MEASURES FOR THE

EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF

THE BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT


(The Implementation Measures)

























Adopted by the Judicial Integrity Group
at its Meeting held in
Lusaka, Zambia






21 and 22 January 2010
2
CONTENTS


Introduction 3

Part One
Responsibilities of the Judiciary


1. Formulation of a Statement of Principles of Judicial Conduct 6

2. Application and Enforcement of Principles of Judicial Conduct 6

3. Assignment of Cases 7

4. Court Administration 7

5. Access to Justice 8

6. Transparency in the Exercise of Judicial Office 8

7. Judicial Training 10

8. Advisory Opinions 11

9. Immunity of Judges 11


Part Two
Responsibilities of the State


10. Constitutional Guarantee of Judicial Independence 12

11. Qualifications for Judicial Office 13

12. Appointment of Judges 13

13. Tenure of Judges 14

14. Remuneration of Judges 15

15. Discipline of Judges 15

16. Removal of Judges from Office 16

17. Budget of the Judiciary 16


Definitions 17
3
INTRODUCTION


The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct identify six core values of the
judiciary Independence, Impartiality, Integrity, Propriety, Equality,
Competence and Diligence. They are intended to establish standards of
ethical conduct for judges. They are designed to provide guidance to judges
in the performance of their judicial duties and to afford the judiciary a
framework for regulating judicial conduct. They are also intended to assist
members of the executive and the legislature, and lawyers and the public in
general, to better understand the judicial role, and to offer the community a
standard by which to measure and evaluate the performance of the judicial
sector. The Commentary on the Bangalore Principles is intended to
contribute to a better understanding of these Principles.

The section on Implementation in the Bangalore Principles of Judicial
Conduct states that:

By reason of the nature of judicial office, effective measures shall be adopted by
national judiciaries to provide mechanisms to implement these principles if such
mechanisms are not already in existence in their jurisdictions.

In some jurisdictions mechanisms and procedures are already in existence,
having been instituted by law or rules of court, to establish ethical standards
of conduct for judges. In others they are not. Accordingly, this statement of
measures is offered by the Judicial Integrity Group as guidelines or
benchmarks for the effective implementation of the Bangalore Principles.

This statement is in two parts. Part One describes the measures that are
required to be adopted by the judiciary. Part Two describes the institutional
arrangements that are required to ensure judicial independence and which
are exclusively within the competence of the State. While judicial
independence is in part a state of mind of members of the judiciary, the State
is required to establish a set of institutional arrangements that will enable the
judge and other relevant office holders to enjoy that state of mind. The
protection of the administration of justice from political influence or
interference cannot be achieved by the judiciary alone. While it is the
responsibility of the judge to be free of inappropriate connections with the
executive and the legislature, it is the responsibility of the State to establish
the institutional arrangements that would secure the independence of the
judiciary from the other two branches of government.
1


1
In its General Comment No.32 (2007), the Human Rights Committee states that the requirement of
independence in article 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights refers, in
particular, to the procedure and qualifications for the appointment of judges, and guarantees relating to
their security of tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where
such exist, the conditions governing promotion, transfer, suspension and cessation of their functions,
and the actual independence of the judiciary from political interference by the executive branch and
legislature. Accordingly, States are required to take specific measures guaranteeing the independence
of the judiciary, protecting judges from any form of political influence in their decision-making
through the constitution or adoption of laws establishing clear procedures and objective criteria for the
appointment, remuneration, tenure, promotion, suspension and dismissal of members of the judiciary
and disciplinary sanctions taken against them.
4

In preparing this statement of measures, reference was made to several
national constitutions and to regional and international initiatives to ensure
that they reflect a broad national and international consensus. The latter
include:

(a) The Draft Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (Siracusa
Principles) formulated by a representative committee of experts in
1981;

(b) The Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence adopted by the
International Bar Association in 1982;

(c) The United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary 1985;

(d) The Draft Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice 1988
(the Singhvi Declaration);

