The Future of the International Monetary System

Speech by Vtor Constncio, Vice-President of the C!,

The "olden Series lecture at the #fficial Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum
$#MFIF%,
&ondon, '( )o*ember '+,,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is with pleasure that I have accepted the invitation from the OMFIF
Golden Series on World Money to talk about the future of the
international monetary system !his sub"ect has become very topical
this year, not least in view of the discussions and pro#ress achieved at
the very recent $annes Summit
I will start by briefly recallin# the key features of a #ood international
monetary system and on this basis, I will try to define what are, in my
view, the main weaknesses of the present system %or &non'system(
as many describe it) !his will allow me to dwell upon the possible
evolution over the medium run of some of the main components of the
international monetary system When concludin#, I will assess whether
such an evolution may prove to be an ade*uate response to the
challen#es we are confronted with
What can we expect from a good-quality international
monetary system?
!he ultimate #oal of the international monetary system %hereafter+
IMS) is to maintain an orderly system of payments amon# nations !o
this aim, the IMS has to provide the services of an international
currency, ensure ade*uate creation of #lobal li*uidity, define an
e,chan#e rate re#ime amon# national currencies and include an
ad"ustment mechanism to avoid e,cessive e,ternal real and financial
imbalances across nations
-oth #lobal li*uidity and the ad"ustment mechanism can be interpreted
as #lobal public #oods %see e# .ichen#reen /012, $amdessus /000,
3orrucci and Mc4ay 56//) It is indeed only throu#h access to global
liquidity that it becomes possible to participate in, and finance, the
#lobal economy by usin# one or more reserve currencies as a means
of payment, a unit of account or a store of value
7nd it is only throu#h an efficient and effective adjustment
mechanism that it becomes possible to benefit from &e,ternal
stability(, namely a #lobal sustainable constellation of cross'country
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economic linka#es %e# via current accounts and asset8liability
positions) Once e,ternal stability is achieved, cross'country linka#es
do not #ive rise to disruptive developments, such as disorderly
e,chan#e rate and asset price swin#s or contractions in real output
and employment .,ternal stability crucially depends on the policy
behaviour of those issuers and holders of international currencies that
are systemically relevant
!he exchange rate and capital flow regimes are probably the core
elements of the ad"ustment mechanism, since they define the de#ree
of fle,ibility of each IMS, ie its adaptability to chan#in# economic
circumstances In contrast to the -retton Woods system with fi,ed
e,chan#es rates, semi'closed capital accounts and a strict ad"ustment
mechanism, an IMS such as the present one en"oys a much hi#her
de#ree of adaptability .ach country is free to choose its e,chan#e rate
and capital account re#ime, and the reserve'issuin# countries face no
IMS'embedded limits to the creation of #lobal li*uidity !his is a
fundamental stren#th of today9s system, but it may also become : as
we will see : a ma"or weakness to the e,tent that it creates scope for
unsustainable domestic #rowth models and the ensuin# accumulation
of real and financial imbalances
What are the shortcomings of the present non-system
-esides the persistent e,ternal imbalances, there are many other
shortcomin#s bein# mentioned about the present &non'system( I can
mention a few of them+ abrupt reversal of capital flows; systematic
inflows #oin# from emer#in# to developed countries; inefficient
accumulation of reserves by emer#in# countries; e,cessive e,chan#e
rate volatility ineffective to ensure e,ternal balance; asymmetry of
ad"ustment pressure between deficit and surplus countries; absence of
mechanisms to ensure the sufficient and timely supply of #lobal
li*uidity in times of financial crises
!his list means that, potentially, all the features of an IMS can be at
stake in the present discussion, contrary to what happened in the late
nineties when the discussion revolved around the functionin# of the
financial sector and the crisis prevention and resolution in emer#in#
economies !he debate then was not about the reform of the IMS but
rather about a new Global Financial 7rchitecture, meanin# the
international framework for safe#uardin# and ensurin# the efficient
functionin# of the #lobal financial system
