved i n gi vi ng Soci al Securi ty reci pi ents a pre-termi nati on hear-
i ng woul d be hi gh. Therefore, a post-termi nati on heari ng, wi th ful l
retroacti ve restorati on of benefi ts, i f the cl ai mant prevai l s, was
found sati sfactory.
239
1736
240
Mi tchel l v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1975). See also i d. at 623 (Jus-
ti ce Powel l concurri ng), 629 (Justi ces Stewart, Dougl as, and Marshal l di ssenti ng).
Justi ce Whi te, who wrote Mitchell and i ncl uded the bal anci ng l anguage i n hi s di s-
sent i n Fuentes v. Shevi n, 407 U.S. 67, 99100 (1972), di d not repeat i t i n North
Georgi a Fi ni shi ng v. Di -Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975), but i t presumabl y underl i es the
reconci l i ati on of Fuentes and Mitchell i n the l atter case and the appl i cati on of Di-
Chem.
241
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
242
North Georgi a Fi ni shi ng v. Di -Chem, 419 U.S. 601, 611 n.2 (1975) (Justi ce
Powel l concurri ng). The majori ty opi ni on draws no such express di sti ncti on, see i d.
at 60506, rather emphasi zi ng that Sniadach-Fuentes do requi re observance of some
due process procedural guarantees. But see Mi tchel l v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600, 614 (1974) (opi ni on of the Court by Justi ce Whi te emphasi zi ng the wages as-
pect of the earl i er case).
243
Mi tchel l v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); North Georgi a Fi ni shi ng v.
Di -Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975). Fuentes was a deci si on of uncertai n vi abi l i ty from
the begi nni ng, i nasmuch as i t was four-to-three; argument had been heard pri or to
the date Justi ces Powel l and Rehnqui st joi ned the Court, hence nei ther parti ci pated
i n the deci si on. See Di-Chem, supra, 61619 (Justi ce Bl ackmun di ssenti ng); Mitchell,
supra, 63536 (Justi ce Stewart di ssenti ng).
Appl i cati on of the standard and other consi derati ons brought
some noteworthy changes to the process accorded debtors and i n-
stal l ment buyers. For exampl e, the previ ous cases had focused
upon the i nterests of the hol ders of the property i n not bei ng un-
justl y depri ved of the goods and funds i n thei r possessi on, i n re-
qui ri ng pre-depri vati on heari ngs. The newer cases l ooked to the i n-
terests of credi tors as wel l . The real i ty i s that both sel l er and
buyer had current, real i nterests i n the property, and the defi ni ti on
of property ri ghts i s a matter of state l aw. Resol uti on of the due
process questi on must take account not onl y of the i nterests of the
buyer of the property but those of the sel l er as wel l .
240
Thus, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
241
mandati ng a pre-
depri vati on heari ng before wages may be garni shed, i s apparentl y
to be l i mi ted to i nstances when wages, and perhaps certai n other
basi c necessi ti es, are i n i ssue and the consequences of depri vati on
woul d be severe.
242
Fuentes, whi ch extended the Sniadach pri n-
ci pl e to al l si gni fi cant property i nterests and thus mandated pre-
depri vati on heari ngs, has been l i mi ted, so that when government
provi des certai n procedural protecti ons i n structuri ng the ex parte
judi ci al determi nati ons that sei zure shoul d take pl ace and provi des
for a prompt and adequate post-depri vati on (but pre-judgment)
heari ng, the due process cl ause i s sati sfi ed.
243
To be val i d, l aws au-
thori zi ng sequestrati on, garni shment, or other sei zure of property
of an al l eged defaul ti ng debtor must requi re that (1) the credi tor
furni sh adequate securi ty to protect the debtors i nterest, (2) the
credi tor make a speci fi c factual showi ng before a neutral offi cer or
magi strate, not a cl erk or other such functi onary, of probabl e cause
to bel i eve that he i s enti tl ed to the rel i ef requested, and (3) an op-
1737
244
Mi tchel l v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 61518 (1974), and i d. at 623 (Jus-
ti ce Powel l concurri ng). And see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 188 (1974) (Jus-
ti ce Whi te concurri ng i n part and di ssenti ng i n part). More recentl y, the Court has
appl i ed a vari ant of the Mathews v. Eldridge formul a i n hol di ng that Connecti cuts
prejudgment attachment statute, whi ch fai l [ed] to provi de a preattachment heari ng
wi thout at l east requi ri ng a showi ng of some exi gent ci rcumstance, operated to
deny equal protecti on. Connecti cut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 18 (1991). [T]he rel evant
i nqui ry requi res, as i n Mathews, fi rst, consi derati on of the pri vate i nterest that wi l l
be affected by the prejudgment measure; second, an exami nati on of the ri sk of erro-
neous depri vati on through the procedures under attack and the probabl e val ue of
addi ti onal or al ternati ve safeguards; and thi rd, i n contrast to Mathews, pri nci pal at-
tenti on to the i nterest of the party seeki ng the prejudgment remedy, wi th, nonethe-
l ess, due regard for any anci l l ary i nterest the government may have i n provi di ng
the procedure or forgoi ng the added burden of provi di ng greater protecti ons. I d. at
11.
245
Compare Fl agg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (no state acti on i n
warehousemans sal e of goods for nonpayment of storage, as authori zed by state
l aw), with Lugar v. Edmondson Oi l Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (state offi ci al s joi nt
parti ci pati on wi th pri vate party i n effecti ng prejudgment attachment of property);
and Tul sa Professi onal Col l ecti on Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) (probate court
was suffi ci entl y i nvol ved wi th acti ons acti vati ng ti me bar i n noncl ai m statute).
246
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 17071 (1974) (Justi ce Powel l concurri ng),
and i d. at 19596 (Justi ce Whi te concurri ng i n part and di ssenti ng i n part); Cl eve-
l and Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermi l l , 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (di scharge of state government
empl oyee). I n Barry v. Barchi , 443 U.S. 55 (1979), the Court hel d that the state i n-
terest i n assuri ng the i ntegri ty of horse raci ng carri ed on under i ts auspi ces justi fi ed
an i nteri m suspensi on wi thout a heari ng once i t establ i shed the exi stence of certai n
facts, provi ded that a prompt judi ci al or admi ni strati ve heari ng woul d fol l ow sus-
pensi on at whi ch the i ssues coul d be determi ned was assured. FDI C v. Mal l en, 486
U.S. 230 (1988) (strong publ i c i nterest i n the i ntegri ty of the banki ng i ndustry justi -
fi es suspensi on of i ndi cted bank offi ci al wi th no pre-suspensi on heari ng, and wi th
90-day del ay before deci si on resul ti ng from post-suspensi on heari ng).
portuni ty be assured for an adversary heari ng promptl y after sei -
zure to determi ne the meri ts of the controversy, wi th the burden
of proof on the credi tor.
244
Efforts to l i ti gate chal l enges to sei zures
i n acti ons i nvol vi ng two pri vate parti es can be thwarted by fi ndi ngs
of no state acti on, but there often i s suffi ci ent parti ci pati on by
state offi ci al s to consti tute state acti on and i mpl i cate due proc-
ess.
245
Si mi l arl y, appl yi ng the tri parti te test of Mathews v. Eldridge
i n the context of government empl oyment, the Court has hel d, al -
bei t by a combi nati on of di vergent opi ni ons, that the i nterest of the
empl oyee i n retai ni ng hi s job, the governmental i nterest i n the ex-
pedi ti ous removal of unsati sfactory empl oyees and the avoi dance of
admi ni strati ve burdens, and the ri sk of an erroneous termi nati on
requi re the provi si on of some mi ni mum pre-termi nati on noti ce and
opportuni ty to respond, al though there need not be a formal adver-
sary heari ng, fol l owed by a ful l post-termi nati on heari ng, compl ete
wi th al l the procedures normal l y accorded and back pay i f the em-
pl oyee i s successful .
246
I n other cases, heari ngs of even mi ni mum
procedures have been di spensed wi th when what i s to be estab-
1738
247
E.g., Di xon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977) (when suspensi on of dri vers l i cense
i s automati c upon convi cti on of a certai n number of offenses, no heari ng i s requi red
because there can be no di spute about facts).
248
Logan v. Zi mmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
249
481 U.S. 252 (1987). Justi ce Marshal l s pl ural i ty opi ni on was joi ned by Jus-
ti ces Bl ackmun, Powel l , and OConnor; Chi ef Justi ce Rehnqui st and Justi ce Scal i a
joi ned Justi ce Whi tes opi ni on taki ng a somewhat narrower vi ew of due process re-
qui rements but supporti ng the pl ural i tys general approach. Justi ces Brennan and
Stevens woul d have requi red confrontati on and cross-exami nati on.
250
For anal ysi s of the cases i mpl i cati ons, see Rakoff, Brock v. Roadway Ex-
press, I nc., and the New Law of Regulatory Due Process, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 157.
l i shed i s so pro forma or routi ne that the l i kel i hood of error i s very
smal l .
247
I n the case deal i ng wi th the negl i gent state fai l ure to ob-
serve a procedural deadl i ne, the Court hel d that the cl ai mant was
enti tl ed to a heari ng wi th the agency to pass upon the meri ts of
hi s cl ai m pri or to di smi ssal of hi s acti on.
248
I n Brock v. Roadway Express, I nc., a Court pl ural i ty appl i ed
si mi l ar anal ysi s to governmental regul ati on of pri vate empl oyment,
determi ni ng that a ful l evi denti ary heari ng i s not requi red to safe-
guard the i nterests of an empl oyer pri or to the ordered rei nstate-
ment of an empl oyee di smi ssed for cause, but that the empl oyer i s
enti tl ed to be i nformed of the substance of the empl oyees charges,
and to have an opportuni ty for i nformal rebuttal .
249
The pri nci pal
di fference wi th the Mathews v. Eldridge test was that here the
Court acknowl edged two confl i cti ng pri vate i nterests to wei gh i n
the equati on: that of the empl oyer i n control l i ng the makeup of i ts
workforce and that of the empl oyee i n not bei ng di scharged for
whi stl ebl owi ng. Whether the case si gnal s a shi ft away from evi -
denti ary heari ng requi rements i n the context of regul atory adju-
di cati on wi l l depend on future devel opments.
250
I n another respect, the bal anci ng standard has resul ted i n an
al terati on of previ ousl y exi sti ng l aw, requi ri ng nei ther a pre- nor
post-termi nati on heari ng i n some i nstances when the State affords
the cl ai mant an al ternati ve remedy, such as a judi ci al acti on for
damages. Thus, passi ng on the i nfl i cti on of corporal puni shment i n
the publ i c school s, a practi ce whi ch i mpl i cated protected l i berty i n-
terests, the Court hel d that the exi stence of common-l aw tort rem-
edi es for wrongful or excessi ve admi ni strati on of puni shment, pl us
the context i n whi ch i t was admi ni stered (i .e., the abi l i ty of the
teacher to observe di rectl y the i nfracti on i n questi on, the openness
of the school envi ronment, the vi si bi l i ty of the confrontati on to
other students and facul ty, and the l i kel i hood of parental reacti on
to unreasonabl eness i n puni shment), made reasonabl y assured the
probabi l i ty that a chi l d woul d be not puni shed wi thout cause or ex-
cessi vel y. The Court di d not i nqui re about the avai l abi l i ty of judi -
1739
251
I ngraham v. Wri ght, 430 U.S. 651, 68082 (1977). I n Memphi s Li ght, Gas
& Water Di v. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 1922 (1987), i nvol vi ng cutoff of uti l i ty servi ce
for non-payment of bi l l s, the Court rejected the argument that common-l aw rem-
edi es were suffi ci ent to obvi ate the pre-termi nati on heari ng requi rement.
252
451 U.S. 527 (1981).
253
I d. at 541, 54344.
254
Dani el s v. Wi l l i ams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (i nvol vi ng negl i gent acts by
pri son offi ci al s).
255
455 U.S. 422, 43536 (1982). The Court al so emphasi zed that a post-depri va-
ti on heari ng i n the context of thi s case woul d be i nadequate. That i s parti cul arl y
true where, as here, the States onl y post-termi nati on process comes i n the form of
an i ndependent tort acti on. Seeki ng redress through a tort sui t i s apt to be a
l engthy and specul ati ve process, whi ch i n a si tuati on such as thi s one wi l l never
make the compl ai nant enti rel y whol e. I d. at 43637.
256
Parratt was a property l oss case and whi l e I ngraham was a l i berty case the
hol di ng there was not that, standi ng al one, a tort remedy was an adequate process.
I t i s not cl ear, therefore, that a tort remedy coul d ever be an adequate substi tute
for some ki nd of heari ng i n a l i berty l oss si tuati on.
ci al remedi es for such vi ol ati on i n the State i n whi ch the case
arose.
251
More expressl y adopti ng the tort remedy theory, the Court i n
Parratt v. Taylor
252
hel d that the l oss of a pri soners mai l -ordered
goods through the negl i gence of pri son offi ci al s consti tuted a depri -
vati on of property, but that the States post-depri vati on tort-cl ai ms
procedure afforded adequate due process. When a state offi cer or
empl oyee acts negl i gentl y, the Court recogni zed, there i s no way
that the State can provi de a pre-termi nati on heari ng; the real
questi on, therefore, i s what ki nd of post-depri vati on heari ng i s suf-
fi ci ent. When the acti on compl ai ned of i s the resul t of the unau-
thori zed fai l ure of agents to fol l ow establ i shed procedures and
there i s no contenti on that the procedures themsel ves are i nad-
equate, the due process cl ause i s sati sfi ed by the provi si on of a ju-
di ci al remedy whi ch the cl ai mant must i ni ti ate.
253
Fi ve years l ater,
however, the Court overrul ed Parratt, hol di ng that the Due Proc-
ess Cl ause i s si mpl y not i mpl i cated by a negligent act of an offi ci al
causi ng uni ntended l oss of or i njury to l i fe, l i berty, or property.
254
Hence, there i s no requi rement for procedural due process stem-
mi ng from such negl i gent acts and no resul ti ng basi s for sui t under
42 U.S.C. 1983 for depri vati on of ri ghts deri vi ng from the Con-
sti tuti on. Pri soners may resort to state tort l aw i n such ci r-
cumstances, but nei ther the Consti tuti on nor 1983 provi des a fed-
eral remedy.
I n Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
255
the Court had di sti n-
gui shed between property
256
depri vati ons resul ti ng from random
and unauthori zed acts of state empl oyees and those resul ti ng from
operati on of establ i shed state procedures, and presumabl y thi s di s-
ti ncti on sti l l hol ds. Post depri vati on procedures woul d not sati sfy
1740
257
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972); Bel l v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535, 542 (1971). See Parratt v. Tayl or, 451 U.S. 527, 53840 (1981).
258
North Ameri can Col d Storage Co. v. Ci ty of Chi cago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908);
Ewi ng v. Myti nger & Cassel berry, 339 U.S. 594 (1950). See also Fahey v. Mal l onee,
332 U.S. 245 (1948). Cf. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 1718 (1979).
259
Phi l l i ps v. Commi ssi oner, 283 U.S. 589, 597 (1931).
260
Central Uni on Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 566 (1921). See also
Bowl es v. Wi l l i ngham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
261
Cafeteri a & Restaurant Workers Uni on v. McEl roy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
262
I d. at 894, 895, 896.
263
I d. at 89698. See Gol dberg v. Kel l y, 397 U.S. 254, 263 n.10 (1970); Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 (1972); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152
(1974) (pl ural i ty opi ni on), and i d. at 18183 (Justi ce Whi te concurri ng i n part and
di ssenti ng i n part).
264
D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Fri ck Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972). See also Fuentes v.
Shevi n, 407 U.S. 67, 9496 (1972).
265
Mul l ane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
266
due process depri vati ons i f i t i s the state system i tsel f that de-
stroys a compl ai nants property i nterest.
I n rare and extraordi nary si tuati ons,
257
where summary ac-
ti on i s necessary to prevent i mmi nent harm to the publ i c, and the
pri vate i nterest i nfri nged i s reasonabl y deemed to be of l ess i mpor-
tance, government can take acti on wi th no noti ce and no oppor-
tuni ty to defend, subject to a ful l l ater heari ng. Exampl es are sei -
zure of contami nated foods or drugs or other such commodi ti es to
protect the consumer.
258
Other possi bi l i ti es are the col l ecti on of
governmental revenues
259
and the sei zure of enemy property i n
warti me.
260
Ci ti ng nati onal securi ty i nterests, the Court uphel d an
order, i ssued wi thout noti ce and an opportuni ty to be heard, ex-
cl udi ng a short-order cook empl oyed by a concessi onai re from a
Naval Gun Factory, but the basi s of the fi ve-to-four deci si on i s un-
cl ear.
261
On the one hand, the Court was ambi val ent about a ri ght-
pri vi l ege di sti ncti on;
262
on the other hand, i t contrasted the l i mi ted
i nterest of the cook barred from the base, she was sti l l free to
work at a number of the concessi onai res other premi ses wi th the
Governments i nterest i n conducti ng a hi gh-securi ty program.
263
Fi nal l y, one may wai ve hi s due process ri ghts, though as wi th
other consti tuti onal ri ghts the wai ver must be knowi ng and vol -
untary.
264
The Requi rements of Due Process. Beari ng i n mi nd that
due process tol erates vari ances i n form appropri ate to the nature
of the case,
265
i t i s nonethel ess possi bl e to i ndi cate general l y the
basi c requi rements. [P]rocedural due process rul es are shaped by
the ri sk of error i nherent i n the truth-fi ndi ng process as appl i ed to
the general i ty of cases.
266
Procedural due process rul es are
meant to protect persons not from the depri vati on, but from the
1741
267
Carey v. Pi phus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978).
268
Fuentes v. Shevi n, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972). At ti mes, the Court has al so
stressed the di gni tary i mportance of procedural ri ghts, the worth of bei ng abl e to
defend ones i nterests even i f one cannot change the resul t. Carey v. Pi phus, 435
U.S. 247, 26667 (1978); Marshal l v. Jerri co, I nc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
269
Mul l ane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
270
Gol dberg v. Kel l y, 397 U.S. 254, 26768 (1970).
271
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Robi nson v. Hanrahan, 409
U.S. 38 (1974); Greene v. Li ndsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
272
273
Bal dwi n v. Hal e, 68 U.S. (1 Wal l .) 223, 233 (1863).
274
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
275
Fuentes v. Shevi n, 407 U.S. 67, 8081 (1972). See Joi nt Anti -Fasci st Refugee
Commi ttee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 17071 (1951) (Justi ce Frankfurter concur-
ri ng).
276
Gol dberg v. Kel l y, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sni adach v. Fami l y Fi nance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
mi staken or unjusti fi ed depri vati on of l i fe, l i berty, or property.
267
The rul es mi ni mi ze substanti vel y unfai r or mi staken depri vati ons
by enabl i ng persons to contest the basi s upon whi ch a State pro-
poses to depri ve them of protected i nterests.
268
Thus, after the de-
termi nati on of the exi stence of a protected i nterest at i ssue, i t must
sti l l be determi ned what procedure i s adequate.
(1) Notice. An el ementary and fundamental requi rement of
due process i n any proceedi ng whi ch i s to be accorded fi nal i ty i s no-
ti ce reasonabl y cal cul ated, under al l the ci rcumstances, to appri se
i nterested parti es of the pendency of the acti on and afford them an
opportuni ty to present thei r objecti ons.
269
The noti ce must be suf-
fi ci ent to enabl e the reci pi ent to determi ne what i s bei ng proposed
and what he must do to prevent the depri vati on of hi s i nterest.
270
Ordi nari l y, servi ce of the noti ce must be reasonabl y structured to
assure that the person to whom i t i s di rected recei ves i t.
271
(2) Hearing. [S]ome form of heari ng i s requi red before an i ndi -
vi dual i s fi nal l y depri ved of a property [or l i berty] i nterest.
272
Parti es whose ri ghts are to be affected are enti tl ed to be
heard.
273
The noti ce of heari ng and the opportuni ty to be heard
must be granted at a meani ngful ti me and i n a meani ngful man-
ner.
274
The consti tuti onal ri ght to be heard i s a basi c aspect of
the duty of government to fol l ow a fai r process of deci si on maki ng
when i t acts to depri ve a person of hi s possessi ons. The purpose of
thi s requi rement i s not onl y to ensure abstract fai r pl ay to the i ndi -
vi dual . I ts purpose, more parti cul arl y, i s to protect hi s use and pos-
sessi on of property from arbi trary encroachment. . . .
275
The
Court has i n recent years devel oped a compl ex cal cul us to deter-
mi ne whether a heari ng shoul d precede the depri vati on or whether
a prompt post-depri vati on heari ng woul d be adequate. General l y,
where the l oss, even temporari l y, woul d be severe or catastrophi c,
the heari ng must come fi rst;
276
where a temporary depri vati on
1742
277
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Mathews v. El dri dge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976); Barry v. Barchi , 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
278
I d. at 66.
279
Mathews v. El dri dge, 424 U.S. 319, 34345 (1976); Mi tchel l v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 1317 (1979); Barry v.
Barchi , 443 U.S. 55, 6566 (1979).
280
Gol dberg v. Kel l y, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
281
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (temporary suspensi on of student from
school ). See also Board of Curators v. Horowi tz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
282
Coe v. Armour Ferti l i zer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915).
283
Gol dberg v. Kel l y, 397 U.S. 254, 26667 (1970); Mathews v. El dri dge, 424
U.S. 319, 34345 (1976). See also FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265, 27577 (1949).
284
Tumey v. Ohi o, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); I n re Murchi son, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
285
Gol dberg v. Kel l y, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
286
Marshal l v. Jerri co, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Schwei ker v. McCl ure, 456
U.S. 188, 195 (1982).
287
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
woul d be l ess severe and the opposi ng i nterest i s i mportant, the
heari ng may come l ater,
277
so l ong as i t i s promptl y assured.
278
Too, the nature of what must be shown wi l l be taken i nto account.
Where the showi ng to be establ i shed i s l argel y formal or subject to
substanti al documentary evi dence, a post-termi nati on heari ng may
suffi ce,
279
whi l e i n cases i n whi ch the evi dence i s l argel y subjecti ve
and dependent upon the personal appearance of the cl ai mant the
heari ng must ordi nari l y precede the l oss and the ci rcumstance may
requi re a more hi ghl y structured proceedi ng.
280
Someti mes, be-
cause of the nature of the opposi ng i nterest and the ci rcumstances
of the determi nati on, the heari ng need i nvol ve onl y mi ni mal for-
mal i ty.
281
The heari ng requi rement does not depend upon an ad-
vance showi ng that the cl ai mant wi l l prevai l at such a heari ng.
282
Whi l e wri tten presentati ons may be acceptabl e i n some si tuati ons,
i n others the i ssue of veraci ty may necessi tate oral presentati on or
oral exami nati on of wi tnesses, or the peti ti oner may not have the
abi l i ty to present hi s case i n wri ti ng.
283
(3) I mpartial Tribunal. Just as i n cri mi nal and quasi -cri mi nal
cases,
284
an i mparti al deci si on maker i s an essenti al ri ght i n
ci vi l proceedi ngs as wel l .
285
The neutral i ty requi rement hel ps to
guarantee that l i fe, l i berty, or property wi l l not be taken on the
basi s of an erroneous or di storted concepti on of the facts or the l aw.
. . . At the same ti me, i t preserves both the appearance and real i ty
of fai rness . . . by ensuri ng that no person wi l l be depri ved of hi s
i nterests i n the absence of a proceedi ng i n whi ch he may present
hi s case wi th assurance that the arbi ter i s not predi sposed to fi nd
agai nst hi m.
286
Thus, the conduct of deportati on heari ngs by a
person who, whi l e he had not i nvesti gated the case heard, was al so
an i nvesti gator who must judge the resul ts of others i nvesti gati ons
just as one of them woul d some day judge hi s, rai sed a substanti al
probl em whi ch was resol ved through statutory constructi on.
287
But
1743
288
Schwei ker v. McCl ure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982); Wi throw v. Larki n, 421 U.S.
35, 47 (1975); Uni ted States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941).
289
Wi throw v. Larki n, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
290
I d. at 51.
291
Gi bson v. Berryhi l l , 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
292
Hortonvi l l e Joi nt School Di st. v. Hortonvi l l e Educ. Assn, 426 U.S. 482
(1976). Compare Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 170 n.5 (1974) (Justi ce Powel l ),
with i d. at 19699 (Justi ce Whi te), and 216 (Justi ce Marshal l ).
293
Marshal l v. Jerri co, 446 U.S. 238, 24850 (1980) (regi onal admi ni strator as-
sessi ng fi nes for chi l d l abor vi ol ati ons, wi th penal ti es goi ng i nto fund to rei mburse
cost of system of enforci ng chi l d l abor l aws). But tradi ti ons of prosecutori al di scre-
ti on do not i mmuni ze from judi ci al scruti ny cases i n whi ch enforcement deci si ons
of an admi ni strator were moti vated by i mproper factors or were otherwi se contrary
to l aw. I d. at 249.
294
Gol dberg v. Kel l y, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970). See also I CC v. Loui svi l l e &
Nashvi l l e R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 9394 (1913); Wi l l ner v. Commi ttee on Character, 373
U.S. 96, 10304 (1963). Cf. 7(c) of the Admi ni strati ve Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
556(d).
there i s a presumpti on of honesty and i ntegri ty i n those servi ng
as adjudi cators,
288
so that the burden i s on the objecti ng party to
show a confl i ct of i nterest or some other speci fi c reason for di s-
qual i fi cati on of a speci fi c offi cer or for di sapproval of the system.
I t i s not, wi thout more, a vi ol ati on of due process to combi ne i nves-
ti gati ng and adjudi cati ng functi ons i n the same agency,
289
al -
though the questi on of combi nati on of functi ons i s a substanti al one
i n admi ni strati ve l aw.
290
A showi ng of bi as or of strong i mpl i ca-
ti ons of bi as was deemed made i n a case i n whi ch the state optom-
etry board, whi ch was made up onl y of pri vate practi ti oners, was
proceedi ng agai nst other l i censed optometri sts for unprofessi onal
conduct, because they were empl oyed by corporati ons. Si nce success
i n the boards effort woul d redound to the personal benefi t of pri -
vate practi ti oners, the Court thought the i nterest of the board
members to be suffi ci ent to di squal i fy them.
291
However, the Court
hel d that school board members di d not have such an offi ci al or
personal stake i n the deci si on as to di squal i fy them from maki ng
the deci si on whether to fi re teachers who had engaged i n a stri ke
agai nst the school system i n vi ol ati on of state l aw.
292
A l esser
standard of i mparti al i ty appl i es to an admi ni strati ve offi cer who
acts i n a prosecutori al rol e.
293
(4) Confrontation and Cross-Examination. I n al most every set-
ti ng where i mportant deci si ons turn on questi ons of fact, due proc-
ess requi res an opportuni ty to confront and cross-exami ne adverse
wi tnesses.
294
Where the evi dence consi sts of the testi mony of i n-
di vi dual s whose memory mi ght be faul ty or who, i n fact, mi ght be
perjurers or persons moti vated by mal i ce, vi ndi cti veness, i ntol er-
ance, prejudi ce, or jeal ousl y, the i ndi vi dual s ri ght to show that i t
i s untrue depends on the ri ghts of confrontati on and cross-exami na-
ti on. Thi s Court has been zeal ous to protect these ri ghts from ero-
1744
295
Greene v. McEl roy, 360 U.S. 474, 49697 (1959). But see Ri chardson v.
Peral es, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (where authors of documentary evi dence are known to
peti ti oner and he di d not subpoena them, he may not compl ai n that agency rel i ed
on that evi dence). Cf. Mathews v. El dri dge, 424 U.S. 319, 34345 (1976).
296
Greene v. McEl roy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959), quoted with approval in Gol d-
berg v. Kel l y, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970).
297
Recommendati ons and Reports of the Admi ni strati ve Conference of the Uni t-
ed States 571 (19681970).
298
FMC v. Angl o-Canadi an Shi ppi ng Co., 335 F.2d 255 (9th Ci r. 1964);
Fai rbank v. Hardi n, 429 F.2d 264, 268 (9th Ci r.), cert. deni ed, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
299
Gol dberg v. Kel l y, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). The excl usi veness of the record
i s fundamental i n admi ni strati ve l aw. See 7(d) of the Admi ni strati ve Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. 556(e). However, one must show not onl y that the agency used ex parte
evi dence but that he was prejudi ced thereby. Market Street Ry. v. Rai l road Commn,
324 U.S. 548 (1945) (agency deci si on supported by evi dence i n record, i ts deci si on
sustai ned, di sregardi ng ex parte evi dence).
300
397 U.S. 254, 27071 (1970).
si on. I t has spoken out not onl y i n cri mi nal cases, . . . but al so i n
al l types of cases where admi ni strati ve . . . acti ons were under
scruti ny.
295
(5) Discovery. The Court has never di rectl y confronted thi s
i ssue, but i n one case i t di d observe i n di ctum. [W]here govern-
mental acti on seri ousl y i njures an i ndi vi dual , and the reasonabl e-
ness of the acti on depends on fact fi ndi ngs, the evi dence used to
prove the Governments case must be di scl osed to the i ndi vi dual so
that he has an opportuni ty to show that i t i s untrue.
296
Some fed-
eral agenci es have adopted di scovery rul es model ed on the Federal
Rul es of Ci vi l Procedure, and the Admi ni strati ve Conference has
recommended that al l do so.
297
There appear to be no cases, how-
ever, hol di ng they must, and there i s some authori ty that they can-
not absent congressi onal authori zati on.
298
(6) Decision on the Record. [T]he deci si onmakers concl usi on as
to a reci pi ents el i gi bi l i ty must rest sol el y on the l egal rul es and
evi dence adduced at the heari ng. . . . To demonstrate compl i ance
wi th thi s el ementary requi rement, the deci si onmaker shoul d state
the reasons for hi s determi nati on and i ndi cate the evi dence he re-
l i ed on . . . though hi s statement need not amount to a ful l opi ni on
or even formal fi ndi ngs of fact and concl usi ons of l aw.
299
(7) Counsel. I n Goldberg v. Kelly,
300
the Court hel d that an
agency must permi t the reci pi ent to be represented by and assi sted
by counsel . I t di d not, however, deci de that the agency must pro-
vi de counsel for one unabl e to afford hi s own and di d not deci de
that the agency need not do so. I n the years si nce, the ri ght of ci vi l
l i ti gants i n court and persons before agenci es who coul d not afford
retai ned counsel has exci ted much controversy, and whi l e qui te re-
centl y the Court has appl i ed i ts bal anci ng standard to requi re a
case-by-case determi nati on wi th respect to the ri ght to appoi nted
1745
301
Lassi ter v. Department of Soci al Servi ces, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). The deci si on
was a fi ve-to-four one, Justi ces Stewart, Whi te, Powel l , and Rehnqui st and Chi ef
Justi ce Burger i n the majori ty, Justi ces Bl ackmun, Brennan, Marshal l , and Stevens
i n di ssent. I d. at 35, 59.
302
I d. at 2527. The Court purported to draw the di sti ncti on from Gagnon v.
Scarpel l i , 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (no per se ri ght to counsel i n probati on revocati on pro-
ceedi ngs). To i ntroduce thi s presumpti on i nto the bal anci ng, however, appears to
di sregard the fact that the fi rst factor of Mathews v. Eldridge, upon whi ch the Court
(and di ssent) rel i ed, rel ates to the i mportance of the i nterest to the person cl ai mi ng
the ri ght, thus, at l east i n thi s context, reduci ng the val ue of the fi rst Eldridge fac-
tor.
303
I d. at 452 U.S., 3132. The Mathews v. Eldridge standards were drafted i n
the context of the general i ty of cases and were not i ntended for case-by-case appl i ca-
ti on Cf. 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976).
304
E.g., Li ttl e v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (i ndi gent enti tl ed to state-funded
bl ood testi ng i n a paterni ty acti on the State requi red to be i nsti tuted); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (i mposi ti on of hi gher standard of proof i n case i nvol v-
i ng state termi nati on of parental ri ghts).
counsel , the matter seems far from settl ed. I n a case i nvol vi ng a
state proceedi ng to termi nate the parental ri ghts of an i ndi gent
wi thout provi di ng her counsel , the Court recogni zed as an ex-
tremel y i mportant one the parents i nterest, but observed that the
States i nterest i n protecti ng the wel fare of chi l dren was l i kewi se
very i mportant. The i nterest i n correct factfi ndi ng was strong on
both si des, but, the Court thought, the proceedi ng was rel ati vel y
si mpl e, no features were present rai si ng a ri sk of cri mi nal l i abi l i ty,
no expert wi tnesses were present, and no speci al l y troubl esome
substanti ve or procedural i ssues had been rai sed.
301
But what
ti pped the scal e i n the Courts deci si on not to requi re counsel i n
thi s case was the pre-emi nent general i zati on i t drew from i ts
precedents that an i ndi gent has an absol ute ri ght to appoi nted
counsel onl y where he may l ose hi s physi cal l i berty i f he l oses the
l i ti gati on.
302
Thus, i n al l other si tuati ons when l i berty or property
i nterests are present, the ri ght of an i ndi gent to appoi nted counsel
i s to be determi ned on a case-by-case basi s, i ni ti al l y by the tri al
judge, subject to appel l ate revi ew.
303
I n other due process cases i n-
vol vi ng parental ri ghts, the Court has hel d that due process re-
qui res speci al state attenti on to parental ri ghts,
304
and i t i s to be
supposed that the counsel i ssue wi l l recur.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CRIMINAL
Generally
The Supreme Courts guardi anshi p of state cri mi nal justi ce
systems under the due process cl ause has never been subject to
preci se statement of metes and bounds. Rather, the Court i n each
case must ask whether the chal l enged practi ce or pol i cy vi ol ates a
fundamental pri nci pl e of l i berty and justi ce whi ch i nheres i n the
1746
1
Twi ni ng v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908).
2
Pal ko v. Connecti cut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
3
Rochi n v. Cal i forni a, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
4
Duncan v. Loui si ana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
5
Supra, pp. 95764.
6
Justi ce Bl ack thought the Fourteenth Amendment shoul d be l i mi ted i n thi s re-
gard to the speci fi c guarantees found el sewhere i n the Bi l l of Ri ghts. See, e.g., I n
re Wi nshi p, 397 U.S. 358, 377 (1970) (di ssenti ng). For Justi ce Harl ans response, see
i d. at 372 n.5 (concurri ng).
7
I n re Wi nshi p, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), hel d that, despi te the absence of a speci fi c
consti tuti onal provi si on requi ri ng proof beyond a reasonabl e doubt i n cri mi nal cases,
such proof i s a due process requi rement. For other recurrences to general due proc-
ess reasoni ng, as di sti nct from rel i ance on more speci fi c Bi l l of Ri ghts provi si ons,
very i dea of a free government and i s the i nal i enabl e ri ght of a ci ti -
zen of such government.
1
The questi on i s whether a cl ai med ri ght
i s i mpl i ci t i n the concept of ordered l i berty, whether i t partakes
of the very essence of a scheme of ordered l i berty.
2
I nevi tabl y,
judgment expresses a determi nati on that certai n practi ces do or do
not offend those canons of decency and fai rness whi ch express the
noti ons of justi ce of Engl i sh-speaki ng peopl es even toward those
charged wi th the most hei nous offenses.
3
More recentl y, the Court
has eschewed as too abstract an i nqui ry as to whether some proce-
dural safeguard was necessary before a system coul d be i magi ned
whi ch woul d be regarded as ci vi l i zed wi thout that safeguard. Rath-
er, [t]he recent cases . . . have proceeded upon the val i d assump-
ti on that state cri mi nal processes are not i magi nary and theoreti cal
schemes but actual systems beari ng vi rtual l y every characteri sti c
of the common-l aw system that has been devel opi ng contempora-
neousl y i n Engl and and i n thi s country. The questi on thus i s
whether gi ven thi s ki nd of system a parti cul ar procedure i s fun-
damental whether, that i s, a procedure i s necessary to an Angl o-
Ameri can regi me of ordered l i berty. . . . [Therefore the l i mi tati ons
i mposed by the Court on the States are] not necessari l y fundamen-
tal to fai rness i n every cri mi nal system that mi ght be i magi ned but
[are] fundamental i n the context of the cri mi nal processes mai n-
tai ned by the Ameri can States.
4
Appl yi ng thi s anal ysi s the Court i n recent years has hel d that
practi cal l y al l the cri mi nal procedural guarantees of the Bi l l of
Ri ghts the Fourth, Fi fth, Si xth, and Ei ghth Amendments con-
tai n l i mi tati ons whi ch are fundamental to state cri mi nal justi ce
systems and that the absence of one or the other parti cul ar guaran-
tees deni es a suspect or a defendant due process of l aw.
5
However,
the due process cl ause of the Fourteenth Amendment i s not l i mi ted
to those speci fi c guarantees spel l ed out i n the Bi l l of Ri ghts,
6
but
rather contai ns protecti on agai nst practi ces and pol i ci es whi ch may
fal l short of fundamental fai rness wi thout runni ng afoul of a spe-
ci fi c provi si on.
7
1747
see, e.g., Chambers v. Mi ssi ssi ppi , 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Wardi us v. Oregon, 412 U.S.
470 (1973); Mul l aney v. Wi l bur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Estel l e v. Wi l l i ams, 425 U.S.
501 (1976); Henderson v. Ki bbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977); Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977); Tayl or v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978); Kentucky v. Whorton, 441
U.S. 786 (1979); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); Hi cks v. Okl ahoma,
447 U.S. 343 (1980).
8
Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97 (1948). Vague l aws offend several i mportant
val ues. Fi rst, because we assume that man i s free to steer between l awful and un-
l awful conduct, we i nsi st that l aws gi ve the person of ordi nary i ntel l i gence a reason-
abl e opportuni ty to know what i s prohi bi ted, so that he may act accordi ngl y. Vague
l aws may trap the i nnocent by not provi di ng fai r warni ngs. Second, i f arbi trary and
di scri mi natory enforcement i s to be prevented, l aws must provi de expl i ci t standards
for those who appl y them. A vague l aw i mpermi ssi bl y del egates basi c pol i cy matters
to pol i cemen, judges, and juri es for resol uti on on an ad hoc and subjecti ve basi s,
wi th the attendant dangers of arbi trary and di scri mi natory appl i cati ons. Grayned
v. Ci ty of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 10809 (1972), quoted in Vi l l age of Hoffman Es-
tates v. The Fl i psi de, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982).
9
Cantwel l v. Connecti cut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
10
Wi nters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 51516 (1948). Cf. Col ten v. Kentucky,
407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
11
Papachri stou v. Ci ty of Jacksonvi l l e, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Smi th v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566 (1974).
12
Pal mer v. Ci ty of Eucl i d, 402 U.S. 544 (1971); Vi l l age of Hoffman Estates v.
The Fl i psi de, 455 U.S. 489, 49495 (1982).
13
Wi nters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 50910 (1948); Thornhi l l v. Al abama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940).
14
E.g., Uni ted States v. Nati onal Dai ry Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963).
The Elements of Due Process
Cl ari ty i n Cri mi nal Statutes: The Voi d-for-Vagueness
Doctri ne. Legi sl ati on may run afoul of the Due Process Cl ause
because i t fai l s to gi ve adequate gui dance to those who woul d be
l aw-abi di ng, to advi se defendants of the nature of the offense wi th
whi ch they are charged, or to gui de courts i n tryi ng those who are
accused.
8
Acts whi ch are made cri mi nal must be defi ned wi th ap-
propri ate defi ni teness.
9
There must be ascertai nabl e standards of
gui l t. Men of common i ntel l i gence cannot be requi red to guess at
the meani ng of the enactment. The vagueness may be from uncer-
tai nty i n regard to persons wi thi n the scope of the act . . . or i n
regard to the appl i cabl e tests to ascertai n gui l t.
10
Statutes whi ch
l ack the requi si te defi ni teness or speci fi ci ty are commonl y hel d
voi d for vagueness. Such a statute may be pronounced whol l y un-
consti tuti onal (unconsti tuti onal on i ts face),
11
or, i f the statute
coul d be appl i ed to both prohi bi tabl e and to protected conduct and
i ts val uabl e effects outwei gh i ts potenti al general harm, i t coul d be
hel d unconsti tuti onal as appl i ed.
12
General l y, a vague statute that
regul ates i n the area of Fi rst Amendment guarantees wi l l be pro-
nounced whol l y voi d,
13
whi l e one that does not reach such pro-
tected conduct wi l l ei ther be uphel d because i t i s appl i ed to cl earl y
proscri babl e conduct, or voi ded as appl i ed when the conduct i s mar-
gi nal and the proscri pti on i s uncl ear.
14
1748
15
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Edel man v. Cal i forni a, 344 U.S.
357 (1953).
16
E.g., Wi nters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 540 (1948) (Justi ce Frankfurter di s-
senti ng); Edel man v. Cal i forni a, 344 U.S. 357, 362 (1953) (Justi ce Bl ack di ssenti ng);
Hi cks v. Di stri ct of Col umbi a, 383 U.S. 252 (1966) (Justi ce Dougl as di ssenti ng).
17
405 U.S. 156 (1972).
18
Coates v. Ci ty of Ci nci nnati , 402 U.S. 611 (1971). See also Shuttl esworth v.
Ci ty of Bi rmi ngham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965). Boui e v. Ci ty of Col umbi a, 378 U.S. 347
(1964), voi ded convi cti on on trespass charges ari si ng out of a si t-i n at a drugstore
l unch counter si nce the trespass statute di d not gi ve fai r noti ce that i t was a cri me
to refuse to l eave pri vate premi ses after bei ng requested to do so. And see Kol ender
The Court voi ded for vagueness a statute provi di ng that any
person not engaged i n any l awful occupati on, known to be a mem-
ber of any gang consi sti ng of two or more persons, who had been
convi cted at l east three ti mes of bei ng a di sorderl y person, or who
had been convi cted of any cri me i n that or any other State, i s to
be consi dered a gangster and subject to fi ne or i mpri sonment. The
Court observed that nei ther at the common l aw nor by statute are
the words gang and gangster gi ven defi ni te meani ng, that the
enforci ng agenci es and courts were free to construe the terms
broadl y or narrowl y, and that the phrase known to be a member
was ambi guous. The statute was hel d voi d on i ts face, and the
Court refused to al l ow speci fi cati on of detai l s i n the parti cul ar i n-
di ctment to save i t because i t was the statute, not the accusati on,
that prescri bed the rul e to govern conduct.
15
Possi bl y concl udi ng a controversy of l ong standi ng wi th regard
to the val i di ty of vagrancy l aws as general l y wri tten,
16
a unani -
mous Court i n Papachristou v. City of J acksonville
17
struck down
for vagueness an ordi nance whi ch puni shed di ssol ute persons who
go about beggi ng, . . . common ni ght wal kers, . . . common rai l ers
and brawl ers, persons wanderi ng or strol l i ng around from pl ace to
pl ace wi thout any l awful purpose or object, habi tual l oafers, . . .
persons negl ecti ng al l l awful busi ness and habi tual l y spendi ng
thei r ti me by frequenti ng house of i l l fame, gami ng houses, or
pl aces where al cohol i c beverages are sol d or served, persons abl e to
work but habi tual l y l i vi ng upon the earni ngs of thei r wi ves or
mi nor chi l dren. . . . The ordi nance was i nval i d, sai d Justi ce Doug-
l as for the Court, because i t di d not gi ve fai r noti ce, di d not requi re
speci fi c i ntent to commi t an unl awful act, permi tted and encour-
aged arbi trary and errati c arrests and convi cti ons, commi tted too
much di screti on to pol i cemen, and cri mi nal i zed acti vi ti es whi ch by
modern standards are normal l y i nnocent. Si mi l arl y, an ordi nance
maki ng i t a cri mi nal offense for three or more persons to assembl e
on a si dewal k and conduct themsel ves i n a manner annoyi ng to
passers-by was i mpermi ssi bl y vague; because i t encroached on the
freedom of assembl y i t was voi d on i ts face.
18
But an ordi nance
1749
v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (requi rement that person detai ned i n val i d Terry
stop provi de credi bl e and rel i abl e i denti fi cati on i s faci al l y voi d as encouragi ng ar-
bi trary enforcement).
19
Pal mer v. Ci ty of Eucl i d, 402 U.S. 544 (1971).
20
Col ten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
21
Connal l y v. General Constructi on Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
22
Gi acci o v. Pennsyl vani a, 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
23
Mi nnesota ex rel . Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
puni shi ng suspi ci ous persons was voi d onl y as appl i ed to a person
engagi ng i n ambi guous conduct whi ch i t was possi bl e to fi t wi thi n
the ordi nances defi ni ti on.
19
A statute authori zi ng convi cti on for
di sorderl y conduct of any person who refuses to move on upon po-
l i ce request and who i s i ntent on causi ng i nconveni ence, annoy-
ance, or al arm was uphel d agai nst faci al chal l enge and as appl i ed
to one i nterferi ng wi th pol i ce ti cketi ng of a car for val i d reasons.
20
A state statute i mposi ng severe, cumul ati ve puni shments upon
contractors wi th the State who pay thei r workmen l ess than the
current rate of per di em wages i n the l ocal i ty where the work i s
performed was hel d to be so vague that men of common i ntel -
l i gence must necessari l y guess at i ts meani ng and di ffer as to i ts
appl i cati on.
21
Si mi l arl y, a statute whi ch al l owed jurors to requi re
an acqui tted defendant to pay the costs of the prosecuti on, el uci -
dated onl y by the judges i nstructi on to the jury that the defendant
shoul d onl y have to pay the costs i f i t thought hi m gui l ty of some
mi sconduct though i nnocent of the cri me wi th whi ch he was
charged, was found to fal l short of the requi rements of due proc-
ess.
22
But the Court sustai ned as nei ther too vague nor i ndefi ni te
a state l aw whi ch provi ded for commi tment of a psychopathi c per-
sonal i ty by probate acti on aki n to a l unacy proceedi ng and whi ch
had been construed by the state court as appl yi ng to those persons
who, by habi tual course of mi sconduct i n sexual matters, have evi -
denced utter l ack of power to control thei r sexual i mpul ses and are
l i kel y to i nfl i ct i njury. The underl yi ng condi ti ons habi tual course
of mi sconduct i n sexual matters and l ack of power to control i m-
pul ses and l i kel i hood of attack on others were vi ewed as cal l i ng
for evi dence of past conduct poi nti ng to probabl e consequences and
as bei ng as suscepti bl e of proof as many of the cri teri a constantl y
appl i ed i n cri mi nal proceedi ngs.
23
Other Aspects of Statutory Noti ce. Conceptual l y rel ated to
the probl em of defi ni teness i n cri mi nal statutes i s the probl em of
the requi si te noti ce a person must have that a statute commands
that somethi ng not be done or al ternati vel y that unl ess somethi ng
i s done cri mi nal l i abi l i ty wi l l resul t. Ordi nari l y, i t can be sai d that
i gnorance of the l aw affords no excuse, that everyone i s presumed
to know that certai n thi ngs may not be done. Moreover, i n other
1750
24
E.g., Uni ted States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
25
E.g., Boyce Motor Li nes v. Uni ted States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952); Col autti v.
Frankl i n, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979). Cf. Screws v. Uni ted States, 325 U.S. 91, 101
03 (1945) (pl ural i ty opi ni on).
26
E.g., Mori ssette v. Uni ted States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
27
355 U.S. 225 (1957).
28
I d. at 228, 22930.
29
For a thorough eval uati on of the basi s for and the nature of the entrapment
defense, see Sei dman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal J ustice
i nstances, the subject matter or conduct may be suffi ci ent to al ert
one that there are regul atory l aws whi ch must be observed.
24
I n
sti l l other i nstances, the requi rement of sci enter may take care
of the probl em i n that there may be a statutory requi rement of i n-
tent expressed through some form of the word wi l l ful ,
25
but the
Court has so far fai l ed i n deal i ng wi th those cases i nvol vi ng stri ct
l i abi l i ty to devel op the i mpl i cati ons of the mens rea requi rement.
26
There remai ns the case of Lambert v. California,
27
i nval i dati ng a
muni ci pal code that made i t a cri me for anyone who had ever been
convi cted of a fel ony to remai n i n the ci ty for more than fi ve days
wi thout regi steri ng. Emphasi zi ng that the act of bei ng i n the ci ty
was not i tsel f bl ameworthy, the Court voi ded the convi cti on, hol d-
i ng that the fai l ure to regi ster was qui te unl i ke the commi ssi on
of acts, or the fai l ure to act under ci rcumstances that shoul d al ert
the doer to the consequences of hi s deed. Where a person di d not
know of the duty to regi ster and where there was no proof of the
probabi l i ty of such knowl edge, he may not be convi cted consi stentl y
wi th due process. Were i t otherwi se, the evi l woul d be as great as
i t i s when the l aw i s wri tten i n pri nt too fi ne to read or i n a l an-
guage forei gn to the communi ty.
28
Entrapment. Certai n cri mi nal offenses, because they are
consensual acti ons taken between and among wi l l i ng parti es,
present pol i ce wi th di ffi cul t i nvesti gati ve probl ems. Some of that
di ffi cul ty may be al l evi ated through el ectroni c and other survei l -
l ance, whi ch i s covered by the search and sei zure provi si ons of the
Fourth Amendment, and i n other respects i nformers may be uti -
l i zed, whi ch may i mpl i cate several consti tuti onal provi si ons. Some-
ti mes, however, pol i ce agents may encourage persons to engage
i n cri mi nal behavi or, by seeki ng to buy from them or to sel l to
them narcoti cs or contraband or by seeki ng to determi ne i f publ i c
empl oyees or offi cers are corrupt by offeri ng them bri bes. The
Court has deal t wi th thi s i ssue i n terms of the entrapment de-
fense, though i t i s uncl ear whether the basi s of the defense i s one
of statutory constructi on the l egi sl ature woul d not have i ntended
to puni sh conduct i nduced by pol i ce agents one of supervi sory au-
thori ty of the federal courts to deter wrongful pol i ce conduct, or one
of due process command.
29
1751
Dilemma, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 111. The statutory basi s was sai d to be the ground
i n the Courts fi rst di scussi on of the i ssue, Sorrel l s v. Uni ted States, 287 U.S. 435,
44649 (1932), and that basi s remai ns the choi ce of some Justi ces. Hampton v. Uni t-
ed States, 425 U.S. 484, 48889 (1976) (pl ural i ty opi ni on of Justi ces Rehnqui st and
Whi te and Chi ef Justi ce Burger). The supervi sory power basi s was argued by Jus-
ti ce Frankfurter i n Sherman v. Uni ted States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (concurri ng).
Uti l i zati on of that power was rejected i n Uni ted States v. Russel l , 411 U.S. 423, 490
(1973), and by the pl ural i ty i n Hampton, supra, 490. The Hampton pl ural i ty thought
the due process cl ause woul d never be appl i cabl e, no matter what conduct govern-
ment agents engaged i n, unl ess they vi ol ated some protected ri ght of the defendant,
and that i nducement and encouragement coul d never do that; Justi ces Powel l and
Bl ackmun, i d. at 491, thought that pol i ce conduct, even i n the case of a predi sposed
defendant, coul d be so outrageous as to vi ol ate due process. The Russell and Hamp-
ton di ssenters di d not cl earl y di fferenti ate between the supervi sory power and due
process but seemed to bel i eve that both were i mpl i cated. I d. at 495 (Justi ces Bren-
nan, Stewart, and Marshal l ); Russell, supra, 439 (Justi ces Stewart, Brennan, and
Marshal l ). The Court agai n fai l ed to cl ari fy the basi s for the defense i n Mathews
v. Uni ted States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988), hol di ng that a defendant i n a federal cri mi nal
case who deni es commi ssi on of the cri me i s enti tl ed to assert an i nconsi stent en-
trapment defense where the evi dence warrants, and i n Jacobson v. Uni ted States,
112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992) (i nval i dati ng a convi cti on under the Chi l d Protecti on
Act of 1984 because government sol i ci tati on i nduced the defendant to purchase chi l d
pornography).
30
Jacobson v. Uni ted States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992). Here the Court hel d
that the government had fai l ed to prove that the defendant was i ni ti al l y predi sposed
to purchase chi l d pornography, even though he had become so predi sposed fol l owi ng
sol i ci tati on through an undercover sti ng operati on. For several years government
agents had sent the defendant mai l i ngs sol i ci ti ng hi s vi ews on pornography and
chi l d pornography, and urgi ng hi m to obtai n materi al s i n order to fi ght censorshi p
and stand up for i ndi vi dual ri ghts.
31
Sorrel l s v. Uni ted States, 287 U.S. 435, 45152 (1932); Sherman v. Uni ted
States, 356 U.S. 369, 37678 (1958); Masci al e v. Uni ted States, 356 U.S. 386, 388
(1958); Uni ted States v. Russel l , 411 U.S. 423, 43236 (1973); Hampton v. Uni ted
States, 425 U.S. 484, 488489 (1976) (pl ural i ty opi ni on), and i d. at 491 (Justi ces
Powel l and Bl ackmun concurri ng).
32
Jacobson v. Uni ted States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1992).
The Court has empl oyed the so-cal l ed subjecti ve approach to
eval uati ng the defense of entrapment. Thi s subjecti ve approach fol -
l ows a two-pronged anal ysi s. Fi rst, the questi on i s asked whether
the offense was i nduced by a government agent. Second, i f the gov-
ernment has i nduced the defendant to break the l aw, the prosecu-
ti on must prove beyond reasonabl e doubt that the defendant was
di sposed to commi t the cri mi nal act pri or to fi rst bei ng approached
by Government agents.
30
I f the defendant can be shown to have
been ready and wi l l i ng to commi t the cri me whenever the oppor-
tuni ty presented i tsel f, the defense of entrapment i s unavai l i ng, no
matter the degree of i nducement.
31
On the other hand, [w]hen the
Governments quest for convi cti on l eads to the apprehensi on of an
otherwi se l aw-abi di ng ci ti zen who, i f l eft to hi s own devi ces, l i kel y
woul d never run afoul of the l aw, the courts shoul d i ntervene.
32
An objecti ve approach, whi l e rejected by the Supreme Court, has
been advocated by some Justi ces and recommended for codi fi cati on
1752
33
See Ameri can Law I nsti tute, MODEL PENAL CODE 2.13 (Offi ci al Draft, 1962);
NATI ONAL COMMI SSI ON ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRI MI NAL LAWS, A PROPOSED NEW
FEDERAL CRI MI NAL CODE 702(2) (Fi nal Draft, 1971).
34
Sorrel l s v. Uni ted States, 287 U.S. 435, 45859 (1932) (separate opi ni on of
Justi ce Roberts); Sherman v. Uni ted States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958) (Justi ce
Frankfurter concurri ng); Uni ted States v. Russel l , 411 U.S. 423, 441 (1973) (Justi ce
Stewart di ssenti ng); Hampton v. Uni ted States, 425 U.S. 484, 49697 (1976) (Justi ce
Brennan di ssenti ng).
35
Thus, i n Sorrells and Sherman government agents sol i ci ted defendants, i n
Russell the agents suppl i ed an i ngredi ent, whi ch was commonl y avai l abl e, and i n
Hampton the agents suppl i ed an essenti al and di ffi cul t to obtai n i ngredi ent.
36
The defense was rejected as to al l the Abscam defendants. E.g., Uni ted
States v. Kel l y, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Ci r. 1983); Uni ted States v. Wi l l i ams, 705 F.2d
603 (2d Ci r. 1983); Uni ted States v. Jannotti , 673 F.2d 578 (3d Ci r.), cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
37
Stoval l v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
38
Ki rby v. I l l i noi s, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
39
Uni ted States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
40
Nei l v. Bi ggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196201 (1972); Manson v. Brathwai te, 432
U.S. 98, 11417 (1977). The factors to be consi dered i n eval uati ng the l i kel i hood of
mi si denti fi cati on i ncl ude the opportuni ty of the wi tness to vi ew the suspect at the
ti me of the cri me, the wi tness degree of attenti on, the accuracy of the wi tness pri or
descri pti on of the suspect, the l evel of certai nty demonstrated by the wi tness at the
confrontati on, and the l ength of ti me between the cri me and the confrontati on. See
also Stoval l v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Si mmons v. Uni ted States, 390 U.S. 377
(1968); Foster v. Cal i forni a, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); Col eman v. Al abama, 399 U.S. 1
(1970).
by Congress and the state l egi sl atures.
33
The objecti ve approach
di sregards the defendants predi sposi ti on and l ooks to the i nduce-
ments used by government agents. I f the government empl oyed
means of persuasi on or i nducement creati ng a substanti al ri sk that
the person tempted wi l l engage i n the conduct, the defense i s avai l -
abl e.
34
Typi cal l y, entrapment cases have ri sen i n the narcoti cs
area,
35
but more recentl y, as i n the Abscam controversy, the
focus has been on publ i c corrupti on and the offeri ng of bri bes to
publ i c offi ci al s.
36
Cri mi nal I denti fi cati on Process. The conduct by pol i ce of
i denti fi cati on processes seeki ng to i denti fy the perpetrators of
cri mes by l i neups, showups, photographi c di spl ays, and the l i ke
can rai se due process probl ems. For posti ndi ctment l i neups and
showups conducted before June 12, 1967,
37
for prei ndi ctment l i ne-
ups and showups,
38
and for i denti fi cati on processes at whi ch the
defendant i s not present,
39
the questi on of the admi ssi bi l i ty of an
i n-court i denti fi cati on or of testi mony about an out-of-court i denti -
fi cati on i s whether there i s a very substanti al l i kel i hood of
mi si denti fi cati on, and that questi on must be determi ned on the
total i ty of the ci rcumstances.
40
Suggesti ve confrontati ons are di sapproved because they i n-
crease the l i kel i hood of mi si denti fi cati on, and unnecessari l y sugges-
ti ve ones are condemned for the further reason that the i ncreased
1753
41
Nei l v. Bi ggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972).
42
Manson v. Brathwai te, 432 U.S. 98, 10714 (1977). The eval uati ve factors
were what the per se rul e and the l ess stri ct rul e contri buted to excl udi ng unrel i abl e
eyewi tness testi mony from jury consi derati on, to deterrence of suggesti ve proce-
dures, and to the admi ni strati on of justi ce. The possi bi l i ty of a per se rul e i n post-
Stovall cases had been l eft open i n Nei l v. Bi ggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972). Due
process does not requi re that the i n-court heari ng to determi ne whether to excl ude
a wi tness i denti fi cati on as arri ved at i mproperl y be out of the presence of the jury.
Watki ns v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981).
43
Hurtado v. Cal i forni a, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
44
Smi th v. OGrady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941) (gui l ty pl ea of l ayman unrepresented
by counsel to what prosecuti on represented as a charge of si mpl e burgl ary but
whi ch was i n fact a charge of burgl ary wi th expl osi ves carryi ng a much l engthi er
sentence i s voi d). See also Col e v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948) (affi rmance by ap-
pel l ate court of convi cti on and sentence on ground that evi dence showed defendant
gui l ty under a secti on of the statute not charged vi ol ated due process); I n re Ruffal o,
390 U.S. 544 (1968) (di sbarment i n proceedi ng on charge whi ch was not made unti l
after l awyer had testi fi ed deni ed due process); Rabe v. Washi ngton, 405 U.S. 313
(1972) (affi rmance of obsceni ty convi cti on because of the context i n whi ch a movi e
was shown grounds nei ther covered i n the statute nor l i sted i n the charge was
i nval i d).
45
Norri s v. Al abama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Cassel l v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950);
Eubanks v. Loui si ana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954); Pi erre v. Loui si ana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939). See i nfra, pp. 185457. On preju-
di ci al publ i ci ty, see Beck v. Washi ngton, 369 U.S. 541 (1962).
46
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116, 117 (1934). See also Buchal ter v.
New York, 319 U.S. 427, 429 (1943).
chance of mi si denti fi cati on i s gratui tous.
41
But, bal anci ng the fac-
tors that i t thought furni shed the gui dance for deci si on, the Court
decl i ned to l ay down a per se rul e of excl usi on of an i denti fi cati on
because i t was obtai ned under condi ti ons of unnecessary sugges-
ti veness al one, feel i ng that the fai rness standard of due process
does not requi re an evi denti ary rul e of such severi ty.
42
I ni ti ati on of the Prosecuti on. I ndi ctment by a grand jury
i s not a requi rement of due process; a State may proceed i nstead
by i nformati on.
43
Due process does requi re that, whatever the pro-
cedure, a defendant must be gi ven adequate noti ce of the offense
charged agai nst hi m and for whi ch he i s to be tri ed,
44
even asi de
from the requi rements of the Si xth Amendment. Where, of course,
a grand jury i s uti l i zed, i t must be fai rl y consti tuted and free from
prejudi ci al i nfl uences.
45
Fai r Tri al . The provi si ons of the Bi l l of Ri ghts now appl i ca-
bl e to the States contai n basi c guarantees of a fai r tri al ri ght to
counsel , ri ght to speedy and publ i c tri al , ri ght to be free from use
of unl awful l y sei zed evi dence and unl awful l y obtai ned confessi ons,
and the l i ke. But thi s does not exhaust the requi rements of fai r-
ness. Due process of l aw requi res that the proceedi ngs shal l be
fai r, but fai rness i s a rel ati ve, not an absol ute concept. . . . What
i s fai r i n one set of ci rcumstances may be an act of tyranny i n oth-
ers.
46
Conversel y, as appl i ed to a cri mi nal tri al , deni al of due
1754
47
Li senba v. Cal i forni a, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
48
273 U.S. 510 (1927). See also Ward v. Vi l l age of Monroevi l l e, 409 U.S. 57
(1972). But see Dugan v. Ohi o, 277 U.S. 61 (1928). Bi as or prejudi ce of an appel l ate
judge can al so depri ve a l i ti gant of due process. Aetna Li fe I ns. Co. v. LaVoi e, 475
U.S. 813 (1986) (fai l ure of state supreme court judge wi th pecuni ary i nterest a
pendi ng sui t on an i ndi sti ngui shabl e cl ai m to recuse).
49
E.g., Fi sher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949); Ungar v. Sarafi te, 376 U.S. 575
(1964); Hol t v. Vi rgi ni a, 381 U.S. 131 (1965); Mayberry v. Pennsyl vani a, 400 U.S.
455 (1971); Johnson v. Mi ssi ssi ppi , 403 U.S. 212 (1971); Tayl or v. Hayes, 418 U.S.
488 (1974). See generally I l l i noi s v. Al l en, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). I n the context of al -
l eged contempt before a judge acti ng as a one-man grand jury, the Court reversed
cri mi nal contempt convi cti ons, sayi ng: A fai r tri al i n a fai r tri bunal i s a basi c re-
qui rement of due process. Fai rness of course requi res an absence of actual bi as i n
the tri al of cases. But our system of l aw has al ways endeavored to prevent even the
probabi l i ty of unfai rness. I n re Murchi son, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
50
Smi th v. Phi l l i ps, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) (juror had job appl i cati on pendi ng wi th
prosecutors offi ce duri ng tri al ). See also Remmer v. Uni ted States, 347 U.S. 227
(1954) (bri be offer to si tti ng juror); Denni s v. Uni ted States, 339 U.S. 162, 16772
(1950) (government empl oyees on jury).
51
MuMi n v. Vi rgi ni a, 500 U.S. 415 (1991). For di scussi on of the requi rements
of jury i mparti al i ty about capi tal puni shment, see di scussi on under Si xth Amend-
ment, supra p. 1415.
process i s the fai l ure to observe that fundamental fai rness essenti al
to the very concept of justi ce. I n order to decl are a deni al of i t . . .
[the Court] must fi nd that the absence of that fai rness fatal l y i n-
fected the tri al ; the acts compl ai ned of must be of such qual i ty as
necessari l y prevents a fai r tri al .
47
Bi as or prejudi ce ei ther i nherent i n the structure of the tri al
system or as i mposed by external events wi l l deny ones ri ght to
a fai r tri al . Thus, i n Tumey v. Ohio
48
i t was hel d to vi ol ate due
process to vest tri al of offenders i n a judge who recei ved, i n addi -
ti on to hi s sal ary, the costs i mposed on a convi cted defendant, and
who was al so mayor of the muni ci pal i ty whi ch recei ved part of the
money col l ected i n fi nes. The i nfl uence of contemptuous mi s-
behavi or i n court upon the i mparti al i ty of the presi di ng judge who
may ci te for contempt and sentence contemnors has di vi ded the
Court.
49
Due process i s al so vi ol ated by the parti ci pati on of a bi -
ased or otherwi se parti al juror, but there i s no presumpti on that
jurors who are potenti al l y compromi sed are i n fact prejudi ced; ordi -
nari l y the proper avenue of rel i ef i s a heari ng at whi ch the juror
may be questi oned and the defense afforded an opportuni ty to
prove actual bi as.
50
Exposure to pretri al publ i ci ty does not nec-
essari l y bi as jurors. Thus, a tri al judges refusal to questi on poten-
ti al jurors about the contents of news reports to whi ch they had
been exposed di d not vi ol ate the defendants ri ght to due process,
i t bei ng suffi ci ent that the judge on voir dire asked the jurors
whether they coul d put asi de what they had heard about the case,
l i sten to the evi dence wi th an open mi nd, and render an i mparti al
verdi ct.
51
I t i s not a deni al of due process for the prosecuti on to
1755
52
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
53
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(1923).
54
Sheppard v. Maxwel l , 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Ri deau v. Loui si ana, 373 U.S. 723
(1963); I rvi n v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); But see Strobl e v. Cal i forni a, 343 U.S.
181 (1952); Murphy v. Fl ori da, 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
55
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
56
Chandl er v. Fl ori da, 449 U.S. 560 (1981). The deci si on was unani mous but
Justi ces Stewart and Whi te concurred on the basi s that Estes had establ i shed a per
se consti tuti onal rul e whi ch had to be overrul ed, i d. at 583, 586, contrary to the
Courts posi ti on. I d. at 57074.
57
Wardi us v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
cal l the jurys attenti on to the defendants pri or cri mi nal record
when the object i s to enabl e the jury, whi ch has the sentenci ng
functi on as wel l as the gui l t-determi nati on functi on, once i t has de-
termi ned gui l t or i nnocence and i f the former, to i ncrease the sen-
tence whi ch woul d otherwi se be gi ven under a reci di vi st statute.
52
Mob domi nati on of a tri al so as to rob the jury of i ts judgment
on the evi dence presented, i s, of course, a cl assi c due process vi ol a-
ti on.
53
More recentl y, concern wi th the i mpact of prejudi ci al publ i c-
i ty upon jurors and potenti al jurors has caused the Court to i n-
struct tri al courts that they shoul d be vi gi l ant to guard agai nst
such prejudi ce and to curb both the publ i ci ty and the jurys expo-
sure to i t.
54
A state rul e permi tti ng the tel evi si ng of certai n tri al s
was struck down on the grounds that the harmful potenti al effect
on the jurors was substanti al , that the testi mony presented at tri al
may be di storted by the mul ti faceted i nfl uence of tel evi si on upon
the conduct of wi tnesses, that the judges abi l i ty to presi de over the
tri al and guarantee fai rness i s consi derabl y encumbered to the pos-
si bl e detri ment of fai rness, and that the defendant i s l i kel y to be
harassed by hi s tel evi si on exposure.
55
Subsequentl y, however, i n
part because of i mprovements i n technol ogy whi ch caused much
l ess di srupti on of the tri al process and i n part because of the l ack
of empi ri cal data showi ng that the mere presence of the broadcast
medi a i n the courtroom necessari l y has an adverse effect on the
process, the Court has hel d that due process does not al together
precl ude the tel evi si ng of state cri mi nal tri al s.
56
I t i s permi ssi bl e for the State to requi re a defendant to gi ve
pretri al noti ce of an i ntenti on to rel y on an al i bi defense and to fur-
ni sh the names of supporti ng wi tnesses, but due process requi res
reci procal di scovery i n such ci rcumstances, necessi tati ng that the
State gi ve defendant pretri al noti ce of i ts rebuttal evi dence on the
al i bi i ssue.
57
Because of the possi bl e i mpai rment of the presump-
ti on of i nnocence i n the mi nds of the jurors, due process i s vi ol ated
when the accused i s compel l ed to stand tri al before a jury whi l e
1756
58
Estel l e v. Wi l l i ams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). The convi cted defendant was deni ed
habeas rel i ef, however, because of fai l ure to object at tri al . But cf. Hol brook v.
Fl ynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986) (presence i n courtroom of uni formed state troopers serv-
i ng as securi ty guards was not the same sort of i nherentl y prejudi ci al si tuati on).
59
Chambers v. Mi ssi ssi ppi , 410 U.S. 284 (1973). See also Davi s v. Al aska, 415
U.S. 786 (1974) (refusal to permi t defendant to exami ne prosecuti on wi tness about
hi s adjudi cati on as juveni l e del i nquent and status on probati on at ti me, i n order to
show possi bl e bi as, was due process vi ol ati on, al though general pri nci pl e of protect-
i ng anonymi ty of juveni l e offenders was val i d); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683
(1986) (excl usi on of testi mony as to ci rcumstances of a confessi on can depri ve a de-
fendant of a fai r tri al when the ci rcumstances bear on the credi bi l i ty as wel l as the
vol untari ness of the confessi on).
60
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
61
Tayl or v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978). However, an i nstructi on on the pre-
sumpti on of i nnocence need not be gi ven i n every case, Kentucky v. Whorton, 441
U.S. 786 (1979), the Court rei terati ng that the total i ty of the ci rcumstances must
be l ooked to i n order to determi ne i f fai l ure to so i nstruct deni ed due process. The
ci rcumstances emphasi zed i n Taylor i ncl uded the skel etal i nstructi on on burden of
proof combi ned wi th the prosecutors remarks i n hi s openi ng and cl osi ng statements
i nvi ti ng the jury to consi der the defendants pri or record and hi s i ndi ctment i n the
present case as i ndi cati ng gui l t. See also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510
(1979) (i nstructi ng jury tryi ng person charged wi th purposel y or knowi ngl y caus-
i ng vi cti ms death that l aw presumes that a person i ntends the ordi nary con-
sequences of hi s vol untary acts deni ed due process because jury coul d have treated
the presumpti on as concl usi ve or as shi fti ng burden of persuasi on and i n ei ther
event State woul d not have carri ed i ts burden of provi ng gui l t). And see Cupp v.
Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973); Henderson v. Ki bbe, 431 U.S. 145, 15455 (1973).
For other cases appl yi ng Sandstrom, see Franci s v. Frankl i n, 471 U.S. 307 (1985)
(contradi ctory but ambi guous i nstructi on not cl earl y expl ai ni ng states burden of
persuasi on on i ntent does not erase Sandstrom error i n earl i er part of charge); Rose
v. Cl ark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) (Sandstrom error can i n some ci rcumstances consti tute
harml ess error under pri nci pl es of Chapman v. Cal i forni a, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). Si mi -
l arl y, i mproper arguments by a prosecutor do not necessari l y consti tute pl ai n
error, and a revi ewi ng court may consi der i n the context of the enti re record of the
dressed i n i denti fi abl e pri son cl othes.
58
Ordi nary evi denti ary rul es
of cri mi nal tri al s may i n some i nstances deny a defendant due
process. Thus, the combi nati on i n a tri al of two rul es (1) that de-
ni ed defendant the ri ght to cross-exami ne hi s own wi tness, whom
he had cal l ed because the prosecuti on woul d not, i n order to el i ci t
evi dence excul patory to defendant and (2) that deni ed defendant
the ri ght to i ntroduce the testi mony of wi tnesses about matters tol d
them out of court on the ground the testi mony woul d be hearsay,
under al l the ci rcumstances, deni ed defendant hi s consti tuti onal
ri ght to present hi s own defense i n a meani ngful way.
59
Basi c to
due process i s the ri ght to testi fy i n ones own defense; thi s ri ght
may not be restri cted, the Court has hel d, by a states per se rul e
excl udi ng al l hypnoti cal l y refreshed testi mony.
60
Even though the
burden on defendant i s heavy to show that an erroneous i nstruc-
ti on or the fai l ure to gi ve a requested i nstructi on tai nted hi s con-
vi cti on, under some ci rcumstances i t i s a vi ol ati on of due process
and reversi bl e error to fai l to i nstruct the jury that the defendant
i s enti tl ed to a presumpti on of i nnocence.
61
I t does not deny a de-
1757
tri al the tri al courts fai l ure to redress such error i n the absence of contemporaneous
objecti on. Uni ted States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985).
62
North v. Russel l , 427 U.S. 328 (1976).
63
Uni ted States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
64
North Carol i na v. Al ford, 400 U.S. 25 (1971); Parker v. North Carol i na, 397
U.S. 790 (1970). See also Brady v. Uni ted States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). A gui l ty pl ea
wi l l ordi nari l y wai ve chal l enges to al l eged unconsti tuti onal pol i ce practi ces occur-
ri ng pri or to the pl ea, unl ess the defendant can show that the pl ea resul ted from
i ncompetent counsel . Tol l ett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Davi s v. Uni ted
States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973). But see Bl ackl edge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). The
State can permi t pl eas of gui l ty i n whi ch the defendant reserves the ri ght to rai se
consti tuti onal questi ons on appeal , and federal habeas courts wi l l honor that ar-
rangement. Lefkowi tz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). Rel ease-di smi ssal agree-
ments, pursuant to whi ch the prosecuti on agrees to di smi ss cri mi nal charges i n ex-
change for the defendants agreement to rel ease hi s ri ght to fi l e a ci vi l acti on for
al l eged pol i ce or prosecutori al mi sconduct, are not per se i nval i d. Town of Newton
v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
65
Bl ackl edge v. Al l i son, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
66
Bordenki rcher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). Charged wi th forgery, Hayes
was i nformed duri ng pl ea negoti ati ons that i f he woul d pl ead gui l ty the prosecutor
woul d recommend a fi ve-year sentence; i f he di d not pl ead gui l ty, the prosecutor
woul d al so seek an i ndi ctment under the habi tual cri mi nal statute under whi ch
Hayes, because of two pri or fel ony convi cti ons, woul d recei ve a mandatory l i fe sen-
tence i f convi cted. Hayes refused to pl ead, was rei ndi cted, and upon convi cti on was
sentenced to l i fe. Four Justi ces di ssented, i d. at 365, 368, contendi ng that the Court
had watered down North Carol i na v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). See also Uni ted
States v. Goodwi n, 457 U.S. 368 (1982).
fendant due process to subject hi m i ni ti al l y to tri al before a
nonl awyer pol i ce court judge when there i s a l ater tri al de novo
avai l abl e under the States court system.
62
Gui l ty Pl eas. A defendant may pl ead gui l ty i nstead of i nsi st-
i ng that the prosecuti on prove hi m gui l ty. There are a number of
di fferent reasons why a defendant may be wi l l i ng to pl ead gui l ty,
perhaps because of overwhel mi ng evi dence agai nst hi m, perhaps
because, whi l e the evi dence l eaves the outcome i n doubt, shoul d he
go to tri al and be convi cted hi s sentence wi l l be more severe than
i f he pl eads gui l ty, perhaps to secure some other advantage. Often
the defendant and hi s attorney engage i n pl ea bargai ni ng wi th
the prosecuti on so that he i s guaranteed a l i ght sentence or i s al -
l owed to pl ead to a l esser offense. Whi l e the government may not
structure i ts system so as to coerce a gui l ty pl ea,
63
a gui l ty pl ea
that i s entered vol untari l y, knowi ngl y, and understandi ngl y, even
to obtai n an advantage, i s suffi ci ent to overcome consti tuti onal ob-
jecti ons.
64
The gui l ty pl ea and the often concomi tant pl ea bargai n
are i mportant and necessary components of the cri mi nal justi ce
system,
65
and i t i s not i mpermi ssi bl e for a prosecutor duri ng such
pl ea bargai ns to put a defendant to a hard choi ce, requi ri ng hi m
to forego hi s ri ght to go to tri al i n return for escapi ng what i s l i kel y
to be a much more severe penal ty i f he does el ect to go to tri al .
66
1758
67
Boyki n v. Al abama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). I n Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S.
637 (1976), the Court hel d that a defendant charged wi th fi rst degree murder who
el ected to pl ead gui l ty to second degree murder had not vol untari l y, i n the consti tu-
ti onal sense, entered the pl ea because nei ther hi s counsel nor the tri al judge had
i nformed hi m that an i ntent to cause the death of the vi cti m was an essenti al el e-
ment of gui l t i n the second degree; consequentl y no showi ng was made that he
knowi ngl y was admi tti ng such i ntent. A pl ea may be i nvol untary ei ther because
the accused does not understand the nature of the consti tuti onal protecti ons that
he i s wai vi ng . . . or because he has such an i ncompl ete understandi ng of the charge
that hi s pl ea cannot stand as an i ntel l i gent admi ssi on of gui l t. I d. at 645 n.13. See
also Bl ackl edge v. Al l i son, 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
68
Santobel l o v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). Defendant and a prosecutor
reached agreement on a gui l ty pl ea i n return for no sentence recommendati on by
the prosecuti on. At the sentenci ng heari ng months l ater, a di fferent prosecutor rec-
ommended the maxi mum sentence, and that sentence was i mposed. The Court va-
cated the judgment, hol di ng that the prosecutors enti re staff was bound by the
promi se. Pri or to the pl ea, however, the prosecutor may wi thdraw hi s fi rst offer, and
a defendant who l ater pl ed gui l ty after accepti ng a second, l ess attracti ve offer has
no ri ght to enforcement of the fi rst agreement. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504
(1984).
69
Mooney v. Hol ahan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
70
The Court di smi ssed the peti ti oners sui t on the ground that adequate process
exi sted i n the state courts to correct any wrong and that peti ti oner had not avai l ed
hi msel f of i t. A state court subsequentl y apprai sed the evi dence and rul ed that the
al l egati ons had not been proved i n Ex parte Mooney, 10 Cal . 2d 1, 73 P.2d 554
(1937), cert. denied 305 U.S. 598 (1938).
The court must i nqui re whether the defendant i s pl eadi ng vol -
untari l y, knowi ngl y, and understandi ngl y,
67
and the adjudi cati ve
el ement i nherent i n accepti ng a pl ea of gui l ty must be attended by
safeguards to i nsure the defendant what i s reasonabl y due i n the
ci rcumstances. Those ci rcumstances wi l l vary, but a constant factor
i s that when a pl ea rests i n any si gni fi cant degree on a promi se
or agreement of the prosecutor, so that i t can be sai d to be part
of the i nducement or consi derati on, such promi se must be ful -
fi l l ed.
68
Prosecutori al Mi sconduct. When a convi cti on i s obtai ned
by the presentati on of testi mony known to the prosecuti ng authori -
ti es to have been perjured, due process i s vi ol ated. The cl ause can-
not be deemed to be sati sfi ed by mere noti ce and heari ng i f a State
has contri ved a convi cti on through the pretense of a tri al whi ch i n
truth i s but used as a means of depri vi ng a defendant of l i berty
through a del i berate decepti on of court and jury by the presen-
tati on of testi mony known to be perjured. Such a contri vance . . .
i s as i nconsi stent wi th the rudi mentary demands of justi ce as i s
the obtai ni ng of a l i ke resul t by i nti mi dati on.
69
The quoted l an-
guage was di ctum i n the case i n whi ch i t was uttered,
70
but the
pri nci pl e enunci ated has been uti l i zed to requi re state offi ci al s to
controvert al l egati ons of convi cted persons that knowi ngl y fal se tes-
1759
71
Pyl e v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Whi te v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
See also New York ex rel . Whi tman v. Wi l son, 318 U.S. 688 (1943); Ex parte Hawk,
321 U.S. 114 (1914). But see Hysl er v. Fl ori da, 315 U.S. 411 (1942); Li senba v. Cal i -
forni a, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
72
Napue v. I l l i noi s, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Al corta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
I n the former case, the pri nci pal prosecuti on wi tness was defendants accompl i ce,
and he testi fi ed that he had recei ved no promi se of consi derati on i n return for hi s
testi mony. I n fact, the prosecutor had promi sed hi m consi derati on, but di d nothi ng
to correct the fal se testi mony. See also Gi gl i o v. Uni ted States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)
(same). I n the l atter case, i nvol vi ng a husbands ki l l i ng of hi s wi fe because of her
i nfi del i ty, a prosecuti on wi tness testi fi ed at the habeas corpus heari ng that he tol d
the prosecutor that he had been i nti mate wi th the woman but that the prosecutor
had tol d hi m to vol unteer nothi ng of i t, so that at tri al he had testi fi ed hi s rel ati on-
shi p wi th the woman was whol l y casual . I n both cases, the Court deemed i t i rrel e-
vant that the fal se testi mony had gone onl y to the credi bi l i ty of the wi tness rather
than to the defendants gui l t. What i f the prosecuti on shoul d become aware of the
perjury of a prosecuti on wi tness fol l owi ng the tri al ? Cf. Durl ey v. Mayo, 351 U.S.
277 (1956). But see Smi th v. Phi l l i ps, 455 U.S. 209, 21821 (1982) (prosecutors fai l -
ure to di scl ose that one of the jurors has a job appl i cati on pendi ng before hi m, thus
renderi ng hi m possi bl y parti al , does not go to fai rness of the tri al and due process
i s not vi ol ated).
73
386 U.S. 1 (1967).
74
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). I n Jencks v. Uni ted States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), i n
the exerci se of i ts supervi sory power over the federal courts, the Court hel d that
the defense was enti tl ed to obtai n, for i mpeachment purposes, statements whi ch had
been made to government agents by government wi tnesses duri ng the i nvesti gatory
stage. Cf. Scal es v. Uni ted States, 367 U.S. 203, 25758 (1961). A subsequent stat-
ute modi fi ed but l argel y codi fi ed the deci si on and was uphel d by the Court. Pal ermo
v. Uni ted States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959), sustai ni ng 18 U.S.C. 3500.
75
See the di vi si on of opi ni on i n Gi l es v. Maryl and, 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
ti mony had been used to convi ct,
71
and to upset convi cti ons found
to have been so procured.
72
Extendi ng the pri nci pl e, the Court i n
Miller v. Pate
73
upset a convi cti on obtai ned after the prosecuti on
had represented to the jury that a pai r of mens shorts found near
the scene of a sex attack bel onged to the defendant and that they
were stai ned wi th bl ood; the defendant showed i n a habeas corpus
proceedi ng that no evi dence connected hi m wi th the shorts and fur-
thermore that the shorts were not i n fact bl oodstai ned, and that
the prosecuti on had known these facts.
Furthermore, i n Brady v. Maryland,
74
the Court hel d that the
suppressi on by the prosecuti on of evi dence favorabl e to an accused
upon request vi ol ates due process where the evi dence i s materi al
ei ther to gui l t or to puni shment, i rrespecti ve of the good fai th or
bad fai th of the prosecuti on. I n that case, the prosecuti on had sup-
pressed an extrajudi ci al confessi on of defendants accompl i ce that
he had actual l y commi tted the murder; the accompl i ces confessi on
coul d have i nfl uenced the jurys determi nati on of puni shment but
not i ts judgment of gui l t. But thi s begi nni ng toward the devel op-
ment of cri mi nal di scovery was not carri ed forward,
75
and the
Court has wai vered i n i ts appl i cati on of Brady.
1760
76
408 U.S. 786, 79495 (1972). Joi ni ng Justi ce Bl ackmuns opi ni on were Jus-
ti ces Brennan, Whi te, Rehnqui st, and Chi ef Justi ce Burger. Di ssenti ng were Jus-
ti ces Dougl as, Stewart, Marshal l , and Powel l . I d. at 800.
77
427 U.S. 97 (1976).
78
I d. at 10304. Thi s si tuati on i s the Mooney v. Holohan type of case.
79
I d. at 10406. Thi s the Brady si tuati on.
80
I d. at 10614. Thi s was the Agurs fact si tuati on. Si mi l arl y, there i s no obl i ga-
ti on that l aw enforcement offi ci al s preserve breath sampl es whi ch have been uti l i zed
i n a breath-anal ysi s test; the Agurs materi al i ty standard i s met onl y by evi dence
whi ch possess[es] an excul patory val ue . . . apparent before [i t] was destroyed, and
al so [i s] of such a nature that the defendant woul d be unabl e to obtai n comparabl e
evi dence by other reasonabl y avai l abl e means. Cal i forni a v. Trombetta, 467 U.S.
479, 489 (1984). See also Ari zona v. Youngbl ood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (negl i gent fai l -
ure to refri gerate and otherwi se preserve potenti al l y excul patory physi cal evi dence
from sexual assaul t ki t does not vi ol ate a defendants due process ri ghts absent bad
fai th on the part of the pol i ce).
I n fi ndi ng Brady i nappl i cabl e because the evi dence wi thhel d
was not materi al and not excul patory, the Court i n Moore v. I lli-
nois,
76
restated the governi ng pri nci pl es. The heart of the hol di ng
i n Brady i s the prosecuti ons suppressi on of evi dence, i n the face
of a defense producti on request, where the evi dence i s favorabl e to
the accused and i s materi al ei ther to gui l t or to puni shment. I m-
portant, then, are (a) suppressi on by the prosecuti on after a re-
quest by the defense, (b) the evi dences favorabl e character for the
defense, and (c) the materi al i ty of the evi dence.
I n United States v. Agurs,
77
the Court summari zed and some-
what expanded the prosecutors obl i gati on to di scl ose to the defense
excul patory evi dence i n hi s possessi on, even i n the absence of a re-
quest, or upon a general request, by defendant. The obl i gati on i s
expressed i n a tri parti te test of materi al i ty of the excul patory evi -
dence i n the context of the tri al record. Fi rst, i f the prosecutor
knew or shoul d have known that testi mony gi ven to the tri al was
perjured, the convi cti on must be set asi de i f there i s any reasonabl e
l i kel i hood that the fal se testi mony coul d have affected the judg-
ment of the jury.
78
Second, i f the defense speci fi cal l y requested cer-
tai n evi dence and the prosecutor wi thhel d i t, the convi cti on must
be set asi de i f the suppressed evi dence mi ght have affected the out-
come of the tri al .
79
Thi rd (the new l aw created i n Agurs), i f the de-
fense di d not make a request at al l , or si mpl y asked for al l Brady
materi al or for anythi ng excul patory, a duty resi des i n the pros-
ecuti on to reveal to the defense obvi ousl y excul patory evi dence; i f
the prosecutor does not reveal i t, reversal of a convi cti on may be
requi red, but onl y i f the undi scl osed evi dence creates a reasonabl e
doubt as to the defendants gui l t.
80
A prosecutor does not vi ol ate the due process cl ause when, i n
negoti ati ng wi th a defendant to obtai n a gui l ty pl ea or some other
acti on that wi l l l essen the tri al burden, such as tri al before a judge
1761
81
Bordenki rcher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); Uni ted States v. Goodwi n, 457
U.S. 368 (1982). I n the former case, duri ng pl ea negoti ati ons, the prosecutor tol d
defendant that i f he di d not pl ead gui l ty to the charges he woul d bri ng addi ti onal
charges, and he di d so upon defendants conti nued refusal . I n the l atter case, de-
fendant was charged wi th a mi sdemeanor and coul d have been tri ed before a mag-
i strate; he refused to pl ead gui l ty and sought a jury tri al i n di stri ct court. The Gov-
ernment obtai ned a four-count fel ony i ndi ctment based upon the same conduct and
acqui red a convi cti on.
