Reforming the Congolese Security Sector: Which Way Forward?

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A panel discussion

Anthony Gambino, Author of “Congo: Securing Peace, Sustaining Progress,”

Gerard Prunier, Author of Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making
of the Continental Catastrophe”

Willet Weeks, DAI, Special Advisor to USAID for peace building and stabilization

Joseph Siegle, Moderator, Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies

On October 29, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies convened three leading experts on
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for a panel discussion to examine practical
strategies to reform the DRC’s security sector.

The Need for Reform

The security sector in the DRC confronts one of the most complex series of security
threats on the African continent. It faces multiple, non-state armed groups with varying
agendas, longstanding ethnic animosities, competition for the Congo’s rich bounty of
natural resources, and a legacy of weak state institutions. Most distinctively, militaries
from at least eight different countries have intervened in the DRC over the last 12 years –
with many retaining significant influence inside the Congo. In short, the security sector in
the DRC has repeatedly failed to protect the territorial integrity and citizens of the
country from either domestic or international threats.

The costs of this instability have been high. An estimated 5.4 million Congolese have
died directly or indirectly since the conflict began in 1997 making it the world’s single
most deadly conflict since World War II (and claiming just under 10 percent of the entire
population). The economic devastation of the conflict has been estimated at more than
$250 billion. Given its location in the heart of Africa, the ongoing instability in the DRC
has security and development implications throughout the continent.

Violence in the North and South Kivus is particularly heinous and persistent. Since the
Kimia II security operation was launched in January 2009 in North and South Kivu, more
than 1,000 civilians have been killed, and more than 1.2 million have been displaced.
Most disturbingly, the Congolese security sector is regularly a source of insecurity for

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This is a synthesis of the panel presentations and discussion. The views summarized here do not represent
the positions of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the Department of Defense, or the United States
government.
Congo’s citizens – persistently charged by the United Nations and human rights groups
with human rights abuses, including the escalating and systematic use of gender- and
sexually-based violence. Since January, more than 7,000 women have been raped in the
Kivus. The UN Human Rights Office alleges that the vast majority of these have been
committed by the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (known by its
French acronym FARDC) and the Congolese National Police (PNC).

Military effectiveness and respect for the population go hand in hand from the
perspective of counterinsurgency operations, where the trust, support, and information
sharing of the population are indispensible. Accordingly, any realistic scenario for
achieving sustainable stability in the DRC will require significant rehabilitation of the
security sector.

Challenges to Reform

Integration of former rebels within the FARDC as part of earlier peace agreements has
dramatically weakened the caliber of the Congolese armed forces. The haphazard and
swift integration process has contributed to an unprofessional military lacking loyalty,
pride and morale. It has also banded together warlords and killers who have little regard
for the civilian authorities and non-combatants they have been empowered to protect.
Indeed, some analysts suggest that the spike in abuses attributed to the FARDC is, in fact,
the work of former militiamen.

Reform efforts cannot assume that protecting the population is a priority objective for the
armed forces. Rather, given the many years of neglect of the Congolese security sector
dating back to the era of long-time president Mobutu Sese Seko, the military has adopted
a predatory posture toward the population. Accordingly, in the current conflict, when the
FARDC or the militias occupy territory, the impulse is not to provide protection and
services but to reap the spoils offered by their position. The majority of destruction that
occurs during this conflict, therefore, typically occurs after sporadic clashes between rival
armed groups have concluded. Under these circumstances, the population has learned to
fear all sides.

There has historically been limited commitment among Congolese political leaders to
reform the security sector. This is attributed to Mobutu not wanting to build a security
apparatus that could threaten his hold on power. Certain politicians and commanders
have also profited financially from the control of the armed forces through exploitation
and engagement in illicit business enterprises.

Ongoing strategic and natural resource interests of neighboring countries, primarily

Rwanda, the LRA and Sudan maintain significant influence within the DRC and with the
Congolese security sector. While the governments of Rwanda and the DRC have recently
been cooperating out of shared security interests, this relationship is very tenuous.
Though lacking natural resource interests, Angola has trained units of the FARDC, many
of which rely on Portuguese as the lingua franca. Moreover, due to heavy migration
during Angola’s civil war, many Angolans have links in the Congo. Navigating these
active international influences makes the task for reform in the DRC particularly
complicated.

Recommendations for the Way Forward

ƒ There are two overarching priorities moving forward – immediately stabilizing

the insecurity in the east and rehabilitating the Congolese security sector over the
medium term. To advance the first, the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC,
MONUC, should fully embrace its mandate, renewed and expanded in December
2008, to “ensure the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel,
under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular, violence emanating
from any of the parties engaged in the conflict.” This would require MONUC to
confront any armed groups that threaten civilians rather than limiting itself
primarily to a peacekeeping role. The space created by this stability would, in
turn, enable greater focus on the reform effort.

ƒ As part of fulfilling its mandate, MONUC would engage more vigorously with
the FARDC in establishing security and preventing the abuses of the civilian
population by the Congolese armed forces. In doing so, MONUC would, in fact,
only be enforcing a “zero-tolerance” policy the FARDC command announced in
July for commanders of units that perpetrate criminal acts, specifically, “rapes,
subjection of civilians to forced labour, theft, extortion, torture, looting,
destruction of agricultural fields or livestock, murder or any other reprehensible
act.”
ƒ Building on a November announcement by MONUC that it would halt support to
several specific FARDC units suspected of killing civilians, MONUC must halt
all support to FARDC units suspected of violating the DRC’s “zero-tolerance”
policy and actively intervene against FARDC and militia groups that threaten
civilians.

ƒ Adopt a Training, Pay, and Accountability (TPA) strategy for security sector
capacity building in order to create a motivated and effective FARDC. Training
would need to be rigorous to develop a qualified, professional and unified force.
This training would be especially relevant for militia troops being integrated into
the armed forces. Adequate pay would limit the compulsion to loot and pillage
which often follows current FARDC operations, whose soldiers receive negligible
or no salaries. Lastly, accountability through effective military discipline and
judicial processes would turn the tide against a culture of impunity that has
permeated the FARDC. To fully inculcate and apply the lessons from the
training, MONUC trainers would be embedded within and co-deploy with
FARDC forces.

ƒ Focus initial TPA effort on establishing one to two well-trained and fully-vetted
FARDC brigades. Starting with this focused training effort is much more
achievable than trying to re-train the entire 150,000-strong FARDC force. It also
places an emphasis on quality over quantity. The experience of combat in the
DRC in the past decade has reinforced this reality. Smaller numbers of disciplined
forces are far more effective than much larger contingents. Such an effort would
build on isolated cases of successful security sector capacity building in recent
years in the DRC as well as in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

ƒ While initially focusing on 1-2 brigades, long-term improvements in the DRC

security sector will require sustained strategic engagement and adequate financial
support over several years. Given that the DRC must prepare for both internal and
external threats, this cannot be a piecemeal effort but would likely entail a five-
year intensive undertaking.

ƒ Undertaking substantive reform will require much greater donor coordination. It

would also require significant diplomatic engagement so that political leaders
recognized the incentives of supporting substantive reform of the Congolese
security sector. Such an effort would build on the comparative advantages each
donor partner could offer. The European Union has already conducted a census of
FARDC troops and is familiar with the army’s structure. MONUC’s troop-
contributing countries have effective and disciplined armed forces. The U.S. can
more vigorously support MONUC diplomatically and financially to implement its
mandate and address the institutional challenges, corruption, and lax political will
in Kinshasa for security sector reform. Congo’s regional neighbors, who exercise
influence over armed factions within the DRC, might also be more responsive to
Washington than Kinshasa.