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!oday, after the start of the crisis in 5662, the issues under discussion
are at the core of what constitutes an International Monetary System+
/) 7re new international currencies necessary and8or unavoidable in
the present circumstances< 5) Should chan#es be introduced in the
forei#n e,chan#e re#ime< =) 3oes the system need new and stron#er
instruments of li*uidity provision, especially in times of financial
crises< >) What chan#es should be introduced in the ad"ustment
mechanism< ?) Which reforms are needed in the about international
re#ulation of the financial sector<
I will not address this last point @e#ardin# the second issue on the
e,chan#e rate re#ime, I will only mention that I see no "ustification to
chan#e the floatin# re#ime amon# the ma"or currencies or to modify
the recommendation that bi# emer#in# economies should also adopt
much more fle,ible rate re#imes !his means that in the conflict
characterised by Mac4innon %/00>) between the international
adjustment view of e,chan#e rates and the monetary standard view, I
take the side of the former 7lso, the present situation of financial
#lobalisation confirms the early Abipolar viewA of 7le,ander Swoboda
that with hi#h capital mobility the only stable e,chan#e rate re#imes
are floatin# rates or hard pe#s, of which monetary unions are an
e,treme e,ample %see .ichen#reen, 56/6)
Towards an unavoidable, but desirable, multi-polar !"?
!here are many predictions about the #radual addition of other
currencies to the dollar as truly international currencies What seems
to make this unavoidable it is not only the emer#ence of the euro, the
increasin# stren#th of $hina or the #rowin# vulnerabilities of the BS
!he #rowth in importance of emer#in# countries, that have seen their
share in the world G3C au#mented by /? percenta#e points in the last
56 years, creates a structural increase for the demand of reserves that
the developed countries, includin# the BS7, will not be in a position to
supply
!his *uestion is linked with the problem of the provision of official
international li*uidity 7s Maurice Obstfeld %56//) has recently
recalled, there is a fiscal dimension to the supply of official reserves
Do sin#le country in the world could indefinitely offer its currency as
the reserve asset that could satisfy all the needs of a #rowin# rest of
the world In the present circumstances where deficit and debt ratios
need to be decreased, the BS could not offer its bonds and !'bills as
the almost e,clusive reserve asset of the world In this conte,t, .uro
assets are necessary .ven if they are clearly seen as an unrealistic
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prospect, .urobonds, from the pure perspective of the International
Monetary System, would be useful as a reserve asset for the world
economy In the future, the system will also need assets in the
$hinese currency, when $hina will have a convertible currency, a
fle,ible e,chan#e rate and a developed bond market
7ll this implies that one possible scenario is the evolution towards a
truly multi-polar !", which, as many have recently observed,
would produce credible alternatives to dollar'denominated
investments, thereby enhancin# policy discipline in the core reserve
issuer 7lso, a multi'currency world would imply #reater monetary
policy autonomy in emer#in# economies such as $hina, which would
thus be in a better position to tackle its own imbalances %see e# -ini
Sma#hi 56//)
!here are five key conditions for a currency to become a ma"or
international currency !he first one is havin# a very large
economy, which en#enders network e,ternalities and lowers
transaction costs !he second is #iven by deep, efficient and
open financial markets !hird, #ood political and macroeconomic
governance is of course of the essence to preserve the e,ternal
value of a currency Fourth, full enforcement of the rule of law is
e*ually crucial as it ensures the protection of investors9 property
ri#hts Fifth, one should not overlook the importance of
geopolitical influence and political stability
It is therefore not easy for a currency to fill all the conditions
necessary for it to have an international role $onse*uently, I do
not think that we will see a ma"or chan#e in the role of the US
dollar over the ne,t /6'/? years : thou#h the conclusion may
well be different over a lon#er horiEon !he appearance of the
euro as a new #lobally important currency has not produced a
shift to a #enuine duopoly in the supply of international
currencies, and had little impact on the dollar9s centrality in the
IMS We are likely to see the shares of other currencies #rowin#