(e) Recommendation No.R (94) 12 of the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe on the Independence, Efficiency and Role of
Judges, 1994;

(f) The Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the
Judiciary adopted by a conference of Chief Justices of the Asia-Pacific
region in 1995;

(g) The European Charter on the Statute for Judges adopted in 1998;

(h) The Universal Charter of the Judge adopted by the International
Association of Judges in 1999;

(i) The Latimer House Guidelines on Parliamentary Supremacy and
Judicial Independence for the Commonwealth adopted in 2001;

(j) Opinions of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE):

Opinion No.1 (2001): Standards concerning the Independence of
the Judiciary and the Irremovability of Judges;

Opinion No.2 (2002): Principles and Rules governing Judges
Professional Conduct, in particular Ethics, Incompatible Behaviour
and Impartiality;

Opinion No.3 (2003): Appropriate Initial and In-Service Training for
Judges at National and European Levels;

Opinion No.10 (2007): A Council for the Judiciary.

5
(k) The Blantyre Rule of Law/Separation of Powers Communique issued
by representatives of all three branches of government in the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) region in 2003;

(l) The Cairo Declaration on Judicial Independence adopted by the
participants of the Second Arab Justice Conference held in 2003;

(m)The Suva Statement on the Principles of Judicial Independence and
Access to Justice adopted at a judicial colloquium in 2004.

(n) Justice Matters the report of the Irish Council for Civil Liberties on
Independence, Accountability and the Irish Judiciary, 2007;

(o) General Comment No.32 (2007) of the Human Rights Committee on
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

(p) The Venice Commission Report on Judicial Appointments, 2007;

(q) The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Draft Guide
on Strengthening Judicial Integrity and Capacity, October 2009.
6
Part One

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE JUDICIARY



1. Formulation of a Statement of Principles of Judicial Conduct

1.1 The judiciary should adopt a statement of principles of judicial conduct,
taking into consideration the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct.

1.2 The judiciary should ensure that such statement of principles of judicial
conduct is disseminated among judges and in the community.

1.3 The judiciary should ensure that judicial ethics, based on such
statement of principles of judicial conduct, are an integral element in
the initial and continuing training of judges.


2. Application and Enforcement of Principles of Judicial Conduct

2.1 The judiciary should consider establishing a judicial ethics advisory
committee of sitting and/or retired judges to advise its members on the
propriety of their contemplated or proposed future conduct.
2


2.2 The judiciary should consider establishing a credible, independent
judicial ethics review committee to receive, inquire into, resolve and
determine complaints of unethical conduct of members of the judiciary,
where no provision exists for the reference of such complaints to a
court. The committee may consist of a majority of judges, but should
preferably include sufficient lay representation to attract the confidence
of the community. The committee should ensure, in accordance with
law, that protection is accorded to complainants and witnesses, and
that due process is secured to the judge against whom a complaint is
made, with confidentiality in the preliminary stages of an inquiry if that
is requested by the judge. To enable the committee to confer such
privilege upon witnesses, etc., it may be necessary for the law to afford
absolute or qualified privilege to the proceedings of the committee.

2
In many jurisdictions in which such committees have been established a judge may request an
advisory opinion about the propriety of his or her own conduct. The committee may also issue
opinions on its own initiative on matters of interest to the judiciary. Opinions address contemplated or
proposed future conduct and not past or current conduct unless such conduct relates to future conduct
or is continuing. Formal opinions set forth the facts upon which the opinion is based and provide
advice only with regard to those facts. They cite the rules, cases and other authorities that bear upon
the advice rendered and quote the applicable principles of judicial conduct. The original formal
opinion is sent to the person requesting the opinion, while an edited version that omits the names of
persons, courts, places and any other information that might tend to identify the person making the
request is sent to the judiciary, bar associations and law school libraries. All opinions are advisory
only, and are not binding, but compliance with an advisory opinion may be considered to be evidence
of good faith.