82
Bl ackl edge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). Defendant was convi cted i n an i nfe-
ri or court of a mi sdemeanor. He had a ri ght to a de novo tri al i n superi or court,
but when he exerci sed the ri ght the prosecutor obtai ned a fel ony i ndi ctment based
upon the same conduct. The di sti ncti on the Court draws between thi s case and
Bordenkircher and Goodwin i s that of pretri al conduct, i n whi ch vi ndi cti veness i s
not l i kel y, and posttri al conduct, i n whi ch vi ndi cti veness i s more l i kel y and i s not
permi tted. Accord, Thi gpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 (1984).
83
I n re Wi nshi p, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
84
I d. at 363 (quoti ng Coffi n v. Uni ted States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)). Justi ce
Harl ans Winship concurrence, i d. at 368, proceeded on the basi s that i nasmuch as
there i s l i kel i hood of error i n any system of reconstructi ng past events, the error
of convi cti ng the i nnocent shoul d be reduced to the greatest extent possi bl e through
the use of the reasonabl e doubt standard.
85
Mi l es v. Uni ted States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881); Davi s v. Uni ted States, 160
U.S. 469, 488 (1895); Hol t v. Uni ted States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910); Spei ser v.
Randal l , 357 U.S. 513, 52526 (1958).
86
I n addi ti on to Winship, see also Estel l e v. Wi l l i ams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976);
Henderson v. Ki bbe, 431 U.S. 145, 153 (1977); Ul ster County Court v. Al l en, 442
U.S. 140, 156 (1979); Sandstorm v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 52024 (1979). On the
i nterrel ated concepts of the burden of the prosecuti on to prove gui l t beyond a rea-
sonabl e doubt and defendants enti tl ement to a presumpti on of i nnocence, see Tayl or
rather than jury, he threatens and carri es out the threat to seek
a more severe sentence, ei ther by chargi ng a greater offense or rec-
ommendi ng a l onger sentence.
81
But the prosecutor does deny due
process i f he penal i zes the asserti on of a ri ght or pri vi l ege by the
defendant by chargi ng more severel y or recommendi ng a l onger
sentence.
82
The di sti ncti on appears to represent very fi ne l i ne-
drawi ng, but i t appears to be one the Court i s commi tted to.
Proof, Burden of Proof, and Presumpti ons. The due proc-
ess cl auses of the Fi fth and Fourteenth Amendments [protect] the
accused agai nst convi cti on except upon proof beyond a reasonabl e
doubt of every fact necessary to consti tute the cri me wi th whi ch he
i s charged.
83
The reasonabl e doubt standard pl ays a vi tal rol e i n
the Ameri can scheme of cri mi nal procedure. I t i s a pri me i nstru-
ment for reduci ng the ri sk of convi cti ons resti ng on factual error.
The standard provi des concrete substance for the presumpti on of
i nnocence that bedrock axi omati c and el ementary pri nci pl e
whose enforcement l i es at the foundati on of the admi ni strati on of
our cri mi nal l aw.
84
I n many past cases, thi s standard was as-
sumed to be the requi red one,
85
but because i t was so wi del y ac-
cepted onl y recentl y has the Court had the opportuni ty to pro-
nounce i t guaranteed by due process.
86
The presumpti on of i nno-
1762
v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 48386 (1978), and Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786
(1979).
87
E.g., Deutch v. Uni ted States, 367 U.S. 456, 471 (1961). See also Cage v. Lou-
i si ana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curi am) (jury i nstructi on that expl ai ns reasonabl e
doubt as doubt that woul d gi ve ri se to a grave uncertai nty, as equi val ent to a
substanti al doubt, and as requi ri ng a moral certai nty, suggests a hi gher degree
of certai nty than i s requi red for acqui ttal , and therefore vi ol ates the Due Process
Cl ause).
88
Hol t v. Uni ted States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); Agnew v. Uni ted States, 165 U.S.
36 (1897). These cases overturned Coffi n v. Uni ted States, 156 U.S. 432, 460 (1895),
i n whi ch the Court hel d that the presumpti on of i nnocence was evi dence from whi ch
the jury coul d fi nd a reasonabl e doubt.
89
Thompson v. Ci ty of Loui svi l l e, 362 U.S. 199 (1960); Garner v. Loui si ana, 368
U.S. 157 (1961); Tayl or v. Loui si ana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962); Barr v. Ci ty of Col umbi a,
378 U.S. 146 (1964); Johnson v. Fl ori da, 391 U.S. 596 (1968). See also Chessman
v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957).
90
443 U.S. 307 (1979).
91
I d. at 316, 31819. On a somewhat rel ated poi nt, the Court has rul ed that
a general gui l ty verdi ct on a mul ti pl e-object conspi racy need not be set asi de i f the
evi dence i s i nadequate to support convi cti on as to one of the objects of the conspi r-
acy, but i s adequate to support convi cti on as to another. Gri ffi n v. Uni ted States,
112 U.S. 466 (1991).
92
421 U.S. 684 (1975). See also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 52024
(1979).
cence i s val uabl e i n assuri ng defendants a fai r tri al ,
87
and i t oper-
ates to ensure that the jury consi ders the case sol el y on the evi -
dence.
88
The Court has l ong hel d i t woul d set asi de under the due proc-
ess cl ause convi cti ons that are supported by no evi dence at al l ,
89
but Winship necessi tated a reconsi derati on of whether i t shoul d i n
revi ewi ng state cases wei gh the suffi ci ency of the evi dence. Thus,
i n J ackson v. Virginia,
90
i t hel d that federal courts, on di rect ap-
peal of federal convi cti ons or col l ateral revi ew of state convi cti ons,
must sati sfy themsel ves whether the record evi dence coul d reason-
abl y support a fi ndi ng of gui l t beyond a reasonabl e doubt. The
questi on the revi ewi ng court i s to ask i tsel f i s not whether it be-
l i eves the evi dence at the tri al establ i shed gui l t beyond a reason-
abl e doubt, but whether, after vi ewi ng the evi dence i n the l i ght
most favorabl e to the prosecuti on, any rati onal tri er of fact coul d
have found the essenti al el ements of the cri me beyond a reasonabl e
doubt.
91
I nasmuch as due process requi res the prosecuti on to prove be-
yond a reasonabl e doubt every fact necessary to consti tute the
cri me charged, the Court hel d i n Mullaney v. Wilbur
92
that i t was
a deni al of thi s consti tuti onal guarantee to requi re a defendant
charged wi th murder to prove that he acted i n the heat of passi on
on sudden provocati on i n order to reduce the homi ci de to man-
sl aughter. The Court i ndi cated that a bal anci ng of i nterests test
was to be empl oyed to determi ne when the due process cl ause re-
1763
93
Ri vera v. Del aware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976), di smi ssi ng as not presenti ng a sub-
stanti al federal questi on an appeal from a hol di ng that Mullaney di d not prevent
a State from pl aci ng on the defendant the burden of provi ng i nsani ty by a prepon-
derance of the evi dence. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 20205 (1977)
(expl ai ni ng the i mport of Rivera). Justi ce Rehnqui st and Chi ef Justi ce Burger con-
curri ng i n Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704, 705, had argued that the case di d not requi re
any reconsi derati on of the hol di ng i n Lel and v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), that
the defense may be requi red to prove i nsani ty beyond a reasonabl e doubt.
94
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
95
Di ssenti ng i n Patterson, Justi ce Powel l argued that the two statutes were
functi onal equi val ents that shoul d be treated al i ke consti tuti onal l y. He woul d hol d
that as to those facts whi ch hi stori cal l y have made a substanti al di fference i n the
puni shment and sti gma fl owi ng from a cri mi nal act the State al ways bears the bur-
den of persuasi on but that new affi rmati ve defenses may be created and the burden
of establ i shi ng them pl aced on the defendant. I d. at 216. Patterson was fol l owed i n
Marti n v. Ohi o, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (state need not di sprove defendant acted i n sel f-
defense based on honest bel i ef she was i n i mmi nent danger, when offense i s aggra-
vated murder, an el ement of whi ch i s pri or cal cul ati on and desi gn). Justi ce Powel l ,
qui red the prosecuti on to carry the burden and when some part of
the burden mi ght be shi fted to the defendant, but the deci si on
cal l ed i nto questi on the practi ce i n many States under whi ch some
burdens of persuasi on were borne by the defense, and rai sed the
prospect that the prosecuti on must bear al l burdens of persuasi on,
a si gni fi cant and wei ghty task gi ven the l arge numbers of affi rma-
ti ve defenses.
But the Court soon summari l y rejected the argument that
Mullaney means that the prosecuti on must negate the i nsani ty de-
fense,
93
and i n ful l -scal e consi derati on uphel d a state statute that
provi ded that an i ntenti onal ki l l i ng i s murder but permi tted the
defendant to assert extreme emoti onal di sturbance as an affi rma-
ti ve defense whi ch, i f proved by the defense by a preponderance of
the evi dence, woul d reduce the murder offense to mansl aughter.
94
Accordi ng to the Court, the consti tuti onal defi ci ency i n Mullaney
was that the statute made mal i ce an el ement of the offense but
permi tted mal i ce to be presumed upon proof of the other el ements
and requi red the defendant to prove the absence of mal i ce. I n Pat-
terson the statute obl i gated the State to prove each el ement of the
offense (the death, the i ntent to ki l l , and the causati on) beyond a
reasonabl e doubt, but al l owed the defendant to present an affi rma-
ti ve defense that woul d reduce the degree of the offense, and as to
whi ch the defendant bears the burden of persuasi on by a prepon-
derance of the evi dence. The deci si ve i ssue, then, was whether the
statute requi red the state to prove beyond a reasonabl e doubt each
el ement of the offense. So defi ned, the di sti ncti on and the consti tu-
ti onal mandate are formal i sti c, and the l egi sl ature can shi ft bur-
dens of persuasi on between prosecuti on and defense easi l y through
the statutory defi ni ti ons of the offenses.
95
Al so formal i sti c i s the
1764
agai n di ssenti ng, urged a di sti ncti on between defenses that negate an el ement of the
cri me and those that do not. I d. at 236, 240.
96
McMi l l an v. Pennsyl vani a, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (the fi ndi ng i ncreased the mi ni -
mum sentence that coul d be i mposed but di d not affect the maxi mum sentence).
97
See, e.g., Yee Hem v. Uni ted States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925) (uphol di ng statute
that proscri bed possessi on of smoki ng opi um that had been i l l egal l y i mported and
authori zed jury to presume i l l egal i mportati on from fact of possessi on); Manl ey v.
Georgi a, 279 U.S. 1 (1929) (i nval i dati ng statutory presumpti on that every i nsol vency
of a bank shal l be deemed fraudul ent).
98
319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943) (voi di ng presumpti on of transportati on of fi rearm i n
i nterstate commerce from possessi on). Compare Uni ted States v. Gai ney, 380 U.S.
63 (1965) (uphol di ng presumpti on from presence at si te of i l l egal sti l l that defendant
was carryi ng on or ai di ng i n carryi ng on i ts operati on), with Uni ted States v.
Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965) (voi di ng presumpti on from presence at si te of i l l egal
sti l l that defendant had possessi on, custody, or control of sti l l ).
99
395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969).
100
I d. at 3754. Whi l e some of the reasoni ng i n Yee Hem, supra n.97, was di s-
approved, i t was factual l y di sti ngui shed as i nvol vi ng users of hard narcoti cs.
di sti ncti on between el ements of the cri me and sentenci ng factors;
a state may treat as a sentenci ng consi derati on provabl e by a pre-
ponderance of the evi dence the fact that the defendant vi si bl y pos-
sessed a fi rearm duri ng commi ssi on of the offense.
96
Qui te cl osel y rel ated i s the i ssue of statutory presumpti ons;
these general l y provi de for the proof of the presumed fact, an el e-
ment of a cri me, by the establ i shment of another fact, the basi c
fact.
97
I n Tot v. United States,
98
the Court hel d that a statutory
presumpti on was val i d under the due process cl ause i f i t met a ra-
ti onal connecti on test. Under our deci si ons, a statutory presump-
ti on cannot be sustai ned i f there be no rati onal connecti on between
the fact proved and the ul ti mate fact presumed, i f the i nference of
the one from the proof of the other i s arbi trary because of l ack of
connecti on between the two i n common experi ence. I n Leary v.
United States,
99
however, the due process test was sti ffened to re-
qui re that for such a rati onal connecti on to exi st, i t must at l east
be sai d wi th substanti al assurance that the presumed fact i s more
l i kel y than not to fl ow from the proved fact on whi ch i t i s made
to depend. Thus, a provi si on whi ch permi tted a jury to i nfer from
defendants possessi on of mari juana hi s knowl edge of i ts i l l egal i m-
portati on was voi ded. A l engthy canvass of factual materi al s estab-
l i shed to the Courts sati sfacti on that whi l e the greater part of
mari juana consumed here i s of forei gn ori gi n there was sti l l a good
amount produced domesti cal l y and there was thus no way to as-
sure that the majori ty of those possessi ng mari juana have any rea-
son to know thei r mari juana i s i mported.
100
The Court l eft open
the questi on whether a presumpti on whi ch survi ved the rati onal
connecti on test must al so sati sfy the cri mi nal reasonabl e doubt
1765
101
I d. at 36 n.64. The matter was al so l eft open i n Turner v. Uni ted States, 396
U.S. 398 (1970) (judged by ei ther rati onal connecti on or reasonabl e doubt, a pre-
sumpti on that the possessor of heroi n knew i t was i l l egal l y i mported was val i d, but
the same presumpti on wi th regard to cocai ne was i nval i d under the rati onal con-
necti on test because a great deal of the substance was produced domesti cal l y), and
i n Barnes v. Uni ted States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973) (under ei ther test a presumpti on
that possessi on of recentl y stol en property, i f not sati sfactori l y expl ai ned, i s grounds
for i nferri ng possessor knew i t was stol en sati sfi es due process).
102
Ul ster County Court v. Al l en, 442 U.S. 140, 16667 (1979).
103
The majori ty thought that possessi on was more l i kel y than not the case from
the ci rcumstances, whi l e the four di ssenters di sagreed. I d. at 168 (Justi ces Powel l ,
Brennan, Stewart, and Marshal l ). See also Estel l e v. McGui re, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991)
(uphol di ng a jury i nstructi on that, to di ssenti ng Justi ces OConnor and Stevens, i d.
at 484, seemed to di rect the jury to draw the i nference that evi dence that a chi l d
had been battered i n the past meant that the defendant, the chi l ds father, had
necessari l y done the batteri ng).
104
334 U.S. 736, 74041 (1948). I n Hi cks v. Okl ahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980), the
jury had been charged i n accordance wi th an habi tual offender statute that i f i t
found defendant gui l ty of the offense charged, whi ch woul d be a thi rd fel ony convi c-
ti on, i t shoul d assess puni shment at 40 years i mpri sonment. The jury convi cted and
gave defendant 40 years. Subsequentl y, i n another case, the habi tual offender under
standard i f proof of the cri me charged or an essenti al el ement
thereof depends upon i ts use.
101
I n i ts most recent case, a cl osel y di vi ded Court drew a di sti nc-
ti on between mandatory presumpti ons, whi ch a jury must accept,
and permi ssi ve presumpti ons, whi ch may be presented to the jury
as part of al l the evi dence to be consi dered. Wi th respect to manda-
tory presumpti ons, si nce the prosecuti on bears the burden of es-
tabl i shi ng gui l t, i t may not rest i ts case enti rel y on a presumpti on,
unl ess the fact proved i s suffi ci ent to support the i nference of gui l t
beyond a reasonabl e doubt. But, wi th respect to permi ssi ve pre-
sumpti ons, the prosecuti on may rel y on al l of the evi dence i n the
record to meet the reasonabl e doubt standard. There i s no more
reason to requi re a permi ssi ve statutory presumpti on to meet a
reasonabl e-doubt standard before i t may be permi tted to pl ay any
part i n a tri al than there i s to requi re that degree of probati ve
force for other rel evant evi dence before i t may be admi tted.
102
Thus, because the jury was tol d i t had to bel i eve i n defendants
gui l t beyond a reasonabl e doubt and that i t coul d consi der the i n-
ference, due process was not vi ol ated by the appl i cati on of the stat-
utory presumpti on that the presence of a fi rearm i n an automobi l e
i s presumpti ve evi dence of i ts i l l egal possessi on by al l persons then
occupyi ng the vehi cl e.
103
The di vi si on of the Court i n these cases and i n the Mullaney
v. Wilbur l i ne of cases cl earl y shows the unsettl ed doctri nal nature
of the i ssues.
Sentenci ng. I n Townsend v. Burke
104
the Court overturned
a sentence i mposed on an uncounsel ed defendant by a judge who
1766
whi ch Hi cks had been sentenced was decl ared unconsti tuti onal , but Hi cks convi c-
ti on was affi rmed on the basi s that hi s sentence was sti l l wi thi n the permi ssi bl e
range open to the jury. The Supreme Court reversed. Hi cks was deni ed due process
because he was statutori l y enti tl ed to the exerci se of the jurys di screti on and coul d
have been gi ven a sentence as l ow as ten years. That the jury mi ght sti l l have gi ven
the sti ffer sentence was onl y conjectural . On other due process restri cti ons on the
determi nati on of the appl i cabi l i ty of reci di vi st statutes to convi cted defendants, see
Chewi ng v. Cunni ngham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962); Oyl er v. Bol es, 368 U.S. 448 (1962);
and Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). On Ei ghth Amendment rel evance, see
supra, pp. 149596.
105
337 U.S. 241 (1949). See also Wi l l i ams v. Okl ahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959).
106
430 U.S. 349 (1977).
107
Onl y Justi ces Stevens, Stewart, and Powel l took the posi ti on descri bed i n the
text. I d. at 35761. Justi ce Brennan wi thout el aborati on thought the resul t com-
i n reci ti ng defendants record from the bench made several errors
and faceti ous comments. [W]hi l e di sadvantaged by l ack of counsel ,
thi s pri soner was sentenced on the basi s of assumpti ons concerni ng
hi s cri mi nal record whi ch were materi al l y untrue. Such a resul t,
whether caused by carel essness or desi gn, i s i nconsi stent wi th due
process of l aw, and such a convi cti on cannot stand. But i n the ab-
sence of revel ati ons of errors by the sentenci ng judge, the content
of procedural due process at sentenci ng i s vague.
Williams v. New York
105
uphel d the i mposi ti on of the death
penal ty al though the jury i n convi cti ng had recommended mercy,
the judge i ndi cati ng that he was di sregardi ng the recommendati on
because of i nformati on i n the presentence report prepared by a pro-
bati on offi cer and not shown to the defendant or hi s counsel . The
Court vi ewed as hi ghl y undesi rabl e the restri cti on of judi ci al di s-
creti on i n sentenci ng by requi ri ng adherence to rul es of evi dence
whi ch woul d excl ude hi ghl y rel evant and i nformati ve materi al ;
si mi l arl y, di scl osure of such i nformati on to the defense coul d wel l
dry up sources whi ch feared retri buti on or embarrassment. Thus,
hearsay and rumors woul d be consi dered and there woul d be no op-
portuni ty of rebuttal . Sti l l i n the context of capi tal cases, the Court
has now, al though by no consi stent rati onal e, l i mi ted Williams. I n
Gardner v. Florida,
106
the jury had recommended a l i fe sentence
upon convi cti ng defendant of murder, but the tri al judge sentenced
the defendant to death, rel yi ng i n part on a confi denti al
presentence report whi ch he di d not characteri ze or make avai l abl e
to defense or prosecuti on. Three Justi ces found that because death
was si gni fi cantl y di fferent from other puni shments and because
sentenci ng procedures were subject to hi gher due process standards
than when Williams was deci ded, the report must be made part of
the record for revi ew so that the factors moti vati ng i mposi ti on of
the death penal ty may be known, and ordi nari l y must be made
avai l abl e to the defense. Al l but one of the other Justi ces joi ned the
resul t on vari ous other bases.
107
On the other hand, i n United
1767
pel l ed by due process, i d. at 364, Justi ces Whi te and Bl ackmun thought the resul t
necessi tated by the Ei ghth Amendment, i d. at 362, 364, as di d Justi ce Marshal l i n
a di fferent manner. I d. at 365. Chi ef Justi ce Burger concurred onl y i n the resul t,
i d. at 362, and Justi ce Rehnqui st di ssented. I d. at 371. See also Lankford v. I daho,
500 U.S. 110 (1991) (due process deni ed where judge sentenced defendant to death
after judges and prosecutors acti ons mi sl ed defendant and counsel i nto bel i evi ng
that death penal ty woul d not be at i ssue i n sentenci ng heari ng).
108
438 U.S. 41 (1978).
109
See also Uni ted States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972); Chaffi n v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 (1973). Cf. 18 U.S.C. 3577.
110
386 U.S. 605 (1967).
111
389 U.S. 128 (1967).
112
383 U.S. 541, 554, 561, 563 (1966). Kent was ambi guous whether i t was
based on statutory i nterpretati on or consti tuti onal anal ysi s; I n re Gaul t, 387 U.S.
1 (1967), appears to have consti tuti onal i zed the l anguage.
States v. Grayson,
108
a noncapi tal case, the Court rel i ed heavi l y on
Williams i n hol di ng that a sentenci ng judge may properl y consi der
hi s belief that the defendant was untruthful i n hi s tri al testi mony
i n deci di ng to i mpose a more severe sentence than he woul d other-
wi se have i mposed. Under the current scheme of i ndi vi dual i zed i n-
determi nate sentenci ng, the Court decl ared, the judge must be free
to consi der the broadest range of i nformati on i n assessi ng the de-
fendants prospects for rehabi l i tati on; defendants truthful ness, as
assessed by the tri al judge from hi s own observati ons, i s rel evant
i nformati on.
109
I n Specht v. Patterson,
110
the Court speci fi cal l y reaffi rmed Wil-
liams, but decl i ned to appl y i t, fi ndi ng that due process had been
deni ed under ci rcumstances si gni fi cantl y di fferent from those of
Williams. Specht had been convi cted of taki ng i ndecent l i berti es,
whi ch carri ed a maxi mum sentence of ten years, but was sentenced
under a sex offenders statute to an i ndefi ni te term of one day to
l i fe. The sex offenders l aw, the Court observed, di d not make the
commi ssi on of the parti cul ar offense the basi s for sentenci ng. I n-
stead, by tri ggeri ng a new heari ng to determi ne whether the con-
vi cted person was a publ i c threat, an habi tual offender, or mental l y
i l l , the l aw i n effect consti tuted a new charge that must be accom-
pani ed by procedural safeguards. Mempa v. Rhay
111
hel d that
when sentenci ng i s deferred subject to probati on and the terms of
probati on are al l egedl y vi ol ated so that the convi cted defendant i s
returned for sentenci ng, he must then be represented by counsel ,
i nasmuch as i t i s a poi nt i n the process where substanti al ri ghts
of the defendant may be affected. Moreover, i n Kent v. United
States
112
the Court requi red that before a juveni l e court deci ded to
wai ve juri sdi cti on and transfer a juveni l e to an adul t court i t must
hol d a heari ng and permi t defense counsel to exami ne the proba-
ti on offi cers report whi ch formed the basi s for the courts deci si on.
1768
113
North Carol i na v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). Pearce was hel d to be
nonretroacti ve i n Mi chi gan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973). When a State provi des a
two-ti er court system i n whi ch one may have an expedi ti ous and somewhat i nformal
tri al i n an i nferi or court wi th an absol ute ri ght to tri al de novo i n a court of general
cri mi nal juri sdi cti on i f convi cted, the second court i s not bound by the rul e i n
Pearce, i nasmuch as the potenti al for vi ndi cti veness and i ncl i nati on to deter i s not
present. Col ten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972). But see Bl ackl edge v. Perry, 417
U.S. 21 (1974), di scussed supra, p. 1761.
114
An i nterveni ng convi cti on on other charges for acts commi tted pri or to the
fi rst sentenci ng may justi fy i mposi ti on of an i ncreased sentence fol l owi ng a second
tri al . Wasman v. Uni ted States, 468 U.S. 559 (1984).
115
Chaffi n v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973). Justi ces Stewart, Brennan, and
Marshal l thought the pri nci pl e was appl i cabl e to jury sentenci ng and that prophy-
l acti c l i mi tati ons appropri ate to the probl em shoul d be devel oped. I d. at 35, 38. Jus-
ti ce Dougl as di ssented on other grounds. I d. at 35. The Pearce presumpti on that an
i ncreased, judge-i mposed second sentence represents vi ndi cti veness al so i s i nap-
pl i cabl e i f the second tri al came about because the tri al judge hersel f concl uded that
a retri al was necessary due to prosecutori al mi sconduct before the jury i n the fi rst
tri al . Texas v. McCul l ough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986).
116
Al abama v. Smi th, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
117
Wi l l i ams v. Okl ahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 58687 (1959). See also Col l i ns v. John-
ston, 237 U.S. 502 (1915). On reci di vi st statutes, see Graham v. West Vi rgi ni a, 224
I t i s a deni al of due process for a judge to sentence a convi cted
defendant on retri al to a l onger sentence than he recei ved after the
fi rst tri al i f the object of the sentence i s to puni sh the defendant
for havi ng successful l y appeal ed hi s fi rst convi cti on or to di scour-
age si mi l ar appeal s by others.
113
I f the judge does i mpose a l onger
sentence the second ti me, he must justi fy i t on the record by show-
i ng, for exampl e, the exi stence of new i nformati on meri ti ng a
l onger sentence.
114
Because the possi bi l i ty of vi ndi cti veness i n resentenci ng i s de
minimis when i t i s the jury that sentences, Pearces requi rement
that a judge resentenci ng on a subsequent tri al must justi fy a more
severe sentence i s i nappl i cabl e to jury sentenci ng, at l east i n the
absence of a showi ng that the jury knew of the pri or vacated sen-
tence. The Court concl uded that the possi bi l i ty of vi ndi cti veness
was so l ow because normal l y the jury woul d not know of the resul t
of the pri or tri al nor the sentence i mposed, nor woul d i t feel ei ther
the personal or i nsti tuti onal i nterests of judges l eadi ng to efforts to
di scourage the seeki ng of new tri al s.
115
The presumpti on of vi ndi c-
ti veness i s al so i nappl i cabl e i f the fi rst sentence was i mposed fol -
l owi ng a gui l ty pl ea. Here the Court reasoned that a tri al may wel l
afford the court i nsi ghts i nto the nature of the cri me and the char-
acter of the defendant that were not avai l abl e fol l owi ng the i ni ti al
gui l ty pl ea.
116
Due process does not i mpose any l i mi tati on upon the sentence
that a l egi sl ature may affi x to any offense; that functi on i s i n the
Ei ghth Amendment.
117
1769
U.S. 616, 623 (1912); Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481, 488 (1908), and, under
the Ei ghth Amendment, Rummel v. Estel l e, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
118
Pate v. Robi nson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (ci ti ng Bi shop v. Uni ted States,
350 U.S. 961 (1956)).
119
I d. For treatment of the ci rcumstances when a tri al court shoul d i nqui re i nto
the mental competency of the defendant, see Drope v. Mi ssouri , 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
Al so, an i ndi gent who makes a prel i mi nary showi ng that hi s sani ty at the ti me of
hi s offense wi l l be a substanti al factor i n hi s tri al i s enti tl ed to a court-appoi nted
psychi atri st to assi st i n presenti ng the defense. Ake v. Okl ahoma, 470 U.S. 68
(1985).
120
Medi na v. Cal i forni a, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992).
121
Jackson v. I ndi ana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
122
Jones v. Uni ted States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983). The fact that the affi rmati ve
defense of i nsani ty need onl y be establ i shed by a preponderance of the evi dence,
whi l e ci vi l commi tment requi res the hi gher standard of cl ear and convi nci ng evi -
dence, does not render the former i nval i d; proof beyond a reasonabl e doubt of com-
mi ssi on of a cri mi nal act establ i shes dangerousness justi fyi ng confi nement and
el i mi nates the ri sk of confi nement for mere i di osyncrati c behavi or.
123
463 U.S. at 368.
The Probl em of the I ncompetent or I nsane Defendant or
Convi ct. I t i s a deni al of due process to try or sentence a defend-
ant who i s i nsane or i ncompetent to stand tri al .
118
When i t be-
comes evi dent duri ng the tri al that a defendant i s or has become
i nsane, or i ncompetent to stand tri al , the court on i ts own i ni ti ati ve
must conduct a heari ng on the i ssue.
119
What the state must do
i s to provi de the defendant wi th a chance to prove that he i s i ncom-
petent to stand tri al ; there i s no further consti tuti onal requi rement
that the state assume the burden of provi ng the defendant com-
petent. Due process i s not offended, therefore, by a statutory pre-
sumpti on that a cri mi nal defendant i s competent to stand tri al , or
by a requi rement that the defendant bear the burden of provi ng i n-
competence by a preponderance of the evi dence.
120
When a State
determi nes that a person charged wi th a cri mi nal offense i s i ncom-
petent to stand tri al he cannot be commi tted i ndefi ni tel y for that
reason. The courts power i s to commi t hi m to a peri od no l onger
than i s necessary to determi ne whether there i s a substanti al prob-
abi l i ty that he wi l l attai n hi s capaci ty i n the foreseeabl e future. I f
i t i s determi ned that thi s i s not the case, then the State must ei -
ther rel ease the defendant or i nsti tute the customary ci vi l commi t-
ment proceedi ng that woul d be requi red to commi t any other ci ti -
zen.
121
Commi tment to a mental hospi tal of a cri mi nal defendant ac-
qui tted by reason of i nsani ty does not offend due process, and the
peri od of confi nement may extend beyond the peri od for whi ch the
person coul d have been sentenced i f convi cted.
122
The purpose of
the confi nement i s not puni shment, but treatment, and the Court
expl ai ned that the l ength of a possi bl e cri mi nal sentence therefore
i s i rrel evant to the purposes of . . . commi tment.
123
Thus, the i n-
1770
124
I d. at 370.
125
Foucha v. Loui si ana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
126
477 U.S. 399 (1986).
127
There was no opi ni on of the Court on the i ssue of procedural requi rements.
Justi ce Marshal l , joi ned by Justi ces Brennan, Bl ackmun, and Stevens, woul d hol d
that the ascertai nment of a pri soners sani ty cal l s for no l ess stri ngent standards
than those demanded i n any other aspect of a capi tal proceedi ng. 477 U.S. at 411
12. Concurri ng Justi ce Powel l thought that due process mi ght be met by a proceed-
i ng far l ess formal than a tri al , that the state shoul d provi de an i mparti al offi cer
or board that can recei ve evi dence and argument from the pri soners counsel . I d.
at 427. Concurri ng Justi ce OConnor, joi ned by Justi ce Whi te, emphasi zed Fl ori das
deni al of the opportuni ty to be heard, and di d not express an opi ni on on whether
the state coul d desi gnate the governor as deci si onmaker. Thus Justi ce Powel l s opi n-
i on, requi ri ng the opportuni ty to be heard before an i mparti al offi cer or board, sets
forth the Courts hol di ng.
128
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894). See also Andrews v. Swartz,
156 U.S. 272, 275 (1895); Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155, 158 (1900); Reetz
v. Mi chi gan, 188 U.S. 505, 508 (1903).
129
Gri ffi n v. I l l i noi s, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); i d. at 21 (Justi ce Frankfurter con-
curri ng), 27 (di ssenti ng opi ni on); Ross v. Moffi tt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
130
The l i ne of cases begi ns wi th Gri ffi n v. I l l i noi s, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), i n whi ch
i t was deemed to vi ol ate both the due process and the equal protecti on cl auses for
a State to deny to i ndi gent defendants free transcri pts of the tri al proceedi ngs,
sani ty acqui ttee may be confi ned for treatment unti l such ti me as
he has regai ned hi s sani ty or i s no l onger a danger to hi msel f or
soci ety.
124
I t fol l ows, however, that a state may not i ndefi ni tel y
confi ne an i nsani ty acqui ttee who i s no l onger mental l y i l l but who
has an untreatabl e personal i ty di sorder that may l ead to cri mi nal
conduct.
125
The Court hel d i n Ford v. Wainwright that the Ei ghth Amend-
ment prohi bi ts the state from carryi ng out the death penal ty on an
i ndi vi dual who i s i nsane, and that properl y rai sed i ssues of pre-
executi on sani ty must be determi ned i n a proceedi ng sati sfyi ng the
mi ni mum requi rements of due process.
126
Those mi ni mum stand-
ards are not met when the deci si on on sani ty i s l eft to the unfet-
tered di screti on of the governor; rather, due process requi res the
opportuni ty to be heard before an i mparti al offi cer or board.
127
Correcti ve Process: Appeal s and Other Remedi es. An
appeal from a judgment of convi cti on i s not a matter of absol ute
ri ght, i ndependentl y of consti tuti onal or statutory provi si ons al l ow-
i ng such appeal . A revi ew by an appel l ate court of the fi nal judg-
ment i n a cri mi nal case, however grave the offense of whi ch the ac-
cused i s convi cted, was not at common l aw and i s not now a nec-
essary el ement of due process of l aw. I t i s whol l y wi thi n the di scre-
ti on of the state to al l ow or not to al l ow such a revi ew.
128
Thi s
hol di ng has been recentl y reaffi rmed
129
al though the Court has
al so hel d that when a State does provi de appel l ate process i t may
not so condi ti on the pri vi l ege as to deny i t i rrati onal l y to some per-
sons, such as i ndi gents.
130
But i t i s not the case that a State i s
1771
whi ch woul d enabl e them adequatel y to prosecute appeal s from convi cti ons. See
infra, pp. 191620.
131
237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915).
132
Moore v. Dempsey, 261, U.S. 86, 90, 91 (1923); Mooney v. Hol ohan, 294 U.S.
103, 113 (1935); New York ex rel . Whi tman v. Wi l son, 318, U.S. 688, 690 (1943);
Young v. Ragan, 337 U.S. 235, 23839 (1949).
133
Ex parte Hul l , 312 U.S. 546 (1941); Whi te v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
134
Carter v. I l l i noi s, 329 U.S. 173, 17576 (1946).
135
Supra, pp. 81112. Note that i n Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965), the
Court had taken for revi ew a case whi ch rai sed the i ssue whether a State coul d si m-
pl y omi t any correcti ve process for heari ng and determi ni ng cl ai ms of federal con-
free to have no correcti ve process at al l i n whi ch defendants may
pursue remedi es for federal consti tuti onal vi ol ati ons. I n Frank v.
Mangum,
131
the Court asserted that a convi cti on obtai ned i n a
mob-domi nated tri al was contrary to due process: i f the State, sup-
pl yi ng no correcti ve process, carri es i nto executi on a judgment of
death or i mpri sonment based upon a verdi ct thus produced by mob
domi nati on, the State depri ves the accused of hi s l i fe or l i berty
wi thout due process of l aw. Consequentl y, i t has been stated nu-
merous ti mes that the absence of some form of correcti ve process
when the convi cted defendant al l eges a federal consti tuti onal vi ol a-
ti on contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment,
132
and i t has been
hel d that to burden thi s process, such as l i mi ti ng the ri ght to peti -
ti on for habeas corpus, i s to deny the convi cted defendant hi s con-
sti tuti onal ri ghts.
133
The mode by whi ch federal consti tuti onal ri ghts are to be vi n-
di cated after convi cti on i s for the government concerned to deter-
mi ne. Wi de di screti on must be l eft to the States for the manner
of adjudi cati ng a cl ai m that a convi cti on i s unconsti tuti onal . States
are free to devi se thei r own systems of revi ew i n cri mi nal cases. A
State may deci de whether to have di rect appeal s i n such cases, and
i f so under what ci rcumstances. . . . I n respecti ng the duty l ai d
upon them . . . States have a wi de choi ce of remedi es. A State may
provi de that the protecti on of ri ghts granted by the Federal Con-
sti tuti on be sought through the wri t of habeas corpus or coram
nobis. I t may use each of these anci ent wri ts i n i ts common l aw
scope, or i t may put them to new uses; or i t may afford remedy by
a si mpl e moti on brought ei ther i n the court of ori gi nal convi cti on
or at a pl ace of detenti on. . . . So l ong as the ri ghts under the Uni t-
ed States Consti tuti on may be pursued, i t i s for a State and not
for thi s Court to defi ne the mode by whi ch they may be vi ndi -
cated.
134
I f a State provi des a mode of redress, a defendant must
fi rst exhaust that mode, and i f unsuccessful may seek rel i ef i n fed-
eral court; i f there i s no adquate remedy i n state court, the defend-
ant may peti ti on a federal court for rel i ef through a wri t of habeas
corpus.
135
1772
sti tuti onal vi ol ati ons, but i t di smi ssed the case when the State i n the i nteri m en-
acted provi si ons for such process.
136
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
137
261 U.S. 86 (1923).
138
297 U.S. 278 (1936).
139
Ruffi n v. Commonweal th, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871).
140
Cf. I n re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894).
141
Pri ce v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
142
There i s no i ron curtai n drawn between the Consti tuti on and the pri sons
of thi s country. Wol ff v. McDonnel l , 418 U.S. 539, 55556 (1974).
When appel l ate or other correcti ve process i s made avai l abl e,
i nasmuch as i t i s no l ess a part of the process of l aw under whi ch
a defendant i s hel d i n custody, i t becomes subject to scruti ny for
any al l eged unconsti tuti onal depri vati on of l i fe or l i berty. At fi rst,
the Court seemed content to assume that when a state appel l ate
process formal l y appeared to be suffi ci ent to correct consti tuti onal
errors commi tted by the tri al court, the concl usi on by the appel l ate
court that the tri al courts sentence of executi on shoul d be affi rmed
was ampl e assurance that l i fe woul d not be forfei ted wi thout due
process of l aw.
136
But i n Moore v. Dempsey,
137
whi l e i nsi sti ng that
i t was not departi ng from precedent, the Court di rected a federal
di stri ct court i n whi ch peti ti oners had sought a wri t of habeas cor-
pus to make an i ndependent i nvesti gati on of the facts al l eged by
the peti ti oners mob domi nati on of thei r tri al notwi thstandi ng
that the state appel l ate court had rul ed agai nst the l egal suffi -
ci ency of these same al l egati ons. I ndubi tabl y, Moore marked the
abandonment of the Supreme Courts deference, founded upon con-
si derati ons of comi ty, to deci si ons of state appel l ate tri bunal s on i s-
sues of consti tuti onal i ty, and the procl amati on of i ts i ntenti on no
l onger to treat as vi rtual l y concl usi ve pronouncements by the l atter
that proceedi ngs i n a tri al court were fai r, an abandonment soon
made even cl earer i n Brown v. Mississippi
138
and now taken for
granted.
Ri ghts of Pri soners. Unti l rel ati vel y recentl y the vi ew pre-
vai l ed that a pri soner has, as a consequence of hi s cri me, not onl y
forfei ted hi s l i berty, but al l hi s personal ri ghts except those whi ch
the l aw i n i ts humani ty accords to hi m. He i s for the ti me bei ng
the sl ave of the state.
139
Thi s vi ew i s not now the l aw, and may
never have been whol l y correct.
140
I n 1948 the Court decl ared that
[l ]awful i ncarcerati on bri ngs about the necessary wi thdrawal or
l i mi tati on of many pri vi l eges and ri ghts;
141
many, i ndi cated l ess
than al l , and i t was cl ear that the due process and equal protec-
ti on cl auses to some extent do appl y to pri soners.
142
More di rect
acknowl edgment of consti tuti onal protecti on came i n 1972:
[f]ederal courts si t not to supervi se pri sons but to enforce the con-
sti tuti onal ri ghts of al l persons, whi ch i ncl ude pri soners. We are
1773
143
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972). See also Procuni er v. Marti nez, 416
U.S. 396, 40405 (1974) (i nval i dati ng state pri son mai l censorshi p regul ati ons).
144
Bel l v. Wol fi sh, 441 U.S. 520, 545548, 551, 555, 562 (1979) (federal pri son);
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 351352 (1981).
145
Bel l v. Wol fi sh, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Persons not yet convi cted of a cri me
may be detai ned by government upon the appropri ate determi nati on of probabl e
cause and the detenti on may be effectuated through subjecti on of the pri soner to
the restri cti ons and condi ti ons of the detenti on faci l i ty. But a detai nee may not be
puni shed pri or to an adjudi cati on of gui l t i n accordance wi th due process of l aw.
Therefore, unconvi cted detai nees may not be subjected to condi ti ons and restri cti ons
that amount to puni shment. However, the Court l i mi ted i ts concept of puni shment
to practi ces i ntenti onal l y i nfl i cted by pri son authori ti es and to practi ces whi ch were
arbi trary or purposel ess and unrel ated to l egi ti mate i nsti tuti onal objecti ves.
146
Supra, pp. 149799.
147
E.g., Wol ff v. McDonnel l , 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Baxter v. Pal mi gi ano, 425
U.S. 308 (1976); Vi tek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Washi ngton v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210 (1990) (pri son i nmate has l i berty i nterest i n avoi di ng the unwanted admi n-
i strati on of anti psychoti c drugs).
148
E.g., Procuni er v. Marti nez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Jones v. North Carol i na
Pri soners Labor Uni on, 433 U.S. 119 (1977). On rel i gi ous practi ces and ceremoni es,
see Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
149
Lee v. Washi ngton, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
150
Ex parte Hul l , 312 U.S. 546 (1941); Whi te v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
Pri soners must have reasonabl e access to a l aw l i brary or to persons trai ned i n the
l aw. Younger v. Gi l more, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Bounds v. Smi th, 430 U.S. 817 (1978).
not unmi ndful that pri son offi ci al s must be accorded l ati tude i n the
admi ni strati on of pri son affai rs, and that pri soners necessari l y are
subject to appropri ate rul es and regul ati ons. But persons i n pri son,
l i ke other i ndi vi dual s, have the ri ght to peti ti on the Government
for redress of gri evances. . . .
143
However, whi l e the Court af-
fi rmed that federal courts have the responsi bi l i ty to scruti ni ze pri s-
on practi ces al l eged to vi ol ate the Consti tuti on, at the same ti me
concerns of federal i sm and of judi ci al restrai nt caused the Court to
emphasi ze the necessi ty of deference to the judgments of pri son of-
fi ci al s and others wi th responsi bi l i ty for admi ni steri ng such sys-
tems.
144
Save for chal l enges to condi ti ons of confi nement of pretri al de-
tai nees,
145
the Court has general l y treated chal l enges to pri son
condi ti ons as a whol e under the cruel and unusual puni shments
cl ause of the Ei ghth Amendment,
146
and chal l enges to parti cul ar
i nci dents and practi ces under the due process cl ause
147
as wel l as
under more speci fi c provi si ons, such as the Fi rst Amendment
speech and rel i gi on cl auses.
148
Pri or to formul ati ng i ts current ap-
proach, the Court recogni zed several ri ghts of pri soners. Pri soners
have a ri ght to be free of raci al segregati on i n pri sons, except for
the necessi ti es of pri son securi ty and di sci pl i ne.
149
They have the
ri ght to peti ti on for redress of gri evances, whi ch i ncl udes access to
the courts for purposes of presenti ng thei r compl ai nts,
150
and to
bri ng acti ons i n federal courts to recover for damages wrongful l y
1774
151
Hai nes v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Prei ser v. Rodri guez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973).
152
482 U.S. 78 (1987) (uphol di ng a Mi ssouri rul e barri ng i nmate-to-i nmate cor-
respondence, but stri ki ng down a prohi bi ti on on i nmate marri ages absent compel -
l i ng reason such as pregnancy or bi rth of a chi l d).
153
482 U.S. at 89.
154
I d. at 91.
155
Hudson v. Pal mer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984); Bl ock v. Rutherford, 468 U.S.
576 (1984) (hol di ng al so that pri son securi ty needs support a rul e prohi bi ti ng pre-
tri al detai nees contact vi si ts wi th spouses, chi l dren, rel ati ves, and fri ends).
156
Hudson v. Pal mer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984).
157
Hudson v. Pal mer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (hol di ng that state tort l aw pro-
vi ded adequate postdepri vati on remedi es). But see Zi nermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113
(1990) (avai l abi l i ty of postdepri vati on remedy i s i nadequate when depri vati on i s
foreseeabl e, predepri vati on process was possi bl e, and offi ci al conduct was not unau-
thori zed).
done them by pri son admi ni strators.
151
And they have a ri ght, ci r-
cumscri bed by l egi ti mate pri son admi ni strati on consi derati ons, to
fai r and regul ar treatment duri ng thei r i ncarcerati on.
I n Turner v. Safley,
152
the Court announced a general stand-
ard for measuri ng pri soners cl ai ms of depri vati on of consti tuti onal
ri ghts. [W]hen a regul ati on i mpi nges on i nmates consti tuti onal
ri ghts, the regul ati on i s val i d i f i t i s reasonabl y rel ated to l egi ti -
mate penol ogi cal i nterests.
153
Several consi derati ons, the Court
i ndi cated, are appropri ate i n determi ni ng reasonabl eness of a pri s-
on regul ati on. Fi rst, there must be a rati onal rel ati on to a l egi ti -
mate, content-neutral objecti ve, such as pri son securi ty, broadl y de-
fi ned. Avai l abi l i ty of other avenues for exerci se of the i nmate ri ght
suggests reasonabl eness. A further i ndi ci um of reasonabl eness i s
present i f accommodati on woul d have a negati ve effect on l i berty
or safety of guards or other i nmates. On the other hand, an al ter-
nati ve to regul ati on that ful l y accommodated the pri soners ri ghts
at de minimis cost to val i d penol ogi cal i nterests suggests
unreasonabl eness.
154
Fourth Amendment protecti on i s i ncompati bl e wi th the con-
cept of i ncarcerati on and the needs and objecti ves of penal i nsti tu-
ti ons, hence a pri soner has no reasonabl e expectati on of pri vacy i n
hi s pri son cel l protecti ng hi m from shakedown searches desi gned
to root out weapons, drugs, and other contraband.
155
Avenues of
redress for cal cul ated harassment unrel ated to pri son needs are
not total l y bl ocked, the Court i ndi cated; i nmates may sti l l seek pro-
tecti on i n the Ei ghth Amendment or i n state tort l aw.
156
Exi stence
of a meani ngful postdepri vati on remedy for unauthori zed, i nten-
ti onal depri vati on of an i nmates property by pri son personnel pro-
tects the i nmates due process ri ghts.
157
Due process i s not i mpl i -
1775
158
Dani el s v. Wi l l i ams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davi dson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344
(1986).
159
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
160
I d. at 557. Thi s anal ysi s, of course tracks the i nterest anal ysi s di scussed
supra, pp. 172332.
161
However, the Court l ater rul ed, reasons for denyi ng an i nmates request to
cal l wi tnesses need not be di scl osed unti l the i ssue i s rai sed i n court. Ponte v. Real ,
471 U.S. 491 (1985).
162
I d. at 418 U.S., 56172. The Court conti nues to adhere to i ts refusal to re-
qui re appoi ntment of counsel . Vi tek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 49697 (1980), and i d.
at 497500 (Justi ce Powel l concurri ng); Baxter v. Pal mi gi ano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
163
Superi ntendent v. Hi l l , 472 U.S. 445, 454, 457 (1985).
cated at al l by negl i gent depri vati on of l i fe, l i berty, or property by
pri son offi ci al s.
158
I n Wolff v. McDonnell,
159
the Court promul gated due process
standards to govern the i mposi ti on of di sci pl i ne upon pri soners.
Due process appl i es, but si nce pri son di sci pl i nary proceedi ngs are
not part of a cri mi nal prosecuti on the ful l panopl y of ri ghts of a de-
fendant i s not avai l abl e. Rather, the anal ysi s must proceed on a
basi s of i denti fyi ng the i nterest i n l i berty whi ch the cl ause pro-
tects.
Where the state provi des for good-ti me credi t or other pri vi -
l eges and further provi des for forfei ture of these pri vi l eges onl y for
seri ous mi sconduct, the i nterest of the pri soner i n thi s degree of
l i berty enti tl es hi m to those mi ni mum procedures appropri ate
under the ci rcumstances.
160
What the mi ni mum procedures consi st
of i s to be determi ned by bal anci ng the pri soners i nterest agai nst
the val i d i nterest of the pri son i n mai ntai ni ng securi ty and order
i n the i nsti tuti on, i n protecti ng guards and pri soners agai nst retal -
i ati on by other pri soners, and i n reduci ng pri son tensi ons. The
Court hel d i n Wolff that the pri son must afford the subject of a di s-
ci pl i nary proceedi ng advance wri tten noti ce of the cl ai med vi ol ati on
and a wri tten statement of the factfi ndi ngs as to the evi dence re-
l i ed upon and the reasons for the acti on taken; al so, the i nmate
shoul d be al l owed to cal l wi tnesses and present documentary evi -
dence i n defense when permi tti ng hi m to do so wi l l not hazard the
i nsti tuti ons i nterests.
161
Confrontati on and cross-exami nati on of
adverse wi tnesses i s not requi red i nasmuch as these woul d no
doubt hazard val i d i nsti tuti onal i nterests. Ordi nari l y, an i nmate
has no ri ght to representati on by retai ned or appoi nted counsel . Fi -
nal l y, onl y a parti al ri ght to an i mparti al tri bunal was recogni zed,
the Court rul i ng that l i mi tati ons i mposed on the di screti on of a
commi ttee of pri son offi ci al s suffi ced for thi s purpose.
162
Revoca-
ti on of good ti me credi ts, the Court l ater rul ed, must be supported
by some evi dence i n the record, but an amount that mi ght be
characteri zed as meager i s consti tuti onal l y suffi ci ent.
163
1776
164
Meacham v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236
(1976).
165
Ol i m v. Waki nekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983).
166
Vi tek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
167
494 U.S. 210 (1990).
Determi nati on whether due process requi res a heari ng before
a pri soner i s transferred from one i nsti tuti on to another requi res
a cl ose anal ysi s of the appl i cabl e statutes and regul ati ons as wel l
as a consi derati on of the parti cul ar harm suffered by the trans-
feree. On the one hand, the Court found that no heari ng need be
hel d pri or to the transfer from one pri son to another pri son i n
whi ch the condi ti ons were substanti al l y l ess favorabl e. Si nce the
State had not conferred any ri ght to remai n i n the faci l i ty to whi ch
the pri soner was fi rst assi gned, defeasi bl e upon the commi ssi on of
acts for whi ch transfer i s a puni shment, pri son offi ci al s had unfet-
tered di screti on to transfer any pri soner for any reason or for no
reason at al l ; consequentl y, there was nothi ng to hol d a heari ng
about.
164
The same pri nci pl es govern i nterstate pri son trans-
fers.
165
On the other hand, transfer of a pri soner to a mental hos-
pi tal pursuant to a statute authori zi ng transfer i f the i nmate suf-
fers from a mental di sease or defect must be preceded by a hear-
i ng for two al ternati ve reasons. Fi rst, the statute gave the i nmate
a l i berty i nterest si nce i t presumed he woul d not be moved absent
a fi ndi ng he was sufferi ng from a mental di sease or defect. Second,
unl i ke transfers from one pri son to another, transfer to a mental
i nsti tuti on was not wi thi n the range of confi nement covered by the
pri soners sentence, and, moreover, i mposed a sti gma consti tuti ng
a depri vati on of a l i berty i nterest.
166
What kind of a heari ng i s requi red before a state may force a
mental l y i l l pri soner to take anti psychoti c drugs agai nst hi s wi l l
was at i ssue i n Washington v. Harper.
167
There the Court hel d
that a judi ci al heari ng was not requi red. I nstead, the i nmates sub-
stanti ve l i berty i nterest (deri ved from the Due Process Cl ause as
wel l as from state l aw) was adequatel y protected by an admi ni stra-
ti ve heari ng before i ndependent medi cal professi onal s, at whi ch
heari ng the i nmate has the ri ght to a l ay advi sor but not an attor-
ney.
Probati on and Parol e. Someti mes convi cted defendants are
not sentenced to jai l , but i nstead are pl aced on probati on subject
to i ncarcerati on upon vi ol ati on of the condi ti ons whi ch are i mposed;
others who are jai l ed may subsequentl y qual i fy for rel ease on pa-
rol e before compl eti ng thei r sentence, and are subject to
rei ncarcerati on upon vi ol ati on of i mposed condi ti ons. Because both
of these di sposi ti ons are statutory pri vi l eges granted by the govern-
1777
168
Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481 (1908), hel d that parol e i s not a con-
sti tuti onal ri ght but i nstead i s a present from government to the pri soner. I n
Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935), the Courts premi se was that as a matter of
grace the parol ee was bei ng granted a pri vi l ege and that he shoul d nei ther expect
nor seek due process. Then-Judge Burger i n Hyser v. Reed, 318 F. 2d 225 (D.C.
Ci r.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963), reasoned that due process was i nappl i cabl e
because the parol e boards functi on was to assi st the pri soners rehabi l i tati on and
restorati on to soci ety and that there was no adversary rel ati onshi p between the
board and the parol ee.
169
389 U.S. 128 (1967).
170
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
171
I d. at 480, 482.
172
I d. at 48384.
mental authori ty,
168
i t was l ong assumed that the admi ni strators
of the systems di d not have to accord procedural due process ei ther
i n the granti ng stage or i n the revocati on stage. Now, both grant-
i ng and revocati on are subject to due process anal ysi s, al though the
resul ts tend to be di sparate. Thus, i n Mempa v. Rhay,
169
the tri al
judge had deferred sentenci ng and pl aced the convi cted defendant
on probati on; when facts subsequentl y devel oped whi ch i ndi cated a
vi ol ati on of the condi ti ons of probati on, he was summoned and
summari l y sentenced to pri son. The Court hel d that he had been
enti tl ed to counsel at the deferred sentenci ng heari ng.
I n Morrissey v. Brewer
170
a unani mous Court hel d that parol e
revocati ons must be accompani ed by the usual due process heari ng
and noti ce requi rements. [T]he revocati on of parol e i s not part of
a cri mi nal prosecuti on and thus the ful l panopl y of ri ghts due a de-
fendant i n such a proceedi ng does not appl y to parol e revocati on
. . . [But] the l i berty of a parol ee, al though i ndetermi nate, i ncl udes
many of the core val ues of unqual i fi ed l i berty and i ts termi nati on
i nfl i cts a gri evous l oss on the parol ee and often on others. I t i s
hardl y useful any l onger to try to deal wi th thi s probl em i n terms
of whether the parol ees l i berty i s a ri ght or a pri vi l ege. By what-
ever name, the l i berty i s val uabl e and must be seen as wi thi n the
protecti on of the Fourteenth Amendment. I ts termi nati on cal l s for
some orderl y process, however i nformal .
171
What process i s due,
then, turned upon the States i nterests. I ts pri nci pal i nterest was
that havi ng once convi cted a defendant, i mpri soned hi m, and re-
l eased hi m for rehabi l i tati on purposes at some ri sk, i t shoul d be
abl e to return the i ndi vi dual to i mpri sonment wi thout the burden
of a new adversary cri mi nal tri al i f i n fact he has fai l ed to abi de
by the condi ti ons of hi s parol e. But the State has no i nterest i n
revoki ng parol e wi thout some i nformal procedural guarantees, i n-
asmuch as thi s wi l l not i nterfere wi th i ts reasonabl e i nterest.
172
Mi ni mal due process, the Court hel d, requi res that at both
stages of the revocati on process the arrest of the parol ee and the
1778
173
I d. at 48487.
174
I d. at 48789.
175
Bl ack v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606 (1985).
176
Bearden v. Georgi a, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983).
formal revocati on the parol ee i s enti tl ed to certai n ri ghts. Prompt-
l y fol l owi ng arrest of the parol ee, there shoul d be an i nformal hear-
i ng to determi ne whether reasonabl e grounds exi st for revocati on
of parol e; thi s prel i mi nary heari ng shoul d be conducted at or rea-
sonabl y near the pl ace of the al l eged parol e vi ol ati on or arrest and
as promptl y as conveni ent after arrest whi l e i nformati on i s fresh
and sources are avai l abl e, and shoul d be conducted by someone not
di rectl y i nvol ved i n the case, though he need not be a judi ci al offi -
cer. The parol ee shoul d be gi ven adequate noti ce that the heari ng
wi l l take pl ace and what vi ol ati ons are al l eged, he shoul d be abl e
to appear and speak i n hi s own behal f and produce other evi dence,
and he shoul d be al l owed to exami ne those who have gi ven adverse
evi dence agai nst hi m unl ess i t i s determi ned that the i denti ty of
such i nformant shoul d not be reveal ed. Al so, the heari ng offi cer
shoul d prepare a di gest of the heari ng and base hi s deci si on upon
the evi dence adduced at the heari ng.
173
Pri or to the fi nal deci si on on revocati on, there shoul d be a
more formal revocati on heari ng at whi ch there woul d be a fi nal
eval uati on of any contested rel evant facts and consi derati on wheth-
er the facts as determi ned warrant revocati on. The heari ng must
take pl ace wi thi n a reasonabl e ti me after the parol ee i s taken i nto
custody and he must be enabl ed to controvert the al l egati ons or
offer evi dence i n mi ti gati on. The procedural detai l s of such hear-
i ngs are for the States to devel op but the Court speci fi ed mi ni mum
requi rements of due process. They i ncl ude (a) wri tten noti ce of the
cl ai med vi ol ati ons of parol e; (b) di scl osure to the parol ee of evi -
dence agai nst hi m; (c) opportuni ty to be heard i n person and to
present wi tnesses and documentary evi dence; (d) the ri ght to
confront and cross-exami ne adverse wi tnesses (unl ess the heari ng
offi cer speci fi cal l y fi nds good cause for not al l owi ng confrontati on);
(e) a neutral and detached heari ng body such as a tradi ti onal pa-
rol e board, members of whi ch need not be judi ci al offi cers or l aw-
yers; and (f) a wri tten statement by the factfi nders as to the evi -
dence rel i ed on and the reasons for revoki ng parol e.
174
Ordi nari l y
the wri tten statement need not i ndi cate that the sentenci ng court
or revi ew board consi dered al ternati ves to i ncarcerati on,
175
but a
sentenci ng court must consi der such al ternati ves i f the probati on
vi ol ati on consi sts of the fai l ure of an i ndi gent probati oner, through
no faul t of hi s own, to pay a fi ne or resti tuti on.
176
1779
177
Gagnon v. Scarpel l i , 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
178
442 U.S. 1 (1979). Justi ce Powel l thought that creati on of a parol e system
di d create a l egi ti mate expectancy of fai r procedure protected by due process, but,
save i n one respect, he agreed wi th the Court that the procedure fol l owed was ade-
quate. I d. at 18. Justi ces Marshal l , Brennan, and Stevens argued i n di ssent that
the Courts anal ysi s of the l i berty i nterest was faul ty and that due process requi red
more than the board provi ded. I d. at 22.
179
Fol l owi ng Greenholtz, the Court hel d i n Board of Pardons v. Al l en, 482 U.S.
369 (1987), that a l i berty i nterest was created by a Montana statute provi di ng that
a pri soner shal l be rel eased upon certai n fi ndi ngs by a parol e board.
The Court has appl i ed a fl exi bl e due process standard to the
provi si on of counsel . Counsel i s not i nvari abl y requi red i n parol e or
probati on revocati on proceedi ngs. The State shoul d, however, pro-
vi de the assi stance of counsel where an i ndi gent person may have
di ffi cul ty i n presenti ng hi s versi on of di sputed facts wi thout cross-
exami nati on of wi tnesses or presentati on of compl i cated documen-
tary evi dence. Presumpti vel y, counsel shoul d be provi ded where the
person requests counsel , based on a ti mel y and col orabl e cl ai m that
he has not commi tted the al l eged vi ol ati on, or i f that i ssue be
uncontested, there are reasons i n justi fi cati on or mi ti gati on that
mi ght make revocati on i nappropri ate.
177
Wi th respect to the granti ng of parol e, the Courts anal ysi s of
the due process cl auses meani ng i n Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal
I nmates
178
i s much more probl emati cal . Rejected was the theory
that the mere establ i shment of the possi bi l i ty of parol e was suffi -
ci ent to create a l i berty i nterest enti tl i ng any pri soner meeti ng the
general standards of el i gi bi l i ty to a due process protected expecta-
ti on of bei ng deal t wi th i n any parti cul ar way. On the other hand,
the Court di d recogni ze i n the parti cul ar statute before i t the cre-
ati on of some expectancy of rel ease that was enti tl ed to some meas-
ure of consti tuti onal protecti on, whi l e cauti oni ng that onl y by a
case-by-case anal ysi s coul d i t be sai d whether other parol e statutes
si mi l arl y created such expectancy.
179
I n any event, the Court con-
si dered the nature of the deci si ons that parol e authori ti es must
make to hol d that the ful l panopl y of due process guarantees i s not
requi red; procedures desi gned to el i ci t speci fi c facts are i nappropri -
ate under the ci rcumstances. Rather, mi ni mi zi ng the ri sk of error
i s the pri me consi derati on, and that goal was achi eved by the
boards l argel y i nformal methods; the l ower court erred, therefore,
i n i mposi ng requi rements of formal heari ngs, noti ce, and speci fi ca-
ti on of parti cul ar evi dence i n the record. The i nmate was afforded
an opportuni ty to be heard and when parol e was deni ed he was i n-
formed i n what respects he fel l short of qual i fyi ng. That afforded
the process that was due.
Where, however, government by i ts statutes and regul ati ons
creates no obl i gati on of the pardoni ng authori ty and thus creates
1780
180
Connecti cut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981); Jago v. Van
Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981). The former case i nvol ved not parol e but commutati on
of a l i fe sentence, commutati on bei ng mecessary to become el i gi bl e for parol e. The
statute gave the Board total di screti on to commute, but i n at l east 75% of the cases
pri soner recei ved a favorabl e acti on and vi rtual l y al l of the pri soners who had thei r
sentences commuted were promptl y parol ed. I n Van Curen, the Court made express
what had been i mpl i ci t i n Dumschat; the mutual l y expl i ci t understandi ngs concept
under whi ch some property i nterests are found protected does not appl y to l i berty
i nterests. Van Curen i s al so i nteresti ng because there the parol e board had granted
the peti ti on for parol e but wi thi n days revoked i t before the pri soner was rel eased,
upon bei ng tol d that he had l i ed at the heari ng before the board.
181
For anal ysi s of the state l aws as wel l as appl i cati on of consti tuti onal pri n-
ci pl es to juveni l es, see SAMUEL M. DAVI S, RI GHTS OF JUVENI LES: THE JUVENI LE JUS-
TI CE SYSTEM (2d ed. 1989).
182
I n re Gaul t, 387 U.S. 1, 1229 (1967).
183
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
no l egi ti mate expectancy of rel ease, the pri soner may not by show-
i ng the favorabl e exerci se of the authori ty i n the great number of
cases demonstrate such a l egi ti mate expectancy. The mere exi st-
ence of purel y di screti onary authori ty and the frequent exerci se of
i t creates no enti tl ement.
180
The Probl em of the J uveni l e Offender. Al l of the States of
the Uni on and the Di stri ct of Col umbi a make provi si on for deal i ng
wi th juveni l e offenders outsi de of the cri mi nal system for adul t of-
fenders.
181
These juveni l e justi ce systems appl y both to offenses
that woul d be cri mi nal i f commi tted by an adul t and to del i nquent
behavi or not recogni zabl e under l aws deal i ng wi th adul ts, such as
habi tual truancy, deportment endangeri ng the moral s or heal th of
the juveni l e or others, or di sobedi ence maki ng the juveni l e uncon-
trol l abl e by hi s parents. The reforms of the earl y part of thi s cen-
tury provi ded not onl y for segregati ng juveni l es from adul t offend-
ers i n the adjudi cati on, detenti on, and correcti onal faci l i ti es, but
they al so di spensed wi th the substanti ve and procedural rul es sur-
roundi ng cri mi nal tri al s whi ch were mandated by due process. Jus-
ti fi cati on for thi s abandonment of consti tuti onal guarantees was of-
fered by descri bi ng juveni l e courts as ci vi l not cri mi nal and as not
di spensi ng cri mi nal puni shment, and offeri ng the theory that the
state was acti ng as parens patriae for the juveni l e offender and was
i n no sense hi s adversary.
182
Di si l l usi onment wi th the resul ts of
juveni l e reforms coupl ed wi th judi ci al emphasi s on consti tuti onal
protecti on of the accused l ed i n the 1960s to a substanti al restri c-
ti on of these el ements of juveni l e juri sprudence.
After traci ng i n much detai l thi s hi story of juveni l e courts, the
Court hel d i n I n re Gault
183
that the appl i cati on of due process to
juveni l e proceedi ngs woul d not endanger the good i ntenti ons vested
i n the system nor di mi ni sh the features of the system whi ch were
deemed desi rabl e emphasi s upon rehabi l i tati on rather than pun-
1781
184
I d. at 2728.
185
I d. at 3135. Justi ce Harl an concurred i n part and di ssented i n part, i d. at
65, agreei ng on the appl i cabi l i ty of due process but di sagreei ng wi th the standards
of the Court. Justi ce Stewart di ssented whol l y, argui ng that the appl i cati on of proce-
dures devel oped for adversary cri mi nal proceedi ngs to juveni l e proceedi ngs woul d
endanger thei r objecti ves and contendi ng that the deci si on was a backward step to-
ward undoi ng the reforms i nsti tuted i n the past. I d. at 78.
186
Kent v. Uni ted States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), noted on thi s poi nt i n I n re
Gaul t, 387 U.S. 1, 3031 (1967).
i shment, a measure of i nformal i ty, avoi dance of the sti gma of
cri mi nal convi cti on, the l ow vi si bi l i ty of the process but that the
consequences of the absence of due process standards made thei r
appl i cati on necessary. Ul ti matel y, however, we confront the real i ty
of that porti on of the juveni l e court process wi th whi ch we deal i n
thi s case. A boy i s charged wi th mi sconduct. The boy i s commi tted
to an i nsti tuti on where he may be restrai ned of l i berty for years.
I t i s of no consti tuti onal consequence and of l i mi ted practi cal
meani ng that the i nsti tuti on to whi ch he i s commi tted i s cal l ed an
I ndustri al School . The fact of the matter i s that, however euphe-
mi sti c the ti tl e, a recei vi ng home or an i ndustri al school for juve-
ni l es i s an i nsti tuti on of confi nement i n whi ch the chi l d i s i ncarcer-
ated for a greater or l esser ti me. Hi s worl d becomes a bui l di ng
wi th whi tewashed wal l s, regi mented routi ne and i nsti tuti onal
hours. . . . I nstead of mother and father and si sters and brothers
and fri ends and cl assmates, hi s worl d i s peopl ed by guards,
custodi ans, state empl oyees, and del i nquents confi ned wi th hi m
for anythi ng from waywardness to rape and homi ci de. I n vi ew of
thi s, i t woul d be extraordi nary i f our Consti tuti on di d not requi re
the procedural regul ari ty and the exerci se of care i mpl i ed i n the
phrase due process. Under our Consti tuti on, the condi ti on of bei ng
a boy does not justi fy a kangaroo court.
184
Thus, the Court i n Gault requi red that noti ce of charges be
gi ven i n ti me for the juveni l e to prepare a defense, requi red a hear-
i ng i n whi ch the juveni l e coul d be represented by retai ned or ap-
poi nted counsel , requi red observance of the ri ghts of confrontati on
and cross-exami nati on, and requi red that the juveni l e be protected
agai nst sel f-i ncri mi nati on.
185
I t di d not pass upon the ri ght of ap-
peal or the fai l ure to make transcri pts of heari ngs. Earl i er, the
Court had hel d that before a juveni l e coul d be wai ved to an adul t
court for tri al , there had to be a heari ng and fi ndi ngs of reasons,
a resul t based on statutory i nterpretati on but apparentl y
consti tuti onal i zed i n Gault.
186
Subsequentl y, i t was hel d that the
essenti al s of due process and fai r treatment requi red that a juve-
ni l e coul d be adjudged del i nquent onl y on evi dence beyond a rea-
sonabl e doubt when the offense charged woul d be a cri me i f com-
1782
187
I n re Wi nshi p, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Chi ef Justi ce Burger and Justi ce Stewart
di ssented, fol l owi ng essenti al l y the Stewart reasoni ng i n Gault. The Courts opi ni on
today rests enti rel y on the assumpti on that al l juveni l e proceedi ngs are cri mi nal
prosecuti ons, hence subject to consti tuti onal l i mi tati on. . . . What the juveni l e court
systems need i s not more but l ess of the trappi ngs of l egal procedure and judi ci al
formal i sm; the juveni l e system requi res breathi ng room and fl exi bi l i ty i n order to
survi ve, i f i t can survi ve the repeated assaul ts from thi s Court. I d. at 375, 376. Jus-
ti ce Bl ack di ssented because he di d not thi nk the reasonabl e doubt standard a con-
sti tuti onal requi rement at al l . I d. at 377.
188
McKei ver v. Pennsyl vani a, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). No opi ni on was concurred
i n by a majori ty of the Justi ces. Justi ce Bl ackmuns opi ni on of the Court, whi ch was
joi ned by Chi ef Justi ce Burger and Justi ces Stewart and Whi te, reasoned that a ju-
veni l e proceedi ng was not a cri mi nal prosecuti on wi thi n the terms of the Si xth
Amendment, so that jury tri al s were not automati cal l y requi red; i nstead, the pri or
cases had proceeded on a fundamental fai rness approach and i n that regard a jury
was not a necessary component of fai r factfi ndi ng and i ts use woul d have seri ous
repercussi ons on the rehabi l i tati ve and protecti on functi ons of the juveni l e court.
Justi ce Whi te al so submi tted a bri ef concurrence emphasi zi ng the di fferences be-
tween adul t cri mi nal tri al s and juveni l e adjudi cati ons. I d. at 551. Justi ce Brennan
concurred i n one case and di ssented i n another because i n hi s vi ew open proceedi ngs
woul d operate to protect juveni l es from oppressi on i n much the same way as a jury
woul d. I d. at 553. Justi ce Harl an concurred because he di d not bel i eve jury tri al s
were consti tuti onal l y mandated i n state courts. I d. at 557. Justi ces Dougl as, Bl ack,
and Marshal l di ssented. I d. at 557.
189
Fare v. Mi chael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
190
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (uphol di ng the search of a stu-
dents purse to determi ne whether the student possessed ci garettes i n vi ol ati on of
schoool rul e; evi dence of drug acti vi ty hel d admi ssi bl e i n a prosecuti on under the
juveni l e l aws).
mi tted by an adul t,
187
but sti l l l ater the Court hel d that jury tri al s
were not consti tuti onal l y requi red i n juveni l e tri al s.
188
On a few occasi ons the Court has consi dered whether ri ghts ac-
corded to adul ts duri ng i nvesti gati on of cri me are to be accorded
juveni l es. I n one such case the Court rul ed that a juveni l e under-
goi ng custodi al i nterrogati on by pol i ce had not i nvoked a Miranda
ri ght to remai n si l ent by requesti ng permi ssi on to consul t wi th hi s
probati on offi cer, si nce a probati on offi cer coul d not be equated
wi th an attorney, but i ndi cated as wel l that a juveni l es wai ver of
Miranda ri ghts was to be eval uated under the same total i ty-of-the-
ci rcumstances approach appl i cabl e to adul ts. That approach per-
mi ts i ndeed i t mandates i nqui ry i nto al l the ci rcumstances sur-
roundi ng the i nterrogati on . . . i ncl ud[i ng] eval uati on of the juve-
ni l es age, experi ence, educati on, background, and i ntel l i gence, and
i nto whether he has the capaci ty to understand the warni ngs gi ven
hi m. . . .
189
I n another case the Court rul ed that, whi l e the
Fourth Amendment appl i es to searches of students by publ i c school
authori ti es, nei ther the warrant requi rement nor the probabl e
cause standard i s appropri ate.
190
I nstead, a si mpl e reasonabl eness
1783
191
Thi s si ngl e rul e, the Court expl ai ned, wi l l permi t school authori ti es to regu-
l ate thei r conduct accordi ng to the di ctates of reason and common sense. 469 U.S.
at 343. Rejecti ng the suggesti on of di ssenti ng Justi ce Stevens, the Court was un-
wi l l i ng to adopt a standard under whi ch the l egal i ty of a search i s dependent upon
a judges eval uati on of the rel ati ve i mportance of vari ous school rul es. I d. at n.9.
192
467 U.S. 253 (1984).
193
See SAMUEL M. DAVI S, RI GHTS OF JUVENI LES: THE JUVENI LE JUSTI CE SYS-
TEM, ch. 4, Wai ver of Juri sdi cti on (2d ed. 1989).
194
492 U.S. 361 (1989).
195
Thompson v. Okl ahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
196
See anal ysi s of Ei ghth Amendment pri nci pl es, supra pp. 149192.
standard governs al l searches of students persons and effects by
school authori ti es.
191
The Court rul ed i n Schall v. Martin
192
that preventi ve deten-
ti on of juveni l es does not offend due process when i t serves the l e-
gi ti mate state purpose of protecti ng soci ety and the juveni l e from
potenti al consequences of pretri al cri me, when the terms of confi ne-
ment serve those l egi ti mate purposes and are nonpuni ti ve, and
when procedures provi de suffi ci ent protecti on agai nst erroneous
and unnecessary detenti ons. A statute authori zi ng pretri al deten-
ti on of accused juveni l e del i nquents on a fi ndi ng of seri ous ri sk
that the juveni l e woul d commi t cri mes pri or to tri al , provi di ng for
expedi ted heari ngs (the maxi mum possi bl e detenti on was 17 days),
and guaranteei ng a formal , adversari al probabl e cause heari ng
wi thi n that peri od, was found to sati sfy these requi rements.
Each state has a procedure by whi ch juveni l es may be tri ed as
adul ts.
193
Wi th the Court havi ng cl ari fi ed the consi tuti onal re-
qui rements for i mposi ti on of capi tal puni shment, i t was onl y a mat-
ter of ti me before the Court woul d have to determi ne whether
states may subject juveni l es to capi tal puni shment. I n Stanford v.
Kentucky,
194
the Court hel d that the Ei ghth Amendment does not
categori cal l y prohi bi t i mposi ti on of the death penal ty for i ndi vi d-
ual s who commi t cri mes at age 16 or 17; earl i er the Court had i n-
val i dated a statutory scheme permi tti ng capi tal puni shment for
cri mes commi tted before age 16.
195
I n wei ghi ng val i di ty under the
Ei ghth Amendment, the Court has l ooked to state practi ce to deter-
mi ne whether a consensus agai nst executi on exi sts.
196
Sti l l to be consi dered by the Court are such questi ons as the
substanti ve and procedural guarantees to be appl i ed i n proceedi ngs
when the matter at i ssue i s non-cri mi nal del i nquent behavi or.
The Probl em of Ci vi l Commi tment. As i s the case wi th ju-
veni l e offenders, several other cl asses of persons are subject to con-
fi nement by processes and i n courts deemed ci vi l rather than cri mi -
nal . Wi thi n thi s category of protecti ve commi tment are i nvol un-
tary commi tments for treatment of i nsani ty and other degrees of
mental i ncompetence, retardati on, al cohol i sm, narcoti cs addi cti on,
1784
197
Onl y i n Mi nnesota ex rel . Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940), di d
the Court earl i er approach consi derati on of the probl em. Other cases refl ected the
Courts concern wi th the ri ghts of convi cted cri mi nal defendants and general l y re-
qui red due process procedures or that the commi tment of convi cted cri mi nal defend-
ants fol l ow the procedures requi red for ci vi l commi tments. Specht v. Patterson, 386
U.S. 605 (1967); Baxstrom v. Herol d, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); Lynch v. Overhol ser, 369
U.S. 705 (1962); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Jackson v. I ndi ana, 406
U.S. 715 (1972); McNei l v. Di rector, 407 U.S. 245 (1972). Cf. Murel v. Bal ti more Ci ty
Cri mi nal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972).
198
422 U.S. 563 (1975).
199
That i s, the ri ght to treatment of the i nvol untari l y commi tted. Supra, pp.
169092.
200
422 U.S. at 576.
201
I d. at 57677. The Court remanded to al l ow the tri al court to determi ne
whether Donal dson shoul d recover personal l y from hi s doctors and others for hi s
confi nement, under standards formul ated under 42 U.S.C. 1983. See Wood v.
Stri ckl and, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
202
OConnor v. Donal dson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975).
203
Zi nermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
sexual psychopathy, and the l i ke. I nasmuch as the depri vati on of
l i berty i s as severe as that experi enced by juveni l es adjudged del i n-
quent, and i n addi ti on i s accompani ed wi th harm to reputati on, i t
i s surpri si ng that the Court has onl y recentl y deal t wi th the
i ssue.
197
I n OConnor v. Donaldson,
198
bypassi ng the di ffi cul t i ssues of
consti tuti onal l aw rai sed by the l ower courts resol uti on of the
case,
199
the Court hel d that a State cannot consti tuti onal l y con-
fi ne wi thout more a nondangerous i ndi vi dual who i s capabl e of sur-
vi vi ng safel y i n freedom by hi msel f or wi th the hel p of wi l l i ng and
responsi bl e fami l y members or fri ends.
200
The tri al jury had found
that Donal dson was not dangerous to hi msel f or to others, and the
Court rul ed that he had been unconsti tuti onal l y confi ned.
201
Left
to resol uti on another day were such questi ons as when, or by what
procedures, a mental l y i l l person may be confi ned by the State on
any of the grounds whi ch, under contemporary statutes, are gen-
eral l y advanced to justi fy i nvol untary confi nement of such a per-
son to prevent i njury to the publ i c, to ensure hi s own survi val or
safety, or to al l evi ate or cure hi s i l l ness
202
and the ri ght, i f any,
to recei ve treatment for the confi ned persons i l l ness. To conform
to due process requi rements, procedures for vol untary admi ssi on
shoul d recogni ze the possi bi l i ty that persons i n need of treatment
may not be competent to gi ve i nformed consent; thi s i s not a si tua-
ti on where avai l abi l i ty of a meani ngful postdepri vati on remedy can
cure the due process vi ol ati on.
203
Procedural l y, i t i s cl ear that an i ndi vi dual s l i berty i nterest i n
bei ng free from unjusti fi abl e confi nement and from the adverse so-
ci al consequences of bei ng l abel ed mental l y i l l requi res government
to assume a greater share of the ri sk of error i n provi ng the exi st-
1785
204
Addi ngton v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). See also Vi tek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480 (1980) (transfer of pri son i nmate to mental hospi tal ).
205
442 U.S. 584 (1979). See also Secretary of Publ i c Wel fare v. I nsti tuti onal i zed
Juveni l es, 442 U.S. 640 (1979).
206
442 U.S. at 598617. The di ssenters agreed on thi s poi nt. I d. at 62637.
207
I d. at 61720. The di ssenters woul d have requi red a preconfi nement heari ng.
I d. at 63738.
208
I d. at 617. The di ssent woul d have mandated a formal postadmi ssi on hear-
i ng. I d. at 62526.
ence of such i l l ness as a precondi ti on to confi nement. Thus, the evi -
denti ary standard of a preponderance, normal l y used i n l i ti gati on
between pri vate parti es, i s consti tuti onal l y i nadequate i n commi t-
ment proceedi ngs. On the other hand, the cri mi nal standard of be-
yond a reasonabl e doubt i s not necessary because the states ai m
i s not puni ti ve and because some or even much of the consequence
of an erroneous deci si on not to commi t may fal l upon the i ndi vi d-
ual . Moreover, the cri mi nal standard addresses an essenti al l y fac-
tual questi on, whereas i nterpretati ve and predi cti ve determi nati ons
must al so be made i n reachi ng a concl usi on on commi tment. The
Court therefore i mposed a standard of cl ear and convi nci ng evi -
dence.
204
Di ffi cul t questi ons of what due process may requi re i n the con-
text of commi tment of al l egedl y mental l y i l l and mental l y retarded
chi l dren by thei r parents or by the State when such chi l dren are
wards of the State were confronted i n Parham v. J .R.
205
Under the
chal l enged l aws there were no formal preadmi ssi on heari ngs, but
psychi atri c and soci al workers di d i ntervi ew parents and chi l dren
and reached some form of i ndependent determi nati on that commi t-
ment was cal l ed for. The Court acknowl edged the potenti al for
abuse but bal anced thi s agai nst such factors as the responsi bi l i ty
of parents for the care and nurture of thei r chi l dren and the l egal
presumpti on that parents usual l y act i n behal f of thei r chi l drens
wel fare, the i ndependent rol e of medi cal professi onal s i n deci di ng
to accept the chi l dren for admi ssi on, and the real possi bi l i ty that
the i nsti tuti on of an adversary proceedi ng woul d both deter parents
from acti ng i n good fai th to i nsti tuti onal i ze chi l dren needi ng such
care and i nterfere wi th the abi l i ty of parents to assi st wi th the care
of i nsti tuti onal i zed chi l dren.
206
Si mi l arl y, the same concerns, re-
fl ected i n the statutory obl i gati on of the State to care for chi l dren
i n i ts custody, caused the Court to appl y the same standards to i n-
vol untary commi tment by the Government.
207
Left to future reso-
l uti on was the questi on of the due process requi rements for
postadmi ssi on revi ew of the necessi ty for conti nued confi ne-
ment.
208
1786
1
Shel l ey v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). Si mi l arl y, the due process cl ause
of the Fi fth Amendment, wi th i ts equal protecti on component, l i mi ts onl y federal
governmental acti on and not that of pri vate parti es, as i s true of each of the provi -
si ons of the Bi l l of Ri ghts. The scope and reach of the state acti on doctri ne i s thus
the same whether a State or the Nati onal Government i s concerned. See CBS v.
Democrati c Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
2
Ci vi l Ri ghts Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). Wi th regard to the pri nci pal i ssue
i n thi s deci si on, the l i mi tati on of the state acti on requi rement on Congress enforce-
ment powers, see i nfra, pp. 192933.
3
Recentl y, however, because of broadeni ng due process concepti ons and the re-
sul ti ng l i ti gati on, i ssues of state acti on have been rai sed wi th respect to the due
process cl ause. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropol i tan Edi son Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974);
Fl agg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Rendel l -Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830
(1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oi l Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Bl um v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991 (1982).
4
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 473 (1953) (concurri ng). The Justi ce was speak-
i ng of the state acti on requi rement of the Fi fteenth Amendment. The Ni neteenth
and Twenty-si xth Amendments al so hi nge on state acti on; the Thi rteenth Amend-
ment, banni ng sl avery and i nvol untary servi tude, does not.
5
Uni ted States v. Rai nes, 362 U.S. 17, 25 (1960). A pri me exampl e i s the statu-
tory requi rement of raci al l y segregated school s condemned i n Brown v. Board of
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
Scope and Application
State Acti on. [T]he acti on i nhi bi ted by the fi rst secti on of
the Fourteenth Amendment i s onl y such acti on as may fai rl y be
sai d to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shi el d
agai nst merel y pri vate conduct, however di scri mi natory or wrong-
ful .
1
The Amendment by i ts express terms provi des that [n]o
State . . . and nor shal l any State . . . engage i n the proscri bed
conduct. I t i s State acti on of a parti cul ar character that i s prohi b-
i ted. I ndi vi dual i nvasi on of i ndi vi dual ri ghts i s not the subject mat-
ter of the amendment. I t has a deeper and broader scope. I t nul -
l i fi es and makes voi d al l State l egi sl ati on, and State acti on of every
ki nd, whi ch i mpai rs the pri vi l eges and i mmuni ti es of ci ti zens of the
Uni ted States, or whi ch i njures them i n l i fe, l i berty, or property
wi thout due process of l aw, or whi ch deni es to any of them the
equal protecti on of the l aws.
2
Whi l e the state acti on doctri ne i s
equal l y appl i cabl e to deni al s of pri vi l eges or i mmuni ti es, due proc-
ess, and equal protecti on, i t i s actual l y onl y wi th the l ast great
ri ght of the Fourteenth Amendment that the doctri ne i s i nvari abl y
associ ated.
3
The vi tal requi rement i s State responsi bi l i ty, Justi ce Frank-
furter once wrote, that somewhere, somehow, to some extent,
there be an i nfusi on of conduct by offi ci al s, panopl i ed wi th State
power, i nto any scheme to deny protected ri ghts.
4
Certai nl y, state
l egi sl ati on commandi ng a di scri mi natory resul t i s state acti on con-
demned by the fi rst secti on of the Fourteenth Amendment, and i s
voi d.
5
But the di ffi cul ty for the Court has begun when the conduct
1787
Educati on, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). And see Peterson v. Ci ty of Greenvi l l e, 373 U.S. 244
(1963), hol di ng that trespass convi cti ons of Afri can Ameri cans si tti ng-i n at a l unch
counter over the objecti on of the manager cannot stand because of a l ocal ordi nance
commandi ng such separati on, i rrespecti ve of the managers probabl e atti tude i f no
such ordi nance exi sted.
6
Ex parte Vi rgi ni a, 100 U.S. 339, 34647 (1880).
7
Lugar v. Edmondson Oi l Co., 457 U.S. 922, 93637 (1982). Freedom of the i n-
di vi dual to choose hi s associ ates or hi s nei ghbors, to use and di spose of hi s property
as he sees fi t, to be i rrati onal , arbi trary, capri ci ous, even unjust i n hi s personal rel a-
ti ons are thi ngs al l enti tl ed to a l arge measure of protecti on from governmental i n-
terference. Thi s l i berty woul d be overri dden i n the name of equal i ty, i f the struc-
tures of the amendment were appl i ed to governmental and pri vate acti on wi thout
di sti ncti on. Al so i nherent i n the concept of state acti on are val ues of federal i sm, a
recogni ti on that there are areas of pri vate ri ghts upon whi ch federal power shoul d
not l ay a heavy hand and whi ch shoul d properl y be l eft to the more preci se i nstru-
ments of l ocal authori ty. Peterson v. Ci ty of Greenvi l l e, 373 U.S. 244, 250 (1963)
(Justi ce Harl an concurri ng).
compl ai ned of i s not so cl earl y the acti on of a State but i s, perhaps,
the acti on of a mi nor state offi ci al not authori zed or perhaps forbi d-
den by state l aw so to act, or i s, perhaps on the other hand, the
acti on of a pri vate party who nonethel ess has some rel ati onshi p
wi th governmental authori ty.
The conti nuum of state acti on ranges from obvi ous l egi sl ated
deni al of equal protecti on to pri vate acti on that i s no l onger so si g-
ni fi cantl y rel ated to or bri gaded wi th state acti on that the Amend-
ment appl i es. The prohi bi ti ons of the Amendment have reference
to acti ons of the pol i ti cal body denomi nated by a State, by what-
ever i nstruments or i n whatever modes that acti on may be taken.
A State acts by i ts l egi sl ati ve, i ts executi ve, or i ts judi ci al authori -
ti es. I t can act i n no other way. The consti tuti onal provi si on, there-
fore, must mean that no agency of the State, or of the offi cers or
agents by whom i ts powers are exerted, shal l deny to any person
wi thi n i ts juri sdi cti on the equal protecti on of the l aws. Whoever, by
vi rtue of publ i c posi ti on under a State government, depri ves an-
other of property, l i fe, or l i berty, wi thout due process of l aw, or de-
ni es or takes away the equal protecti on of the l aws, vi ol ates the
consti tuti onal i nhi bi ti on; and as he acts i n the name and for the
State, and i s cl othed wi th the States power, hi s act i s that of the
State.
6
Careful adherence to the state acti on requi rement preserves
an area of i ndi vi dual freedom by l i mi ti ng the reach of federal l aw
and federal judi ci al power. I t al so avoi ds i mposi ng on the State, i ts
agenci es or offi ci al s, responsi bi l i ty for conduct for whi ch they can-
not fai rl y be bl amed. A major consequence i s to requi re the courts
to respect the l i mi ts of thei r own power as di rected agai nst state
governments and pri vate i nterests. Whether thi s i s good or bad pol -
i cy, i t i s a fundamental fact of our pol i ti cal order.