over time, but it is unlikely that there will be "ust one currency
replacin# the BS dollar9s he#emony
!he euro has established itself as the second most important
international currency after the BS dollar 7t the same time, this role is
predominantly re#ional in nature, since the euro is mainly used by
economic a#ents resident in euro area nei#hbourin# countries with
special political and economic ties to the .uropean Bnion and the euro
area More recently, it is known that 7sian investors and forei#n
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central banks accounted for a siEable share of the demand for bonds
issued by the .uropean Financial Stability Facility %.FSF)
Lookin# ahead, the share of the euro in international markets has the
potential to rise further once financial stability and market inte#ration
is restored in the euro area !he on#oin# efforts to improve the
#overnance of the euro area and provide it with a credible crisis
resolution mechanism will also indirectly affect the international use of
the euro, even if the .$- and the .urosystem do not take any
initiatives to directly promote its use %7n#eloni, Sapir 56//) !his
neutral stance : neither foster nor hinder : is based on our conviction
that the international use of currencies should be a by'product of
autonomous market decisions driven by the aforementioned five
determinants
!urnin# to the Chinese renminbi, one can observe that the use of the
renminbi as an international currency has remained limited althou#h
$hina is now the third lar#est economy %after the Bnited States and
the euro area) and second lar#est e,porter %after the euro area) of the
world
!he $hinese authorities have launched several initiatives since March
5660 to promote a wider international use of the renminbi, e# in
trade invoicin#, in deepenin# the role of the offshore centre played by
Fon# 4on# S7@, or in a#reein# local currency swap a#reements with
several central banks
Devertheless, the full potential of the renminbi can ultimately only be
achieved with the liberalisation of the capital account, accompanied by
the reform of domestic financial markets Once these will be in place, a
ma"or internationalisation of the renminbi will happen as a by'product
For the time bein#, $hinese authorities seem to be tryin# to prudently
promote financial liberaliEation via e,perimentin# with market'driven
renminbi securities in Fon# 4on# S7@ -ut this comes at the
e,pense of increasin# e,posure to capital flows which poses challen#es
for the macro'prudential set'up, especially #iven the current
undervaluation of the renminbi Fence, $hinese authorities may also
slow down the use of the renminbi abroad should tensions for domestic
policy makers mount 7ll in all, the potential for the renminbi to
up#rade as an international currency is clearly hu#e, but the timin# is
difficult to predict
The necessary reform of the ad#ustment mechanism
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I share 4re#el9s %56/6) view that &the basic problem Gwith the current
IMSH is not the particular national liability that serves as the
international currency, but the failure of an efficient ad"ustment
mechanism for #lobal imbalances(
Indeed, one needs only to look at the problem of #lobal payment
imbalances to find weaknesses of the current IMS, or rather &non'
system( !he build up of increasin#ly lar#e current account surpluses
in some e,port'oriented economies, which rely on a #rowth'model
based on over'savin#s, was, in con"unction with accumulatin# deficits
in a number of consumption'driven economies, a ma"or source of
concern in the years which preceded the #lobal financial crisis Such
imbalances were coupled with &twin #luts( in #lobal li*uidity and
planned savin#s which led to historically low risk premia : the main
symptom that systemic risk was escalatin# in the presence of easy
finance accommodatin# complacent borrowers
.ven the #lobal financial crisis and the policy responses have reduced
the imbalances only partly and temporarily over the most recent
years !he fact that these imbalances have persisted for so lon#
e,poses a key weakness of the system, namely the inadequacy of
the ad#ustment mechanisms Let me e,plain this in more detail by
lookin# at the various stakeholders+
$ational authorities in deficit and surplus countries had little
incentives to depart from their #rowth model and policy course
Indeed, prior to the crisis the economies with the lar#est e,ternal
imbalances were often outperformin# their peers in terms of G3C
#rowth+ the lar#er the imbalance, the hi#her was the #rowth rate over
the short run Moreover, the deficit and surplus countries, rather than