7
The committee may refer sufficiently serious complaints to the body
responsible for exercising disciplinary control over the judge.
3



3. Assignment of Cases

3.1 The nomination of judges to sit on a bench is an inextricable part of the
exercise of judicial power.

3.2 The division of work among the judges of a court, including the
distribution of cases, should ordinarily be performed under a
predetermined arrangement provided by law or agreed by all the
judges of the relevant court. Such arrangements may be changed in
clearly defined circumstances such as the need to have regard to a
judges special knowledge or experience. The allocation of cases may,
by way of example, be made by a system of alphabetical or
chronological order or other random selection process.

3.3 A case should not be withdrawn from a particular judge without valid
reasons. Any such reasons and the procedures for such withdrawal
should be provided for by law or rules of court.


4. Court Administration

4.1 The responsibility for court administration, including the appointment,
supervision and disciplinary control of court personnel should vest in
the judiciary or in a body subject to its direction and control.

4.2 The judiciary should adopt and enforce principles of conduct for court
personnel, taking into consideration the Principles of Conduct for Court
Personnel formulated by the Judicial Integrity Group in 2005.

4.3 The judiciary should endeavour to utilize information and
communication technologies with a view to strengthening the
transparency, integrity and efficiency of justice.


3
In many jurisdictions in which such committees have been established, complaints into pending cases
are not entertained, unless it is a complaint of undue delay. A complaint is required to be in writing
and signed, and include the name of the judge, a detailed description of the alleged unethical conduct,
the names of any witnesses, and the complainants address and telephone number. The judge is not
notified of a complaint unless the committee determines that an ethics violation may have occurred.
The identity of the person making the complaint is not disclosed to the judge unless the complainant
consents. It may be necessary, however, for a complainant to testify as a witness in the event of a
hearing. All matters before the committee are confidential. If it is determined that there may have
been an ethics violation, the committee usually handles the matter informally by some form of
counselling with the judge. If the committee issues a formal charge against the judge, it may conduct a
hearing and, if it finds the charge to be well-founded, may reprimand the judge privately, or place the
judge on a period of supervision subject to terms and conditions. Charges that the committee deems
sufficiently serious to require the retirement, public censure or removal of the judge are referred to the
body responsible for exercising disciplinary control over the judge.
8
4.4 In exercising its responsibility to promote the quality of justice, the
judiciary should, through case audits, surveys of court users and other
stakeholders, discussion with court-user committees and other means,
endeavour to review public satisfaction with the delivery of justice and
identify systemic weaknesses in the judicial process with a view to
remedying them.

4.5 The judiciary should regularly address court users complaints, and
publish an annual report of its activities, including any difficulties
encountered and measures taken to improve the functioning of the
justice system.


5. Access to Justice

5.1 Access to justice is of fundamental importance to the rule of law. The
judiciary should, within the limits of its powers, adopt procedures to
facilitate and promote such access.

5.2 When there is no sufficient legal aid publicly available, the high costs of
private legal representation make it necessary for the judiciary to
consider, where appropriate and desirable, such initiatives as the
encouragement of pro bono representation of selected litigants by the
legal profession of selected litigants, the appointment of amici curiae
(friend of the court), alternative dispute resolution, and community
justice procedures, to protect interests that would otherwise be
unrepresented in court proceedings; and the provision of permission to
appropriate non-qualified persons (including paralegals) to represent
parties before a court.

5.3 The judiciary should institute modern case management techniques to
ensure the just, orderly and expeditious conduct and conclusion of
court proceedings.
4



6. Transparency in the Exercise of Judicial Office


4
Traditionally, the parties to a dispute control the movement of a case, with judges and court personnel
merely acting as facilitators. It is now recognized in many jurisdictions that the judiciary should
actively monitor and control the progress of a case, especially in the original courts, from institution to
judgment, including the completion of all the post-judgment steps. The active management by the
court of the progress of a case is designed to encourage the just, orderly and expeditious resolution of
disputes. This may involve the case being handled by the same judge from beginning to end; the early
fixing of a near-immutable trial date; the judge himself fixing the timetable and giving relevant
directions in the pre-trial period; and the same judge trying the case if it goes to trial. The active
involvement of the judge enables him or her to deal effectively with the critical areas of litigation, such
as defective pleadings, excessive discovery of documents and other techniques frequently employed to
delay the proceedings. It may also facilitate the continuous hearing of a case instead of short and
incomplete hearings spread over several weeks or months.