7
That the doc-
1788
8
Onl y by si fti ng facts and wei ghi ng ci rcumstances can the nonobvi ous i nvol ve-
ment of the State i n pri vate conduct be attri buted i ts true si gni fi cance. Burton v.
Wi l mi ngton Parki ng Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
9
Brown v. Board of Educati on, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10
I nfra, pp. 184347.
11
Compare Washi ngton v. Seattl e School Di st., 458 U.S. 457 (1982), with
Crawford v. Los Angel es Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
12
Keyes v. Denver School Di stri ct, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (emphasi s by
Court). See also Col umbus Bd. of Educ. v. Peni ck, 443 U.S. 449, 457 n.5 (1979).
tri ne serves certai n val ues and di sserves others i s not a cri ti ci sm
of i t but a recogni ti on that i n formul ati ng and appl yi ng the several
tests by whi ch the presence of state acti on i s di scerned,
8
the
Court has consi derabl e di screti on and the wei ghts of the opposi ng
val ues and i nterests wi l l l ead to substanti al l y di fferent appl i cati ons
of the tests. Thus, fol l owi ng the Ci vi l War, when the Court sought
to reassert federal i sm val ues, i t i mposed a rather ri gi d state acti on
standard. Duri ng the ci vi l ri ghts movement of the 1950s and 1960s,
when al most al l state acti on contenti ons were rai sed i n a raci al
context, the Court general l y found the presence of state acti on. As
i t grew more sympatheti c to federal i sm concerns i n the l ate 1970s
and 1980s, the Court began to reassert a strengthened state acti on
doctri ne, pri mari l y but hardl y excl usi vel y i n nonraci al cases.
Operati on of the state acti on doctri ne was cri ti cal i n determi n-
i ng whether school systems were segregated unconsti tuti onal l y by
race. The ori gi nal Brown cases and subsequent ones arose i n the
context of statutori l y mandated separati on of the races and occa-
si oned therefore no controversy i n fi ndi ng state acti on.
9
The after-
math i n the South i nvol ved not so much state acti on as the deter-
mi nati on of the remedi es necessary to achi eve a uni tary system.
10
But i f raci al segregati on i s not the resul t of state acti on i n some
aspect, then i ts exi stence i s not subject to consti tuti onal remedy.
11
Di sti ngui shi ng between the two si tuati ons has occasi oned much
controversy.
Confronti ng i n a case ari si ng from Denver, Col orado, the i ssue
of a school system i n whi ch no statutory dual system had ever been
i mposed, the Court restated the obvi ous pri nci pl e that raci al seg-
regati on caused by i ntenti onal l y segregati ve school board acti ons
i s de jure and not de facto, just as i f i t had been mandated by stat-
ute. [T]he di fferenti ati ng factor between de jure segregati on and
so-cal l ed de facto segregati on . . . i s purpose or intent to seg-
regate.
12
Where i t i s proved that a meani ngful porti on of a school
system i s segregated as a resul t of offi ci al acti on, the offi ci al agency
must bear the burden of provi ng that other school segregati on
wi thi n the system i s adventi ti ous and not the resul t of offi ci al ac-
ti on. I t i s not the responsi bi l i ty of compl ai nants to show that each
1789
13
I d. at 208213. The conti nui ng val i di ty of the Keyes shi fti ng-of-the-burden
pri nci pl e, after Washi ngton v. Davi s, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Dayton Bd. of Educ.
v. Bri nkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977), was asserted i n Col umbus Bd. of Educ. v. Peni ck,
443 U.S. 449, 455458 & n.7, 46768 (1979), and Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Bri nkman,
443 U.S. 526, 54042 (1979).
14
Col umbus Bd. of Educ. v. Peni ck, 443 U.S. 449, 45861 (1979); Dayton Bd.
of Educ. v. Bri nkman, 443 U.S. 526, 53440 (1979).
15
Mi l l i ken v. Bradl ey, 418 U.S. 717, 74445 (1974).
16
Ex parte Vi rgi ni a, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). Si mi l arl y, the acts of a state governor
are state acti ons, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 1617 (1958); Sterl i ng v. Constanti n,
287 U.S. 378, 393 (1932), as are the acts of prosecuti ng attorneys, Mooney v.
Hol ohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112, 113 (1935), state and l ocal el ecti on offi ci al s, Uni ted
States v. Cl assi c, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), and l aw enforcement offi ci al s. Gri ffi n v.
Maryl and, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Screws v.
Uni ted States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). One need not be an empl oyee of the State to act
school i n a system i s de jure segregated to be enti tl ed to a system-
wi de desegregati on pl an.
13
Moreover, the Court has al so appar-
entl y adopted a rul e to the effect that i f i t can be proved that at
some ti me i n the past a school board has purposeful l y mai ntai ned
a raci al l y separated system, a conti nui ng obl i gati on to di smantl e
that system can be sai d to have devol ved upon the agency at that
earl i er poi nt so that i ts subsequent acti ons can be hel d to a stand-
ard of havi ng promoted desegregati on or of not havi ng promoted i t,
so that faci al l y neutral or ambi guous school board pol i ci es can form
the basi s for a judi ci al fi ndi ng of i ntenti onal di scri mi nati on.
14
Di fferent resul ts, however, fol l ow when i nter-di stri ct segrega-
ti on i s an i ssue. Di sregard of di stri ct l i nes i s permi ssi bl e by a fed-
eral court i n formul ati ng a desegregati on pl an onl y when i t fi nds
an i nter-di stri ct vi ol ati on. Before the boundari es of separate and
autonomous school di stri cts may be set asi de by consol i dati ng the
separate uni ts for remedi al purposes by i mposi ng a cross-di stri ct
remedy, i t must fi rst be shown that there has been a consti tuti onal
vi ol ati on wi thi n one di stri ct that produces a si gni fi cant segregati ve
effect i n another di stri ct. Speci fi cal l y i t must be shown that raci al l y
di scri mi natory acts of the state or l ocal school di stri cts, or of a si n-
gl e school di stri ct, have been a substanti ve cause of i nter-di stri ct
segregati on.
15
The de jure/de facto di sti ncti on i s thus wel l estab-
l i shed i n school cases and i s fi rml y grounded upon the state ac-
ti on l anguage of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I t has l ong been establ i shed that the acti ons of state offi cers
and agents are attri butabl e to the State. Thus, appl i cati on of a fed-
eral statute i mposi ng a cri mi nal penal ty on a state judge who ex-
cl uded Afri can Ameri cans from jury duty was uphel d as wi thi n con-
gressi onal power under the Fourteenth Amendment; the judges ac-
ti on consti tuted state acti on even though state l aw di d not author-
i ze hi m to sel ect the jury i n a raci al l y di scri mi natory manner.
16
1790
under col or of state l aw; he may merel y parti ci pate i n an act wi th state offi cers.
Uni ted States v. Pri ce, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
17
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
18
Screws v. Uni ted States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Wi l l i ams v. Uni ted States, 341
U.S. 97 (1951); Uni ted States v. Pri ce, 383 U.S. 787 (1966). See also Uni ted States
v. Rai nes, 362 U.S. 17, 25 (1960). As Justi ce Brandei s noted i n I owa-Des Moi nes
Nati onal Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 246 (1931), acts done by vi rtue of publ i c
posi ti on under a State government . . . and . . . i n the name and for the State . . .
are not to be treated as i f they were the acts of pri vate i ndi vi dual s, al though i n
doi ng them the offi ci al acted contrary to an express command of the state l aw. Note
that for purposes of bei ng amenabl e to sui t i n federal court, however, the i mmuni ty
of the States does not shi el d state offi cers who are al l eged to be engagi ng i n i l l egal
or unconsti tuti onal acti on. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), supra, pp. 1537
44. Cf. Screws v. Uni ted States, supra, 14748.
19
Uni ted States v. Cl assi c, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
20
Cf. Adi ckes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
21
Lombard v. Loui si ana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963). No statute or ordi nance man-
dated segregati on at l unch counters but both the mayor and the chi ef of pol i ce had
recentl y i ssued statements announci ng thei r i ntenti on to mai ntai n the exi sti ng pol -
i cy of separati on. Thus, the convi cti on of Afri can Ameri cans for trespass because
they refused to l eave a segregated l unch counter was voi ded.
22
Gri ffi n v. Maryl and, 378 U.S. 130 (1964). Guard at pri vate entertai nment
ground was al so deputy sheri ff; he coul d not execute the raci al l y di scri mi natory pol i -
ci es of hi s pri vate empl oyer. See also Wi l l i ams v. Uni ted States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
23
Exampl es al ready al l uded to i ncl ude Lombard v. Loui si ana, 373 U.S. 267
(1963), i n whi ch certai n offi ci al s had advocated conti nued segregati on, Peterson v.
Ci ty of Greenvi l l e, 373 U.S. 244 (1963), i n whi ch there were segregati on-requi ri ng
ordi nances and customs of separati on, and Robi nson v. Fl ori da, 378 U.S. 153 (1964),
i n whi ch heal th regul ati ons requi red separate restroom faci l i ti es i n any establ i sh-
ment servi ng both races.
The fact that the state acti on category i s not l i mi ted to si tuati ons
i n whi ch state l aw affi rmati vel y authori zes di scri mi natory acti on
was made cl earer i n Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
17
i n whi ch the Court
found unconsti tuti onal state acti on i n the di scri mi natory admi ni s-
trati on of an ordi nance fai r and non-di scri mi natory on i ts face. Not
even the fact that the acti ons of the state agents are i l l egal under
state l aw makes the acti on nonattri butabl e to the State for pur-
poses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
18
Mi suse of power, possessed
by vi rtue of state l aw and made possi bl e onl y because the wrong-
doer i s cl othed wi th the authori ty of state l aw, i s acti on taken
under col or of state l aw.
19
When the deni al of equal protecti on
i s not commanded by l aw or by admi ni strati ve regul ati on but i s
nonethel ess accompl i shed through pol i ce enforcement of custom
20
or through hortatory admoni ti ons by publ i c offi ci al s to pri vate par-
ti es to act i n a di scri mi natory manner,
21
the acti on i s state acti on.
When a State cl othes a pri vate party wi th offi ci al authori ty, he
may not engage i n conduct forbi dden the State.
22
Beyond thi s poi nt we enter the area i n whi ch the di scri mi na-
tory i ntent i s that of a pri vate i ndi vi dual and the questi on i s
whether a State has encouraged the effort or has i mpermi ssi bl y
ai ded i t.
23
Of notabl e i mportance and a subject of controversy si nce
1791
24
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
25
I d. at 1314.
26
I d. at 19. I n Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), the Court outl awed judi ci al
enforcement of restri cti ve covenants i n the Di stri ct of Col umbi a as vi ol ati ve of ci vi l
ri ghts l egi sl ati on and publ i c pol i cy. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), hel d
that damage acti ons for vi ol ati ons of raci al l y restri cti ve covenants woul d not be judi -
ci al l y entertai ned.
27
Ri ce v. Si oux Ci ty Memori al Park Cemetery, 245 I owa 147, 60 N.W. 2d 110
(1953), affd by an equal l y di vi ded Court, 348 U.S. 880 (1954), reheari ng granted,
judgment vacated & certi orari di smi ssed, 349 U.S. 70 (1955); Bl ack v. Cutter Lab-
oratori es, 351 U.S. 292 (1956). The central i ssue i n the si t-i n cases, whether state
enforcement of trespass l aws at the behest of pri vate parti es acti ng on the basi s of
i t was deci ded i s Shelley v. Kraemer.
24
There, property owners
brought sui t to enforce a raci al l y restri cti ve covenant, seeki ng to
enjoi n the sal e of a home by whi te sel l ers to bl ack buyers. The cov-
enants standi ng al one, Chi ef Justi ce Vi nson sai d, vi ol ated no ri ghts
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. So l ong as the purposes
of those agreements are effectuated by vol untary adherence to thei r
terms, i t woul d appear cl ear that there has been no acti on by the
State and the provi si ons of the Amendment have not been vi o-
l ated. However, that was not al l . These are cases i n whi ch the
purposes of the agreements were secured onl y by judi ci al enforce-
ment by state courts of the restri cti ve terms of the agreements.
25
Establ i shi ng that the precedents were to the effect that judi ci al ac-
ti on of state courts was state acti on, the Court conti nued to fi nd
that judi ci al enforcement of these covenants was forbi dden. The
undi sputed facts di scl ose that peti ti oners were wi l l i ng purchasers
of properti es upon whi ch they desi re to establ i sh homes. The own-
ers of the properti es were wi l l i ng sel l ers; and contracts of sal e were
accordi ngl y consummated. . . .
These are not cases . . . i n whi ch the States have merel y ab-
stai ned from acti on, l eavi ng pri vate i ndi vi dual s free to i mpose such
di scri mi nati ons as they see fi t. Rather, these are cases i n whi ch the
States have made avai l abl e to such i ndi vi dual s the ful l coerci ve
power of government to deny to peti ti oners, on the grounds of race
or col or, the enjoyment of property ri ghts i n premi ses whi ch peti -
ti oners are wi l l i ng and fi nanci al l y abl e to acqui re and whi ch the
grantors are wi l l i ng to sel l .
26
Arguments about the scope of Shelley began i mmedi atel y. Di d
the rati onal e mean that no pri vate deci si on to di scri mi nate coul d
be effectuated i n any manner by acti on of the State, as by enforce-
ment of trespass l aws or judi ci al enforcement of di scri mi nati on i n
wi l l s? Or di d i t rather forbi d the acti on of the State i n i nterferi ng
wi th the wi l l i ngness of two pri vate parti es to deal wi th each other?
Di sposi ti on of several earl y cases possi bl y governed by Shelley l eft
thi s i ssue unanswered.
27
But the Court has experi enced no di f-
1792
thei r own di scri mi natory moti vati ons, was evaded by the Court, i n fi ndi ng some
other form of state acti on and reversi ng al l convi cti ons. I ndi vi dual Justi ces di d
el aborate, however. Compare Bel l v. Maryl and, 378 U.S. 226, 25560 (1964) (opi ni on
of Justi ce Dougl as), with i d. at 326 (Justi ces Bl ack, Harl an, and Whi te di ssenti ng).
28
I n New York Ti mes Co. v. Sul l i van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and progeny, defa-
mati on acti ons based on common-l aw rul es were found to i mpl i cate Fi rst Amend-
ment ri ghts and the Court i mposed varyi ng l i mi ti ng rul es on such rul es of l aw. See
i d. at 265 (fi ndi ng state acti on). Si mi l arl y, i n NAACP v. Cl ai borne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886 (1982), a ci vi l l awsui t between pri vate parti es, the appl i cati on of state
common-l aw rul es to assess damages for acti ons i n a boycott and pi cketi ng was
found to consti tute state acti on. I d. at 916 n.51.
29
396 U.S. 435 (1970). The matter had previ ousl y been before the Court i n
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
30
I d. at 445. Note the use of the same rati onal e i n another context i n Pal mer
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226 (1971). On a di fferent resul t i n the Gi rard Col l ege
wi l l case, see i nfra, p. 1689 n.14.
31
387 U.S. 369 (1967). The deci si on was 5-to4, Justi ces Harl an, Bl ack, Cl ark,
and Stewart di ssenti ng. I d. at 387.
fi cul ty i n fi ndi ng that state court enforcement of common-l aw rul es
i n a way that has an i mpact upon speech and press ri ghts i s state
acti on and tri ggers the appl i cati on of consti tuti onal rul es.
28
I t may
be that the substanti ve rul e that i s bei ng enforced i s the di sposi ti ve
i ssue, rather than the mere exi stence of state acti on. Thus, i n
Evans v. Abney,
29
a state court, asked to enforce a di scri mi natory
sti pul ati on i n a wi l l that property devi sed to a ci ty for use as a
publ i c park shoul d never be used by Afri can Ameri cans, rul ed that
the ci ty coul d not operate the park i n a segregated fashi on; i nstead
of stri ki ng the segregati on requi rement from the wi l l , the court or-
dered return of the property to the decedents hei rs, i nasmuch as
the trust had fai l ed. The Supreme Court hel d the deci si on permi s-
si bl e, i nasmuch as the state court had merel y carri ed out the tes-
tators i ntent wi th no raci al moti vati on i tsel f, and di sti ngui shed
Shelley on the basi s that Afri can Ameri cans were not di scri mi nated
agai nst by the reversi on, because everyone was depri ved of use of
the park.
30
Si mi l ar to Shelley i n controversy and the i ndefi ni teness of i ts
rati onal e, the l atter el ement of whi ch appears to have undergone
a modi fyi ng rati onal i zati on, i s Reitman v. Mulkey,
31
i n whi ch, fol -
l owi ng enactment of an open housi ng l aw by the Cal i forni a l egi s-
l ature, an i ni ti ati ve and referendum measure was passed that re-
peal ed the l aw and amended the state consti tuti on to prevent any
agency of the State or of l ocal government from henceforth forbi d-
di ng raci al di scri mi nati on i n pri vate housi ng. Uphol di ng a state
court i nval i dati on of thi s amendment, the Court appeared to
ground i ts deci si on on two l i nes of reasoni ng, ei ther on the state
courts premi se that passage of the provi si on encouraged pri vate
raci al di scri mi nati on i mpermi ssi bl y or on the basi s that the provi -
si on made di scri mi natory raci al practi ces i mmune from the ordi -
1793
32
See, e.g., i d. at 377 (l anguage suggesti ng both l i nes of reasoni ng).
33
Hunter v. Eri ckson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). I n Lee v. Nyqui st, 318 F. Supp. 710
(W.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971), New York enacted a statute prohi bi ti ng
the assi gnment of students or the establ i shment of school di stri cts for the purpose
of achi evi ng raci al bal ance i n attendance, unl ess wi th the express approval of a l o-
cal l y el ected school board or wi th the consent of the parents, a measure desi gned
to restri ct the state educati on commi ssi oners program to amel i orate de facto seg-
regati on. The federal court hel d the l aw voi d, hol di ng i n rel i ance on Mulkey that
the statute encouraged raci al di scri mi nati on and that by treati ng educati onal mat-
ters i nvol vi ng raci al cri teri a di fferentl y than i t treated other educati onal matters i t
made more di ffi cul t a resol uti on of the de facto segregati on probl em.
34
Washi ngton v. Seattl e School Di st., 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Crawford v. Los An-
gel es Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982). A fi ve-to-four majori ty i n Seattle found the
faul t to be a raci al l y-based structuri ng of the pol i ti cal process maki ng i t more di f-
fi cul t to undertake acti ons desi gned to i mprove raci al condi ti ons than to undertake
any other educati onal acti on. An 8-to1 majori ty i n Crawford found that repeal of
a measure to bus to undo de facto segregati on, wi thout i mposi ng any barri er to
other remedi al devi ces, was permi ssi bl e.
35
Crawford, 458 U.S. at 539, quoted in Seattle, 458 U.S. at 483. See also Dayton
Bd. of Educ. v. Bri nkman, 433 U.S. 406, 414 (1977).
nary l egi sl ati ve process, whi l e not so l i mi ti ng other processes, and
thus i mpermi ssi bl y burdened mi nori ti es i n the achi evement of l e-
gi ti mate ai ms i n a way other cl asses of persons were not bur-
dened.
32
I n a subsequent case, the l atter rati onal e was uti l i zed i n
a unani mous deci si on voi di ng an Akron ordi nance, whi ch sus-
pended an open housi ng ordi nance and provi ded that any future
ordi nance regul ati ng transacti ons i n real property on the basi s of
race, col or, rel i gi on, nati onal ori gi n or ancestry must be submi tted
to a vote of the peopl e before i t coul d become effecti ve, whi l e any
other ordi nance woul d become effecti ve when passed, except that i t
coul d be peti ti oned to referendum.
33
That Mulkey and Hunter stand for the proposi ti on that i mpos-
i ng a barri er to raci al amel i orati on l egi sl ati on i s the deci si ve and
condemni ng factor i s evi dent from two recent deci si ons wi th respect
to state referendum deci si ons on busi ng for i ntegrati on.
34
Both
cases agree that the si mpl e repeal or modi fi cati on of desegregati on
or anti di scri mi nati on l aws, wi thout more, never has been vi ewed as
embodyi ng a presumpti vel y i nval i d raci al cl assi fi cati on.
35
I t i s
thus not i mpermi ssi bl e to overturn a previ ous governmental deci -
si on, or to defeat the effort i ni ti al l y to arri ve at such a deci si on,
si mpl y because the state acti on may concei vabl y encourage pri vate
di scri mi nati on.
I n other i nstances i n whi ch the di scri mi nati on i s bei ng prac-
ti ced by pri vate parti es, the questi on essenti al l y i s whether there
has been suffi ci ent state i nvol vement to bri ng the Fourteenth
Amendment i nto pl ay; that i s, the pri vate di scri mi nati on i s not con-
sti tuti onal l y forbi dden unl ess to some si gni fi cant extent the State
i n any of i ts mani festati ons has been found to have become i n-
1794
36
Burton v. Wi l mi ngton Parki ng Authori ty, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
37
I d. at 722.
38
Smi th v. Al l wri ght, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
39
Pennsyl vani a v. Board of Trustees, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). On remand, the state
courts substi tuted pri vate persons as trustees to carry out the wi l l . I n re Gi rard Col -
l ege Trusteeshi p, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A. 2d 844, cert. deni ed, 357 U.S. 570 (1958). Thi s
expedi ent was, however, ul ti matel y hel d unconsti tuti onal . Brown v. Pennsyl vani a,
392 F.2d 120 (3d Ci r.), cert. deni ed, 391 U.S. 921 (1968).
40
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). Justi ces Bl ack, Harl an, and Stewart
di ssented. I d. at 312, 315. For the subsequent rul i ng i n thi s case, see Evans v.
Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), consi dered supra, p. 1686.
41
Burton v. Wi l mi ngton Parki ng Authori ty, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
vol ved i n i t.
36
There i s no cl ear formul a. Onl y by si fti ng facts and
wei ghi ng ci rcumstances can the nonobvi ous i nvol vement of the
State i n pri vate conduct be attri buted i ts true si gni fi cance.
37
State
acti on was found i n a number of ci rcumstances. The Whi te Pri -
mary was outl awed by the Court not because the partys di scri mi -
nati on was commanded by statute but because the party operated
under the authori ty of the State and i t i n fact control l ed the out-
come of el ecti ons.
38
Al though the Ci ty of Phi l adel phi a was acti ng
as trustee i n admi ni steri ng and carryi ng out the wi l l of someone
who had l eft money for a col l ege, admi ssi on to whi ch was sti pu-
l ated to be for whi te boys onl y, the ci ty was hel d to be engaged i n
forbi dden state acti on i n di scri mi nati ng agai nst Afri can Ameri cans
i n admi ssi on.
39
When state courts on peti ti on of i nterested parti es
removed the Ci ty of Macon as trustees of a segregated park l eft i n
trust for such use i n a wi l l and appoi nted new trustees i n order to
keep the park segregated, the Court reversed, fi ndi ng that the Ci ty
was sti l l i nextri cabl y i nvol ved i n the mai ntenance and operati on of
the park.
40
I n a si gni fi cant case i n whi ch the Court expl ored a
l engthy l i st of contacts between the State and a pri vate corpora-
ti on, i t hel d that the l essee of property wi thi n an off-street parki ng
bui l di ng owned and operated by a muni ci pal i ty coul d not excl ude
Afri can Ameri cans from i ts restaurant. I t was emphasi zed that the
bui l di ng was publ i cl y bui l t and owned, that the restaurant was an
i ntegral part of the compl ex, that the restaurant and the parki ng
faci l i ti es compl emented each other, that the parki ng authori ty had
regul atory power over the l essee and had made sti pul ati ons but
nothi ng rel ated to raci al di scri mi nati on, and that the fi nanci al suc-
cess of the restaurant benefi ted the governmental agency; the de-
gree of state parti ci pati on and i nvol vement i n di scri mi natory ac-
ti on was suffi ci ent to condemn i t.
41
The questi on arose, then, what degree of state parti ci pati on
was si gni fi cant? Woul d l i censi ng of a busi ness cl othe the acti ons
of that busi ness wi th suffi ci ent state i nvol vement? Woul d regul a-
ti on? Or provi si on of pol i ce and fi re protecti on? Woul d enforcement
1795
42
See, e.g., the vari ous opi ni ons i n Bel l v. Maryl and, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
43
407 U.S. 163 (1972). One provi si on of the state l aw was, however, hel d uncon-
sti tuti onal . That provi si on requi red a l i censee to observe al l i ts by-l aws and there-
fore mandated the Moose Lodge to fol l ow the di scri mi nati on provi si on of i ts by-l aws.
I d. at 17779.
44
I d. at 173.
45
I d. at 17677.
46
I d. at 17475.
47
Jackson v. Metropol i tan Edi son Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (under the due
process cl ause).
48
Powe v. Mi l es, 407 F.2d. 73, 81 (2d Ci r. 1968). See also NCAA v. Tarkani an,
488 U.S. 179 (1988) (col l ege athl eti c associ ati ons appl i cati on of rul es l eadi ng to a
state uni versi tys suspensi on of i ts basketbal l coach di d not consti tute state acti on
on the part of the associ ati on).
of state trespass l aws be i nval i d i f i t effectuated di scri mi nati on?
The si t-i n cases of the earl y 1960s presented al l these questi ons
and more but di d not resol ve them.
42
The basi cs of an answer
came i n Moose Lodge No. 107 v. I rvis,
43
i n whi ch the Court hel d
that the fact that a pri vate cl ub was requi red to have a l i quor l i -
cense to serve al cohol i c dri nks and di d have such a l i cense di d not
bar i t from di scri mi nati ng agai nst Afri can Ameri cans. I t deni ed
that pri vate di scri mi nati on became consti tuti onal l y i mpermi ssi bl e
i f the pri vate enti ty recei ves any sort of benefi t or servi ce at al l
from the State, or i f i t i s subject to state regul ati on i n any degree
whatever, si nce any such rul e woul d evi scerate the state acti on
doctri ne. Rather, where the i mpetus for the di scri mi nati on i s pri -
vate, the State must have si gni fi cantl y i nvol ved i tsel f wi th i nvi di -
ous di scri mi nati on.
44
Moreover, whi l e the State had extensi ve
powers to regul ate i n detai l the l i quor deal i ngs of i ts l i censees, i t
cannot be sai d to i n any way foster or encourage raci al di scri mi na-
ti on. Nor can i t be sai d to make the State i n any real i sti c sense
a partner or even a joi nt venturer i n the cl ubs enterpri se.
45
And
there was nothi ng i n the l i censi ng rel ati onshi p here that ap-
proached the symbi oti c rel ati onshi p between l essor and l essee
whi ch the Court had found i n Burton.
46
The Court subsequentl y made cl ear that governmental i nvol ve-
ment wi th pri vate persons or pri vate corporati ons i s not the cri ti cal
factor i n determi ni ng the exi stence of state acti on. Rather, the
i nqui ry must be whether there i s a suffi ci entl y cl ose nexus between
the State and the chal l enged acti on of the regul ated enti ty so that
the acti on of the l atter may be fai rl y treated as that of the State
i tsel f.
47
Or, to quote Judge Fri endl y, who fi rst enunci ated the test
thi s way, the essenti al poi nt i s that the state must be i nvol ved
not si mpl y wi th some acti vi ty of the i nsti tuti on al l eged to have i n-
fl i cted i njury upon a pl ai nti ff but wi th the acti vi ty that caused the
i njury. Putti ng the poi nt another way, the state acti on, not the pri -
vate, must be the subject of the compl ai nt.
48
Therefore, the Court
1796
49
Jackson v. Metropol i tan Edi son Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974). I n di ssent, Jus-
ti ce Marshal l protested that the quoted l anguage marked a sharp departure from
precedent, that state authori zati on and approval of pri vate conduct has been hel d
to support a fi ndi ng of state acti on. I d. at 369. Note that i n Cantor v. Detroi t Edi -
son Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), the pl ural i ty opi ni on used much the same anal ysi s to
deny anti trust i mmuni ty to a uti l i ty practi ce merel y approved but not requi red by
the regul ati ng commi ssi on, but most of the Justi ces were on di fferent si des of the
same questi on i n the two cases.
50
Jackson v. Metropol i tan Edi son Co., 419 U.S. 345, 35158 (1974). On the due
process l i mi tati ons on the conduct of publ i c uti l i ti es, see Memphi s Li ght, Gas &
Water Di v. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
51
Fl agg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978) (due process).
52
I d. at 16466. I f, however, a state offi cer acts wi th the pri vate party i n secur-
i ng the property i n di spute, that i s suffi ci ent to create the requi si te state acti on and
the pri vate party may be subjected to sui t i f the sei zure does not comport wi th due
process. Lugar v. Edmondson Oi l Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
53
Bl um v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
found no such nexus between the State and a publ i c uti l i tys acti on
i n termi nati ng servi ce to a customer. Nei ther the fact that the busi -
ness was subject to state regul ati on, nor that the State had con-
ferred i n effect a monopol y status upon the uti l i ty, nor that i n re-
vi ewi ng the companys tari ff schedul es the regul atory commi ssi on
had i n effect approved the termi nati on provi si on i ncl uded therei n
(but had not requi red the practi ce, had not put i ts own wei ght on
the si de of the proposed practi ce by orderi ng i t)
49
operated to
make the uti l i tys acti on the States acti on.
50
Si gni fi cantl y ti ghten-
i ng the standard further agai nst a fi ndi ng of state acti on, the
Court asserted that pl ai nti ffs must establ i sh not onl y that a pri vate
party acted under col or of the chal l enged statute, but al so that i ts
acti ons are properl y attri butabl e to the State. . . .
51
And the ac-
ti ons are to be attri butabl e to the State apparentl y onl y i f the State
compel l ed the acti ons and not i f the State merel y establ i shed the
process through statute or regul ati on under whi ch the pri vate
party acted. Thus, when a pri vate party, havi ng someones goods
i n hi s possessi on and seeki ng to recover the charges owned on stor-
age of the goods, acts under a permi ssi ve state statue to sel l the
goods and retai n out of the proceeds hi s charges, hi s acti ons are
not governmental acti on and need not fol l ow the di ctates of the due
process cl ause.
52
I n the context of regul ated nursi ng home si tua-
ti ons, i n whi ch the homes were cl osel y regul ated and state offi ci al s
reduced or wi thdrew Medi cai d benefi ts pai d to pati ents when they
were di scharged or transferred to i nsti tuti ons provi di ng a l ower
l evel of care, the Court found that the acti ons of the homes i n di s-
chargi ng or transferri ng were not thereby rendered the acti ons of
the government.
53
I n a few cases, the Court has i ndi cated that di scri mi natory ac-
ti on by pri vate parti es may be precl uded by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment i f the parti cul ar party i nvol ved i s exerci si ng a publ i c func-
1797
54
345 U.S. 461 (1953).
55
326 U.S. 501 (1946).
56
I d. at 506.
57
See Amal gamated Food Empl oyees Uni on v. Logan Val l ey Pl aza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968), limited in Ll oyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), and overruled in
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). The Marsh pri nci pl e i s good onl y when pri -
vate property has taken on all the attri butes of a muni ci pal i ty. I d. at 51617.
58
Jackson v. Metropol i tan Edi son Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
59
Fl agg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157159 (1978).
60
Rendel l -Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
61
Bl um v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 10111012 (1982).
62
Fl agg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978) (quoti ng Jackson v. Metropol i -
tan Edi son Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)).
63
Rendel l -Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
64
Edmonson v. Leesvi l l e Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
ti on. Thi s rati onal e i s one of those whi ch emerges from the vari ous
opi ni ons i n Terry v. Adams.
54
I n Marsh v. Alabama,
55
a Jehovahs
Wi tness had been convi cted of trespass after passi ng out l i terature
on the streets of a company-owned town and the Court reversed.
I t i s not at al l cl ear from the opi ni on of the Court what i t was that
made the pri vatel y-owned town one to whi ch the Consti tuti on ap-
pl i ed. I n essence, i t appears to have been that the town had al l
the characteri sti cs of any other Ameri can town, that i t was l i ke
a State. The more an owner, for hi s advantage, opens up hi s prop-
erty for use by the publ i c i n general , the more do hi s ri ghts become
ci rcumscri bed by the statutory and consti tuti onal ri ghts of those
who use i t.
56
Subsequent efforts to expand upon Marsh were at
fi rst successful and then turned back, and the publ i c functi on
theory i n the context of pri vatel y-owned shoppi ng centers was
sharpl y curtai l ed.
57
Attempts to appl y such a theory to other ki nds of pri vate con-
duct, such as to pri vate uti l i ti es,
58
to pri vate uti l i zati on of permi s-
si ve state l aws to secure property cl ai med to bel ong to credi tors,
59
to the operati on of school s for probl em chi l dren referred by publ i c
i nsti tuti ons,
60
and to the operati ons of nursi ng homes the pati ents
of whi ch are practi cal l y al l funded by publ i c resources,
61
proved
unavai l i ng. The publ i c functi on doctri ne i s to be l i mi ted to a del e-
gati on of a power tradi ti onal l y excl usi vel y reserved to the
State.
62
Therefore, the questi on i s not whether a pri vate group
i s servi ng a publ i c functi on.. . . That a pri vate enti ty performs a
functi on whi ch serves the publ i c does not make i ts acts state ac-
ti on.
63
Publ i c functi on di d pl ay an i mportant part, however, i n the
Courts fi ndi ng state acti on i n exerci se of peremptory chal l enges i n
jury sel ecti on by non-governmental parti es.
I n fi ndi ng state acti on i n the raci al l y di scri mi natory use of pe-
remptory chal l enges by a pri vate party duri ng voir dire i n a ci vi l
case,
64
the Court appl i ed tests devel oped i n an earl i er case i nvol v-
1798
65
Lugar v. Edmondson Oi l Corp., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
66
Edmonson v. Leesvi l l e Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 62022 (1991) (ci tati ons
omi tted).
67
I d. at 624, 625.
68
I d. at 628.
69
I d. at 639, 643.
70
Georgi a v. McCol l um, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992). I t was, of course, beyond di s-
pute that a prosecutors exerci se of peremptory chal l enges consti tutes state acti on.
See Swai n v. Al abama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
i ng garni shment and attachment.
65
The Court fi rst asks whether
the cl ai med consti tuti onal depri vati on resul ted from the exerci se of
a ri ght or pri vi l ege havi ng i ts source i n state authori ty, and then
whether the pri vate party charged wi th the depri vati on coul d be
descri bed i n al l fai rness as a state actor. I n answeri ng the second
questi on, the Court consi ders three factors: the extent to whi ch
the actor rel i es on governmental assi stance and benefi ts, whether
the actor i s performi ng a tradi ti onal governmental functi on, and
whether the i njury caused i s aggravated i n a uni que way by the
i nci dents of governmental authori ty.
66
There was no questi on that
exerci se of peremptory chal l enges deri ves from governmental au-
thori ty (ei ther state or federal , as the case may be); exerci se of pe-
remptory chal l enges i s authori zed by l aw, and the number i s l i m-
i ted. Si mi l arl y, the Court easi l y concl uded that pri vate parti es ex-
erci se peremptory chal l enges wi th the overt and si gni fi cant as-
si stance of the court. So too, jury sel ecti on i s the performance of a
tradi ti onal governmental functi on: the jury i s a qui ntessenti al gov-
ernmental body, havi ng no attri butes of a pri vate actor, and i t fol -
l owed, so the Court majori ty bel i eved, that sel ecti on of i ndi vi dual s
to serve on that body i s al so a governmental functi on whether or
not i t i s del egated to or shared wi th pri vate i ndi vi dual s.
67
Fi nal l y,
the Court concl uded that the i njury caused by the di scri mi nati on
i s made more severe because the government permi ts i t to occur
wi thi n the courthouse i tsel f.
68
Di ssenti ng Justi ce OConnor com-
pl ai ned that the Court was wi pi ng away centuri es of adversary
practi ce i n whi ch unrestrai ned pri vate choi ce has been recogni zed
i n exerci se of peremptory chal l enges; [i ]t i s anti theti cal to the na-
ture of our adversari al process, the Justi ce contended, to say that
a pri vate attorney acti ng on behal f of a pri vate cl i ent represents
the government for consti tuti onal purposes.
69
Even though i n a cri mi nal case i t i s the government and the
defendant who are adversari es, rather than two pri vate parti es, as
i s ordi nari l y the case i n ci vi l acti ons, the Court soon appl i ed these
same pri nci pl es to hol d that exerci se of peremptory chal l enges by
the defense i n a cri mi nal case al so consti tutes state acti on.
70
The
same general i ti es appl y wi th at l east equal force: there i s overt and
si gni fi cant governmental assi stance i n creati ng and structuri ng the
1799
71
Pol k County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 512 (1981).
72
112 U.S. at 2356. Justi ce OConnor, agai n di ssenti ng, poi nted out that the
Courts di sti ncti on was i nconsi stent wi th Dodsons decl arati on that publ i c defenders
are not vested wi th state authori ty when performi ng a l awyers tradi ti onal func-
ti ons as counsel to a defendant i n a cri mi nal proceedi ng. I d. at 2362. Justi ce Scal i a,
al so di ssenti ng agai n, decri ed reducti on of Edmonson to the termi nal l y absurd: A
cri mi nal defendant, i n the process of defendi ng hi msel f agai nst the state, i s hel d to
be acti ng on behal f of the state. I d. at 2364. Chi ef Justi ce Rehnqui st, who had di s-
sented i n Edmonson, concurred i n McCollum i n the bel i ef that i t was control l ed by
Edmonson, and Justi ce Thomas, who had not parti ci pated i n Edmonson, expressed
si mi l ar vi ews i n a concurrence.
73
Jackson v. Metropol i tan Edi son Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974); Bl um v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. I rvi s, 407 U.S. 163
(1972).
74
Bl um v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); Fl agg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149, 166 (1978); Jackson v. Metropol i tan Edi son Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974).
75
On fundi ng, see Si mki ns v. Moses H. Cone Memori al Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th
Ci r. 1963), cert. deni ed, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Li brary, 149
F.2d 212 (4th Ci r.), cert. deni ed, 326 U.S. 721 (1945); Chri sthi l f v. Annapol i s Emer-
gency Hosp. Assn, 496 F.2d 174 (4th Ci r. 1974). But cf. Greco v. Orange Mem.
Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Ci r.), cert. deni ed, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975). On tax
benfi ts, see Green v. Connal l y, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), affd.
sub nom. Coi t v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); McGl otten v. Connal l y, 338 F. Supp.
448 (D.D.C. 1972); Jackson v. Statl er Foundati on, 496 F.2d 623 (2d Ci r. 1974). But
cf. New York Ci ty Jaycees v. Uni ted States Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856 (2d Ci r. 1976);
process, a cri mi nal jury serves an i mportant governmental functi on
and i ts sel ecti on i s al so i mportant, and the courtroom setti ng i nten-
si fi es harmful effects of di scri mi natory acti ons. An earl i er case
71
hol di ng that a publ i c defender was not a state actor when engaged
i n general representati on of a cri mi nal defendant was di sti n-
gui shed, the Court emphasi zi ng that exerci se of a peremptory
chal l enge di ffers si gni fi cantl y from other acti ons taken i n support
of a defendants defense, si nce i t i nvol ves sel ecti on of persons to
wi el d governmental power.
72
The rul es devel oped by the Court for busi ness regul ati on are
that (1) the mere fact that a busi ness i s subject to state regul ati on
does not by i tsel f convert i ts acti on i nto that of the State for pur-
poses of the Fourteenth Amendment,
73
and (2) a State normal l y
can be hel d responsi bl e for a pri vate deci si on onl y when i t has ex-
erci sed coerci ve power or has provi ded such si gni fi cant encourage-
ment, ei ther overt or covert, that the choi ce must be deemed to be
that of the State.
74
Previ ousl y, the Courts deci si ons wi th respect to state i nvol ve-
ment i n the pri vate acti vi ti es of i ndi vi dual s and enti ti es rai sed the
questi on whether fi nanci al assi stance and tax benefi ts provi ded to
pri vate parti es woul d so cl othe them wi th state acti on that di s-
cri mi nati on by them and other conduct woul d be subjected to con-
sti tuti onal constrai nts. Many l ower courts had hel d state acti on to
exi st i n such ci rcumstances.
75
However the questi on mi ght have
1800
Greenya v. George Washi ngton Uni v., 512 F.2d 556 (D.C. Ci r.), cert. deni ed, 423
U.S. 995 (1975).
76
457 U.S. 830 (1982).
77
457 U.S. 991 (1982).
78
I d. at 1011.
79
489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989).
80
Estel l e v. Gambl e, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
81
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
been answered under the ol der cases, i t i s evi dent that a negati ve
answer fl ows from the premi ses of the more recent cases. I n
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
76
the pri vate school recei ved probl em stu-
dents referred to i t by publ i c i nsti tuti ons, i t was heavi l y regul ated,
and i t recei ved between 90 and 99% of i ts operati ng budget from
publ i c funds. I n Blum v. Yaretsky,
77
the nursi ng home had prac-
ti cal l y al l of i ts operati ng and capi tal costs subsi di zed by publ i c
funds and more than 90% of i ts resi dents had thei r medi cal ex-
penses pai d from publ i c funds; i n setti ng rei mbursement rates, the
State i ncl uded a formul a to assure the home a profi t. Neverthel ess,
i n both cases the Court found that the enti ti es remai ned pri vate,
and requi red pl ai nti ffs to show that as to the compl ai ned of acti ons
the State was i nvol ved, ei ther through coerci on or encouragement.
That programs undertaken by the State resul t i n substanti al fund-
i ng of the acti vi ti es of a pri vate enti ty i s no more persuasi ve than
the fact of regul ati on of such an enti ty i n demonstrati ng that the
State i s responsi bl e for deci si ons made by the enti ty i n the course
of i ts busi ness.
78
I n the soci al wel fare area, the Court has drawn a sharp di s-
ti ncti on between governmental acti on subject to substanti ve due
process requi rements, and governmental i nacti on, not so con-
strai ned. There bei ng no affi rmati ve ri ght to governmental ai d,
the Court announced i n DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social
Services Department
79
that as a general matter, . . . a States fai l -
ure to protect an i ndi vi dual agai nst pri vate vi ol ence si mpl y does
not consti tute a vi ol ati on of the Due Process Cl ause. Before there
can be state i nvol vement creati ng an affi rmati ve duty to protect an
i ndi vi dual , the Court expl ai ned, the state must have taken a per-
son i nto i ts custody and hel d hi m there agai nst hi s wi l l so as to
restri ct hi s freedom to act on hi s own behal f. Thus, whi l e the Court
had recogni zed due process vi ol ati ons for fai l ure to provi de ade-
quate medi cal care to i ncarcerated pri soners,
80
and for fai l ure to
ensure reasonabl e safety for i nvol untari l y commi tted mental pa-
ti ents,
81
no such affi rmati ve duty arose from the fai l ure of soci al
servi ces agents to protect an abused chi l d from further abuse from
hi s parent. Even though possi bl e abuse had been reported to the
agency and confi rmed and moni tored by the agency, and the agency
1801
82
489 U.S. at 201.
83
I d. at 202.
84
I d. at 203.
85
For exampl e, ri ghts of associ ati on protected by the Fi rst Amendment. See
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. I rvi s, 407 U.S. 163, 17980 (1972) (Justi ce Dougl as di ssent-
i ng); Gi l more v. Ci ty of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974); Norwood v. Harri son,
413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973). The ri ght can be i mpl i cated as wel l by affi rmati ve l egi sl a-
ti ve acti on barri ng di scri mi nati on i n pri vate organi zati ons. See Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 17579 (1976).
86
413 U.S. 455 (1973).
had done nothi ng to protect the chi l d, the Court emphasi zed that
the actual i njury was i nfl i cted by the parent and di d not occur
whi l e [the chi l d] was i n the States custody.
82
Whi l e the State
may have i ncurred l i abi l i ty i n tort through the negl i gence of i ts so-
ci al workers, [not] every tort commi tted by a state actor [i s] a con-
sti tuti onal vi ol ati on.
83
[I ]t i s wel l to remember . . . that the harm
was i nfl i cted not by the State of Wi sconsi n, but by [the chi l ds] fa-
ther.
84
Judi ci al i nqui ry i nto the exi stence of state acti on may be di -
rected toward the i mpl ementati on of ei ther of two remedi es, and
thi s may wel l l ead to some di fference i n the search. I n the cases
consi dered here sui ts were agai nst a pri vate actor to compel hi m
to hal t hi s di scri mi natory acti on, to enjoi n hi m to admi t bl acks to
a l unch counter, for exampl e. But one coul d just as readi l y bri ng
sui t agai nst the government to compel i t to cease ai di ng the pri vate
actor i n hi s di scri mi natory conduct. Recurrence to the l atter rem-
edy mi ght wel l avoi d consti tuti onal i ssues that an order di rected to
the pri vate party woul d rai se.
85
I n any event, i t must be deter-
mi ned whether the governmental i nvol vement i s suffi ci ent to gi ve
ri se to a consti tuti onal remedy; i n a sui t agai nst the pri vate party
i t must be determi ned whether he i s so i nvol ved wi th the govern-
ment as to be subject to consti tuti onal restrai nts, whi l e i n a sui t
agai nst the government agency i t must be determi ned whether the
governments acti on i mpermi ssi bl y fostered the pri vate conduct.
Thus, i n Norwood v. Harrison,
86
the Court struck down the
provi si on of free textbooks by the State to pri vate school s set up
as raci al l y segregated i nsti tuti ons to avoi d desegregated publ i c
school s, even though the textbook program predated the establ i sh-
ment of these school s. [A]ny tangi bl e state assi stance, outsi de the
general i zed servi ces government mi ght provi de to pri vate seg-
regated school s i n common wi th other school s, and wi th al l ci ti zens,
i s consti tuti onal l y prohi bi ted i f i t has a si gni fi cant tendency to fa-
ci l i tate, rei nforce, and support pri vate di scri mi nati on.. . . The con-
sti tuti onal obl i gati on of the State requi res i t to steer cl ear, not onl y
of operati ng the ol d dual system of raci al l y segregated school s, but
al so of gi vi ng si gni fi cant ai d to i nsti tuti ons that practi ce raci al or
1802
87
Gi l more v. Ci ty of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 56869 (1974) (quoti ng Nor-
wood v. Harri son, 413 U.S. 455, 466, 467 (1973)).
88
Gi l more v. Ci ty of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 570 (1974).
89
I d. at 57374. I n Bl um v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), pl ai nti ffs, objecti ng
to deci si ons of the nursi ng home i n di schargi ng or transferri ng pati ents, sued publ i c
offi ci al s, but they objected to the di scharges and transfers, not to the changes i n
Medi cai d benefi ts made by the offi ci al s.
90
Si mon v. Eastern Kentucky Wel fare Ri ghts Organi zati on, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
See id. at 46, 6364 (Justi ce Brennan concurri ng and di ssenti ng).
other i nvi di ous di scri mi nati ons.
87
And i n a subsequent case, the
Court approved a l ower court order that barred the ci ty from per-
mi tti ng excl usi ve temporary use of publ i c recreati onal faci l i ti es by
segregated pri vate school s because that i nterfered wi th an out-
standi ng order mandati ng publ i c school desegregati on. But i t re-
manded for further factfi ndi ng wi th respect to permi tti ng
nonexcl usi ve use of publ i c recreati onal faci l i ti es and general gov-
ernment servi ces by segregated pri vate school s so that the di stri ct
court coul d determi ne whether such uses i nvol ve government so
di rectl y i n the acti ons of those users as to warrant court i nterven-
ti on on consti tuti onal grounds.
88
Unl i ke the si tuati on i n whi ch
pri vate cl ub di scri mi nati on i s attacked di rectl y, the questi on of the
exi stence of state acti on centers i n the extent of the ci tys i nvol ve-
ment i n di scri mi natory acti ons by pri vate agenci es usi ng publ i c fa-
ci l i ti es. . . . Recei pt of just any sort of benefi t or servi ce at al l does
not by the mere provi si on el ectri ci ty, water, and pol i ce and fi re
protecti on, access general l y to muni ci pal recreati onal faci l i ti es
consti tute a showi ng of state i nvol vement i n di scri mi nati on and the
l ower courts order was too broad because not predi cated upon a
proper fi ndi ng of state acti on. I f, however, the ci ty or other govern-
mental enti ty rati ons otherwi se freel y accessi bl e recreati onal faci l i -
ti es, the case for state acti on wi l l natural l y be stronger than i f the
faci l i ti es are si mpl y avai l abl e to al l comers wi thout condi ti on or
reservati on. The l ower court was di rected to si ft facts and wei gh
ci rcumstances on a case-by-case basi s i n maki ng determi nati ons.
89
I t shoul d be noted, however, that the Court has i nterposed,
wi thout menti oni ng these cases, a potenti al l y si gni fi cant barri er to
uti l i zati on of the pri nci pl e set out i n them. I n a 1976 deci si on,
whi ch i t has expanded si nce, i t hel d that pl ai nti ffs, seeki ng
di sal l owal of governmental tax benefi ts accorded to i nsti tuti ons
that al l egedl y di scri mi nated agai nst compl ai nants and thus i n-
vol ved the government i n thei r acti ons, must i n order to bri ng the
sui t show that revocati on of the benefi t woul d cause the i nsti tu-
ti ons to cease the compl ai ned-of conduct.
90
Persons. I n the case i n whi ch i t was fi rst cal l ed upon to i n-
terpret thi s cl ause, the Court doubted whether any acti on of a
1803
91
Sl aughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wal l .) 36, 81 (1873). Cf. Weber v. Aetna
Casual ty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 177 (1972) (Justi ce Rehnqui st di ssenti ng).
92
Chi cago, B. & Q. R.R. v. I owa, 94 U.S. 155 (1877); Pei k v. Chi cago & Nw.
Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1877); Chi cago, M. & St. P. R.R. v. Ackl ey, 94 U.S. 179 (1877);
Wi nona & St. Peter R.R. v. Bl ake, 94 U.S. 180 (1877).
93
Santa Cl ara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). The
background and devel opments from thi s utterance are treated i n H. GRAHAM,
EVERYMANS CONSTI TUTI ON HI STORI CAL ESSAYS ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,
THE CONSPI RACY THEORY, AND AMERI CAN CONSTI TUTI ONALI SM (1968), chs. 9, 10,
and pp. 56684. Justi ce Bl ack, i n Connecti cut General Li fe I ns. Co. v. Johnson, 303
U.S. 77, 85 (1938), and Justi ce Dougl as, i n Wheel i ng Steel Corp. v. Gl ander, 337
U.S. 562, 576 (1949), have di sagreed that corporati ons are persons for equal protec-
ti on purposes.
94
Yi ck Wo v. Hopki ns, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). For modern exampl es, see Levy
v. Loui si ana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968); Graham v. Ri chardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371
(1971).
95
Ci ty of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192 (1923); Wi l l i ams v. Mayor of Bal -
ti more, 289 U.S. 36 (1933).
96
See Pl yl er v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 21016 (1982) (expl i cati ng meani ng of the
phrase i n the context of hol di ng that al i ens i l l egal l y present i n a State are wi thi n
i ts juri sdi cti on and may thus rai se equal protecti on cl ai ms).
97
Bl ake v. McCl ung, 172 U.S. 239, 261 (1898); Sul l y v. Ameri can Natl Bank,
178 U.S. 289 (1900).
State not di rected by way of di scri mi nati on agai nst the [N]egroes
as a cl ass, or on account of thei r race, wi l l ever be hel d to come
wi thi n the purvi ew of thi s provi si on.
91
Nonethel ess, i n deci di ng
the Granger Cases shortl y thereafter, the Justi ces seemi ngl y enter-
tai ned no doubt that the rai l road corporati ons were enti tl ed to i n-
voke the protecti on of the cl ause.
92
Ni ne years l ater, Chi ef Justi ce
Wai te announced from the bench that the Court woul d not hear ar-
gument on the questi on whether the equal protecti on cl ause ap-
pl i ed to corporati ons. We are al l of the opi ni on that i t does.
93
The
word has been gi ven the broadest possi bl e meani ng. These provi -
si ons are uni versal i n thei r appl i cati on, to al l persons wi thi n the
terri tori al juri sdi cti on, wi thout regard to any di fferences of race, of
col or, or of nati onal i ty. . .
94
The onl y qual i fi cati on i s that a mu-
ni ci pal corporati on cannot i nvoke the cl ause agai nst i ts State.
95
Wi thi n I ts J uri sdi cti on. Persons wi thi n i ts juri sdi cti on
are enti tl ed to equal protecti on from a State. Largel y because Arti -
cl e I V, 2, has from the begi nni ng guaranteed the pri vi l eges and
i mmuni ti es of ci ti zens i n the several States, the Court has rarel y
construed the phrase i n rel ati on to natural persons.
96
I t was fi rst
hel d that a forei gn corporati on not doi ng busi ness i n a State under
condi ti ons that subjected i t to process i ssui ng from the courts of
that State was not wi thi n the juri sdi cti on and coul d not compl ai n
of the preferences granted resi dent credi tors i n the di stri buti on of
assets of an i nsol vent corporati on,
97
but thi s hol di ng was subse-
quentl y qual i fi ed, the Court hol di ng that a forei gn corporati on
whi ch sued i n a court of a State i n whi ch i t was not l i censed to
1804
98
Kentucky Fi nance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp., 262 U.S. 544
(1923).
99
Hi l l sborough v. Cromwel l , 326 U.S. 620 (1946).
100
Wheel i ng Steel Corp. v. Gl ander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949); Hanover I ns. Co. v.
Hardi ng, 272 U.S. 494 (1926). See also Phi l adel phi a Fi re Assn v. New York, 119
U.S. 110 (1886).
101
The story i s recounted i n J. JAMES, THE FRAMI NG OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1956). See also JOURNAL OF THE JOI NT COMMI TTEE OF FI FTEEN ON RE-
CONSTRUCTI ON (B. Kendri ck, ed. 1914). The fl oor debates are col l ected i n 1 STATU-
TORY HI STORY OF THE UNI TED STATES CI VI L RI GHTS 181 (B. Schwartz, ed. 1970).
102
Ci vi l Ri ghts Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, now i n part 42 U.S.C. 1981,
1982. See Jones v. Al fred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 42237 (1968).
103
As i n fact much of the l egi sl ati on whi ch survi ved chal l enge i n the courts was
repeal ed i n 1894 and 1909. 28 Stat. 36; 35 Stat. 1088. See R. CARR, FEDERAL PRO-
TECTI ON OF CI VI L RI GHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD 4546 (1947).
104
TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (rev. ed. 1965); Frank & Munro, The Origi-
nal Understanding of Equal Protection of the Laws, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1950);
Bi ckel , The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1955); and see the essays col l ected i n H. GRAHAM, EVERYMANS CONSTI TUTI ON
HI STORI CAL ESSAYS ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, THE CONSPI RACY THEORY,
AND AMERI CAN CONSTI TUTI ONALI SM (1968). I n cal l i ng for reargument i n Brown v.
Board of Educati on, 345 U.S. 972 (1952), the Court asked for and recei ved extensi ve
anal ysi s of the l egi sl ati ve hi story of the Amendment wi th no concl usi ve resul ts.
Brown v. Board of Educati on, 347 U.S. 483, 48990 (1954).
105
Sl aughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wal l .) 36, 81 (1873).
do busi ness to recover possessi on of property wrongful l y taken from
i t i n another State was wi thi n the juri sdi cti on and coul d not be
subjected to unequal burdens i n the mai ntenance of the sui t.
98
The
test of amenabi l i ty to servi ce of process wi thi n the State was i g-
nored i n a l ater case deal i ng wi th di scri mi natory assessment of
property bel ongi ng to a nonresi dent i ndi vi dual .
99
When a State has
admi tted a forei gn corporati on to do busi ness wi thi n i ts borders,
that corporati on i s enti tl ed to equal protecti on of the l aws but not
necessari l y to i denti cal treatment wi th domesti c corporati ons.
100
Equal Protection: J udging Classifications by Law
A guarantee of equal protecti on of the l aws was contai ned i n
every draft l eadi ng up to the fi nal versi on of 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
101
I mmedi atel y pressi ng to i ts sponsors was the de-
si re to provi de a fi rm consti tuti onal basi s for al ready-enacted ci vi l
ri ghts l egi sl ati on,
102
and, by amendi ng the Consti tuti on, to pl ace
repeal beyond the accompl i shment of a si mpl e majori ty i n a future
Congress.
103
No doubt there were confl i cti ng i nterpretati ons of the
phrase equal protecti on among sponsors and supporters and the
l egi sl ati ve hi story does l i ttl e to cl ari fy whether any sort of consen-
sus was accompl i shed and i f so what i t was.
104
Whi l e the Court
earl y recogni zed that Afri can Ameri cans were the pri mary i ntended
benefi ci ari es of the protecti ons thus adopted,
105
the spare l anguage
was majesti cal l y unconfi ned to so l i mi ted a cl ass or to so l i mi ted
a purpose. Thus, as wi l l be seen, the equal protecti on standard
1805
106
I n Buck v. Bel l , 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927), Justi ce Hol mes characteri zed the
equal protecti on cl ause as the l ast resort of consti tuti onal arguments.
107
See Yi ck Wo v. Hopki ns, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (di scri mi nati on agai nst Chi nese
on the West Coast).
108
Ti gner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1980).
109
Atchi son, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 106 (1899). See also from
the same peri od, Ori ent I ns. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557 (1869); Bachtel v. Wi l son,
204 U.S. 36 (1907); Watson v. Maryl and, 218 U.S. 173 (1910), and l ater cases. Kotch
v. Board of Ri ver Port Pi l ot Commrs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Goesaert v. Cl eary, 335
U.S. 464 (1948); McGowan v. Maryl and, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Schi l b v. Kuebel , 404
U.S. 357 (1971); Rai l road Reti rement Bd. v. Fri tz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Schwei ker
v. Wi l son, 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
110
Barrett v. I ndi ana, 229 U.S. 26 (1913).
111
Barbi er v. Connol l y, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885).
112
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963); Wi l l i amson v. Lee Opti cal Co.,
348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
came to be appl i cabl e to al l cl assi fi cati ons by l egi sl ati ve and other
offi ci al bodi es, though not wi th much i ni ti al success,
106
unti l now
the equal protecti on cl ause i n the fi el ds of ci vi l ri ghts and fun-
damental l i berti es l ooms l arge as a consti tuti onal text affordi ng the
federal and state courts extensi ve powers of revi ew wi th regard to
di fferenti al treatment of persons and cl asses.
The Tradi ti onal Standard: Restrai ned Revi ew. The tra-
di ti onal standard of revi ew of equal protecti on chal l enges of cl assi -
fi cati ons devel oped l argel y though not enti rel y i n the context of eco-
nomi c regul ati on.
107
I t i s sti l l most val i dl y appl i ed there, al though
i t appears i n many other contexts as wel l . A more acti ve revi ew
has been devel oped for cl assi fi cati ons based on a suspect i ndi ci um
or affecti ng a fundamental i nterest.
The Fourteenth Amendment enjoi ns the equal protecti on of
the l aws, and l aws are not abstract proposi ti ons. Justi ce Frank-
furter once wrote. They do not rel ate to abstract uni ts, A, B, and
C, but are expressi ons of pol i cy ari si ng out of speci fi c di ffi cul ti es,
addressed to the attai nment of speci fi c ends by the use of speci fi c
remedi es. The Consti tuti on does not requi re thi ngs whi ch are di f-
ferent i n fact or opi ni on to be treated i n l aw as though they were
the same.
108
The mere fact of cl assi fi cati on wi l l not voi d l egi sl a-
ti on,
109
then, because i n the exerci se of i ts powers a l egi sl ature has
consi derabl e di screti on i n recogni zi ng the di fferences between and
among persons and si tuati ons.
110
Cl ass l egi sl ati on, di scri mi nati ng
agai nst some and favori ng others, i s prohi bi ted; but l egi sl ati on
whi ch, i n carryi ng out a publ i c purpose, i s l i mi ted i n i ts appl i ca-
ti on, i f wi thi n the sphere of i ts operati on i t affects al i ke al l persons
si mi l arl y si tuated, i s not wi thi n the amendment.
111
Or, more suc-
ci nctl y, statutes create many cl assi fi cati ons whi ch do not deny
equal protecti on; i t i s onl y i nvi di ous di scri mi nati on whi ch offends
the Consti tuti on.
112
1806
113
220 U.S. 61, 7879 (1911), quoted i n ful l i n Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457,
46364 (1957). Cl assi fi cati ons whi ch are purposeful l y di scri mi natory fal l before the
equal protecti on cl ause wi thout more. E.g., Barbi er v. Connol l y, 113 U.S. 27, 30
(1885); Yi ck Wo v. Hopki ns, 118 U.S. 356, 37374 (1886). Cf. New York Ci ty Transi t
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 n.40 (1979). Expl i ci t i n al l the formul ati ons i s
that a l egi sl ature must have had a permi ssi bl e purpose, a requi rement whi ch i s sel -
dom fai l ed, gi ven the l eni ency of judi ci al revi ew. But see Zobel v. Wi l l i ams, 457 U.S.
55, 6364 (1982), and i d. at 65 (Justi ce Brennan concurri ng).
114
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Vi rgi ni a, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See also
Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 573 (1910).
115
E.g., F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Vi rgi ni a, 253 U.S. 412 (1920); Stewart Dry
Goods Co. v. Lewi s, 294 U.S. 550 (1935); Mayfl ower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S.
266 (1936).
116
I n Nebbi a v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934), speaki ng of the l i mi ts of
the due process cl ause, the Court observed that i n the absence of other consti tu-
ti onal restri cti ons, a state i s free to adopt whatever economi c pol i cy may reasonabl y
be deemed to promote publ i c wel fare.
How then i s the l i ne between permi ssi bl e and i nvi di ous cl assi -
fi cati on to be determi ned? I n Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co.,
113
the Court summari zed one versi on of the rul es sti l l prevai l -
i ng. 1. The equal protecti on cl ause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not take from the State the power to cl assi fy i n the adopti on
of pol i ce l aws, but admi ts of the exerci se of a wi de scope of di scre-
ti on i n that regard, and avoi ds what i s done onl y when i t i s wi th-
out any reasonabl e basi s and therefore i s purel y arbi trary. 2. A
cl assi fi cati on havi ng some reasonabl e basi s does not offend agai nst
that cl ause merel y because i t i s not made wi th mathemati cal ni cety
or because i n practi ce i t resul ts i n some i nequal i ty. 3. When the
cl assi fi cati on i n such a l aw i s cal l ed i n questi on, i f any state of
facts reasonabl y can be concei ved that woul d sustai n i t, the exi st-
ence of that state of facts at the ti me the l aw was enacted must
be assumed. 4. One who assai l s the cl assi fi cati on i n such a l aw
must carry the burden of showi ng that i t does not rest upon any
reasonabl e basi s, but i s essenti al l y arbi trary. Especi al l y because of
the emphasi s upon the necessi ty for total arbi trari ness, utter i rra-
ti onal i ty, and the fact that the Court wi l l strai n to concei ve of a
set of facts that wi l l justi fy the cl assi fi cati on, the test i s extremel y
l eni ent and, assumi ng the exi stence of a consti tuti onal l y permi s-
si bl e goal , no cl assi fi cati on wi l l ever be upset. But, contempora-
neousl y wi th thi s test, the Court al so pronounced another l eni ent
standard whi ch di d l eave to the courts a judgmental rol e. I n thi s
test, the cl assi fi cati on must be reasonabl e, not arbi trary, and must
rest upon some ground of di fference havi ng a fai r and substanti al
rel ati on to the object of the l egi sl ati on, so that al l persons si mi l arl y
ci rcumstanced shal l be treated al i ke.
114
Use of the l atter standard
di d i n fact resul t i n some i nval i dati ons.
115
But then, coi nci dent wi th the demi se of substanti ve due proc-
ess i n the area of economi c regul ati on,
116
the Court reverted to the
1807
117
E.g., Ti gner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940); Kotch v. Board of Ri ver Port Pi l ot
Commrs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Goesaert v. Cl eary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Rai l way Ex-
press Agency v. Ci ty of New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); McGowan v. Maryl and, 366
U.S. 420 (1961).
118
Wi l l i amson v. Lee Opti cal Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); McDonal d v. Board
of El ecti on Commrs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); Schi l b v. Kuebel , 404 U.S. 357, 364
65 (1971); Ci ty of New Orl eans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); Mi nnesota v.
Cl over Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981).
119
Ci ty of New Orl eans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 30304 (1976); Ci ty of Pi ttsburg
v. Al co Parki ng Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974).
120
Dandri dge v. Wi l l i ams, 397 U.S. 471, 48586 (1970); Jefferson v. Hackney,
406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972). See also New York Ci ty Transi t Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S.
568, 58794 (1979).
121
E.g., McGi nni s v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 27077 (1973); Johnson v. Robi son,
415 U.S. 361, 37483 (1974); Ci ty of Charl otte v. I nternati onal Assn of Fi refi ghters,
426 U.S. 283, 28689 (1976). I t i s si gni fi cant that these opi ni ons were wri tten by
Justi ces who subsequentl y di ssented from more rel axed standard of revi ew cases
and urged adherence to at l east a standard requi ri ng arti cul ati on of the goal s
sought to be achi eved and an eval uati on of the fi t of the rel ati onshi p between goal
and cl assi fi cati on. Rai l road Reti rement Bd. v. Fri tz, 449 U.S. 166, 182 (1980) (Jus-
ti ces Brennan and Marshal l di ssenti ng); Schwei ker v. Wi l son, 450 U.S. 221, 239
(1981) (Justi ces Powel l , Brennan, Marshal l , and Stevens di ssenti ng). See also New
York Ci ty Transi t Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 594 (1979) (Justi ce Powel l concur-
ri ng i n part and di ssenti ng i n part), and i d. at 597, 602 (Justi ces Whi te and Mar-
shal l di ssenti ng).
former standard, deferri ng to the l egi sl ati ve judgment on questi ons
of economi cs and rel ated matters; even when an i mpermi ssi bl e pur-
pose coul d have been attri buted to the cl assi fi ers i t was usual l y
possi bl e to concei ve of a reason that woul d justi fy the cl assi fi ca-
ti on.
117
Strengtheni ng the deference was the recogni ti on of di scre-
ti on i n the l egi sl ature not to try to deal wi th an evi l or a cl ass of
evi l s al l wi thi n the scope of one enactment but to approach the
probl em pi ecemeal , to l earn from experi ence, and to amel i orate the
harmful resul ts of two evi l s di fferentl y, resul ti ng i n permi ssi bl e
over- and under-i ncl usi ve cl assi fi cati ons.
118
I n recent years, the Court has been remarkabl y i nconsi stent i n
setti ng forth the standard whi ch i t i s usi ng, and the resul ts have
refl ected thi s. I t has uphel d economi c cl assi fi cati ons that suggested
i mpermi ssi bl e i ntenti on to di scri mi nate, reci ti ng at l ength the
Lindsley standard, compl ete wi th the concei vi ng-of-a-basi s and the
one-step-at-a-ti me rati onal e,
119
and i t has appl i ed thi s rel axed
standard to soci al wel fare regul ati ons.
120
I n other cases, i t has uti -
l i zed the Royster Guano standard and has l ooked to the actual goal
arti cul ated by the l egi sl ature i n determi ni ng whether the cl assi fi ca-
ti on had a reasonabl e rel ati onshi p to that goal ,
121
al though i t has
usual l y ended up uphol di ng the cl assi fi cati on. Fi nal l y, purportedl y
appl yi ng the rati onal basi s test, the Court has i nval i dated some
1808
122
E.g., Li ndsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 7479 (1972); Ei senstadt v. Bai rd, 405
U.S. 438 (1972); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Department of Agri cul ture
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Ci ty of Cl eburne v. Cl eburne Li vi ng Center, 473
U.S. 432 (1985) (rejecti ng vari ous justi fi cati ons offered for excl usi on of a home for
the mental l y retarded i n an area where boardi ng homes, nursi ng and conval escent
homes, and fraterni ty or sorori ty houses were permi tted). The Court i n Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), uti l i zed the Royster Guano formul ati on and purported
to stri ke down a sex cl assi fi cati on on the rati onal basi s standard, but, whether the
standard was actual l y used or not, the case was the begi nni ng of the deci si ons ap-
pl yi ng a hi gher standard to sex cl assi fi cati ons.
123
449 U.S. 166, 17479 (1980). The quotati on i s i d. at 17677 n.10. The extent
of deference i s notabl e, i nasmuch as the l egi sl ati ve hi story seemed cl earl y to estab-
l i sh that the purpose the Court purported to di scern as the basi s for the cl assi fi ca-
ti on was not the congressi onal purpose at al l . I d. at 18697 (Justi ce Brennan di s-
senti ng). The Court observed, however, that i t was consti tuti onal l y i rrel evant
whether the pl ausi bl e basi s was i n fact wi thi n Congress reasoni ng, i nasmuch as the
Court has never requi red a l egi sl ature to arti cul ate i ts reasons for enactng a stat-
ute. I d. at 179. For a conti nuati on of the debate over actual purpose and concei vabl e
justi fi cati on, see Kassel v. Consol i dated Frei ghtways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 68085
(1981) (Justi ce Brennan concurri ng), and i d. at 70206 (Justi ce Rehnqui st di ssent-
i ng). Cf. Schwei ker v. Wi l son, 450 U.S. 221, 24345 (1981) (Justi ce Powel l di ssent-
i ng).
124
450 U.S. 221, 23039 (1981). Nonethel ess, the four di ssenters thought that
the purpose di scerned by the Court was not the actual purpose, that i t had i n fact
no purpose i n mi nd, and that the cl assi fi cati on was not rati onal . I d. at 239.
125
Justi ce Bl ackmun wrote the Courts opi ni on i n Wilson, Justi ce Rehnqui st i n
Fritz.
126
Mi nnesota v. Cl over Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 46170 (1981). The
quoted phrase i s at 466.
cl assi fi cati ons i n the areas tradi ti onal l y most subject to total def-
erence.
122
Attempts to devel op a consi stent pri nci pl e have so far been un-
successful . I n Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,
123
the Court ac-
knowl edged that [t]he most arrogant l egal schol ar woul d not cl ai m
that al l of these cases ci ted appl i ed a uni form or consi stent test
under equal protecti on pri nci pl es, but then went on to note the
di fferences between Lindsley and Royster Guano and chose the
former. But, shortl y, i n Schweiker v. Wilson,
124
i n an opi ni on wri t-
ten by a di fferent Justi ce,
125
the Court sustai ned another cl assi -
fi cati on, usi ng the Royster Guano standard to eval uate whether the
cl assi fi cati on bore a substanti al rel ati onshi p to the goal actual l y
chosen and arti cul ated by Congress. I n between these deci si ons,
the Court approved a state cl assi fi cati on after sati sfyi ng i tsel f that
the l egi sl ature had pursued a permi ssi bl e goal , but setti ng asi de
the deci si on of the state court that the cl assi fi cati on woul d not pro-
mote that goal ; the Court announced that i t was i rrel evant whether
i n fact the goal woul d be promoted, the questi on i nstead bei ng
whether the l egi sl ature coul d rati onal l y have deci ded that i t
woul d.
126
1809
127
I n Ci ty of Mesqui te v. Al addi ns Castl e, 455 U.S. 283, 294 (1982), the Court
observed that i t was not cl ear whether i t woul d appl y Royster Guano to the cl assi -
fi cati on at i ssue, ci ti ng Fritz as wel l as Crai g v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), an i n-
termedi ate standard case i nvol vi ng gender. Justi ce Powel l deni ed that Royster
Guano or Reed v. Reed had ever been rejected. I d. at 301 n.6 (di ssenti ng). See also
i d. at 29697 (Justi ce Whi te).
128
The excepti on i s Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), whi ch, though i t pur-
ported to appl y Royster Guano, may have appl i ed hei ghtened scruti ny. See Zobel v.
Wi l l i ams, 457 U.S. 55, 6163 (1982), i n whi ch i t found the cl assi fi cati ons not rati on-
al l y rel ated to the goal s, wi thout di scussi ng whi ch standard i t was usi ng.
129
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). I n appl yi ng ri gi d scruti ny, however, the Court
was deferenti al to the judgment of mi l i tary authori ti es, and to congressi onal judg-
ment i n exerci si ng i ts war powers.
130
Brown v. Board of Educati on, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
I n short, i t i s uncertai n whi ch formul ati on of the rati onal basi s
standard the Court wi l l adhere to.
127
I n the mai n, the i ssues i n re-
cent years have not i nvol ved the val i di ty of cl assi fi cati ons, but
rather the care wi th whi ch the Court has revi ewed the facts and
the l egi sl ati on wi th i ts l egi sl ati ve hi story to uphol d the chal l enged
cl assi fi cati ons. The recent deci si ons voi di ng cl assi fi cati ons have not
cl earl y set out whi ch standard they have been usi ng.
128
Deter-
mi nati on i n thi s area, then, must awai t presentati on to the Court
of a cl assi fi cati on whi ch i t woul d sustai n under the Lindsley stand-
ard and i nval i date under Royster Guano.
The New Standards: Acti ve Revi ew. When government l eg-
i sl ates or acts ei ther on the basi s of a suspect cl assi fi cati on or
wi th regard to a fundamental i nterest, the tradi ti onal standard
of equal protecti on revi ew i s abandoned, and the Court exerci ses a
stri ct scruti ny. Under thi s standard government must dem-
onstrate a hi gh degree of need, and usual l y l i ttl e or no presumpti on
favori ng the cl assi fi cati on i s to be expected. After much i ni ti al con-
troversy wi thi n the Court, i t has now created a thi rd category, fi nd-
i ng several cl assi fi cati ons to be worthy of a degree of i ntermedi -
ate scruti ny requi ri ng a showi ng of i mportant governmental pur-
poses and a cl ose fi t between the cl assi fi cati on and the purposes.
Paradi gmati c of suspect categori es i s cl assi fi cati on by race.
Fi rst i n the l i ne of cases deal i ng wi th thi s i ssue i s Korematsu v.
United States,
129
concerni ng the warti me evacuati on of Japanese-
Ameri cans from the West Coast, i n whi ch the Court sai d that be-
cause onl y a si ngl e ethni c-raci al group was i nvol ved the measure
was i mmedi atel y suspect and subject to ri gi d scruti ny. The
school segregati on cases
130
purported to enunci ate no per se rul e,
however, al though subsequent summary treatment of a host of seg-
regati on measures may have i mpl i ci tl y done so, unti l i n stri ki ng
down state l aws prohi bi ti ng i nterraci al marri age or cohabi tati on
the Court decl ared that raci al cl assi fi cati ons bear a far heavi er
burden of justi fi cati on than other cl assi fi cati ons and were i nval i d
1810
131
McLaughl i n v. Fl ori da, 379 U.S. 184, 192, 194 (1964).
132
Lovi ng v. Vi rgi ni a, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). I n Lee v. Washi ngton, 390 U.S.
333 (1968), i t was i ndi cated that preservati on of di sci pl i ne and order i n a jai l mi ght
justi fy raci al segregati on there i f shown to be necessary.
133
Personnel Admi ni strator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979), quoted in
Washi ngton v. Seattl e School Di st., 458 U.S. 457, 485 (1982).
134
Regents of the Uni v. of Cal i forni a v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 28720 (1978)
(Justi ce Powel l announci ng judgment of Court) (suspect), and i d. at 35579 (Justi ces
Brennan, Whi te, Marshal l , and Bl ackmun concurri ng i n part and di ssenti ng i n part)
(i ntermedi ate scruti ny); Ful l i l ove v. Kl utzni ck, 448 U.S. 448, 49192 (1980) (Chi ef
Justi ce Burger announci ng judgment of Court) (a most searchi ng exami nati on but
not choosi ng a parti cul ar anal ysi s), and i d. at 495 (Justi ce Powel l concurri ng), 523
(Justi ce Stewart di ssenti ng) (suspect), 548 (Justi ce Stevens di ssenti ng) (searchi ng
scruti ny).
135
Hunter v. Eri ckson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Washi ngton v. Seattl e School Di st.,
458 U.S. 457 (1982).
136
Graham v. Ri chardson, 403 U.S. 365, 37172 (1971).
137
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); for the hi nt, see Ei senstadt v. Bai rd, 405
U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972).
138
See Levy v. Loui si ana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (stri ct revi ew); Labi ne v. Vi ncent,
401 U.S. 532 (1971) (l eni ent revi ew); Weber v. Aetna Casual ty & Surety Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972) (modi fi ed stri ct revi ew).
139
Cf. McDonal d v. Board of El ecti on Commrs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969); Bul -
l ock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). See Shapi ro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658
59 (1969) (Justi ce Harl an di ssenti ng). But cf. Li ndsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972);
Dandri dge v. Wi l l i ams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
because no overri di ng statutory purpose
131
was shown and they
were not necessary to some l egi ti mate overri di ng purpose.
132
A
raci al cl assi fi cati on, regardl ess of purported moti vati on, i s pre-
sumpti vel y i nval i d and can be uphel d onl y upon an extraordi nary
justi fi cati on.
133
Remedi al raci al cl assi fi cati ons, that i s, the devel -
opment of affi rmati ve acti on or si mi l ar programs that cl assi fy on
the basi s of race for the purpose of amel i orati ng condi ti ons resul t-
i ng from past di scri mi nati on, are subject to more than tradi ti onal
revi ew scruti ny, but whether the hi ghest or some i ntermedi ate
standard i s the appl i cabl e test i s uncertai n.
134
A measure whi ch
does not draw a di sti ncti on expl i ci tl y on race but whi ch does draw
a l i ne between those who seek to use the l aw to do away wi th or
modi fy raci al di scri mi nati on and those who oppose such efforts
does i n fact create an expl i ci t raci al cl assi fi cati on and i s consti tu-
ti onal l y suspect.
135
Toward the end of the Warren Court, there emerged a trend
to treat cl assi fi cati ons on the basi s of nati onal i ty or al i enage as
suspect,
136
to accord sex cl assi fi cati ons a somewhat hei ghtened tra-
di ti onal revi ew whi l e hi nti ng that a hi gher standard mi ght be ap-
propri ate i f such cl assi fi cati ons passed l eni ent revi ew,
137
and to
pass on statutory and admi ni strati ve treatments of i l l egi ti mates i n-
consi stentl y.
138
Language i n a number of opi ni ons appeared to sug-
gest that poverty was a suspect condi ti on, so that treati ng the poor
adversel y mi ght cal l for hei ghtened equal protecti on revi ew.
139
1811
140
San Antoni o I ndep. School Di st. v. Rodri guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
141
I d. at 4445. The Court asserted that onl y when there i s an absol ute depri -
vati on of some ri ght or i nterest because of i nabi l i ty to pay wi l l there be stri ct scru-
ti ny. I d. at 20.
142
E.g., Uni ted States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977); Harri s v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
143
Crai g v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Justi ce Powel l noted that he agreed
the precedents made cl ear that gender cl assi fi cati ons are subjected to more cri ti cal
exami nati on than when fundamental ri ghts and suspect cl asses are absent, i d.
at 210 (concurri ng), and added: As i s evi dent from our opi ni ons, the Court has had
di ffi cul ty i n agreei ng upon a standard of equal protecti on anal ysi s that can be ap-
pl i ed consi stentl y to the wi de vari ety of l egi sl ati ve cl assi fi cati ons. There are val i d
reasons for di ssati sfacti on wi th the two-ti er approach that has been promi nent i n
the Courts deci si ons i n the past decade. Al though vi ewed by many as a resul t-ori -
ented substi tute for more cri ti cal anal ysi s, that approach wi th i ts narrowl y l i mi ted
upper ti er now has substanti al precedenti al support. As has been true of Reed and
i ts progeny, our deci si on today wi l l be vi ewed by some as a mi ddl e-ti er approach.
Whi l e I woul d not endorse that characteri zati on and woul d not wel come a further
subdi vi di ng of equal protecti on anal ysi s, candor compel s the recogni ti on that the rel -
ati vel y deferenti al rati onal basi s standard of revi ew normal l y appl i ed takes on a
sharper focus when we address a gender-based cl assi fi cati on. So much i s cl ear from
our recent cases. I d. at 210, n.*. Justi ce Stevens wrote that i n hi s vi ew the two-
ti ered anal ysi s does not descri be a method of deci di ng cases but rather i s a method
the Court has empl oyed to expl ai n deci si ons that actual l y appl y a si ngl e standard
i n a reasonabl y consi stent fashi on. I d. at 211, 212. Chi ef Justi ce Burger and Justi ce
Rehnqui st woul d empl oy the rati onal basi s test for gender cl assi fi cati on. I d. at 215,
217 (di ssenti ng). Occasi onal l y, because of the parti cul ar subject matter, the Court
has appeared to appl y a rati onal basi s standard i n fact i f not i n doctri ne, E.g.,
Rostker v. Gol dberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (mi l i tary); Mi chael M. v. Superi or Court,
450 U.S. 464 (1981) (appl i cati on of statutory rape prohi bi ti on to boys but not to
gi rl s). Four Justi ces i n Fronti ero v. Ri chardson, 411 U.S. 677, 68487 (1973), were
prepared to fi nd sex a suspect cl assi fi cati on, and i n Mi ssi ssi ppi Uni v. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n. 9 (1982), the Court appeared to l eave open the possi -
bi l i ty that at l east some sex cl assi fi cati ons may be deemed suspect.
However, i n a major eval uati on of equal protecti on anal ysi s
earl y i n thi s peri od, Justi ce Powel l for the Court uti l i zed sol el y the
two-ti er approach, determi ni ng that because the i nterests i nvol ved
di d not occasi on stri ct scruti ny the Court woul d thus deci de the
case on mi ni mum rati onal i ty standards.
140
Deci si vel y rejected was
the contenti on that a de facto weal th cl assi fi cati on, wi th an adverse
i mpact on the poor, was ei ther a suspect cl assi fi cati on or meri ted
some scruti ny other than the tradi ti onal basi s,
141
a hol di ng that
has several ti mes been strongl y reaffi rmed by the Court.
142
But
the Courts rejecti on of some form of i ntermedi ate scruti ny di d not
l ong survi ve.
Wi thout extended consi derati on of the i ssue of standards, the
Court more recentl y adopted an i ntermedi ate l evel of scruti ny, per-
haps one encompassi ng several degrees of i ntermedi ate scruti ny.
Thus, gender cl assi fi cati ons must, i n order to wi thstand consti tu-
ti onal chal l enge, serve i mportant governmental objecti ves and
must be substanti al l y rel ated to achi evement of those objec-
ti ves.
143
And cl assi fi cati ons that di sadvantage i l l egi ti mates are
1812
144
Mi l l s v. Habl uetzel , 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347
(1979); Lal l i v. Lal l i , 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Tri mbl e v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
I n Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976), i t was sai d that di scri mi nati on
agai nst i l l egi ti mates has never approached the severi ty or pervasi veness of the hi s-
tori c l egal and pol i ti cal di scri mi nati on agai nst women and Negroes. Lucas sus-
tai ned a statutory scheme vi rtual l y i denti cal to the one struck down i n Cal i fano v.
Gol dfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), except that the l atter i nvol ved sex whi l e the former
i nvol ved i l l egi ti macy.
145
Appl yi ng stri ct scruti ny, see, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougal l , 413 U.S. 634 (1973);
Nyqui st v. Maucl et, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). Appl yi ng l eni ent scruti ny i n cases i nvol vi ng
restri cti ons on al i en entry i nto the pol i ti cal communi ty, see Fol ey v. Connel i e, 435
U.S. 291 (1978); Ambach v. Norwi ck, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Cabel l v. Chavez-Sal i do,
454 U.S. 432 (1982). See also Pl yl er v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
146
Massachusetts Bd. of Reti rement v. Murgi a, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (uphol di ng
mandatory reti rement at age 50 for state pol i ce); Vance v. Bradl ey, 440 U.S. 93
(1979) (mandatory reti rement at age 60 for forei gn servi ce offi cers); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991) (mandatory reti rement at age 70 for state judges).
See also Ci ty of Cl eburne v. Cl eburne Li vi ng Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (hol d-
i ng that a l ower court erred i n hol di ng mental retardati on a quasi -suspect cl assi -
fi cati on cal l i ng for a more exacti ng standard of judi ci al revi ew than i s normal l y ac-
corded economi c and soci al l egi sl ati on).
147
Ci ty of Cl eburne v. Cl eburne Li vi ng Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); See di scus-
si on supra pp. 180509.
148
Kramer v. Uni on Free School Di st., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapi ro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
subject to a si mi l ar though l ess exacti ng scruti ny of purpose and
fi t.
144
Thi s peri od al so saw a wi thdrawal of the Court from the
pri nci pl e that al i enage i s al ways a suspect cl assi fi cati on, so that
some di scri mi nati ons agai nst al i ens based on the nature of the po-
l i ti cal order, rather than economi cs or soci al i nterests, need pass
onl y the l eni ent revi ew standard.
145
Expansi on of the characteri sti cs whi ch when used as a basi s
for cl assi fi cati on must be justi fi ed by a hi gher showi ng than ordi -
nary economi c cl assi fi cati ons has so far been resi sted, the Court
hol di ng, for exampl e, that age cl assi fi cati ons are nei ther suspect
nor enti tl ed to i ntermedi ate scruti ny.
146
Whi l e resi sti ng creati on of
new suspect or quasi -suspect cl assi fi cati ons, however, the Court
may nonethel ess appl y the Royster Guano rather than the Lindsley
standard of rati onal i ty.
147
The other phase of acti ve revi ew of cl assi fi cati ons hol ds that
when certai n fundamental l i berti es and i nterests are i nvol ved, gov-
ernment cl assi fi cati ons whi ch adversel y affect them must be justi -
fi ed by a showi ng of a compel l i ng i nterest necessi tati ng the cl assi -
fi cati on and by a showi ng that the di sti ncti ons are requi red to fur-
ther the governmental purpose. The effect of appl yi ng the test, as
i n the other branch of acti ve revi ew, i s to deny to l egi sl ati ve judg-
ments the deference usual l y accorded them and to di spense wi th
the general presumpti on of consti tuti onal i ty usual l y gi ven state
cl assi fi cati ons.
148
1813
149
I d. at 660 (Justi ce Harl an di ssenti ng).
150
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
151
Reynol ds v. Si ms, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
152
Carri ngton v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Harper v. Vi rgi ni a Bd. of El ecti ons,
383 U.S. 663 (1966); Wi l l i ams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
153
394 U.S. 618, 627, 634, 638 (1969).
154
Kramer v. Uni on Free School Di st., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Ci pri ano v. Ci ty of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Ci ty of Phoeni x v. Kol odzi ejski , 399 U.S. 204 (1970);
Dunn v. Bl umstei n, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
155
Thi s i ndefi ni teness has been a recurri ng theme i n di ssents. E.g., Shapi ro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969) (Justi ce Harl an); Weber v. Aetna Casual ty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 177 (1972) (Justi ce Rehnqui st).
156
E.g., Dunn v. Bl umstei n, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
157
E.g., Shapi ro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
158
E.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
159
Ski nner v. Okl ahoma ex rel . Wi l l i amson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
160
San Antoni o I ndep. School Di st. v. Rodri guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
I t i s thought
149
that the fundamental ri ght theory had i ts
ori gi ns i n Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
150
i n whi ch the
Court subjected to stri ct scruti ny a state statute provi di ng for
compul sory steri l i zati on of habi tual cri mi nal s, such scruti ny bei ng
thought necessary because the l aw affected one of the basi c ci vi l
ri ghts. I n the apporti onment deci si ons, Chi ef Justi ce Warren ob-
served that si nce the ri ght to exerci se the franchi se i n a free and
uni mpai red manner i s preservati ve of other basi c ci vi l and pol i ti cal
ri ghts, any al l eged i nfri ngement of the ri ght of ci ti zens to vote
must be careful l y and meti cul ousl y scruti ni zed.