e,ertin# policy discipline on each other, in fact accommodated the
other in the pursuit of their respective #rowth models %see 3ooley et
al 566=)
!ar%et discipline also proved partly unreliable for a number of
reasons
Firstly, markets fre*uently do not function in line with fundamentals as
e,pected, leadin# to mispricin# and undue volatility in, for e,ample,
e,chan#e rates and credit risk premia !his may be e,plained in part
by factors such as herdin# behaviour, but also the lack of a shared
view on the relevant fundamentals
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Secondly, market behaviour has also been constrained by structural
factors and policy re#imes On the deficit side, the fact that the Bnited
States provides the deepest and most li*uid financial market ' and
issues the dominant reserve currency ' provides it with an unparalleled
platform to offer &safe( debt instruments !he insatiable demand for
such debt instruments puts stron# pressure on the BS financial system
and its incentives %$aballero 5660) 7t the same time, the BS derives
its &e,orbitant privile#e( from this situation !he demand for BS assets
constrains the #rowth in credit and e,chan#e rate risk premia char#ed
by markets on risin# BS debt !his effectively limits the increase in
e,ternal borrowin# costs, thus removin# an incentive to curb
borrowin# On the surplus side, the semi'fi,ed e,chan#e rate re#imes
and the semi'closed capital account of some ma"or surplus countries
prevent markets from e,ertin# e,cessive pressure on capital flows or
the e,chan#e rate of such countries
!hirdly, accommodated by a trend towards self're#ulation, financial
markets encoura#ed rather than tamed e,cessive borrowin# Income
constraints on debt accumulation were circumvented throu#h
innovative debt instruments, which were insufficiently checked by
*uality credit analysis and internal controls Moreover, in the search
for yield and diversification, capital flows to emer#in# markets and
&carry trade economies( have sur#ed, promptin#, in certain cases, the
imposition of capital controls to limit the potentially disruptive
influences of both e,cess inflows and their reversals
!he international community has a role to play in e,ertin# pressure
on countries to ad"ust, primarily the International Monetary Fund %IMF)
and the G56 7lthou#h helpful policy recommendations have been put
forward at the #lobal level, the traction #ained by the international
community has often not been as stron# as it needed to be !he IMF,
to some e,tent, has been hampered in its efforts to ensure the
stability of the IMS !he e,istin# rules were desi#ned for the pre'
#lobalisation era and the enforcement mechanisms are not sufficiently
effective
@e#ardin# the rules, these were a#reed in an era of fi,ed e,chan#e
rates, closed capital accounts and hi#hly re#ulated financial markets
when the financial sector was the handmaiden of the real economy
!his was well before the widespread liberalisation of trade, financial
markets and capital accounts that defines #lobalisation For e,ample,
under the IMF 7rticles of 7#reement, members are free to pursue
capital account re#imes and e,chan#e rate re#imes of their choice,
with only limited constraints
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!he outcome is a #lobal constellation of e,chan#e rate re#imes that
does not ensure sustained economic, financial and monetary stability
!he pe# of currencies of a number of emer#in# economies to the BS
dollar creates a symbiosis that fosters ever lar#er imbalances and
hence risks of disorderly ad"ustment Carticularly when one of the
emer#in# economies is very lar#e, the pe##in# of its currency to
another risks limitin# the fle,ibility of ad"ustment in both, which in
turn threatens to distort the e,chan#e rate of other ma"or currency
pairs, with implications for #lobal economic performance
!urnin# to the enforcement mechanisms, surveillance and peer policy
review have an essential role to play in identifyin# risks and
encoura#in# remedial policy action -ut international pressure :
includin# via the IMF and the G56 : still suffers from lack of #rip .ven
when risks are correctly identified and policy recommendations are
appropriate, as it happened durin# IMF9s multilateral consultations in
566I'62, there is no #uarantee of necessary policy ad"ustments bein#
made !his remains the weakest aspect of the surveillance process
!he crisis has led to increased efforts to improve surveillance, e# with
the transformation of the Financial Stability Forum into the Financial
Stability -oard %FS-) with an enlar#ed membership and broadened
mandate, chan#es inside the IMF, and the launchin# of the G56