9
6.1 Judicial proceedings should, in principle, be conducted in public. The
publicity of hearings ensures the transparency of proceedings. The
judiciary should make information regarding the time and venue of
hearings available to the public and provide for adequate facilities for
the attendance of interested members of the public, within reasonable
limits, taking into account, inter alia, the potential interest in the case
and the duration of the hearing.
5


6.2 The judiciary should actively promote transparency in the delivery of
justice, and ensure that, subject to judicial supervision, the public, the
media and court users have reliable access to all information pertaining
to judicial proceedings, both pending and concluded, whether on a
court website or through appropriate and accessible records. Such
information should include reasoned judgments, pleadings, motions
and evidence, but affidavits or like evidentiary documents that have not
yet been accepted by the court as evidence may be excluded.

6.3 To facilitate access to the judicial system, the judiciary should ensure
that standard, user-friendly forms and instructions, and clear and
accurate information on matters such as filing fees, court procedures
and hearing schedules are made available to potential court users.

6.4 The judiciary should ensure that witnesses, other court users and
interested members of the public have access to easily readable signs
and publicly displayed courthouse orientation guides. Sufficient court
personnel should be provided to respond to questions through public
information services. They should be available close to court
entrances. Customer service and resource centres should be provided
in an accessible place. Court users should have access to safe, clean,
convenient and user-friendly court premises, with comfortable waiting
areas, adequate public space, and amenities for special-need users,
such as children, victims, and the disabled.

6.5 The judiciary should consider initiating outreach programmes designed
to educate the public on the role of the justice system in society and to
address common uncertainties or misconceptions about the justice
system.
6


5
The requirement of a public hearing does not necessarily apply to all appellate proceedings which
may take place on the basis of written presentations, or to pre-trial decisions. Article 14(1) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights acknowledges that a court has the power to
exclude all or part of the public for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in
a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent
strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would be
prejudicial to the interests of justice. Apart from such exceptional circumstances, a hearing must be
open to the general public, including members of the media, and must not, for instance, be limited to a
particular category of persons. Even in cases in which the public is excluded from the trial, the
judgment, including the essential findings, evidence and legal reasoning must be made public, except
where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires, or the proceedings concern matrimonial
disputes or the guardianship of children.

6
In a departure from the traditional belief that judges should remain isolated from the community to
ensure their independence and impartiality, judicial outreach now involves proactive measures by
10

6.6 The judiciary should afford access and appropriate assistance to the
media in the performance of its legitimate function of informing the
public about judicial proceedings, including decisions in particular
cases.


7. Judicial Training

7.1 To the full extent of its powers, the judiciary itself should organize,
conduct or supervise the training of judges.

7.2 In jurisdictions that do not have adequate training facilities, the judiciary
should, through the appropriate channels, seek the assistance of
appropriate national and international bodies and educational
institutions in providing access to such facilities or in developing the
local knowledge capacity.

7.3 All appointees to judicial office should have or acquire, before they take
up their duties, appropriate knowledge of relevant aspects of
substantive national and international law and procedure. Duly
appointed judges should also receive an introduction to other fields
relevant to judicial activity such as management of cases and
administration of courts, information technology, social sciences, legal
history and philosophy, and alternative dispute resolution.

7.4 The training of judicial officers should be pluralist in outlook in order to
guarantee and strengthen the open-mindedness of the judge and the
impartiality of the judiciary.

7.5 While it is necessary to institute training programmes for judges on a
regular basis, in-service training should normally be based on the
voluntary participation of members of the judiciary.