151
A sti ffeni ng of
the tradi ti onal test coul d be noted i n the opi ni on of the Court stri k-
i ng down certai n restri cti ons on voti ng el i gi bi l i ty
152
and the phrase
compel l i ng state i nterest was used several ti mes i n Justi ce Bren-
nans opi ni on i n Shapiro v. Thompson.
153
Thereafter, the phrase
was used i n several voti ng cases i n whi ch restri cti ons were voi ded,
and the doctri ne was asserted i n other cases.
154
Whi l e no opi ni on of the Court attempted to del i neate the proc-
ess by whi ch certai n fundamental ri ghts were di fferenti ated from
others,
155
i t was evi dent from the cases that the ri ght to vote,
156
the ri ght of i nterstate travel ,
157
the ri ght to be free of weal th di s-
ti ncti ons i n the cri mi nal process,
158
and the ri ght of procreati on
159
were at l east some of those i nterests that tri ggered acti ve revi ew
when de jure or de facto offi ci al di sti ncti ons were made wi th re-
spect to them. Thi s branch of acti ve revi ew the Court al so sought
to rati onal i ze and restri ct i n Rodriguez,
160
whi ch i nvol ved both a
cl ai m of de facto weal th cl assi fi cati ons bei ng suspect and a cl ai m
that educati on was a fundamental i nterest so that affordi ng l ess of
i t to peopl e because they were poor acti vated the compel l i ng state
i nterest standard. The Court readi l y agreed that educati on was an
i mportant val ue i n our soci ety. But the i mportance of a servi ce
performed by the State does not determi ne whether i t must be re-
1814
161
I d. at 30, 3334. But see i d. at 62 (Justi ce Brennan di ssenti ng), 70, 11017
(Justi ces Marshal l and Dougl as di ssenti ng).
162
Zobel v. Wi l l i ams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 & n.6 (1982), and i d. at 6668 (Justi ce
Brennan concurri ng), 7880 (Justi ce OConnor concurri ng) (travel ).
163
Zabl ocki v. Redhai l , 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
164
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harri s v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
165
E.g., Ji mi nez v. Wei nberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (i l l egi ti macy); Nyqui st v.
Maucl et, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (al i enage); Cal i fano v. Gol dfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977)
(sex).
166
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
garded as fundamental for purposes of exami nati on under the
Equal Protecti on Cl ause. . . . [T]he answer l i es i n assessi ng wheth-
er there i s a ri ght to educati on expl i ci tl y or i mpl i ci tl y guaranteed
by the Consti tuti on.
161
A ri ght to educati on i s not expressl y pro-
tected by the Consti tuti on, conti nued the Court, and i t was unwi l l -
i ng to fi nd an i mpl i ed ri ght because of i ts undoubted i mportance.
But just as Rodriguez was unabl e to prevent the Courts adop-
ti on of a three-ti er or sl i di ng-ti er standard of revi ew i n the fi rst
phase of the acti ve-revi ew doctri ne, so i t di d not by stressi ng the
requi rement that an i nterest be expressl y or i mpl i edl y protected by
the Consti tuti on prevent the addi ti on of other i nterests to the l i st
of fundamental i nterests. The di ffi cul ty was that the Court deci -
si ons on the ri ght to vote, the ri ght to travel , the ri ght to procreate,
as wel l as others, premi se the consti tuti onal vi ol ati on to be of the
equal protecti on cl ause, whi ch does not i tsel f guarantee the ri ght
but prevents the di fferenti al governmental treatment of those at-
tempti ng to exerci se the ri ght.
162
Thus, state l i mi tati on on the
entry i nto marri age was soon denomi nated an i ncursi on on a fun-
damental ri ght whi ch requi red a compel l i ng justi fi cati on.
163
Whi l e
deni al s of publ i c fundi ng of aborti ons were hel d to i mpl i cate no fun-
damental i nterest aborti on bei ng a fundamental i nterest and no
suspect cl assi fi cati on because onl y poor women needed publ i c
fundi ng
164
other deni al s of publ i c assi stance because of i l l egi t-
i macy, al i enage, or sex have been deemed governed by the same
standard of revi ew as affi rmati ve harms i mposed on those
grounds.
165
And i n Plyler v. Doe,
166
the compl ete deni al of edu-
cati on to the chi l dren of i l l egal al i ens was found subject to i nter-
medi ate scruti ny and i nval i dated.
Thus, the nature of acti ve revi ew i n equal protecti on juri spru-
dence remai ns i n fl ux, subject to shi fti ng majori ti es and varyi ng de-
grees of concern about judi ci al acti vi sm and judi ci al restrai nt. But
the cases, more ful l y revi ewed hereafter, cl earl y i ndi cate that a
sl i di ng scal e of revi ew i s a fact of the Courts cases, however much
i ts doctri nal expl anati on l ags behi nd.
1815
167
See e.g., Yi ck Wo v. Hopki ns, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Gui nn v. Uni ted States,
238 U.S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wi l son, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Gomi l l i on v. Li ghtfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960). Government may make a raci al cl assi fi cati on that, for exampl e,
does not separate whi tes from bl acks but that by focussi ng on an i ssue of raci al i m-
port creates a cl assi fi cati on that i s suspect. Washi ngton v. Seattl e School Di st., 458
U.S. 457, 46774 (1982).
168
Washi ngton v. Davi s, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). A cl assi fi cati on havi ng a di f-
ferenti al i mpact, absent a showi ng of di scri mi natory purpose, i s subject to revi ew
under the l eni ent, rati onal i ty standard. I d. at 24748; Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S.
613, 617 n.5 (1982). The Court has appl i ed the same standard to a cl ai m of sel ecti ve
prosecuti on al l egedl y penal i zi ng exerci se of Fi rst Amendment ri ghts. Wayte v. Uni t-
ed States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (no di scri mi natory purpose shown). And see
Bazemore v. Fri day, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (exi stence of si ngl e-race, state-sponsored
4-H Cl ubs i s permi ssi bl e, gi ven whol l y vol untary nature of membershi p).
169
The pri nci pal case was Pal mer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), i n whi ch
a 5-to4 majori ty refused to order a ci ty to reopen i ts swi mmi ng pool s cl osed al l eg-
edl y to avoi d compl yi ng wi th a court order to desegregate them. The majori ty opi n-
i on strongl y warned agai nst voi di ng governmental acti on upon an assessment of offi -
ci al moti ve, i d. at 22426, but i t al so, and the Davis Court so read i t as actual l y
deci di ng, drew the concl usi on that si nce the pool s were cl osed for both whi tes and
bl acks there was no di scri mi nati on. The ci tys avowed reason for cl osi ng the pool s
to avoi d vi ol ence and economi c l oss coul d not be i mpeached by al l egati ons of a ra-
ci al moti ve. See also Wri ght v. Counci l of Ci ty of Empori a, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
Testing Facially Neutral Classifications Which Impact on
Minorities
A cl assi fi cati on expressl y upon the basi s of race tri ggers stri ct
scruti ny and ordi nari l y resul ts i n i ts i nval i dati on; si mi l arl y, a cl as-
si fi cati on that faci al l y makes a di sti ncti on on the basi s of sex, or
al i enage, or i l l egi ti macy tri ggers the l evel of scruti ny appropri ate
to i t. A cl assi fi cati on that i s ostensi bl y neutral but i s an obvi ous
pretext for raci al di scri mi nati on or for di scri mi nati on on some
other forbi dden basi s i s subject to hei ghtened scruti ny and ordi -
nari l y i nval i dati on.
167
But when i t i s contended that a l aw, whi ch
i s i n effect neutral , has a di sproporti onatel y adverse effect upon a
raci al mi nori ty or upon another group parti cul arl y enti tl ed to the
protecti on of the equal protecti on cl ause, a much more di ffi cul t case
i s presented.
I t i s necessary that one cl ai mi ng harm through the di sparate
or di sproporti onate i mpact of a faci al l y neutral l aw prove i ntent or
moti ve to di scri mi nate. [A] l aw, neutral on i ts face and servi ng
ends otherwi se wi thi n the power of government to pursue, i s not
i nval i d under the Equal Protecti on Cl ause si mpl y because i t may
affect a greater proporti on of one race than of another.
168
I n rel i -
ance upon a pri or Supreme Court deci si on that had seemed to es-
chew moti ve or i ntent and to pi npoi nt effect as the key to a con-
sti tuti onal vi ol ati on
169
and upon the Courts deci si ons readi ng con-
gressi onal ci vi l ri ghts enactments as provi di ng that when empl oy-
ment practi ces di squal i fyi ng di sproporti onate numbers of bl acks
are chal l enged, di scri mi natory purpose need not be proved, and
1816
170
Gri ggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Al bemarl e Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The Davis Court adhered to thi s readi ng of Ti tl e VI I ,
merel y refusi ng to i mport the statutory standard i nto the consti tuti onal standard.
Washi ngton v. Davi s, 426 U.S. 229, 23839, 24648 (1976). Subsequent cases i nvol v-
i ng gender di scri mi nati on rai sed the questi on of the vi tal i ty of Griggs, General El ec-
tri c Co. v. Gi l bert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Nashvi l l e Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136
(1977), but the di sagreement among the Justi ces appears to be whether Griggs ap-
pl i es to each secti on of the anti di scri mi nati on provi si on of Ti tl e VI I . See Dothard
v. Rawl i nson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Furnco Const. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
But see General Bui l di ng Contractors Assn v. Pennsyl vani a, 458 U.S. 375 (1982)
(unl i ke Ti tl e VI I , under 42 U.S.C. 1981, deri ved from the Ci vi l Ri ghts Act of 1866,
proof of di scri mi natory i ntent i s requi red).
171
See Washi ngton v. Davi s, 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.12 (1976) (l i sti ng and di s-
approvi ng cases). Cases not ci ted by the Court i ncl uded the Fi fth Ci rcui ts wrestl i ng
wi th the de facto/de jure segregati on di sti ncti on. I n Ci sneros v. Corpus Chri sti
I ndep. School Di st., 467 F.2d 142, 14850 (5th Ci r. 1972) (en banc), cert. deni ed, 413
U.S. 920 (1973), the court hel d that moti ve and purpose were i rrel evant and the de
facto and de jure nomencl ature to be meani ngl ess. After the di sti ncti on was rei t-
erated i n Keyes v. Denver School Di stri ct, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), the Fi fth Ci rcui t
adopted the posi ti on that a deci si onmaker must be presumed to have i ntended the
probabl e, natural , or foreseeabl e consequences of hi s deci si on and thus that a school
board deci si on, whatever i ts faci al moti vati on, that resul ts i n segregati on i s i nten-
ti onal i n the consti tuti onal sense. Uni ted States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d
380 (5th Ci r.), vacated and remanded for reconsi derati on i n l i ght of Washi ngton v.
Davi s, 429 U.S. 990 (1976), modi fi ed and adhered to, 564 F.2d 162, reh. deni ed, 579
F.2d 910 (5th Ci r. 197778), cert deni ed, 443 U.S. 915 (1979). See also Uni ted States
v. Texas Educ. Agency, 600 F.2d 518 (5th Ci r. 1979). Thi s form of anal ysi s was,
however, substanti al l y cabi ned i n Massachusetts Personnel Admr v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 27880 (1979), al though foreseeabi l i ty as one ki nd of proof was acknowl -
edged by Col umbus Bd. of Educ. v. Peni ck, 443 U.S. 449, 46465 (1979).
172
Washi ngton v. Davi s, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
that i t i s an i nsuffi ci ent response to demonstrate some rati onal
basi s for the chal l enged practi ces,
170
a number of l ower federal
courts had devel oped i n consti tuti onal l i ti gati on a di sproporti onate
i mpact anal ysi s under whi ch a vi ol ati on coul d be establ i shed upon
a showi ng that a statute or practi ce adversel y affected a cl ass wi th-
out regard to di scri mi natory purpose, absent some justi fi cati on
goi ng substanti al l y beyond what woul d be necessary to val i date
most other cl assi fi cati ons.
171
These cases were di sapproved i n
Davis; but the Court di d note that an i nvi di ous di scri mi natory
purpose may often be i nferred from the total i ty of the rel evant
facts, i ncl udi ng the fact, i f i t be true, that the l aw bears more heav-
i l y on one race than another. I t i s al so not i nfrequentl y true that
the di scri mi natory i mpact . . . may for al l practi cal purposes dem-
onstrate unconsti tuti onal i ty because i n vari ous ci rcumstances the
di scri mi nati on i s very di ffi cul t to expl ai n on nonraci al grounds.
172
Both el uci dati on and not a l i ttl e confusi on fol l owed upon appl i -
cati on of Davis i n the fol l owi ng Terms. Looki ng to a chal l enged
zoni ng deci si on of a l ocal board whi ch had a harsher i mpact upon
bl acks and l ow-i ncome persons than on others, the Court expl ai ned
1817
173
Vi l l age of Arl i ngton Hei ghts v. Metropol i tan Housi ng Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977).
174
I d. at 26566, 270 n.21. See also Mt. Heal thy Ci ty Bd. of Educ. v. Doyl e, 429
U.S. 274, 28487 (1977) (once pl ai nti ff shows defendant acted from i mpermi ssi bl e
moti ve i n not rehi ri ng hi m, burden shi fts to defendant to show resul t woul d have
been same i n the absence of that moti ve; consti tuti onal vi ol ati on not establ i shed
merel y by showi ng of wrongful moti ve); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985)
(ci rcumstances of enactment made i t cl ear that state consti tuti onal amendment re-
qui ri ng di senfranchi sement for cri mes i nvol vi ng moral turpi tude had been adopted
for purpose of raci al di scri mi nati on, even though i t was real i zed that some poor
whi tes woul d al so be di senfranchi sed thereby).
175
Arlington Heights, supra, at 266.
176
I d. at 26768.
i n some detai l how i nqui ry i nto moti vati on woul d work.
173
Fi rst,
a pl ai nti ff i s not requi red to prove that an acti on rested sol el y on
di scri mi natory purpose; establ i shi ng a di scri mi natory purpose
among permi ssi bl e purposes shi fts the burden to the defendant to
show that the same deci si on woul d have resul ted absent the i mper-
mi ssi bl e moti ve.
174
Second, determi ni ng whether a di scri mi natory
purpose was a moti vati ng factor demands a sensi ti ve i nqui ry i nto
such ci rcumstanti al and di rect evi dence of i ntent as may be avai l -
abl e. I mpact provi des a starti ng poi nt and [s]ometi mes a cl ear
pattern, unexpl ai nabl e on grounds other than race, emerges from
the effect of the state acti on even when the governi ng l egi sl ati on
appears neutral on i ts face, but thi s i s a rare case.
175
I n the ab-
sence of such a stark pattern, a court wi l l l ook to such factors as
the hi stori cal background of the deci si on, especi al l y i f there i s a
seri es of offi ci al di scri mi natory acti ons. The speci fi c sequence of
events may shed l i ght on purpose, as woul d departures from nor-
mal procedural sequences or from substanti ve consi derati ons usu-
al l y rel i ed on i n the past to gui de offi ci al acti ons. Contemporary
statements of deci si onmakers may be exami ned, and [i ]n some ex-
traordi nary i nstances the members mi ght be cal l ed to the stand at
tri al to testi fy concerni ng the purpose of the offi ci al acti on, al -
though even then such testi mony frequentl y wi l l be barred by pri vi -
l ege.
176
I n most ci rcumstances, a court i s to l ook to the total i ty
of the ci rcumstances to ascertai n i ntent.
Strengtheni ng of the i ntent standard was evi denced i n a deci -
si on sustai ni ng agai nst sex di scri mi nati on chal l enge a state l aw
gi vi ng an absol ute preference i n ci vi l servi ce hi ri ng to veterans.
Veterans who obtai n at l east a passi ng grade on the rel evant exam-
i nati on may exerci se the preference at any ti me and as many ti mes
as they wi sh and are ranked ahead of al l nonveterans, no matter
what thei r score. The l ower court observed that the statutory and
admi ni strati ve excl usi on of women from the armed forces unti l the
recent past meant that vi rtual l y al l women were excl uded from
state ci vi l servi ce posi ti ons and hel d that resul ts so cl earl y foreseen
1818
177
Massachusetts Personnel Admr v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). Thi s
case cl earl y establ i shed the appl i cati on of Davis and Arlington Heights to al l
nonraci al cl assi fi cati ons attacked under the equal protecti on cl ause. But compare
Col umbus Bd. of Educ. v. Peni ck, 443 U.S. 449 (1979), and Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Bri nkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979), i n the context of the quotati on i n the text. These
cases found the Davis standard sati sfi ed on a showi ng of past di scri mi nati on cou-
pl ed wi th foreseeabl e i mpact i n the school segregati on area.
178
446 U.S. 55 (1980). Al so deci ded by the pl ural i ty was that di scri mi natory
purpose i s a requi si te showi ng to establ i sh a vi ol ati on of the Fi fteenth Amendment
and of the equal protecti on cl ause i n the fundamental i nterest context, vote di l u-
ti on, rather than just i n the suspect cl assi fi cati on context.
179
Whi te v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1972), was the pri or case. See also
Whi tcomb v. Chavi s, 403 U.S. 124 (1971). Justi ce Whi te, the author of Register, di s-
sented i n Mobile, supra, 446 U.S. 94, on the basi s that the total i ty of the facts re-
l i ed upon by the Di stri ct Court to support i ts i nference of purposeful di scri mi nati on
i s even more compel l i ng than that present i n White v. Register. Justi ce Bl ackmun,
i d. at 80, and Justi ces Brennan and Marshal l , agreed wi th hi m as al ternate hol d-
i ngs, i d. at 94, 103.
180
I d. at 6574.
coul d not be sai d to be uni ntended. Reversi ng, the Supreme Court
found that the veterans preference l aw was not overtl y or covertl y
gender based; too many men are nonveterans to permi t such a con-
cl usi on and there are women veterans. That the preference i mpl i c-
i tl y i ncorporated past offi ci al di scri mi nati on agai nst women was
hel d not to detract from the fact that rewardi ng veterans for thei r
servi ce to thei r country was a l egi ti mate publ i c purpose. Acknowl -
edgi ng that the consequences of the preference were foreseeabl e,
the Court pronounced thi s fact i nsuffi ci ent to make the requi si te
showi ng of i ntent. Di scri mi natory purpose . . . i mpl i es more than
i ntent as vol i ti on or i ntent as awareness of consequences. . . . I t
i mpl i es that the deci si onmaker . . . sel ected or reaffi rmed a par-
ti cul ar course of acti on at l east i n part because of, not merel y i n
spi te of, i ts adverse effects upon an i denti fi abl e group.
177
Moreover, i n City of Mobile v. Bolden
178
a pl ural i ty of the
Court apparentl y attempted to do away wi th the total i ty of ci r-
cumstances test and to eval uate standi ng on i ts own each of the
factors offered to show a di scri mi natory i ntent. At i ssue was the
consti tuti onal i ty of the use of mul ti -member el ectoral di stri cts to
sel ect the ci ty commi ssi on. A pri or deci si on had i nval i dated a
mul ti -member di stri cti ng system as di scri mi natory agai nst bl acks
and Hi spani cs, wi thout consi deri ng whether i ts rul i ng was pre-
mi sed on di scri mi natory purpose or adverse i mpact but l i sti ng and
wei ghi ng a seri es of factors the total i ty of whi ch caused the Court
to fi nd i nvi di ous di scri mi nati on.
179
But i n the pl ural i ty opi ni on i n
Mobile, each of the factors, vi ewed al one, was deemed i nsuffi ci ent
to show purposeful di scri mi nati on.
180
Moreover, the pl ural i ty sug-
gested that some of the factors thought to be deri ved from i ts
precedents and formi ng part of the total i ty test i n opi ni ons of the
1819
181
I d. at 7374. The pri nci pal formul ati on of the test was i n Zi mmer v.
McKei then, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Ci r. 1973), affd on other grounds sub nom.
East Carrol l Pari sh School Bd. v. Marshal l , 424 U.S. 636 (1976), and i ts components
are thus frequentl y referred to as the Zimmer factors.
182
By the Voti ng Ri ghts Act Amendments of 1982, P.L. 97205, 96 Stat. 131,
42 U.S.C. 1973 (as amended), see S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Congress, 2d sess. 2728
(1982), Congress proscri bed a vari ety of el ectoral practi ces whi ch resul ts i n a de-
ni al or abri dgment of the ri ght to vote, and spel l ed out i n essence the Zimmer fac-
tors as el ements of a total i ty of the ci rcumstances test.
183
458 U.S. 613 (1982). The deci si on, handed down wi thi n days of fi nal congres-
si onal passage of the Voti ng Ri ghts Act Amendments, was wri tten by Justi ce Whi te
and joi ned by Chi ef Justi ce Burger and Justi ces Brennan, Marshal l , Bl ackmun, and
OConnor. Justi ces Powel l and Rehnqui st di ssented, i d. at 628, as di d Justi ce Ste-
vens. I d. at 631.
184
I d. at 61822 (descri bi ng and di sagreei ng wi th the Mobile pl ural i ty, whi ch
had used the phrase at 446 U.S. 74). The Lodge Court approved the pri or reference
that moti ve anal ysi s requi red an anal ysi s of such ci rcumstanti al and di rect evi -
dence as was avai l abl e. I d., 618 (quoti ng Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266).
185
The Court confi rmed the Mobi l e anal ysi s that the fundamental i nterest
si de of hei ghtened equal protecti on anal ysi s requi res a showi ng of i ntent when the
cri teri a of cl assi fi cati on are neutral and di d not reach the Fi fteenth Amendment
i ssue i n thi s case. I d. at 619 n. 6.
186
I d. at 618 (quoti ng Washi ngton v. Davi s, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).
187
I d. at 62324.
l ower federal courts such as mi nori ty access to the candi date se-
l ecti on process, governmental responsi veness to mi nori ty i nterests,
and the hi story of past di scri mi nati on were of qui te l i mi ted si g-
ni fi cance i n determi ni ng di scri mi natory i ntent.
181
But, contem-
poraneousl y wi th Congress statutory rejecti on of the Mobile pl ural -
i ty standards,
182
the Court, i n Rogers v. Lodge,
183
appeared to di s-
avow much of Mobile and to permi t the federal courts to fi nd di s-
cri mi natory purpose on the basi s of ci rcumstanti al evi dence
184
that i s more remi ni scent of pre- Washington v. Davis cases than of
the more recent deci si ons.
Rogers v. Lodge was al so a mul ti member el ectoral di stri ct case
brought under the equal protecti on cl ause
185
and the Fi fteenth
Amendment. The fact that the system operated to cancel out or di -
l ute bl ack voti ng strength, standi ng al one, was i nsuffi ci ent to con-
demn i t; di scri mi natory i ntent i n creati ng or mai ntai ni ng the sys-
tem was necessary. But di rect proof of such i ntent i s not requi red.
[A]n i nvi di ous purpose may often be i nferred from the total i ty of
the rel evant facts, i ncl udi ng the fact, i f i t i s true, that the l aw
bears more heavi l y on one race than another.
186
Turni ng to the
l ower courts enunci ati on of standards, the Court approved the
Zimmer formul ati on. The fact that no bl ack had ever been el ected
i n the county, i n whi ch bl acks were a majori ty of the popul ati on
but a mi nori ty of regi stered voters, was i mportant evi dence of pur-
poseful excl usi on.
187
Standi ng al one thi s fact was not suffi ci ent,
but a hi stori cal showi ng of past di scri mi nati on, of systemi c excl u-
si on of bl acks from the pol i ti cal process as wel l as educati onal seg-
1820
188
I d. at 624627. The Court al so noted the exi stence of other factors showi ng
the tendency of the system to mi ni mi ze the voti ng strength of bl acks, i ncl udi ng the
l arge si ze of the juri sdi cti on and the mai ntenance of majori ty vote and si ngl e-seat
requi rements and the absence of resi dency requi rements.
189
Castaneda v. Parti da, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). The deci si on was 5-to4, Justi ce
Bl ackmun wri ti ng the opi ni on of the Court and Chi ef Justi ce Burger and Justi ces
Stewart, Powel l , and Rehnqui st di ssenti ng. I d. at 504507.
190
I d. at 49394. Thi s had been recogni zed i n Washi ngton v. Davi s, 426 U.S.
229, 241 (1976), and Vi l l age of Arl i ngton Hei ghts v. Metropol i tan Housi ng Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.13 (1977).
191
Castaneda v. Parti da, 430 U.S. 482, 494, 49799 (1977).
regati on and di scri mi nati on, combi ned wi th conti nued unrespon-
si veness of el ected offi ci al s to the needs of the bl ack communi ty, i n-
di cated the presence of di scri mi natory moti vati on. The Court al so
l ooked to the depressed soci o-economi c status of the bl ack popu-
l ati on as bei ng both a resul t of past di scri mi nati on and a barri er
to bl ack access to voti ng power.
188
As for the di stri ct courts appl i -
cati on of the test, the Court revi ewed i t under the deferenti al
cl earl y erroneous standard and affi rmed i t.
The Court i n a jury di scri mi nati on case has al so seemed to
al l ow what i t had sai d i n Davis and Arlington Heights i t woul d not
permi t.
189
Noti ng that di sproporti on al one i s i nsuffi ci ent to estab-
l i sh a vi ol ati on, the Court nonethel ess hel d that pl ai nti ffs showi ng
that 79 percent of the countys popul ati on was Spani sh-surnamed
whi l e jurors sel ected i n recent years ranged from 39 to 50 percent
Spani sh-surnamed was suffi ci ent to establ i sh a prima facie case of
di scri mi nati on. Several factors probabl y account for the di fference.
Fi rst, the Court has l ong recogni zed that di scri mi nati on i n jury se-
l ecti on can be i nferred from l ess of a di sproporti on than i s needed
to show other di scri mi nati ons, i n major part because i f jury sel ec-
ti on i s trul y random any substanti al di sproporti on reveal s the pres-
ence of an i mpermi ssi bl e factor, whereas most offi ci al deci si ons are
not random.
190
Second, the jury sel ecti on process was hi ghl y sub-
jecti ve and thus easi l y mani pul ated for di scri mi natory purposes,
unl i ke the process i n Davis and Arlington Heights whi ch was regu-
l ari zed and open to i nspecti on.
191
Thus, jury cases are l i kel y to
conti nue to be speci al cases and i n the usual fact si tuati on, at l east
where the process i s open, pl ai nti ffs wi l l bear a heavy and substan-
ti al burden i n showi ng di scri mi natory raci al and other ani mus.
1821
192
Davi dson v. Ci ty of New Orl eans, 96 U.S. 97, 106 (1878).
193
Phi l adel phi a Fi re Assn v. New York, 119 U.S. 110 (1886); Santa Cl ara
County v. Southern Paci fi c R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
194
Bel l s Gap R.R. v. Pennsyl vani a, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890) (emphasi s sup-
pl i ed).
195
I d. The State may, i f i t chooses, exempt certai n cl asses of property from any
taxati on at al l , such as churches, l i brari es, and the property of chari tabl e i nsti tu-
ti ons. I t may i mpose di fferent speci fi c taxes upon vari ous trades and professi ons,
and may vary the rates of exci se upon vari ous products; i t may tax real estate and
personal property i n a di fferent manner; i t may tax vi si bl e property onl y, and not
tax securi ti es for payment of money; i t may al l ow deducti ons for i ndebtedness, or
not al l ow them. Al l such regul ati ons, and those of l i ke character, so l ong as they
proceed wi thi n reasonabl e l i mi ts and general usage, are wi thi n the di screti on of the
state l egi sl ature, or the peopl e of the State i n frami ng thei r Consti tuti on. See
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973); Kahn v. Shevi n,
416 U.S. 351 (1974); and Ci ty of Pi ttsburgh v. Al co Parki ng Corp., 417 U.S. 369
(1974).
196
Loui svi l l e Gas Co. v. Col eman, 227 U.S. 32, 37 (1928). Cl assi fi cati ons for
purpose of taxati on have been hel d val i d i n the fol l owi ng si tuati ons:
Banks: a heavi er tax on banks whi ch make l oans mai nl y from money of deposi -
tors than on other fi nanci al i nsti tuti ons whi ch make l oans mai nl y from money sup-
pl i ed otherwi se than by deposi ts. Fi rst Natl Bank v. Tax Commn, 289 U.S. 60
(1933).
Bank deposi ts: a tax of 50 cents per $100 on deposi ts i n banks outsi de a State
i n contrast wi th a rate of 10 cents per $100 on deposi ts i n the State. Madden v.
Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
TRADITIONAL EQUAL PROTECTION:
ECONOMIC REGULATION AND RELATED
EXERCISES OF THE POLICE POWER
Taxation
At the outset, the Court di d not regard the equal protecti on
cl ause as havi ng any beari ng on taxati on.
192
I t soon, however, took
juri sdi cti on of cases assai l i ng speci fi c tax l aws under thi s provi -
si on,
193
and i n 1890 i t cauti ousl y conceded that cl ear and hosti l e
di scri mi nati ons agai nst parti cul ar persons and cl asses, especi al l y
such as are of an unusual character, unknown to the practi ce of
our government, mi ght be obnoxi ous to the consti tuti onal prohi bi -
ti on.
194
But i t observed that the equal protecti on cl ause was not
i ntended to compel the States to adopt an i ron rul e of equal tax-
ati on and propounded some concl usi ons val i d today.
195
I n succeed-
i ng years the cl ause has been i nvoked but spari ngl y to i nval i date
state l evi es. I n the fi el d of property taxati on, i nequal i ty has been
condemned onl y i n two cl asses of cases: (1) di scri mi nati on i n as-
sessments, and (2) di scri mi nati on agai nst forei gn corporati ons. I n
addi ti on, there are a handful of cases i nval i dati ng, because of i n-
equal i ty, state l aws i mposi ng i ncome, gross recei pts, sal es and l i -
cense taxes.
Cl assi fi cati on for Purpose of Taxati on. The power of the
State to cl assi fy for purposes of taxati on i s of wi de range and fl exi -
bi l i ty.
196
A State may adjust i ts taxi ng system i n such a way as
1822
Coal : a tax of 2 1/2 percent on anthraci te but not on bi tumi nous coal . Hei sl er
v. Thomas Col l i ery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922). Gasol i ne: a graduated severance tax
on oi l s sol d pri mari l y for thei r gasol i ne content, measured by resort to Baume grav-
i ty. Ohi o Oi l Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146 (1930); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S.
176 (1983) (prohi bi ti on on pass-through to consumers of oi l and gas severance tax).
Chai n stores: a pri vi l ege tax graduated accordi ng to the number of stores mai n-
tai ned, Tax Commrs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931); Fox v. Standard Oi l Co., 294
U.S. 87 (1935); a l i cense tax based on the number of stores both wi thi n and wi thout
the State, Great Atl anti c & Paci fi c Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937) (di sti n-
gui shi ng Loui s K. Li ggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933)).
El ectri ci ty: muni ci pal systems may be exempted, Puget Sound Co. v. Seattl e,
291 U.S. 619 (1934); that porti on of el ectri ci ty produced whi ch i s used for pumpi ng
water for i rri gati ng l ands may be exempted, Utah Power & Li ght Co. v. Pfost, 286
U.S. 165 (1932).
I nsurance compani es: l i cense tax measured by gross recei pts upon domesti c l i fe
i nsurance compani es from whi ch fraternal soci eti es havi ng l odge organi zati ons and
i nsuri ng l i ves of members onl y are exempt, and si mi l ar forei gn corporati ons are sub-
ject to a fi xed and comparati vel y sl i ght fee for the pri vi l ege of doi ng l ocal busi ness
of the same ki nd. Northwestern Li fe I ns. Co. v. Wi sconsi n, 247 U.S. 132 (1918).
Ol eomargari ne: cl assi fi ed separatel y from butter. Magnano Co. v. Hami l ton, 292
U.S. 40 (1934).
Peddl ers: cl assi fi ed separatel y from other vendors. Caskey Baki ng Co. v. Vi r-
gi ni a, 313 U.S. 117 (1941).
Publ i c uti l i ti es: a gross recei pts tax at a hi gher rate for rai l roads than for other
publ i c uti l i ti es, Ohi o Tax Cases, 232 U.S. 576 (1914); a gasol i ne storage tax whi ch
pl aces a heavi er burden upon rai l roads than upon common carri ers by bus, Nash-
vi l l e C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wal l ace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933); a tax on rai l roads measured
by gross earni ngs from l ocal operati ons, as appl i ed to a rai l road whi ch recei ved a
l arger net i ncome than others from the l ocal acti vi ty of renti ng, and borrowi ng cars,
I l l i noi s Cent. R.R. v. Mi nnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940); a gross recei pts tax appl i cabl e
onl y to publ i c uti l i ti es, i ncl udi ng carri ers, the proceeds of whi ch are used for rel i ev-
i ng the unempl oyed, New York Rapi d Transi t Corp. v. New York, 303 U.S. 573
(1938).
Wi ne: exempti on of wi ne from grapes grown i n the State whi l e i n the hands of
the producer, Cox v. Texas, 202 U.S. 446 (1906).
Laws i mposi ng mi scel l aneous l i cense fees have been uphel d as fol l ows:
Ci garette deal ers: taxi ng retai l ers and not whol esal ers. Cook v. Marshal l Coun-
ty, 196 U.S. 261 (1905).
Commi ssi on merchants: requi rements that deal ers i n farm products on commi s-
si on procure a l i cense, Payne v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 112 (1918).
El evators and warehouses: l i cense l i mi ted to certai n el evators and warehouses
on ri ght-of-way of rai l road, Cargi l l Co. v. Mi nnesota, 180 U.S. 452 (1901); a l i cense
tax appl i cabl e onl y to commerci al warehouses where no other commerci al
warehousi ng faci l i ti es i n townshi p subject to tax, I ndependent Warehouses v.
Scheel e, 331 U.S. 70 (1947).
Laundri es: exempti on from l i cense tax of steam l aundri es and women engaged
i n the l aundry busi ness where not more than two women are empl oyed. Quong
Wi ng v. Ki rkendal l , 223 U.S. 59 (1912).
Merchants: exempti on from l i cense tax measured by amount of purchases, of
manufacturers wi thi n the State sel l i ng thei r own product. Armour & Co. v. Vi rgi ni a,
246 U.S. 1 (1918).
Sugar refi neri es: exempti on from l i cense appl i cabl e to refi ners of sugar and mo-
l asses of pl anters and farmers gri ndi ng and refi ni ng thei r own sugar and mol asses.
Ameri can Sugar Refi ni ng Co. v. Loui si ana, 179 U.S. 89 (1900).
Theaters: l i cense graded accordi ng to pri ce of admi ssi on. Metropol i s Theatre Co.
v. Chi cago, 228 U.S. 61 (1913).
Whol esal ers of oi l : occupati on tax on whol esal ers i n oi l not appl i cabl e to whol e-
sal ers i n other products. Southwestern Oi l Co. v. Texas, 217 U.S. 114 (1910).
1823
197
Quong Wi ng v. Ki rkendal l , 223 U.S. 59, 62 (1912). See also Hammond Pack-
i ng Co. v. Montana, 233 U.S. 331 (1914); Al l i ed Stores of Ohi o v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522 (1959).
198
Puget Sound Co. v. Seattl e, 291 U.S. 619, 625 (1934). See Ci ty of Pi ttsburgh
v. Al co Parki ng Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974).
199
Col gate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 422 (1935).
200
Southern Ry. v. Greene Co., 216 U.S. 400, 417 (1910); Quaker Ci ty Cab Co.
v. Pennsyl vani a, 277 U.S. 389, 400 (1928).
201
Keeney v. New York, 222 U.S. 525, 536 (1912); Tax Commrs v. Jackson, 283
U.S. 527, 538 (1931).
202
Gi ozza v. Ti erman, 148 U.S. 657, 662 (1893).
203
Loui svi l l e Gas Co. v. Col eman, 227 U.S. 32, 37 (1928). See also Bel l s Gap
R.R. v. Pennsyl vani a, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890).
204
Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewi s, 294 U.S. 550 (1935). See also Val enti ne v.
Great Atl anti c & Paci fi c Tea Co., 299 U.S. 32 (1936).
205
Loui s K. Li ggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933).
206
Quaker Ci ty Cab Co. v. Pennsyl vani a, 277 U.S. 389 (1928). Thi s case was
formal l y overrul ed i n Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356
(1973).
207
Tax Commrs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537 (1931).
208
Col gate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 422 (1935).
209
Darnel l v. I ndi ana, 226 U.S. 390, 398 (1912); Farmers Bank v. Mi nnesota,
232 U.S. 516, 531 (1914).
to favor certai n i ndustri es or forms of i ndustry
197
and may tax di f-
ferent types of taxpayers di fferentl y, despi te the fact that they com-
pete.
198
I t does not fol l ow, however, that because some degree of
i nequal i ty from the nature of thi ngs must be permi tted, gross i n-
equal i ty must al so be al l owed.
199
Cl assi fi cati on may not be arbi -
trary. I t must be based on a real and substanti al di fference
200
and
the di fference need not be great or conspi cuous,
201
but there must
be no di scri mi nati on i n favor of one as agai nst another of the same
cl ass.
202
Al so, di scri mi nati ons of an unusual character are scruti -
ni zed wi th speci al care.
203
A gross sal es tax graduated at i ncreas-
i ng rates wi th the vol ume of sal es,
204
a heavi er l i cense tax on each
uni t i n a chai n of stores where the owner has stores l ocated i n
more than one county,
205
and a gross recei pts tax l evi ed on cor-
porati ons operati ng taxi cabs, but not on i ndi vi dual s,
206
have been
hel d to be a repugnant to the equal protecti on cl ause. But i t i s not
the functi on of the Court to consi der the propri ety or justness of
the tax, to seek for the moti ves and cri ti ci ze the publ i c pol i cy whi ch
prompted the adopti on of the statute.
207
I f the evi dent i ntent and
general operati on of the tax l egi sl ati on i s to adjust the burden wi th
a fai r and reasonabl e degree of equal i ty, the consti tuti onal requi re-
ment i s sati sfi ed.
208
One not wi thi n the cl ass cl ai med to be di scri mi nated agai nst
cannot rai se the questi on of consti tuti onal i ty of a statute on the
ground that i t deni es equal protecti on of the l aw.
209
I f a tax ap-
pl i es to a cl ass whi ch may be separatel y taxed, those wi thi n the
cl ass may not compl ai n because the cl ass mi ght have been more
1824
210
Morf v. Bi ngaman, 298 U.S. 407, 413 (1936).
211
Bal ti c Mi ni ng Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68, 88 (1913). See also Cheney
Brothers Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147, 157 (1918).
212
Phi l adel phi a Fi re Assn v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 119 (1886).
213
Hanover Fi re I ns. Co. v. Hardi ng, 272 U.S. 494, 511 (1926).
214
Southern Ry. v. Green, 216 U.S. 400, 418 (1910).
215
Concordi a I ns. Co. v. I l l i noi s, 292 U.S. 535 (1934).
216
Li ncol n Natl Li fe I ns. Co. v. Read, 325 U.S. 673 (1945). Thi s deci si on was
descri bed as an anachroni sm i n Western & Southern Li fe I ns. Co. v. State Bd. Of
Equal i zati on, 451 U.S. 648, 667 (1981), the Court reaffi rmi ng the rul e that taxes
di scri mi nati ng agai nst forei gn corporati ons must bear a rati onal rel ati on to a l egi ti -
mate state purpose.
217
Wheel i ng Steel Corp. v. Gl ander, 337 U.S. 562, 571, 572 (1949).
218
393 U.S. 117 (1968).
aptl y defi ned nor because others, not of the cl ass, are taxed i m-
properl y.
210
Forei gn Corporati ons and Nonresi dents. The equal pro-
tecti on cl ause does not requi re i denti cal taxes upon al l forei gn and
domesti c corporati ons i n every case.
211
I n 1886, a Pennsyl vani a
corporati on previ ousl y l i censed to do busi ness i n New York chal -
l enged an i ncreased annual l i cense tax i mposed by that State i n re-
tal i ati on for a l i ke tax l evi ed by Pennsyl vani a agai nst New York
corporati ons. Thi s tax was hel d val i d on the ground that the State,
havi ng power to excl ude enti rel y, coul d change the condi ti ons of ad-
mi ssi on for the future and coul d demand the payment of a new or
further tax as a l i cense fee.
212
Later cases whi ttl ed down thi s rul e
consi derabl y. The Court deci ded that after i ts admi ssi on, the for-
ei gn corporati on stands equal and i s to be cl assi fi ed wi th domesti c
corporati ons of the same ki nd,
213
and that where i t has acqui red
property of a fi xed and permanent nature i n a State, i t cannot be
subjected to a more onerous tax for the pri vi l ege of doi ng busi ness
than i s i mposed on domesti c corporati ons.
214
A state statute taxi ng
forei gn corporati ons wri ti ng fi re, mari ne, i nl and navi gati on and
casual ty i nsurance on net recei pts, i ncl udi ng recei pts from casual ty
busi ness, was hel d i nval i d under the equal protecti on cl ause where
forei gn compani es wri ti ng onl y casual ty i nsurance were not subject
to a si mi l ar tax.
215
Later, the doctri ne of Philadelphia Fire Asso-
ciation v. New York was revi ved to sustai n an i ncreased tax on
gross premi ums whi ch was exacted as an annual l i cense fee from
forei gn but not from domesti c corporati ons.
216
Even though the
ri ght of a forei gn corporati on to do busi ness i n a State rests on a
l i cense, yet the equal protecti on cl ause i s hel d to i nsure i t equal i ty
of treatment, at l east so far as ad val orem taxati on i s concerned.
217
The Court, i n WHYY v. Glassboro
218
hel d that a forei gn nonprofi t
corporati on l i censed to do busi ness i n the taxi ng State i s deni ed
equal treatment i n vi ol ati on of the equal protecti on cl ause where
an exempti on from state property taxes granted to domesti c cor-
1825
219
470 U.S. 869, 878 (1985). The vote was 54, wi th Justi ce Powel l s opi ni on
for the Court bei ng joi ned by Chi ef Justi ce Burger and by Justi ces Whi te,
Bl ackmun, and Stevens. Justi ce OConnors di ssent was joi ned by Justi ces Brennan,
Marshal l , and Rehnqui st.
220
470 U.S. at 880.
221
The fi rst l evel of the Courts two-ti ered anal ysi s of state statutes affecti ng
commerce tests for vi rtual per se i nval i di ty. When a state statute di rectl y regul ates
or di scri mi nates agai nst i nterstate commerce, or when i ts effect i s to favor i n-state
economi c i nterests over out-of-state i nterests, we have general l y struck down the
statute wi thout further i nqui ry. Brown-Forman Di sti l l ers Corp. v. New York State
Li quor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986).
222
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Vi rgi ni a, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). See also Wal ters
v. Ci ty of St. Loui s, 347 U.S. 231 (1954), sustai ni ng muni ci pal i ncome tax i mposed
on gross wages of empl oyed persons but onl y on net profi ts of busi ness men and
sel f-empl oyed.
223
Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 56, 57 (1920); Travi s v. Yal e & Towne Mfg.
Co., 252 U.S. 60, 75, 76 (1920).
porati ons i s deni ed to a forei gn corporati on sol el y because i t was
organi zed under the l aws of a si ster State and where there i s no
greater admi ni strati ve burden i n eval uati ng a forei gn corporati on
than a domesti c corporati on i n the taxi ng State.
State taxati on of i nsurance compani es, i nsul ated from Com-
merce Cl ause attack by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, must pass
si mi l ar hurdl es under the Equal Protecti on Cl ause. I n Metropolitan
Life I ns. Co. v. Ward,
219
the Court concl uded that taxati on favori ng
domesti c over forei gn corporati ons consti tutes the very sort of pa-
rochi al di scri mi nati on that the Equal Protecti on Cl ause was i n-
tended to prevent. Rejecti ng the asserti on that i t was merel y i m-
posi ng Commerce Cl ause rhetori c i n equal protecti on cl othi ng, the
Court expl ai ned that the emphasi s i s di fferent even though the re-
sul t i n some cases wi l l be the same: the Commerce Cl ause meas-
ures the effects whi ch otherwi se val i d state enactments have on
i nterstate commerce, whi l e the Equal Protecti on Cl ause merel y re-
qui res a rati onal rel ati on to a val i d state purpose.
220
However, the
Courts hol di ng that the di scri mi natory purpose was i nval i d under
equal protecti on anal ysi s woul d al so be a basi s for i nval i dati on
under a di fferent strand of Commerce Cl ause anal ysi s.
221
I ncome Taxes. A state l aw whi ch taxes the enti re i ncome of
domesti c corporati ons whi ch do busi ness i n the State, i ncl udi ng
that deri ved wi thi n the State, whi l e exempti ng enti rel y the i ncome
recei ved outsi de the State by domesti c corporati ons whi ch do no
l ocal busi ness, i s arbi trary and i nval i d.
222
I n taxi ng the i ncome of
a nonresi dent, there i s no deni al of equal protecti on i n l i mi ti ng the
deducti on of l osses to those sustai ned wi thi n the State, al though
resi dents are permi tted to deduct al l l osses, wherever i ncurred.
223
A retroacti ve statute i mposi ng a graduated tax at rates di fferent
from those i n the general i ncome tax l aw, on di vi dends recei ved i n
1826
224
Wel ch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938).
225
Magoun v. I l l i noi s Trust & Savi ngs Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 288, 300 (1898).
226
Bi l l i ngs v. I l l i noi s, 188 U.S. 97 (1903).
227
Campbel l v. Cal i forni a, 200 U.S. 87 (1906).
228
Sal omon v. State Tax Commn, 278 U.S. 484 (1929).
229
Board of Educ. v. I l l i noi s, 203 U.S. 553 (1906).
230
Maxwel l v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525 (1919).
231
Conti nental Baki ng Co. v. Woodri ng, 286 U.S. 352 (1932).
232
Di xi e Ohi o Express Co. v. State Revenue Commn, 306 U.S. 72, 78 (1939).
233
Al ward v. Johnson, 282 U.S. 509 (1931).
a pri or year whi ch were deducti bl e from gross i ncome under the
l aw i n effect when they were recei ved, does not vi ol ate the equal
protecti on cl ause.
224
I nheri tance Taxes. There i s no deni al of equal protecti on i n
prescri bi ng di fferent treatment for l i neal rel ati ons, col l ateral ki n-
dred and unrel ated persons, or i n i ncreasi ng the proporti onate bur-
den of the tax progressi vel y as the amount of the benefi t i n-
creases.
225
A tax on l i fe estates where the remai nder passes to l i n-
eal hei rs i s val i d despi te the exempti on of l i fe estates where the re-
mai nder passes to col l ateral hei rs.
226
There i s no arbi trary cl assi -
fi cati on i n taxi ng the transmi ssi on of property to a brother or si s-
ter, whi l e exempti ng that to a son-i n-l aw or daughter-i n-l aw.
227
Vested and conti ngent remai nders may be treated di fferentl y.
228
The exempti on of property bequeathed to chari tabl e or educati onal
i nsti tuti ons may be l i mi ted to those wi thi n the State.
229
I n com-
puti ng the tax col l ecti bl e from a nonresi dent decedents property
wi thi n the State, a State may appl y the perti nent rates to the
whol e estate wherever l ocated and take that proporti on thereof
whi ch the property wi thi n the State bears to the total ; the fact that
a greater tax may resul t than woul d be assessed on an equal
amount of property i f owned by a resi dent, does not i nval i date the
resul t.
230
Motor Vehi cl e Taxes. I n demandi ng compensati on for the
use of hi ghways, a State may exempt certai n types of vehi cl es, ac-
cordi ng to the purpose for whi ch they are used, from a mi l eage tax
on carri ers.
231
A state mai ntenance tax act, whi ch taxes vehi cl e
property carri ers for hi re at greater rates than si mi l ar vehi cl es car-
ryi ng property not for hi re i s reasonabl e, si nce the use of roads by
one haul i ng not for hi re general l y i s l i mi ted to transportati on of hi s
own property as an i nci dent to hi s occupati on and i s substanti al l y
l ess than that of one engaged i n busi ness as a common carri er.
232
A property tax on motor vehi cl es used i n operati ng a stage l i ne
that makes constant and unusual use of the hi ghways may be
measured by gross recei pts and be assessed at a hi gher rate than
taxes on property not so empl oyed.
233
Common motor carri ers of
frei ght operati ng over regul ar routes between fi xed termi ni may be
1827
234
Beki ns Van Li nes v. Ri l ey, 280 U.S. 80 (1929).
235
Morf v. Bi ngaman, 298 U.S. 407 (1936).
236
Cl ark v. Paul Gray, I nc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
237
Carl ey & Hami l ton v. Snook, 281 U.S. 66 (1930).
238
Aero Mayfl ower Transi t Co. v. Georgi a Publ i c Serv. Commn, 295 U.S. 285
(1935).
239
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Vi rgi ni a, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
240
Mi ssouri v. Dockery, 191 U.S. 165 (1903).
241
Kentucky Uni on Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140, 161 (1911).
242
Charl eston Fed. S. & L. Assn v. Al derson, 324 U.S. 182 (1945); Nashvi l l e
C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browni ng, 310 U.S. 362 (1940).
taxed at hi gher rates than other carri ers, common and pri vate.
234
A fee for the pri vi l ege of transporti ng motor vehi cl es on thei r own
wheel s over the hi ghways of the State for purpose of sal e does not
vi ol ate the equal protecti on cl ause as appl i ed to cars movi ng i n
caravans.
235
The exempti on from a tax for a permi t to bri ng cars
i nto the State i n caravans of cars moved for sal e between zones i n
the State i s not an unconsti tuti onal di scri mi nati on where i t ap-
pears that the traffi c subject to the tax pl aces a much more seri ous
burden on the hi ghways than that whi ch i s exempt.
236
Al so sus-
tai ned as val i d have been exempti ons of vehi cl es wei ghi ng l ess
than 3000 pounds from graduated regi strati on fees i mposed on car-
ri ers for hi re, notwi thstandi ng that the exempt vehi cl es, when l oad-
ed, may outwei gh those taxed;
237
and exempti ons from vehi cl e l i -
cense taxes l evi ed on pri vate motor carri ers of persons whose vehi -
cl es haul passengers and farm products between poi nts not havi ng
rai l road faci l i ti es or farm and dai ry products for producers there-
of.
238
Property Taxes. The States l ati tude of di screti on i s notabl y
wi de i n the cl assi fi cati on of property for purposes of taxati on and
the granti ng of parti al or total exempti on on the grounds of pol -
i cy,
239
whether the exempti on resul ts from the terms of the statute
i tsel f or the conduct of a state offi ci al i mpl ementi ng state pol i cy.
240
A provi si on for the forfei ture of l and for nonpayment of taxes i s not
i nval i d because the condi ti ons to whi ch i t appl i es exi st onl y i n a
part of the State.
241
Al so, di fferences i n the basi s of assessment
are not i nval i d where the person or property affected mi ght prop-
erl y be pl aced i n a separate cl ass for purposes of taxati on.
242
Earl y
cases drew the di sti ncti on between i ntenti onal and systemati c di s-
cri mi natory acti on by state offi ci al s i n underval ui ng some property
whi l e taxi ng at ful l val ue other property i n the same cl ass an ac-
ti on that coul d be i nval i dated under the equal protecti on cl ause
and mere errors i n judgment resul ti ng i n unequal val uati on or
underval uati on acti ons that di d not support a cl ai m of di scri mi na-
1828
243
Sunday Lake I ron Co. v. Wakefi el d, 247 U.S. 350 (1918); Raymond v. Chi -
cago Tracti on Co., 207 U.S. 20, 35, 37 (1907); Coutl er v. Loui svi l l e & Nashvi l l e R.R.,
196 U.S. 599 (1905). See also Chi cago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585 (1907).
244
488 U.S. 336 (1989).
245
Nordl i nger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992).
246
I d. at 233435.
247
I d. at 2333.
248
Si oux Ci ty Bri dge v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 446 (1923).
249
Hi l l sborough v. Cromwel l , 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946); Al l egheny Pi ttsburgh
Coal Co. v. Webster County Commn, 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
250
St. Loui s-San Franci sco Ry v. Mi ddl ekamp, 256 U.S. 226, 230 (1921).
251
Memphi s & Charl eston Ry. v. Pace, 282 U.S. 241 (1931).
ti on.
243
More recentl y, however, the Court i n Allegheny Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. Webster County Commission,
244
found a deni al of equal
protecti on to property owners whose assessments, based on recent
purchase pri ces, ranged from 8 to 35 ti mes hi gher than comparabl e
nei ghbori ng property for whi ch the assessor fai l ed over a 10-year
peri od to readjust apprai sal s. Then, onl y a few years l ater, the
Court uphel d a Cal i forni a bal l ot i ni ti ati ve that i mposed a qui te
si mi l ar resul t: property that i s sol d i s apprai sed at purchase pri ce,
whi l e assessments on property that has stayed i n the same hands
si nce 1976 may ri se no more that 2% per year.
245
Allegheny Pitts-
burgh was di sti ngui shed, the di spari ty i n assessments bei ng sai d
to resul t from admi ni strati ve fai l ure to i mpl ement state pol i cy
rather than from i mpl ementati on of a coherent state pol i cy.
246
Cal i forni as acqui si ti on-val ue system favori ng those who hol d on to
property over those who purchase and sel l property was vi ewed as
furtheri ng rati onal state i nterests i n promoti ng l ocal nei ghborhood
preservati on, conti nui ty, and stabi l i ty, and i n protecti ng reason-
abl e rel i ance i nterests of exi sti ng homeowners.
247
An owner aggri eved by di scri mi nati on i s enti tl ed to have hi s
assessment reduced to the common l evel .
248
Equal protecti on i s de-
ni ed i f a State does not i tsel f remove the di scri mi nati on; i t cannot
i mpose upon the person agai nst whom the di scri mi nati on i s di -
rected the burden of seeki ng an upward revi si on of the assessment
of other members of the cl ass.
249
A corporati on whose val uati ons
were accepted by the assessi ng commi ssi on cannot compl ai n that i t
was taxed di sproporti onatel y, as compared wi th others, i f the com-
mi ssi on di d not act fraudul entl y.
250
Speci al Assessment. A speci al assessment i s not di scri mi na-
tory because apporti oned on an ad valorem basi s, nor does i ts va-
l i di ty depend upon the recei pt of some speci al benefi t as di sti n-
gui shed from the general benefi t to the communi ty.
251
Rai l road
property may not be burdened for l ocal i mprovements upon a basi s
so whol l y di fferent from that used for ascertai ni ng the contri buti on
demanded of i ndi vi dual owners as necessari l y to produce mani fest
1829
252
Kansas Ci ty So. Ry. v. Road I mp. Di st. No. 6, 256 U.S. 658 (1921); Thomas
v. Kansas Ci ty So. Ry., 261 U.S. 481 (1923).
253
Road I mp. Di st. v. Mi ssouri Paci fi c R.R., 274 U.S. 188 (1927).
254
Branson v. Bush, 251 U.S. 182 (1919).
255
Col umbus & Greenvi l l e Ry. v. Mi l l er, 283 U.S. 96 (1931).
256
Buck v. Bel l , 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
257
McGowan v. Maryl and, 366 U.S. 420, 42526 (1961).
258
Ci ty of New Orl eans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). Uphol di ng an ordi nance
that banned al l pushcart vendors from the French Quarter, except those i n conti nu-
ous operati on for more than ei ght years, the Court summari zed i ts method of deci -
si on here. When l ocal economi c regul ati on i s chal l enged sol el y as vi ol ati ng the
Equal Protecti on Cl ause, thi s Court consi stentl y defers to l egi sl ati ve determi nati ons
as to the desi rabi l i ty of parti cul ar statutory di scri mi nati ons. . . . Unl ess a cl assi fi ca-
ti on trammel s fundamental personal ri ghts or i s drawn upon i nherentl y suspect di s-
ti ncti ons such as race, rel i gi on, or al i enage, our deci si ons presume the consti tu-
ti onal i ty of the statutory di scri mi nati ons and requi re onl y that the cl assi fi cati on
chal l enged be rati onal l y rel ated to a l egi ti mate state i nterest. States are accorded
wi de l ati tude i n the regul ati on of thei r l ocal economi es under thei r pol i ce powers,
i nequal i ty.
252
A speci al hi ghway assessment agai nst rai l roads
based on real property, rol l i ng stock, and other personal property
i s unjustl y di scri mi natory when other assessments for the same i m-
provement are based on real property al one.
253
A l aw requi ri ng the
franchi se of a rai l road to be consi dered i n val ui ng i ts property for
apporti onment of a speci al assessment i s not i nval i d where the
franchi ses were not added as a separate personal property val ue to
the assessment of the real property.
254
I n taxi ng rai l roads wi thi n
a l evee di stri ct on a mi l eage basi s, i t i s not necessari l y arbi trary
to fi x a l ower rate per mi l e for those havi ng l ess than 25 mi l es of
mai n l i ne wi thi n the di stri ct than for those havi ng more.
255
Police Power Regulation
Cl assi fi cati on. Justi ce Hol mes characteri zati on of the equal
protecti on cl ause as the usual l ast refuge of consti tuti onal argu-
ments
256
was no doubt made wi th the practi ce i n mi nd of contest-
ants tacki ng on an equal protecti on argument to a due process
chal l enge of state economi c regul ati on. Few pol i ce regul ati ons have
been hel d unconsti tuti onal on thi s ground.
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment permi ts the States a wi de scope
of di screti on i n enacti ng l aws whi ch affect some groups of ci ti zens
di fferentl y than others. The consti tuti onal safeguard i s offended
onl y i f the cl assi fi cati on rests on grounds whol l y i rrel evant to the
achi evement of the States objecti ve. State l egi sl atures are pre-
sumed to have acted wi thi n thei r consti tuti onal power despi te the
fact that, i n practi ce, thei r l aws resul t i n some i nequal i ty. A statu-
tory di scri mi nati on wi l l not be set asi de i f any state of facts reason-
abl y may be concei ved to justi fy i t.
257
The Court has made i t cl ear
that onl y the total l y i rrati onal cl assi fi cati on i n the economi c fi el d
wi l l be struck down,
258
and i t has hel d that l egi sl ati ve cl assi fi ca-
1830
and rati onal di sti ncti ons may be made wi th substanti al l y l ess than mathemati cal
exacti tude. Legi sl atures may i mpl ement thei r program step-by-step . . . i n such eco-
nomi c areas, adopti ng regul ati ons that onl y parti al l y amel i orate a percei ved evi l and
deferri ng compl ete el i mi nati on of the evi l to future regul ati ons. . . . I n short, the
judi ci ary may not si t as a super-l egi sl ature to judge the wi sdom or undesi rabi l i ty
of l egi sl ati ve pol i cy determi nati ons made i n areas that nei ther affect fundamental
ri ghts nor proceed al ong suspect l i nes . . . ; i n the l ocal economi c sphere, i t i s onl y
the i nvi di ous di scri mi nati on, the whol l y arbi trary act, whi ch cannot stand consi st-
entl y wi th the Fourteenth Amendment. I d. at 30304.
259
The grandfather cl ause uphel d i n Dukes preserved the operati ons of two
concerns that had operated i n the Quarter for 20 years. The cl assi fi cati on was sus-
tai ned on the basi s of (1) the Ci ty Counci l proceedi ng step-by-step and el i mi nati ng
vendors of more recent vi ntage, (2) the Counci l deci di ng that newer busi nesses were
l ess l i kel y to have bui l t up substanti al rel i ance i nterests i n conti nued operati on i n
the Quarter, and (3) the Counci l bel i evi ng that both grandfathered vendi ng i nter-
ests had themsel ves become part of the di sti ncti ve character and charm of the Quar-
ter. I d. 30506. See also Fri edman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 1718 (1979); Uni ted
States v. Maryl and Savi ngs-Share I ns. Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 6 (1970).
260
Mi nnesota v. Cl over Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 46170 (1981). The
quoted phrase i s at 466 (emphasi s by Court). Purporti ng to promote the purposes
of resource conservati on, easi ng sol i d waste di sposal probl ems, and conservi ng en-
ergy, the l egi sl ature had banned pl asti c nonreturnabl e mi l k cartons but permi tted
al l other nonpl asti c nonreturnabl e contai ners, such as paperboard cartons. The state
court had thought the di sti ncti on i rrati onal , but the Supreme Court thought the l eg-
i sl ature coul d have bel i eved a basi s for the di sti ncti on exi sted. Courts wi l l recei ve
evi dence that a di sti ncti on i s whol l y i rrati onal . Uni ted States v. Carol ene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 15354 (1938).
Cl assi fi cati ons under pol i ce regul ati ons have been hel d val i d as fol l ows:
Adverti si ng: di scri mi nati on between bi l l board and newpaper adverti si ng of ci ga-
rettes, Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932); prohi bi ti on of adverti si ng si gns
on motor vehi cl es, except when used i n the usual busi ness of the owner and not
used mai nl y for adverti si ng, Fi fth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U.S. 467 (1911);
prohi bi ti on of adverti si ng on motor vehi cl es except noti ces or adverti si ng of products
of the owner, Rai l way Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); prohi bi ti on
agai nst sal e of arti cl es on whi ch there i s a representati on of the fl ag for adverti si ng
purposes, except newspapers, peri odi cal s and books, Hal ter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S.
34 (1907).
Amusement: prohi bi ti on agai nst keepi ng bi l l i ard hal l s for hi re, except i n case
of hotel s havi ng twenty-fi ve or more rooms for use of regul ar guests. Murphy v.
Cal i forni a, 225 U.S. 623 (1912).
Attorneys: Kansas l aw and court regul ati ons requi ri ng resi dent of Kansas, l i -
censed to practi ce i n Kansas and Mi ssouri and mai ntai ni ng l aw offi ces i n both
States, but who practi ces regul arl y i n Mi ssouri , to obtai n l ocal associ ate counsel as
a condi ti on of appeari ng i n a Kansas court. Marti n v. Wal ton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961).
Two di ssenters, Justi ces Dougl as and Bl ack, woul d sustai n the requi rement, i f l i m-
i ted i n appl i cati on to an attorney who practi ced onl y i n Mi ssouri .
ti ons that i mpact severel y upon some busi nesses and qui te favor-
abl y upon others may be saved through stri ngent deference to l eg-
i sl ati ve judgment.
259
So deferenti al i s the cl assi fi cati on that i t de-
ni es the chal l engi ng party any ri ght to offer evi dence to seek to
prove that the l egi sl ature i s wrong i n i ts concl usi on that i ts cl assi -
fi cati on wi l l serve the purpose i t has i n mi nd, so l ong as the ques-
ti on i s at l east debatabl e and the l egi sl ature could rationally have
decided that i ts cl assi fi cati on woul d foster i ts goal .
260
1831
Cattl e: a cl assi fi cati on of sheep, as di sti ngui shed from cattl e, i n a regul ati on re-
stri cti ng the use of publ i c l ands for grazi ng. Bacon v. Wal ker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907).
See also Omaechevarri a v. I daho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918).
Cotton gi ns: i n a State where cotton gi ns are hel d to be publ i c uti l i ti es and thei r
rates regul ated, the granti ng of a l i cense to a cooperati ve associ ati on di stri buti ng
profi ts ratabl y to members and nonmembers does not deny other persons operati ng
gi ns equal protecti on when there i s nothi ng i n the l aws to forbi d them to di stri bute
thei r net earni ngs among thei r patrons. Corporati on Commn v. Lowe, 281 U.S. 431
(1930).
Debt adjustment busi ness: operati on onl y as i nci dent to l egi ti mate practi ce of
l aw. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
Eye gl asses: l aw exempti ng sel l ers of ready-to-wear gl asses from regul ati ons for-
bi ddi ng opti ci ans to fi t or repl ace l enses wi thout prescri pti ons from ophthal mol ogi st
or optometri st and from restri cti ons on sol i ci tati on of sal e of eye gl asses by use of
adverti si ng matter. Wi l l i amson v. Lee Opti cal Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
Fi sh processi ng: stri cter regul ati on of reducti on of fi sh to fl our or meal than of
canni ng. Baysi de Fi sh Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936).
Food: bread sol d i n l oaves must be of prescri bed standard si zes, Schmi di nger
v. Chi cago, 226 U.S. 578 (1913); food preservati ves contai ni ng bori c aci d may not
be sol d, Pri ce v. I l l i noi s, 238 U.S. 446 (1915); l ard not sol d i n bul k must be put up
i n contai ners hol di ng one, three or fi ve pounds or some whol e mul ti pl e thereof, Ar-
mour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U.S. 510 (1916); mi l k i ndustry may be pl aced i n
a speci al cl ass for regul ati on, Li eberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552 (1906); ven-
dors produci ng mi l k outsi de ci ty may be cl assi fi ed separatel y, Adams v. Mi l waukee,
228 U.S. 572 (1913); produci ng and nonproduci ng vendors may be di sti ngui shed i n
mi l k regul ati ons, St. John v. New York, 201 U.S. 633 (1906); di fferent mi ni mum and
maxi mum mi l k pri ces may be fi xed for di stri butors and storekeepers, Nebbi a v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); pri ce di fferenti al may be granted for sel l ers of mi l k not
havi ng a wel l adverti sed trade name, Bordens Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297
U.S. 251 (1936); ol eomargari ne col ored to resembl e butter may be prohi bi ted, Cap-
i tal Ci ty Dai ry Co. v. Ohi o, 183 U.S. 238 (1902); tabl e syrups may be requi red to
be so l abel ed and di scl ose i denti ty and proporti on of i ngredi ents, Corn Products Rfg.
Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427 (1919).
Geographi cal di scri mi nati ons: l egi sl ati on l i mi ted i n appl i cati on to a parti cul ar
geographi cal or pol i ti cal subdi vi si on of a State, Ft. Smi th Co. v. Pavi ng Di st., 274
U.S. 387, 391 (1927); ordi nance prohi bi ti ng a parti cul ar busi ness i n certai n secti ons
of a muni ci pal i ty, Hadacheck v. Sebasti an, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); statute authori zi ng
a muni ci pal commi ssi on to l i mi t the hei ght of bui l di ngs i n commerci al di stri cts to
125 feet and i n other di stri cts to 80 to 100 feet, Wel ch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91
(1909); ordi nance prescri bi ng l i mi ts i n ci ty outsi de of whi ch no woman of l ewd char-
acter shal l dwel l , LHote v. New Orl eans, 177 U.S. 587, 595 (1900). And see North
v. Russel l , 427 U.S. 328, 338 (1976).
Hotel s: requi rement that keepers of hotel s havi ng over fi fty guests empl oy ni ght
watchmen. Mi l l er v. Strahl , 239 U.S. 426 (1915).
I nsurance compani es: regul ati on of fi re i nsurance rates wi th exempti on for
farmers mutual s, German Al l i ance I ns. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389 (1914); di fferent
requi rements i mposed upon reci procal i nsurance associ ati ons than upon mutual
compani es, Hoopeston Canni ng Co. v. Cul l en, 318 U.S. 313 (1943); prohi bi ti on
agai nst l i fe i nsurance compani es or agents engagi ng i n undertaki ng busi ness, Dan-
i el v. Fami l y I ns. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949).
I ntoxi cati ng l i quors: excepti on of druggi st or manufacturers from regul ati on.
Ll oyd v. Dol l i son, 194 U.S. 445 (1904); Eberl e v. Mi chi gan, 232 U.S. 700 (1914).
Landl ord-tenant: requi ri ng tri al no l ater than si x days after servi ce of compl ai nt
and l i mi ti ng tri abl e i ssues to the tenants defaul t, provi si ons appl i cabl e i n no other
l egal acti on, under procedure al l owi ng l andl ord to sue to evi ct tenants for
nonpayment of rent, i nasmuch as prompt and peaceful resol uti on of the di spute i s
proper objecti ve and tenants have other means to pursue other rel i ef. Li ndsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
1832
Lodgi ng houses: requi rement that spri nkl er systems be i nstal l ed i n bui l di ngs of
nonfi reproof constructi on i s val i d as appl i ed to such a bui l di ng whi ch i s safeguarded
by a fi re al arm system, constant watchman servi ce and other safety arrangements.
Queensi de Hi l l s Co. v. Saxl , 328 U.S. 80 (1946).
Markets: prohi bi ti on agai nst operati on of pri vate market wi thi n si x squares of
publ i c market. Natal v. Loui si ana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891).
Medi ci ne: a uni form standard of professi onal attai nment and conduct for al l
physi ci ans, Hurwi tz v. North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926); reasonabl e exempti ons from medi -
cal regi strati on l aw. Watson v. Maryl and, 218 U.S. 173 (1910); exempti on of persons
who heal by prayer from regul ati ons appl i cabl e to drugl ess physi ci ans, Crane v.
Johnson, 242 U.S 339 (1917); excl usi on of osteopathi c physi ci ans from publ i c hos-
pi tal s, Hayman v. Gal veston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927); requi rement that persons who
treat eyes wi thout use of drugs be l i censed as optometri sts wi th excepti on for per-
sons treati ng eyes by use of drugs, who are regul ated under a di fferent statute,
McNaughton v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 344 (1917); a prohi bi ti on agai nst adverti si ng by
denti sts, not appl i cabl e to other professi ons, Seml er v. Dental Exami ners, 294 U.S.
608 (1935).
Motor vehi cl es: guest passenger regul ati on appl i cabl e to automobi l es but not to
other cl asses of vehi cl es, Si l ver v. Si l ver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929); exempti on of vehi cl es
from other States from regi strati on requi rement, Storaasl i v. Mi nnesota, 283 U.S.
57 (1931); cl assi fi cati on of dri verl ess automobi l es for hi re as publ i c vehi cl es, whi ch
are requi red to procure a l i cense and to carry l i abi l i ty i nsurance, Hodge Co. v. Ci n-
ci nnati , 284 U.S. 335 (1932); exempti on from l i mi tati ons on hours of l abor for dri v-
ers of motor vehi cl es of carri ers of property for hi re, of those not pri nci pal l y engaged
i n transport of property for hi re, and carri ers operati ng whol l y i n metropol i tan
areas, Wel ch Co. v. New Hampshi re, 306 U.S. 79 (1939); exempti on of busses and
temporary movements of farm i mpl ements and machi nery and trucks maki ng short
haul s from common carri ers from l i mi tati ons i n net l oad and l ength of trucks,
Sprol es v. Bi nford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932); prohi bi ti on agai nst operati on of uncerti fi ed
carri ers, Bradl ey v. Publ i c Uti l i ty Commn, 289 U.S. 92 (1933); exempti on from regu-
l ati ons affecti ng carri ers for hi re, of persons whose chi ef busi ness i s farmi ng and
dai ryi ng, but who occasi onal l y haul farm and dai ry products for compensati on,
Hi ckl i n v. Coney, 290 U.S. 169 (1933); exempti on of pri vate vehi cl es, street cars and
omni buses from i nsurance requi rements appl i cabl e to taxi cabs, Packard v. Banton,
264 U.S. 140 (1924).
Peddl ers and sol i ci tors: a State may cl assi fy and regul ate i ti nerant vendors and
peddl ers, Emert v. Mi ssouri , 156 U.S. 296 (1895); may forbi d the sal e by them of
drugs and medi ci nes, Baccus v. Loui si ana, 232 U.S. 334 (1914); prohi bi t drummi ng
or sol i ci ti ng on trai ns for busi ness for hotel s, medi cal practi ti oners, and the l i ke,
Wi l l i ams v. Arkansas, 217 U.S. 79 (1910); or sol i ci tati on of empl oyment to prosecute
or col l ect cl ai ms, McCl oskey v. Tobi n, 252 U.S. 107 (1920). And a muni ci pal i ty may
prohi bi t canvassers or peddl ers from cal l i ng at pri vate resi dences unl ess requested
or i nvi ted by the occupant to do so. Breard v. Ci ty of Al exandri a, 341 U.S. 622
(1951).
Property destructi on: destructi on of cedar trees to protect appl e orchards from
cedar rust, Mi l l er v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
Rai l roads: prohi bi ti on on operati on on a certai n street, Rai l road Co. v. Ri ch-
mond, 96 U.S. 521 (1878); requi rement that fences and cattl e guards and al l ow re-
covery of mul ti pl e damages for fai l ure to compl y, Mi ssouri Paci fi c Ry. v. Humes, 115
U.S. 512 (1885); Mi nneapol i s Ry. v. Beckwi th, 129 U.S. 26 (1889); Mi nneapol i s &
St. Loui s Ry. v. Emmons, 149 U.S. 364 (1893); assessi ng rai l roads wi th enti re ex-
pense of al teri ng a grade crossi ng, New York & N.E. R.R. v. Bri stol , 151 U.S. 556
(1894); l i abi l i ty for fi re communi cated by l ocomoti ve engi nes, St. Loui s & S. F. Ry.
v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1 (1897); requi red weed cutti ng; Mi ssouri , Kan., & Tex. Ry.
v. May, 194 U.S. 267 (1904); presumpti on agai nst a rai l road fai l i ng to gi ve pre-
scri bed warni ng si gnal s, Atl anti c Coast Li ne R.R. v. Ford, 287 U.S. 502 (1933); re-
qui red use of l ocomoti ve headl i ghts of a speci fi ed form and power, Atl anti c Coast
Li ne Ry. v. Georgi a, 234 U.S. 280 (1914); presumpti on that rai l roads are l i abl e for
1833
damage caused by operati on of thei r l ocomoti ves, Seaboard Ai r Li ne Ry. v. Watson,
287 U.S. 86 (1932); requi red spri nkl i ng of streets between tracks to l ay the dust,
Paci fi c Gas Co. v. Pol i ce Court, 251 U.S. 22 (1919). State ful l -crew l aws do not
vi ol ate the equal protecti on cl ause by si ngl i ng out the rai l roads for regul ati on and
by maki ng no provi si on for mi ni mum crews on any other segment of the transpor-
tati on i ndustry, Fi remen v. Chi cago, R.I . & P. Ry., 393 U.S. 129 (1968).
Sal es i n bul k: requi rement of noti ce of bul k sal es appl i cabl e onl y to retai l deal -
ers. Lemi eux v. Young, 211 U.S. 489 (1909).
Secret soci eti es: regul ati ons appl i ed onl y to one cl ass of oath-bound associ ati ons,
havi ng a membershi p of 20 or more persons, where the cl ass regul ated has a tend-
ency to make the secrecy of i ts purpose and membershi p a cl oak for conduct i ni mi cal
to the personal ri ghts of others and to the publ i c wel fare. New York ex rel . Bryant
v. Zi mmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
Securi ti es: a prohi bi ti on on the sal e of capi tal stock on margi n or for future de-
l i very whi ch i s not appl i cabl e to other objects of specul ati on, e.g., cotton, grai n. Oti s
v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 (1903).
Sunday cl osi ng l aw: notwi thstandi ng that they prohi bi t the sal e of certai n com-
modi ti es and servi ces whi l e permi tti ng the vendi ng of others not markedl y di fferent,
and, even as to the l atter, frequentl y restri ct thei r di stri buti on to smal l retai l ers as
di sti ngui shed from l arge establ i shments handl i ng sal abl e as wel l as nonsal abl e
i tems, such l aws have been uphel d. Despi te the desi rabi l i ty of havi ng a requi red day
of rest, a certai n measure of mercanti l e acti vi ty must necessari l y conti nue on that
day and i n terms of requi ri ng the smal l est number of empl oyees to forego thei r day
of rest and mi ni mi zi ng traffi c congesti on, i t i s preferabl e to l i mi t thi s acti vi ty to re-
tai l ers empl oyi ng the smal l est number of workers; al so, i t curbs evasi on to refuse
to permi t stores deal i ng i n both sal abl e and nonsal abl e i tems to be open at al l .
McGowan v. Maryl and, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys from Harri son-Al l entown v.
McGi nl ey, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfel d v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gal l agher
v. Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961). See also Soon Hi ng v. Crowl ey, 113
U.S. 703 (1885); Peti t v. Mi nnesota, 177 U.S. 164 (1900).
Tel egraph compani es: a statute prohi bi ti ng sti pul ati on agai nst l i abi l i ty for neg-
l i gence i n the del i very of i nterstate messages, whi ch di d not forbi d express compa-
ni es and other common carri ers to l i mi t thei r l i abi l i ty by contract. Western Uni on
Tel egraph Co. v. Mi l l i ng Co., 218 U.S. 406 (1910).
261
Hartford I ns. Co. v. Harri son, 301 U.S. 459 (1937).
262
Smi th v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931).
263
Mayfl ower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936). See Uni ted States v.
Maryl and Savi ngs-Share I ns. Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 7 n.2 (1970) (reservi ng questi on of
cases val i di ty, but i nterpreti ng i t as standi ng for the proposi ti on that no showi ng
of a val i d l egi sl ati ve purpose had been made).
The Court has condemned a vari ety of statutory cl assi fi cati ons
as fai l i ng to survi ve the rati onal basi s test, al though some of the
cases are of doubtful vi tal i ty today and some have been questi oned.
Thus, the Court i nval i dated a statute whi ch forbade stock i nsur-
ance compani es to act through agents who were thei r sal ari ed em-
pl oyees but permi tted mutual compani es to operate i n thi s man-
ner.
261
A l aw whi ch requi red pri vate motor vehi cl e carri ers to ob-
tai n certi fi cates of conveni ence and necessi ty and to furni sh secu-
ri ty for the protecti on of the publ i c was hel d i nval i d because of the
exempti on of carri ers of fi sh, farm, and dai ry products.
262
The
same resul t befel l a statute whi ch permi tted mi l l deal ers wi thout
wel l adverti sed trade names the benefi t of a pri ce di fferenti al but
whi ch restri cted thi s benefi t to such deal ers enteri ng the busi ness
before a certai n date.
263
I n a deci si on si nce overrul ed, the Court
1834
264
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), overruled by Ci ty of New Orl eans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), where the exempti on of one concern had been by preci se
descri pti on rather than by name.
265
Hol den v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1988).
266
Bunti ng v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
267
Atki n v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903).
268
Keokee Coke Co. v. Tayl or, 234 U.S. 224 (1914). See also Knoxvi l l e I ron Co.
v. Harbi son, 183 U.S. 13 (1901).
269
McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (1909).
270
Prudenti al I ns. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922).
271
Chi cago, R.I . & P. Ry. v. Perry, 259 U.S. 548 (1922).
272
Mountai n Ti mber Co. v. Washi ngton, 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
273
New York Central R.R. v. Whi te, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Mi ddl etown v. Texas
Power & Li ght Co., 249 U.S. 152 (1919); Ward & Gow v. Kri nsky, 259 U.S. 503
(1922).
274
Li ncol n Fed. Labor Uni on v. Northwestern I ron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525
(1949). Nei ther i s i t a deni al of equal protecti on for a ci ty to refuse to wi thhol d from
i ts empl oyees paychecks dues owi ng thei r uni on, al though i t wi thhol ds for taxes,
reti rement-i nsurance programs, savi ng programs, and certai n chari ti es, because i ts
offered justi fi cati on that i ts practi ce of al l owi ng wi thhol di ng onl y when i t benefi ts
al l ci ty or department empl oyees i s a l egi ti mate method to avoi d the burden of wi th-
hol di ng money for al l persons or organi zati ons that request a checkoff. Ci ty of Char-
l otte v. Fi refi ghters, 426 U.S. 283 (1976).
struck down a l aw whi ch exempted by name the Ameri can Express
Company from the terms pertai ni ng to the l i censi ng, bondi ng, regu-
l ati on, and i nspecti on of currency exchanges engaged i n the sal e
of money orders.
264
Other Business and Employment Relations
Labor Rel ati ons. Objecti ons to l abor l egi sl ati on on the
ground that the l i mi tati on of parti cul ar regul ati ons to speci fi ed i n-
dustri es was obnoxi ous to the equal protecti on cl ause have been
consi stentl y overrul ed. Statutes l i mi ti ng hours of l abor for empl oy-
ees i n mi nes, smel ters,
265
mi l l s, factori es,
266
or on publ i c works
267
have been sustai ned. And a statute forbi ddi ng persons engaged i n
mi ni ng and manufacturi ng to i ssue orders for payment of l abor un-
l ess redeemabl e at face val ue i n cash was si mi l arl y hel d
unobjecti onabl e.
268
The exempti on of mi nes empl oyi ng l ess than
ten persons from a l aw pertai ni ng to measurement of coal to deter-
mi ne a mi ners wages i s not unreasonabl e.
269
Al l corporati ons
270
or publ i c servi ce corporati ons
271
may be requi red to i ssue to em-
pl oyees who l eave thei r servi ce l etters stati ng the nature of the
servi ce and the cause of l eavi ng even though other empl oyers are
not so requi red.
I ndustri es may be cl assi fi ed i n a workmens compensati on act
accordi ng to the respecti ve hazards of each,
272
and the exempti on
of farm l aborers and domesti c servants does not render such an act
i nval i d.
273
A statute provi di ng that no person shal l be deni ed op-
portuni ty for empl oyment because he i s not a member of a l abor
uni on does not offend the equal protecti on cl ause.
274
At a ti me
1835
275
E.g., Mul l er v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
276
Goesaert v. Cl eary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
277
Ti tl e VI I , 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. On sex di scri mi nati on general l y,
see i nfra, pp. 187586.
278
Mal l i nckrodt Works v. St. Loui s, 238 U.S. 41 (1915).
279
I nternati onal Harvester Co. v. Mi ssouri , 234 U.S. 199 (1914).
280
Ti gner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940) (overrul i ng Connol l y v. Uni on Sewer
Pi pe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902)).
281
Standard Oi l Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413 (1910).
282
Carrol l v. Greenwi ch I ns. Co., 199 U.S. 401 (1905).
283
Paci fi c States Co. v. Whi te, 296 U.S. 176 (1935); see also Sl aughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wal l .) 36 (1873): Nebbi a v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 529 (1934).
284
Safeway Stores v. Okl ahoma Grocers, 360 U.S. 334, 33941 (1959).
when protecti ve l abor l egi sl ati on general l y was fal l i ng under l i b-
erty of contract appl i cati ons of the due process cl ause, the Court
general l y approved protecti ve l egi sl ati on di rected sol el y to women
workers
275
and thi s sol i ci tude conti nued i nto present ti mes i n the
approval of l aws whi ch were more questi onabl e,
276
but passage of
the sex di scri mi nati on provi si on of the 1964 Ci vi l Ri ghts Act has
general l y cal l ed i nto questi on al l such protecti ve l egi sl ati on ad-
dressed sol el y to women.
277
Monopol i es and Unfai r Trade Practi ces. On the pri nci pl e
that the l aw may hi t the evi l where i t i s most fel t, state anti trust
l aws appl i cabl e to corporati ons but not to i ndi vi dual s,
278
or to ven-
dors of commodi ti es but not to vendors of l abor,
279
have been
uphel d. Contrary to i ts earl i er vi ew, the Court now hol ds that an
anti trust act whi ch exempts agri cul tural products i n the hands of
the producer i s val i d.
280
Di versi ty wi th respect to penal ti es al so
has been sustai ned. Corporati ons vi ol ati ng the l aw may be pro-
ceeded agai nst by bi l l i n equi ty, whi l e i ndi vi dual s are i ndi cted and
tri ed.
281
A provi si on, superi mposed upon the general anti trust l aw,
for revocati on of the l i censes of fi re i nsurance compani es that enter
i nto i l l egal combi nati ons, does not vi ol ate the equal protecti on
cl ause.
282
A grant of monopol y pri vi l eges, i f otherwi se an appro-
pri ate exerci se of the pol i ce power, i s i mmune to attack under that
cl ause.
283
Li kewi se, enforcement of an unfai r sal es act, whereby
merchants are pri vi l eged to gi ve tradi ng stamps, worth two and
one-hal f percent of the pri ce, wi th goods sol d at or near statutory
cost, whi l e a competi ng merchant, not i ssui ng stamps, i s precl uded
from maki ng an equi val ent pri ce reducti on, effects no di scri mi na-
ti on. There i s a reasonabl e basi s for concl udi ng that destructi ve,
decepti ve competi ti on resul ts from sel ecti ve l oss-l eader sel l i ng
whereas such abuses do not attend i ssuance of tradi ng stamps
across the board, as a di scount for payment i n cash.
284
Admi ni strati ve Di screti on. A muni ci pal ordi nance whi ch
vests i n supervi sory authori ti es a naked and arbi trary power to
grant or wi thhol d consent to the operati on of l aundri es i n wooden
1836
285
Yi ck Wo v. Hopki ns, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
286
Fi scher v. St. Loui s, 194 U.S. 361 (1904).
287
Gori eb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
288
Wi l son v. Eureka Ci ty, 173 U.S. 32 (1899).
289
Gundl i ng v. Chi cago, 177 U.S. 183 (1900).
290
Kotch v. Board of Ri ver Port Pi l ot Commrs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
291
Dandri dge v. Wi l l i ams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). Deci si ons respecti ng the
ri ghts of the i ndi gent i n the cri mi nal process and di cta i n Shapi ro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 627 (1969), had rai sed the prospect that because of the i mportance of
food, shel ter, and other necessi ti es of l i fe, cl assi fi cati ons wi th an adverse or per-
haps severe i mpact on the poor and needy woul d be subjected to a hi gher scruti ny.
Dandridge was a rejecti on of thi s approach, whi ch was more ful l y el aborated i n an-
other context i n San Antoni o School Di st. v. Rodri guez, 411 U.S. 1, 1829 (1973).
292
Dandri dge v. Wi l l i ams, 397 U.S. 471, 48387 (1970).
bui l di ngs, wi thout consi derati on of the ci rcumstances of i ndi vi dual
cases, consti tutes a deni al of equal protecti on of the l aw when con-
sent i s wi thhel d from certai n persons sol el y on the basi s of nati on-
al i ty.
285
But a ci ty counci l may reserve to i tsel f the power to make
excepti ons from a ban on the operati on of a dai ry wi thi n the
ci ty,
286
or from bui l di ng l i ne restri cti ons.
287
Wri tten permi ssi on of
the mayor or presi dent of the ci ty counci l may be requi red before
any person shal l move a bui l di ng on a street.
288
The mayor may
be empowered to determi ne whether an appl i cant has a good char-
acter and reputati on and i s a sui tabl e person to recei ve a l i cense
for the sal e of ci garettes.
289
I n a l ater case,
290
the Court hel d that
the unfettered di screti on of ri ver pi l ots to sel ect thei r apprenti ces,
whi ch was al most i nvari abl y exerci sed i n favor of thei r rel ati ves
and fri ends, was not a deni al of equal protecti on to persons not se-
l ected despi te the fact that such apprenti ceshi p was requi si te for
appoi ntment as a pi l ot.
Soci al Wel fare. The tradi ti onal reasonabl e basi s standard
of equal protecti on adjudi cati on devel oped i n the mai n i n cases i n-
vol vi ng state regul ati on of busi ness and i ndustry. The admi ni stra-
ti on of publ i c wel fare assi stance, by contrast, i nvol ves the most
basi c economi c needs of i mpoveri shed human bei ngs. We recogni ze
the dramati cal l y real factual di fference between the ci ted cases and
thi s one, but we can fi nd no basi s for appl yi ng a di fferent consti tu-
ti onal standard.
291
Thus, a formul a for di spensi ng ai d to depend-
ent chi l dren whi ch i mposed an upper l i mi t on the amount one fam-
i l y coul d recei ve, regardl ess of the number of chi l dren i n the fami l y,
so that the more chi l dren i n a fami l y the l ess money per chi l d was
recei ved, was found to be rati onal l y rel ated to the l egi ti mate state
i nterest i n encouragi ng empl oyment and i n mai ntai ni ng an equi -
tabl e bal ance between wel fare fami l i es and the fami l i es of the
worki ng poor.