Framework for Stron#, Sustainable, and -alanced Growth and its
Mutual 7ssessment Crocess !here is a #eneral reco#nition of the need
to stren#then the multilateral an#le of surveillance, to better
encompass interlinka#es and spillover effects, and to better inte#rate
macroeconomic and financial sector
More work needs to be done, however, to further stren#then the
effectiveness of surveillance !here is no widespread consensus yet on
how a country9s policies impact on other countries and : more
importantly : no willin#ness of countries to submit themselves to
closer scrutiny -y contrast, we can observe a lot of mutual fin#er'
pointin#, mainly between advanced and emer#in# economies, but to
some e,tent also within the two #roups It follows that .M.s push for
an inclusion of #lobal li*uidity and its drivers into multilateral
surveillance, whereas advanced countries see a need for more scrutiny
of reserve accumulation practices, e,chan#e rate policies and capital
controls 7#ainst this back#round, it is also obvious that a lot of
countries do not have any appetite to chan#e the IMF9s 7rticles of
7#reement to ratify a broadenin# and stren#thenin# of surveillance
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What can be done in such circumstances< I think that first of all we
need to work even harder to achieve a better understandin# of
interlinka#es and spillover effects !his implies the need for more and
better analysis !he new pilot spillover reports that the IMF started this
year with a handful of systemically important countries are one
welcome step in that direction Further research on the impact of
policies in systemically important economies on #lobal li*uidity
conditions and on capital flows will also help framin# the discussions
Goin# forward, better awareness, a certain spirit of multilateralism
and, last but not least, improved mechanisms to foster traction of
policy advice will be crucial elements to stren#then the effectiveness of
surveillance in contributin# to #lobal stability
&volution of global official liquidity
7nother area in which views are very much divided is the debate about
the enhancement of official li*uidity provision One idea is to stren#th
the so'called global financial safety net '()"$*+ It would be used
in those e,ceptional situations when countries with sound
fundamentals suffer from financial market disruptions : such as
forei#n currency li*uidity shorta#es or sudden stops in capital inflows :
caused by conta#ion from ma"or %e# Lehman'type) e,ternal shocks +
7lso here si#nificant pro#ress has been achieved over the last years+
IMF resources have been tripled compared to 5661, access ri#hts to
IMF financin# increased, and new facilities were created -ut some
believe that this is not enou#h, and ar#ue with pertinent ar#uments,
that further enhancin# the #lobal financial safety net would provide
incentives for countries to decrease their reserve holdin#s %see Fahri,
Gourinchas and @ey, 56//) Fowever, as I mentioned earlier, the
accumulation of lar#e stocks of reserves is not only based on
precautionary motives .ven the most customer'friendly IMF facilities
mi#ht not lead countries to lower their reserves since they offer a
hi#her level of comfort and convenience than IMF facilities 7t the
same time, countries mi#ht face problems in actually usin# their
reserves in times of crisis, #iven that markets mi#ht not focus on the
absolute level, but rather on the relative chan#es
Further reforms of the Fund9s toolkit need to be based on a thorou#h
assessment of the e,perience with the e,istin# tools and the resource
implications further insurance'type facilities would have !he call for
increased Fund resources, which is recently bein# voiced a#ain, has
also to be assessed carefully in li#ht of e,istin# and potential demand
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for Fund support $oncernin# another S3@ allocation, one should
consider that durin# the recent crisis only a very small amount of S3@s
allocated in 5660 has actually been converted into usable currencies
What would seem to be "ustified is to foresee established mechanisms
to provide li*uidity in times of financial crises when private li*uidity
suddenly disappears In this conte,t there have been also calls on
central banks to establish a permanent scheme of swap lines to help
countries in times of systemic stress Fowever, while central banks will
certainly continue to assume their responsibilities in times of distress,
they cannot commit e,'ante to any si#nificant provision of li*uidity as
this could interfere with their mandate and create moral haEard
,oncluding remar%s- s this enough?