7.6 Where the language of legal literature (i.e. law reports, appellate
judgments, etc) is different from the language of legal education,
instruction in the former should be provided to both lawyers and
judges.

7.7 The training programmes should take place in, and encourage, an
environment in which members of different branches and levels of the
judiciary may meet and exchange their experiences and secure
common insights from dialogue with each other.

judges and direct interaction with the communities they serve. Experience suggests that increased
public knowledge about the law and court processes promote not only judicial transparency but also
public confidence. Recent outreach approaches have included town hall meetings, the production of
radio and television programmes, and the dissemination of awareness-raising materials such as court
user guides in the form of short pamphlets providing basic information on arrest, detention and bail,
criminal and civil procedures, and useful contacts for crime victims, witnesses and other users.

11


8. Advisory Opinions

8.1 A judge or a court should not render advisory opinions to the executive
or the legislature except under an express constitutional or statutory
provision permitting that course.


9. Immunity of Judges

9.1 A judge should be criminally liable under the general law for an offence
of general application committed by him or her and cannot therefore
claim immunity from ordinary criminal process.

9.2 A judge should enjoy personal immunity from civil suits for conduct in
the exercise of a judicial function.

9.3 The remedy for judicial errors (whether in respect of jurisdiction,
substance or procedure) should lie in an appropriate system of appeals
or judicial review.

9.4 The remedy for injury incurred by reason of negligence or misuse of
authority by a judge should lie only against the State without recourse
by the State against the judge.

9.5 Since judicial independence does not render a judge free from public
accountability, and legitimate public criticism of judicial performance is
a means of ensuring accountability subject to law, a judge should
generally avoid the use of the criminal law and contempt proceedings
to restrict such criticism of the courts.



12
Part Two

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE STATE



10. Constitutional Guarantee of Judicial Independence

10.1 The principle of judicial independence requires the State to provide
guarantees through constitutional or other means:

(a) that the judiciary shall be independent of the executive and the
legislature, and that no power shall be exercised as to interfere with the
judicial process;

(b) that everyone has the right to be tried with due expedition and without
undue delay by the ordinary courts or tribunals established by law
subject to appeal to, or review by, the courts;

(c) that no special ad hoc tribunals shall be established to displace the
normal jurisdiction otherwise vested in the courts;

(d) that, in the decision-making process, judges are able to act without any
restriction, improper influence, inducement, pressure, threat or
interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason, and
exercise unfettered freedom to decide cases impartially, in accordance
with their conscience and the application of the law to the facts as they
find them;

(e) that the judiciary shall have jurisdiction, directly or by way of review,
over all issues of a judicial nature, and that no organ other than the
court may decide conclusively its own jurisdiction and competence, as
defined by law;

(f) that the executive shall refrain from any act or omission that preempts
the judicial resolution of a dispute or frustrates the proper execution of
a court decision;

(g) that a person exercising executive or legislative power shall not
exercise, or attempt to exercise, any form of pressure on judges,
whether overt or covert;

(h) that legislative or executive powers that may affect judges in their
office, their remuneration, conditions of service or their resources, shall
not be used with the object or consequence of threatening or bringing
pressure upon a particular judge or judges;

(i) that the State shall ensure the security and physical protection of
members of the judiciary and their families, especially in the event of
threats being made against them; and
13


(j) that allegations of misconduct against a judge shall not be discussed in
the legislature except on a substantive motion for the removal or
censure of a judge of which prior notice has been given.


11. Qualifications for Judicial Office

11.1 Persons selected for judicial office should be individuals of ability,
integrity and efficiency with appropriate training or qualifications in law.

11.2 The assessment of a candidate for judicial office should involve
consideration not only of his or her legal expertise and general
professional abilities, but also of his or her social awareness and
sensitivity, and other personal qualities (including a sense of ethics,
patience, courtesy, honesty, commonsense, tact, humility and
punctuality) and communication skills. The political, religious or other
beliefs or allegiances of a candidate, except where they are proved to
intrude upon the judges performance of judicial duties, should not be
relevant.