292
Si mi l arl y, a state wel fare assi stance formul a
whi ch, after cal cul ati on of i ndi vi dual need, provi ded l ess of the de-
termi ned amount to fami l i es wi th dependent chi l dren than to those
1837
293
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). See also Ri chardson v. Bel cher,
404 U.S. 78 (1971) (sustai ni ng Soci al Securi ty provi si on reduci ng di sabi l i ty benefi ts
by amount recei ved from workers compensati on but not that recei ved from pri vate
i nsurance).
294
E.g., Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976) (provi si on gi vi ng benefi ts
to marri ed woman under 62 wi th dependent chi l dren i n her care whose husband re-
ti res or becomes di sabl ed but denyi ng benefi ts to di vorced woman under 62 wi th de-
pendents represents rati onal judgment wi th respect to l i kel y dependency of marri ed
but not di vorced women); Cal i fano v. Bol es, 443 U.S. 282 (1979) (l i mi tati on of bene-
fi ts to wi dows and di vorced wi ves of wage earners does not deny equal protecti on
to mother of i l l egi ti mate chi l d of wage earner who was never marri ed to wage earn-
er).
295
Department of Agri cul ture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (al so questi oni ng
rati onal i ty).
296
Li ndsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). The Court di d i nval i date one provi -
si on of the l aw requi ri ng tenants agai nst whom an evi cti on judgment had been en-
tered after a tri al to post a bond i n doubl e the amout of rent to become due by the
determi nati on of the appeal , because i t bore no reasonabl e rel ati onshi p to any val i d
state objecti ve and arbi trari l y di sti ngui shed between defendants i n evi cti on acti ons
and defendants i n other acti ons. I d. at 7479.
297
Ei senstadt v. Bai rd, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
persons i n the aged and i nfi rm categori es di d not vi ol ate equal pro-
tecti on because a State coul d reasonabl y bel i eve that the aged and
i nfi rm are the l east abl e to bear the hardshi ps of an i nadequate
standard of l i vi ng, and that the apporti onment of l i mi ted funds was
therefore rati onal .
293
Whi l e rei terati ng that thi s standard of re-
vi ew i s not a toothl ess one, the Court has nonethel ess sustai ned
a vari ety of di sti ncti ons on the basi s that Congress coul d rati onal l y
have bel i eved them justi fi ed,
294
acti ng to i nval i date a provi si on
onl y once and then on the premi se that Congress was actuated by
an i mproper purpose.
295
Si mi l arl y, the Court has rejected the contenti on that access to
housi ng, despi te i ts great i mportance, i s of any fundamental i nter-
est whi ch woul d pl ace a bar upon the l egi sl atures gi vi ng l andl ords
a much more favorabl e and summary process of judi ci al l y-con-
trol l ed evi cti on acti ons than was avai l abl e i n other ki nds of l i ti ga-
ti on.
296
However, a statute whi ch prohi bi ted the di spensi ng of contra-
cepti ve devi ces to si ngl e persons for bi rth control but not for di s-
ease preventi on purposes and whi ch contai ned no l i mi tati on on di s-
pensati on to marri ed persons was hel d to vi ol ate the equal protec-
ti on cl ause on several grounds. On the basi s of the ri ght i nfri nged
by the l i mi tati on, the Court saw no rati onal basi s for the State to
di sti ngui sh between marri ed and unmarri ed persons. Si mi l arl y, the
exempti on from the prohi bi ti on for purposes of di sease preventi on
nul l i fi ed the argument that the rati onal basi s for the l aw was the
deterrence of forni cati on, the rati onal i ty of whi ch the Court doubt-
ed i n any case.
297
Al so denyi ng equal protecti on was a l aw afford-
1838
298
Stanl ey v. I l l i noi s, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
299
Pace v. Al abama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883). See Sal zburg v. Maryl and, 346 U.S.
545 (1954), sustai ni ng l aw renderi ng i l l egal l y sei zed evi dence i nadmi ssi bl e i n pros-
ecuti ons i n state courts for mi sdemeanors but permi tti ng use of such evi dence i n
one county i n prosecuti ons for certai n gambl i ng mi sdemeanors. Di sti ncti ons based
on county areas were deemed reasonabl e. I n North v. Russel l , 427 U.S. 328 (1976),
the Court sustai ned the provi si on of l aw-trai ned judges for some pol i ce courts and
l ay judges for others, dependi ng upon the state consti tuti onal cl assi fi cati on of ci ti es
accordi ng to popul ati on, si nce as l ong as al l peopl e wi thi n each cl assi fi ed area are
treated equal l y, the di fferent cl assi fi cati ons wi thi n the court system are justi fi abl e.
300
Col l i ns v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502, 510 (1915); Pennsyl vani a v. Ashe, 302
U.S. 51 (1937).
301
McDonal d v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901); Moore v. Mi ssouri , 159
U.S. 673 (1895); Graham v. West Vi rgi ni a, 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
302
Carl esi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51 (1914).
303
Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481 (1908).
304
Pennsyl vani a v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937).
305
McGi nni s v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973). Cf. Hurtado v. Uni ted States, 410
U.S. 578 (1973).
i ng marri ed parents, di vorced parents, and unmarri ed mothers an
opportuni ty to be heard wi th regard to the i ssue of thei r fi tness to
conti nue or to take custody of thei r chi l dren, an opportuni ty the
Court deci ded was mandated by due process, but presumi ng the
unfi tness of the unmarri ed father and gi vi ng hi m no heari ng.
298
Puni shment of Cri me. Equal i ty of protecti on under the l aw
i mpl i es that i n the admi ni strati on of cri mi nal justi ce no person
shal l be subject to any greater or di fferent puni shment than an-
other i n si mi l ar ci rcumstances.
299
Comparati ve gravi ty of cri mi nal
offenses i s, however, l argel y a matter of state di screti on, and the
fact that some offenses are puni shed wi th l ess severi ty than others
does not deny equal protecti on.
300
Heavi er penal ti es may be i m-
posed upon habi tual cri mi nal s for l i ke offenses,
301
even after a par-
don for an earl i er offense,
302
and such persons may be made i nel i -
gi bl e for parol e.
303
A state l aw doubl i ng the sentence on pri soners
attempti ng to escape does not deny equal protecti on by subjecti ng
pri soners who attempt to escape together to di fferent sentences de-
pendi ng on thei r ori gi nal sentences.
304
A statute denyi ng state pri soners good ti me credi t for
presentence i ncarcerati on but permi tti ng those pri soners who ob-
tai n bai l or other rel ease i mmedi atel y to recei ve good ti me credi t
for the enti re peri od whi ch they ul ti matel y spend i n custody, good
ti me counti ng toward the date of el i gi bi l i ty for parol e, does not
deny the pri soners i ncarcerated i n l ocal jai l s equal protecti on i nas-
much as the di sti ncti on i s rati onal l y justi fi ed by the fact that good
ti me credi t i s desi gned to encourage pri soners to engage i n reha-
bi l i tati on courses and acti vi ti es whi ch exi st onl y i n state pri sons
and not i n l ocal jai l s.
305
1839
306
Ski nner v. Okl ahoma ex rel . Wi l l i amson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
307
Ri nal di v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966). But see Ful l er v. Oregon, 417 U.S.
40 (1974) (i mposi ti on of rei mbursement obl i gati on for state-provi ded defense assi st-
ance upon convi cted defendants but not upon those acqui tted or whose convi cti ons
are reversed i s objecti vel y rati onal ).
308
James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
309
Schi l b v. Kuebel , 404 U.S. 357 (1971).
310
I nfra, pp. 191625.
The equal protecti on cl ause does, however, render i nval i d a
statute requi ri ng the steri l i zati on of persons convi cted of vari ous
offenses when the statute draws a l i ne between l i ke offenses, such
as between l arceny by fraud and embezzl ement.
306
A statute whi ch
provi ded that convi cted defendants sentenced to i mpri sonment
must rei mburse the State for the furni shi ng of free transcri pts of
thei r tri al by havi ng amounts deducted from pri son pay deni ed
such persons equal protecti on when i t di d not requi re rei mburse-
ment of those fi ned, gi ven suspended sentences, or pl aced on proba-
ti on.
307
Si mi l arl y, a statute enabl i ng the State to recover the costs
of such transcri pts and other l egal defense fees by a ci vi l acti on
was defecti ve under the equal protecti on cl ause because i ndi gent
defendants agai nst whom judgment was entered under the statute
di d not have the benefi t of exempti ons and benefi ts afforded other
ci vi l judgment debtors.
308
But a bai l reform statute whi ch provi ded
for l i beral i zed forms of rel ease and whi ch i mposed the costs of oper-
ati ng the system upon one category of rel eased defendants, gen-
eral l y those most i ndi gent, was not i nval i d because the cl assi fi ca-
ti on was rati onal and because the measure was i n any event a sub-
stanti al i mprovement upon the ol d bai l system.
309
The Court i n
the l ast several years has appl i ed the cl ause stri ctl y to prohi bi t nu-
merous de jure and de facto di sti ncti ons based on weal th or
i ndi gency.
310
EQUAL PROTECTION AND RACE
Overview
The Fourteenth Amendment i s one of a seri es of consti tuti onal
provi si ons havi ng a common purpose; namel y, securi ng to a race re-
centl y emanci pated, a race that through many generati ons had
been hel d i n sl avery, al l the ci vi l ri ghts that the superi or race
enjoy. The true spi ri t and meani ng of the amendments . . . cannot
be understood wi thout keepi ng i n vi ew the hi story of the ti mes
when they were adopted, and the general objects they pl ai nl y
sought to accompl i sh. At the ti me when they were i ncorporated
i nto the Consti tuti on, i t requi red l i ttl e knowl edge of human nature
to anti ci pate that those who had l ong been regarded as an i nferi or
and subject race woul d, when suddenl y rai sed to the rank of ci ti -
1840
1
Strauder v. West Vi rgi ni a, 100 U.S. 303, 30607 (1880).
2
I d. (l aw provi di ng for jury servi ce speci fi ed whi te mal es). Moreover i t wi l l not
do to argue that a l aw that segregates the races or prohi bi ts contacts between them
di scri mi nates equal l y agai nst both races. Buchanan v. Warl ey, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
(ordi nance prohi bi ti ng bl acks from occupyi ng houses i n bl ocks where whi tes were
predomi nant and whi tes from occupyi ng houses i n bl ocks where bl acks were pre-
domi nant). Compare Pace v. Al abama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (sustai ni ng convi cti on
under statute that i mposed a greater penal ty for adul tery or forni cati on between a
whi te person and an Afri can Ameri can than was i mposed for si mi l ar conduct by
members of the same race, usi ng equal appl i cati on theory), with McLaughl i n v.
Fl ori da, 379 U.S. 184, 188 (1964), and Lovi ng v. Vi rgi ni a, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (re-
jecti ng theory).
3
Yi ck Wo v. Hopki ns, 118 U.S. 356, 37374 (1886) (di scri mi nati on agai nst Chi -
nese).
4
Sl aughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wal l .) 36, 6772 (1873); Strauder v. West
Vi rgi ni a, 100 U.S. 303, 30708 (1880); Vi rgi ni a v. Ri ves, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880);
Ex parte Vi rgi ni a, 100 U.S. 339, 34445 (1880).
5
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
6
Roberts v. Ci ty of Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 206 (1849).
zenshi p, be l ooked upon wi th jeal ousy and posi ti ve di sl i ke, and that
State l aws mi ght be enacted or enforced to perpetuate the di sti nc-
ti ons that had before exi sted. . . . [The Fourteenth Amendment]
was desi gned to assure to the col ored race the enjoyment of al l the
ci vi l ri ghts that under the l aw are enjoyed by whi te persons, and
to gi ve to that race the protecti on of the general government i n
that enjoyment, whenever i t shoul d be deni ed by the States. I t not
onl y gave ci ti zenshi p and the pri vi l eges of ci ti zenshi p to persons of
col or, but i t deni ed to any State the power to wi thhol d from them
the equal protecti on of the l aws, and authori zed Congress to en-
force i ts provi si on by appropri ate l egi sl ati on.
1
Thus, a state l aw
whi ch on i ts face worked a di scri mi nati on agai nst Afri can Ameri -
cans was voi d.
2
I n addi ti on, [t]hough the l aw i tsel f be fai r on i ts
face and i mparti al i n appearance, yet, i f i t i s appl i ed and admi ni s-
tered by publ i c authori ty wi th an evi l eye and an unequal hand,
so as practi cal l y to make unjust and i l l egal di scri mi nati ons be-
tween persons i n si mi l ar ci rcumstances, materi al to thei r ri ghts,
the deni al of equal justi ce i s sti l l wi thi n the prohi bi ti on of the Con-
sti tuti on.
3
Education
Devel opment and Appl i cati on of Separate But Equal .
Cases deci ded soon after rati fi cati on of the Fourteenth Amendment
may be read as precl udi ng any state-i mposed di sti ncti on based on
race,
4
but the Court i n Plessy v. Ferguson
5
adopted a pri nci pl e
fi rst propounded i n l i ti gati on attacki ng raci al segregati on i n the
school s of Boston, Massachusetts.
6
Plessy concerned not school s but
a state l aw requi ri ng the furni shi ng of equal but separate faci l i -
ti es for rai l transportati on and requi ri ng the separati on of whi te
1841
7
Pl essy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 54344 (1896). We consi der the underl yi ng
fal l acy of the pl ai nti ffs argument to consi st i n the assumpti on that the enforced sep-
arati on of the two races stamps the col ored race wi th a badge of i nferi ori ty. I f thi s
be so, i t i s not by reason of anythi ng found i n the act, but sol el y because the col ored
race chooses to put that constructi on upon i t. I d. at 552, 559.
8
I d. at 54445. The act of Congress i n provi di ng for separate school s i n the Di s-
tri ct of Col umbi a was speci fi cal l y noted. Justi ce Harl ans wel l -known di ssent con-
tended that the purpose and effect of the l aw i n questi on was di scri mi natory and
stamped Afri can Ameri cans wi th a badge of i nferi ori ty. [I ]n vi ew of the Consti tu-
ti on, i n the eye of the l aw, there i s i n thi s country no superi or, domi nant, rul i ng
cl ass of ci ti zens. There i s no caste here. Our Consti tuti on i s col or-bl i nd, and nei ther
knows nor tol erates cl asses among ci ti zens. I d. at 552, 559.
9
Gong Lum v. Ri ce, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
10
Cummi ngs v. Board of Educati on, 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
11
Berea Col l ege v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
and col ored passengers. The object of the [Fourteenth]
[A]mendment was undoubtedl y to enforce the absol ute equal i ty of
the two races before the l aw, but i n the nature of thi ngs i t coul d
not have been i ntended to abol i sh di sti ncti ons based upon col or, or
to enforce soci al , as di sti ngui shed from pol i ti cal , equal i ty, or a com-
mi ngl i ng of the two races upon terms unsati sfactory to ei ther.
Laws permi tti ng, and even requi ri ng thei r separati on i n pl aces
where they are l i abl e to be brought i nto contact do not necessari l y
i mpl y the i nferi ori ty of ei ther race to the other, and have been gen-
eral l y, i f not uni versal l y, recogni zed as wi thi n the competency of
the state l egi sl atures i n exerci se of thei r pol i ce power.
7
The Court
observed that a common i nstance of thi s type of l aw was the sepa-
rati on by race of chi l dren i n school , whi ch had been uphel d, i t was
noted, even by courts of states where the pol i ti cal ri ghts of the col -
ored race have been l ongest and most earnestl y enforced.
8
Subsequent cases fol l owi ng Plessy that actual l y concerned
school segregati on di d not expressl y questi on the doctri ne and the
Courts deci si ons assumed i ts val i di ty. I t hel d, for exampl e, that a
Chi nese student was not deni ed equal protecti on by bei ng cl assi fi ed
wi th Afri can Ameri cans and sent to school wi th them rather than
wi th whi tes,
9
and i t uphel d the refusal of an i njuncti on to requi re
a school board to cl ose a whi te hi gh school unti l i t opened a hi gh
school for Afri can Ameri cans.
10
And no vi ol ati on of the equal pro-
tecti on cl ause was found when a state l aw prohi bi ted a pri vate col -
l ege from teachi ng whi tes and Afri can Ameri cans together.
11
I n 1938, the Court began to move away from separate but
equal . I t then hel d that a State whi ch operated a l aw school open
to whi tes onl y and whi ch di d not operate any l aw school open to
Afri can Ameri cans vi ol ated an appl i cants ri ght to equal protecti on,
even though the State offered to pay hi s tui ti on at an out-of-state
l aw school . The requi rement of the cl ause was for equal faci l i ti es
1842
12
Mi ssouri ex rel . Gai nes v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). See also Si puel v.
Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
13
Sweatt v. Pai nter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
14
McLauri n v. Okl ahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
15
347 U.S. 483 (1954). Segregati on i n the school s of the Di stri ct of Col umbi a
was hel d to vi ol ate the due process cl ause of the Fi fth Amendment i n Bol l i ng v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
16
Brown v. Board of Educati on, 347 U.S. 483, 48990, 49295 (1954).
wi thi n the State.
12
When Texas establ i shed a l aw school for Afri -
can Ameri cans after the pl ai nti ff had appl i ed and been deni ed ad-
mi ssi on to the school mai ntai ned for whi tes, the Court hel d the ac-
ti on to be i nadequate, fi ndi ng that the nature of l aw school s and
the associ ati ons possi bl e i n the whi te school necessari l y meant that
the separate school was unequal .
13
Equal l y objecti onabl e was the
fact that when Okl ahoma admi tted an Afri can Ameri can l aw stu-
dent to i ts onl y l aw school i t requi red hi m to remai n physi cal l y sep-
arate from the other students.
14
Brown v. Board of Education. Separate but equal was
formal l y abandoned i n Brown v. Board of Education,
15
i nvol vi ng
chal l enges to segregati on per se i n the school s of four States i n
whi ch the l ower courts had found that the school s provi ded were
equal i zed or were i n the process of bei ng equal i zed. Though the
Court had asked for argument on the i ntent of the framers, exten-
si ve research had proved i nconcl usi ve, and the Court asserted that
i t coul d not turn the cl ock back to 1867. . . or even to 1896, but
must rather consi der the i ssue i n the context of the vi tal i mpor-
tance of educati on i n 1954. The Court reasoned that deni al of op-
portuni ty for an adequate educati on woul d often be a deni al of the
opportuni ty to succeed i n l i fe, that separati on of the races i n the
school s sol el y on the basi s of race must necessari l y generate feel -
i ngs of i nferi ori ty i n the di sfavored race adversel y affecti ng edu-
cati on as wel l as other matters, and therefore that the equal pro-
tecti on cl ause was vi ol ated by such separati on. We concl ude that
i n the fi el d of publ i c educati on the doctri ne of separate but equal
has no pl ace. Separate educati onal faci l i ti es are i nherentl y un-
equal .
16
After heari ng argument on what remedi al order shoul d i ssue,
the Court remanded the cases to the l ower courts to adjust the ef-
fectuati on of i ts mandate to the parti cul ari ti es of each school di s-
tri ct. At stake i s the personal i nterest of the pl ai nti ffs i n admi s-
si on to publ i c school s as soon as practi cabl e on a nondi scri mi natory
basi s. The l ower courts were di rected to requi re that the defend-
ants make a prompt and reasonabl e start toward ful l compl i ance,
al though [o]nce such a start has been made, some addi ti onal ti me
woul d be needed because of probl ems ari si ng i n the course of com-
1843
17
Brown v. Board of Educati on, 349 U.S. 294, 30001 (1955).
18
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
19
E.g., Covi ngton v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Ci r.), cert. deni ed, 361 U.S. 840
(1959); Hol t v. Ral ei gh Ci ty Bd. of Educ., 265 F.2d 95 (4th Ci r.), cert. deni ed, 361
U.S. 818 (1959); Dove v. Parham, 271 F.2d 132 (8th Ci r. 1959).
20
E.g., McCoy v. Greensboro Ci ty Bd. of Educ., 283 F.2d 667 (4th Ci r. 1960);
Green v. School Board of Roanoke, 304 F.2d 118 (4th Ci r. 1962); Gi bson v. Board
of Pub. I nstructi on of Dade County, 272 F.2d 763 (5th Ci r. 1959); Northcross v.
Board of Educ. of Memphi s, 302 F.2d 818 (6th Ci r. 1962), cert. deni ed, 370 U.S. 944
(1962).
21
McNeese v. Board of Educati on, 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
22
Gri ffi n v. Board of Supervi sors of Pri nce Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964)
(hol di ng that under the ci rcumstances the cl osi ng by a county of i ts school s whi l e
al l the other school s i n the State were open deni ed equal protecti on, the ci r-
cumstances apparentl y bei ng the state permi ssi on and authori ty for the cl osi ng and
the exi stence of state and county tui ti on grant/tax credi t programs maki ng an offi -
ci al connecti on wi th the pri vate school s operati ng i n the county and hol di ng that
a federal court i s empowered to di rect the appropri ate offi ci al s to rai se and expend
money to operate school s). On school cl osi ng l egi sl ati on i n another State, see Bush
v. Orl eans Pari sh School Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42, 188 F. Supp. 916 (E.D. La. 1960),
affd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961); Hal l v. St. Hel ena Pari sh School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649
(E.D. La. 1961), affd, 368 U.S. 515 (1962).
23
Goss v. Board of Educ. of Ci ty of Knoxvi l l e, 373 U.S. 683 (1963). Such pl ans
permi tted as of ri ght a student assi gned to a school i n whi ch students of hi s race
were a mi nori ty to transfer to a school where the student majori ty was of hi s race.
24
Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphi s, 333 F.2d 661 (6th Ci r. 1964).
25
The fi rst comment appeared i n di ctum i n a nonschool case, Watson v. Ci ty
of Memphi s, 373 U.S. 526, 530 (1963), and was i mpl i ed i n Goss v. Board of Educ.
of Ci ty of Knoxvi l l e, 373 U.S. 683, 689 (1963). I n Bradl ey v. School Bd. of Ci ty of
Ri chmond, 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965), the Court announced that [d]el ays i n deseg-
pl i ance and the l ower courts were to al l ow i t i f on i nqui ry del ay
were found to be i n the publ i c i nterest and [to be] consi stent wi th
good fai th compl i ance . . . to effectuate a transi ti on to a raci al l y
nondi scri mi natory school system. But i n any event the l ower
courts were to requi re compl i ance wi th al l del i berate speed.
17
Browns Aftermath. For the next several years, the Court
decl i ned to i nterfere wi th the admi ni strati on of i ts mandate, rul i ng
onl y i n those years on the efforts of Arkansas to bl ock desegrega-
ti on of school s i n Li ttl e Rock.
18
I n the mai n, these years were
taken up wi th enactment and admi ni strati on of pupi l pl acement
l aws by whi ch offi ci al s assi gned each student i ndi vi dual l y to a
school on the basi s of formal l y nondi scri mi natory cri teri a, and
whi ch requi red the exhausti on of state admi ni strati ve remedi es be-
fore each pupi l seeki ng reassi gnment coul d bri ng i ndi vi dual l i ti ga-
ti on.
19
The l ower courts eventual l y began voi di ng these l aws for
di scri mi natory appl i cati on, permi tti ng cl ass acti ons,
20
and the Su-
preme Court voi ded the exhausti on of state remedi es requi re-
ment.
21
I n the earl y 1960s, vari ous state practi ces school cl os-
i ngs,
22
mi nori ty transfer pl ans,
23
zoni ng,
24
and the l i ke were
rul ed i mpermi ssi bl e, and the Court i ndi cated that the ti me was
runni ng out for ful l i mpl ementati on of the Brown mandate.
25
1844
regati ng school systems are no l onger tol erabl e. A grade-a-year pl an was i mpl i ci tl y
di sapproved i n Cal houn v. Lati mer, 377 U.S. 263 (1964), vacati ng and remandi ng
321 F.2d 302 (5th Ci r. 1963). See Si ngl eton v. Jackson Muni ci pal Separate School
Di st., 355 F.2d 865 (5th Ci r. 1966).
26
E.g., Bradl ey v. School Bd. of Ci ty of Ri chmond, 345 F.2d 310 (4th Ci r.), revd
on other grounds, 382 U.S. 103 (1965); Bowman v. School Bd. of Charl es Ci ty Coun-
ty, 382 F.2d 326 (4th Ci r. 1967).
27
Pub. L. 88352, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq. (prohi bi ti ng di scri mi -
nati on i n federal l y assi sted programs). HEW gui del i nes were desi gned to afford
gui dance to state-l ocal offi ci al s i n i nterpretati ons of the l aw and were accepted as
authori tati ve by the courts and uti l i zed. Davi s v. Board of School Commrs of Mobi l e
County, 364 F.2d 896 (5th Ci r. 1966); Kemp v. Beasl ey, 352 F.2d 14 (8th Ci r. 1965).
28
391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Board of Educ. of Goul d School Di st., 391 U.S.
443 (1968). These cases had been preceded by a ci rcui t-wi de promul gati on of si mi l ar
standards i n Uni ted States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Ci r.
1966), modi fi ed & affd. en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Ci r.), cert. deni ed, 389 U.S. 840
(1967).
29
Green, 391 U.S. at 439, 442 (1968). Brown I I was a cal l for the di smantl i ng
of wel l -entrenched dual systems tempered by an awareness that compl ex and
mul ti faceted probl ems woul d ari se whi ch woul d requi re ti me and fl exi bi l i ty for a
successful resol uti on. School boards such as the respondent then operati ng state-
compel l ed dual systems were neverthel ess cl earl y charged wi th the affi rmati ve duty
to take whatever steps mi ght be necessary to convert to a uni tary system i n whi ch
raci al di scri mi nati on woul d be el i mi nated root and branch. I d. at 43738. The case
l ai d to rest the di ctum of Bri ggs v. El l i ott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955),
that the Consti tuti on does not requi re i ntegrati on but merel y forbi ds di scri mi na-
ti on. Green and Raney v. Board of Educ. of Goul d School Di st., 391 U.S. 443 (1968),
found freedom of choi ce pl ans i nadequate, and Monroe v. Board of Commrs of Ci ty
of Jackson, 391 U.S. 450 (1968), found a free transfer pl an i nadequate.
About thi s ti me, freedom of choi ce pl ans were promul gated
under whi ch each chi l d i n the school di stri ct coul d choose each year
whi ch school he wi shed to attend, and, subject to space l i mi tati ons,
he coul d attend that school . These were fi rst approved by the l ower
courts as acceptabl e means to i mpl ement desegregati on, subject to
the reservati on that they be fai rl y admi ni stered.
26
Enactment of
Ti tl e VI of the Ci vi l Ri ghts Act of 1964 and HEW enforcement i n
a manner as to requi re effecti ve i mpl ementati on of affi rmati ve ac-
ti ons to desegregate
27
l ed to a change of atti tude i n the l ower
courts and the Supreme Court. I n Green v. School Board of New
Kent County,
28
the Court posi ted the pri nci pl e that the onl y deseg-
regati on pl an permi ssi bl e i s one whi ch actual l y resul ts i n the abol i -
ti on of the dual school , and charged school offi ci al s wi th an affi rma-
ti ve obl i gati on to achi eve i t. School boards must present to the di s-
tri ct courts a pl an that promi ses real i sti cal l y to work and promi ses
real i sti cal l y to work now, i n such a manner as to convert prompt-
l y to a system wi thout a whi te school and a Negro school , but just
school s.
29
Furthermore, as the Court and l ower courts had by
then made cl ear, school desegregati on encompassed not onl y the
abol i ti on of dual attendance systems for students, but al so the
1845
30
Bradl ey v. School Bd. of Ci ty of Ri chmond, 382 U.S. 103 (1965) (facul ty deseg-
regati on i s i ntegral part of any pupi l desegregati on pl an); Uni ted States v. Mont-
gomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969) (uphol di ng di stri ct court order re-
qui ri ng assi gnment of facul ty and staff on a rati o based on raci al popul ati on of di s-
tri ct).
31
Uni ted States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Ci r. 1966),
mod. & affd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Ci r.), cert. deni ed, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
32
Hal l v. St. Hel ena Pari sh School Bd., 417 F.2d 801 (5th Ci r.), cert. deni ed,
396 U.S. 904 (1969); Henry v. Cl arksdal e Mun. Separate School Di st., 409 F.2d 682
(5th Ci r.), cert. deni ed, 396 U.S. 940 (1969); Brewer v. School Bd. of Ci ty of Norfol k,
397 F.2d 37 (4th Ci r. 1968); Cl ark v. Board of Educ. of Ci ty of Li ttl e Rock, 426 F.2d
1035 (8th Ci r. 1970).
33
Al exander v. Hol mes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969). The Court
summari l y rei terated i ts poi nt several ti mes i n the Term. Carter v. West Fana Par-
i sh School Board, 396 U.S. 290 (1970); Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphi s,
397 U.S. 232 (1970); Dowel l v. Bd. of Educ. of Okl ahoma Ci ty, 396 U.S. 269 (1969).
34
402 U.S. 1 (1971); see also Davi s v. Board of School Commrs of Mobi l e Coun-
ty, 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
35
McDani el v. Barresi , 402 U.S. 39 (1971); North Carol i na State Bd. of Educ.
v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
mergi ng i nto one system of facul ty,
30
staff, and servi ces, so that no
school coul d be marked as ei ther a bl ack or a whi te school .
31
I mpl ementati on of School Desegregati on. I n the after-
math of Green, the vari ous Courts of Appeal s hel d i nadequate an
i ncreasi ng number of school board pl ans based on freedom of
choi ce, on zoni ng whi ch fol l owed tradi ti onal resi denti al patterns,
or on some combi nati on of the two.
32
The Supreme Courts next op-
portuni ty to speak on the subject came when HEW sought to wi th-
draw desegregati on pl ans i t had submi tted at court request and
asked for a postponement of a court-i mposed deadl i ne, whi ch was
rel uctantl y granted by the Fi fth Ci rcui t. The Court unani mousl y
reversed and announced that conti nued operati on of segregated
school s under a standard of al l owi ng al l del i berate speed for de-
segregati on i s no l onger consti tuti onal l y permi ssi bl e. Under expl i ci t
hol di ngs of thi s Court the obl i gati on of every school di stri ct i s to
termi nate dual school systems at once and to operate now and
hereafter onl y uni tary school s.
33
I n the October 1970 Term the Court i n Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education
34
undertook to el aborate the re-
qui rements for achi evi ng a uni tary school system and del i neati ng
the methods whi ch coul d or must be used to achi eve i t, and at the
same ti me struck down state i nhi bi ti ons on the process.
35
The
opi ni on i n Swann emphasi zed that the goal si nce Brown was the
di smantl i ng of an offi ci al l y-i mposed dual school system. I ndepend-
ent of student assi gnment, where i t i s possi bl e to i denti fy a whi te
school or a Negro school si mpl y by reference to the raci al composi -
ti on of teachers and staff, the qual i ty of school bui l di ngs and equi p-
ment, or the organi zati on of sports acti vi ti es, a prima facie case of
1846
36
402 U.S. at 18.
37
I d. at 2527.
38
I d. at 2225.
39
I d. at 2729.
40
I d. at 2931.
41
I d. at 3132. I n Pasadena Ci ty Bd. of Educ. v. Spangl er, 427 U.S. 424 (1976),
the Court hel d that after a school board has compl i ed wi th a judi ci al l y-i mposed de-
segregati on pl an i n student assi gnments and thus undone the exi sti ng segregati on,
i t i s beyond the di stri ct courts power to order i t subsequentl y to i mpl ement a new
pl an to undo the segregati ve effects of shi fti ng resi denti al patterns. The Court
agreed wi th the di ssenters, Justi ces Marshal l and Brennan, i d., 436, 441, that the
school board had not compl i ed i n other respects, such as i n staff hi ri ng and pro-
vi ol ati on of substanti ve consti tuti onal ri ghts under the Equal Pro-
tecti on Cl ause i s shown.
36
Whi l e the exi stence of some smal l
number of one-race, or vi rtual l y one-race, school s wi thi n a di stri ct
i s not i n and of i tsel f the mark of a system that sti l l practi ces seg-
regati on by l aw, any such si tuati on must be cl osel y scruti ni zed by
the l ower courts, and school offi ci al s have a heavy burden to prove
that the si tuati on i s not the resul t of state-fostered segregati on.
Any desegregati on pl an whi ch contempl ates such a si tuati on must
before a court accepts i t be shown not to be affected by present or
past di scri mi natory acti on on the part of state and l ocal offi ci al s.
37
When a federal court has to devel op a remedi al desegregati on pl an,
i t must start wi th an appreci ati on of the mathemati cs of the raci al
composi ti on of the school di stri ct popul ati on; i ts pl an may rel y to
some extent on mathemati cal rati os but i t shoul d exerci se care that
thi s use i s onl y a starti ng poi nt.
38
Because current attendance patterns may be attri butabl e to
past di scri mi natory acti ons i n si te sel ecti on and l ocati on of school
bui l di ngs, the Court i n Swann determi ned that i t i s permi ssi bl e,
and may be requi red, to resort to al teri ng of attendance boundari es
and groupi ng or pai ri ng school s i n nonconti guous fashi on i n order
to promote desegregati on and undo past offi ci al acti on; i n thi s re-
medi al process, consci ous assi gnment of students and drawi ng of
boundari es on the basi s of race i s permi ssi bl e.
39
Transportati on of
students busi ng i s a permi ssi bl e tool of educati onal and desegre-
gati on pol i cy, i nasmuch as a nei ghborhood attendance pol i cy may
be i nadequate due to past di scri mi nati on. The soundness of any
busi ng pl an must be wei ghed on the basi s of many factors, i ncl ud-
i ng the age of the students; when the ti me or di stance of travel i s
so great as to ri sk the heal th of chi l dren or si gni fi cantl y i mpi nge
on the educati onal process, the wei ght shi fts.
40
Fi nal l y, the Court
i ndi cated, once a uni tary system has been establ i shed, no affi rma-
ti ve obl i gati on rests on school boards to adjust attendance year by
year to refl ect changes i n composi ti on of nei ghborhoods so l ong as
the change i s sol el y attri butabl e to pri vate acti on.
41
1847
moti on, but i t thought that was i rrel evant to the i ssue of neutral student assi gn-
ments.
42
The presence or absence of a statute mandati ng separati on provi des no tal i s-
man i ndi cati ng the di sti ncti on between de jure and de facto segregati on. Col umbus
Bd. of Educ. v. Peni ck, 443 U.S. 449, 457 n.5 (1979). As earl y as Ex parte Vi rgi ni a,
100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880), i t was sai d that no agency of the State, or of the offi cers
or agents by whom i ts powers are exerted, shal l deny to any person wi thi n i ts juri s-
di cti on the equal protecti on of the l aws. Whoever, by vi rtue of publ i c posi ti on under
a State government, . . . deni es or takes away the equal protecti on of the l aws . . .
vi ol ates the consti tuti onal i nhi bi ti on: and as he acts i n the name and for the State,
and i s cl othed wi th the States power, hi s act i s that of the State. The si gni fi cance
of a statute i s that i t si mpl i fi es i n the extreme a compl ai nants proof.
43
418 U.S. 717 (1974).
44
I d. at 745.
45
I d. at 74142.
Northern School s: I nter- and I ntradi stri ct Desegrega-
ti on. The appearance i n the Court of school cases from l arge met-
ropol i tan areas i n whi ch the separati on of the races was not man-
dated by l aw but al l egedl y by offi ci al conni vance through zoni ng of
school boundari es, pupi l and teacher assi gnment pol i ci es, and si te
sel ecti ons, requi red the devel opment of standards for determi ni ng
when segregati on was de jure and what remedi es shoul d be i m-
posed when such offi ci al separati on was found.
42
Accepti ng the fi ndi ngs of l ower courts that the acti ons of l ocal
school offi ci al s and the state school board were responsi bl e i n part
for the raci al segregati on exi sti ng wi thi n the school system of the
Ci ty of Detroi t, the Court i n Milliken v. Bradley
43
set asi de a de-
segregati on order whi ch requi red the formul ati on of a pl an for a
metropol i tan area i ncl udi ng the Ci ty and 53 adjacent suburban
school di stri cts. The basi c hol di ng of the Court was that such a
remedy coul d be i mpl emented onl y to cure an i nter-di stri ct con-
sti tuti onal vi ol ati on, a fi ndi ng that the acti ons of state offi ci al s and
of the suburban school di stri cts were responsi bl e, at l east i n part,
for the i nterdi stri ct segregati on, through ei ther di scri mi natory ac-
ti ons wi thi n those juri sdi cti ons or consti tuti onal vi ol ati ons wi thi n
one di stri ct that had produced a si gni fi cant segregati ve effect i n an-
other di stri ct.
44
The permi ssi bl e scope of an i nter-di stri ct order,
however, woul d have to be consi dered i n l i ght of the Courts l an-
guage regardi ng the val ue pl aced upon l ocal educati onal uni ts. No
si ngl e tradi ti on i n publ i c educati on i s more deepl y rooted than l ocal
control over the operati on of school s; l ocal autonomy has l ong been
thought essenti al both to the mai ntenance of communi ty concern
and support for publ i c school s and to qual i ty of the educati onal
process.
45
Too, the compl exi ty of formul ati ng and overseei ng the
i mpl ementati on of a pl an that woul d effect a de facto consol i dati on
of mul ti pl e school di stri cts, the Court i ndi cated, woul d i mpose a
task whi ch few, i f any, judges are qual i fi ed to perform and one
1848
46
I d. at 74243. Thi s theme has been sounded i n a number of cases i n sui ts
seeki ng remedi al acti ons i n parti cul arl y i ntractabl e areas. Mayor of Phi l adel phi a v.
Educati onal Equal i ty League, 415 U.S. 605, 615 (1974); OShea v. Li ttl eton, 414
U.S. 488, 50002 (1974). I n Hi l l s v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293 (1976), the Court
wrote that i t had rejected the metropol i tan order because of fundamental l i mi ta-
ti ons on the remedi al powers of the federal courts to restructure the operati on of
l ocal and state governmental enti ti es. . . . I n other pl aces, the Court stressed the
absence of i nterdi stri ct vi ol ati ons, i d., 294, and i n sti l l others pai red the two rea-
sons. I d. at 296.
47
Mi l l i ken v. Bradl ey, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974). The four di ssenters argued both
that state i nvol vement was so pervasi ve that an i nter-di stri ct order was permi ssi bl e
and that such an order was mandated because i t was the States obl i gati on to estab-
l i sh a uni tary system, an obl i gati on whi ch coul d not be met wi thout an i nter-di stri ct
order. I d. at 757, 762, 781.
48
I d. at 744. See Hi l l s v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 294 n.11 (1976) ([T]he
Courts deci si on i n Milliken was premi sed on a control l i ng pri nci pl e governi ng the
permi ssi bl e scope of federal judi ci al power.); Austi n I ndep. School Di st. v. Uni ted
States, 429 U.S. 990, 991 (1976) (Justi ce Powel l concurri ng) (a core pri nci pl e of de-
segregati on cases i s that set out i n Milliken).
49
When an enti re school system has been separated i nto whi te and bl ack
school s by l aw, di sestabl i shment of the system and i ntegrati on of the enti re system
i s requi red. Havi ng once found a vi ol ati on, the di stri ct judge or school authori ti es
shoul d make every effort to achi eve the greatest possi bl e degree of actual desegrega-
ti on, taki ng i nto account the practi cal i ti es of the si tuati on. . . . The measure of any
desegregati on pl an i s i ts effecti veness. Davi s v. Board of School Commrs, 402 U.S.
33, 37 (1971). See Swann v. Charl otte-Meckl enburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25
(1971).
50
413 U.S. 189 (1973).
whi ch woul d depri ve the peopl e of control of thei r school s through
el ected representati ves.
46
The consti tuti onal ri ght of the Negro re-
spondents resi di ng i n Detroi t i s to attend a uni tary school system
i n that di stri ct.
47
The control l i ng pri nci pl e consi stentl y expounded i n our hol d-
i ngs, sai d the Court i n the Detroit case, i s that the scope of the
remedy i s determi ned by the nature and extent of the consti tu-
ti onal vi ol ati on.
48
Whi l e thi s axi om caused l i ttl e probl em when
the vi ol ati on consi sted of statutori l y mandated separati on,
49
i t has
requi red a consi derabl e expendi ture of judi ci al effort and parsi ng of
opi ni ons to work out i n the context of systems i n whi ch the offi ci al
practi ce was nondi scri mi natory but offi ci al acti on operated to the
contrary. At fi rst, the di ffi cul ty was obscured through the creati on
of presumpti ons that eased the burden of proof on pl ai nti ffs, but
l ater the Court had appeared to sti ffen the requi rements on pl ai n-
ti ffs.
Determi nati on of the exi stence of a consti tuti onal vi ol ati on and
the formul ati on of remedi es, wi thi n one di stri ct, fi rst was presented
to the Court i n a northern setti ng i n Keyes v. Denver School Dis-
trict.
50
The l ower courts had found the school segregati on exi sti ng
wi thi n one part of the Ci ty to be attri butabl e to offi ci al acti on, but
as to the central ci ty they found the separati on not to be the resul t
1849
51
I d. at 207211. Justi ce Rehnqui st argued that i mposi ti on of a di stri ct-wi de
segregati on order shoul d not proceed from a fi ndi ng of segregati ve i ntent and effect
i n onl y one porti on, that i n effect the Court was i mposi ng an affi rmati ve obl i gati on
to i ntegrate wi thout fi rst fi ndi ng a consti tuti onal vi ol ati on. I d. at 254 (di ssenti ng).
Justi ce Powel l cauti oned di stri ct courts agai nst i mposi ng di srupti ve desegregati on
pl ans, especi al l y substanti al busi ng i n l arge metropol i tan areas, and stressed the re-
sponsi bi l i ty to proceed wi th reason, fl exi bi l i ty, and bal ance. I d. at 217, 236 (concur-
ri ng and di ssenti ng). See hi s opi ni on i n Austi n I ndep. School Di st. v. Uni ted States,
429 U.S. 990, 991 (1976) (concurri ng).
52
Of si gni fi cance was the di sal l owance of the di sproporti onate i mpact anal ysi s
i n consti tuti onal i nterpretati on and the adopti on of an apparentl y strengthened i n-
tent requi rement. Washi ngton v. Davi s, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Vi l l age of Arl i ngton
Hei ghts v. Metropol i tan Housi ng Dev. Corp ., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Massachusetts
Personnel Admr v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). Thi s pri nci pl e appl i es i n the school
area. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Bri nkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419 (1977).
53
Pasadena Ci ty Bd. of Educ. v. Spangl er, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
54
I d. at 436.
of offi ci al acti on and refused to i mpose a remedy for those school s.
The Supreme Court found thi s l atter hol di ng to be error, hol di ng
that when i t i s proved that a si gni fi cant porti on of a system i s offi -
ci al l y segregated, the presumpti on ari ses that segregati on i n the
remai nder or other porti ons of the system i s al so si mi l arl y con-
tri ved. The burden the shi fts to the school board or other offi ci al s
to rebut the presumpti on by provi ng, for exampl e, that geographi -
cal structure or natural boundari es have caused the di vi di ng of a
di stri ct i nto separate i denti fi abl e and unrel ated uni ts. Thus, a fi nd-
i ng that one si gni fi cant porti on of a school system i s offi ci al l y seg-
regated may wel l be the predi cate for fi ndi ng that the enti re sys-
tem i s a dual one, necessi tati ng the i mposi ti on upon the school au-
thori ti es of the affi rmati ve obl i gati on to create a uni tary system
throughout.
51
Keyes then was consi stent wi th earl i er cases requi ri ng a show-
i ng of offi ci al compl i ci ty i n segregati on and l i mi ti ng the remedy to
the vi ol ati on found; by creati ng presumpti ons Keyes si mpl y afforded
pl ai nti ffs a way to surmount the barri ers i mposed by stri ct appl i ca-
ti on of the requi rements. Fol l owi ng the enunci ati on i n the Detroit
i nter-di stri ct case, however, of the control l i ng pri nci pl e of school
desegregati on cases, the Court appeared to move away from the
Keyes approach.
52
Fi rst, the Court hel d that federal equi ty power
was l acki ng to i mpose orders to correct demographi c shi fts not at-
tri buted to any segregati ve acti ons on the part of the defend-
ants.
53
A di stri ct court that had ordered i mpl ementati on of a stu-
dent assi gnment pl an that resul ted i n a raci al l y neutral system ex-
ceeded i ts authori ty, the Court hel d, by orderi ng annual readjust-
ments to offset the demographi c changes.
54
Second, i n the fi rst Dayton case the l ower courts had found
three consti tuti onal vi ol ati ons that had resul ted i n some pupi l seg-
1850
55
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Bri nkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977) (quoti ng Hi l l s v.
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 294 (1976)).
56
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Bri nkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977). The Court di d
not di scuss the presumpti ons that had been permi tted by Keyes. Justi ce Brennan,
the author of Keyes, concurred on the basi s that the vi ol ati ons found di d not justi fy
the remedy i mposed, asserti ng that the methods of proof uti l i zed i n Keyes were sti l l
val i d. I d. at 421.
57
Col umbus Bd. of Educ. v. Peni ck, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ.
v. Bri nkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
regati on, and, based on these three, vi ewed as cumul ati ve vi ol a-
ti ons, a di stri ct-wi de transportati on pl an had been i mposed. Re-
versi ng, the Supreme Court rei terated that the remedi al powers of
the federal courts are cal l ed forth by vi ol ati ons and are l i mi ted by
the scope of those vi ol ati ons. Once a consti tuti onal vi ol ati on i s
found, a federal court i s requi red to tai l or the scope of the remedy
to fi t the nature and extent of the consti tuti onal vi ol ati on.
55
The
goal i s to restore the pl ai nti ffs to the posi ti on they woul d have oc-
cupi ed had they not been subject to unconsti tuti onal acti on. Lower
courts must determi ne how much i ncremental segregati ve effect
these vi ol ati ons had on the raci al di stri buti on of the Dayton school
popul ati on as presentl y consti tuted, when that di stri buti on i s com-
pared to what i t woul d have been i n the absence of such consti tu-
ti onal vi ol ati ons. The remedy must be desi gned to redress that di f-
ference, and onl y i f there has been a systemwi de i mpact may there
be a systemwi de remedy.
56
The Court then sent the case back to
the di stri ct court for the taki ng of evi dence, the fi ndi ng of the na-
ture of the vi ol ati ons, and the devel opment of an appropri ate rem-
edy.
Surpri si ngl y, however, Keyes was reaffi rmed and broadl y ap-
pl i ed i n subsequent appeal s of the Dayton case after remand and
i n an appeal from Col umbus, Ohi o.
57
Fol l owi ng the Supreme Court
standards, the Dayton di stri ct court hel d that the pl ai nti ffs had
fai l ed to prove offi ci al segregati ve i ntent, but was reversed by the
appeal s court. The Columbus di stri ct court had found and had been
affi rmed i n fi ndi ng raci al l y di scri mi natory conduct and had ordered
extensi ve busi ng. The Supreme Court hel d that the evi dence ad-
duced i n both di stri ct courts showed that the school boards had
carri ed out segregati ng acti ons affecti ng a substanti al porti on of
each school system pri or to and contemporaneousl y wi th the 1954
deci si on i n Brown v. Board of Education. The Keyes presumpti on
therefore requi red the school boards to show that systemwi de di s-
cri mi nati on had not exi sted, and they fai l ed to do so. Because each
system was a dual one i n 1954, i t was subject to an affi rmati ve
duty to take whatever steps mi ght be necessary to convert to a uni -
tary system i n whi ch raci al di scri mi nati on woul d be el i mi nated
1851
58
Col umbus Bd. of Educ. v. Peni ck, 443 U.S. 449, 459 (1979) (quoti ng Green v.
School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 43738 (1968)). Contrast the Courts
more recent deci si on i n Bazemore v. Fri day, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curi am), hol d-
i ng that adopti on of a whol l y neutral admi ssi ons pol i cy for vol untary membershi p
i n state-sponsored 4-H Cl ubs was suffi ci ent even though si ngl e race cl ubs conti nued
to exi st under that pol i cy. There i s no consti tuti onal requi rement that states i n al l
ci rcumstances pursue affi rmati ve remedi es to overcome past di scri mi nati on, the
Court concl uded; the vol untary nature of the cl ubs, unrestri cted by state defi ni ti on
of attendance zones or other deci si ons affecti ng membershi p, presented a whol l y
di fferent mi l i eu from publ i c school s. I d. at 408 (concurri ng opi ni on of Justi ce Whi te,
endorsed by the Courts per curi am opi ni on).
59
I d. at 46165.
60
I d. at 46567.
61
Mi l l i ken v. Bradl ey, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). The Court al so affi rmed that part
of the order di recti ng the State of Mi chi gan to pay one-hal f the costs of the man-
dated programs. I d. at 28891.
62
495 U.S. 33 (1990).
63
I d. at 52. Si mi l arl y, the Court hel d i n Spal l one v. Uni ted States, 493 U.S. 265
(1990), that a di stri ct court had abused i ts di screti on i n i mposi ng contempt sanc-
root and branch.
58
Fol l owi ng 1954, segregated school s conti nued
to exi st and the school boards had i n fact taken acti ons whi ch had
the effect of i ncreasi ng segregati on. I n the context of the on-goi ng
affi rmati ve duty to desegregate, the foreseeabl e i mpact of the ac-
ti ons of the boards coul d be uti l i zed to i nfer segregati ve i ntent,
thus sati sfyi ng the Davis-Arlington Heights standards.
59
The Court
further affi rmed the di stri ct-wi de remedi es, hol di ng that i ts earl i er
Dayton rul i ng had been premi sed upon the evi dence of onl y a few
i sol ated di scri mi natory practi ces; here, because systemwi de i mpact
had been found, systemwi de remedi es were appropri ate.
60
Reaffi rmati on of the breadth of federal judi ci al remedi al pow-
ers came when, i n a second appeal of the Detroit case, the Court
unani mousl y uphel d the order of a di stri ct court mandati ng com-
pensatory or remedi al educati onal programs for school chi l dren
who had been subjected to past acts of de jure segregati on. So l ong
as the remedy i s rel ated to the condi ti on found to vi ol ate the Con-
sti tuti on, so l ong as i t i s remedi al , and so l ong as i t takes i nto ac-
count the i nterests of state and l ocal authori ti es i n managi ng thei r
own affai rs, federal courts have broad and fl exi bl e powers to rem-
edy past wrongs.
61
The broad scope of federal courts remedi al powers was more
recentl y reaffi rmed i n Missouri v. J enkins.
62
There the Court rul ed
that a federal di stri ct court has the power to order l ocal authori ti es
to i mpose a tax i ncrease i n order to pay to remedy a consti tuti onal
vi ol ati on, and i f necessary may enjoi n operati on of state l aws pro-
hi bi ti ng such tax i ncreases. However, the Court al so hel d, the di s-
tri ct court had abused i ts di screti on by i tsel f i mposi ng an i ncrease
i n property taxes wi thout fi rst affordi ng l ocal offi ci al s the oppor-
tuni ty to devi se thei r own sol uti ons.
63
1852
ti ons di rectl y on members of a ci ty counci l for refusi ng to vote to i mpl ement a con-
sent decree desi gned to remedy housi ng di scri mi nati on. I nstead, the court shoul d
have proceeded fi rst agai nst the ci ty al one, and shoul d have proceeded agai nst i ndi -
vi dual counci l members onl y i f the sancti ons agai nst the ci ty fai l ed to produce com-
pl i ance.
64
Swann v. Charl otte-Meckl enburg Board of Educati on, 402 U.S. 1, 3031
(1971).
65
Mi l l i ken v. Bradl ey, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974).
66
E.g., 407(a) of the Ci vi l Ri ghts Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 248, 42 U.S.C. 2000c
6, construed to cover onl y de facto segregati on i n Swann v. Charl otte-Meckl enburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 1718 (1971); 803 of the Educati on Amendments of 1972,
86 Stat. 372, 20 U.S.C. 1653 (expi red), i nterpreted i n Drummond v. Acree, 409
U.S. 1228 (1972) (Justi ce Powel l i n Chambers), and the Equal Educati onal Opportu-
ni ti es and Transportati on of Students Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 514 (1974), 20 U.S.C.
17011757, see especi al l y 1714, i nterpreted i n Morgan v. Kerri gan, 530 F.2d
401, 41115 (1st Ci r.), cert. deni ed, 426 U.S. 995 (1976), and Uni ted States v. Texas
Educati on Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 394 n.18 (5th Ci r.), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. Austi n I ndep. School Di st. v. Uni ted States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); and a seri es
of annual appropri ati ons ri ders, fi rst passed as ri ders to the 1976 and 1977 Labor-
HEW bi l l s, 108, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976), and 101, 91 Stat. 1460, 42 U.S.C. 2000d,
uphel d agai nst faci al attack i n Brown v. Cal i fano, 627 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Ci r. 1980).
67
See, e.g., The 14th Amendment and School Busing, Hearings before the Senate
J udiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, 97th Congress, 1st Sess. (1981); and
School Desegregation, Hearings before the House J udiciary Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights, 97th Congress, 1st Sess. (1981).
Efforts to Curb Busi ng and Other Desegregati on Rem-
edi es. Especi al l y duri ng the 1970s, courts and Congress grappl ed
wi th the appropri ateness of vari ous remedi es for de jure raci al sep-
arati on i n the publ i c school s, both North and South. Busi ng of
school chi l dren created the greatest amount of controversy. Swann,
of course, sancti oned an order requi ri ng fai rl y extensi ve busi ng, as
di d the more recent Dayton and Columbus cases, but the earl i er
case cauti oned as wel l that courts must observe l i mi ts occasi oned
by the nature of the educati onal process and the wel l -bei ng of chi l -
dren,
64
and subsequent cases decl ared the pri nci pl e that the rem-
edy must be no more extensi ve than the vi ol ati on found.
65
Con-
gress has enacted several provi si ons of l aw, ei ther permanent stat-
utes or annual appropri ati ons l i mi ts, that purport to restri ct the
power of federal courts and admi ni strati ve agenci es to order or to
requi re busi ng, but these, ei ther because of drafti ng i nfel i ci ti es or
because of modi fi cati ons requi red to obtai n passage, have been
l argel y i neffectual .
66
Stronger proposal s, for statutes or for con-
sti tuti onal amendments, were i ntroduced i n Congress, but none
passed both Houses.
67
Of consi derabl e i mportance to the possi bl e val i di ty of any sub-
stanti al congressi onal restri cti on on judi ci al provi si on of remedi es
for de jure segregati on vi ol ati ons are two deci si ons contrasti ngl y
deal i ng wi th referenda-approved restri cti ons on busi ng and other
1853
68
Washi ngton v. Seattl e School Di st., 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Crawford v. Los An-
gel es Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982). The deci si ons were i n essence an appl i cati on
of Hunter v. Eri ckson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
69
Washi ngton v. Seattl e School Di st., 458 U.S. 457, 47082 (1982). Justi ce
Bl ackmun wrote the opi ni on of the Court and was joi ned by Justi ces Brennan,
Whi te, Marshal l , and Stevens. Di ssenti ng were Justi ces Powel l , Rehnqui st, OCon-
nor, and Chi ef Justi ce Burger. I d. at 488. The di ssent essenti al l y argued that be-
cause the State was ul ti matel y enti rel y responsi bl e for al l educati onal deci si ons, i ts
choi ce to take back part of the power i t had del egated di d not rai se the i ssues the
majori ty thought i t di d.
70
Crawford v. Los Angel es Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 53540 (1982).
remedi es i n Washi ngton State and Cal i forni a.
68
Voters i n Wash-
i ngton, fol l owi ng a deci si on by the school board i n Seattl e to under-
take a mandatory busi ng program, approved an i ni ti ati ve that pro-
hi bi ted school boards from assi gni ng students to any but the near-
est or next nearest school that offered the students course of study;
there were so many excepti ons, however, that the prohi bi ti on i n ef-
fect appl i ed onl y to busi ng for raci al purposes. I n Cal i forni a the
state courts had i nterpreted the state consti tuti on to requi re school
systems to el i mi nate both de jure and de facto segregati on. The vot-
ers approved an i ni ti ati ve that prohi bi ted state courts from order-
i ng busi ng unl ess the segregati on was i n vi ol ati on of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and a federal judge woul d be empowered to
order i t under Uni ted States Supreme Court precedents.
By a narrow di vi si on, the Court hel d unconsti tuti onal the
Washi ngton measure, and wi th near unani mi ty of resul t i f not of
reasoni ng i t sustai ned the Cal i forni a measure. The consti tuti onal
fl aw i n the Washi ngton measure, the Court hel d, was that i t had
chosen a raci al cl assi fi cati on busi ng for desegregati on and i m-
posed more severe burdens upon those seeki ng to obtai n such a pol -
i cy than i t i mposed wi th respect to any other pol i cy. Local school
boards coul d make educati on pol i cy on anythi ng but busi ng. By si n-
gl i ng out busi ng and maki ng i t more di ffi cul t than anythi ng el se,
the voters had expressl y and knowi ngl y enacted a l aw that had an
i ntenti onal i mpact on a mi nori ty.
69
The Court di scerned no such
i mpedi ment i n the Cal i forni a measure, a si mpl e repeal of a remedy
that had been wi thi n the governments di screti on to provi de. More-
over, the State conti nued under an obl i gati on to al l evi ate de facto
segregati on by every other feasi bl e means. The i ni ti ati ve had mere-
l y forecl osed one parti cul ar remedy court-ordered mandatory bus-
i ng as i nappropri ate.
70
Termi nati on of Court Supervi si on. Wi th most school de-
segregati on decrees havi ng been entered decades ago, the i ssue has
ari sen as to what showi ng of compl i ance i s necessary for a school
di stri ct to free i tsel f of conti nui ng court supervi si on. The Court
grappl ed wi th the i ssue, fi rst i n a case i nvol vi ng Okl ahoma Ci ty
1854
71
498 U.S. 237 (1991).
72
I d. at 24950.
73
112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
74
100 U.S. 303 (1880). Cf. Vi rgi ni a v. Ri ves, 100 U.S. 313 (1880). Di scri mi nati on
on the basi s of race, col or, or previ ous condi ti on of servi tude i n jury sel ecti on has
al so been statutori l y i l l egal si nce enactment of 4 of the Ci vi l Ri ghts Act of 1875,
18 Stat. 335, 18 U.S.C. 243. See Ex parte Vi rgi ni a, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). I n Hernan-
dez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), the Court found jury di scri mi nati on agai nst Mexi -
can-Ameri cans to be a deni al of equal protecti on, a rul i ng i t rei terated i n Castaneda
v. Parti da, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), fi ndi ng proof of di scri mi nati on by stati sti cal di spari -
publ i c school s, then i n a case i nvol vi ng the Uni versi ty of Mi s-
si ssi ppi col l ege system. A desegregati on decree may be l i fted, the
Court sai d i n Oklahoma City Board of Education v. Dowell,
71
upon
a showi ng that the purposes of the l i ti gati on have been ful l y
achi eved, i .e., that the school di stri ct i s bei ng operated i n com-
pl i ance wi th the commands of the Equal Protecti on Cl ause, that
i t has been so operated for a reasonabl e peri od of ti me, and that
i t i s unl i kel y that the school board woul d return to i ts former vi o-
l ati ons. On remand, the tri al court was di rected to determi ne
whether the Board had compl i ed i n good fai th wi th the desegrega-
ti on decree si nce i t was entered, and whether the vesti ges of past
[de jure] di scri mi nati on had been el i mi nated to the extent prac-
ti cabl e.
72
I n United States v. Fordice,
73
the Court determi ned that
the State of Mi ssi ssi ppi had not, by adopti ng and i mpl ementi ng
race-neutral pol i ci es, el i mi nated al l vesti ges of i ts pri or de jure, ra-
ci al l y segregated, dual system of hi gher educati on. The State
must al so, to the extent practi cabl e and consi stent wi th sound edu-
cati onal practi ces, eradi cate pol i ci es and practi ces that are trace-
abl e to the dual system and that conti nue to have segregati ve ef-
fects. The Court i denti fi ed several survi vi ng aspects of Mi ssi ssi ppi s
pri or dual system whi ch are consti tuti onal l y suspect, and whi ch
must be justi fi ed or el i mi nated. The States admi ssi ons pol i cy, re-
qui ri ng hi gher test scores for admi ssi on to the fi ve hi stori cal l y
whi te i nsti tuti ons than for admi ssi on to the three hi stori cal l y bl ack
i nsti tuti ons, i s suspect because i t ori gi nated as a means of preserv-
i ng segregati on. Al so suspect are the wi despread dupl i cati on of pro-
grams, a possi bl e remnant of the dual separate-but-equal system;
i nsti tuti onal mi ssi on cl assi fi cati ons maki ng three hi stori cal l y whi te
school s the fl agshi p comprehensi ve uni versi ti es; and the retenti on
and operati on of al l ei ght school s rather than the possi bl e merger
of some.
J uries
I t has been establ i shed si nce Strauder v. West Virginia
74
that
excl usi on of an i denti fi abl e raci al or ethni c group from a grand
1855
ti es, even though Mexi can-surnamed i ndi vi dual s consti tuted a governi ng majori ty of
the county and a majori ty of the sel ecti ng offi ci al s were Mexi can-Ameri can.
75
Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900);
Rogers v. Al abama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904); Pi erre v. Loui si ana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939);
Smi th v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Hi l l v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Cassel l v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Reece v. Georgi a, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Eubanks v. Loui si -
ana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Arnol d v. North Carol i na, 376 U.S. 773 (1964); Al exander
v. Loui si ana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
76
Hol l i ns v. Okl ahoma, 295 U.S. 394 (1935); Avery v. Georgi a, 345 U.S. 559
(1953).
77
Neal v. Del aware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Marti n v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906);
Norri s v. Al abama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Hal e v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Pat-
ton v. Mi ssi ssi ppi , 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Col eman v. Al abama, 377 U.S. 129 (1964);
Whi tus v. Georgi a, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Jones v. Georgi a, 389 U.S. 24 (1967); Si ms
v. Georgi a, 385 U.S. 538 (1967).
78
Even i f there i s no di scri mi nati on i n the sel ecti on of the peti t jury whi ch con-
vi cted hi m, a defendant who shows di scri mi nati on i n the sel ecti on of the grand jury
whi ch i ndi cted hi m i s enti tl ed to a reversal of hi s convi cti on. Cassel l v. Texas, 339
U.S. 282 (1950); Al exander v. Loui si ana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Vasquez v. Hi l l ery,
474 U.S. 254 (1986) (habeas corpus remedy).
79
Powers v. Ohi o, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1373 (1991). See also Peters v. Ki ff, 407 U.S.
493 (1972) (defendant enti tl ed to have hi s convi cti on or i ndi ctment set asi de i f he
proves such excl usi on). The Court i n 1972 was substanti al l y di vi ded wi th respect to
the reason for rejecti ng the same cl ass rul e that the defendant be of the excl uded
cl ass but i n Tayl or v. Loui si ana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), i nvol vi ng a mal e defendant
and excl usi on of women, the Court ascri bed the resul t to the fai r-cross-secti on re-
qui rement of the Si xth Amendment, whi ch woul d have appl i cati on across-the
board.
80
Carter v. Jury Commn of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970).
81
I d.; Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
82
Norri s v. Al abama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Patton v. Mi ssi ssi ppi , 332 U.S. 463
(1947); Hi l l v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
jury
75
whi ch i ndi cts a defendant or a peti t jury
76
whi ch tri es hi m,
or from both,
77
deni es a defendant of the excl uded race equal pro-
tecti on and necessi tates reversal of hi s convi cti on or di smi ssal of
hi s i ndi ctment.
78
Even i f the defendants race di ffers from that of
the excl uded jurors, the Court has recentl y hel d, the defendant has
thi rd party standi ng to assert the ri ghts of jurors excl uded on the
basi s of race.
79
Defendants i n cri mi nal proceedi ngs do not have
the onl y cogni zabl e l egal i nterest i n nondi scri mi natory jury sel ec-
ti on. Peopl e excl uded from juri es because of thei r race are as much
aggri eved as those i ndi cted and tri ed by juri es chosen under a sys-
tem of raci al excl usi on.
80
Thus, persons may bri ng acti ons seeki ng
affi rmati ve rel i ef to outl aw di scri mi nati on i n jury sel ecti on, i nstead
of dependi ng on defendants to rai se the i ssue.
81
A prima facie case of del i berate and systemati c excl usi on i s
made when i t i s shown that no Afri can Ameri cans have served on
juri es for a peri od of years
82
or when i t i s shown that the number
of Afri can Ameri cans who served was grossl y di sproporti onate to
the percentage of Afri can Ameri cans i n the popul ati on and el i gi bl e
1856
83
Pi erre v. Loui si ana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Cassel l v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(1950); Eubanks v. Loui si ana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Whi tus v. Georgi a, 385 U.S. 545
(1967); Al exander v. Loui si ana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972). For an el aborate di scussi on of
stati sti cal proof, see Castaneda v. Parti da, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
84
Norri s v. Al abama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Eubanks v. Georgi a, 385 U.S. 545
(1967); Si ms v. Georgi a, 389 U.S. 404 (1967); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360
361 (1970).
85
Avery v. Georgi a, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) (names of whi tes and Afri can Ameri -
cans l i sted on di fferentl y col ored paper for drawi ng for jury duty); Whi tus v. Geor-
gi a, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (jurors sel ected from county tax books, i n whi ch names of
Afri can Ameri cans were marked wi th a c).
86
Carter v. Jury Commn of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 33137 (1970), and
cases ci ted.
87
I d. at 34041.
88
380 U.S. 202 (1965).
for jury servi ce.
83
Once thi s prima facie showi ng has been made,
the burden i s upon the juri sdi cti on to prove that di scri mi nati on
was not practi ced; i t i s not adequate that jury sel ecti on offi ci al s tes-
ti fy under oath that they di d not di scri mi nate.
84
Al though the
Court i n connecti on wi th a showi ng of great di spari ti es i n the ra-
ci al makeup of jurors cal l ed has voi ded certai n practi ces whi ch
made di scri mi nati on easy to accompl i sh,
85
i t has not outl awed di s-
creti onary sel ecti on pursuant to general standards of educati onal
attai nment and character whi ch can be admi ni stered fai rl y.
86
Si mi l arl y, i t decl i ned to rul e that Afri can Ameri cans must be i n-
cl uded on al l -whi te jury commi ssi ons whi ch admi ni ster the jury se-
l ecti on l aws i n some States.
87
I n Swain v. Alabama,
88
Afri can Ameri cans regul arl y appeared
on jury veni res but no Afri can Ameri can had actual l y served on a
jury. I t appeared that the absence was attri butabl e to the acti on
of the prosecutor i n peremptori l y chal l engi ng al l potenti al Afri can
Ameri can jurors, but the Court refused to set asi de the convi cti on.
The use of peremptory chal l enges to excl ude the Afri can Ameri cans
i n the parti cul ar case was permi ssi bl e, the Court hel d, regardl ess
of the prosecutors moti ve, al though i t was i ndi cated the consi stent
use of such chal l enges to remove Afri can Ameri cans woul d be un-
consti tuti onal . Because the record di d not di scl ose that the prosecu-
ti on was responsi bl e sol el y for the fact that no Afri can Ameri can
had ever served on a jury and that some excl usi ons were not the
resul t of defense peremptory chal l enges, defendants cl ai ms were
rejected.
The Swain hol di ng as to the evi denti ary standard was over-
rul ed i n Batson v. Kentucky, the Court rul i ng that a defendant
may establ i sh a pri ma faci e case of purposeful [raci al ] di scri mi na-
ti on i n sel ecti on of the peti t jury sol el y on evi dence concerni ng the
prosecutors exerci se of peremptory chal l enges at the defendants
[own] tri al . To rebut thi s showi ng, the prosecutor must arti cul ate
1857
89
476 U.S. 79, 96, 98 (1986). The pri nci pl es were appl i ed i n Trevi no v. Texas,
112 S. Ct. 1547 (1991), hol di ng that a cri mi nal defendants al l egati on of a states
pattern of hi stori cal and habi tual use of peremptory chal l enges to excl ude members
of raci al mi nori ti es was suffi ci ent to rai se an equal protecti on cl ai m under Swain
as wel l as Batson. I n Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), a prosecutor
was hel d to have sustai ned hi s burden of provi di ng a race-neutral expl anati on for
usi ng peremptory chal l enges to stri ke bi l i ngual Lati no jurors; the prosecutor had ex-
pl ai ned that, based on the answers and demeanor of the prospecti ve jurors, he had
doubted whether they woul d accept the i nterpreters offi ci al transl ati on of tri al testi -
mony by Spani sh-speaki ng wi tnesses. The Batson rul i ng appl i es to cases pendi ng on
di rect revi ew or not yet fi nal when Batson was deci ded, Gri ffi th v. Kentucky, 479
U.S. 314 (1987), but does not appl y to a case on federal habeas corpus revi ew, Al l en
v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986).
90
Edmonson v. Leesvi l l e Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
91
Georgi a v. McCol l um, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
92
Rose v. Mi tchel l , 443 U.S. 545, 551 n.4 (1979).
93
Hobby v. Uni ted States, 468 U.S. 339 (1984). Note al so that i n thi s l i mi ted
context where i njury to the defendant was l argel y conjectural , the Court seemi ngl y
revi ved the same cl ass rul e, hol di ng that a whi te defendant chal l engi ng on due proc-
ess grounds excl usi on of bl acks as grand jury foremen coul d not rel y on equal pro-
tecti on pri nci pl es protecti ng bl acks defendants from the i njuri es of sti gmati zati on
and prejudi ce associ ated wi th di scri mi nati on. I d. at 347.
94
481 U.S. 279 (1987). The deci si on was 54, wi th Justi ce Powel l s opi ni on of
the Court bei ng joi ned by Chi ef Justi ce Rehnqui st and by Justi ces Whi te, OConnor,
and Scal i a, and wi th Justi ces Brennan, Bl ackmun, Stevens, and Marshal l di ssent-
i ng.
a neutral expl anati on rel ated to the parti cul ar case, but the expl a-
nati on need not ri se to the l evel justi fyi ng exerci se of a chal l enge
for cause.
89
The Court has al so extended Batson to appl y to ra-
ci al l y di scri mi natory use of peremptory chal l enges by pri vate l i ti -
gants i n ci vi l l i ti gati on,
90
and by a defendant i n a cri mi nal case,
91
the pri nci pal i ssue i n these cases bei ng the presence of state acti on,
not the i nval i di ty of purposeful raci al di scri mi nati on.
Di scri mi nati on i n the sel ecti on of grand jury foremen presents
a cl oser questi on, answer to whi ch depends i n part on the respon-
si bi l i ti es of a foreman i n the parti cul ar system chal l enged. Thus
the Court had assumed wi thout deci di ng that di scri mi nati on i n
sel ecti on of foremen for state grand juri es woul d vi ol ate equal pro-
tecti on i n a system i n whi ch the judge sel ected a foreman to serve
as a thi rteenth voti ng juror, and that foreman exerci sed si gni fi cant
powers.
92
That si tuati on was di sti ngui shed, however, i n a due
process chal l enge to the federal system, where the foremans re-
sponsi bi l i ti es are essenti al l y cl eri cal and where the sel ecti on i s
from among the members of an al ready-chosen jury.
93
Capital Punishment
I n McCleskey v. Kemp
94
the Court rejected an equal protecti on
cl ai m of a bl ack defendant who recei ved a death sentence fol l owi ng
convi cti on for murder of a whi te vi cti m, even though a stati sti cal
study showed that bl acks charged wi th murderi ng whi tes were
1858
95
481 U.S. at 294. Di ssenti ng Justi ces Brennan, Bl ackmun and Stevens chal -
l enged thi s posi ti on as i nconsi stent wi th the Courts usual approach to capi tal pun-
i shment, i n whi ch greater scruti ny i s requi red. I d. at 340, 34748, 366.
96
I d. at 297. Di screti on i s especi al l y i mportant to the rol e of a capi tal sentenc-
i ng jury, whi ch must be al l owed to consi der any mi ti gati ng factor rel ati ng to the
defendants background or character, or to the nature of the offense; the Court al so
ci ted the tradi ti onal l y wi de di screti on accorded deci si ons of prosecutors. I d. at
296.
97
The Court di sti ngui shed Batson by suggesti ng that the death penal ty chal -
l enge woul d requi re a prosecutor to rebut a study that anal yzes the past conduct
of scores of prosecutors whereas the peremptory chal l enge i nqui ry woul d focus onl y
on the prosecutors own acts. 481 U.S. at 296 n.17.
98
245 U.S. 60 (1917). See also Harmon v. Tyl er, 273 U.S. 668 (1927); Ri chmond
v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930).
99
Shel l ey v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). Cf. Corri gan v. Buckl ey, 271 U.S. 323
(1926).
100
387 U.S. 369 (1967).
more than four ti mes as l i kel y to recei ve a death sentence i n the
state than were defendants charged wi th ki l l i ng bl acks. The Court
di sti ngui shed Batson v. Kentucky by characteri zi ng capi tal sentenc-
i ng as fundamental l y di fferent from jury veni re sel ecti on; con-
sequentl y, rel i ance on stati sti cal proof of di scri mi nati on i s l ess
rather than more appropri ate.
95
Because di screti on i s essenti al to
the cri mi nal justi ce process, we woul d demand excepti onal l y cl ear
proof before we woul d i nfer that the di screti on has been abused.
96
Al so, the Court noted, there i s not the same opportuni ty to rebut
a stati sti cal i nference of di scri mi nati on; jurors may not be requi red
to testi fy as to thei r moti ves, and for the most part prosecutors are
si mi l arl y i mmune from i nqui ry.
97
Housing
Buchanan v. Warley
98
i nval i dated an ordi nance whi ch prohi b-
i ted bl acks from occupyi ng houses i n bl ocks where the greater
number of houses were occupi ed by whi tes and whi ch prohi bi ted
whi tes from doi ng so where the greater number of houses were oc-
cupi ed by bl acks. Al though raci al l y restri cti ve covenants do not
themsel ves vi ol ate the equal protecti on cl ause, the judi ci al enforce-
ment of them, ei ther by i njuncti ve rel i ef or through entertai ni ng
damage acti ons, does vi ol ate the Fourteenth Amendment.
99
Ref-
erendum passage of a consti tuti onal amendment repeal i ng a fai r
housi ng l aw and prohi bi ti ng further state or l ocal acti on i n that
di recti on was hel d unconsti tuti onal i n Reitman v. Mulkey,
100
though on somewhat ambi guous grounds, whi l e a state consti tu-
ti onal requi rement that deci si ons of l ocal authori ti es to bui l d l ow-
rent housi ng projects i n an area must fi rst be submi tted to referen-
dum, al though other si mi l ar deci si ons were not so l i mi ted, was
1859
101
James v. Val ti erra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). The Court di d not percei ve that ei -
ther on i ts face or as appl i ed the provi si on was other than raci al l y neutral . Justi ces
Marshal l , Brennan, and Bl ackmun di ssented. I d. at 143.
102
Ci vi l Ri ghts Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, 42 U.S.C. 1982, see Jones v. Al fred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), and Ti tl e VI I I of the Ci vi l Ri ghts Act of 1968,
82 Stat. 73, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.
103
See Hi l l s v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
104
Pl essy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
105
Gayl e v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), affg 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Al a.)
(statute requi ri ng segregati on on buses i s unconsti tuti onal ). We have settl ed be-
yond questi on that no State may requi re raci al segregati on of i nterstate transpor-
tati on faci l i ti es. . . . Thi s questi on i s no l onger open; i t i s forecl osed as a l i ti gabl e
i ssue. Bai l ey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962).
106
McCabe v. Atchi son, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
107
Mi tchel l v. Uni ted States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
108
Morgan v. Vi rgi ni a, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Henderson v. Uni ted States, 339
U.S. 816 (1950).
109
364 U.S. 454 (1960).
110
E.g., Mayor & Ci ty Counci l of Bal ti more v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955)
(publ i c beaches and bathhouses); Hol mes v. Ci ty of Atl anta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(muni ci pal gol f courses); Mui r v. Loui svi l l e Park Theatri cal Assn, 347 U.S. 971
(1954) (ci ty l ease of park faci l i ti es); New Orl eans Ci ty Park I mprovement Assn v.
found to accord wi th the equal protecti on cl ause.
101
Pri vate raci al
di scri mi nati on i n the sal e or rental of housi ng i s subject to two fed-
eral l aws prohi bi ti ng most such di scri mi nati on.
102
Provi si on of
publ i cl y assi sted housi ng, of course, must be on a nondi scri m-
i natory basi s.
103
Other Areas of Discrimination
Transportati on. The separate but equal doctri ne won Su-
preme Court endorsement i n the transportati on context,
104
and i ts
passi ng i n the educati on fi el d di d not l ong predate i ts demi se i n
transportati on as wel l .
105
Duri ng the i nterval , the Court hel d i n-
val i d a state statute whi ch permi tted carri ers to provi de sl eepi ng
and di ni ng cars for whi te persons onl y,
106
hel d that a carri ers pro-
vi si on of unequal , or nonexi stent, fi rst cl ass accommodati ons to Af-
ri can Ameri cans vi ol ated the I nterstate Commerce Act,
107
and
voi ded both state-requi red and pri vatel y i mposed segregati on of the
races on i nterstate carri ers as burdens on commerce.
108
Boynton v.
Virginia
109
voi ded a trespass convi cti on of an i nterstate Afri can
Ameri can bus passenger who had refused to l eave a restaurant
whi ch the Court vi ewed as an i ntegral part of the faci l i ti es devoted
to i nterstate commerce and therefore subject to the I nterstate Com-
merce Act.
Publ i c Faci l i ti es. I n the aftermath of Brown v. Board of
Education, the Court i n a l engthy seri es of per curiam opi ni ons es-
tabl i shed the i nval i di ty of segregati on i n publ i cl y provi ded or sup-
ported faci l i ti es and of requi red segregati on i n any faci l i ty or func-
ti on.
110
A muni ci pal i ty coul d not operate a raci al l y-segregated park
1860
Deti ege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (publ i c parks and gol f courses); State Athl eti c Commn
v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (statute requi ri ng segregated athl eti c contests); Turn-
er v. Ci ty of Memphi s, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (admi ni strati ve regul ati on requi ri ng seg-
regati on i n ai rport restaurant); Schi ro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (ordi nance re-
qui ri ng segregati on i n muni ci pal audi tori um).
111
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). State courts had removed the ci ty as
trustee but the Court thought the ci ty was sti l l i nextri cabl y bound up i n the oper-
ati on and mai ntenance of the park. Justi ces Bl ack, Harl an, and Stewart di ssented
because they thought the removal of the ci ty as trustee removed the el ement of
state acti on. I d. at 312, 315.
112
Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). The Court thought that i n effectuati ng
the testators i ntent i n the fashi on best permi tted by the Fourteenth Amendment,
the state courts engaged i n no acti on vi ol ati ng the equal protecti on cl ause. Justi ces
Dougl as and Brennan di ssented. I d. at 448, 450.
113
Pal mer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). The Court found that there was
no offi ci al encouragement of di scri mi nati on through the act of cl osi ng the pool s and
that i nasmuch as both whi te and bl ack ci ti zens were depri ved of the use of the pool s
there was no unl awful di scri mi nati on. Justi ces Whi te, Brennan, and Marshal l di s-
sented, argui ng that state acti on taken sol el y i n opposi ti on to desegregati on was i m-
permi ssi bl e, both i n defi ance of the l ower court order and because i t penal i zed Afri -
can Ameri cans for asserti ng thei r ri ghts. I d. at 240. Justi ce Dougl as al so di ssented.
I d. 231.
114
Lovi ng v. Vi rgi ni a, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
115
McLaughl i n v. Fl ori da, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
116
Pal more v. Si doti , 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
117
Johnson v. Vi rgi ni a, 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
118
Hami l ton v. Al abama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964) (reversi ng contempt convi cti on of
wi tness who refused to answer questi ons so l ong as prosecutor addressed her by her
fi rst name).
119
Lee v. Washi ngton, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Wi l son v. Kel l ey, 294 F. Supp. 1005
(N.D.Ga.), affd, 393 U.S. 266 (1968).
pursuant to a wi l l whi ch l eft the property for that purpose and
whi ch speci fi ed that onl y whi tes coul d use the park,
111
but i t was
permi ssi bl e for the state courts to hol d that the trust had fai l ed
and to i mpl y a reverter to the decedents hei rs.
112
A muni ci pal i ty
under court order to desegregate i ts publ i cl y-owned swi mmi ng
pool s was hel d to be enti tl ed to cl ose the pool s i nstead, so l ong as
i t enti rel y ceased operati on of them.
113
Marri age. Statutes whi ch forbi d the contracti ng of marri age
between persons of di fferent races are unconsti tuti onal
114
as are
statutes whi ch penal i ze i nterraci al cohabi tati on.
115
Si mi l arl y, a
court may not deny custody of a chi l d based on a parents remar-
ri age to a person of another race and the presumed best i nterests
of the chi l d to be free from the prejudi ce and sti gmati zati on that
mi ght resul t.
116
J udi ci al System. Segregati on i n courtrooms i s unl awful and
may not be enforced through contempt ci tati ons for di sobedi ence
117
or through other means. Treatment of parti es to or wi tnesses i n ju-
di ci al acti ons based on thei r race i s i mpermi ssi bl e.
118
Jai l i nmates
have a ri ght not to be segregated by race unl ess there i s some over-
ri di ng necessi ty ari si ng out of the process of keepi ng order.
119
1861
120
Anderson v. Marti n, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
121
Tanci l v. Wool l s, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (summari l y affi rmi ng l ower court rul i ngs
sustai ni ng l aw requi ri ng that every di vorce decree i ndi cate race of husband and
wi fe, but voi di ng l aws requi ri ng separate l i sts of whi tes and Afri can Ameri cans i n
voti ng, tax and property records).
122
E.g., Burton v. Wi l mi ngton Parki ng Authori ty, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Turner
v. Ci ty of Memphi s, 369 U.S. 350 (1962); Peterson v. Ci ty of Greenvi l l e, 373 U.S.
244 (1963); Lombard v. Loui si ana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Robi nson v. Fl ori da, 378
U.S. 153 (1964).
123
Ti tl e I I , 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. 2000a to 2000a6. See Hamm v. Ci ty of
Rock Hi l l , 379 U.S. 306 (1964). On the vari ous posi ti ons of the Justi ces on the con-
sti tuti onal i ssue, see the opi ni ons i n Bel l v. Maryl and, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
124
See i nfra, pp. 194650.
125
E.g., Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358 (1971); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S.
222 (1985) (di senfranchi sement for cri mes i nvol vi ng moral turpi tude adopted for
purpose of raci al di scri mi nati on).
126
E.g., Gomi l l i on v. Li ghtfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Uni ted Jewi sh Orgs. v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
Publ i c Desi gnati on. I t i s unconsti tuti onal to desi gnate can-
di dates on the bal l ot by race
120
and apparentl y any sort of desi gna-
ti on by race on publ i c records i s suspect al though not necessari l y
unl awful .
121
Publ i c Accommodati ons. Whether or not di scri mi nati on
practi ced by operators of retai l sel l i ng and servi ce establ i shments
gave ri se to a deni al of consti tuti onal ri ghts occupi ed the Courts
attenti on consi derabl y i n the earl y 1960s, but i t avoi ded fi nal l y de-
ci di ng one way or the other, general l y fi ndi ng forbi dden state ac-
ti on i n some aspect of the si tuati on.
122
Passage of the 1964 Ci vi l
Ri ghts Act obvi ated any necessi ty to resol ve the i ssue.
123
El ecti ons. Whi l e, of course, the deni al of the franchi se on the
basi s of race or col or vi ol ates the Fi fteenth Amendment and a se-
ri es of i mpl ementi ng statutes enacted by Congress,
124
the admi ni s-
trati on of el ecti on statutes so as to treat whi te and bl ack voters or
candi dates di fferentl y can consti tute a deni al of equal protecti on as
wel l .
125
Addi ti onal l y, cases of gerrymanderi ng of el ectoral di stri cts
and the creati on or mai ntenance of el ectoral practi ces that di l ute
and weaken bl ack and other mi nori ty voti ng strength i s subject to
Fourteenth and Fi fteenth Amendment and statutory attack.
126
Permissible Remedial Utilizations of Racial Classifications
Of cri ti cal i mportance i n equal protecti on l i ti gati on i s the de-
gree to whi ch government i s permi tted to take race or another sus-
pect cl assi fi cati on i nto account i n order to formul ate and i mpl ement
a remedy to overcome the effects of past di scri mi nati on agai nst the
cl ass. Often the i ssue i s framed i n terms of reverse di scri mi na-
ti on, i nasmuch as the governmental acti on del i beratel y favors
members of the cl ass and may si mul taneousl y i mpact adversel y
1862
127
Whi l e the emphasi s i s upon governmental acti on, pri vate affi rmati ve acti ons
may i mpl i cate statutory bars to uses of race. E.g., McDonal d v. Santa Fe Trai l
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), hel d, not i n the context of an affi rmati ve acti on
program, that whi tes were as enti tl ed as any group to protecti on of federal l aws
banni ng raci al di scri mi nati on i n empl oyment. The Court emphasi zed that i t was not
passi ng at al l on the permi ssi bi l i ty of affi rmati ve acti on programs. I d. at 280 n.8.
I n Uni ted Steel workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), the Court hel d that ti tl e VI I
di d not prevent empl oyers from i nsti tuti ng vol untary, race-consci ous affi rmati ve ac-
ti on pl ans. Accord, Johnson v. Transportati on Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). Nor does
ti tl e VI I prohi bi t a court from approvi ng a consent decree provi di ng broader rel i ef
than the court woul d be permi tted to award. Local 93, I ntl Assn of Fi refi ghters v.
Ci ty of Cl evel and, 478 U.S. 501 (1986). And, court-ordered rel i ef pursuant to ti tl e
VI I may benefi t persons not themsel ves the vi cti ms of di scri mi nati on. Local 28 of
the Sheet Metal Workers I ntl Assn v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
128
E.g., Swann v. Charl otte-Meckl enburg Board of Educati on, 402 U.S. 1, 22
25 (1971).
129
Programs to overcome past soci etal di scri mi nati ons agai nst women have
been approved, Kahn v. Shevi n, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Schl esi nger v. Bal l ard, 419
U.S. 498 (1975); Cal i fano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), but gender cl assi fi cati ons
are not as suspect as raci al ones. Preferenti al treatment for Ameri can I ndi ans was
approved, Morton v. Mancari , 417 U.S. 535 (1974), but on the basi s that the cl assi -
fi cati on was pol i ti cal rather than raci al .
130
The consti tuti onal i ty of a l aw school admi ssi ons program i n whi ch mi nori ty
appl i cants were preferred for a number of posi ti ons was before the Court i n DeFuni s
v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), but the meri ts were not reached.
131
430 U.S. 144 (1977). Chi ef Justi ce Burger di ssented, i d., 180, and Justi ce
Marshal l di d not parti ci pate.
upon nonmembers of the cl ass.
127
Whi l e the Court i n pri or cases
had accepted both the use of race and other suspect cri teri a as
val i d factors i n formul ati ng remedi es to overcome di scrmi nati on
128
and the accordi ng of preferences to cl ass members when the cl ass
had previ ousl y been the object of di scri mi nati on,
129
i t had never
unti l recentl y gi ven pl enary revi ew to programs that expressl y used
race as the pri me consi derati on i n the awardi ng of some publ i c
benefi t.