Will the chan#es in the IMS which, based on current information, we
are likely to witness over the ne,t ten'fifteen years be sufficient to
make it resilient and sustainable< I am certainly not amon# those who
consider that this is the case -ut then, what further chan#es are
indispensable< !he answer to this *uestion depends upon the lon#er'
term vision If we are really headin# towards a multi'polar system, this
may well set stron#er incentives for policy discipline, since the
e,orbitant privile#e will be more widely shared
-ut will the road towards the new multi'polar system be smooth or
very bumpy< Well, a lot will depend on the path of further financial
market development, capital account liberalisation and e,chan#e rate
fle,ibility in .M.s, since this will pro#ressively reduce the demand for
safe debt instruments issued by advanced economies It will also allow
a better channellin# of domestic credit to investment and
consumption, which in turn will help to promote #rowth driven by
domestic demand 7nd a lot will obviously also depend on the ability of
advanced economies, startin# with the euro area, to learn the
appropriate lessons from the current soverei#n debt and bankin#
crisis !he speed and scope of this process will depend on decisions of
policy makers and market participants in the various parts of this
world If this whole process will be resolute and #radual at the same
time, it should allow for an orderly transition towards a multi'polar
IMS
7nother *uestion is whether the new IMS would be steady in nature or
whether a new he#emon would emer#e possibly to accomplish the
&he#emonic stability theory( promoted by 4indleber#er %4indleber#er,
/026) !he answer will, a#ain, depend predominantly on policy'
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makers It remains to be seen whether the currency competitors of
such a multi'polar world will be of relatively close wei#ht, both in
economic and financial terms, but also with respect to the political and
#overnance factors discussed before when considerin# the
preconditions for a currency to become a ma"or international currency
7s re#ards the necessary chan#es to international cooperation, we will
need to see a #reater awareness amon# #lobal partners about their
interlinka#es and the ensuin# responsibilities to ensure the stability of
the whole system I am convinced that, without a minimum spirit of
multilateralism and a minimum de#ree of cooperation, no future IMS
will remain stable for lon# It is to be hoped that countries, especially
those with systemic relevance, understand that it is in their best self'
interest to consider e,ternalities and cooperate -ut such
&enli#htenment( alone will not be sufficient to ensure stability If the
IMS as such does not deliver the ri#ht incentives, the international
community will have to eventually a#ree on enhanced ad"ustment
mechanisms, e# in order to foster the traction of policy
recommendations It is to be hoped that we do not need another
#lobal crisis to instil the necessary incentives
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and LallJe %56//)+ &Global currencies for tomorrow+ 7 .uropean
perspective(, -rue#el -lueprint Series, vol MIII
7n#eloni, I and Sapir, 7 %56//), !he international monetary system is
chan#in#+ What opportunities for .urope<, paper for -rue#el'CII.
$onference !he !ransatlantic @elationship in an .ra of Growin#
Multipolarity, -erlin, 52 September 56/6
-ini Sma#hi, L %56//)+ &!he !riffin dilemma revisited(, speech at the
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3ecember
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11
entitled &'ey Issues in %eform of the International Monetary and
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.conomic @esearch, March
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-ooks, Dew Pork
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and International @eserve $urrencies( : .conomic Cublic Colicy -rief
7rchive, Levy .conomics Institute
Mc4innon, @onald %/00>) 3iscussion of Ceter 4enen &Floatin#
e,chan#e rate re#imes reconsidered( in Ceter - 4enen et al %ed) &)he
International Monetary System( $ambrid#e Bniversity Cress, pa#e /I?
Obstfeld, Maurice %56//) &International li*uidity+ the fiscal dimension(
4eynote speech at the -ank of Oapan, Institute of Monetary and
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!riffin, @ %/0I6)+ &Gold and the dollar crisis(, Pale Bniversity Cress,
Dew Faven
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