11.3 In the selection of judges, there should be no discrimination on
irrelevant grounds. A requirement that a candidate for judicial office
must be a national of the country concerned shall not be considered
discriminatory on irrelevant grounds. Due consideration should be
given to ensuring a fair reflection by the judiciary of society in all its
aspects.


12. The Appointment of Judges

12.1 Provision for the appointment of judges should be made by law.

12.2 Members of the judiciary and members of the community should each
play appropriately defined roles in the selection of candidates suitable
for judicial office.

12.3 In order to ensure transparency and accountability in the process, the
appointment and selection criteria should be made accessible to the
general public, including the qualities required from candidates for high
judicial office. All judicial vacancies should be advertised in such a way
as to invite applications by, or nominations of, suitable candidates for
appointment.

12.4 One mechanism which has received particular support in respect of
States developing new constitutional arrangements consists in the
creation of a Higher Council for the Judiciary, with mixed judicial and
lay representation, membership of which should not be dominated by
political considerations.
14

12.5 Where an independent council or commission is constituted for the
appointment of judges, its members should be selected on the basis of
their competence, experience, understanding of judicial life, capacity
for appropriate discussion and appreciation of the importance of a
culture of independence. Its non-judge members may be selected from
among outstanding jurists or citizens of acknowledged reputation and
experience chosen by an appropriate appointment mechanism.

12.6 The promotion of judges, when not based on seniority, should be made
by the independent body responsible for the appointment of judges,
and should be based on an objective appraisal of his or her
performance, having regard to the expertise, abilities, personal
qualities and skills required for initial appointment.

12.7 The procedure in certain states of the Chief Justice or President of the
Supreme Court being elected, in rotation, from among the judges of
that court by the judges themselves, is not inconsistent with the
principle of judicial independence and may be considered for adoption
by other states.


13. Tenure of Judges

13.1 It is the duty of the State to provide a full complement of judges to
discharge the work of the judiciary.

13.2 A judge should have a constitutionally guaranteed tenure until a
mandatory retirement age or the expiry of a fixed term of office.
7
A
fixed term of office should not ordinarily be renewable unless
procedures exist to ensure that the decision regarding re-appointment
is made according to objective criteria and on merit.

13.3 The engagement of temporary or part-time judges should not be a
substitute for a full complement of permanent judges. Where permitted
by local law, such temporary or part-time judges should be appointed
on conditions, and accompanied by guarantees, of tenure or objectivity
regarding the continuation of their engagement which eliminate, so far
as possible, any risks in relation to their independence.

13.4 Because the appointment of judges on probation could, if abused,
undermine the independence of the judiciary, the decision whether or

7
National practice appears to favour a specified retirement age for judges of superior courts. The
constitutionally prescribed retirement age for judges of the highest court ranges from 62 in Belize,
Botswana and Guyana to 65 in Greece, India, Malaysia, Namibia (with the possibility of extension to
70), Singapore, Sri Lanka and Turkey, 68 in Cyprus, 70 in Australia, Brazil Ghana, Peru and South
Africa, to 75 in Canada and Chile. In some of these jurisdictions (for example, Belize and Botswana),
however, provision exists to permit a judge who has reached retirement age to continue in office as
long as may be necessary to enable him to deliver judgment or to do any other thing in relation to
proceedings that were commenced before him before he attained that age.

15
not to confirm such appointment should only be taken by the
independent body responsible for the appointment of judges.

13.5 Except pursuant to a system of regular rotation provided by law or
formulated after due consideration by the judiciary, and applied only by
the judiciary or by an independent body, a judge should not be
transferred from one jurisdiction, function or location to another without
his or her consent.
8



14. Remuneration of Judges

14.1 The salaries, conditions of service and pensions of judges should be
adequate, commensurate with the status, dignity and responsibilities of
their office, and should be periodically reviewed for those purposes.