130
I n United J ewish Organizations v. Carey
131
the State, i n order
to compl y wi th the Voti ng Ri ghts Act and to obtai n the Uni ted
States Attorney General s approval for a redi stri cti ng l aw, had
drawn a pl an whi ch consci ousl y used raci al cri teri a to create a cer-
tai n number of di stri cts wi th nonwhi te popul ati ons l arge enough to
permi t the el ecti on of nonwhi te candi dates i n spi te of the l ower vot-
i ng turnout of nonwhi tes. I n the process a Hasi di c Jewi sh commu-
ni ty previ ousl y l ocated enti rel y wi thi n one senate and one assembl y
di stri ct was di vi ded between two senate and two assembl y di stri cts,
and members of that communi ty sued, al l egi ng that the val ue of
thei r votes had been di l uted sol el y for the purpose of achi evi ng a
raci al quota. The Supreme Court approved the di stri cti ng, al though
the fragmented majori ty of seven concurred i n no majori ty opi ni on.
Justi ce Whi te, del i veri ng the judgment of the Court, based the
resul t on al ternati ve grounds. Fi rst, because the redi stri cti ng took
1863
132
I d. at 15565. Joi ni ng thi s part of the opi ni on were Justi ces Brennan,
Bl ackmun, and Stevens.
133
I d. at 16568. Joi ni ng thi s part of the opi ni on were Justi ces Stevens and
Rehnqui st. I n a separate opi ni on, Justi ce Brennan noted that preferenti al race pol i -
ci es were subject to several substanti al arguments: (1) they may di sgui se a pol i cy
that perpetuates di sadvantageous treatment; (2) they may serve to sti mul ate soci -
etys l atent race consci ousness; (3) they may sti gmati ze reci pi ent groups as much
as overtl y di scri mi natory practi ces agai nst them do; (4) they may be percei ved by
many as unjust. The presence of the Voti ng Ri ghts Act and the Attorney General s
supervi si on made the di fference to hi m i n thi s case. I d. at 168. Justi ces Stewart and
Powel l concurred, agreei ng wi th Justi ce Whi te that there was no showi ng of a pur-
pose on the l egi sl atures part to di scri mi nate agai nst whi te voters and that the effect
of the pl an was i nsuffi ci ent to i nval i date i t. I d. at 179.
134
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
pl ace pursuant to the admi ni strati on of the Voti ng Ri ghts Act, the
Justi ce argued that compl i ance wi th the Act necessari l y requi red
States to be race consci ous i n the drawi ng of l i nes so as not to di -
l ute mi nori ty voti ng strength, that thi s requi rement was not de-
pendent upon a showi ng of past di scri mi nati on, and that the States
retai ned di screti on to determi ne just what strength mi nori ty voters
needed i n el ectoral di stri cts i n order to assure thei r proporti onal
representati on. Moreover, the creati on of the certai n number of di s-
tri cts i n whi ch mi nori ti es were i n the majori ty was reasonabl e
under the ci rcumstances.
132
Second, Justi ce Whi te wrote that, i rrespecti ve of what the Vot-
i ng Ri ghts Act may have requi red, what the State had done di d not
vi ol ate ei ther the Fourteenth or the Fi fteenth Amendment. Thi s
was so because the pl an, even though i t used race i n a purposeful
manner, represented no raci al sl ur or sti gma wi th respect to whi tes
or any other race; the pl an di d not operate to mi ni mi ze or unfai rl y
cancel out whi te voti ng strength because as a cl ass whi tes woul d
be represented i n the l egi sl ature i n accordance wi th thei r propor-
ti on of the popul ati on i n the juri sdi cti on.
133
Wi th the Court so di vi ded, l i ght on the consti tuti onal i ty of af-
fi rmati ve acti on was anti ci pated i n Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,
134
but agai n the Court fragmented. The Davi s
campus medi cal school each year admi tted 100 students; the school
set asi de 16 of those seats for di sadvantaged mi nori ty students,
who were qual i fi ed but not necessari l y as qual i fi ed as those wi n-
ni ng admi ssi on to the other 84 pl aces. Twi ce deni ed admi ssi on,
Bakke sued, argui ng that had not the 16 posi ti ons been set asi de
he coul d have been admi tted. The state court ordered hi m admi tted
and ordered the school not to consi der race i n admi ssi ons. By two
5-to4 votes, the Supreme Court affi rmed the order admi tti ng
Bakke but set asi de the order forbi ddi ng the consi derati on of race
i n admi ssi ons.
1864
135
78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. 2000d to 2000d7. The Act bars di scri mi nati on on
the ground of race, col or, or nati onal ori gi n by any reci pi ent of federal fi nanci al as-
si stance.
136
438 U.S. at 40821 (Justi ces Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnqui st and Chi ef Jus-
ti ce Burger).
137
I d. at 28487 (Justi ce Powel l ), 32855 (Justi ces Brennan, Whi te, Marshal l ,
and Bl ackmun).
138
I d. at 35579 (Justi ces Brennan, Whi te, Marshal l , and Bl ackmun). The i nter-
medi ate standard of revi ew adopted by the four Justi ces i s that formul ated for gen-
der cases. Raci al cl assi fi cati ons desi gned to further remedi al purposes must serve
i mportant governmental objecti ves and must be substanti al l y rel ated to achi eve-
ment of those objecti ves. I d. at 359.
139
I d. at 287320.
Four Justi ces di d not reach the consti tuti onal questi on. I n
thei r vi ew, Ti tl e VI of the Ci vi l Ri ghts Act of 1964
135
outl awed the
col l eges program and made unnecessary any consi derati on of the
Consti tuti on. They thus woul d admi t Bakke and bar use of race i n
admi ssi ons.
136
The remai ni ng fi ve Justi ces agreed among them-
sel ves that Ti tl e VI , on i ts face and i n l i ght of i ts l egi sl ati ve hi s-
tory, proscri bed onl y what the equal protecti on cl ause pro-
scri bed.
137
They thus reached the consti tuti onal i ssue but resol ved
i t di fferentl y. Four Justi ces, i n an opi ni on by Justi ce Brennan, ar-
gued that raci al cl assi fi cati ons desi gned to further remedi al pur-
poses were not forecl osed by the Consti tuti on under appropri ate
ci rcumstances. Even ostensi bl y beni gn raci al cl assi fi cati ons coul d
be mi sused and produce sti gmati zi ng effects; therefore, they must
be searchi ngl y scruti ni zed by courts to ferret out these i nstances.
But beni gn raci al preferences, unl i ke i nvi di ous di scri mi nati ons,
need not be subjected to stri ct scruti ny; i nstead, an i ntermedi ate
scruti ny woul d do. As appl i ed, then, thi s revi ew woul d enabl e the
Court to stri ke down any remedi al raci al cl assi fi cati on that sti g-
mati zed any group, that si ngl ed out those l east wel l represented i n
the pol i ti cal process to bear the brunt of the program, or that was
not justi fi ed by an i mportant and arti cul ated purpose.
138
Justi ce Powel l argued that al l raci al cl assi fi cati ons are suspect
and requi re stri ct scruti ny. Si nce none of the justi fi cati ons asserted
by the col l ege met thi s hi gh standard of revi ew, he woul d have i n-
val i dated the program. But he di d percei ve justi fi cati ons for a l ess
ri gi d consi derati on of race as one factor among many i n an admi s-
si ons program; di versi ty of student body was an i mportant and pro-
tected i nterest of an academy and woul d justi fy an admi ssi ons set
of standards that made affi rmati ve use of race. Amel i orati ng the ef-
fects of past di scri mi nati on woul d justi fy the remedi al use of race,
the Justi ce thought, when the enti ty i tsel f had been found by ap-
propri ate authori ty to have di scri mi nated, but the col l ege coul d not
i nfl i ct harm upon other groups i n order to remedy past soci etal di s-
cri mi nati on.
139
Justi ce Powel l thus joi ned the fi rst group i n agree-
1865
140
See i d., 319320 (Justi ce Powel l ).
141
448 U.S. 448 (1980). Justi ce Stewart, joi ned by Justi ce Rehnqui st, di ssented
i n one opi ni on, i d. at 522, whi l e Justi ce Stevens di ssented i n another. I d. at 532.
142
I d. at 45692. Justi ces Whi te and Powel l joi ned thi s opi ni on. Justi ce Powel l
al so concurred i n a separate opi ni on, i d. at 495, whi ch qual i fi ed to some extent hi s
agreement wi th the Chi ef Justi ce.
143
I d. at 517.
144
I d. at 473480. The program was an exerci se of Congress spendi ng power,
but the consti tuti onal objecti ons rai sed had not been previ ousl y resol ved i n that con-
text. The pl ural i ty therefore turned to Congress regul atory powers, whi ch i n thi s
case undergi rded the spendi ng power, and found the power to repose i n the com-
merce cl ause wi th respect to pri vate contractors and i n 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment wi th respect to state agenci es. The Marshal l pl ural i ty appeared to at-
tach no si gni fi cance i n thi s regard to the fact that Congress was the acti ng party.
i ng that Bakke shoul d be admi tted, but he joi ned the second group
i n permi tti ng the col l ege to consi der race to some degree i n i ts ad-
mi ssi ons.
140
Fi nal l y, i n Fullilove v. Klutznick,
141
the Court resol ved most of
the outstandi ng consti tuti onal questi on regardi ng the val i di ty of
race-consci ous affi rmati ve acti on programs. Al though agai n there
was no majori ty opi ni on of the Court, the seri es of opi ni ons by the
si x Justi ces voti ng to uphol d a congressi onal provi si on requi ri ng
that at l east ten percent of publ i c works funds be set asi de for mi -
nori ty busi ness enterpri ses al l recogni zed that al l evi ati on and re-
medi ati on of past soci etal di scri mi nati on was a l egi ti mate goal and
that race was a permi ssi bl e cl assi fi cati on to use i n remedyi ng the
present effects of past di scri mi nati on. Judgment of the Court was
i ssued by Chi ef Justi ce Burger, who emphasi zed Congress pre-
emi nent rol e under the Commerce cl ause and under the Fourteenth
Amendment to fi nd as a fact the exi stence of past di scri mi nati on
and i ts conti nui ng effects and to i mpl ement remedi es whi ch were
race consci ous i n order to cure those effects.
142
The pri nci pal con-
curri ng opi ni on by Justi ce Marshal l appl i ed the Brennan anal ysi s
i n Bakke, uti l i zi ng mi ddl e-ti er scruti ny to hol d that the race con-
sci ous set-asi de was substanti al l y rel ated to the achi evement of
the i mportant and congressi onal l y arti cul ated goal of remedyi ng
the present effects of past di scri mi nati on.
143
Taken together, the opi ni ons recogni ze that at l east i n Con-
gress there resi des the cl ear power to make the fi ndi ngs that wi l l
form the basi s for a judgment of the necessi ty to use raci al cl assi -
fi cati ons i n an affi rmati ve way; these fi ndi ngs need not be exten-
si ve or express and may be col l ected i n many ways. Whether fed-
eral agenci es or state l egi sl atures and state agenci es have the same
breadth and l eeway to make fi ndi ngs and formul ate remedi es was
l eft unsettl ed but that they have some such power seems evi -
dent.
144
Further, whi l e the opi ni ons emphasi zed the l i mi ted dura-
ti on and magni tude of the set-asi de program, they appeared to at-
1866
145
I d. at 48485, 489 (Chi ef Justi ce Burger), 51315 (Justi ce Powel l ).
146
I d. at 484489 (Chi ef Justi ce Burger), 514515 (Justi ce Powel l ), 520521
(Justi ce Marshal l ).
147
Gui dance on consti tuti onal i ssues i s not necessari l y afforded by cases ari si ng
under Ti tl e VI I of the Ci vi l Ri ghts Act, the Court havi ng asserted that the statutory
prohi bi ti on wi th whi ch the empl oyer must contend was not i ntended to extend as
far as that of the Consti tuti on, and that vol untary empl oyer acti on can pl ay a cru-
ci al rol e i n furtheri ng Ti tl e VI I s purpose of el i mi nati ng the effects of di scri mi nati on
i n the workpl ace. Johnson v. Transportati on Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 628 n.6, 630
(1987) (uphol di ng a l ocal governmental agencys vol untary affi rmati ve acti on pl an
predi cated upon underrepresentati on of women rather than upon past di scri mi na-
tory practi ces by that agency) (emphasi s ori gi nal ). The consti tuti onal i ty of the agen-
cys pl an was not chal l enged. See i d. at 620 n.2.
148
476 U.S. 267 (1986).
149
480 U.S. 149 (1987).
150
476 U.S. at 294. A pl ural i ty of Justi ces i n Wygant thought that past soci etal
di scri mi nati on al one i s i nsuffi ci ent to justi fy raci al cl assi fi cati ons; they woul d re-
qui re some convi nci ng evi dence of past di scri mi nati on by the governmental uni t i n-
vol ved. 476 U.S. at 27476 (opi ni on of Justi ce Powel l , joi ned by Chi ef Justi ce Burger
and by Justi ces Rehnqui st and OConnor).
tach no consti tuti onal si gni fi cance to these l i mi tati ons, thus l eavi ng
the way open for programs of a scope suffi ci ent to remedy al l the
i denti fi ed effects of past di scri mi nati on.
145
But the most i mportant
part of these opi ni ons rests i n the cl ear sustai ni ng of race cl assi -
fi cati ons as permi ssi bl e i n remedi es and i n the approvi ng of some
forms of raci al quotas. Rejected were the arguments that a sti gma
attaches to those mi nori ty benefi ci ari es of such programs, that bur-
dens are pl aced on i nnocent thi rd parti es, and that the program i s
overi ncl usi ve, benefi tti ng some mi nori ty members who had suffered
no di scri mi nati on.
146
The Court remai ns di vi ded i n rul i ng on consti tuti onal chal -
l enges
147
to affi rmati ve acti on pl ans. As a general matter, author-
i ty to appl y raci al cl assi fi cati ons i s at i ts greatest when Congress
i s acti ng pursuant to secti on 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or
other of i ts powers, or when a court i s acti ng to remedy proven di s-
cri mi nati on. But i mpact on di sadvantaged non-mi nori ti es can al so
be i mportant. Two recent cases i l l ustrate the l atter poi nt. I n
Wygant v. J ackson Board of Education,
148
the Court i nval i dated a
provi si on of a col l ecti ve bargai ni ng agreement gi vi ng mi nori ty
teachers a preferenti al protecti on from l ayoffs; i n United States v.
Paradise,
149
the Court uphel d as a remedy for past di scri mi nati on
a court-ordered raci al quota i n promoti ons. Justi ce Whi te, concur-
ri ng i n Wygant, emphasi zed the harsh, di rect effect of l ayoffs on af-
fected non-mi nori ty empl oyees.
150
By contrast, a pl ural i ty of Jus-
ti ces i n Paradise vi ewed the remedy i n that case as affecti ng non-
mi nori ti es l ess harshl y than di d the l ayoffs i n Wygant, si nce the
1867
151
480 U.S. at 18283 (opi ni on of Justi ce Brennan, joi ned by Justi ces Marshal l ,
Bl ackmun, and Powel l ). A majori ty of Justi ces emphasi zed that the egregi ous nature
of the past di scri mi nati on by the governmental uni t justi fi ed the ordered rel i ef. 480
U.S. at 153 (opi ni on of Justi ce Brennan), i d. at 189 (Justi ce Stevens).
152
488 U.S. 469 (1989). Croson was deci ded by a 63 vote. The porti ons of Jus-
ti ce OConnors opi ni on adopted as the opi ni on of the Court were joi ned by Chi ef
Justi ce Rehnqui st and by Justi ces Whi te, Stevens, and Kennedy. The l atter two Jus-
ti ces joi ned onl y part of Justi ce OConnors opi ni on; each added a separate concur-
ri ng opi ni on. Justi ce Scal i a concurred separatel y; Justi ces Marshal l , Brennan, and
Bl ackmun di ssented.
153
497 U.S. 547 (1990). Thi s was a 54 deci si on, Justi ce Brennans opi ni on of
the Court bei ng joi ned by Justi ces Whi te, Marshal l , Bl ackmun, and Stevens. Justi ce
OConnor wrote a di ssenti ng opi ni on joi ned by the Chi ef Justi ce and by Justi ces
Scal i a and Kennedy, and Justi ce Kennedy added a separate di ssenti ng opi ni on
joi ned by Justi ce Scal i a.
154
497 U.S. at 56465.
155
488 U.S. at 50102.
promoti on quota woul d merel y del ay promoti ons of those affected,
rather than cause the l oss of thei r jobs.
151
A cl ear di sti ncti on has been drawn between federal and state
power to appl y raci al cl assi fi cati ons. I n City of Richmond v. J .A.
Croson Co.,
152
the Court i nval i dated a mi nori ty set-asi de requi re-
ment that hol ders of constructi on contracts wi th the ci ty sub-
contract at l east 30% of the dol l ar amount to mi nori ty busi ness en-
terpri ses. Appl yi ng stri ct scruti ny, the Court found Ri chmonds pro-
gram to be defi ci ent because i t was not ti ed to evi dence of past di s-
cri mi nati on i n the ci tys constructi on i ndustry. By contrast, the
Court i n Metro Broadcasting, I nc. v. FCC
153
appl i ed a more l eni ent
standard of revi ew i n uphol di ng two raci al preference pol i ci es used
by the FCC i n the award of radi o and tel evi si on broadcast l i censes.
The FCC pol i ci es, the Court expl ai ned, are beni gn, race-consci ous
measures that are substanti al l y rel ated to the achi evement of an
i mportant governmental objecti ve of broadcast di versi ty.
154
I n Croson, the Court rul ed that the ci ty had fai l ed to establ i sh
a compel l i ng i nterest i n the raci al quota system because i t fai l ed
to i denti fy past di scri mi nati on i n i ts constructi on i ndustry. Mere
reci tati on of a beni gn or remedi al purpose wi l l not suffi ce, the
Court concl uded, nor wi l l rel i ance on the di spari ty between the
number of contracts awarded to mi nori ty fi rms and the mi nori ty
popul ati on of the ci ty. [W]here speci al qual i fi cati ons are necessary,
the rel evant stati sti cal pool for purposes of demonstrati ng excl usi on
must be the number of mi nori ti es qual i fi ed to undertake the par-
ti cul ar task.
155
The overi ncl usi ve defi ni ti on of mi nori ti es, i ncl ud-
i ng U.S. ci ti zens who are Bl acks, Spani sh-speaki ng, Ori ental s, I n-
di ans, Eski mos, or Al euts, al so i mpugn[ed] the ci tys cl ai m of re-
medi al moti vati on, there havi ng been no evi dence of any past
1868
156
I d. at 506.
157
I d. at 508.
158
497 U.S. at 600. Justi ce OConnors di ssenti ng opi ni on contended that the
case does not present a consi dered deci si on of the Congress and the Presi dent.
I d. at 607 (quoti ng Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473).
159
497 U.S. at 563 & n.11. For the di ssenti ng vi ews of Justi ce OConnor see i d.
at 60607. See also Croson, 488 U.S. at 504 (opi ni on of Court).
160
Because Justi ce Brennan, who authored the Courts opi ni on i n Metro Broad-
casting, reti red at the end of the 198990 Term, the conti nui ng vi tal i ty of the opi n-
i on bears watchi ng.
di scri mi nati on agai nst non-Bl acks i n the Ri chmond constructi on i n-
dustry.
156
I t fol l owed that Ri chmonds set-asi de program al so was not
narrowl y tai l ored to remedy the effects of past di scri mi nati on i n
the ci ty: an i ndi vi dual i zed wai ver procedure made the quota ap-
proach unnecessary, and a mi nori ty entrepreneur from anywhere
i n the country coul d obtai n an absol ute raci al preference.
157
At i ssue i n Metro Broadcasting were two mi nori ty preference
pol i ci es of the FCC, one recogni zi ng an enhancement for mi nori ty
ownershi p and parti ci pati on i n management when the FCC consi d-
ers competi ng l i cense appl i cati ons, and the other authori zi ng a
di stress sal e transfer of a broadcast l i cense to a mi nori ty enter-
pri se. These raci al preferences unl i ke the set-asi des at i ssue i n
Fullilove ori gi nated as admi ni strati ve pol i ci es rather than statu-
tory mandates. Because Congress l ater endorsed these pol i ci es,
however, the Court was abl e to concl ude that they bore the i mpri -
matur of l ongstandi ng congressi onal support and di recti on.
158
Metro Broadcasting i s noteworthy for several other reasons as
wel l . The Court rejected the di ssents argument seemi ngl y accept-
ed by a Croson majori ty that Congresss more extensi ve authori ty
to adopt raci al cl assi fi cati ons must trace to secti on 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and i nstead rul ed that Congress al so may rel y
on race-consci ous measures i n exerci se of i ts commerce and spend-
i ng powers.
159
Thi s meant that the governmental i nterest
furthered by a race-consci ous pol i cy need not be remedi al , but coul d
be a l ess focused i nterest such as broadcast di versi ty. Secondl y, as
noted above, the Court eschewed stri ct scruti ny anal ysi s: the gov-
ernmental i nterest need onl y be i mportant rather than compel -
l i ng, and the means adopted need onl y be substanti al l y rel ated
rather than narrowl y tai l ored to furtheri ng the i nterest. Thi s
means that, for the ti me bei ng, at l east, federal l egi sl ati on i mpos-
i ng raci al preferences need pass a l ower hurdl e than state and l ocal
l egi sl ati on regardl ess of whether the federal l egi sl ati on i s an exer-
ci se of secti on 5 power.
160
1869
1
Graham v. Ri chardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971). See also Yi ck Wo v. Hopki ns,
118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); Truax v. Rai ch, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915); Takahashi v. Fi sh
& Game Commn, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948). Al i ens, even unl awful al i ens, are per-
sons to whom the Fi fth and Fourteenth Amendments appl y. Pl yl er v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 21016 (1982). The Federal Government may not di scri mi nate i nvi di ousl y
agai nst al i ens, Mathews v. Di az, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). However, because of the
pl enary power del egated by the Consti tuti on to the nati onal government to deal
wi th al i ens and natural i zati on, federal cl assi fi cati ons are judged by l ess demandi ng
standards than are those of the States, and many cl assi fi cati ons whi ch woul d fai l
i f attempted by the States have been sustai ned because Congress has made them.
I d. at 7884; Fi al l o v. Bel l , 430 U.S. 787 (1977). Addi ti onal l y, state di scri mi nati on
agai nst al i ens may fai l because i t i mposes burdens not permi tted or contempl ated
by Congress i n i ts regul ati ons of admi ssi on and condi ti ons of admi ssi on. Hi nes v.
Davi dowi tz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Tol l v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982). Such state di s-
cri mi nati on may al so vi ol ate treaty obl i gati ons and be voi d under the supremacy
cl ause, Askura v. Ci ty of Seattl e, 265 U.S. 332 (1924), and some federal ci vi l ri ghts
statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. 1981, protect resi dent al i ens as wel l as ci ti zens. Gra-
ham v. Ri chardson, supra, at 37680.
2
Yi ck Wo v. Hopki ns, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
3
McGready v. Vi rgi ni a, 94 U.S. 391 (1877); Patsone v. Pennsyl vani a, 232 U.S.
138 (1914) (l i mi ti ng al i ens ri ghts to devel op natural resources); Hauenstei n v.
Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880); Bl ythe v. Hi nckl ey, 180 U.S. 333 (1901) (restri cti on
of devol uti on of property to al i ens); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923);
Porterfi el d v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Webb v. OBri en, 263 U.S. 313 (1923);
Fri ck v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923) (deni al of ri ght to own and acqui re l and); Hei m
v. McCal l , 239 U.S. 175 (1915); Peopl e v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, affd,
239 U.S. 195 (1915) (barri ng publ i c empl oyment to al i ens); Ohi o ex rel . Cl arke v.
Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (prohi bi ti ng al i ens from operati ng pool rooms). The
Court struck down a statute restri cti ng the empl oyment of al i ens by pri vate empl oy-
ers, however. Truax v. Rai ch, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
4
320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
5
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
THE NEW EQUAL PROTECTION
Classifications Meriting Close Scrutiny
Al i enage and Nati onal i ty. I t has l ong been settl ed . . .
that the term person [i n the equal protecti on cl ause] encompasses
l awful l y admi tted resi dent al i ens as wel l as ci ti zens of the Uni ted
States and enti tl es both ci ti zens and al i ens to the equal protecti on
of the l aws of the State i n whi ch they resi de.
1
Thus, one of the
earl i est equal protecti on deci si ons struck down the admi ni strati on
of a faci al l y-l awful l i censi ng ordi nance whi ch was bei ng appl i ed to
di scri mi nate agai nst Chi nese.
2
But the Court i n many cases there-
after recogni zed a permi ssi bl e state i nterest i n di sti ngui shi ng be-
tween i ts ci ti zens and al i ens by restri cti ng enjoyment of resources
and publ i c empl oyment to i ts own ci ti zens.
3
But i n Hirabayashi v.
United States,
4
i t was announced that [d]i sti ncti ons between ci ti -
zens sol el y because of thei r ancestry was odi us to a free peopl e
whose i nsti tuti ons are founded upon the doctri ne of equal i ty. And
i n Korematsu v. United States,
5
cl assi fi cati ons based upon race and
nati onal i ty were sai d to be suspect and subject to the most ri gi d
scruti ny. These di cta resul ted i n a 1948 deci si on whi ch appeared
1870
6
Takahashi v. Fi sh & Game Commn, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
7
I d. at 420. The deci si on was preceded by Oyama v. Cal i forni a, 332 U.S. 633
(1948), whi ch was al so suscepti bl e to bei ng read as questi oni ng the premi se of the
earl i er cases.
8
Graham v. Ri chardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
9
413 U.S. 634 (1973).
10
I d. at 64749. See also Fol ey v. Connel i e, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978). Al i ens can
be excl uded from voti ng, Skatfe v. Rorex, 553 P.2d 830 (Col o. 1976), appeal di s-
mi ssed for l ack of substanti al federal questi on, 430 U.S. 961 (1977), and can be ex-
cl uded from servi ce on juri es. Perki ns v. Smi th, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D.Md. 1974) (3-
judge court), affd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
11
Sugarman v. Dougal l , 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). Such state restri cti ons are
not whol l y i mmune from scruti ny under the Equal Protecti on Cl ause. I d. at 648.
to cal l i nto questi on the rati onal e of the parti cul ar i nterest doc-
tri ne under whi ch earl i er di scri mi nati ons had been justi fi ed. There
the Court hel d voi d a statute barri ng i ssuance of commeri cal fi sh-
i ng l i censes to persons i nel i gi bl e to ci ti zenshi p, whi ch i n effect
meant resi dent al i en Japanese.
6
The Fourteenth Amendment and
the l aws adopted under i ts authori ty thus embody a general pol i cy
that al l persons l awful l y i n thi s country shal l abi de i n any state
on an equal i ty of l egal pri vi l eges wi th al l ci ti zens under non-
di scri mi natory l aws. Justi ce Bl ack sai d for the Court that the
power of a state to appl y i ts l aws excl usi vel y to i ts al i en i nhab-
i tants as a cl ass i s confi ned wi thi n narrow l i mi ts.
7
Announci ng that cl assi fi cati ons based on al i enage . . . are i n-
herentl y suspect and subject to cl ose scruti ny, the Court struck
down state statutes whi ch ei ther whol l y di squal i fi ed resi dent al i ens
for wel fare assi stance or i mposed a l engthy durati onal resi dency re-
qui rement on el i gi bi l i ty.
8
Thereafter, i n a seri es of deci si ons, the
Court adhered to i ts concl usi on that al i enage was a suspect cl assi -
fi cati on and voi ded a vari ety of restri cti ons. More recentl y, how-
ever, i t has created a major pol i ti cal functi on excepti on to stri ct
scruti ny revi ew, whi ch shows some potenti al of di spl aci ng the pre-
vi ous anal ysi s al most enti rel y.
I n Sugarman v. Dougall,
9
the Court voi ded the total excl usi on
of al i ens from a States competi ti ve ci vi l servi ce. A States power to
preserve the basi c concepti on of a pol i ti cal communi ty enabl es i t
to prescri be the qual i fi cati ons of i ts offi cers and voters,
10
the Court
hel d, and thi s power woul d extend al so to persons hol di ng state
el ecti ve or i mportant nonel ecti ve executi ve, l egi sl ati ve, and judi ci al
posi ti ons, for offi cers who parti ci pate di rectl y i n the formul ati on,
executi on, or revi ew of broad publ i c pol i cy perform functi ons that
go to the heart of representati ve government.
11
But a fl at ban
upon much of the States career publ i c servi ce, both of pol i cy-mak-
i ng and non-pol i cy-maki ng jobs, ran afoul of the requi rement that
i n achi evi ng a val i d i nterest through the use of a suspect cl assi fi ca-
1871
12
Justi ce Rehnqui st di ssented. I d. at 649. I n the course of the opi ni on, the
Court hel d i nappl i cabl e the doctri ne of speci al publ i c i nterest, the i dea that a
States concern wi th the restri cti on of the resources of the State to the advancement
and profi t of i ts ci ti zens i s a val i d basi s for di scri mi nati on agai nst out-of-state ci ti -
zens and al i ens general l y, but i t di d not decl are the doctri ne i nval i d. I d. at 643
45. The pol i ti cal functi on excepti on i s i nappl i cabl e to notari es publ i c, who do not
perform functi ons goi ng to the heart of representati ve government. Bernal v. Fai nt-
er, 467 U.S. 216 (1984).
13
I n re Gri ffi ths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). Chi ef Justi ce Burger and Justi ce
Rehnqui st di ssented. I d. at 730, and 649 (Sugarman di ssent al so appl i cabl e to Grif-
fiths).
14
Exami ni ng Board v. Fl ores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976). Si nce the juri sdi c-
ti on was Puerto Ri co, the Court was not sure whether the requi rement shoul d be
governed by the Fi fth or Fourteenth Amendment but deemed the questi on i mmate-
ri al si nce the same resul t woul d be achi eved. The quoted expressi on i s from Truax
v. Rai ch, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
15
432 U.S. 1 (1977).
16
I d. at 9. Chi ef Justi ce Burger and Justi ces Powel l , Rehnqui st, and Stewart
di ssented. I d. at 12, 15, 17. Justi ce Rehnqui sts di ssent argued that the nature of
the di squal i fi cati on precl uded i t from bei ng consi dered suspect.
ti on the State must empl oy means that are preci sel y drawn i n l i ght
of the val i d purpose.
12
State bars agai nst the admi ssi on of al i ens to the practi ce of
l aw were al so struck down, the Court hol di ng that the State had
not met the heavy burden of showi ng that i ts deni al of admi ssi on
to al i ens was necessary to accompl i sh a consti tuti onal l y permi ssi bl e
and substanti al i nterest. The States admi tted i nterest i n assuri ng
the requi si te qual i fi cati ons of persons l i censed to practi ce l aw coul d
be adequatel y served by judgi ng appl i cants on a case-by-case basi s
and i n no sense coul d the fact that a l awyer i s consi dered to be an
offi cer of the court serve as a val i d justi fi cati on for a fl at prohi bi -
ti on.
13
Nor coul d Puerto Ri co offer a justi fi cati on for excl udi ng
al i ens from one of the common occupati ons of the communi ty,
hence i ts bar on l i censi ng al i ens as ci vi l engi neers was voi ded.
14
I n Nyquist v. Mauclet,
15
the Court seemed to expand the doc-
tri ne. Chal l enged was a statute that restri cted the recei pt of schol -
arshi ps and si mi l ar fi nanci al support to ci ti zens or to al i ens who
were appl yi ng for ci ti zenshi p or who fi l ed a statement affi rmi ng
thei r i ntent to appl y as soon as they became el i gi bl e. Therefore,
si nce any al i en coul d escape the l i mi tati on by a vol untary act, the
di squal i fi cati on was not ai med at al i ens as a cl ass, nor was i t based
on an i mmutabl e characteri sti c possessed by a di screte and i nsu-
l ar mi nori ty the cl assi fi cati on that had been the basi s for decl ar-
i ng al i enage a suspect category i n the fi rst pl ace. But the Court
voi ded the statute. The i mportant poi nts are that 661(3) i s di -
rected at al i ens and that onl y al i ens are harmed by i t. The fact
that the statute i s not an absol ute bar does not mean that i t does
not di scri mi nate agai nst the cl ass.
16
Two proffered justi fi cati ons
1872
17
Fol ey v. Connel i e, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978). The opi ni on was by Chi ef Justi ce
Burger and the quoted phrase was from hi s di ssent i n Nyqui st v. Maucl et, 432 U.S.
1, 14 (1977). Justi ces Marshal l , Stevens, and Brennan di ssented. I d. at 302, 307.
18
I d.at 29596. Formal l y fol l owi ng Sugarman v. Dougal l , supra, the opi ni on
consi derabl y enl arged the excepti on noted i n that case; see also Nyqui st v. Maucl et,
432 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (emphasi zi ng the narrowness of the excepti on). Concurri ng
i n Foley, supra, 300, Justi ce Stewart observed that i t i s di ffi cul t i f not i mpossi bl e
to reconci l e the Courts judgment i n thi s case wi th the ful l sweep of the reasoni ng
and authori ty of some of our past deci si ons. I t i s onl y because I have become i n-
creasi ngl y doubtful about the val i di ty of those deci si ons (i n at l east some of whi ch
I concurred) that I joi n the opi ni on of the Court i n thi s case. On the other hand,
Justi ce Bl ackmun, who had wri tten several of the past deci si ons, i ncl udi ng Mauclet,
concurred al so, fi ndi ng the case consi stent. I d.
19
I d. at 29798. I n El rod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), barri ng patronage di s-
mi ssal s of pol i ce offi cers, the Court had nonethel ess recogni zed an excepti on for pol -
i cymaki ng offi cers whi ch i t di d not extend to the pol i ce.
20
441 U.S. 68 (1979). The opi ni on, by Justi ce Powel l , was joi ned by Chi ef Jus-
ti ce Burger and Justi ces Stewart, Whi te, and Rehnqui st. Di ssenti ng were Justi ces
Bl ackmun, Brennan, Marshal l , and Stevens. The di squal i fi cati on standard was of
were hel d i nsuffi ci ent to meet the hi gh burden i mposed by the
stri ct scruti ny doctri ne.
However, i n the fol l owi ng Term, the Court deni ed that every
excl usi on of al i ens was subject to stri ct scruti ny, because to do so
woul d obl i terate al l the di sti ncti ons between ci ti zens and al i ens,
and thus deprecate the hi stori c val ues of ci ti zenshi p.
17
Uphol di ng
a state restri cti on agai nst al i ens qual i fyi ng as state pol i cemen, the
Court reasoned that the permi ssi bl e di sti ncti on between ci ti zen and
al i en i s that the former i s enti tl ed to parti ci pate i n the processes
of democrati c deci si onmaki ng. Accordi ngl y, we have recogni zed a
States hi stori c power to excl ude al i ens from parti ci pati on i n i ts
democrati c pol i ti cal i nsti tuti ons, . . . as part of the soverei gns obl i -
gati on to preserve the basi c concepti on of a pol i ti cal commu-
ni ty.
18
When a State acts thusl y by cl assi fyi ng agai nst al i ens, i ts
acti on i s not subject to stri ct scruti ny but rather need onl y meet
the rati onal basi s test. I t i s therefore permi ssi bl e to reserve to ci ti -
zens offi ces havi ng the most i mportant pol i cy responsi bi l i ti es, a
reservati on drawn from Sugarman, but the cri ti cal factor i n thi s
case i s the anal ysi s fi ndi ng that the pol i ce functi on i s one of the
basi c functi ons of government. The executi on of the broad powers
vested i n pol i ce offi cers affects members of the publ i c si gni fi cantl y
and often i n the most sensi ti ve areas of dai l y l i fe. . . . Cl earl y the
exerci se of pol i ce authori ty cal l s for a very hi gh degree of judgment
and di screti on, the abuse or mi suse of whi ch can have seri ous i m-
pact on i ndi vi dual s. The offi ce of a pol i ceman i s i n no sense one of
the common occupati ons of the communi ty. . . .
19
Conti nui ng to enl arge the excepti on, the Court i n Ambach v.
Norwick
20
uphel d a bar to qual i fyi ng as a publ i c school teacher for
1873
course, that hel d i nval i d as a di squal i fi cati on for recei pt of educati onal assi stance
i n Nyqui st v. Maucl et, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
21
Ambach v. Norwi ck, 441 U.S. 68, 75 (1979).
22
I d.
23
I d. at 7580. The quotati on, i d. at 76, i s from Sugarman v. Dougal l , 413 U.S.
634, 647 (1973).
24
454 U.S. 432 (1982). Joi ni ng the opi ni on of the Court were Justi ces Whi te,
Powel l , Rehnqui st, OConnor, and Chi ef Justi ce Burger. Di ssenti ng were Justi ces
Bl ackmun, Brennan, Marshal l , and Stevens. I d. at 447.
25
I d. at 442.
26
I d. at 445.
resi dent al i ens who have not mani fested an i ntenti on to appl y for
ci ti zenshi p. The governmental functi on test took on added si gni fi -
cance, the Court sayi ng that the di sti ncti on between ci ti zens and
al i ens, though ordi nari l y i rrel evant to pri vate acti vi ty, i s fun-
damental to the defi ni ti on and government of a State.
21
Thus,
governmental enti ti es, when exerci si ng the functi ons of govern-
ment, have wi der l ati tude i n l i mi ti ng the parti ci pati on of
nonci ti zens.
22
Teachers, the Court thought, because of the rol e of
publ i c educati on i n i ncul cati ng ci vi c val ues and i n prepari ng chi l -
dren for parti ci pati on i n soci ety as ci ti zens and because of the re-
sponsi bi l i ty and di screti on they have i n ful fi l l i ng that rol e, perform
a task that go[es] to the heart of representati ve government.
23
The ci ti zenshi p requi rement need onl y bear a rati onal rel ati onshi p
to the state i nterest, and the Court concl uded i t cl earl y di d so.
Then, i n Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,
24
the Court sustai ned a
state l aw i mposi ng a ci ti zenshi p requi rement upon al l posi ti ons
desi gnated as peace offi cers, uphol di ng i n context that el i gi bi l i ty
prerequi si te for probati on offi cers. Fi rst, the Court hel d that the ex-
tensi on of the requi rement to an enormous range of peopl e who
were vari ousl y cl assi fi ed as peace offi cers di d not reach so far nor
was i t so broad and haphazard as to bel i e the cl ai m that the State
was attempti ng to ensure that an i mportant functi on of govern-
ment be i n the hands of those havi ng a bond of ci ti zenshi p. [T]he
cl assi fi cati ons used need not be preci se; there need onl y be a sub-
stanti al fi t.
25
As to the parti cul ar posi ti ons, the Court hel d that
they, l i ke the state troopers i nvol ved i n Foley, suffi ci entl y partake
of the soverei gns power to exerci se coerci ve force over the i ndi vi d-
ual that they may be l i mi ted to ci ti zens.
26
Thus, the Court so far has drawn a tri parti te di fferenti ati on
wi th respect to governmental restri cti ons on al i ens. Fi rst, i t has
di sapproved the earl i er l i ne of cases and now woul d forecl ose at-
tempts by the States to retai n certai n economi c benefi ts, pri mari l y
empl oyment and opportuni ti es for l i vel i hood, excl usi vel y for ci ti -
zens. Second, when government exerci ses pri nci pal l y i ts spendi ng
functi ons, such as those wi th respect to publ i c empl oyment gen-
1874
27
I d. at 43839
28
Thus, the statute i n Chavez-Salido appl i ed to such posi ti ons as tol l -servi ce
empl oyees, cemetery sextons, fi sh and game wardens, and furni ture and beddi ng i n-
spectors, and yet the overal l cl assi fi cati on was deemed not so i l l -fi tti ng as to requi re
i ts voi di ng.
29
Pl yl er v. Doe, 457 U.S. 432 (1982). Joi ni ng the opi ni on of the Court were Jus-
ti ces Brennan, Marshal l , Bl ackmun, Powel l , and Stevens. Di ssenti ng were Chi ef
Justi ce Burger and Justi ces Whi te, Rehnqui st, and OConnor. I d. at 242.
30
I n San Antoni o School Di st. v. Rodri guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), whi l e hol di ng
that educati on i s not a fundamental i nterest, the Court expressl y reserved the ques-
ti on whether a total deni al of educati on to a cl ass of chi l dren woul d i nfri nge upon
a fundamental i nterest. I d.at 18, 25 n.60, 37. The Plyler Courts emphasi s upon the
total deni al of educati on and the general l y suspect nature of al i enage cl assi fi cati ons
l eft ambi guous whether the state di scri mi nati on woul d have been subjected to stri ct
scruti ny i f i t had survi ved i ntermedi ate scruti ny. Justi ce Powel l thought the Court
had rejected stri ct scruti ny, 457 U.S. at 238 n.2 (concurri ng), whi l e Justi ce
Bl ackmun thought i t had not reached the questi on, i d. at 235 n.3 (concurri ng). I n-
deed, thei r concurri ng opi ni ons seem di rected more toward the di sabi l i ty vi si ted
upon i nnocent chi l dren than the broader compl ex of factors set out i n the opi ni on
of the Court. I d.at 231, 236.
eral l y and to el i gi bi l i ty for publ i c benefi ts, i ts cl assi fi cati ons wi th
an adverse i mpact on al i ens wi l l be stri ctl y scruti ni zed and usual l y
fai l . Thi rd, when government acts i n i ts soverei gn capaci ty, when
i t acts wi thi n i ts consti tuti onal prerogati ves and responsi bi l i ti es to
establ i sh and operate i ts own government, i ts deci si ons wi th re-
spect to the ci ti zenshi p qual i fi cati ons of an appropri atel y des-
i gnated cl ass of publ i c offi ce hol ders wi l l be subject onl y to tradi -
ti onal rati onal basi s scruti ny.
27
However, the pol i ti cal functi on
standard i s el asti c, and so l ong as di squal i fi cati ons are attached to
speci fi c occupati ons
28
rather than to the ci vi l servi ce i n general , as
i n Sugarman, the concept seems capabl e of encompassi ng the ex-
cl usi on.
When confronted wi th a state statute that authori zed l ocal
school boards to excl ude from publ i c school s al i en chi l dren who
were not l egal l y admi tted to the Uni ted States, the Court deter-
mi ned that an i ntermedi ate l evel of scruti ny was appropri ate and
found that the proffered justi fi cati ons di d not sustai n the cl assi fi ca-
ti on.
29
I nasmuch as i t was cl ear that the undocumented status of
the chi l dren was not i rrel evant to val i d government goal s and i nas-
much as the Court had previ ousl y hel d that access to educati on
was not a fundamental i nterest whi ch tri ggered stri ct scruti ny of
governmental di sti ncti ons rel ati ng to educati on,
30
the Courts deci -
si on to accord i ntermedi ate revi ew was based upon an amal gam of
at l east three factors. Fi rst, al i enage was a characteri sti c that pro-
vokes speci al judi ci al protecti on when used as a basi s for di scri mi -
nati on. Second, the chi l dren were i nnocent parti es who were havi ng
a parti cul ar onus i mposed on them because of the mi sconduct of
thei r parents. Thi rd, the total deni al of an educati on to these chi l -
1875
31
I d. at 22324.
32
Rejected state i nterests i ncl uded preservi ng l i mi ted resources for i ts l awful
resi dents, deterri ng an i nfl ux of i l l egal al i ens, avoi di ng the speci al burden caused
by these chi l dren, and servi ng chi l dren who were more l i kel y to remai n i n the State
and contri bute to i ts wel fare. I d. at 22730.
33
Bradwel l v. I l l i noi s, 83 U.S. (16 Wal l .) 130, 141 (1873). The cases i nvol vi ng
al l eged di scri mi nati on agai nst women contai n l arge numbers of quai nt quotati ons
from unl i kel y sources. Uphol di ng a l aw whi ch i mposed a fee upon al l persons en-
gaged i n the l aundry busi ness, but excepti ng busi nesses empl oyi ng not more than
two women, Justi ce Hol mes sai d: I f Montana deems i t advi sabl e to put a l i ghter
burden upon women than upon men wi th regard to an empl oyment that our peopl e
commonl y regard as more appropri ate for the former, the Fourteenth Amendment
does not i nterfere by creati ng a fi cti ti ous equal i ty where there i s a real di fference.
Quong Wi ng v. Ki rkendal l , 223 U.S. 59, 63 (1912). And uphol di ng a l aw prohi bi ti ng
most women from tendi ng bar, Justi ce Frankfurter sai d: The fact that women may
now have achi eved the vi rtues that men have l ong cl ai med as thei r prerogati ves and
now i ndul ge i n vi ces that men have l ong practi ced, does not precl ude the States
from drawi ng a sharp l i ne between the sexes, certai nl y i n such matters as the regu-
l ati on of the l i quor traffi c. . . . The Consti tuti on does not requi re l egi sl atures to re-
fl ect soci ol ogi cal i nsi ght, or shi fti ng soci al standards, any more than i t requi res
them to keep abreast of the l atest sci enti fi c standards. Goesaert v. Cl eary, 335 U.S.
464, 466 (1948).
34
Mi nor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wal l .) 162 (1875) (pri vi l eges and i mmuni -
ti es).
dren woul d stamp them wi th an enduri ng di sabi l i ty that woul d
harm both them and the State al l thei r l i ves.
31
The Court eval u-
ated each of the States attempted justi fi cati ons and found none of
them sati sfyi ng the l evel of revi ew demanded.
32
I t seems evi dent
that Plyler v. Doe i s a uni que case and that whatever i t may doc-
tri nal l y stand for, a suffi ci entl y si mi l ar factual si tuati on cal l i ng for
appl i cati on of i ts standards i s unl i kel y to be repl i cated.
Sex. Shortl y after rati fi cati on of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the refusal of I l l i noi s to l i cense a woman to practi ce l aw was chal -
l enged before the Supreme Court, and the Court rejected the chal -
l enge i n tones whi ch prevai l ed wel l i nto the twenti eth century.
The ci vi l l aw, as wel l as nature i tsel f, has al ways recogni zed a
wi de di fference i n the respecti ve spheres and desti ni es of man and
woman. Man i s, or shoul d be, womans protector and defender. The
natural and proper ti mi di ty and del i cacy whi ch bel ongs to the fe-
mal e sex evi dentl y unfi ts i t for many of the occupati ons of ci vi l l i fe.
The consti tuti on of the fami l y organi zati on, whi ch i s founded i n the
di vi ne ordi nance, as wel l as i n the nature of thi ngs, i ndi cates the
domesti c sphere as that whi ch properl y bel ongs to the domai n and
functi ons of womanhood.
33
On the same premi se, a statute re-
stri cti ng the franchi se to men was sustai ned.
34
The greater number of cases have i nvol ved l egi sl ati on ai med to
protect women from oppressi ve worki ng condi ti ons, as by prescri b-
1876
35
Mul l er v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Domi ni on Hotel v. Ari zona, 249 U.S.
265 (1919).
36
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parri sh, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
37
E.g., Radi ce v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (prohi bi ti ng ni ght work by
women i n restaurants). A si mi l ar restri cti on set a maxi mum wei ght that women
coul d be requi red to l i ft.
38
Hoyt v. Fl ori da, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
39
Croni n v. Adams, 192 U.S. 108 (1904).
40
Goesaert v. Cl eary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
41
Thus, ti tl e VI I of the Ci vi l Ri ghts Act of 1964, 80 Stat. 662, 42 U.S.C. 2000e
et seq., bans di scri mi nati on agai nst ei ther sex i n empl oyment. See, e.g., Phi l l i ps v.
Marti n-Mari etta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Dothard v. Rawl i nson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977); Los Angel es Dept of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Ari -
zona Governi ng Comm. for Tax Deferred Pl ans v. Norri s, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (ac-
tuari al l y based l ower monthl y reti rement benefi ts for women empl oyees vi ol ates
Ti tl e VI I ); Meri tor Savi ngs Bank v. Vi nson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (hosti l e envi ron-
ment sex harassment cl ai m i s acti onabl e). Reversi ng rul i ngs that pregnancy di s-
cri mi nati on i s not reached by the statutory bar on sex di scri mi nati on, General El ec-
tri c Co. v. Gi l bert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Nashvi l l e Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136
(1977), Congress enacted the Pregnancy Di scri mi nati on Act, Pub. L. 95555 (1978),
92 Stat. 2076, amendi ng 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Equal Pay Act, 77 Stat. 56 (1963),
amendi ng the Fai r Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d), general l y appl i es to
wages pai d for work requi ri ng equal ski l l , effort, and responsi bi l i ty. See Corni ng
Gl ass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). On the controversi al i ssue of com-
parabl e worth and the i nterrel ati onshi p of ti tl e VI I and the Equal Pay Act, see
County of Washi ngton v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
42
See, e.g., Roberts v. Uni ted States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (state prohi bi -
ti on on gender di scri mi nati on i n aspects of publ i c accommodati on, as appl i ed to
membershi p i n a ci vi c organi zati on, i s justi fi ed by compel l i ng state i nterest).
i ng maxi mum hours
35
or mi ni mum wages
36
or by restri cti ng some
of the thi ngs women coul d be requi red to do.
37
A 1961 deci si on
uphel d a state l aw whi ch requi red jury servi ce of men but whi ch
gave women the opti on of servi ng or not. We cannot say that i t
i s consti tuti onal l y i mpermi ssi bl e for a State acti ng i n pursui t of the
general wel fare, to concl ude that a woman shoul d be rel i eved from
the ci vi c duty of jury servi ce unl ess she hersel f determi nes that
such servi ce i s consi stent wi th her own speci al responsi bi l i ti es.
38
Another type of protecti ve l egi sl ati on for women that was sustai ned
by the Court i s that premi sed on protecti on of moral s, as by forbi d-
di ng the sal e of l i quor to women.
39
I n a hi ghl y controversi al rul i ng,
the Court sustai ned a state l aw whi ch forbade the l i censi ng of any
femal e bartender, except for the wi ves or daughters of mal e own-
ers. The Court purported to vi ew the l aw as one for the protecti on
of the heal th and moral s of women general l y, wi th the excepti on
bei ng justi fi ed by the consi derati on that such women woul d be
under the eyes of a protecti ve mal e.
40
A wi de vari ety of sex di scri mi nati ons by governmental and pri -
vate parti es, i ncl udi ng the protecti ve l abor l egi sl ati on previ ousl y
sustai ned, i s now subjected to federal statutory proscri pti on, ban-
ni ng, for i nstance, sex di scri mi nati on i n empl oyment and requi ri ng
equal pay for equal work.
41
Some states have fol l owed sui t.
42
1877
43
On the Equal Ri ghts Amendment, see supra, pp. 90406, 913.
44
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
45
I d.at 7577. Cf. Ei senstadt v. Bai rd, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972). A statute
si mi l ar to that i n Reed was before the Court i n Ki rchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455
(1981) (i nval i dati ng statute gi vi ng husband uni l ateral ri ght to di spose of joi ntl y
owned communi ty property wi thout wi fes consent).
46
Crai g v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Cal i fano v. Gol dfarb, 430 U.S. 199,
21011 (1977) (pl ural i ty opi ni on); Cal i fano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316317
(1977); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
388 (1979); Massachusetts Personnel Admr v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979);
Cal i fano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 85 (1979); Wengl er v. Druggi sts Mutual I ns. Co.,
446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980); Ki rchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Mi s-
si ssi ppi Uni v. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 72324 (1982). But see Mi chael
M. v. Superi or Court, 450 U.S. 464, 46869 (1981) (pl ural i ty opi ni on); i d. at 483
(Justi ce Bl ackmun concurri ng); Rostker v. Gol dberg, 453 U.S. 57, 6972 (1981). The
test i s the same whether women or men are di sadvantaged by the cl assi fi cati on, Orr
v. Orr, supra, at 279; Caban v. Mohammed, supra, at 394; Mi ssi ssi ppi Uni v. for
Women v. Hogan, supra at 724, al though Justi ce Rehnqui st and Chi ef Justi ce Burg-
er strongl y argued that when mal es are di sadvantaged onl y the rati onal basi s test
Whi l e the proposed Equal Ri ghts Amendment pended before the
States and ul ti matel y fai l ed of rati fi cati on,
43
the Supreme Court
undertook a major eval uati on of sex cl assi fi cati on doctri ne, fi rst ap-
pl yi ng a hei ghtened tradi ti onal standard of revi ew (wi th bi te) to
voi d a di scri mi nati on and then, after comi ng wi thi n a vote of mak-
i ng sex a suspect cl assi fi cati on, settl i ng upon an i ntermedi ate
standard. These standards conti nue, wi th some uncertai nti es of ap-
pl i cati on and some tendenci es among the Justi ces both to l essen
and to i ncrease the burden of governmental justi fi cati on, to provi de
the anal ysi s for eval uati on of sex cl assi fi cati ons.
I n Reed v. Reed,
44
the Court hel d i nval i d a state probate l aw
whi ch gave mal es preference over femal es when both were equal l y
enti tl ed to admi ni ster an estate. Because the statute provi des that
di fferent treatment be accorded to the appl i cants on the basi s of
thei r sex, Chi ef Justi ce Burger wrote, i t thus establ i shes a cl assi -
fi cati on subject to scruti ny under the Equal Protecti on Cl ause. The
Court proceeded to hol d that under tradi ti onal equal protecti on
standards requi ri ng a cl assi fi cati on to be reasonabl e and not arbi -
trari l y rel ated to a l awful objecti ve the cl assi fi cati on made was an
arbi trary way to achi eve the objecti ve the State advanced i n de-
fense of the l aw, that i s, to reduce the area of controversy between
otherwi se equal l y qual i fi ed appl i cants for admi ni strati on. Thus, the
Court used tradi ti onal anal ysi s but the hol di ng seems to go some-
what further to say that not al l l awful i nterests of a State may be
advanced by a cl assi fi cati on based sol el y on sex.
45
I t i s now establ i shed that sex cl assi fi cati ons, i n order to wi th-
stand equal protecti on scruti ny, must serve i mportant govern-
mental objecti ves and must be substanti al l y rel ated to achi evement
of those objecti ves.
46
Thus, after several years i n whi ch sex di s-
1878
i s appropri ate. Crai g v. Boren, supra, 217, 21821; Cal i fano v. Gol dfarb, supra, at
224. That adopti on of a standard has not el i mi nated di ffi cul ty i n deci di ng such cases
shoul d be evi dent by perusal of the cases fol l owi ng.
47
I n Fronti ero v. Ri chardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), four Justi ces were prepared
to hol d that sex cl assi fi cati ons are i nherentl y suspect and must therefore be sub-
jected to stri ct scruti ny. I d.at 68487 (Justi ces Brennan, Dougl as, Whi te, and Mar-
shal l ). Three Justi ces, reachi ng the same resul t, thought the statute fai l ed the tradi -
ti onal test and decl i ned for the moment to consi der whether sex was a suspect cl as-
si fi cati on, fi ndi ng that i nappropri ate whi l e the Equal Ri ghts Amendment was pend-
i ng. I d. at 691 (Justi ces Powel l and Bl ackmun and Chi ef Justi ce Burger). Justi ce
Stewart found the statute voi d under tradi ti onal scruti ny and Justi ce Rehnqui st di s-
sented. I d. at 691. I n Mi ssi ssi ppi Uni v. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9
(1982), Justi ce OConnor for the Court expressl y reserved deci si on whether a cl assi -
fi cati on that survi ved i ntermedi ate scruti ny woul d be subject to stri ct scruti ny.
48
Whi l e thei r concurrences i n Crai g v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210, 211 (1976), i n-
di cate some reti cence about express rel i ance on i ntermedi ate scruti ny, Justi ces Pow-
el l and Stevens have si nce joi ned or wri tten opi ni ons stati ng the test and appl yi ng
i t. E.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979) (Justi ce Powel l wri ti ng the
opi ni on of the Court); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 359 (1979) (Justi ce Powel l
concurri ng); Cal i fano v. Gol dfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977) (Justi ce Stevens concur-
ri ng); Caban v. Mohammed, supra, at 401 (Justi ce Stevens di ssenti ng). Chi ef Justi ce
Burger and Justi ce Rehnqui st have not cl earl y stated a test, al though thei r def-
erence to l egi sl ati ve judgment approaches the tradi ti onal scruti ny test. But see
Cal i fano v. Westcott, supra, at 93 (joi ni ng Court on substanti ve deci si on). And cf.
Mi ssi ssi ppi Uni v. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 73435 (1982) (Justi ce
Bl ackmun di ssenti ng).
49
The test i s thus the same as i s appl i ed to i l l egi ti macy cl assi fi cati ons, al though
wi th apparentl y more ri gor when sex i s i nvol ved.
50
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). See also Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S.
501 (1977). Assumpti ons about the tradi ti onal rol es of the sexes afford no basi s for
support of cl assi fi cati ons under the i ntermedi ate scruti ny standard. E.g., Orr v. Orr,
440 U.S. 268, 27980 (1979); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355 (1979);
Ki rchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981). Justi ce Stevens i n parti cul ar has been
ti ncti ons were more often voi ded than sustai ned wi thout a cl ear
statement of the standard of revi ew,
47
a majori ty of the Court has
arri ved at the i ntermedi ate standard whi ch many had thought i t
was appl yi ng i n any event.
48
The Court fi rst exami nes the statu-
tory or admi ni strati ve scheme to determi ne i f the purpose or objec-
ti ve i s permi ssi bl e and, i f i t i s, whether i t i s i mportant. Then, hav-
i ng ascertai ned the actual moti vati on of the cl assi fi cati on, the
Court engages i n a bal anci ng test to determi ne how wel l the cl assi -
fi cati on serves the end and whether a l ess di scri mi natory one
woul d serve that end wi thout substanti al l oss to the government.
49
Some sex di sti ncti ons were seen to be based sol el y upon ol d
noti ons, no l onger val i d i f ever they were, about the respecti ve
rol es of the sexes i n soci ety, and those di sti ncti ons fai l ed to survi ve
even tradi ti onal scruti ny. Thus, a state l aw defi ni ng the age of ma-
jori ty as 18 for femal es and 21 for mal es, enti tl i ng the mal e chi l d
to support by hi s di vorced father for three years l onger than the
femal e chi l d, was deemed merel y i rrati onal , grounded as i t was i n
the assumpti on of the mal e as the breadwi nner, needi ng l onger to
prepare, and the femal e as sui ted for wi fe and mother.
50
Si mi l arl y,
1879
concerned whether l egi sl ati ve cl assi fi cati ons by sex si mpl y refl ect tradi ti onal ways
of thi nki ng or are the resul t of a reasoned attempt to reach some neutral goal , e.g.,
Cal i fano v. Gol dfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 22223 (1978) (concurri ng), and he wi l l sustai n
some otherwi se i mpermi ssi bl e di sti ncti ons i f he fi nds the l egi sl ati ve reasoni ng to ap-
proxi mate the l atter approach. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 401 (1979) (di s-
senti ng).
51
Tayl or v. Loui si ana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). The preci se basi s of the deci si on was
the Si xth Amendment ri ght to a representati ve cross secti on of the communi ty, but
the Court deal t wi th and di sapproved the reasoni ng i n Hoyt v. Fl ori da, 368 U.S. 57
(1961), i n whi ch a si mi l ar jury sel ecti on process was uphel d agai nst due process and
equal protecti on chal l enge.
52
Crai g v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
53
I d.at 198, 199200, 20104.
54
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
a state jury system that i n effect excl uded al most al l women was
deemed to be based upon an overbroad general i zati on about the
rol e of women as a cl ass i n soci ety, and the admi ni strati ve conven-
i ence served coul d not justi fy i t.
51
Assumpti ons about the rel ati ve posi ti ons of the sexes, however,
are not wi thout some basi s i n fact, and sex may someti mes be a
rel i abl e proxy for the characteri sti c, such as need, wi th whi ch i t i s
the l egi sl atures actual i ntenti on to deal . But hei ghtened scruti ny
requi res evi dence of the exi stence of the di sti ngui shi ng fact and i ts
cl ose correspondence wi th the condi ti on for whi ch sex stands as
proxy. Thus, i n the case whi ch fi rst expressl y announced the i nter-
medi ate scruti ny standard, the Court struck down a state statute
that prohi bi ted the sal e of non-i ntoxi cati ng 3.2 beer to mal es
under 21 and to femal es under 18.
52
Accepti ng the argument that
traffi c safety was an i mportant governmental objecti ve, the Court
emphasi zed that sex i s an often i naccurate proxy for other, more
germane cl assi fi cati ons. Taki ng the stati sti cs offered by the State
as of val ue, whi l e cauti oni ng that stati sti cal anal ysi s i s a dubi ous
busi ness that i s i n tensi on wi th the normati ve phi l osophy that
underl i es the Equal Protecti on Cl ause, the Court thought the cor-
rel ati on between mal es and femal es arrested for drunk dri vi ng
showed an undul y tenuous fi t to al l ow the use of sex as a di sti nc-
ti on.
53
I nval i dati ng an Al abama l aw i mposi ng al i mony obl i gati ons
upon mal es but not upon femal es, the Court acknowl edged that as-
si sti ng needy spouses was a l egi ti mate and i mportant govern-
mental objecti ve and woul d then have turned to ascertai ni ng
whether sex was a suffi ci entl y accurate proxy for dependency, so i t
coul d be sai d that the cl assi fi cati on was substanti al l y rel ated to
achi evement of the objecti ve.
54
However, the Court observed that
the State al ready conducted i ndi vi dual i zed heari ngs wi th respect to
the need of the wi fe, so that wi th l i ttl e addi ti onal burden needy
mal es coul d be i denti fi ed and hel ped. The use of the sex standard
1880
55
I d. at 28083. An admi ni strati ve conveni ence justi fi cati on was not avai l abl e,
therefore. I d. at 281 & n.12. Whi l e such an argument has been accepted as a suffi -
ci ent justi fi cati on i n at l east some i l l egi ti macy cases, Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495, 509 (1976), i t has nei ther whol l y been rul ed out nor accepted i n sex cases. I n
Lucas, supra, 50910, the Court i nterpreted Fronti ero v. Ri chardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973), as havi ng requi red a showi ng at l east that for every dol l ar l ost to a reci pi ent
not meeti ng the general purpose qual i fi cati on a dol l ar i s saved i n admi ni strati ve ex-
pense. I n Wengl er v. Druggi sts Mutual I ns. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 152 (1980), the Court
sai d that [i ]t may be that there are l evel s of admi ni strati ve conveni ence that wi l l
justi fy di scri mi nati ons that are subject to hei ghtened scruti ny . . . , but the req-
ui si te showi ng has not been made here by the mere cl ai m that i t woul d be i nconven-
i ent to i ndi vi dual i ze determi nati ons about wi dows as wel l as wi dowers. Justi ce Ste-
vens apparentl y woul d demand a factual showi ng of substanti al savi ngs. Cal i fano
v. Gol dfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 219 (1977) (concurri ng).
56
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). Four Justi ces di ssented. I d. at 394
(Justi ce Stewart), 401 (Justi ces Stevens and Rehnqui st and Chi ef Justi ce Burger).
For the conceptual l y di fferent probl em of cl assi fi cati on between di fferent groups of
women on the basi s of marri age or absence of marri age to a wage earner, see
Cal i fano v. Bol es, 443 U.S. 282 (1979).
57
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979). Justi ces Whi te, Brennan, Marshal l ,
and Bl ackmun, who had been i n the majori ty i n Caban, di ssented. I d. at 361.
as a proxy, therefore, was not justi fi ed because i t needl essl y bur-
dened needy men and advantaged fi nanci al l y secure women whose
husbands were i n need.
55
Di scri mi nati on between unwed mothers and unwed fathers re-
cei ved di fferent treatments through the Courts percepti on of the
justi fi cati ons and presumpti ons underl yi ng each. A New York l aw
permi tted the unwed mother but not the unwed father of an i l l egi t-
i mate chi l d to bl ock hi s adopti on by wi thhol di ng consent. Acti ng i n
the i nstance of one who acknowl edged hi s parenthood and who had
mai ntai ned a cl ose rel ati onshi p wi th hi s chi l d over the years, the
Court coul d di scern no substanti al rel ati onshi p between the cl assi -
fi cati on and some i mportant state i nterest. Promoti on of adopti on
of i l l egi ti mates and thei r consequent l egi ti mati on was i mportant,
but the assumpti on that al l unwed fathers ei ther stood i n a di f-
ferent rel ati onshi p to thei r chi l dren than di d the unwed mother or
that the di ffi cul ty of fi ndi ng the fathers woul d unreasonabl y bur-
den the adopti on process was overbroad, as the facts of the case re-
veal ed. No barri er exi sted to the State di spensi ng wi th consent
when the father or hi s l ocati on i s unknown, but di squal i fi cati on of
al l unwed fathers may not be used as a shorthand for that step.
56
On the other hand, the Court sustai ned a Georgi a statute whi ch
permi tted the mother of an i l l egi ti mate chi l d to sue for the wrong-
ful death of the chi l d but whi ch al l owed the father to sue onl y i f
he had l egi ti mated the chi l d and there i s no mother.
57
There was
no opi ni on of the Court, but both opi ni ons maki ng up the resul t
emphasi zed that the objecti ve of the State, the avoi dance of di f-
1881
58
The pl ural i ty opi ni on determi ned that the statute di d not i nvi di ousl y di s-
cri mi nate agai nst men as a cl ass; i t was no overbroad general i zati on but proceeded
from the fact that onl y men coul d l egi ti mate chi l dren by uni l ateral acti on. The sexes
were not si mi l arl y si tuated, therefore, and the cl assi fi cati on recogni zed that. As a
resul t, al l that was requi red was that the means be a rati onal way of deal i ng wi th
the probl em of provi ng paterni ty. I d. at 35358. Justi ce Powel l found the statute
val i d because the sex-based cl assi fi cati on was substanti al l y rel ated to the objecti ve
of avoi di ng probl ems of proof i n provi ng paterni ty. He al so emphasi zed that the fa-
ther had i t wi thi n hi s power to remove the bar by l egi ti mati ng the chi l d. I d. at 359.
59
Fronti ero v. Ri chardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
60
420 U.S. 636 (1975).
61
430 U.S. 199 (1977). The di ssent argued that whatever the cl assi fi cati on uti -
l i zed, soci al i nsurance programs shoul d not automati cal l y be subjected to hei ghtened
scruti ny but rather onl y to tradi ti onal rati onal i ty revi ew. I d. at 224 (Justi ce
Rehnqui st wi th Chi ef Justi ce Burger and Justi ces Stewart and Bl ackmun). I n
Wengl er v. Druggi sts Mutual I ns. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980), voi di ng a state workers
compensati on provi si on i denti cal to that voi ded i n Goldfarb, onl y Justi ce Rehnqui st
conti nued to adhere to thi s vi ew, al though the others may have yi el ded onl y to
precedent.
fi cul ti es i n provi ng paterni ty, was an i mportant one whi ch was ad-
vanced by the cl assi fi cati on.
58
As i n the i nstance of i l l egi ti macy cl assi fi cati ons, the i ssue of
sex qual i fi cati ons for the recei pt of governmental fi nanci al benefi ts
has di vi ded the Court and occasi oned cl ose di sti ncti ons. A statutory
scheme under whi ch a servi ceman coul d cl ai m hi s spouse as a de-
pendent for al l owances whi l e a servi cewomans spouse was not
consi dered a dependent unl ess he was shown i n fact to be de-
pendent upon her for more than one hal f of hi s support was hel d
an i nval i d di ssi mi l ar treatment of si mi l arl y si tuated men and
women, not justi fi ed by the admi ni strati ve conveni ence rati onal e.
59
I n Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
60
the Court struck down a Soci al Se-
curi ty provi si on that gave survi vors benefi ts based on the i nsureds
earni ngs to the wi dow and mi nor chi l dren but gave such benefi ts
onl y to the chi l dren and not to the wi dower of a deceased woman
worker. Focusi ng not onl y upon the di scri mi nati on agai nst the wi d-
ower but pri mari l y upon the di scri mi nati on vi si ted upon the
woman worker whose earni ngs di d not provi de the same support
for her fami l y that a mal e workers di d, the Court saw the basi s
for the di sti ncti on resti ng upon the general i zati on that a woman
woul d stay home and take care of the chi l dren whi l e a man woul d
not. Si nce the Court percei ved the purpose of the provi si on to be
to enabl e the survi vi ng parent to choose to remai n at home to care
for mi nor chi l dren, the sex cl assi fi cati on i l l fi tted the end and was
i nvi di ousl y di scri mi natory.
But when i n Califano v. Goldfarb
61
the Court was confronted
wi th a Soci al Securi ty provi si on structured much as the benefi t sec-
ti ons struck down i n Frontiero and Wiesenfeld, even i n the l i ght of
an express hei ghtened scruti ny, no majori ty of the Court coul d be
1882
62
I d. at 430 U.S. 20409, 21217 (Justi ces Brennan, Whi te, Marshal l , and Pow-
el l ). Congress responded by el i mi nati ng the dependency requi rement but by addi ng
a pensi on offset provi si on reduci ng spousal benefi ts by the amount of vari ous other
pensi ons recei ved. Conti nuati on i n thi s context of the Goldfarb gender-based de-
pendency cl assi fi cati on for a fi ve-year grace peri od was uphel d i n Heckl er v.
Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984), as di rectl y and substanti al l y rel ated to the i mportant
governmental i nterest i n protecti ng agai nst the effects of the pensi on offset the re-
ti rement pl ans of i ndi vi dual s who had based thei r pl ans on unreduced pre-Goldfarb
payment l evel s.
63
I d. at 217. Justi ce Stevens adhered to thi s vi ew i n Wengl er v. Druggi sts Mu-
tual I ns. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 154 (1980). Note the unani mi ty of the Court on the sub-
stanti ve i ssue, al though i t was di vi ded on remedy, i n voi di ng i n Cal i fano v. West-
cott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979), a Soci al Securi ty provi si on gi vi ng benefi ts to fami l i es wi th
dependent chi l dren who have been depri ved of parental support because of the un-
empl oyment of the father but gi vi ng no benefi ts when the mother i s unempl oyed.
64
453 U.S. 57 (1981). Joi ni ng the opi ni on of the Court were Justi ces Rehnqui st,
Stewart, Bl ackmun, Powel l , and Stevens, and Chi ef Justi ce Burger. Di ssenti ng were
Justi ces Whi te, Marshal l , and Brennan. I d. at 83, 86.
obtai ned for the reason for stri ki ng down the statute. The secti on
provi ded that a wi dow was enti tl ed to recei ve survi vors benefi ts
based on the earni ngs of her deceased husband, regardl ess of de-
pendency, but payments were to go to the wi dower of a deceased
wi fe onl y upon proof that he had been recei vi ng at l east hal f of hi s
support from her. The pl ural i ty opi ni on treated the di scri mi nati on
as consi sti ng of di sparate treatment of women wage-earners whose
tax payments di d not earn the same fami l y protecti on as mal e
wage earners taxes. Looki ng to the purpose of the benefi ts provi -
si on, the pl ural i ty percei ved i t to be protecti on of the fami l i al uni t
rather than of the i ndi vi dual wi dow or wi dower and to be keyed to
dependency rather than need. The sex cl assi fi cati on was thus found
to be based on an assumpti on of femal e dependency whi ch i l l -
served the purpose of the statute and was an i l l -chosen proxy for
the underl yi ng qual i fi cati on. Admi ni strati ve conveni ence coul d not
justi fy use of such a questi onabl e proxy.
62
Justi ce Stevens, concur-
ri ng, accepted most of the anal ysi s of the di ssent but nonethel ess
came to the concl usi on of i nval i di ty. Hi s argument was essenti al l y
that whi l e ei ther admi ni strati ve conveni ence or a desi re to remedy
di scri mi nati on agai nst femal e spouses coul d justi fy use of a sex
cl assi fi cati on, nei ther purpose was served by the sex cl assi fi cati on
actual l y used i n thi s statute.
63
Agai n, the Court di vi ded cl osel y when i t sustained two i n-
stances of cl assi fi cati ons cl ai med to consti tute sex di scri mi nati on.
I n Rostker v. Goldberg,
64
rejecti ng presi denti al recommendati ons,
Congress provi ded for regi strati on onl y of mal es for a possi bl e fu-
ture mi l i tary draft, excl udi ng women al together. The Court di s-
cussed but di d not expl i ci tl y choose among proffered equal protec-
ti on standards, but i t apparentl y appl i ed the i ntermedi ate test of
Craig v. Boren. However, i t di d so i n the context of i ts often-stated
1883
65
I d. at 6972, 7883. The di ssent argued that regi stered persons woul d fi l l
noncombat posi ti ons as wel l as combat ones and that drafti ng women woul d add to
women vol unteers provi di ng support for combat personnel and woul d free up men
i n other posi ti ons for combat duty. Both di ssents assumed wi thout deci di ng that ex-
cl usi on of women from combat served i mportant governmental i nterests. I d. at 83,
93. The majori tys rel i ance on an admi ni strati ve conveni ence argument, i t shoul d be
noted, i d., 81, was contrary to recent precedent. Supra, p. 1880 n.55.
66
450 U.S. 464 (1981). Joi ni ng the opi ni on of the Court were Justi ces
Rehnqui st, Stewart, and Powel l , and Chi ef Justi ce Burger, consti tuti ng onl y a pl u-
ral i ty. Justi ce Bl ackmun concurred i n a somewhat more l i mi ted opi ni on. I d. at 481.
Di ssenti ng were Justi ces Brennan, Whi te, Marshal l , and Stevens. I d. at 488, 496.
67
I d. at 47074, 481. The di ssents questi oned both whether the pregnancy de-
terrence rati onal e was the purpose underl yi ng the di sti ncti on and whether, i f i t was,
the cl assi fi cati on was substanti al l y rel ated to achi evement of the goal . I d. at 488,
496.
preference for extreme deference to mi l i tary deci si ons and to con-
gressi onal resol uti on of mi l i tary deci si ons. Eval uati ng the congres-
si onal determi nati on, the Court found that i t has not been un-
thi nki ng or refl exi vel y based upon tradi ti onal noti ons of the di f-
ferences between men and women; rather, Congress had exten-
si vel y del i berated over i ts deci si on. I t had found, the Court as-
serted, that the purpose of regi strati on was the creati on of a pool
from whi ch to draw combat troops when needed, an i mportant and
i ndeed compel l i ng governmental i nterest, and the excl usi on of
women was not onl y suffi ci entl y but cl osel y rel ated to that pur-
pose because they were i l l -sui ted for combat, coul d be excl uded
from combat, and regi steri ng them woul d be too burdensome to the
mi l i tary system.
65
I n Michael M. v. Superior Court,
66
the Court di d expressl y
adopt the Craig v. Boren i ntermedi ate standard, but i ts appl i cati on
of the test appeared to represent a departure i n several respects
from pri or cases i n whi ch i t had struck down sex cl assi fi cati ons.
Michael M. i nvol ved the consti tuti onal i ty of a statute that puni shed
mal es, but not femal es, for havi ng sexual i ntercourse wi th a
nonspousal person under 18 years of age. The pl ural i ty and the
concurrence general l y agreed, but wi th some di fference of empha-
si s, that whi l e the l aw was founded on a cl ear sex di sti ncti on i t was
justi fi ed because i t di d serve an i mportant governmental i nterest,
the preventi on of teenage pregnanci es. I nasmuch as women may
become pregnant and men may not, women woul d be better de-
terred by that bi ol ogi cal fact, and men needed the addi ti onal l egal
deterrence of a cri mi nal penal ty. Thus, the l aw recogni zed that for
purposes of thi s cl assi fi cati on men and women were not si mi l arl y
si tuated, and the statute di d not deny equal protecti on.
67
Cases of beni gn di scri mi nati on, that i s, statutory cl assi fi ca-
ti ons that benefi t women and di sadvantage men i n order to over-
come the effects of past soci etal di scri mi nati on agai nst women,
1884
68
416 U.S. 351 (1974).
69
I d. at 355.
70
419 U.S. 498 (1975).
71
Wei nberger v. Wi esenfel d, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975); Cal i fano v. Gol dfarb, 430
U.S. 199, 209 n.8 (1977); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 28082 (1979); Wengl er v. Drug-
gi sts Mutual I ns. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 15052 (1980). I n l i ght of the sti ffened stand-
ard, Justi ce Stevens has cal l ed for overrul i ng Kahn, Cal i fano v. Gol dfarb, supra,
22324, but Justi ce Bl ackmun woul d preserve that case. Orr v. Orr, supra, at 284.
Cf. Regents of the Uni v. of Cal i forni a v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 30203 (1978) (Justi ce
Powel l ; l ess stri ngent standard of revi ew for beni gn sex cl assi fi cati ons).
have presented the Court wi th some di ffi cul ty. Al though the fi rst
two cases were revi ewed under apparentl y tradi ti onal rati onal
basi s scruti ny, the more recent cases appear to subject these cl assi -
fi cati ons to the same i ntermedi ate standard as any other sex cl assi -
fi cati on. Kahn v. Shevin
68
uphel d a state property tax exempti on
al l owi ng wi dows but not wi dowers a $500 exempti on. I n justi fi ca-
ti on, the State had presented extensi ve stati sti cal data showi ng the
substanti al economi c and empl oyment di sabi l i ti es of women i n rel a-
ti on to men. The provi si on, the Court found, was reasonabl y de-
si gned to further the state pol i cy of cushi oni ng the fi nanci al i mpact
of spousal l oss upon the sex for whom that l oss i mposes a di s-
proporti onatel y heavy burden.
69
And i n Schlesinger v. Ballard,
70
the Court sustai ned a provi si on requi ri ng the mandatory di scharge
from the Navy of a mal e offi cer who has twi ce fai l ed of promoti on
to certai n l evel s, whi ch i n Bal l ards case meant di scharge after ni ne
years of servi ce, whereas women offi cers were enti tl ed to 13 years
of servi ce before mandatory di scharge for want of promoti on. The
di fference was hel d to be a rati onal recogni ti on of the fact that
mal e and femal e offi cers were di ssi mi l arl y si tuated and that
women had far fewer promoti onal opportuni ti es than men had.
Al though i n each of these cases the Court accepted the prof-
fered justi fi cati on of remedi al purpose wi thout searchi ng i nqui ry,
l ater cases cauti on that the mere reci tati on of a beni gn, compen-
satory purpose i s not an automati c shi el d whi ch protects agai nst
any i nqui ry i nto the actual purposes underl yi ng a statutory
scheme.
71
Rather, after speci fi cal l y ci ti ng the hei ghtened scruti ny
that al l sex cl assi fi cati ons are subjected to, the Court l ooks to the
statute and to i ts l egi sl ati ve hi story to ascertai n that the scheme
does not actual l y penal i ze women, that i t was actual l y enacted to
compensate for past di scri mi nati on, and that i t does not refl ect
merel y archai c and overbroad general i zati ons about women i n i ts
movi ng force. But where a statute i s del i beratel y enacted to com-
pensate for parti cul ar economi c di sabi l i ti es suffered by women, i t
1885
72
Cal i fano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 31618, 320 (1977). There was no doubt
that the provi si on sustai ned i n Webster had been adopted expressl y to rel i eve past
soci etal di scri mi nati on. The four Goldfarb di ssenters concurred speci al l y, fi ndi ng no
di fference between the two provi si ons. I d. at 321.
73
458 U.S. 718 (1982). Joi ni ng the opi ni on of the Court were Justi ces OConnor,
Brennan, Whi te, Marshal l , and Stevens. Di ssenti ng were Chi ef Justi ce Burger and
Justi ces Bl ackmun, Powel l , and Rehnqui st. I d. at 733, 735.
74
I d. at 728.
75
I d. at 730. I n addi ti on to obl i gati ng the State to show that i n fact there was
exi sti ng di scri mi nati on or effects from past di scri mi nati on, the Court al so appeared
to take the substanti al step of requi ri ng the State to establ i sh that the l egi sl ature
i ntended the si ngl e-sex pol i cy to compensate for any percei ved di scri mi nati on. I d.
at 730 n.16. A requi rement that the proffered purpose be the actual one and that
i t must be shown that the l egi sl ature actual l y had that purpose i n mi nd woul d be
a notabl e sti ffeni ng of equal protecti on standards.
76
I n the major di ssent, Justi ce Powel l argued that onl y a rati onal basi s stand-
ard ought to be appl i ed to sex cl assi fi cati ons that woul d expand womens choi ces,
but that the excl usi on here sati sfi ed i ntermedi ate revi ew because i t promoted di ver-
si ty of educati onal opportuni ty and was premi sed on the bel i ef that si ngl e-sex col -
serves an i mportant governmental objecti ve and wi l l be sustai ned
i f i t i s substanti al l y rel ated to achi evement of that objecti ve.
72
Many of these l i nes of cases converged i n Mississippi Univer-
sity for Women v. Hogan,
73
i n whi ch the Court sti ffened and ap-
pl i ed i ts standards for eval uati ng cl ai med beni gn di sti ncti ons bene-
fi ti ng women and addi ti onal l y appeared to appl y the i ntermedi ate
standard i tsel f more stri ctl y. The case i nvol ved a mal e nurse who
wi shed to attend a femal e-onl y nursi ng school l ocated i n the ci ty
i n whi ch he l i ved and worked; i f he coul d not attend thi s parti cul ar
school he woul d have had to commute 147 mi l es to another nursi ng
school whi ch di d accept men, and he woul d have had di ffi cul ty
doi ng so and retai ni ng hi s job. The State defended on the basi s
that the femal e-onl y pol i cy was justi fi ed as provi di ng educati onal
affi rmati ve acti on for femal es. Reci tati on of a beni gn purpose, the
Court sai d, was not al one suffi ci ent. [A] State can evoke a compen-
satory purpose to justi fy an otherwi se di scri mi natory cl assi fi cati on
onl y i f members of the gender benefi ted by the cl assi fi cati on actu-
al l y suffer a di sadvantage rel ated to the cl assi fi cati on.
74
But
women di d not l ack opportuni ti es to obtai n trai ni ng i n nursi ng; i n-
stead they domi nated the fi el d. I n the Courts vi ew, the state pol i cy
di d not compensate for di scri mi natory barri ers faci ng women, but
i t perpetuated the stereotype of nursi ng as a womans job.
[A]l though the State reci ted a beni gn, compensatory purpose, i t
fai l ed to establ i sh that the al l eged objecti ve i s the actual purpose
underl yi ng the di scri mi natory cl assi fi cati on.
75
Even i f the cl assi -
fi cati on was premi sed on the proffered basi s, the Court concl uded,
i t di d not substanti al l y and di rectl y rel ate to the objecti ve, because
the school permi tted men to audi t the nursi ng cl asses and women
coul d sti l l be adversel y affected by the presence of men.
76
1886
l eges offer di sti ncti ve benefi ts to soci ety. I d. at 735, 740 (emphasi s by Justi ce),
743. The Court noted that because the State mai ntai ned no other si ngl e-sex publ i c
uni versi ty or col l ege, the case di d not present the questi on of whether States can
provi de separate but equal undergraduate i nsti tuti ons for mal es and femal es, i d.
at 720 n.1, al though Justi ce Powel l thought the deci si on di d precl ude such i nsti tu-
ti ons. I d. at 74244. See Vorchhei mer v. School Di st. of Phi l adel phi a, 532 F. 2d 880
(3d Ci r. 1976) (fi ndi ng no equal protecti on vi ol ati on i n mai ntenance of two si ngl e-
sex hi gh school s of equal educati onal offeri ngs, one for mal es, one for femal es), affd
by an equal l y di vi ded Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (Justi ce Rehnqui st not parti ci pat-
i ng).
77
414 U.S. 632 (1974). Justi ce Powel l concurred on equal protecti on grounds. I d.
at 651. See also Turner v. Department of Empl oyment Securi ty, 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
78
Gedul di g v. Ai el l o, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). The Court deni ed that the cl assi fi ca-
ti on was based upon gender as such. Cl assi fi cati on was on the basi s of pregnancy,
and whi l e onl y women can become pregnant, that fact al one was not determi nati ve.
The program di vi des potenti al reci pi ents i nto two groups pregnant woman and
nonpregnant persons. Whi l e the fi rst group i s excl usi vel y femal e, the second i n-
cl udes members of both sexes. I d. at 496 n.20. For a rejecti on of a si mi l ar at-
tempted di sti ncti on, see Nyqui st v. Maucl et, 432 U.S. 1, 9 (1977); and Tri mbl e v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 774 (1977). See also Phi l l i ps v. Marti n-Mari etta Corp., 400
U.S. 542 (1971). For the transmutati on of Geduldig i nto statutory i nterpretati on
and Congress response, see supra, p. 1876 n.41.
79
The fi rst cases set the stage for the l ack of consi stency. Compare Levy v. Lou-
i si ana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), and Gl ona v. Ameri can Guar. & Li ab. I ns. Co., 391 U.S.
73 (1968), i nval i dati ng l aws whi ch precl uded wrongful death acti ons i n cases i nvol v-
i ng the chi l d or the mother when the chi l d was i l l egi ti mate, i n whi ch scruti ny was
stri ct, with Labi ne v. Vi ncent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), i nvol vi ng i ntestate successi on,
i n whi ch scruti ny was rati onal basi s, and Weber v. Aetna Casual ty & Surety Co.,
Another area presenti ng some di ffi cul ty i s that of the rel ati on-
shi p of pregnancy cl assi fi cati ons to gender di scri mi nati on. I n Cleve-
land Board of Education v. LaFluer,
77
a case deci ded upon due
process grounds, two school systems requi ri ng pregnant school
teachers to l eave work four and fi ve months respecti vel y before the
expected chi l dbi rths were found to have acted arbi trari l y and i rra-
ti onal l y i n establ i shi ng rul es not supported by anythi ng more
wei ghty than admi ni strati ve conveni ence buttressed wi th some pos-
si bl e embarrassment of the school boards i n the face of pregnancy.
On the other hand, the excl usi on of pregnancy from a state fi -
nanced program of payments to persons di sabl ed from empl oyment
was uphel d agai nst equal protecti on attack as supportabl e by l egi ti -
mate state i nterests i n the mai ntenance of a sel f-sustai ni ng pro-
gram wi th rates l ow enough to permi t the parti ci pati on of l ow-i n-
come workers at affordabl e l evel s.
78
The absence of supportabl e
reasons i n one case and thei r presence i n the other may wel l have
made the si gni fi cant di fference.
I l l egi ti macy. After wrestl i ng i n a number of cases wi th the
questi on of the permi ssi bi l i ty of governmental cl assi fi cati ons
di sadvantagi ng i l l egi ti mates and the standard for determi ni ng
whi ch cl assi fi cati ons are sustai nabl e, the Court arri ved at a stand-
ard di ffi cul t to state and even more di ffi cul t to appl y.
79
Al though
1887
406 U.S. 164 (1972), i nvol vi ng a workmens compensati on statute di sti ngui shi ng be-
tween l egi ti mates and i l l egi ti mates, i n whi ch scruti ny was i ntermedi ate.
80
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 50306 (1976); Tri mbl e v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762, 76667 (1977); Lal l i v. Lal l i , 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978). Scruti ny i n previ ous
cases had ranged from negl i gi bl e, Labi ne v. Vi ncent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), to some-
thi ng approachi ng stri ctness, Ji mi nez v. Wei nberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631632 (1974).
Mathews i tsel f i l l ustrates the uncertai nty of statement, suggesti ng at one poi nt that
the Labine standard may be appropri ate, supra, at 506, and at another that the
standard appropri ate to sex cl assi fi cati ons i s to be used, i d. at 510, whi l e observi ng
a few pages earl i er that i l l egi ti macy i s enti tl ed to l ess exacti ng scruti ny than ei ther
race or sex. I d. at 506. Trimble settl es on i ntermedi ate scruti ny but does not assess
the rel ati onshi p between i ts standard and the sex cl assi fi cati on standard. See
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979), and Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979) (both cases i nvol vi ng cl assi fi cati ons refl ecti ng both sex and i l l egi ti macy i nter-
ests).