14.2 The salaries, conditions of service and pensions of judges should be
guaranteed by law, and should not be altered to their disadvantage
after appointment.


15. Discipline of Judges

15.1 Disciplinary proceedings against a judge may be commenced only for
serious misconduct.
9
The law applicable to judges may define, as far
as possible in specific terms, conduct that may give rise to disciplinary
sanctions as well as the procedures to be followed.

15.2 A person who alleges that he or she has suffered a wrong by reason of
a judges serious misconduct should have the right to complain to the
person or body responsible for initiating disciplinary action.

15.3 A specific body or person should be established by law with
responsibility for receiving complaints, for obtaining the response of the
judge and for considering in the light of such response whether or not
there is a sufficient case against the judge to call for the initiation of
disciplinary action. In the event of such a conclusion, the body or
person should refer the matter to the disciplinary authority.
10


8
The transfer of judges has been addressed in several international instruments since transfer can be
used to punish an independent and courageous judge, and to deter others from following his or her
example.

9
Conduct that gives rise to disciplinary sanctions must be distinguished from a failure to observe
professional standards. Professional standards represent best practice, which judges should aim to
develop and towards which all judges should aspire. They should not be equated with conduct
justifying disciplinary proceedings. However, the breach of professional standards may be of
considerable relevance, where such breach is alleged to constitute conduct sufficient to justify and
require disciplinary sanction.

10
Unless there is such a filter, judges could find themselves facing disciplinary proceedings brought at
the instance of disappointed litigants.
16

15.4 The power to discipline a judge should be vested in an authority or
tribunal which is independent of the legislature and executive, and
which is composed of serving or retired judges but which may include
in its membership persons other than judges, provided that such other
persons are not members of the legislature or the executive.

15.5 All disciplinary proceedings should be determined by reference to
established standards of judicial conduct, and in accordance with a
procedure guaranteeing full rights of defence.

15.6 There should be an appeal from the disciplinary authority to a court.

15.7 The final decision in any proceedings instituted against a judge
involving a sanction against such judge, whether held in camera or in
public, should be published.

15.8 Each jurisdiction should identify the sanctions permissible under its
own disciplinary system, and ensure that such sanctions are, both in
accordance with principle and in application, proportionate.


16. Removal of Judges from Office

16.1 A judge may be removed from office only for proved incapacity,
conviction of a serious crime, gross incompetence, or conduct that is
manifestly contrary to the independence, impartiality and integrity of the
judiciary.

16.2 Where the legislature is vested with the power of removal of a judge,
such power should be exercised only after a recommendation to that
effect of the independent authority vested with power to discipline
judges.

16.3 The abolition of a court of which a judge is a member should not be
accepted as a reason or an occasion for the removal of the judge.
Where a court is abolished or restructured, all existing members of that
court should be re-appointed to its replacement or appointed to another
judicial office of equivalent status and tenure. Where there is no such
judicial office of equivalent status or tenure, the judge concerned
should be provided with full compensation for loss of office.


17. Budget of the Judiciary

17.1 The budget of the judiciary should be established in collaboration with
the judiciary, care being taken that neither the executive nor legislature
authorities is able to exert any pressure or influence on the judiciary
when setting its budget.

17
17.2 The State should provide the judiciary with sufficient funds and
resources to enable each court to perform its functions efficiently and
without an excessive workload.

17.3 The State should provide the judiciary with the financial and other
resources necessary for the organization and conduct of the training of
judges.

17.4 The budget of the judiciary should be administered by the judiciary
itself or by a body independent of the executive and the legislature and
which acts in consultation with the judiciary. Funds voted for the
judiciary should be protected from alienation and misuse.




DEFINITIONS


In this statement of implementation measures, the following meanings shall
be attributed to the words used:

irrelevant grounds means race, colour, sex, religion, national origin, caste,
disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic
status and other like causes.

judge means any person exercising judicial power, however designated, and
includes a magistrate and a member of an independent tribunal.