81
The major i nconsi stency ari ses from three 5-to4 deci si ons. Labi ne v. Vi ncent,
401 U.S. 532 (1971), was l argel y overrul ed by Tri mbl e v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977), whi ch i tsel f was substanti al l y l i mi ted by Lal l i v. Lal l i , 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
Justi ce Powel l was the swi ng vote for di fferent di sposi ti on of the l atter two cases.
Thus, whi l e four Justi ces argued for stri cter scruti ny and usual l y i nval i dati on of
such cl assi fi cati ons, Lalli v. Lalli, supra, at 277 (Justi ces Brennan, Whi te, Marshal l ,
and Stevens di ssenti ng), and four favor rel axed scruti ny and usual l y sustai ni ng the
cl assi fi cati ons, Trimble v. Gordon, supra, 776, 777 (Chi ef Justi ce Burger and Jus-
ti ces Stewart, Bl ackmun, and Rehnqui st di ssenti ng), Justi ce Powel l appl i ed hi s own
i ntermedi ate scruti ny and sel ecti vel y voi ded and sustai ned. See Lalli v. Lalli, supra,
(pl ural i ty opi ni on by Justi ce Powel l ).
82
A cl assi fi cati on that absol utel y di sti ngui shes between l egi ti mates and
i l l egi ti mates i s not al one subject to such revi ew; one that di sti ngui shes among cl ass-
es of i l l egi ti mates i s al so subject to i t, Tri mbl e v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 774 (1977),
as i ndeed are cl assi fi cati ons based on other factors. E.g., Nyqui st v. Maucl et, 432
U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (al i enage).
i l l egi ti macy i s anal ogous i n many respects to the personal charac-
teri sti cs that have been hel d to be suspect when used as the basi s
of statutory di fferenti ati ons, the anal ogy i s not suffi ci ent to re-
qui re our most exacti ng scruti ny. The scruti ny to whi ch i t i s enti -
tl ed i s i ntermedi ate, not a toothl ess [scruti ny], but somewhere be-
tween that accorded race and that accorded ordi nary economi c cl as-
si fi cati ons. Basi cal l y, the standard requi res a determi nati on of a l e-
gi ti mate l egi sl ati ve ai m and a careful revi ew of how wel l the cl assi -
fi cati on serves, or fi ts, the ai m.
80
The common rati onal e of al l the
i l l egi ti macy cases i s not cl ear, i s i n many respects not whol l y con-
si stent,
81
but the theme that seems to be i mposed on them by the
more recent cases i s that so l ong as the chal l enged statute does not
so structure i ts conferral of ri ghts, benefi ts, or detri ments that
some i l l egi ti mates who woul d otherwi se qual i fy i n terms of the
statutes l egi ti mate purposes are di sabl ed from parti ci pati on, the
i mposi ti on of greater burdens upon i l l egi ti mates or some cl asses of
i l l egi ti mates than upon l egi ti mates i s permi ssi bl e.
82
I ntestate successi on ri ghts for i l l egi ti mates has di vi ded the
Court over the enti re peri od. At fi rst adverti ng to the broad power
of the States over descent of real property, the Court empl oyed re-
1888
83
Labi ne v. Vi ncent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). Weber v. Aetna Casual ty & Surety
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 170 (1972), had confi ned the anal ysi s of Labine to the area of
state i nheri tance l aws i n expandi ng revi ew of i l l egi ti macy cl assi fi cati ons.
84
430 U.S. 762 (1977). Chi ef Justi ce Burger and Justi ces Stewart, Bl ackmun,
and Rehnqui st di ssented, fi ndi ng the statute consti tuti onal l y i ndi sti ngui shabl e
from the one sustai ned i n Labine. I d. at 776. Justi ce Rehnqui st al so di ssented sepa-
ratel y. I d. at 777.
85
I d. at 76870. Whi l e thi s purpose had been al l uded to i n Labi ne v. Vi ncent,
401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971), i t was rejected as a justi fi cati on i n Weber v. Aetna Cas-
ual ty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173, 175 (1972). Vi si ti ng consequences upon the
parent appears to be permi ssi bl e. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 35253 (1979).
86
Tri mbl e v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 77476 (1977). The Court ci ted the fai l ure
of the state court to rel y on thi s purpose and i ts own exami nati on of the statute.
87
I d. at 77374. Thi s justi fi cati on had been promi nent i n Labi ne v. Vi ncent, 401
U.S. 532, 539 (1971), and i ts absence had been deemed cri ti cal i n Weber v. Aetna
Casual ty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 17071 (1972). The Trimble Court thought
thi s approach somewhat of an anal yti cal anomal y and di sapproved i t. However,
the degree to whi ch one coul d conform to the statutes requi rements and the reason-
abl eness of those requi rements i n rel ati on to a l egi ti mate purpose are promi nent i n
Justi ce Powel l s reasoni ng i n subsequent cases. Lal l i v. Lal l i , 439 U.S. 259, 26674
(1978); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 359 (1979) (concurri ng). See also Nyqui st
v. Maucl et, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (al i enage); Mi ssi ssi ppi Uni v. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 723 n.8 (1982) (sex); and compare i d. at 736 (Justi ce Powel l di ssenti ng).
l axed scruti ny to sustai n a l aw denyi ng i l l egi ti mates the ri ght to
share equal l y wi th l egi ti mates i n the estate of thei r common father,
who had acknowl edged the i l l egi ti mates but who had di ed i ntes-
tate.
83
Labine was strongl y di sapproved, however, and vi rtual l y
overrul ed i n Trimble v. Gordon,
84
whi ch found an equal protecti on
vi ol ati on i n a statute al l owi ng i l l egi ti mate chi l dren to i nheri t by i n-
testate successi on from thei r mothers but from thei r fathers onl y
i f the father had acknowl edged the chi l d and the chi l d had been
l egi ti mated by the marri age of the parents. The father i n Trimble
had not acknowl edged hi s chi l d, and had not marri ed the mother,
but a court had determi ned that he was i n fact the father and had
ordered that he pay chi l d support. Careful l y assessi ng the purposes
asserted to be the basi s of the statutory scheme, the Court found
al l but one to be i mpermi ssi bl e or i nappl i cabl e and that one not
served cl osel y enough by the restri cti on. Fi rst, i t was i mpermi ssi bl e
to attempt to i nfl uence the conduct of adul ts not to engage i n i l l i ci t
sexual acti vi ti es by vi si ti ng the consequences upon the offspri ng.
85
Second, the asserti on that the statute mi rrored the assumed i ntent
of decedents, i n that, knowi ng of the statutes operati on, they
woul d have acted to counteract i t through a wi l l or otherwi se, was
rejected as unproved and unl i kel y.
86
Thi rd, the argument that the
l aw presented no i nsurmountabl e barri er to i l l egi ti mates i nheri ti ng
si nce a decedent coul d have l eft a wi l l , marri ed the mother, or
taken steps to l egi ti mate the chi l d, was rejected as i napposi te.
87
Fourth, the statute di d address a substanti al probl em, a permi s-
si bl e state i nterest, presented by the di ffi cul ti es of provi ng pater-
1889
88
Tri mbl e v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 77073 (1977). The resul t i s i n effect a bal -
anci ng one, the means-ends rel ati onshi p must be a substanti al one i n terms of the
advantages of the cl assi fi cati on as compared to the harms of the cl assi fi cati on
means. Justi ce Rehnqui sts di ssent i s especi al l y cri ti cal of thi s approach. I d. at 777,
78186. Al so not i nterferi ng wi th orderl y admi ni strati on of estates i s appl i cati on of
Trimble i n a probate proceedi ng ongoi ng at the ti me Trimble was deci ded; the fact
that the death had occurred pri or to Trimble was i rrel evant. Reed v. Campbel l , 476
U.S. 852 (1986).
89
439 U.S. 259 (1978). The four Trimble di ssenters joi ned Justi ce Powel l i n the
resul t, al though onl y two joi ned hi s opi ni on. Justi ces Bl ackmun and Rehnqui st con-
curred because they thought Trimble wrongl y deci ded and ri pe for overrul i ng. I d.
at 276. The four di ssenters, who had joi ned the Trimble majori ty wi th Justi ce Pow-
el l , thought the two cases were i ndi sti ngui shabl e. I d. at 277.
ni ty and avoi di ng spuri ous cl ai ms. However, the court thought the
means adopted, total excl usi on, di d not approach the fi t necessary
between means and ends to survi ve the scruti ny appropri ate to thi s
cl assi fi cati on. The state court was cri ti ci zed for fai l i ng to consi der
the possi bi l i ty of a mi ddl e ground between the extremes of com-
pl ete excl usi on and case-by-case determi nati on of paterni ty. For at
l east some si gni fi cant categori es of i l l egi ti mate chi l dren of i ntestate
men, i nheri tance ri ghts can be recogni zed wi thout jeopardi zi ng the
orderl y settl ement of estates or the dependabi l i ty of ti tl es to prop-
erty passi ng under i ntestacy l aws.
88
Because the state l aw di d not
fol l ow a reasonabl e mi ddl e ground, i t was i nval i dated.
A reasonabl e mi ddl e ground was di scerned, at l east by Justi ce
Powel l , i n Lalli v. Lalli,
89
concerni ng a statute whi ch permi tted l e-
gi ti mate chi l dren to i nheri t automati cal l y from both thei r parents,
whi l e i l l egi tmates coul d i nheri t automati cal l y onl y from thei r moth-
ers, and coul d i nheri t from thei r i ntestate fathers onl y i f a court
of competent juri sdi cti on had, duri ng the fathers l i feti me, entered
an order decl ari ng paterni ty. The chi l d tendered evi dence of pater-
ni ty, i ncl udi ng a notari zed document i n whi ch the putati ve father,
i n consenti ng to hi s marri age, referred to hi m as my son and sev-
eral affi davi ts by persons who stated that the el der Lal l i had open-
l y and frequentl y acknowl edged that the younger Lal l i was hi s
chi l d. I n the prevai l i ng vi ew, the si ngl e requi rement of entry of a
court order duri ng the fathers l i feti me decl ari ng the chi l d as hi s
met the mi ddl e ground requi rement of Trimble; i t was addressed
cl osel y and preci sel y to the substanti al state i nterest of seei ng to
the orderl y di sposi ti on of property at death by establ i shi ng proof of
paterni ty of i l l egi ti mate chi l dren and avoi di ng spuri ous cl ai ms
agai nst i ntestate estates. To be sure, some i l l egi ti mates who were
unquesti onabl y establ i shed as chi l dren of the decreased woul d be
di squal i fi ed because of fai l ure of compl i ance, but i ndi vi dual fai r-
ness i s not the test. The test rather i s whether the requi rement i s
cl osel y enough rel ated to the i nterests served to meet the standard
1890
90
I l l ustrati ng the di ffi cul ty are two cases i n whi ch the fathers of i l l egi ti mate
chi l dren chal l enged statutes treati ng them di fferentl y than mothers of such chi l dren
were treated. I n Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979), the majori ty vi ewed the
di sti ncti on as a gender-based one rather than as an i l l egi ti macy cl assi fi cati on and
sustai ned a bar to a wrongful death acti on by the father of an i l l egi ti mate chi l d who
had not l egi ti mated hi m; i n Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1980), agai n vi ew-
i ng the di sti ncti on as a gender-based one, the majori ty voi ded a state l aw permi tti ng
the mother but not the father of an i l l egi ti mate chi l d to bl ock hi s adopti on by refus-
i ng to consent. Both deci si ons were 5-to4.
91
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1978) (emphasi s suppl i ed). Fol l owi ng the
deci si on, Texas authori zed i l l egi ti mate chi l dren to obtai n support from thei r fathers.
But the l egi sl ature requi red as a fi rst step that paterni ty must be judi ci al l y deter-
mi ned, and i mposed a l i mi tati ons peri od wi thi n whi ch sui t must be brought of one
year from bi rth of the chi l d. I f sui t i s not brought wi thi n that peri od the chi l d coul d
never obtai n support at any age from hi s father. No l i mi tati on was i mposed on the
opportuni ty of a natural chi l d to seek support, up to age 18. I n Mi l l s v. Habl uetzel ,
456 U.S. 91 (1982), the Court i nval i dated the one-year l i mi tati on. Whi l e a State has
an i nterest i n avoi di ng stal e or fraudul ent cl ai ms, the l i mi t must not be so bri ef as
to deny such chi l dren a reasonabl e opportuni ty to show paterni ty. Si mi l arl y, a 2-
year statute of l i mi tati ons on paterni ty and support acti ons was hel d to deny equal
protecti on to i l l egi ti mates i n Pi ckett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983), and a 6-year l i mi t
was struck down i n Cl ark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988). I n both cases the Court
poi nted to the fact that i ncreasi ngl y sophi sti cated geneti c tests are mi ni mi zi ng the
l urki ng probl ems wi th respect to proof of paterni ty referred to i n Gomez, 409 U.S.
at 538. Al so, the states i nterest i n i mposi ng the 2-year l i mi t was undercut by excep-
ti ons (e.g., for i l l egi ti mates recei vi ng publ i c assi stance), and by di fferent treatment
for mi nors general l y; si mi l arl y, the i mportance of i mposi ng a 6-year l i mi t was bel i ed
by that states more recent enactment of a non-retroacti ve 18-year l i mi t for pater-
ni ty and support acti ons.
of rati onal i ty i mposed. Al so, no doubt the States i nterest coul d
have been served by permi tti ng other ki nds of proof, but that too
i s not the test of the statutes val i di ty. Hence, the bal anci ng neces-
si tated by the Courts promul gati on of standards i n such cases
caused i t to come to di fferent resul ts on cl osel y rel ated fact pat-
terns, maki ng predi ctabi l i ty qui te di ffi cul t but perhaps manage-
abl e.
90
The Courts di ffi cul ty i n arri vi ng at predi ctabl e resul ts has ex-
tended outsi de the area of descent of property. Thus, a Texas chi l d
support l aw affordi ng l egi ti mate chi l dren a ri ght to judi ci al acti on
to obtai n support from thei r fathers whi l e not affordi ng the ri ght
to i l l egi ti mate chi l dren deni ed the l atter equal protecti on. A State
may not i nvi di ousl y di scri mi nate agai nst i l l egi ti mate chi l dren by
denyi ng them substanti al benefi ts accorded chi l dren general l y. We
therefore hol d that once a State posi ts a judi ci al l y enforceabl e ri ght
on behal f of chi l dren to needed support from thei r natural fathers
there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denyi ng such
an essenti al ri ght to a chi l d si mpl y because i ts natural father has
not marri ed i ts mother.
91
Si mi l arl y, a federal Soci al Securi ty provi si on was hel d i nval i d
whi ch made el i gi bl e for benefi ts, because of an i nsured parents di s-
1891
92
Ji mi nez v. Wei nberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974). But cf. Cal i fano v. Bol es, 443
U.S. 282 (1979). See also New Jersey Wel fare Ri ghts Org. v. Cahi l l , 411 U.S. 619
(1973) (l i mi ti ng wel fare assi stance to househol ds i n whi ch parents are ceremoni al l y
marri ed and the chi l dren are l egi ti mate or adopted deni ed i l l egi ti mate chi l dren
equal protecti on); Ri chardson v. Davi s, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972), affg 342 F. Supp. 588
(D. Conn.) (3-judge court), and Ri chardson v. Gri ffi n, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972), affg 346
F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md.) (3-judge court) (Soci al Securi ty provi si on enti tl i ng i l l egi t-
i mate chi l dren to monthl y benefi t payments onl y to extent that payments to wi dow
and l egi ti mate chi l dren do not exhaust benefi ts al l owed by l aw deni es i l l egi ti mates
equal protecti on).
93
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). I t can be seen that the onl y di fference
between J iminez and Lucas i s that i n the former the Court vi ewed the benefi ts as
owi ng to al l chi l dren and not just to dependents, whi l e i n the l atter the benefi ts
were vi ewed as owi ng onl y to dependents and not to al l chi l dren. But i t i s not cl ear
that i n ei ther case the purpose determi ned to underl i e the provi si on of benefi ts was
compel l ed by ei ther statutory l anguage or l egi sl ati ve hi story. For a parti cul arl y good
i l l ustrati on of the di fference such a determi nati on of purpose can make and the way
the majori ty and di ssent i n a 5-to4 deci si on read the purpose di fferentl y, see
Cal i fano v. Bol es, 443 U.S. 282 (1979).
abi l i ty, al l l egi ti mate chi l dren as wel l as those i l l egi ti mate chi l dren
capabl e of i nheri ti ng personal property under state i ntestacy l aw
and those chi l dren who were i l l egi ti mate onl y because of a
nonobvi ous defect i n thei r parents marri age, regardl ess of whether
they were born after the onset of the di sabi l i ty, but whi ch made al l
other i l l egi ti mate chi l dren el i gi bl e onl y i f they were born pri or to
the onset of di sabi l i ty and i f they were dependent upon the parent
pri or to the onset of di sabi l i ty. The Court deemed the purpose of
the benefi ts to be to ai d al l chi l dren and rejected the argument that
the burden on i l l i gi ti mates was necessary to avoi d fraud.
92
However, i n a second case, an al most i denti cal program, pro-
vi di ng benefi ts to chi l dren of a deceased i nsured, was sustai ned be-
cause i ts purpose was found to be to gi ve benefi ts to chi l dren who
were dependent upon the deceased parent and the cl assi fi cati ons
served that purpose. Presumed dependent were al l l egi ti mate chi l -
dren as wel l as those i l l egi ti mate chi l dren who were abl e to i nheri t
under state i ntestacy l aws, who were i l l egi ti mate onl y because of
the techni cal i nval i di ty of the parents marri age, who had been ac-
knowl edged i n wri ti ng by the father, who had been decl ared to be
the fathers by a court deci si on, or who had been hel d enti tl ed to
the fathers support by a court. I l l egi ti mate chi l dren not covered by
these presumpti ons had to establ i sh that they were l i vi ng wi th the
i nsured parent or were bei ng supported by hi m when the parent
di ed. Accordi ng to the Court, al l the presumpti ons consti tuted an
admi ni strati ve conveni ence whi ch was a permi ssi bl e devi ce because
those i l l egi ti mate chi l dren who were enti tl ed to benefi ts because
they were i n fact dependent woul d recei ve benefi ts upon proof of
the fact and i t was i rrel evant that other chi l dren not dependent i n
fact al so recei ved benefi ts.
93
1892
94
Lassi ter v. Northampton County Bd. of El ecti ons, 360 U.S. 45, 5051 (1959).
95
Arti cl e I , 2, cl . 1 (House of Representati ves); Seventeenth Amendment (Sen-
ators); Arti cl e I I , 1, cl . 2 (presi denti al el ectors). See Arti cl e I , 4, cl . 1 and di scus-
si on supra, pp. 11821.
96
Fourteenth Amendment, 2. Justi ce Harl an argued that the i ncl usi on of thi s
provi si on i mpl i edl y permi tted the States to di scri mi nate wi th onl y the prescri bed
penal ty i n consequence and that therefore the equal protecti on cl ause was whol l y
i nappl i cabl e to state el ecti on l aws. Reynol ds v. Si ms, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (di s-
senti ng); Carri ngton v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 97 (1965) (di ssenti ng); Oregon v. Mi tchel l ,
400 U.S. 112, 152 (1970) (concurri ng and di ssenti ng). Justi ce Brennan undertook a
rebuttal of thi s posi ti on i n Oregon v. Mi tchel l , supra at 229, 250 (concurri ng and
di ssenti ng). But see Ri chardson v. Rami rez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), where 2 was rel -
evant i n precl udi ng an equal protecti on chal l enge.
97
Lassi ter v. Northampton County Bd. of El ecti ons, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
98
Fundamental Interests: The Political Process
The States have l ong been hel d to have broad powers to deter-
mi ne the condi ti ons under whi ch the ri ght of suffrage may be exer-
ci sed. . . , absent of course the di scri mi nati on whi ch the Consti tu-
ti on condemns.
94
The Consti tuti on provi des that the qual i fi cati ons
of el ectors i n congressi onal el ecti ons are to be determi ned by ref-
erence to the qual i fi cati ons prescri bed i n the States for the el ectors
of the most numerous branch of the l egi sl ature, and the States are
authori zed to determi ne the manner i n whi ch presi denti al el ectors
are sel ected.
95
The second secti on of the Fourteenth Amendment
provi des for a proporti onate reducti on i n a States representati on i n
the House when i t deni es the franchi se to i ts qual i fi ed mal e ci ti -
zens
96
and speci fi c di scri mi nati ons on the basi s of race, sex, and
age are addressed i n other Amendments. We do not suggest that
any standards whi ch a State desi res to adopt may be requi red of
voters. But there i s wi de scope for exerci se of i ts juri sdi cti on. Resi -
dence requi rements, age, previ ous cri mi nal record . . . are obvi ous
exampl es i ndi cati ng factors whi ch a State may take i nto consi der-
ati on i n determi ni ng the qual i fi cati on of voters. The abi l i ty to read
and wri te l i kewi se has some rel ati on to standards desi gned to pro-
mote i ntel l i gent use of the bal l ot.
97
The perspecti ve of thi s 1959 opi ni on by Justi ce Dougl as has
now been revol uti oni zed. Undoubtedl y, the ri ght of suffrage i s a
fundamental matter i n a free and democrati c soci ety. Especi al l y
si nce the ri ght to exerci se the franchi se i n a free and uni mpai red
manner i s preservati ve of other basi c ci vi l and pol i ti cal ri ghts, any
al l eged i nfri ngement of the ri ghts of ci ti zens to vote must be care-
ful l y and meti cul ousl y scruti ni zed.
98
Any unjusti fi ed di scri mi na-
ti on i n determi ni ng who may parti ci pate i n pol i ti cal affai rs or i n
the sel ecti on of publ i c offi ci al s undermi nes the l egi ti macy of rep-
resentati ve government. . . . Statutes granti ng the franchi se to
resi dents on a sel ecti ve basi s al ways pose the danger of denyi ng
1893
99
Kramer v. Uni on Free School Di st., 395 U.S. 621, 62628 (1969). See also Hi l l
v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975). But cf. Hol t Ci vi c Cl ub v. Ci ty of Tuscal oosa,
439 U.S. 60 (1978).
100
Thus, i n San Antoni o School Di st. v. Rodri guez, 411 U.S. 1, 3435 nn.74 &
78 (1973), a major doctri nal effort to curb the fundamental i nterest si de of the
new equal protecti on, the Court acknowl edged that the ri ght to vote di d not come
wi thi n i ts prescri pti on that ri ghts to be deemed fundamental must be expl i ci tl y or
i mpl i ci tl y guaranteed i n the Consti tuti on. Nonthel ess, ci ti zens have a consti tu-
ti onal l y protected ri ght to parti ci pate i n el ecti ons whi ch i s protected by the equal
protecti on cl ause. Dunn v. Bl umstei n, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972). The franchi se i s the
guardi an of al l other ri ghts. Reynol ds v. Si ms, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
101
Dunn v. Bl umstei n, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Justi ce Bl ackmun concurred spe-
ci al l y, i d. at 360, Chi ef Justi ce Burger di ssented, i d. at 363, and Justi ces Powel l and
Rehnqui st di d not parti ci pate. The voi ded statute i mposed a requi rement of one year
i n the State and three months i n the county. The Court di d not i ndi cate what dura-
ti on l ess than ni nety days woul d be permi ssi bl e, al though i t shoul d be noted that
i n the Voti ng Ri ghts Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 316, 42 U.S.C. 1973aa
1, Congress prescri bed a thi rty-day peri od for purposes of voti ng i n presi denti al el ec-
ti ons. Note al so that i t does not matter whether one travel s i nterstate or i ntrastate.
Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Al a. 1970), affd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
some ci ti zens any effecti ve voi ce i n the governmental affai rs whi ch
substanti al l y affect thei r l i ves. Therefore, i f a chal l enged state stat-
ute grants the ri ght to vote to some bona fi de resi dents of requi si te
age and ci ti zenshi p and deni es the franchi se to others, the Court
must determi ne whether the excl usi ons are necessary to promote a
compelling state i nterest.
And, for these reasons, the deference usual l y gi ven to the
judgment of l egi sl ators does not extend to deci si ons concerni ng
whi ch resi dent ci ti zens may parti ci pate i n the el ecti on of l egi sl ators
and other publ i c offi ci al s. . . . [W]hen we are revi ewi ng statutes
whi ch deny some resi dents the ri ght to vote, the general presump-
ti on of consti tuti onal i ty afforded state statutes and the tradi ti onal
approval gi ven state cl assi fi cati ons i f the Court can concei ve of a
rati onal basi s for the di sti ncti ons made are not appl i cabl e.
99
Usi ng thi s anal yti cal approach, the Court has establ i shed a regi me
of cl ose revi ew of a vast range of state restri cti ons on the el i gi bi l i ty
to vote, on access to the bal l ot by candi dates and parti es, and on
the wei ghi ng of votes cast through the devi ces of apporti onment
and di stri cti ng. Changes i n Court membershi p over the years has
l ed to some rel axati on i n the appl i cati on of pri nci pl es, but even as
the Court has drawn back i n other areas i t has tended to preserve,
both doctri nal l y and i n fact, the el ecti on cases.
100
Voter Qual i fi cati ons. A State may requi re resi dency as a
qual i fi cati on to vote but si nce durati onal resi dency requi rements
i mpermi ssi bl y restri ct the ri ght to vote and penal i ze the asserti on
of the consti tuti onal ri ght to travel they are i nval i d.
101
The Court
i ndi cated that the States have a justi fi ed i nterest i n preventi ng
fraud and i n faci l i tati ng determi nati on of the el i gi bi l i ty of potenti al
1894
102
Marston v. Lewi s, 410 U.S. 679 (1973). Regi strati on was by vol unteer work-
ers who made stati sti cal l y si gni fi cant errors requi ri ng correcti ons by county record-
ers before certi fi cati on. Pri mary el ecti ons were hel d i n the fal l , thus occupyi ng the
ti me of the recorders, so that a backl og of regi strati ons had to be processed before
the el ecti on. A peri od of 50 days rather than 30, the Court thought, was justi fi abl e.
However, the same peri od was uphel d for another State on the authori ty of Marston
i n the absence of such justi fi cati on, but i t appeared that pl ai nti ffs had not con-
troverted the States justi fyi ng evi dence. Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973). Jus-
ti ces Brennan, Dougl as, and Marshal l di ssented i n both cases. I d. at 682, 688.
103
Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
104
Carri ngton v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
105
Harper v. Vi rgi ni a Bd. of El ecti ons, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Justi ces Bl ack, Har-
l an, and Stewart di ssented. I d. at 670, 680. Pol l tax qual i fi cati ons had previ ousl y
been uphel d i n Breedl ove v. Suttl es, 302 U.S. 277 (1937); and Butl er v. Thompson,
341 U.S. 937 (1951).
106
Kramer v. Uni on Free School Di st., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). The Court assumed
wi thout deci di ng that the franchi se i n some ci rcumstances coul d be l i mi ted to those
pri mari l y i nterested or pri mari l y affected by the outcome, but found that the re-
stri cti on permi tted some persons wi th no i nterest to vote and di squal i fi ed others
wi th an i nterest. Justi ces Stewart, Bl ack, and Harl an di ssented. I d. at 594.
regi strants and granted that durati onal resi dency requi rements
furthered these i nterests, but, i t sai d, the State had not shown that
the requi rements were necessary, that i s that the i nterests coul d
not be furthered by means whi ch i mposed a l esser burden on the
ri ght to vote. Other asserted i nterests knowl edgeabi l i ty of voters,
common i nterests, i ntel l i gent voti ng were sai d ei ther not to be
served by the requi rements or to be i mpermi ssi bl e i nterests.
A 50-day durati onal resi dency requi rement was sustai ned i n
the context of the cl osi ng of the regi strati on process at 50 days
pri or to el ecti ons and of the mechani cs of the States regi strati on
process. The peri od, the Court found, was necessary to achi eve the
States l egi ti mate goal s.
102
A State that exerci sed general cri mi nal , taxi ng, and other ju-
ri sdi cti on over persons on certai n federal encl aves wi thi n the State,
the Court hel d, coul d not treat these persons as nonresi dents for
voti ng purposes.
103
A statute whi ch provi ded that anyone who en-
tered mi l i tary servi ce outsi de the State coul d not establ i sh voti ng
resi dence i n the State so l ong as he remai ned i n the mi l i tary was
hel d to deny to such a person the opportuni ty such as al l non-mi l i -
tary persons enjoyed of showi ng that he had establ i shed resi -
dence.
104
Restri cti ng the suffrage to those persons who had pai d a
pol l tax was an i nvi di ous di scri mi nati on because i t i ntroduced a
capri ci ous or i rrel evant factor of weal th or abi l i ty to pay i nto an
area i n whi ch i t had no pl ace.
105
Extendi ng thi s rul i ng, the Court
hel d that the el i gi bi l i ty to vote i n l ocal school el ecti ons may not be
l i mi ted to persons owni ng property i n the di stri ct or who have chi l -
dren i n school ,
106
and deni ed States the ri ght to restri ct the vote
1895
107
Ci pri ano v. Ci ty of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). Justi ces Bl ack, Harl an, and
Stewart concurred speci al l y. I d. at 707.
108
Ci ty of Phoeni x v. Kol odzi ejski , 399 U.S. 204 (1970). Justi ce Stewart and
Chi ef Justi ce Burger di ssented. I d. at 215. I n Hi l l v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975),
the Court struck down a l i mi tati on on the ri ght to vote on a general obl i gati on bond
i ssue to persons who have rendered or l i sted real , mi xed, or personal property for
taxati on i n the el ecti on di stri ct. I t was not a speci al i nterest el ecti on si nce a gen-
eral obl i gati on bond i ssue i s a matter of general i nterest.
109
Sal yer Land Co. v. Tul are Water Storage Di st., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). See also
Associ ated Enterpri ses v. Tol tec Watershed I mprov. Di st., 410 U.S. 743 (1973) (l i mi -
tati on of franchi se to property owners i n the creati on and mai ntenance of di stri ct
uphel d). Justi ces Dougl as, Brennan, and Marshal l di ssented i n both cases. I d. at
735, 745.
110
410 U.S. at 72728.
111
I d. at 730, 732. Thus, the Court posi ted reasons that mi ght have moved the
l egi sl ature to adopt the excl usi ons.
112
451 U.S. 355 (1981). Joi ni ng the opi ni on of the Court were Justi ces Stewart,
Powel l , Rehnqui st, Stevens, and Chi ef Justi ce Burger. Di ssenti ng were Justi ces
Whi te, Brennan, Marshal l , and Bl ackmun. I d. at 374.
to property owners i n el ecti ons on the i ssuance of revenue bonds
107
or general obl i gati on bonds.
108
However, the Court hel d that because the acti vi ti es of a water
storage di stri ct fel l so di sproporti onatel y on l andowners as a group,
a l i mi tati on of the franchi se i n el ecti ons for the di stri cts board of
di rectors to l andowners, whether resi dent or not and whether natu-
ral persons or not, excl udi ng non-l andowni ng resi dents and l essees
of l and, and wei ghi ng the votes granted accordi ng to assessed val u-
ati on of l and, comported wi th equal protecti on standards.
109
Adverti ng to the reservati on i n pri or l ocal governmental uni t el ec-
ti on cases
110
that some functi ons of such uni ts mi ght be so speci al -
i zed as to permi t devi ati on from the usual rul es, the Court then
proceeded to assess the franchi se restri cti ons accordi ng to the tra-
di ti onal standards of equal protecti on rather than by those of stri ct
scruti ny.
111
Al so narrowl y approached was the i ssue of the effect
of the Di stri cts acti vi ti es, the Court focusi ng upon the assessments
agai nst l andowners as the sol e means of payi ng expenses rather
than addi ti onal l y noti ng the i mpact upon l essees and non-
l andowni ng resi dents of such functi ons as fl ood control . The ap-
proach taken i n thi s case seems di fferent i n great degree from that
i n pri or cases and coul d i n the future al ter the resul ts i n other
l ocal government cases. These cases were extended somewhat i n
Ball v. J ames,
112
i n whi ch the Court sustai ned a system i n whi ch
voti ng el i gi bi l i ty was l i mi ted to l andowners and votes were al l o-
cated to these voters on the basi s of the number of acres they
owned. The enti ty was a water recl amati on di stri ct whi ch stores
and del i vers water to 236,000 acres of l and i n the State and sub-
si di zes i ts water operati ons by sel l i ng el ectri ci ty to hundreds of
thousands of consumers i n a nearby metropol i tan area. The enti tys
1896
113
The water di stri ct cases were di sti ngui shed i n Qui nn v. Mi l l sap, 491 U.S. 95,
109 (1989), the Court hol di ng that a board of freehol ders appoi nted to recommend
a reorgani zati on of l ocal government had a mandate far more encompassi ng than
l and use i ssues, si nce i ts recommendati ons affect[] al l ci ti zens . . . regardl ess of
l and ownershi p.
114
Rosari o v. Rockefel l er, 410 U.S. 752 (1973). Justi ces Powel l , Dougl as, Bren-
nan, and Marshal l di ssented. I d. at 763.
115
Kusper v. Ponti kes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973). Justi ces Bl ackmun and Rehnqui st
di ssented. I d. at 61, 65.
116
Tashji an v. Republ i can Party of Connecti cut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986). Al though
i ndependents were al l owed to regi ster i n a party on the day before a pri mary, the
states justi fi cati ons for protect[i ng] the i ntegri ty of the Party agai nst the Party i t-
sel f were deemed i nsubstanti al . I d. at 224.
board of di rectors was el ected through a system i n whi ch the el i gi -
bi l i ty to vote was as descri bed above. The Court thought the enti ty
was a speci al i zed and l i mi ted form to whi ch i ts general franchi se
rul i ngs di d not appl y.
113
Fi ndi ng that preventi on of rai di ng the practi ce whereby vot-
ers i n sympathy wi th one party vote i n anothers pri mary el ecti on
i n order to di stort that el ecti ons resul ts i s a l egi ti mate and val i d
state goal , as one el ement i n the preservati on of the i ntegri ty of the
el ectoral process, the Court sustai ned a state l aw requi ri ng those
voters el i gi bl e at that ti me to regi ster to enrol l i n the party of thei r
choi ce at l east 30 days before the general el ecti on i n order to be
el i gi bl e to vote i n the partys next pri mary el ecti on, 8 to 11 months
hence. The l aw di d not i mpose a prohi bi ti on upon voti ng but mere-
l y i mposed a ti me deadl i ne for enrol l ment, the Court hel d, and i t
was because of the pl ai nti ffs vol untary fai l ure to regi ster that they
di d not meet the deadl i ne.
114
But a l aw whi ch prohi bi ted a person
from voti ng i n the pri mary el ecti on of a pol i ti cal party i f he has
voted i n the pri mary el ecti on of any other party wi thi n the preced-
i ng 23 months was subjected to stri ct scruti ny and was voi ded, i n-
asmuch as i t consti tuted a severe restri cti on upon a voters ri ght
to associ ate wi th the party of hi s choi ce by requi ri ng hi m to forgo
parti ci pati on i n at l east one pri mary el ecti on i n order to change
parti es.
115
A l ess restri cti ve cl osed pri mary system was al so i n-
val i dated, the Court fi ndi ng i nsuffi ci ent justi fi cati on for a states
preventi ng a pol i ti cal party from al l owi ng i ndependents to vote i n
i ts pri mary.
116
I t must not be forgotten, however, that i t i s onl y when a State
extends the franchi se to some and deni es i t to others that a ri ght
to vote ari ses and i s protected by the equal protecti on cl ause. I f
a State chooses to fi l l an offi ce by means other than through an
el ecti on, nei ther the equal protecti on cl ause nor any other consti tu-
ti onal provi si on prevents i t from doi ng so. Thus, i n Rodriguez v.
1897
117
457 U.S. 1 (1982). See also Fortson v. Morri s, 385 U.S. 231 (1966) (l egi sl a-
ture coul d sel ect Governor from two candi dates havi ng hi ghest number of votes cast
when no candi date recei ved majori ty); Sai l ors v. Board of El ecti ons, 387 U.S. 105
(1967) (appoi ntment rather than el ecti on of county school board); Val enti v. Rocke-
fel l er, 292 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (three-judge court), affd, 393 U.S. 405
(1969) (gubernatori al appoi ntment to fi l l Uni ted States Senate vacancy).
118
McDonal d v. Board of El ecti on Commrs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969). But see Goosby
v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973) (McDonald does not precl ude chal l enge to absol ute
prohi bi ti on on voti ng).
119
OBri en v. Ski nner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974). See Ameri can Party of Texas v.
Whi te, 415 U.S. 767, 79495 (1974).
Popular Democratic Party,
117
the Court unani mousl y sustai ned a
Puerto Ri co statute whi ch authori zed the pol i ti cal party to whi ch
an i ncumbent l egi sl ator bel onged to desi gnate hi s successor i n of-
fi ce unti l the next general el ecti on upon hi s death or resi gnati on.
Nei ther the fact that the seat was fi l l ed by appoi ntment nor the
fact that the appoi ntment was by the party, rather than by the
Governor or some other offi ci al , rai sed a consti tuti onal questi on.
The ri ght of unconvi cted jai l i nmates and convi cted
mi sdemeanants (who typi cal l y are under no di sabi l i ty) to vote by
absentee bal l ot remai ns unsettl ed. I n an earl y case appl yi ng rati on-
al basi s scruti ny, the Court hel d that the fai l ure of a State to pro-
vi de for absentee bal l oti ng by unconvi cted jai l i nmates, when ab-
sentee bal l ots were avai l abl e to other cl asses of voters, di d not deny
equal protecti on when i t was not shown that the i nmates coul d not
vote i n any other way.
118
Subsequentl y, the Court hel d unconsti tu-
ti onal a statute denyi ng absentee regi strati on and voti ng ri ghts to
persons confi ned awai ti ng tri al or servi ng mi sdemeanor sentences,
but i t i s uncl ear whether the basi s was the fact that persons con-
fi ned i n jai l s outsi de the county of thei r resi dences coul d regi ster
and vote absentee whi l e those confi ned i n the counti es of thei r resi -
dences coul d not, or whether the statutes jumbl ed di sti ncti ons
among categori es of qual i fi ed voters on no rati onal standard made
i t whol l y arbi trary.
119
Access to the Bal l ot. The equal protecti on cl ause appl i es to
state speci fi cati on of qual i fi cati ons for el ecti ve and appoi nti ve of-
fi ce. Whi l e one may have no ri ght to be el ected or appoi nted to
an offi ce, al l persons do have a federal consti tuti onal ri ght to be
consi dered for publ i c servi ce wi thout the burden of i nvi di ousl y di s-
cri mi natory di squal i fi cati on. The State may not deny to some the
pri vi l ege of hol di ng publ i c offi ce that i t extends to others on the
basi s of di sti ncti ons that vi ol ate federal consti tuti onal guaran-
1898
120
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 36263 (1970) (voi di ng a property qual i fi ca-
ti on for appoi ntment to l ocal school board). See also Chappel l e v. Greater Baton
Rouge Ai rport Di st., 431 U.S. 159 (1977) (voi di ng a qual i fi cati on for appoi ntment as
ai rport commi ssi oner of ownershi p of real or personal property that i s assessed for
taxes i n the juri sdi cti on i n whi ch ai rport i s l ocated); Qui nn v. Mi l l sap, 491 U.S. 95
(1989) (voi di ng property ownershi p requi rement for appoi ntment to board author-
i zed to propose reorgani zati on of l ocal government). Cf. Snowden v. Hughes, 321
U.S. 1 (1944).
121
405 U.S. 134, 14244 (1972).
122
I d. at 14449.
123
Lubi n v. Pani sh, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974).
124
Concurri ng, Justi ces Bl ackmun and Rehnqui st suggested that a reasonabl e
al ternati ve woul d be to permi t i ndi gents to seek wri te-i n votes wi thout payi ng a fi l -
i ng fee, i d. at 722, but the Court i ndi cated thi s woul d be i nadequate. I d. at 719 n.5.
125
457 U.S. 957 (1982). A pl ural i ty of four contended that save i n two ci r-
cumstances bal l ot access cl assi fi cati ons based on weal th and bal l ot access cl assi -
fi cati ons i mposi ng burdens on new or smal l pol i ti cal parti es or i ndependent can-
di dates l i mi tati ons on candi date access to the bal l ot meri t onl y tradi ti onal rati onal
tees.
120
I n Bullock v. Carter,
121
the Court uti l i zed a somewhat
modi fi ed form of the stri ct test i n passi ng upon a fi l i ng fee system
for pri mary el ecti on candi dates whi ch i mposed the cost of the el ec-
ti on whol l y on the candi dates and whi ch made no al ternati ve provi -
si on for candi dates unabl e to pay the fees; the reason for appl i ca-
ti on of the standard, however, was that the fee system depri ved
some cl asses of voters of the opportuni ty to vote for certai n can-
di dates and i t worked i ts cl assi fi cati ons al ong l i nes of weal th. The
system i tsel f was voi ded because i t was not reasonabl y connected
wi th the States i nterest i n regul ati ng the bal l ot and di d not serve
that i nterest and because the cost of the el ecti on coul d be met out
of the state treasury, thus avoi di ng the di scri mi nati on.
122
Recogni zi ng the state i nterest i n mai ntai ni ng a bal l ot of rea-
sonabl e l ength i n order to promote rati onal voter choi ce, the Court
observed nonethel ess that fi l i ng fees al one do not test the genui ne-
ness of a candi dacy or the extent of voter support for an aspi rant.
Therefore, effectuati on of the l egi ti mate state i nterest must be
achi eved by means that do not unfai rl y or unnecessari l y burden the
partys or the candi dates i mportant i nterest i n the conti nued
avai l abi l i ty of pol i ti cal opportuni ty. The i nterests i nvol ved are not
merel y those of parti es or i ndi vi dual candi dates; the voters can as-
sert thei r preferences onl y through candi dates or parti es or both
and i t i s thi s broad i nterest that must be wei ghed i n the bal ance.
[T]he process of qual i fyi ng candi dates for a pl ace on the bal l ot
may not consti tuti onal l y be measured sol el y i n dol l ars.
123
I n the
absence of reasonabl e al ternati ve means of bal l ot access, the Court
hel d, a State may not di squal i fy an i ndi gent candi date unabl e to
pay fi l i ng fees.
124
I n Clements v. Fashing,
125
the Court sustai ned two provi si ons
of state l aw, one that barred certai n offi cehol ders from seeki ng
1899
basi s scruti ny, because candi dacy i s not a fundamental ri ght. The pl ural i ty found
both cl assi fi cati ons met the standard. I d. at 96273 (Justi ces Rehnqui st, Powel l ,
OConnor, and Chi ef Justi ce Burger). Justi ce Stevens concurred, rejecti ng the pl u-
ral i tys standard, but fi ndi ng that i nasmuch as the di sparate treatment was based
sol el y on the States cl assi fi cati on of the di fferent offi ces i nvol ved, and not on the
characteri sti cs of the persons who occupy them or seek them, the acti on di d not vi o-
l ate the equal protecti on cl ause. I d. at 973. The di ssent pri mari l y focused on the
Fi rst Amendment but asserted that the cl assi fi cati ons fai l ed even a rati onal basi s
test. I d. at 976 (Justi ces Brennan, Whi te, Marshal l , and Bl ackmun).
126
393 U.S. 23 (1968). [T]he total i ty of the Ohi o restri cti ve l aws taken as a
whol e i mposes a burden on voti ng and associ ati onal ri ghts whi ch we hol d i s an i n-
vi di ous di scri mi nati on, i n vi ol ati on of the Equal Protecti on Cl ause. I d. at 34. Jus-
ti ces Dougl as and Harl an woul d have rel i ed sol el y on the Fi rst Amendment, i d. at
35, 41, whi l e Justi ces Stewart and Whi te and Chi ef Justi ce Warren di ssented. I d.
at 48, 61, 63.
127
Moore v. Ogi l vi e, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) (overrul i ng MacDougal l v. Green, 335
U.S. 281 (1948)).
el ecti on to the l egi sl ature duri ng the term of offi ce for whi ch they
had been el ected or appoi nted, but that di d not reach other offi ce-
hol ders whose terms of offi ce expi red wi th the l egi sl ators terms
and di d not bar l egi sl ators from seeki ng other offi ces duri ng thei r
terms, and the other that automati cal l y termi nated the terms of
certai n offi cehol ders who announced for el ecti on to other offi ces,
but that di d not appl y to other offi cehol ders who coul d run for an-
other offi ce whi l e conti nui ng to serve. The Court was spl i ntered i n
such a way, however, that i t i s not possi bl e to deri ve a pri nci pl e
from the deci si on appl i cabl e to other fact si tuati ons.
I n Williams v. Rhodes,
126
a compl ex statutory structure whi ch
had the effect of keepi ng off the bal l ot al l but the candi dates of the
two major parti es was struck down under the stri ct test because i t
depri ved the voters of the opportuni ty of voti ng for i ndependent
and thi rd-party candi dates and because i t seri ousl y i mpeded the
exerci se of the ri ght to associ ate for pol i ti cal purposes. Si mi l arl y,
a requi rement that an i ndependent candi date for offi ce i n order to
obtai n a bal l ot posi ti on must obtai n 25,000 si gnatures, i ncl udi ng
200 si gnatures from each of at l east 50 of the States 102 counti es,
was hel d to di scri mi nate agai nst the pol i ti cal ri ghts of the i nhab-
i tants of the most popul ous counti es, when i t was shown that
93.4% of the regi stered voters l i ved i n the 49 most popul ous coun-
ti es.
127
But to provi de that the candi dates of any pol i ti cal organi za-
ti on obtai ni ng 20% or more of the vote i n the l ast gubernatori al or
presi denti al el ecti on may obtai n a bal l ot posi ti on si mpl y by wi n-
ni ng the partys pri mary el ecti on whi l e requi ri ng candi dates of
other parti es or i ndependent candi dates to obtai n the si gnatures of
l ess than fi ve percent of those el i gi bl e to vote at the l ast el ecti on
for the offi ce sought i s not to di scri mi nate unl awful l y, i nasmuch as
1900
128
Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
129
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Ameri can Party of Texas v. Whi te, 415
U.S. 767 (1974); I l l i noi s State Bd. of El ecti ons v. Soci al i st Workers Party, 440 U.S.
173 (1979). And see I ndi ana Communi st Party v. Whi tcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974)
(i mpermi ssi bl e to condi ti on bal l ot access upon a pol i ti cal partys wi l l i ngness to sub-
scri be to oath that party does not advocate the overthrow of l ocal , state or nati onal
government by force or vi ol ence, opi ni on of Court based on Fi rst Amendment, four
Justi ces concurri ng on equal protecti on grounds).
130
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 746 (1974).
131
I d. at 730 (quoti ng Wi l l i ams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968)).
the State pl aced no barri ers of any sort i n the way of obtai ni ng si g-
natures and si nce wri te-i n votes were al so freel y permi tted.
128
Revi ewi ng under the stri ct test the requi rements for qual i fi ca-
ti on of new parti es and i ndependent candi dates for bal l ot posi ti ons,
the Court recogni zed as val i d objecti ves and compel l i ng i nterests
the protecti on of the i ntegri ty of the nomi nati ng and el ecti ng proc-
ess, the promoti on of party stabi l i ty, and the assurance of a modi -
cum of order i n regul ati ng the si ze of the bal l ot by requi ri ng a
showi ng of some degree of support for i ndependents and new par-
ti es before they can get on the bal l ot.
129
[T]o compl y wi th the
Fi rst and Fourteenth Amendments the State must provi de a fea-
si bl e opportuni ty for new pol i ti cal organi zati ons and thei r can-
di dates to appear on the bal l ot.
130
Deci si on whether or not a state
statutory structure affords a feasi bl e opportuni ty i s a matter of de-
gree, very much a matter of consi der[i ng] the facts and ci r-
cumstances behi nd the l aw, the i nterest whi ch the State cl ai ms to
be protecti ng, and the i nterest of those who are di sadvantaged by
the cl assi fi cati on.
131
Thus, i n order to assure that parti es seeki ng bal l ot space com-
mand a si gni fi cant, measurabl e quantum of communi ty support,
Texas was uphel d i n treati ng di fferent parti es i n ways rati onal l y
constructed to achi eve thi s objecti ve. Candi dates of parti es whose
gubernatori al choi ce pol l ed more than 200,000 votes i n the l ast
general el ecti on had to be nomi nated by pri mary el ecti ons and
went on the bal l ot automati cal l y, because the pri or vote adequatel y
demonstrated support. Candi dates whose parti es pol l ed l ess than
200,000 but more than 2 percent coul d be nomi nated i n pri mary
el ecti ons or i n conventi ons. Candi dates of parti es not comi ng wi thi n
ei ther of the fi rst two categori es had to be nomi nated i n conven-
ti ons and coul d obtai n bal l ot space onl y i f the notari zed l i st of par-
ti ci pants at the conventi ons total l ed at l east one percent of the
total votes cast for governor i n the l ast precedi ng general el ecti on
or, fai l i ng thi s, i f i n the 55 succeedi ng days a requi si te number of
qual i fi ed voters si gned peti ti ons to bri ng the total up to one percent
of the gubernatori al vote. [W]hat i s demanded may not be so
exessi ve or i mpracti cal as to be i n real i ty a mere devi ce to al ways,
1901
132
Ameri can Party of Texas v. Whi te, 415 U.S. 767, 783 (1974). I n Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 73840 (1974), the Court remanded so that the di stri ct court
coul d determi ne whether the burden i mposed on an i ndependent party was too se-
vere, i t bei ng requi red i n 24 days i n 1972 to gather 325,000 si gnatures from a pool
of qual i fi ed voters who had not voted i n that years parti san pri mary el ecti ons. See
also I l l i noi s State Bd. of El ecti ons v. Soci al i st Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979)
(voi di ng provi si on that requi red a l arger number of si gnatures to get on bal l ot i n
subdi vi si ons than statewi de).
133
Ameri can Party of Texas v. Whi te, 415 U.S. 767, 78891 (1974). The percent-
ages vari ed wi th the offi ce but no more than 500 si gnatures were needed i n any
event.
134
I d. at 78587.
135
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 72837 (1974). Di ssenti ng, Justi ces Brennan,
Dougl as and Marshal l thought the state i nterest coul d be adequatel y served by a
shorter ti me peri od than a year before the pri mary el ecti on, whi ch meant i n effect
17 months before the general el ecti on. I d. at 755.
136
Munro v. Soci al i st Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986).
137
Ameri can Party of Texas v. Whi te, 415 U.S. 767, 79495 (1974). Uphel d,
however, was state fi nanci ng of the pri mary el ecti on expenses that excl uded conven-
ti on expenses of the smal l parti es. I d. at 79194. But the major parti es had to hol d
conventi ons si mul taneousl y wi th the pri mary el ecti ons the cost of whi ch they had
to bear. For consi derati on of si mi l ar contenti ons i n the context of federal fi nanci ng
of presi denti al el ecti ons, see Buckl ey v. Val eo, 424 U.S. 1, 9397 (1976).
138
Anderson v. Cel ebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). State i nterests i n assuri ng
voter educati on, treati ng al l candi dates equal l y (candi dates parti ci pati ng i n a party
pri mary al so had to decl are candi dacy i n March), and preservi ng pol i ti cal stabi l i ty,
were deemed i nsuffi ci ent to justi fy the substanti al i mpedi ment to i ndependent can-
di dates and thei r supporters.
or al most al ways, excl ude parti es wi th si gni fi cant support from the
bal l ot, but the Court thought that one percent, or 22,000 si gna-
tures i n 1972, fal l s wi thi n the outer boundari es of support the
State may requi re.
132
Si mi l arl y, i ndependent candi dates can be
requi red to obtai n a certai n number of si gnatures as a condi ti on to
obtai n bal l ot space.
133
A State may val i dl y requi re that each voter
parti ci pate onl y once i n each years nomi nati ng process and i t may
therefore di squal i fy any person who votes i n a pri mary el ecti on
from si gni ng nomi nati ng or supporti ng peti ti ons for i ndependent
parti es or candi dates.
134
Equal l y val i d i s a state requi rement that
a candi date for el ecti ve offi ce, as an i ndependent or i n a regul ar
party, must not have been affi l i ated wi th a pol i ti cal party, or wi th
one other than the one of whi ch he seeks i ts nomi nati on, wi thi n
one year pri or to the pri mary el ecti on at whi ch nomi nati ons for the
general el ecti on are made.
135
So too, a state may l i mi t access to
the general el ecti on bal l ot to candi dates who recei ved at l east 1%
of the pri mary votes cast for the parti cul ar offi ce.
136
But i t i s i m-
permi ssi bl e to pri nt the names of the candi dates of the two major
parti es onl y on the absentee bal l ots, l eavi ng off i ndependents and
other parti es.
137
Al so i nval i dated was a requi rement that i nde-
pendent candi dates for Presi dent and Vi ce-Presi dent fi l e nomi nat-
i ng peti ti ons by March 20 i n order to qual i fy for the November bal -
l ot.
138
1902
139
Supra, pp. 68798. Appl i cabi l i ty of the doctri ne to cases of thi s nature was
l eft unresol ved i n Smi l ey v. Hol m, 285 U.S. 355 (1932), and Wood v. Broom, 287
U.S. 1 (1932), was supported by onl y a pl ural i ty i n Col egrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549 (1946), but became the posi ti on of the Court i n subsequent cases. Cook v.
Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946); Col egrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947); MacDougal l
v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); Hartsfi el d v.
Sl oan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958).
140
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
141
376 U.S. 1 (1964). Supra, pp. 10608. Stri ki ng down a county uni t system
of el ecti ng a governor, the Court, i n an opi ni on by Justi ce Dougl as, had al ready
coi ned a vari ant phrase of the more popul ar one man, one vote. The concepti on
of pol i ti cal equal i ty from the Decl arati on of I ndependence to Li ncol ns Gettysburg
Address, to the Fi fteenth, Seventeenth, and Ni neteenth Amendments can mean onl y
one thi ng one person, one vote. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
142
Reynol ds v. Si ms, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); WMCA, I nc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S.
633 (1964); Maryl and Comm. for Fai r Representati on v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964);
Doni s v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v. Si ncock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas
v. Forty-Fourth General Assembl y of Col orado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964). I n the l ast case,
the Court hel d that approval of the apporti onment pl an i n a vote of the peopl e was
i nsuffi ci ent to preserve i t from consti tuti onal attack. An i ndi vi dual s consti tu-
ti onal l y protected ri ght to cast an equal l y wei ghed vote cannot be deni ed even by
a vote of a majori ty of a States el ectorate, i f the apporti onment scheme adopted by
the voters fai l s to measure up to the requi rements of the Equal Protecti on Cl ause.
I d. at 736. Justi ce Harl an di ssented whol l y, denyi ng that the equal protecti on cl ause
had any appl i cati on at al l to apporti onment and di stri cti ng and contendi ng that the
deci si ons were actual l y the resul t of a reformi st nonjudi ci al atti tude on the part
of the Court. 377 U.S. at 589. Justi ces Stewart and Cl ark di ssented i n two and con-
curred i n four cases on the basi s of thei r vi ew that the equal protecti on cl ause was
sati sfi ed by a pl an that was rati onal and that di d not systemati cal l y frustrate the
majori ty wi l l . 377 U.S., 741, 744.
143
Apporti onment and Di stri cti ng. Pri or to 1962, attacks i n
federal courts on the drawi ng of boundari es for congressi onal and
l egi sl ati ve el ecti on di stri cts or the apporti onment of seats to pre-
vi ousl y exi sti ng uni ts ran afoul of the pol i ti cal questi on doc-
tri ne.
139
But Baker v. Carr
140
rei nterpreted the doctri ne i n consi d-
erabl e degree and opened the federal courts to voter compl ai nts
founded on unequal l y popul ated voti ng di stri cts. Wesberry v. Sand-
ers
141
found i n Arti cl e I , 2, of the Consti tuti on a command that
i n the el ecti on of Members of the House of Representati ves di stri cts
were to be made up of substanti al l y equal numbers of persons. I n
si x deci si ons handed down on June 15, 1964, the Court requi red
the al terati on of the el ecti on di stri cts for practi cal l y al l the l egi sl a-
ti ve bodi es i n the Uni ted States.
142
We hol d that, as a basi c consti tuti onal standard, the Equal
Protecti on Cl ause requi res that the seats i n both houses of a bi -
cameral state l egi sl ature must be apporti oned on a popul ati on
basi s. Si mpl y stated, an i ndi vi dual s ri ght to vote for state l egi sl a-
tors i s unconsti tuti onal l y i mpai red when i ts wei ght i s i n a substan-
ti al fashi on di l uted when compared wi th the votes of ci ti zens l i vi ng
i n other parts of the State.
143
What was requi red was that each
1903
144
I d. at 577.
145
Sai l ors v. Board of Educati on, 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
146
390 U.S. 474 (1968). Justi ce Harl an conti nued hi s di ssent from the Reynolds
l i ne of cases, i d. at 486, whi l e Justi ces Fortas and Stewart cal l ed for a more di scern-
i ng appl i cati on and woul d not have appl i ed the pri nci pl e to the county counci l here.
I d. at 495, 509.
147
397 U.S. 50 (1970). The governmental body here was the board of trustees
of a juni or col l ege di stri ct. Justi ces Harl an and Stewart and Chi ef Justi ce Burger
di ssented. I d. at 59, 70.
148
The Court observed that there mi ght be i nstances i n whi ch a State el ects
certai n functi onari es whose duti es are so far removed from normal governmental ac-
ti vi ti es and so di sproporti onatel y affect di fferent groups that a popul ar el ecti on i n
compl i ance wi th Reynolds supra, mi ght not be requi red. . . . I d. at 56. For cases
i nvol vi ng such uni ts, see Sal yer Land Co. v. Tul are Water Storage Di st., 410 U.S.
719 (1973); Associ ated Enterpri ses v. Tol tec Watershed I mp. Di st., 410 U.S. 743
(1973); Bal l v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981). Judi ci al di stri cts need not compl y wi th
Reynolds. Wel l s v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972) (three-judge court),
affd. per curiam, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973).
State make an honest and good fai th effort to construct di stri cts,
i n both houses of i ts l egi sl ature, as nearl y of equal popul ati on as
i s practi cabl e. We real i ze that i t i s a practi cal i mpossi bi l i ty to ar-
range l egi sl ati ve di stri cts so that each one has an i denti cal number
of resi dents, or ci ti zens, or voters. Mathemati cal exactness or preci -
si on i s hardl y a workabl e consti tuti onal requi rement.
144
Among the pri nci pal i ssues rai sed by these deci si ons were
whi ch uni ts were covered by the pri nci pl e, to what degree of
exactness popul ati on equal i ty had to be achi eved, and to what
other el ements of the apporti onment and di stri cti ng process the
equal protecti on cl ause extended.
The fi rst i ssue has l argel y been resol ved, al though some few
probl em areas persi st. I t has been hel d that a school board the
members of whi ch were appoi nted by boards el ected i n uni ts of di s-
parate popul ati ons and whi ch exerci sed onl y admi ni strati ve powers
rather than l egi sl ati ve powers was not subject to the pri nci pl e of
the apporti onment rul i ng.
145
Avery v. Midland County
146
hel d that
when a State del egates l awmaki ng power to l ocal government and
provi des for the el ecti on by di stri ct of the offi ci al s to whom the
power i s del egated, the di stri cts must be establ i shed of substan-
ti al l y equal popul ati ons. But i n Hadley v. J unior College Dis-
trict,
147
the Court abandoned much of the l i mi tati on whi ch was ex-
pl i ci t i n these two deci si ons and hel d that whenever a State choos-
es to vest governmental functi ons i n a body and to el ect the mem-
bers of that body from di stri cts, the di stri cts must have substan-
ti al l y equal popul ati ons. The governmental functi ons shoul d not
be characteri zed as l egi sl ati ve or admi ni strati ve or necessari l y
i mportant or uni mportant; i t i s the fact that members of the body
are el ected from di stri cts whi ch tri ggers the appl i cati on.
148
1904
149
385 U.S. 440, 44344 (1967). See also Ki l garl i n v. Hi l l , 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
150
Ki rkpatri ck v. Prei sl er, 385 U.S. 450 (1967); Duddl eston v. Gri l l s, 385 U.S.
455 (1967).
151
Ki rkpatri ck v. Prei sl er, 394 U.S. 526, 53031 (1969); Wel l s v. Rockefel l er,
394 U.S. 542 (1969). Supra, pp. 10708. The Court has conti nued to adhere to thi s
stri ct standard for congressi onal di stri cti ng, voi di ng a pl an i n whi ch the maxi mum
devi ati on between l argest and smal l est di stri ct was 0.7%, or 3,674 persons. Karcher
v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (rejecti ng asserti on that devi ati ons l ess than esti -
mated census error are necessari l y permi ssi bl e).
152
The Court rel i ed on Swann i n di sapprovi ng of onl y sl i ghtl y smal l er devi -
ati ons (roughl y 28% and 25%) i n Whi tcomb v. Chavi s, 403 U.S. 124, 16163 (1971).
I n Connor v. Wi l l i ams, 404 U.S. 549, 550 (1972), the Court sai d of pl ai nti ffs rel i ance
on Preisler and Wells that these deci si ons do not squarel y control the i nstant ap-
peal si nce they do not concern state l egi sl ati ve apporti onment, but they do rai se
substanti al questi ons concerni ng the consti tuti onal i ty of the Di stri ct Courts pl an as
a desi gn for permanent apporti onment.
153
403 U.S. 182 (1971).
154
I t shoul d al so be noted that whi l e the Court has used total popul ati on fi g-
ures for purposes of computi ng vari ati ons between di stri cts, i t di d approve i n Burns
v. Ri chardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), the use of el i gi bl e voter popul ati on as the basi s
for apporti oni ng i n the context of a State wi th a l arge transi ent mi l i tary popul ati on,
but wi th the cauti on that such a basi s woul d be permi ssi bl e onl y so l ong as the re-
sul ts di d not di verge substanti al l y from that obtai ned by usi ng a total popul ati on
base. Merel y di scounti ng for mi l i tary popul ati ons was di sapproved i n Davi s v.
Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 691 (1964), but whether some more preci se way of di sti ngui sh-
i ng between resi dent and nonresi dent popul ati on woul d be consti tuti onal l y permi s-
si bl e i s uncl ear. Ki rkpatri ck v. Prei sl er, 394 U.S. 526, 534 (1969); Hadl ey v. Juni or
Col l ege Di st., 397 U.S. 50, 57 n.9 (1970).
The second i ssue has been l argel y but not preci sel y resol ved.
I n Swann v. Adams,
149
the Court set asi de a l ower court rul i ng
for the fai l ure of the State to present or the Di stri ct Court to ar-
ti cul ate acceptabl e reasons for the vari ati ons among the popu-
l ati ons of the vari ous l egi sl ati ve di stri cts. . . . De minimis devi -
ati ons are unavoi dabl e, but vari ati ons of 30% among senate di s-
tri cts and 40% among house di stri cts can hardl y be deemed de
minimis and none of our cases suggests that di fferences of thi s
magni tude wi l l be approved wi thout a sati sfactory expl anati on
grounded on acceptabl e state pol i cy. Two congressi onal di stri ct
cases were di sposed of on the basi s of Swann,
150
but when the
Court rul ed that no congressi onal di stri cti ng coul d be approved
wi thout a good-fai th effort to achi eve preci se mathemati cal equal -
i ty or the justi fi cati on of each vari ance, no matter how smal l ,
151
i t di d not then purport to uti l i ze thi s standard i n judgi ng l egi sl a-
ti ve apporti onment and di stri cti ng.
152
And i n Abate v. Mundt
153
the Court approved a pl an for apporti oni ng a county governi ng
body whi ch permi tted a substanti al popul ati on di spari ty, expl ai n-
i ng that i n the absence of a bui l t-i n bi as tendi ng to favor any par-
ti cul ar area or i nterest, a pl an coul d take account of l ocal i zed fac-
tors i n justi fyi ng devi ati ons from equal i ty whi ch mi ght i n other ci r-
cumstances cause the i nval i dati on of a pl an.
154
The total popu-
l ati on devi ati on al l owed i n Abate was 11.9%; the Court refused,
1905
155
New York Ci ty Bd. of Esti mate v. Morri s, 489 U.S. 688 (1989). Under the
pl an each of the Ci tys fi ve boroughs was represented on the board by i ts presi dent
and each of these members had one vote; three ci tywi de el ected offi ci al s (the mayor,
the comptrol l er, and the presi dent of the ci ty counci l ) were al so pl aced on the board
and gi ven two votes api ece (except that the mayor had no vote on the acceptance
or modi fi cati on of hi s budget proposal ). The Court al so rul ed that, when measuri ng
popul ati on devi ati on for a pl an that mi xes at-l arge and di stri ct representati on, the
at-l arge representati on must be taken i nto account. I d. at 699701.
156
Mahan v. Howel l , 410 U.S. 315, 32025 (1973).
157
I d. at 32530. The Court i ndi cated that a 16.4% devi ati on may wel l ap-
proach tol erabl e l i mi ts. I d. at 329. Di ssenti ng, Justi ces Brennan, Dougl as, and Mar-
shal l woul d have voi ded the pl an; addi ti onal l y, they thought the devi ati on was actu-
al l y 23.6% and that the pl an di scri mi nated geographi cal l y agai nst one secti on of the
State, an i ssue not addressed by the Court. I n Chapman v. Mei er, 420 U.S. 1, 21
26 (1975), hol di ng that a 20% vari ati on i n a court-devel oped pl an was not justi fi ed,
the Court i ndi cated that such a devi ati on i n a l egi sl ati vel y-produced pl an woul d be
qui te di ffi cul t to justi fy. See also Summers v. Cenarrusa, 413 U.S. 906 (1973)
(vacati ng and remandi ng for further consi derati on the approval of a 19.4% devi -
ati on). I n Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983), the Court hel d that a consi stent
state pol i cy assuri ng each county at l east one representati ve can justi fy substanti al
devi ati on from popul ati on equal i ty when onl y the margi nal i mpact of representati on
for the states l east popul ous county was chal l enged (the effect on pl ai nti ffs, voters
i n l arger di stri cts, was that they woul d el ect 28 of 64 members rather than 28 of
63), but there was i ndi cati on i n Justi ce OConnors concurri ng opi ni on that a broad-
er-based chal l enge to the pl an, whi ch contai ned a 16% average devi ati on and an
89% maxi mum devi ati on, coul d have succeeded.
however, to extend Abate to approve a total devi ati on of 78% re-
sul ti ng from an apporti onment pl an provi di ng for representati on of
each of New York Ci tys fi ve boroughs on the New York Ci ty Board
of Esti mate.
155
Ni ne years after Reynolds v. Sims, the Court reexami ned the
popul ati on equal i ty requi rement of the apporti onment cases. Rel y-
i ng upon l anguage i n pri or deci si ons that di sti ngui shed l egi sl ati ve
apporti onment from congressi onal di stri cti ng as possi bl y justi fyi ng
di fferent standards of permi ssi bl e devi ati ons from equal i ty, the
Court hel d that more fl exi bi l i ty i s consti tuti onal l y permi ssi bl e wi th
respect to the former than to the l atter.
156
But i t was i n determi n-
i ng how much greater fl exi bi l i ty was permi ssi bl e that the Court
moved i n new di recti ons. Fi rst, appl yi ng the tradi ti onal standard
of rati onal i ty rather than the stri ct test of compel l i ng necessi ty, the
Court hel d that a maxi mum 16.4% devi ati on from equal i ty of popu-
l ati on was justi fi ed by the States pol i cy of mai ntai ni ng the i nteg-
ri ty of pol i ti cal subdi vi si on l i nes, or accordi ng representati on to
subdi vi si ons qua subdi vi si ons, because the l egi sl ature was respon-
si bl e for much l ocal l egi sl ati on.
157
Second, just as the fi rst case
demonstrates, popul ati on devi ati ons among di stri cts may be suffi -
ci entl y l arge to requi re justi fi cati on but nonethel ess be justi fi ed
and l egal l y sustai nabl e. I t i s now ti me to recogni ze . . . that mi nor
devi ati ons from mathemati cal equal i ty among state l egi sl ati ve di s-
tri cts are i nsuffi ci ent to make out a prima facie case of i nvi di ous
1906
158
Gaffney v. Cummi ngs, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973). The maxi mum devi ati on
was 7.83%. The Court di d not preci sel y i ndi cate at what poi nt a devi ati on had to
be justi fi ed, but i t appl i ed the de minimis standard i n Whi te v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755 (1973), i n whi ch the maxi mum devi ati on was 9.9%. Very l i kel y, l arger di f-
ferences between di stri cts woul d not be tol erabl e wi thout justi fi cati ons. I d. at 764.
Justi ces Brennan, Dougl as, and Marshal l di ssented. See also Brown v. Thomson,
462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983): Our deci si ons have establ i shed, as a general matter, that
an apporti onment pl an wi th a maxi mum popul ati on devi ati on under 10% fal l s wi th-
i n [the] category of mi nor devi ati ons [i nsuffi ci ent to make out a prima facie case].
159
Gaffney v. Cummi ngs, 412 U.S. 735, 748 (1973). By contrast, the Court has
hel d that esti mated margi n of error for census stati sti cs does not justi fy devi ati on
from popul ati on equal i ty i n congressi onal di stri cti ng. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S.
725 (1983).
160
Chapman v. Mei er, 420 U.S. 1, 2127 (1975). The Court di d say that court-
ordered reapporti onment of a state l egi sl ature need not attai n the mathemati cal
preci seness requi red for congressi onal redi stri cti ng. I d. at 27 n.19. Apparentl y,
therefore, the Courts reference to both de minimis vari ati ons and approxi mate
popul ati on equal i ty must be read as referri ng to some range approxi mati ng the
Gaffney pri nci pl e. See also Connor v. Fi nch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977).
161
Gomi l l i on v. Li ghtfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Wri ght v. Rockefel l er, 376 U.S.
52 (1964); Si ms v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Al a. 1965) (three-judge court).
162
E.g., WMCA, I nc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (three-judge
court), affd, 382 U.S. 4 (1965); Si ncock v. Gatel y, 262 F. Supp. 739 (D. Del . 1967)
(three-judge court).
di scri mi nati on under the Fourteenth Amendment so as to requi re
justi fi cati on by the State.
158
Thi s recogni ti on of a de minimis devi -
ati on, bel ow whi ch no justi fi cati on was necessary, was mandated,
the Court fel t, by the margi n of error i n census stati sti cs, by the
popul ati on change over the ten-year l i fe of an apporti onment, and
by the rel i ef i t afforded federal courts abl e thus to avoi d over-i n-
vol vement i n essenti al l y a pol i ti cal process. The goal of fai r and
effecti ve representati on i s furthered by el i mi nati ng gross popu-
l ati on vari ati ons among di stri cts, but i t i s not achi eved by mathe-
mati cal equal i ty sol el y. Other rel evant factors are to be taken i nto
account.
159
But when a judi ci al l y-i mposed pl an i s to be formul ated
upon state defaul t, i t must ordi nari l y achi eve the goal of popu-
l ati on equal i ty wi th l i ttl e more than de minimis vari ati on and de-
vi ati ons from approxi mate popul ati on equal i ty must be supported
by enunci ati on of hi stori cal l y si gni fi cant state pol i cy or uni que fea-
tures.
160
Gerrymanderi ng and the permi ssi bl e use of mul ti member di s-
tri cts present exampl es of the thi rd major i ssue. I t i s cl ear that ra-
ci al l y based gerrymanderi ng i s unconsti tuti onal under the Fi f-
teenth Amendment, at l east when i t i s accompl i shed through the
mani pul ati on of di stri ct l i nes.
161
Parti san gerrymanderi ng rai sed
more di ffi cul t i ssues. Several l ower courts rul ed that the i ssue was
beyond judi ci al cogni zance,
162
and the Supreme Court i tsel f, up-
hol di ng an apporti onment pl an frankl y admi tted to have been
drawn wi th the i ntent to achi eve a rough approxi mati on of the
1907
163
Gaffney v. Cummi ngs, 412 U.S. 735, 751, 754 (1973).
164
478 U.S. 109 (1986). The vote on justi ci abi l i ty was 63, wi th Justi ce Whi tes
opi ni on of the Court bei ng joi ned by Justi ces Brennan, Marshal l , Bl ackmun, Powel l ,
and Stevens. Thi s represented an apparent change of vi ew by 3 of the majori ty Jus-
ti ces, who just 2 years earl i er had deni ed that the exi stence of noncompact or ger-
rymandered di stri cts i s by i tsel f a consti tuti onal vi ol ati on. Karcher v. Daggett, 466
U.S. 910, 917 (1983) (Justi ce Brennan, joi ned by Justi ces Whi te and Marshal l , di s-
senti ng from deni al of stay i n chal l enge to di stri ct courts rejecti on of a remedi al di s-
tri cti ng pl an on the basi s that i t contai ned an i ntenti onal gerrymander).
165
Onl y Justi ces Powel l and Stevens thought the I ndi ana redi stri cti ng pl an
voi d; Justi ce Whi te, joi ned by Justi ces Brennan, Marshal l , and Bl ackmun, thought
the record i nadequate to demonstrate conti nui ng di scri mi natory i mpact, and Justi ce
OConnor, joi ned by Chi ef Justi ce Burger and by Justi ce Rehnqui st, woul d have
rul ed that parti san gerrymanderi ng i s nonjusti ci abl e as consti tuti ng a pol i ti cal ques-
ti on not suscepti bl e to manageabl e judi ci al standards.
166
377 U.S. 533, 56566 (1964). Thi s phrase has had a l i fe of i ts own i n the
commentary. See D. Al fange, Jr., Gerrymandering and the Constitution: I nto the
Thorns of the Thicket at Last, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 175, and sources ci ted therei n.
I t i s not cl ear from i ts ori gi nal context, however, that the phrase was coi ned wi th
such broad appl i cati on i n mi nd.
167
The quotati on i s from the Baker v. Carr measure for exi stence of a pol i ti cal
questi on, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
statewi de pol i ti cal strengths of the two parti es, recogni zed the goal
as l egi ti mate and observed that, whi l e the mani pul ati on of appor-
ti onment and di stri cti ng i s not whol l y i mmune from judi ci al scru-
ti ny, we have not ventured far or attempted the i mpossi bl e task
of exti rpati ng pol i ti cs from what are the essenti al l y pol i ti cal proc-
esses of the soverei gn States.
163
More recentl y, however, i n a deci si on of potenti al l y major i m-
port remi ni scent of Baker v. Carr, the Court i n Davis v.
Bandemer
164
rul ed that parti san gerrymanderi ng i n state l egi sl a-
ti ve redi stri cti ng i s justi ci abl e under the Equal Protecti on Cl ause.
But al though the vote was 6 to 3 i n favor of justi ci abi l i ty, a major-
i ty of Justi ces coul d not agree on the proper test for determi ni ng
whether parti cul ar gerrymanderi ng i s unconsti tuti onal , and the
l ower courts hol di ng of unconsti tuti onal i ty was reversed by vote of
7 to 2.
165
Thus, whi l e courthouse doors are now ajar for cl ai ms of
parti san gerrymanderi ng, i t i s uncl ear what i t wi l l take to succeed
on the meri ts. On the justi ci abi l i ty i ssue, the Court vi ewed the po-
l i ti cal questi on cri teri a as no more appl i cabl e than they had been
i n Baker v. Carr. Because Reynolds v. Sims had decl ared fai r and
effecti ve representati on for al l ci ti zens
166
to be the basi c ai m of
l egi sl ati ve apporti onment, and because raci al gerrymanderi ng i s-
sues had been treated as justi ci abl e, the Court vi ewed the rep-
resentati onal i ssues rai sed by parti san gerrymanderi ng as i ndi sti n-
gui shabl e. Agreement as to the exi stence of judi ci al l y di scoverabl e
and manageabl e standards for resol vi ng gerrymanderi ng i ssues,
however, di d not resul t i n a consensus as to what those standards
are.
167
Whi l e a majori ty of Justi ces agreed that di scri mi natory ef-
1908
168
478 U.S. at 133. Joi ni ng i n thi s part of the opi ni on were Justi ces Brennan,
Marshal l , and Bl ackmun.
169
478 U.S. at 173. A si mi l ar approach had been proposed i n Justi ce Stevens
concurri ng opi ni on i n Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 744 (1983).
170
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965); Burns v. Ri chardson, 384 U.S.
73, 8889 (1965); Ki l garl i n v. Hi l l , 386 U.S. 120, 125 n.3 (1967).
171
403 U.S. 124 (1971). Justi ce Harl an concurred speci al l y, i d. at 165, and Jus-
ti ces Dougl as, Brennan, and Marshal l , di ssented, fi ndi ng raci al di scri mi nati on i n
the operati on of the system. I d. at 171.
fect as wel l as di scri mi natory i ntent must be shown, there was si g-
ni fi cant di sagreement as to what consti tutes di scri mi natory effect.
Justi ce Whi tes pl ural i ty opi ni on suggested that there need be evi -
dence of conti nued frustrati on of the wi l l of a majori ty of the voters
or effecti ve deni al to a mi nori ty of voters of a fai r chance to i nfl u-
ence the pol i ti cal process.
168
Moreover, conti nued frustrati on of
the chance to i nfl uence the pol i ti cal process can not be dem-
onstrated by the resul ts of onl y one el ecti on; there must be a hi s-
tory of di sproporti onate resul ts or a fi ndi ng that such resul ts wi l l
conti nue. Justi ce Powel l , joi ned by Justi ce Stevens, di d not formu-
l ate a stri ct test, but suggested that a heavy burden of proof
shoul d be requi red, and that courts shoul d l ook to a vari ety of fac-
tors as they rel ate to the fai rness of a redi stri cti ng pl an i n deter-
mi ni ng whether i t contai ns i nval i d gerrymanderi ng. Among these
factors are the shapes of the di stri cts, adherence to establ i shed
subdi vi si on l i nes, stati sti cs rel ati ng to vote di l uti on, the nature of
the l egi sl ati ve process by whi ch the pl an was formul ated, and evi -
dence of i ntent reveal ed i n l egi sl ati ve hi story.
169
I t had been thought that the use of mul ti member di stri cts to
submerge raci al , ethni c, and pol i ti cal mi nori ti es mi ght be treated
di fferentl y,
170
but i n Whitcomb v. Chavis
171
the Court, whi l e deal -
i ng wi th the i ssue on the meri ts, so envel oped i t i n stri ct standards
of proof and defi ni ti onal anal ysi s as to rai se the possi bi l i ty that i t
mi ght be beyond judi ci al revi ew.
I n Chavis the Court hel d that i nasmuch as the mul ti member
di stri cti ng represented a state pol i cy of more than 100 years ob-
servance and coul d not therefore be sai d to be moti vated by raci al
or pol i ti cal bi as, onl y an actual showi ng that the mul ti member del -
egati on i n fact i nadequatel y represented the al l egedl y submerged
mi nori ty woul d suffi ce to rai se a consti tuti onal questi on. But the
Court al so rejected as i mpermi ssi bl e the argument that any i nter-
est group had any sort of ri ght to be represented i n a l egi sl ati ve
body, i n proporti on to i ts members numbers or on some other
basi s, so that the fai l ure of that group to el ect anyone merel y
meant that al one or i n combi nati on wi th other groups i t si mpl y
l acked the strength to obtai n enough votes, whether the el ecti on be
1909
172
412 U.S. 755, 76570 (1973).
173
To sustai n such cl ai ms, i t i s not enough that the raci al group al l egedl y di s-
cri mi nated agai nst has not had l egi sl ati ve seats i n proporti on to i ts voti ng potenti al .
The pl ai nti ffs burden i s to produce evi dence to support fi ndi ngs that the pol i ti cal
processes l eadi ng to nomi nati on and el ecti on were not equal l y open to parti ci pati on
by the group i n questi on that i ts members had l ess opportuni ty than di d other
resi dents i n the di stri ct to parti ci pate i n the pol i ti cal processes and to el ect l egi sl a-
tors of thei r choi ce. I d. at 76566.
174
446 U.S. 55 (1980). On Congress response to the case, see supra, pp. 1818
19; i nfra, p. 1936.
175
I d. at 6568 (Justi ces Stewart, Powel l , Rehnqui st, and Chi ef Justi ce Burger).
On i ntent versus i mpact anal ysi s, see supra, pp. 181520. Justi ces Bl ackmun and
Stevens concurred on other grounds, i d. at 80, 83, and Justi ces Whi te, Brennan, and
Marshal l di ssented. I d. at 94, 103. Justi ce Whi te agreed that purposeful di scri mi na-
ti on must be found, i d. at 101, whi l e fi ndi ng i t to have been shown, Justi ce
Bl ackmun assumed that i ntent was requi red, and Justi ces Stevens, Brennan, and
Marshal l woul d not so hol d.
i n si ngl e-member or i n mul ti member di stri cts. That fact of l i fe was
not of consti tuti onal di mensi on, whether the group was composed
of bl acks, or Republ i cans or Democrats, or some other category of
persons. Thus, the submergi ng argument was rejected, as was the
argument of a voter i n another county that the Court shoul d re-
qui re uni form si ngl e-member di stri cti ng i n popul ous counti es be-
cause voters i n counti es whi ch el ected l arge del egati ons i n bl ocs
had i n effect greater voti ng power than voters i n other di stri cts;
thi s argument the Court found too theoreti cal and too far removed
from the actual i ti es of pol i ti cal l i fe.
Subsequentl y, and surpri si ngl y i n l i ght of Chavis, the Court i n
White v. Regester
172
affi rmed a di stri ct court i nval i dati on of the use
of mul ti member di stri cts i n two Texas counti es on the ground that,
when consi dered i n the total i ty of the ci rcumstances of di scri mi na-
ti on i n regi strati on and voti ng and i n access to other pol i ti cal op-
portuni ti es, such use deni ed Afri can Ameri cans and Mexi can Amer-
i cans the opportuni ty to parti ci pate i n the el ecti on process i n a rel i -
abl e and meani ngful manner.
173
Doubt was cast on the conti nui ng vi tal i ty of White v. Regester,
however, by the badl y spl i t opi ni on of the Court i n City of Mobile
v. Bolden.
174
A pl ural i ty undermi ned the earl i er case i n two re-
spects, al though i t i s not at al l cl ear that a majori ty of the Court
had been or coul d be assembl ed on ei ther poi nt. Fi rst, the pl ural i ty
argued that an i ntent to di scri mi nate on the part of the redi stri ct-
i ng body must be shown before mul ti member di stri cti ng can be
hel d to vi ol ate the equal protecti on cl ause.
175
Second, the pl ural i ty
read White v. Regester as bei ng consi stent wi th thi s pri nci pl e and
the vari ous factors devel oped i n that case to demonstrate the exi st-
ence of unconsti tuti onal di scri mi nati on to be i n fact i ndi ci a of i n-
tent; however, the pl ural i ty seemi ngl y di sregarded the total i ty of
1910
176
I d. at 6874. Four Justi ces rejected thi s vi ew of the pl ural i ty, whi l e Justi ce
Stevens al so appeared to do so but fol l owed a mode of anal ysi s si gni fi cantl y di fferent
than that of any other Justi ce.
177
458 U.S. 613 (1982). Joi ni ng the opi ni on of the Court were Justi ces Whi te,
Brennan, Marshal l , Bl ackmun, OConnor, and Chi ef Justi ce Burger. Di ssenti ng were
Justi ces Powel l and Rehnqui st, i d. at 628, and Justi ce Stevens. I d. at 631.
178
On the l egi sl ati on, see supra, pp. 181819; i nfra, p. 1936.
179
478 U.S. 30, 5051 (1986). Use of mul ti member di stri cti ng for purposes of
pol i ti cal gerrymanderi ng was at i ssue i n Davi s v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986),
deci ded the same day as Gingles, but there was no agreement as to the appropri ate
consti tuti onal standard. A pl ural i ty l ed by Justi ce Whi te rel i ed on the Whitcomb v.
Chavis reasoni ng, suggesti ng that proof that mul ti member di stri cts were con-
structed for the advantage of one pol i ti cal party fal l s short of the necessary showi ng
of depri vati on of opportuni ty to parti ci pate i n the el ectoral process. 478 U.S. at 136
37. Two Justi ces thought the proof suffi ci ent for a hol di ng of i nval i di ty, the mi nori ty
party havi ng won 46% of the vote but onl y 3 of 21 seats from the mul ti member di s-
tri cts, and the onl y di scerni bl e pattern [bei ng] the appearance of these di stri cts i n
areas where thei r wi nner-take-al l aspects can best be empl oyed to debase [one par-
tys] voti ng strength, (i d. at at 17980, Justi ces Powel l and Stevens), and three Jus-
ti ces thought pol i ti cal gerrymanderi ng cl ai ms to be nonjusti ci abl e.
180
E.g., Reynol ds v. Si ms, 377 U.S. 533, 58687 (1964); Si xty-Seventh Mi n-
nesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 195200 (1972); Whi te v. Wei ser, 412
ci rcumstances test uti l i zed i n Regester and eval uated i nstead
whether each factor al one was suffi ci ent proof of i ntent.
176
Agai n swi tchi ng course, the Court i n Rogers v. Lodge
177
ap-
proved the fi ndi ngs of the l ower courts that a mul ti member el ec-
toral system for el ecti ng a county board of commi ssi oners was
bei ng mai ntai ned for a raci al l y di scri mi natory purpose, al though i t
had not been i nsti tuted for that purpose. Appl yi ng a total i ty of the
ci rcumstances test, and deferri ng to l ower court factfi ndi ng, the
Court, i n an opi ni on by one of the Mobile di ssenters, canvassed a
range of factors whi ch i t hel d coul d combi ne to show a di scri mi na-
tory moti ve, and l argel y overturned the l i mi tati ons whi ch the Mo-
bile pl ural i ty had attempted to i mpose i n thi s area. Wi th the enact-
ment of federal l egi sl ati on speci fi cal l y addressed to the i ssue of
mul ti member di stri cti ng and di l uti on of the votes of raci al mi nori -
ti es, however, i t may be that the Court wi l l have l i ttl e further op-
portuni ty to devel op the matter i n the context of consti tuti onal l i ti -
gati on.
178
I n Thornburg v. Gingles,
179
the Court hel d that
mul ti member di stri cti ng vi ol ates 2 of the Voti ng Ri ghts Act by di -
l uti ng the voti ng power of a raci al mi nori ty when that mi nori ty i s
suffi ci entl y l arge and geographi cal l y compact to consti tute a ma-
jori ty i n a si ngl e-member di stri ct, when i t i s pol i ti cal l y cohesi ve,
and when bl ock voti ng by the majori ty usual l y defeats preferred
candi dates of the mi nori ty.
Fi nal l y, i t shoul d be sai d that the Court has approved the di s-
creti onary exerci se of equi ty powers by the l ower federal courts i n
drawi ng di stri ct boundari es and granti ng other rel i ef i n di stri cti ng
and apporti onment cases,
180
al though that power i s bounded by
1911
U.S. 783, 79495 (1973); Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 4142 (1982). When courts
draw thei r own pl ans, the court i s hel d to ti ghter standards than i s a l egi sl ature
and has to observe smal l er popul ati on devi ati ons and uti l i ze si ngl e-member di stri cts
more than mul ti member ones. Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971); Chap-
man v. Mei er, 420 U.S. 1, 1421 (1975); Wi se v. Li pscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978).
Cf. Mahan v. Howel l , 410 U.S. 315, 333 (1973).
181
E.g., Si xty-Seventh Mi nnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187 (1972)
(reducti on of numbers of members); Whi tcomb v. Chavi s, 403 U.S. 124, 16061
(1971) (di sregard of pol i cy of mul ti member di stri cts not found unconsti tuti onal );
Whi te v. Wei ser, 412 U.S. 783, 79495 (1973); Upham v. Seamon, 406 U.S. 37
(1982). But see Karcher v. Daggett, 466 U.S. 910 (1983) (denyi ng cert. over di ssents
suggesti on that court-adopted congressi onal di stri cti ng pl an had strayed too far from
the structural framework of the l egi sl atures i nval i dated pl an).
182
372 U.S. 368 (1963).
183
403 U.S. 1 (1971).
1
Dunn v. Bl umstei n, 405 U.S. 330, 334 (1972). I nasmuch as the ri ght to travel
i s i mpl i cated by state di sti ncti ons between resi dents and nonresi dents, the rel evant
consti tuti onal provi si on i s the pri vi l eges and i mmuni ti es cl ause, Arti cl e I V, 2, cl .
1.
the consti tuti onal vi ol ati ons found, so that courts do not have carte
blanche, and they shoul d ordi nari l y respect the structural deci si ons
made by state l egi sl atures and the state consti tuti ons.
181
Wei ghi ng of Votes. I t i s not the wei ghi ng of votes but the
manner i n whi ch i t i s done whi ch bri ngs the equal protecti on
cl ause i nto pl ay. Gray v. Sanders
182
struck down the Georgi a coun-
ty uni t system under whi ch each county was al l ocated ei ther two,
four, or si x votes i n statewi de el ecti ons and the candi date carryi ng
the county recei ved those votes. Si nce there were a few very popu-
l ous counti es and scores of poorl y-popul ated ones, the rural coun-
ti es i n effect domi nated statewi de el ecti ons and candi dates wi th
popul ar majori ti es statewi de coul d be and were defeated. But Gor-
don v. Lance
183
approved a provi si on requi ri ng a 60 percent affi rm-
ati ve vote i n a referendum el ecti on before consti tuti onal l y pre-
scri bed l i mi ts on bonded i ndebtedness or tax rates coul d be ex-
ceeded. The Court acknowl edged that the provi si on departed from
stri ct majori ty rul e but stated that the Consti tuti on di d not pre-
scri be majori ty rul e; i t i nstead proscri bed di scri mi nati on through
di l uti on of voti ng power or deni al of the franchi se because of some
cl ass characteri sti c race, urban resi dency, or the l i ke whi l e the
provi si on i n i ssue was nei ther di rected to nor affected any i denti fi -
abl e cl ass.
The Right to Travel
Durati onal Resi dency Requi rements. A durati onal resi -
dency requi rement creates two cl asses of persons: those who have
been wi thi n the State for the prescri bed peri od and those who have
not been.
1
But persons who have moved recentl y, at l east from
1912
2
I ntrastate travel i s protected to the extent that the cl assi fi cati on fai l s to meet
equal protecti on standards i n some respect. Compare Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp.
107 (M.D. Al a. 1970) (three-judge court), affd. per curi am, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972),
with Arl i ngton County Bd. v. Ri chards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977). The same pri nci pl e ap-
pl i es i n the commerce cl ause cases, i n whi ch di scri mi nati on may run agai nst i n-
state as wel l as out-of-state concerns. Cf. Dean Mi l k Co. v. Ci ty of Madi son, 340 U.S.
349 (1951).
3
Shapi ro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 62931, 638 (1969); Dunn v. Bl umstei n,
405 U.S. 330, 33842 (1972); Memori al Hospi tal v. Mari copa County, 415 U.S. 250
(1974); Jones v. Hel ms, 452 U.S. 412, 42021 (1981). See also Oregon v. Mi tchel l ,
400 U.S. 112, 23639 (1970) (Justi ces Brennan, Whi te, and Marshal l ), and i d. at
28592 (Justi ces Stewart and Bl ackmun and Chi ef Justi ce Burger).
4
Shapi ro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasi s by Court); Graham
v. Ri chardson, 403 U.S. 365, 37576 (1971).
5
Crandal l v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wal l .) 35 (1868); Edwards v. Cal i forni a, 314
U.S. 160 (1941) (both cases i n context of di rect restri cti ons on travel ). The source
of the ri ght to travel and the reasons for rel i ance on the equal protecti on cl ause are
questi ons puzzl ed over and unresol ved by the Court. Uni ted States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 758, 759 (1966), and i d. at 76364 (Justi ce Harl an concurri ng and di ssent-
i ng), i d. at 777 n.3 (Justi ce Brennan concurri ng and di ssenti ng); Shapi ro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 62931 (1969), and i d. at 671 (Justi ce Harl an di ssenti ng); San
Antoni o School Di st. v. Rodri guez, 411 U.S. 1, 3132 (1973); Jones v. Hel ms, 452
U.S. 412, 41719 (1981); Zobel v. Wi l l i ams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 & n.6 (1982), and i d.
at 6668 (Justi ce Brennan concurri ng), 7881 (Justi ce OConnor concurri ng).
6
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
7
The durati onal resi dency provi si on establ i shed by Congress for the Di stri ct of
Col umbi a was al so voi ded. I d. at 64142.
8
I d. at 62733. Gaddi s v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717 (N.D.N.Y. 1969), affd sub
nom. Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970), struck down a provi si on construed so
as to bar onl y persons who came i nto the State sol el y to obtai n wel fare assi stance.
State to State,
2
have exerci sed a ri ght protected by the Consti tu-
ti on of the Uni ted States, and the durati onal resi dency cl assi fi ca-
ti on ei ther deters the exerci se of the ri ght or penal i zes those who
have exerci sed the ri ght.
3
Any such cl assi fi cati on i s i nval i d unl ess
shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental inter-
est.
4
The consti tuti onal ri ght to travel has l ong been recogni zed,
5
but i t i s onl y rel ati vel y recentl y that the stri ct standard of equal
protecti on revi ew has been appl i ed to nul l i fy those durati onal resi -
dency provi si ons whi ch have been brought before the Court.
Thus, i n Shapiro v. Thompson,
6
durati onal resi dency requi re-
ments condi ti oni ng el i gi bi l i ty for wel fare assi stance on one years
resi dence i n the State
7
were voi ded. I f the purpose of the requi re-
ments was to i nhi bi t mi grati on by needy persons i nto the State or
to bar the entry of those who came from l ow-payi ng States to hi gh-
er-payi ng ones i n order to col l ect greater benefi ts, the Court sai d,
the purpose was i mpermi ssi bl e.
8
I f on the other hand the purpose
was to serve certai n admi ni strati ve and rel ated governmental ob-
jecti ves the faci l i tati on of the pl anni ng of budgets, the provi si on
of an objecti ve test of resi dency, mi ni mi zati on of opportuni ty for
fraud, and encouragement of earl y entry of new resi dents i nto the
l abor force the requi rements were rati onal l y rel ated to the pur-
1913
9
394 U.S. at 63338. Shapiro was reaffi rmed i n Graham v. Ri chardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971) (stri ki ng down durati onal resi dency requi rements for al i ens appl y-
i ng for wel fare assi stance), and i n Memori al Hospi tal v. Mari copa County, 415 U.S.
250 (1974) (voi di ng requi rement of one years resi dency i n county as condi ti on to
i ndi gents recei vi ng nonemergency hospi tal i zati on or medi cal care at countys ex-
pense). When Connecti cut and New York rei nsti tuted the requi rements, pl eadi ng a
fi nanci al emergency as the compel l i ng state i nterest, they were summari l y rebuffed.
Ri vera v. Dunn, 329 F. Supp. 554 (D. Conn. 1971), affd per curi am, 404 U.S. 1054
(1972); Lopez v. Wyman, Ci v. No. 1971308 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), affd per curi am, 404
U.S. 1055 (1972). The source of the funds, state or federal , i s i rrel evant to appl i ca-
ti on of the pri nci pl e. Pease v. Hansen, 404 U.S. 70 (1971).
10
405 U.S. 330 (1972). But see Marston v. Lewi s, 410 U.S. 679 (1973), and
Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973). Durati onal resi dency requi rements of fi ve
and seven years respecti vel y for candi dates for el ecti ve offi ce were sustai ned i n
Kanapaux v. El l i sor, 419 U.S. 891 (1974), and Sununu v. Stark, 420 U.S. 958 (1975).
11
419 U.S. 393 (1975). Justi ces Marshal l and Brennan di ssented on the meri ts.
I d. at 418.
12
I d. at 409. But the Court al so i ndi cated that the pl ai nti ff was not absol utel y
barred from the state courts, but merel y requi red to wai t for access (whi ch was true
i n the pri or cases as wel l and there hel d i mmateri al ), and that possi bl y the state
i nterests i n marri age and di vorce were more excl usi ve and thus more i mmune from
federal consti tuti onal attack than were the matters at i ssue i n the previ ous cases.
The Court al so di d not i ndi cate whether i t was usi ng stri ct or tradi ti onal scruti ny.
13
Starns v. Mal kerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.Mi nn. 1970), affd per curi am, 401
U.S. 985 (1971). Cf. Vl andi s v. Kl i ne, 412 U.S. 441, 452 & n.9 (1973), and i d. at
456, 464, 467 (di cta). I n Memori al Hospi tal v. Mari copa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256
(1974), the Court, noti ng the resul ts, stated that some wai ti ng peri ods . . . may not
be penal ti es and thus woul d be val i d.
pose but they were not compelling enough to justi fy a cl assi fi cati on
whi ch i nfri nged on a fundamental i nterest.
9
Si mi l arl y, i n Dunn v.
Blumstein,
10
where the durati onal resi dency requi rements deni ed
the franchi se to newcomers, the asserti on of such admi ni strati ve
justi fi cati ons was consti tuti onal l y i nsuffi ci ent to justi fy the cl assi -
fi cati on.
However, a state one-year durati onal resi dency requi rement
for the i ni ti ati on of a di vorce proceedi ng was sustai ned i n Sosna v.
I owa.
11
Whi l e i t i s not cl ear what the preci se basi s of the rul i ng
i s, i t appears that the Court found that the States i nterest i n re-
qui ri ng that those who seek a di vorce from i ts courts be genui nel y
attached to the State and i ts desi re to i nsul ate di vorce decrees from
the l i kel i hood of col l ateral attack justi fi ed the requi rement.
12
Si mi -
l arl y, durati onal resi dency requi rements for l ower i n-state tui ti on
at publ i c col l eges have been hel d consti tuti onal l y justi fi abl e, agai n,
however, wi thout a cl ear statement of reason.
13
A state scheme for returni ng to i ts resi dents a porti on of the
i ncome earned from the vast oi l deposi ts di scovered wi thi n Al aska
foundered upon the formul a for al l ocati ng the di vi dends; that i s,
each adul t resi dent recei ved one uni t of return for each year of resi -
dency subsequent to 1959, the fi rst year of Al askas statehood. The
l aw thus created fi xed, permanent di sti ncti ons between an ever-i n-
1914
14
Zobel v. Wi l l i ams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). Somewhat si mi l ar was the Courts i n-
val i dati on on equal protecti on grounds of a veterans preference for state empl oy-
ment l i mi ted to persons who were state resi dents when they entered mi l i tary serv-
i ce; four Justi ces al so thought the preference penal i zed the ri ght to travel . Attorney
General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
15
La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919), uphol di ng a two-year resi dence
requi rement to become an i nsurance broker, must be consi dered of questi onabl e va-
l i di ty. Durati onal peri ods for admi ssi on to the practi ce of l aw or medi ci ne or other
professi ons have evoked di fferi ng responses by l ower courts.
16
E.g., McCarthy v. Phi l adel phi a Ci vi l Servi ce Commn, 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (or-
di nance requi ri ng ci ty empl oyees to be and to remai n ci ty resi dents uphel d). See Me-
mori al Hospi tal v. Mari copa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255 (1974). See also Marti nez
v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) (bona fi de resi dency requi rement for free tui ti on to
publ i c school s).
17
Jones v. Hel ms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981) (statute made i t a mi sdemeanor to aban-
don a dependent chi l d but a fel ony to commi t the offense and then l eave the State).
18
434 U.S. 374 (1978).
19
Al though the Courts due process deci si ons have broadl y defi ned a protected
l i berty i nterest i n marri age and fami l y, no previ ous case had hel d marri age to be
a fundamental ri ght occasi oni ng stri ct scruti ny. I d. at 396, 397 (Justi ce Powel l con-
curri ng).
creasi ng number of cl asses of bona fi de resi dents based on how l ong
they had been i n the State. The di fferences between the durati onal
resi dency cases previ ousl y deci ded di d not al ter the beari ng of the
ri ght to travel pri nci pl e upon the di stri buti on scheme, but the
Courts deci si on went off on the absence of any permi ssi bl e purpose
underl yi ng the apporti onment cl assi fi cati on and i t thus fai l ed even
the rati onal basi s test.
14
Unresol ved sti l l are i ssues such as durati onal resi dency re-
qui rements for occupati onal l i censes and other purposes.
15
Too, i t
shoul d be noted that thi s l i ne of cases does not appl y to state resi -
dency requi rements themsel ves, as di sti ngui shed from durati onal
provi si ons,
16
and the cases do not i nhi bi t the States when, havi ng
reasons for doi ng so, they bar travel by certai n persons.
17
Marriage and Familial Relations
I n Zablocki v. Redhail,
18
i mporti ng i nto equal protecti on anal -
ysi s the doctri nes devel oped i n substanti ve due process, the Court
i denti fi ed the ri ght to marry as a fundamental i nterest that ne-
cessi tates cri ti cal exami nati on of governmental restri cti ons whi ch
i nterfere di rectl y and substanti al l y wi th the ri ght.
19
Struck down
was a statute that prohi bi ted any resi dent under an obl i gati on to
support mi nor chi l dren from marryi ng wi thout a court order; such
order coul d onl y be obtai ned upon a showi ng that the support obl i -
gati on had been and was bei ng compl i ed wi th and that the chi l dren
were not and were not l i kel y to become publ i c charges. The pl ai n-
ti ff was an i ndi gent wi shi ng to marry but prevented from doi ng so
because he was not compl yi ng wi th a court order to pay support to
an i l l egi ti mate chi l d he had fathered, and because the chi l d was re-
1915
20
I d. at 388. Al though the passage i s not phrased i n the usual compel l i ng i nter-
est terms, the concurrence and the di ssent so vi ewed i t wi thout evoki ng di sagree-
ment from the Court. I d. at 396 (Justi ce Powel l ), 403 (Justi ce Stevens), 407 (Justi ce
Rehnqui st). Justi ces Powel l and Stevens woul d have appl i ed i ntermedi ate scruti ny
to voi d the statute, both for i ts effect on the abi l i ty to marry and for i ts i mpact upon
i ndi gents. I d. at 400, 406 n.10.
21
I d. at 38687. Chi ef Justi ce Burger thought the i nterference here was i nten-
ti onal and substanti al , whereas the provi si on i n J obst was nei ther. I d. at 391 (con-
curri ng).
22
434 U.S. 47 (1977).
cei vi ng publ i c assi stance. Appl yi ng cri ti cal exami nati on, the
Court observed that the statutory prohi bi ti on coul d not be sus-
tai ned unl ess i t was justi fi ed by suffi ci entl y i mportant state i nter-
ests and was cl osel y tai l ored to effectuate onl y those i nterests.
20
Two i nterests were offered that the Court was wi l l i ng to accept as
l egi ti mate and substanti al : requi ri ng permi ssi on under the ci r-
cumstances furni shed an opportuni ty to counsel appl i cants on the
necessi ty of ful fi l l i ng support obl i gati ons, and the process protected
the wel fare of chi l dren who needed support, ei ther by provi di ng an
i ncenti ve to make support payments or by preventi ng appl i cants
from i ncurri ng new obl i gati ons through marri age. The fi rst i nterest
was not served, the Court found, there bei ng no provi si on for coun-
sel i ng and no authori zati on of permi ssi on to marry once counsel i ng
had taken pl ace. The second i nterest was found not to be effec-
tuated by the means. Al ternati ve devi ces to col l ect support exi sted,
the process si mpl y prevented marri age wi thout del i veri ng any
money to the chi l dren, and i t si ngl ed out obl i gati ons i ncurred
through marri age wi thout reachi ng any other obl i gati ons.
Other restri cti ons that rel ate to the i nci dents of or pre-
requi si tes for marri age were careful l y di sti ngui shed by the Court
as nei ther enti tl ed to ri gorous scruti ny nor put i n jeopardy by the
deci si on.
21
For exampl e, i n Califano v. J obst,
22
a unani mous Court
sustai ned a Soci al Securi ty provi si on that revoked di sabl ed depend-
ents benefi ts of any person who marri ed, except when the person
marri ed someone who was al so enti tl ed to recei ve di sabl ed depend-
ents benefi ts. Pl ai nti ff, a reci pi ent of such benefi ts, marri ed some-
one who was al so di sabl ed but not qual i fi ed for the benefi ts, and
hi s benefi ts were termi nated. He sued, al l egi ng that di sti ngui shi ng
between cl asses of persons who marri ed el i gi bl e persons and who
marri ed i nel i gi bl e persons i nfri nged upon hi s ri ght to marry. The
Court rejected the argument, fi ndi ng that benefi t enti tl ement was
not based upon need but rather upon actual dependency upon the
i nsured wage earner; marri age, Congress coul d have assumed, gen-
eral l y termi nates the dependency upon a parent-wage earner.
Therefore, i t was permi ssi bl e as an admi ni strati ve conveni ence to
make marri age the termi nati ng poi nt but to make an excepti on
1916
23
I d. at 54. See also Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976) (provi si on gi v-
i ng benefi ts to a marri ed woman under 62 wi th dependent chi l dren i n her care
whose husband reti res or becomes di sabl ed but denyi ng them to a di vorced woman
under 62 wi th dependents represents a rati onal judgment by Congress wi th respect
to l i kel y dependency of marri ed but not di vorced women and does not deny equal
protecti on); Cal i fano v. Bol es, 443 U.S. 282 (1979) (l i mi tati on of certai n Soci al Secu-
ri ty benefi ts to wi dows and di vorced wi ves of wage earners does not depri ve mother
of i l l egi ti mate chi l d who was never marri ed to wage earner of equal protecti on).
24
See, e.g., Qui l l oi n v. Wal cott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (States gi vi ng to father of
l egi ti mate chi l d who i s di vorced or separated from mother whi l e denyi ng to father
of i l l egi ti mate chi l d a veto over the adopti on of the chi l d by another does not under
the ci rcumstances deny equal protecti on. The ci rcumstances were that the father
never exerci sed custody over the chi l d or shoul dered responsi bi l i ty for hi s super-
vi si on, educati on, protecti on, or care, al though he had made some support payments
and gi ven hi m presents). Accord, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
25
San Antoni o School Di st. v. Rodri guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
26
351 U.S. 12 (1956). The opi ni on of the court was joi ned by Justi ces Bl ack,
Dougl as, and Cl ark, and Chi ef Justi ce Warren. Justi ce Frankfurter concurred. I d.
at 20. Justi ces Burton, Mi nton, Reed, and Harl an di ssented. I d. at 26, 29.
when both marri age partners were recei vi ng benefi ts, as a means
of l esseni ng hardshi p and recogni zi ng that dependency was l i kel y
to conti nue. The marri age rul e was therefore not to be stri ctl y scru-
ti ni zed or i nval i dated si mpl y because some persons who mi ght
otherwi se have marri ed were deterred by the rul e or because some
who di d marry were burdened thereby.
23
I t seems obvi ous, therefore, that the determi nati on of marri age
and fami l i al rel ati onshi ps as fundamental wi l l be a frui tful begi n-
ni ng of l i ti gati on i n the equal protecti on area.
24
Poverty and Fundamental Interests: The Intersection of Due
Process and Equal Protection
General l y. Whatever may be the status of weal th di sti nc-
ti ons per se as a suspect cl assi fi cati on,
25
there i s no doubt that
when the cl assi fi cati on affects some area characteri zed as or con-
si dered to be fundamental i n nature i n the structure of our pol i ty
the abi l i ty of cri mi nal defendants to obtai n fai r treatment through-
out the system, the ri ght to vote, to name two exampl es then the
cl assi fyi ng body bears a substanti al burden i n justi fyi ng what i t
has done. The cases begi n wi th Griffin v. I llinois,
26
surel y one of
the most semi nal cases i n modern consti tuti onal l aw. There, the
State condi ti oned ful l di rect appel l ate revi ew, revi ew as to whi ch
al l convi cted defendants were enti tl ed, on the furni shi ng of a bi l l
of excepti ons or report of the tri al proceedi ngs, i n the preparati on
of whi ch the stenographi c transcri pt of the tri al was usual l y essen-
ti al . Onl y i ndi gent defendants sentenced to death were furni shed
free transcri pts; al l other convi cted defendants had to pay a fee to
obtai n them. I n cri mi nal tri al s, Justi ce Bl ack wrote i n the pl ural -
i ty opi ni on, a State can no more di scri mi nate on account of pov-
1917
27
I d. at 17, 18, 19. Al though Justi ce Bl ack was not expl i ci t, i t seems cl ear that
the system was found to vi ol ate both the due process and the equal protecti on
cl auses. Justi ce Frankfurters concurrence deal t more expressl y wi th the premi se of
the Bl ack opi ni on. I t does not face actual i ty to suggest that I l l i noi s affords every
convi cted person, fi nanci al l y competent or not, the opportuni ty to take an appeal ,
and that i t i s not I l l i noi s that i s responsi bl e for di spari ty i n materi al ci rcumstances.
Of course, a State need not equal i ze economi c condi ti ons. . . . But when a State
deems i t wi se and just that convi cti ons be suscepti bl e to revi ew by an appel l ate
court, i t cannot by force of i ts exacti ons draw a l i ne whi ch precl udes convi cted i ndi -
gent persons, forsooth erroneousl y convi cted, from securi ng such a revi ew merel y by
di sabl i ng them from bri ngi ng to the noti ce of an appel l ate tri bunal errors of the tri al
court whi ch woul d upset the convi cti on were practi cal opportuni ty for revi ew not
forecl osed. I d. at 23.
28
372 U.S. 353 (1963). Justi ce Cl ark di ssented, protesti ng the Courts new fet-
i sh for i ndi gency, i d. at 358, 359, and Justi ces Harl an and Stewart di ssented. I d.
at 360.
29
I d. at 35758.
erty than on account of rel i gi on, race, or col or. Whi l e the State
was not obl i gated to provi de an appeal at al l , when i t does so i t
may not structure i ts system i n a way that di scri mi nates agai nst
some convi cted defendants on account of thei r poverty. The sys-
tems faul t was that i t treated defendants wi th money di fferentl y
than i t treated defendants wi thout money. There can be no equal
justi ce where the ki nd of tri al a man gets depends on the amount
of money he has.
27
The pri nci pl e of Griffin was extended i n Douglas v. Califor-
nia,
28
i n whi ch the court hel d to be a deni al of due process and
equal protecti on a system whereby i n the fi rst appeal as of ri ght
from a convi cti on counsel was appoi nted to represent i ndi gents onl y
i f the appel l ate court fi rst exami ned the record and determi ned
that counsel woul d be of advantage to the appel l ant. There i s l ack-
i ng that equal i ty demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where
the ri ch man, who appeal s as of ri ght, enjoys the benefi t of coun-
sel s exami nati on i nto the record, research of the l aw, and marshal -
l i ng of arguments on hi s behal f, whi l e the i ndi gent, al ready bur-
dened by a prel i mi nary determi nati on that hi s case i s wi thout
meri t, i s forced to shi ft for hi msel f.
29
From the begi nni ng, Justi ce Harl an opposed rel i ance on the
equal protecti on cl ause at al l , argui ng that a due process anal ysi s
was the proper cri teri on to fol l ow. I t i s sai d that a State cannot
di scri mi nate between the ri ch and the poor i n i ts system of cri mi -
nal appeal s. That statement of course commands support, but i t
hardl y sheds l i ght on the true character of the probl em confronti ng
us here. . . . Al l that I l l i noi s has done i s to fai l to al l evi ate the con-
sequences of di fferences i n economi c ci rcumstances that exi st whol -
l y apart from any state acti on. A fee system neutral on i ts face
was not a cl assi fi cati on forbi dden by the equal protecti on cl ause.
1918
30
Gri ffi n v. I l l i noi s, 351 U.S. 12, 34, 35 (1956).
31
Dougl as v. Cal i forni a, 372 U.S. 353, 361 (1963).
32
I d. at 36367.
33
Evi tts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 405 (1985) (hol di ng that due process requi res
that counsel provi ded for appeal s as of ri ght must be effecti ve).
34
Ri nal di v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966).
35
Draper v. Washi ngton, 372 U.S. 487, 496 (1963).
36
Burns v. Ohi o, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Dougl as v. Green, 363 U.S. 192 (1960).
[N]o economi c burden attendant upon the exerci se of a pri vi l ege
bears equal l y upon al l , and i n other ci rcumstances the resul ti ng
di fferenti ati on i s not treated as an i nvi di ous cl assi fi cati on by the
State, even though di scri mi nati on agai nst i ndi gents by name
woul d be unconsti tuti onal .
30
As he protested i n Douglas: The
States, of course, are prohi bi ted by the Equal Protecti on Cl ause
from di scri mi nati ng between ri ch and poor as such i n the formu-
l ati on and appl i cati on of thei r l aws. But i t i s a far di fferent thi ng
to suggest that thi s provi si on prevents the State from adopti ng a
l aw of general appl i cabi l i ty that may affect the poor more harshl y
than i t does the ri ch, or, on the other hand, from maki ng some ef-
fort to redress economi c i mbal ances whi l e not el i mi nati ng them en-
ti rel y.
31
Due process furni shed the standard, Justi ce Harl an fel t, for de-
termi ni ng whether fundamental fai rness had been deni ed. Where
an appeal was barred al together by the i mposi ti on of a fee, the l i ne
mi ght have been crossed to unfai rness, but on the whol e he di d not
see that a system whi ch merel y recogni zed di fferences between and
among economi c cl asses, whi ch as i n Douglas made an effort to
amel i orate the fact of the di fferences by provi di ng appel l ate scru-
ti ny of cases of ri ght, was a system whi ch deni ed due process.
32
The Court has rei terated that both due process and equal pro-
tecti on concerns are i mpl i cated by restri cti ons on i ndi gents exer-
ci se of the ri ght of appeal . I n cases l i ke Griffin and Douglas, due
process concerns were i nvol ved because the States i nvol ved had set
up a system of appeal s as of ri ght but had refused to offer each de-
fendant a fai r opportuni ty to obtai n an adjudi cati on on the meri ts
of hi s appeal . Equal protecti on concerns were i nvol ved because the
State treated a cl ass of defendants i ndi gent ones di fferentl y for
purposes of offeri ng them a meani ngful appeal .
33
Cri mi nal Procedure. [I ]t i s now fundamental that, once es-
tabl i shed . . . avenues [of appel l ate revi ew] must be kept free of
unreasoned di sti ncti ons that can onl y i mpede open and equal ac-
cess to the courts.
34
I n al l cases the duty of the State i s to pro-
vi de the i ndi gent as adequate and effecti ve an appel l ate revi ew as
that gi ven appel l ants wi th funds. . . .
35
No State may condi ti on
the ri ght to appeal
36
or the ri ght to fi l e a peti ti on for habeas cor-
1919
37
Smi th v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
38
Gri ffi n v. I l l i noi s, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Eskri dge v. Washi ngton State Bd. of
Pri son Terms & Parol es, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (unconsti tuti onal to condi ti on free
transcri pt upon tri al judges certi fi cati on that justi ce wi l l thereby be promoted);
Draper v. Washi ngton, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (unconsti tuti onal to condi ti on free tran-
scri pt upon judges certi fi cati on that the al l egati ons of error were not fri vol ous);
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (unconsti tuti onal to deny free transcri pt upon
determi nati on of publ i c defender that appeal was i n vai n); Long v. Di stri ct Court,
385 U.S. 192 (1966) (i ndi gent pri soner enti tl ed to free transcri pt of hi s habeas cor-
pus proceedi ng for use on appeal of adverse deci si on therei n); Gardner v. Cal i forni a,
393 U.S. 367 (1969) (on fi l i ng of new habeas corpus peti ti on i n appel l ate court upon
an adverse nonappeal abl e habeas rul i ng i n a l ower court where transcri pt was need-
ed, one must be provi ded an i ndi gent pri soner). See also Ri nal di v. Yeager, 384 U.S.
305 (1966). For i nstances i n whi ch a transcri pt was hel d not to be needed, see Bri tt
v. North Carol i na, 404 U.S. 266 (1971); Uni ted States v. MacCol l om, 426 U.S. 317
(1976).
39
Wi l l i ams v. Okl ahoma Ci ty, 395 U.S. 458 (1969); Mayer v. Ci ty of Chi cago,
404 U.S. 189 (1971).
40
Dougl as v. Cal i forni a, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Swenson v. Bosl er, 386 U.S. 258
(1967); Anders v. Cal i forni a, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Entsmi nger v. I owa, 386 U.S. 748
(1967). A rul e requi ri ng a court-appoi nted appel l ate counsel to fi l e a bri ef expl ai ni ng
reasons why he concl udes that a cl i ents appeal i s fri vol ous does not vi ol ate the cl i -
ents ri ght to assi stance of counsel on appeal . McCoy v. Court of Appeal s, 486 U.S.
429 (1988). The ri ght i s vi ol ated i f the court al l ows counsel to wi thdraw by merel y
certi fyi ng that the appeal i s meri tl ess wi thout al so fi l i ng an Anders bri ef support-
i ng the certi fi cati on. Penson v. Ohi o, 488 U.S. 75 (1988). On the other hand, si nce
there i s no consti tuti onal ri ght to counsel for i ndi gent pri soners seeki ng
postconvi cti on col l ateral rel i ef, there i s no requi rement that wi thdrawal be justi fi ed
i n an Anders bri ef i f a state has provi ded counsel for postconvi cti on proceedi ngs.
Pennsyl vani a v. Fi nl ey, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (counsel advi sed the court that there
were no arguabl e bases for col l ateral rel i ef).
41
Evi tts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
pus
37
or other form of postconvi cti on rel i ef upon the payment of a
docketi ng fee or some other type of fee when the peti ti oner has no
means to pay. Si mi l arl y, al though the States are not requi red to
furni sh ful l and compl ete transcri pts of thei r tri al s to i ndi gents
when exerpted versi ons or some other adequate substi tute i s avai l -
abl e, i f a transcri pt i s necessary to adequate revi ew of a convi cti on,
ei ther on appeal or through procedures for postconvi cti on rel i ef, the
transcri pt must be provi ded to i ndi gent defendants or to others un-
abl e to pay.
38
Thi s ri ght may not be deni ed by drawi ng a fel ony-
mi sdemeanor di sti ncti on or by l i mi ti ng i t to those cases i n whi ch
confi nement i s the penal ty.
39
A defendants ri ght to counsel i s to
be protected as wel l as the si mi l ar ri ght of the defendant wi th
funds.
40
The ri ght to counsel on appeal necessari l y means the ri ght
to effective assi stance of counsel .
41
But, deci di ng a poi nt l eft unresol ved i n Douglas, the Court
hel d that nei ther the due process nor the equal protecti on cl ause
requi red a State to furni sh counsel to a convi cted defendant seek-
i ng, after he had exhausted hi s appeal s of ri ght, to obtai n di scre-
ti onary revi ew of hi s case i n the States hi gher courts or i n the
Uni ted States Supreme Court. Due process fai rness does not re-
1920
42
Ross v. Moffi tt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). See also Ful l er v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40
(1974) (statute provi di ng, under ci rcumscri bed condi ti ons, that i ndi gent defendant,
who recei ves state-compensated counsel and other assi stance for hi s defense, who
i s convi cted, and who subsequentl y becomes abl e to repay costs, must rei mburse
State for costs of hi s defense i n no way operates to deny hi m assi stance of counsel
or the equal protecti on of the l aws).
43
Murray v. Gi arratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (uphol di ng Vi rgi ni as system under
whi ch uni t attorneys assi gned to pri sons are avai l abl e for some advi ce pri or to the
fi l i ng of a cl ai m, and a personal attorney i s assi gned i f an i nmate succeeds i n fi l i ng
a peti ti on wi th at l east one non-fri vol ous cl ai m).
44
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
45
Younger v. Gi l more, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Bounds v. Smi th, 430 U.S. 817
(1977).
46
399 U.S. 235 (1970).
47
401 U.S. 395 (1971). The Court has not yet treated a case i n whi ch the per-
mi ssi bl e sentence i s $30 or 30 days or some si mi l ar form where ei ther confi nement
or a fi ne wi l l sati sfy the States penal pol i cy.
qui re that after an appeal has been provi ded the State must al ways
provi de counsel to i ndi gents at every stage. Unfai rness resul ts
onl y i f i ndi gents are si ngl ed out by the State and deni ed meani ng-
ful access to that system because of thei r poverty. That essenti al l y
equal protecti on i ssue was deci ded agai nst the defendant i n the
context of an appel l ate system i n whi ch one appeal coul d be taken
as of ri ght to an i ntermedi ate court, wi th counsel provi ded i f nec-
essary, and i n whi ch further appeal s mi ght be granted not pri -
mari l y upon any concl usi on about the resul t bel ow but upon consi d-
erati ons of si gni fi cant i mportance.
42
Not even death row i nmates
have a consti tuti onal ri ght to an attorney to prepare a peti ti on for
col l ateral rel i ef i n state court.
43
Thi s ri ght to l egal assi stance, especi al l y i n the context of the
consti tuti onal ri ght to the wri t of habeas corpus, means that i n the
absence of other adequate assi stance, as through a functi oni ng pub-
l i c defender system, a State may not deny pri soners l egal assi st-
ance of another i nmate
44
and i t must make avai l abl e certai n mi ni -
mal l egal materi al s.
45
The Cri mi nal Sentence. A convi cted defendant may not be
i mpri soned sol el y because of hi s i ndi gency. Williams v. I llinois
46
hel d that i t was a deni al of equal protecti on for a State to extend
the term of i mpri sonment of a convi cted defendant beyond the stat-
utory maxi mum provi ded because he was unabl e to pay the fi ne
whi ch was al so l evi ed upon convi cti on. And Tate v. Short
47
hel d
that i n si tuati ons i n whi ch no term of confi nement i s prescri bed for
an offense but onl y a fi ne, the court may not jai l persons who can-
not pay the fi ne, unl ess i t i s i mpossi bl e to devel op an al ternati ve,
such as i nstal l ment payments or fi nes scal ed to abi l i ty to pay. Wi l l -
ful refusal to pay may, however, be puni shed by confi nement.
1921
48
383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). The pol l tax requi red to be pai d as a condi ti on of
voti ng was $1.50 annual l y. Justi ces Bl ack, Harl an, and Stewart di ssented. I d. at
670, 680.
49
I d. at 668. The Court observed that the ri ght to vote i s too preci ous, too fun-
damental to be so burdened or condi ti oned. I d. at 670.
50
405 U.S. 134 (1972).
51
Lubi n v. Pani sh, 415 U.S. 709 (1974). Note that the Court i ndi cated that Bul-
lock was deci ded on the basi s of restrai ned revi ew. I d. at 715.
52
Bearden v. Georgi a, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
Voti ng. Treatment of i ndi gency i n a ci vi l type of fundamen-
tal i nterest anal ysi s came i n Harper v. Virginia Board of Elec-
tions,
48
i n whi ch i t was hel d that a State vi ol ates the Equal Pro-
tecti on Cl ause . . . whenever i t makes the affl uence of the voter or
payment of any fee an el ectoral standard. Voter qual i fi cati ons have
no rel ati on to weal th nor to payi ng or not payi ng thi s or any other
tax. The Court emphasi zed both the fundamental i nterest i n the
ri ght to vote and the suspect character of weal th cl assi fi cati ons.
[W]e must remember that the i nterest of the State, when i t comes
to voti ng, i s l i mi ted to the power to fi x qual i fi cati ons. Weal th, l i ke
race, creed, or col or, i s not germane to ones abi l i ty to parti ci pate
i ntel l i gentl y i n the el ectoral process. Li nes drawn on the basi s of
weal th or property, l i ke those of race . . . are tradi ti onal l y
di sfavored.
49
The two factors cl assi fi cati on i n effect al ong weal th l i nes and
adverse effect upon the exerci se of the franchi se were ti ed to-
gether i n Bullock v. Carter
50
i n whi ch the setti ng of hi gh fi l i ng fees
for certai n offi ces was struck down upon anal ysi s by a stri cter
standard than the tradi ti onal equal protecti on standard but appar-
entl y a somewhat l esser standard than the compel l i ng state i nter-
est test. The Court hel d that the hi gh fi l i ng fees were not rati onal l y
rel ated to the States i nterest i n al l owi ng onl y seri ous candi dates
on the bal l ot si nce some seri ous candi dates coul d not pay the fees
whi l e some fri vol ous candi dates coul d and that the State coul d not
fi nance the costs of hol di ng the el ecti ons from the fees when the
voters were thereby depri ved of thei r opportuni ty to vote for can-
di dates of thei r preferences.
Extendi ng Bullock, the Court has hel d i t i mpermi ssi bl e for a
State to deny i ndi gents, and presumabl y other persons unabl e to
pay fi l i ng fees, a pl ace on the bal l ot for fai l ure to pay fi l i ng fees,
however reasonabl e i n the abstract the fees may be. A State must
provi de such persons a reasonabl e al ternati ve for getti ng on the
bal l ot.
51
Si mi l arl y, a sentenci ng court i n revoki ng probati on must
consi der al ternati ves to i ncarcerati on i f the reason for revocati on i s
the i nabi l i ty of the i ndi gent to pay a fi ne or resti tuti on.
52
1922
53
401 U.S. 371 (1971).
54
409 U.S. 434 (1973).
55
I d. at 44346. The equal protecti on argument was rejected by uti l i zi ng the
tradi ti onal standard of revi ew, bankruptcy l egi sl ati on bei ng pl aced i n the area of ec-
onomi cs and soci al wel fare, and the use of fees to create a sel f-sustai ni ng bank-
ruptcy system bei ng consi dered to be a rati onal basi s. Di ssenti ng, Justi ce Stewart
Access to Courts. I n Boddie v. Connecticut,
53
Justi ce Harl an
carri ed a majori ty of the Court wi th hi m i n uti l i zi ng a due process
anal ysi s to eval uate the consti tuti onal i ty of a States fi l i ng fees i n
di vorce acti ons whi ch a group of wel fare assi stance reci pi ents at-
tacked as preventi ng them from obtai ni ng di vorces. The Court
found that when the State monopol i zed the avenues to a paci fi c
settl ement of a di spute over a fundamental matter such as mar-
ri age onl y the State coul d termi nate the mari tal status then i t
deni ed due process by i nfl exi bl y i mposi ng fees whi ch kept some
persons from usi ng that avenue. Justi ce Harl ans opi ni on averred
that a faci al l y neutral l aw or pol i cy whi ch di d i n fact depri ve an
i ndi vi dual of a protected ri ght woul d be hel d i nval i d even though
as a general proposi ti on i ts enforcement served a l egi ti mate gov-
ernmental i nterest. The opi ni on concl uded wi th a cauti oni ng obser-
vati on that the case was not to be taken as establ i shi ng a general
ri ght to access to the courts.
The Boddie opi ni on l eft unsettl ed whether a l i ti gants i nterest
i n judi ci al access to effect a paci fi c settl ement of some di spute was
an i nterest enti tl ed to some measure of consti tuti onal protecti on as
a val ue of i ndependent worth or whether a l i ti gant must be seeki ng
to resol ve a matter i nvol vi ng a fundamental i nterest i n the onl y
forum i n whi ch any resol uti on was possi bl e. Subsequent deci si ons
establ i shed that the l atter answer was the choi ce of the Court. I n
United States v. Kras,
54
the Court hel d that the i mposi ti on of fi l i ng
fees whi ch bl ocked the access of an i ndi gent to a di scharge of hi s
debts i n bankruptcy deni ed the i ndi gent nei ther due process nor
equal protecti on. The mari tal rel ati onshi p i n Boddie was a fun-
damental i nterest, the Court sai d, and upon i ts di ssol uti on de-
pended associ ati onal i nterests of great i mportance; however, an i n-
terest i n the el i mi nati on of the burden of debt and i n obtai ni ng a
new start i n l i fe, whi l e i mportant, di d not ri se to the same consti tu-
ti onal l evel as marri age. Moreover, a debtors access to rel i ef i n
bankruptcy had not been monopol i zed by the government to the
same degree as di ssol uti on of a marri age; one may, i n theory, and
often i n actual i ty, manage to resol ve the i ssue of hi s debts by
some other means, such as negoti ati on. Whi l e the al ternati ves i n
many cases, such as Kras, seem barel y l i kel y of successful pursui t,
the Court seemed to be suggesti ng that absol ute precl usi on was a
necessary el ement before a ri ght of access coul d be consi dered.
55
1923
argued that Boddie requi red a di fferent resul t, deni ed that absol ute precl usi on of
al ternati ves was necessary, and woul d have eval uated the i mportance of an i nterest
asserted rather than provi di ng that i t need be fundamental . I d. at 451. Justi ce Mar-
shal l s di ssent was premi sed on an asserted consti tuti onal ri ght to be heard i n court,
a consti tuti onal ri ght of access regardl ess of the i nterest i nvol ved. I d. at 458. Jus-
ti ces Dougl as and Brennan concurred i n Justi ce Stewarts di ssent, as i ndeed di d
Justi ce Marshal l .
56
Ortwei n v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973). The di vi si on was the same 5-to4
that prevai l ed i n Kras. See also Li ndsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). But cases
i nvol vi ng the Boddie pri nci pl e do conti nue to ari se. Li ttl e v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1
(1981) (i n paterni ty sui t that State requi red compl ai nant to i ni ti ate, i ndi gent de-
fendant enti tl ed to have State pay for essenti al bl ood groupi ng test); Lassi ter v. De-
partment of Soci al Servi ces, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (recogni zi ng general ri ght of ap-
poi nted counsel i n i ndi gent parents when State seeks to termi nate parental status,
but usi ng bal anci ng test to determi ne that ri ght was not present i n thi s case).
57
411 U.S. 1 (1973). The opi ni on by Justi ce Powel l was concurred i n by the
Chi ef Justi ce and Justi ces Stewart, Bl ackmun, and Rehnqui st. Justi ces Dougl as,
Brennan, Whi te, and Marshal l di ssented. I d. at 62, 63, 70.
58
I d. at 4455. Appl yi ng the rati onal justi fi cati on test, Justi ce Whi te woul d
have found that the system di d not use means rati onal l y rel ated to the end sought
to be achi eved. I d. at 63.
Subsequentl y, on the i ni ti al appeal papers and wi thout heari ng
oral argument, the Court summari l y uphel d the appl i cati on to
i ndi gents of fi l i ng fees that i n effect precl uded them from appeal i ng
deci si ons of a state admi ni strati ve agency reduci ng or termi nati ng
publ i c assi stance.
56
Educati onal Opportuni ty. Maki ng even cl earer i ts ap-
proach i n de facto weal th cl assi fi cati on cases, the Court i n San An-
tonio School District v. Rodriguez
57
rebuffed an i ntensi ve effort
wi th wi despread support i n l ower court deci si ons to i nval i date the
system preval ent i n 49 of the 50 States of fi nanci ng school s pri -
mari l y out of property taxes, wi th the consequent effect that the
funds avai l abl e to l ocal school boards wi thi n each state were wi del y
di vergent. Pl ai nti ffs had sought to bri ng thei r case wi thi n the stri ct
scruti ny compel l i ng state i nterest doctri ne of equal protecti on re-
vi ew by cl ai mi ng that under the tax system there resul ted a de
facto weal th cl assi fi cati on that was suspect or that educati on was
a fundamental ri ght and the di spari ty i n educati onal fi nanci ng
coul d not therefore be justi fi ed. The Court hel d, however, that
there was nei ther a suspect cl assi fi cati on nor a fundamental i nter-
est i nvol ved, that the system must be judged by the tradi ti onal re-
strai ned standard, and that the system was rati onal l y rel ated to
the States i nterest i n protecti ng and promoti ng l ocal control of
educati on.
58
I mportant as the resul t of the case i s, the doctri nal i mpl i ca-
ti ons are far more i mportant. The attempted denomi nati on of
weal th as a suspect cl assi fi cati on fai l ed on two l evel s. Fi rst, the
Court noted that pl ai nti ffs had not i denti fi ed the cl ass of di s-
1924
59
I d. at 20. But see i d. at 70, 11724 (Justi ces Marshal l and Dougl as di ssent-
i ng).
60
I d. at 2939. But see i d. at 62 (Justi ce Brennan di ssenti ng), 70, 11017 (Jus-
ti ces Marshal l and Dougl as di ssenti ng).
advantaged poor i n such a manner as to further thei r argument.
That i s, the Court found that the exi stence of a cl ass of poor per-
sons, however defi ned, di d not correl ate wi th property-tax-poor di s-
tri cts; nei ther as an absol ute nor as a rel ati ve consi derati on di d i t
appear that tax-poor di stri cts contai ned greater numbers of poor
persons than di d property-ri ch di stri cts, except i n random i n-
stances. Second, the Court hel d, there must be an absol ute depri va-
ti on of some ri ght or i nterest rather than merel y a rel ati ve one be-
fore the depri vati on because of i nabi l i ty to pay wi l l bri ng i nto pl ay
stri ct scruti ny. The i ndi vi dual s, or groups of i ndi vi dual s, who con-
sti tuted the cl ass di scri mi nated agai nst i n our pri or cases shared
two di sti ngui shi ng characteri sti cs: because of thei r i mpecuni ty they
were compl etel y unabl e to pay for some desi red benefi t, and as a
consequence, they sustai ned an absol ute depri vati on of a meani ng-
ful opportuni ty to enjoy that benefi t.
59
No such cl ass had been
i denti fi ed here and more i mportantl y no one was bei ng absol utel y
deni ed an educati on; the argument was that i t was a l ower qual i ty
educati on than that avai l abl e i n other di stri cts. Even assumi ng
that to be the case, however, i t di d not create a suspect cl assi fi ca-
ti on.
Educati on i s an i mportant val ue i n our soci ety, the Court
agreed, bei ng essenti al to the effecti ve exerci se of freedom of ex-
pressi on and i ntel l i gent uti l i zati on of the ri ght to vote. But a ri ght
to educati on i s not expressl y protected by the Consti tuti on, conti n-
ued the Court, nor shoul d i t be i mpl i ed si mpl y because of i ts un-
doubted i mportance. The qual i ty of educati on i ncreases the effec-
ti veness of speech or the abi l i ty to make i nformed el ectoral choi ce
but the judi ci ary i s unabl e to determi ne what l evel of qual i ty woul d
be suffi ci ent. Moreover, the system under attack di d not deny edu-
cati onal opportuni ty to any chi l d, whatever the resul t i n that case
mi ght be; i t was attacked for provi di ng rel ati ve di fferences i n
spendi ng and those di fferences coul d not be correl ated wi th di f-
ferences i n educati onal qual i ty.
60
Rodriguez cl earl y promi sed judi ci al restrai nt i n eval uati ng
chal l enges to the provi si on of governmental benefi ts when the ef-
fect i s rel ati vel y di fferent because of the weal th of some of the re-
ci pi ents or potenti al reci pi ents and when the resul ts, what i s ob-
tai ned, vary i n rel ati ve degrees. Weal th or i ndi gency i s not a per
se suspect cl assi fi cati on but i t must be rel ated to some i nterest that
i s fundamental , and Rodriguez doctri nal l y i mposed a consi derabl e
1925
61
Cf. Pl yl er v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). The case i s al so noted for i ts propo-
si ti on that there were onl y two equal protecti on standards of revi ew, a proposi ti on
even the author of the opi ni on has now abandoned.
62
487 U.S. 450 (1988). Thi s was a 54 deci si on, wi th Justi ce OConnors opi ni on
of the Court bei ng joi ned by Chi ef Justi ce Rehnqui st and Justi ces Whi te, Scal i a, and
Kennedy, and wi th Justi ces Marshal l , Brennan, Stevens, and Bl ackmun di ssenti ng.
63
487 U.S. at 462. The pl ai nti ff chi l d nonethel ess conti nued to attend school ,
so the requi rement was revi ewed as an addi ti onal burden but not a compl ete obsta-
cl e to her educati on.
64
432 U.S. 464 (1977).
65
I d. at 47071.
66
I d. at 47174. See also Harri s v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 32223 (1980). Total
depri vati on was the theme of Boddie and was the basi s of concurrences by Justi ces
Stewart and Powel l i n Zabl ocki v. Redhai l , 434 U.S. 374, 391, 396 (1978), i n that
the State i mposed a condi ti on i ndi gents coul d not meet and made no excepti on for
them. The case al so emphasi zed that Dandri dge v. Wi l l i ams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970),
i mposed a rati onal basi s standard i n equal protecti on chal l enges to soci al wel fare
cases. But see Cal i fano v. Gol dfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), where the majori ty rejected
the di ssents argument that thi s shoul d al ways be the same.
barri er to the di scovery or creati on of addi ti onal fundamental i nter-
ests. As the deci si ons revi ewed earl i er wi th respect to marri age and
the fami l y reveal , that barri er has not hel d enti rel y fi rm, but wi th-
i n a range of i nterests, such as educati on,
61
the case remai ns
strongl y vi abl e. Rel yi ng on Rodriguez and di sti ngui shi ng Plyler, the
Court i n Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools
62
rejected an i ndi -
gent students equal protecti on chal l enge to a state statute permi t-
ti ng school di stri cts to charge a fee for school bus servi ce, i n the
process rejecti ng arguments that ei ther stri ct or hei ghtened
scruti ny i s appropri ate. Moreover, the Court concl uded, there i s no
consti tuti onal obl i gati on to provi de bus transportati on, or to pro-
vi de i t for free i f i t i s provi ded at al l .
63
Aborti on. Rodriguez furni shed the pri nci pal anal yti cal basi s
for the Courts subsequent deci si on i n Maher v. Roe,
64
hol di ng that
a States refusal to provi de publ i c assi stance for aborti ons that
were not medi cal l y necessary under a program that subsi di zed al l
medi cal expenses otherwi se associ ated wi th pregnancy and chi l d-
bi rth di d not deny to i ndi gent pregnant women equal protecti on of
the l aws. As i n Rodriguez, i t was hel d that the i ndi gent are not a
suspect cl ass.
65
Agai n, as i n Rodriguez and i n Kras, i t was hel d
that when the State has not monopol i zed the avenues for rel i ef and
the burden i s onl y rel ati ve rather than absol ute, a governmental
fai l ure to offer assi stance, whi l e fundi ng al ternati ve acti ons, i s not
undue governmental i nterference wi th a fundamental ri ght.
66
Ex-
pansi on of thi s area of the l aw of equal protecti on seems especi al l y
l i mi ted.
SECTI ON 2. Representati ves shal l be apporti oned among the
several States accordi ng to thei r respecti ve numbers, counti ng
1926
67
See generally J. JAMES, THE FRAMI NG OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(1956).
68
Saunders v. Wi l ki ns, 152 F.2d 235 (4th Ci r. 1945), cert. deni ed, 328 U.S. 870
(1946).
the whol e number of persons i n each State, excl udi ng I ndi ans
not taxed. But when the ri ght to vote at any el ecti on for the
choi ce of el ectors for Presi dent and Vi ce Presi dent of the Uni ted
States, Representati ves i n Congress, the Executi ve and Judi ci al
offi cers of a State, or the members of the Legi sl ature thereof,
i s deni ed to any of the mal e i nhabi tants of such State, bei ng
twenty-one years of age, and ci ti zens of the Uni ted States, or
i n any way abri dged, except for parti ci pati on i n rebel l i on, or
other cri me, the basi s of representati on therei n shal l be re-
duced i n the proporti on whi ch the number of such mal e ci ti zens
shal l bear to the whol e number of mal e ci ti zens twenty-one
years of age i n such State.
APPORTIONMENT OF REPRESENTATION
Wi th the abol i ti on of sl avery by the Thi rteenth Amendment,
the Afri can Ameri cans formerl y counted as three-fi fths of persons
woul d be ful l y counted i n the apporti onment of seats i n the House
of Representati ves, i ncreasi ng as wel l the el ectoral vote, there ap-
peared the prospect that pol i ti cal l y the readmi tted Southern States
woul d gai n the advantage i n Congress when combi ned wi th Demo-
crats from the North. I nasmuch as the South was adamantl y op-
posed to Afri can Ameri can suffrage, al l the congressmen woul d be
el ected by whi tes. Many wi shed to provi de for the enfranchi sement
of the Afri can Ameri can and proposal s to thi s effect were voted on
i n both the House and the Senate, but onl y a few Northern States
permi tted Afri can Ameri cans to vote and a seri es of referenda on
the questi on i n Northern States reveal ed substanti al whi te hos-
ti l i ty to the proposal . Therefore, a compromi se was worked out, to
effect a reducti on i n the representati on of any State whi ch di s-
cri mi nated agai nst mal es i n the franchi se.
67
No seri ous effort was ever made i n Congress to effectuate 2,
and the onl y judi ci al attempt was rebuffed.
68
Wi th subsequent con-
sti tuti onal amendments adopted and the uti l i zati on of federal coer-
1927
69
The secti on di d furni sh a basi s to Justi ce Harl an to argue that i nasmuch as
2 recogni zed a pri vi l ege to di scri mi nate subject onl y to the penal ty provi ded, the
Court was i n error i n appl yi ng 1 to questi ons rel ati ng to the franchi se. Compare
Oregon v. Mi tchel l , 400 U.S. 112, 152 (1970) (Justi ce Harl an concurri ng and di ssent-
i ng), with i d. at 229, 250 (Justi ce Brennan concurri ng and di ssenti ng). The l anguage
of the secti on recogni zi ng 21 as the usual mi ni mum voti ng age no doubt pl ayed
some part i n the Courts deci si on i n Oregon v. Mitchell as wel l . I t shoul d al so be
noted that the provi si on rel ati ng to I ndi ans not taxed i s apparentl y obsol ete now
i n l i ght of an Attorney General rul i ng that al l I ndi ans are subject to taxati on. 39
Op. Atty Gen. 518 (1940).
70
418 U.S. 24 (1974). Justi ces Marshal l , Dougl as, and Brennan di ssented. I d.
at 56, 86.
ci ve powers to enfranchi se persons, the secti on i s l i ttl e more than
an hi stori cal curi osi ty.
69
However, i n Richardson v. Ramirez,
70
the Court rel i ed upon
the i mpl i ed approval of di squal i fi cati on upon convi cti on of cri me to
uphol d a state l aw di squal i fyi ng convi cted fel ons for the franchi se
even after the servi ce of thei r terms. I t decl i ned to assess the state
i nterests i nvol ved and to eval uate the necessi ty of the rul e, hol di ng
rather that because of 2 the equal protecti on cl ause was si mpl y
i nappl i cabl e.
SECTI ON 3. No Person shal l be a Senator or Representati ve
i n Congress, or el ector of Presi dent and Vi ce Presi dent, or hol d
any offi ce, ci vi l or mi l i tary, under the Uni ted States, or under
any State, who, havi ng previ ousl y taken an oath, as a member
of Congress, or as an offi cer of the Uni ted States, or as a mem-
ber of any State l egi sl ature, or as an executi ve or judi ci al offi -
cer of any State, to support the Consti tuti on of the Uni ted
States, shal l have engaged i n i nsurrecti on or rebel l i on agai nst
the same, or gi ven ai d or comfort to the enemi es thereof. But
congress may by a vote of two thi rds of each House, remove
such di sabi l i ty.
SECTI ON 4. The val i di ty of the publ i c debt of the Uni ted
States, authori zed by l aw, i ncl udi ng debts i ncurred for payment
of pensi ons and bounti es for servi ces i n suppressi ng i nsurrec-
ti on or rebel l i on, shal l not be questi oned. But nei ther the Uni t-
ed States nor any State shal l assume or pay any debt or obl i ga-
1928
71
E.g., and notabl y, the Pri vate Act of December 14, 1869, ch.1, 16 Stat. 607.
72
Ch. 193, 17 Stat. 142.
73
Act of June 6, 1898, ch. 389, 30 Stat. 432. Legi sl ati on by Congress provi di ng
for removal was necessary to gi ve effect to the prohi bi ti on of 3, and unti l removed
i n pursuance of such l egi sl ati on persons i n offi ce before promul gati on of the Four-
teenth Amendment conti nued to exerci se thei r functi ons l awful l y. Gri ffi ns Case, 11
Fed. Cas. 7 (C.C.D.Va. 1869) (No. 5815). Nor were persons who had taken part i n
the Ci vi l War and had been pardoned by the Presi dent before the adopti on of thi s
Amendment precl uded by thi s secti on from agai n hol di ng offi ce under the Uni ted
States. 18 Op. Atty Gen. 149 (1885). On the constructi on of engaged i n rebel l i on,
see Uni ted States v. Powel l , 27 Fed. Cas. 605 (C.C.D.N.C. 1871) (No. 16,079).
74
Perry v. Uni ted States, 294 U.S. 330, 354 (1935), i n whi ch the Court con-
cl uded that the Joi nt Resol uti on of June 5, 1933, i nsofar as i t attempted to overri de
the gol d-cl ause obl i gati on i n a Fourth Li berty Loan Gol d Bond went beyond the
congressi onal power. On a Confederate bond probl em, see Branch v. Haas, 16 F.
53 (C.C.M.D. Al a. 1883) (ci ti ng Hanauer v. Woodruff, 82 U.S. (15 Wal l .) 439 (1873),
and Thori ngton v. Smi th, 75 U.S. (8 Wal l .) 1 (1869)). See also The Pi etro
Campanel l a, 73 F. Supp. 18 (D. Md. 1947).
ti on i ncurred i n ai d of i nsurrecti on or rebel l i on agai nst the
Uni ted States, or any cl ai m for the l oss or emanci pati on of any
sl ave; but al l such debts, obl i gati ons and cl ai ms shal l be hel d
i l l egal and voi d.
DISQUALIFICATION AND PUBLIC DEBT
The ri ght to remove di sabi l i ti es i mposed by thi s secti on was ex-
erci sed by Congress at di fferent ti mes on behal f of enumerated i n-
di vi dual s.
71
I n 1872, the di sabi l i ti es were removed, by a bl anket
act, from al l persons except Senators and Representati ves of the
Thi rty-si xth and Thi rty-seventh Congresses, offi cers i n the judi ci al ,
mi l i tary and naval servi ce of the Uni ted States, heads of depart-
ments, and forei gn mi ni sters of the Uni ted States.
72
Twenty-si x
years l ater, Congress enacted that the di sabi l i ty i mposed by sec-
ti on 3 . . . i ncurred heretofore, i s hereby removed.
73
Al though 4 was undoubtedl y i nspi red by the desi re to put
beyond questi on the obl i gati ons of the Government i ssued duri ng
the Ci vi l War, i ts l anguage i ndi cates a broader connotati on. . . .
[T]he val i di ty of the publ i c debt. . . [embraces] whatever concerns
the i ntegri ty of the publ i c obl i gati ons, and appl i es to government
bonds i ssued after as wel l as before adopti on of the Amendment.
74
SECTI ON 5. The Congress shal l have power to enforce, by
appropri ate l egi sl ati on, the provi si ons of thi s arti cl e.
ENFORCEMENT
General l y. I n the aftermath of the Ci vi l War, Congress, i n
addi ti on to proposi ng to the States the Thi rteenth, Fourteenth, and
1929
75
Ci vi l Ri ghts Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; the Enforcement Act of 1870,
ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; Act of February 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433; the Ku Kl ux
Kl an Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; Ci vi l Ri ghts Act of 1875; 18 Stat. 335. The
modern provi si ons survi vi ng of these statutes are 18 U.S.C. 241, 242, 42 U.S.C.
198183, 19851986, and 28 U.S.C. 1343. Two l esser statutes were the Sl ave
Ki dnappi ng Act of 1866, ch. 86, 14 Stat. 50, and the Peonage Abol i ti on Act, ch. 187,
14 Stat. 546, 18 U.S.C. 158188, and 42 U.S.C. 1994.
76
See generally R. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTI ON OF CI VI L RI GHTS: QUEST FOR A
SWORD (1947).
77
For cases under 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242 i n thei r previ ous codi fi cati ons, see
Uni ted States v. Mosl ey, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); Uni ted States v. Gradwel l , 243 U.S.
476 (1917); Uni ted States v. Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220 (1918); Uni ted States v. Wheel -
er, 254 U.S. 281 (1920). The resurgence of the use of these statutes began wi th
Uni ted States v. Cl assi c, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), and Screws v. Uni ted States, 325 U.S.
91 (1945).
78
The 1957 and 1960 Acts pri mari l y concerned voti ng; the publ i c accommoda-
ti ons provi si ons of the 1964 Act and the housi ng provi si ons of the 1968 Act were
premi sed on the commerce power.
79
Uni ted States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966). The devel opment of congressi onal enforcement powers i n these cases
was paral l el ed by a si mi l ar expansi on of the enforcement powers of Congress wi th
regard to the Thi rteenth Amendment, Jones v. Al fred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968), supra, pp. 155455, and the Fi fteenth Amendment. South Carol i na v. Katz-
enbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), i nfra, pp. 194650.
80
82 Stat. 73, 18 U.S.C. 245. The statute has yet to recei ve i ts consti tuti onal
testi ng.
81
On the state acti on doctri ne i n the context of the di rect appl i cati on of 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra, pp. 17861802.
Fi fteenth Amendments, enacted seven statutes desi gned i n a vari -
ety of ways to i mpl ement the provi si ons of these Amendments.
75
Several of these l aws were general ci vi l ri ghts statutes whi ch
broadl y attacked raci al and other di scri mi nati on on the part of pri -
vate i ndi vi dual s and groups as wel l as by the States, but the Su-
preme Court decl ared unconsti tuti onal or rendered i neffecti ve prac-
ti cal l y al l of these l aws over the course of several years.
76
I n the
end, Reconstructi on was abandoned and wi th rare excepti ons no
cases were brought under the remai ni ng statutes unti l fai rl y re-
centl y.
77
Begi nni ng wi th the Ci vi l Ri ghts Act of 1957, however,
Congress general l y acted pursuant to i ts powers under the com-
merce cl ause
78
unti l Supreme Court deci si ons i ndi cated an expan-
si ve concept of congressi onal power under the Ci vi l War Amend-
ments,
79
whi ch cul mi nated i n broad provi si ons agai nst pri vate i n-
terference wi th ci vi l ri ghts i n the 1968 l egi sl ati on.
80
The story of
these years i s l argel y an account of the state acti on doctri ne i n
terms of i ts l i mi tati on on congressi onal powers;
81
l atel y, i t i s the
sti l l -unfol di ng hi story of the l esseni ng of the doctri ne combi ned
wi th a judi ci al vesti ng of di screti on i n Congress to rei nterpret the
scope and content of the ri ghts guaranteed i n these three consti tu-
ti onal amendments.
State Acti on. I n enforci ng by appropri ate l egi sl ati on the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees agai nst state deni al s, Congress
1930
82
Secti on 3 of the Ci vi l Ri ghts Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, 28 U.S.C. 1443. See
Vi rgi ni a v. Ri ves, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880); Strauder v. West Vi rgi ni a, 100 U.S. 303
(1880). The statute i s of l i mi ted uti l i ty because of the i nterpretati on pl aced on i t al -
most from the begi nni ng. Compare Georgi a v. Rachel , 384 U.S. 780 (1966), with Ci ty
of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
83
18 U.S.C. 241, 242. See Screws v. Uni ted States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Wi l -
l i ams v. Uni ted States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Uni ted States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966); Uni ted States v. Pri ce, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); Uni ted States v. Johnson, 390
U.S. 563 (1968).
84
42 U.S.C. 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see also 42 U.S.C.
1985(3), construed i n Gri ffi n v. Breckenri dge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
85
Ex parte Vi rgi ni a, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
86
Uni ted States v. Pri ce, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
87
Both 18 U.S.C. 242 and 42 U.S.C. 1983 contai n l anguage restri cti ng appl i -
cati on to depri vati ons under col or of state l aw, whereas 18 U.S.C. 241 l acks such
l anguage. The newest statute, 18 U.S.C. 245, contai ns, of course, no such l anguage.
On the meani ng of custom as used i n the under col or of phrase, see Adi ckes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
88
E.g., the probl em of speci fi c i ntent i n Screws v. Uni ted States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945), and Wi l l i ams v. Uni ted States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951), and the probl em of what
ri ght or pri vi l ege i s secured to a person by the Consti tuti on and l aws of the
Uni ted States, whi ch di vi ded the Court i n Uni ted States v. Wi l l i ams, 341 U.S. 70
(1951), and whi ch was resol ved i n Uni ted States v. Pri ce, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
89
18 Stat. 335, 1, 2.
90
109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court al so rejected the Thi rteenth Amendment founda-
ti on for the statute, a foundati on revi ved by Jones v. Al fred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968).
has the di screti on to adopt remedi al measures, such as authori zi ng
persons bei ng deni ed thei r ci vi l ri ghts i n state courts to remove
thei r cases to federal courts,
82
and to provi de cri mi nal
83
and
ci vi l
84
l i abi l i ty for state offi ci al s and agents
85
or persons associ ated
wi th them
86
who vi ol ate protected ri ghts. These statutory meas-
ures desi gned to el i mi nate di scri mi nati on under col or of l aw
87
present no probl ems of consti tuti onal foundati on, al though there
may wel l be other probl ems of appl i cati on.
88
But the Reconstruc-
ti on Congresses di d not stop wi th statutory i mpl ementati on of
ri ghts guaranteed agai nst state i nfri ngement, movi ng as wel l
agai nst pri vate i nterference.
Thus, i n the Ci vi l Ri ghts Act of 1875
89
Congress had pro-
scri bed pri vate raci al di scri mi nati on i n the admi ssi on to and use of
i nns, publ i c conveyances, theaters, and other pl aces of publ i c
amusement. The Civil Rights Cases
90
found thi s enactment to be
beyond Congress power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. I t
was observed that 1 was prohi bi tory onl y upon the States and di d
not reach pri vate conduct. Therefore, Congress power under 5 to
enforce 1 by appropri ate l egi sl ati on was hel d to be si mi l arl y l i m-
i ted. I t does not i nvest Congress wi th power to l egi sl ate upon sub-
jects whi ch are wi thi n the domai n of State l egi sl ati on; but to pro-
vi de modes of rel i ef agai nst State l egi sl ati on, or State acti on, of the
ki nd referred to. I t does not authori ze Congress to create a code of
1931
91
109 U.S. at 11. Justi ce Harl ans di ssent reasoned that Congress had the
power to protect ri ghts secured by the Fourteenth Amendment agai nst i nvasi on by
both state and pri vate acti on, but al so vi ewed pl aces of publ i c accommodati on as
servi ng a quasi -publ i c functi on whi ch sati sfi ed the state acti on requi rement i n any
event. I d. at 4648, 5657.
92
92 U.S. 542 (1876). The acti on was pursuant to 6 of the 1870 Enforcement
Act, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, the predecessor of 18 U.S.C. 241.
93
106 U.S. 629 (1883). The case hel d unconsti tuti onal a provi si on of 2 of the
1871 Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
94
See also Bal dwi n v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887); Hodges v. Uni ted States,
203 U.S. 1 (1906); Uni ted States v. Wheel er, 254 U.S. 281 (1920). Under the Fi f-
teenth Amendment, see James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903).
95
Uni ted States v. Crui kshank, 92 U.S. 542, 55253, 556 (1876). The ri ghts
whi ch the Court assumed the Uni ted States coul d protect agai nst pri vate i nter-
ference were the ri ght to peti ti on Congress for a redress of gri evances and the ri ght
to vote free of i nterference on raci al grounds i n a federal el ecti on.
96
Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Uni ted States v. Cl assi c, 313 U.S.
299 (1941).
97
Logan v. Uni ted States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
98
I n re Quarl es, 158 U.S. 532 (1895). See also Uni ted States v. Waddel l , 112
U.S. 76 (1884) (ri ght to homestead).
99
Uni ted States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Gri ffi n v. Breckenri dge, 403 U.S.
88 (1971).
100
341 U.S. 70 (1951).
muni ci pal l aw for the regul ati on of pri vate ri ghts; but to provi de
modes of redress agai nst the operati on of State l aws, and the ac-
ti on of State offi cers executi ve or judi ci al , when these are subver-
si ve of the fundamental ri ghts speci fi ed i n the amendment.
91
The
hol di ng i n thi s case had al ready been preceded by United States v.
Cruikshank
92
and by United States v. Harris
93
i n whi ch the Fed-
eral Government had prosecuted i ndi vi dual s for ki l l i ng and i njur-
i ng Afri can Ameri cans. The Amendment di d not i ncrease the power
of the Federal Government vi s-a-vi s i ndi vi dual s, the Court hel d,
onl y wi th regard to the States themsel ves.
94
Cruikshank di d, however, recogni ze a smal l category of federal
ri ghts whi ch Congress coul d protect agai nst pri vate depri vati on,
ri ghts whi ch the Court vi ewed as deri vi ng parti cul arl y from ones
status as a ci ti zen of the Uni ted States and whi ch Congress had
a general pol i ce power to protect.
95
These ri ghts i ncl uded the ri ght
to vote i n federal el ecti ons, general and pri mary,
96
the ri ght to fed-
eral protecti on whi l e i n the custody of federal offi cers,
97
and the
ri ght to i nform federal offi ci al s of vi ol ati ons of federal l aw.
98
The
ri ght of i nterstate travel i s a basi c ri ght deri ved from the Federal
Consti tuti on whi ch Congress may protect.
99
I n United States v.
Williams,
100
i n the context of state acti on, the Court di vi ded four-
to-four over whether the predecessor of 18 U.S.C. 241 i n i ts ref-
erence to a ri ght or pri vi l ege secured . . . by the Consti tuti on or
l aws of the Uni ted States encompassed ri ghts guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, or was restri cted to those ri ghts whi ch
Congress can beyond doubt consti tuti onal l y secure agai nst i nter-
1932
101
383 U.S. 787 (1966) (due process cl ause).
102
383 U.S. 745 (1966) (equal protecti on cl ause).
103
Justi ce Brennans opi ni on, i d. at 774, was joi ned by Chi ef Justi ce Warren
and Justi ce Dougl as. Hi s statement that [a] majori ty of the members of the Court
expresses the vi ew today that 5 empowers Congress to enact l aws puni shi ng all
conspi raci es to i nterfere wi th the exerci se of Fourteenth Amendment ri ghts, whether
or not state offi cers or others acti ng under the col or of state l aw are i mpl i cated i n
the conspi racy, i d. at 782 (emphasi s by the Justi ce), was based upon the l anguage
of Justi ce Cl ark, joi ned by Justi ces Bl ack and Fortas, i d. at 761, that i nasmuch as
Justi ce Brennan reached the i ssue the three Justi ces were al so of the vi ew that
there now can be no doubt that the speci fi c l anguage of 5 empowers the Congress
to enact l aws puni shi ng al l conspi raci es wi th or wi thout state acti on that i nter-
fere wi th Fourteenth Amendment ri ghts. I d. at 762. I n the opi ni on of the Court,
Justi ce Stewart di scl ai med any i ntenti on of speaki ng of Congress power under 5.
I d. at 755.
104
I d. at 782.
ference by pri vate i ndi vi dual s. Thi s i ssue was agai n reached i n
United States v. Price
101
and United States v. Guest,
102
agai n i n
the context of state acti on, i n whi ch the Court concl uded that the
statute i ncl uded wi thi n i ts scope ri ghts guaranteed by the due
process and equal protecti on cl auses.
I nasmuch as both Price and Guest concerned conduct whi ch the
Court found i mpl i cated wi th suffi ci ent state acti on, i t di d not then
have to reach the questi on of 241s consti tuti onal i ty when appl i ed
to pri vate acti on i nterferi ng wi th ri ghts not the subject of a general
pol i ce power. But Justi ce Brennan, respondi ng to what he appar-
entl y i ntepreted as l anguage i n the opi ni on of the Court construi ng
Congress power under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to be l i m-
i ted by the state acti on requi rement, appended a l engthy state-
ment, whi ch a majori ty of the Justi ces joi ned, argui ng that Con-
gress power was broader.
103
Al though the Fourteenth Amend-
ment i tsel f . . . speaks to the State or to those acti ng under the
col or of i ts authori ty, l egi sl ati on protecti ng ri ghts created by that
Amendment, such as the ri ght to equal uti l i zati on of state faci l i ti es,
need not be confi ned to puni shi ng conspi raci es i n whi ch state offi -
cers parti ci pate. Rather, 5 authori zes Congress to make l aws that
i t concl udes are reasonabl y necessary to protect a ri ght created by
and ari si ng under that Amendment; and Congress i s thus ful l y em-
powered to determi ne that puni shment of pri vate conspi raci es
i nterferi ng wi th the exerci se of such a ri ght i s necessary to i ts ful l
protecti on.
104
The Justi ce throughout the opi ni on refers to Four-
teenth Amendment ri ghts, by whi ch he meant ri ghts whi ch, i n the
words of 18 U.S.C. 241, are secured . . . by the Consti tuti on,
i .e., by the Fourteenth Amendment through prohi bi tory words ad-
dressed onl y to governmental offi cers. Thus, the equal protecti on
cl ause commands that al l publ i c faci l i ti es owned or operated by or
on behal f of the State, be avai l abl e equal l y to al l persons; that ac-
1933
105
I d. at 77779, 784.
106
The ci vi l statute paral l el i ng the cri mi nal statute hel d unconsti tuti onal i n
Uni ted States v. Harri s, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), i s 42 U.S.C. 1985(3), si mi l arl y de-
ri ved from 2 of the 1871 Act, 17 Stat. 13, and i t too l acks a col or of l aw requi re-
ment. Thi s provi si on was read i nto i t i n Col l i ns v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951),
to avoi d what the Court then saw as a substanti al consti tuti onal probl em. I n Gri ffi n
v. Breckenri dge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), col or of l aw was read out of the statute. Whi l e
i t mi ght be di ffi cul t to concei ve of what mi ght consti tute a depri vati on of the equal
protecti on of the l aws by pri vate persons . . . there i s nothi ng i nherent i n the
phrase that requi res the acti on worki ng the depri vati on to come from the State.
I d. at 97. What the l anguage actual l y requi red, sai d the unani mous Court, was an
i ntent to depri ve of equal protecti on, or equal pri vi l eges and i mmuni ti es, means
that there must be some raci al , or perhaps otherwi se cl ass-based, i nvi di ousl y di s-
cri mi natory ani mus behi nd the conspi rators acti on. The conspi racy, i n other words,
must ai m at a depri vati on of the equal enjoyment of ri ghts secured by the l aw to
al l . I d. at 102. As so construed, the statute was hel d consti tuti onal as appl i ed i n
the compl ai nt before the Court on the basi s of the Thi rteenth Amendment and the
ri ght to travel ; there was no necessi ty therefore, to consi der Congress 5 powers.
I d. at 107.
The l ower courts are qui te di vi ded wi th respect to what consti tutes a nonrace,
cl ass-based ani mus wi thi n the requi si te for 1985(3) coverage and whether a pri -
vate conspi racy may be reached. See, e.g., Acti on v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Ci r.
1971); Dombrowski v. Dowl i ng, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Ci r. 1972); Great Ameri can Fed.
S. & L. Assn v. Novotny, 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Ci r. 1978) (en banc), revd, 442 U.S.
366 (1979); Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d 979 (5th Ci r. 1982) (en banc). The Supreme
Courts Novotny deci si on was based sol el y on statutory i nterpretati on and avoi ded
both questi ons, al though both Justi ces Powel l and Stevens woul d requi re a showi ng
of state acti on. 442 U.S. at 378, 381 (concurri ng).
107
109 U.S. 3, 1314 (1883).
cess i s a ri ght granted by the Consti tuti on, and 5 i s vi ewed as
a posi ti ve grant of l egi sl ati ve power, authori zi ng Congress to exer-
ci se i ts di screti on i n fashi oni ng remedi es to achi eve ci vi l and pol i ti -
cal equal i ty for al l ci ti zens. Wi thi n thi s di screti on i s the power to
determi ne that i n order adequatel y to protect the ri ght to equal uti -
l i zati on of state faci l i ti es, i t i s al so appropri ate to puni sh other i n-
di vi dual s who woul d deny such access.
105
I t i s not cl ear, fol l owi ng changes i n Court personnel and i n the
absence of defi ni ti ve adjudi cati on, whether thi s expansi on of Con-
gress power sti l l commands a majori ty of the Court.
106
I f the
Court adheres to the expansi on, i t i s not cl ear what the l i mi ts and
potenti al i ti es of the expansi on are, whether i t i s onl y wi th regard
to state faci l i ti es that Congress may reach pri vate i nterferi ng
conduct, and what ri ghts are reasonabl y and properl y encom-
passed wi thi n the concept of Fourteenth Amendment ri ghts.
Congressi onal Defi ni ti on of Fourteenth Amendment
Ri ghts. I n the Civil Rights Cases,
107
the Court observed that
the l egi sl ati on whi ch Congress i s authori zed to adopt i n thi s be-
hal f i s not general l egi sl ati on upon the ri ghts of the ci ti zen, but
correcti ve l egi sl ati on, that i s, l aws to counteract and overrul e
those state l aws whi ch 1 forbade the States to adopt. And the
Court was qui te cl ear that under i ts responsi bi l i ti es of judi ci al re-
1934
108
Cf. Marbury v. Madi son, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803).
109
383 U.S. 745, 783 and n.7 (1966) (concurri ng and di ssenti ng).
110
384 U.S. 641 (1966). Besi des the ground of deci si on di scussed here, Morgan
al so advanced an al ternati ve ground for uphol di ng the statute. That i s, Congress
mi ght have overri dden the state l aw not because the l aw i tsel f vi ol ated the equal
protecti on cl ause but because bei ng wi thout the vote meant the cl ass of persons was
subject to di scri mi natory state and l ocal treatment and gi vi ng these peopl e the bal -
l ot woul d afford a means of correcti ng that si tuati on. The statute therefore was an
appropri ate means to enforce the equal protecti on cl ause under necessary and prop-
er standards. I d. at 652653. A si mi l ar necessary and proper approach underl ay
South Carol i na v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), under the Fi fteenth Amend-
ments enforcement cl ause.
111
79 Stat. 439, 42 U.S.C. 1973b(e).
112
384 U.S. at 648.
113
Lassi ter v. Northampton County Bd. of El ecti ons, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
vi ew, i t was the body whi ch woul d determi ne that a state l aw was
i mpermi ssi bl e and that a federal l aw passed pursuant to 5 was
necessary and proper to enforce 1.
108
But i n United States v.
Guest,
109
Justi ce Brennan protested that thi s vi ew attri butes a far
too l i mi ted objecti ve to the Amendments sponsors, that i n fact the
pri mary purpose of the Amendment was to augment the power of
Congress, not the judi ci ary.
I n Katzenbach v. Morgan,
110
Justi ce Brennan, thi s ti me speak-
i ng for the Court, i n effect overrode the l i mi ti ng vi ew and posi ted
a doctri ne by whi ch Congress was to defi ne the substance of what
the l egi sl ati on enacted pursuant to 5 must be appropri ate to. That
i s, i n uphol di ng the consti tuti onal i ty of a provi si on of the Voti ng
Ri ghts Act of 1965
111
barri ng the appl i cati on of Engl i sh l i teracy
requi rements to a certai n cl ass of voters, the Court rejected a state
argument that an exerci se of congressi onal power under 5 . . .
that prohi bi ts the enforcement of a state l aw can onl y be sustai ned
i f the judi ci al branch determi nes that the state l aw i s prohi bi ted
by the provi si ons of the Amendment that Congress sought to en-
force.
112
I nasmuch as the Court had previ ousl y uphel d an Engl i sh
l i teracy requi rement under equal protecti on chal l enge,
113
accept-
ance of the argument woul d have doomed the federal l aw. But, sai d
Justi ce Brennan, Congress i tsel f mi ght have questi oned the jus-
ti fi cati ons put forward by the State i n defense of i ts l aw and mi ght
have concl uded that i nstead of bei ng supported by acceptabl e rea-
sons the requi rements were unrel ated to those justi fi cati ons and
di scri mi natory i n i ntent and effect. The Court woul d not eval uate
the competi ng consi derati ons whi ch mi ght have l ed Congress to i ts
concl usi on; si nce Congress brought a speci al l y i nformed l egi sl ati ve
competence to an apprai sal of voti ng requi rements, i t was Con-
gress prerogati ve to wei gh the consi derati ons and the Court woul d
sustai n the concl usi on i f we percei ve a basi s upon whi ch Congress
1935
114
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 65356 (1966).
115
I d. at 668. Justi ce Stewart joi ned thi s di ssent.
116
I d. at 651 n.10. Justi ce OConnor for the Court quoted and rei terated Justi ce
Brennans l anguage i n Mi ssi ssi ppi Uni v. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731
33 (1982).
117
82 Stat. 73, 18 U.S.C. 245. See S. Rep. No. 721, 90th Congress, 1st Sess.
67 (1967). See also 82 Stat. 81, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.
118
Ti tl e I I , Omni bus Safe Streets and Cri me Control Act, 82 Stat. 210, 18
U.S.C. 3501, 3502. See S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Congress, 2d Sess. 5363 (1968).
The cases whi ch were subjects of the l egi sl ati on were Mi randa v. Ari zona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), and Uni ted States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), i nsofar as federal cri mi -
nal tri al s were concerned.
119
Ti tl es I I and I I I of the Voti ng Ri ghts Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 316,
42 U.S.C. 1973aa1, 1973bb.
120
Oregon v. Mi tchel l , 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
121
I d. at 229, 27881 (Justi ces Brennan, Whi te, and Marshal l ), 135, 14144
(Justi ce Dougl as).
122
I d. at 152, 20409 (Justi ce Harl an).
mi ght predi cate a judgment that the requi rements consti tuted i n-
vi di ous di scri mi nati on.
114
I n di ssent, Justi ce Harl an protested that [i ]n effect the Court
reads 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as gi vi ng Congress the
power to defi ne the substantive scope of the Amendment. I f that i n-
deed be the true reach of 5, then I do not see why Congress
shoul d not be abl e as wel l to exerci se i ts 5 di screti on by enacti ng
statutes so as i n effect to di l ute equal protecti on and due process
deci si ons of thi s Court.
115
Justi ce Brennan rejected thi s reason-
i ng. We emphasi ze that Congress power under 5 i s l i mi ted to
adopti ng measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment;
5 grants Congress no power to restri ct, abrogate, or di l ute these
guarantees.
116
Congress responded, however, i n both fashi ons. On
the one hand, i n the 1968 Ci vi l Ri ghts Act i t rel i ed on Morgan i n
expandi ng federal powers to deal wi th pri vate vi ol ence that i s ra-
ci al l y moti vated, and to some degree i n outl awi ng most pri vate
housi ng di scri mi nati on;
117
on the other hand, i t enacted provi si ons
of l aw purporti ng to overrul e the Courts expansi on of the sel f-i n-
cri mi nati on and ri ght-to-counsel cl auses of the Bi l l of Ri ghts, ex-
pressl y i nvoki ng Morgan.
118
Congress power under Morgan returned to the Courts consi d-
erati on when several States chal l enged congressi onal l egi sl ati on
119
l oweri ng the voti ng age i n al l el ecti ons to 18 and prescri bi ng resi -
dency and absentee voti ng requi rements for the conduct of presi -
denti al el ecti ons. I n uphol di ng the l atter provi si on and i n di vi di ng
over the former, the Court reveal ed that Morgans vi tal i ty was i n
some consi derabl e doubt, at l east wi th regard to the reach whi ch
many observers had previ ousl y seen.
120
Four Justi ces accepted
Morgan i n ful l ,
121
whi l e one Justi ce rejected i t total l y
122
and an-
1936
123
I d. at 119, 12631 (Justi ce Bl ack).
124
The age reducti on provi si on coul d be sustai ned onl y i f Congress has the
power not onl y to provi de the means of eradi cati ng si tuati ons that amount to a vi o-
l ati on of the Equal Protecti on Cl ause, but al so to determi ne as a matter of sub-
stanti ve consti tuti onal l aw what si tuati ons fal l wi thi n the ambi t of the cl ause, and
what state i nterests are compel l i ng. I d. at 296 (Justi ces Stewart and Bl ackmun
and Chi ef Justi ce Burger). I n thei r vi ew, Congress di d not have that power and
Morgan di d not confer i t. But i n voti ng to uphol d the resi dency and absentee provi -
si on, the Justi ces concl uded that Congress coul d rati onal l y concl ude that the i mpo-
si ti on of durati onal resi dency requi rements unreasonabl y burdens and sancti ons the
pri vi l ege of taki ng up resi dence i n another State wi thout reachi ng an i ndependent
determi nati on of thei r own that the requi rements di d i n fact have that effect. I d.
at 286.
125
See Ci ty of Rome v. Uni ted States, 446 U.S. 156, 17383 (1980), under the
Fi fteenth Amendment. I nfra, pp. 194850. See also Ful l i l ove v. Kl utzni ck, 448 U.S.
448, 47678 (1980) (pl ural i ty opi ni on by Chi ef Justi ce Burger), and i d. at 50002
(Justi ce Powel l concurri ng).
126
The Voti ng Ri ghts Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. 97205, 96 Stat. 131,
amendi ng 42 U.S.C. 1973, were desi gned to overturn Ci ty of Mobi l e v. Bol den, 446
U.S. 55 (1980). A substanti al change of di recti on i n Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613
(1982), handed down coextensi vel y wi th congressi onal enactment, seems to have
brought Congress and the Court i nto essenti al al i gnment, thus avoi di ng a possi bl e
consti tuti onal confl i ct.
127
See The Human Li fe Bi l l , Heari ngs before the Senate Judi ci ary Subcommi t-
tee on Separati on of Powers, 97th Congress, l st sess. (1981). An el aborate consti tu-
ti onal anal ysi s of the bi l l appears i n Estrei cher, Congressional Power and Constitu-
tional Rights: Reflections on Proposed Human Life Legislation, 68 VA. L. REV. 333
(1982).
other woul d have l i mi ted i t to raci al cases.
123
The other three Jus-
ti ces seemi ngl y restri cted Morgan to i ts al ternate rati onal e i n pass-
i ng on the age reducti on provi si on but the manner i n whi ch they
deal t wi th the resi dency and absentee voti ng provi si on afforded
Congress some degree of di screti on i n maki ng substanti ve deci si ons
about what state acti on i s di scri mi natory above and beyond the ju-
di ci al vi ew of the matter.
124
More recent deci si ons read broadl y Congress power to make
determi nati ons that appear to be substanti ve deci si ons wi th respect
to consti tuti onal vi ol ati ons.
125
Acti ng under both the Fourteenth
and Fi fteenth Amendments, Congress has acted to reach state el ec-
toral practi ces that resul t i n di l uti ng the voti ng power of mi nori -
ti es, al though the Court apparentl y requi res that i t be shown that
el ectoral procedures must have been created or mai ntai ned wi th a
di scri mi natory ani mus before they may be i nval i dated under the
two Amendments.
126
Moreover, movements have been i ni ti ated i n
Congress by opponents of certai n of the Courts deci si ons, notabl y
the aborti on rul i ngs, to uti l i ze 5 powers to curtai l the ri ghts the
Court has deri ved from the due process cl ause and other provi si ons
of the Consti tuti on.
127

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