IDEALISM AND REALISM IN WESTERN AND INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
There have been different Idealistic views in Western and Indian
philosophies as follows: Western Idealism (i) Platonic Idealism The Idealism of Plato is objective in the sense that the ideas enjoy an existence in a real world independent of any mind. Mind is not antecedent for the existence of ideas. The ideas are there whether a mind reveals them or not. The determination of the phenomenal world depends on them. They somehow determine the empirical existence of the world. Hence, Platos conception of reality is nothin! b"t a system of eternal, imm"table and immaterial ideas. (ii) Idealism of Berele! #er$eley may be said to be the fo"nder of Idealism in the modern period. The existence of thin!s m"st be determined by perception of idea. This type of Idealism may be re!arded as s"bjective Idealism. %ccordin! to #er$eley, it is the individ"al mind that determines the existence of external objects. &or the emer!ence of perception, the existence of external objects independent of mind is necessary. Witho"t an external and independent object no perception is possible. (iii) Idealism of "ant The Idealism of 'ant consists in that the world of o"r $nowled!e is an ideal constr"ction o"t of sense manifold to which alone the forms and cate!ories of "nderstandin! are confined and, therefore, is $nown as objective Idealism. It is s"bjective in the sense that $nowled!e does not reach o"t to the world of thin!s(in(themselves. He ar!"es that reality cannot be !rasped by o"r $nowled!e beca"se o"r j"d!ment is conditional, relative and partial. We cannot $now a thin! as it is b"t we $now it as o"r experience reveals. (#) Idealism of He$el The f"ndamental )"estion before He!el was: What m"st be the nat"re and characteristic of "ltimate principle of the "niverse in order to explain by it the ori!in, !rowth and development of mind and nat"re, their m"t"al relations, as well as the )"estion of science, philosophy, ethics, art and reli!ion. The world consists of both( mind and nat"re, s"bject and object, self and not(self. He!el seems to reserve for his %bsol"te an imm"table and inexha"stible bein! which always transcends its world of becomin!. In other words the absol"te Idealism of He!el may be called objective Idealism. (#i) Idealism of Bradle! #radley finds that the external relations are meanin!less to the conception of the "nity of reality and the internal relations. #radley thin$s that the proper or!an for !raspin! the absol"te *eality is not intellect b"t the whole of mental life which is constit"ted by intellect, feelin! and will. He, therefore, describes his %bsol"te as identified with experience. H"man experience is a piece of transcendental experience and can approximate it when it has learnt to transcend the limitations of intellect. The %bsol"te of #radley therefore, is to be felt, experienced or reali+ed and not to be $nown by o"r simple intellect. Indian Idealism #"ddhism and ,edanta are the most important schools of Indian Idealism. (i) %o$acara sc&ool of B'dd&ism %ccordin! to it, as is !enerally believed, only momentary ideas are real. The reality which is !rasped by the fo"r cate!ories of tho"!ht is only Phenomenal. The hi!hest reality is "nchan!in!, calm and permanent. It is beyond the fo"r cate!ories of tho"!ht. It is beyond the d"ality of s"bject and object. #y mere analysis we cannot !rasp reality. Th"s, it is indescribable and devoid of any explanation. The external world is the creation, not of the individ"al conscio"sness, b"t of the absol"te conscio"sness. %ll except conscio"sness is "nreal. -onscio"sness alone is the established tr"th preached by the #"ddha. %ll the three worlds are the res"lt of discrimination or tho"!ht(relations. .o external object exists in reality. %ll that is, is conscio"sness. (ii) Idealism of Sanara( In the philosophy of /ana$ra the "ltimate reality is #rahman or self. He maintains that the transcendental !ro"nds of experience are self. The self is not momentary b"t permanent, not chan!in! b"t chan!eless, not finite b"t infinite, not limited and conditional b"t "nlimited and "nconditional. The existence of self is self proved 0svayam siddha1 and cannot be denied. It is always conscio"s. /an$ara reco!ni+es three !rades of reality.The external object of o"r ordinary experience have only a ,yavahari$a /atta 0empirical reality1, the objects appearin! in dreams and ill"sions enjoy only a Pratibhasi$a /atta 0ill"sory appearance1 and #rahma, i.e., the %bsol"te has the Parmarthi$a /atta 0"ltimate reality1. The ,yavahari$a and Pratibhasi$a existences are real from a lower stand(point. The "ltimate reality is the hi!hest reality which is devoid of all differences and contradictions. We cannot $now #rahma b"t we can become #rahma. 2He, who $nows #rahma, becomes #rahman. (iii) Mad&!amia Sc&ool of B'dd&ism %ccordin! to this school, reality is beyond the fo"r cate!ories of tho"!ht. H"man intellect cannot !rasp reality. What we !rasp is the Prapanca, and not the Paramartha. If we p"t this idea in technical lan!"a!e of #"ddhism, we can say that the h"man $nowled!e is confined to the /amvarti(/atya, i.e., to the phenomenal reality. It is "nable to !rasp the Paramartha(/atya i.e. the no"menal reality. The #"ddhism preaches reality 0dharma1 considerin! two types of tr"th. The first type is the Phenomenal Tr"th and the second one is the .o"menal Tr"th. The empirical world is the phenomenal reality, while the "ltimate tr"th is the no"menal reality. 2The "ltimate tr"th is int"itional, peacef"l, devoid of pl"rality and one. This is the nat"re of reality. Western Realism The *ealism, which believes in one material reality, is called monistic *ealism. If it ta$es the existent to be two, it wo"ld fall in the cate!ory of 3"alistic *ealism. If it admits reality to be more than two, it wo"ld be called Pl"ralistic *ealism. /imilarly, some other types of *ealism wo"ld be dealt with accordin! to their specific characteristics. (a) Monistic Realism The primitive 4ree$ philosophers s"ch as Thales, %naximander, %naximenes and Heraclit"s, in so far as they each tho"!ht one or other of water, air or fire to be the one indivisible st"ff of reality, were Monistic *ealists. To them all thin!s as the physical objects, the mind, the life and the rest were the prod"cts of any one of these st"ffs. Th"s, conscio"sness was considered to be merely a prod"ct of matter. ()) D'alistic Realism Plato and %ristotle may be said to have ind"l!ed in 3"alism in spite of their insistence on the reality of the world of Ideas or &orms. %ristotle was, perhaps, more prono"nced in his 3"alism than Plato. In modern philosophy, it was 3ecartes who !ave a distinct t"rn to *ealism. To him matter and mind are independent existences each havin! a characteristic diametrically opposed to the characteristic of the other. %ltho"!h 'ant was an Idealist in his no"menal o"tloo$, still he become !"ilty of a 3o"ble 3"alism(5pistemolo!ical 3"alism between sense and "nderstandin! and ontolo!ical 3"alism between mind and no"menal world of thin!s(in themselves. (c) Pl'ralistic Realism 4ree$ thin$ers tho"!ht that the visible objects of the "niverse are many and independent of one another, and each s"ch object can be divided f"rther and f"rther till we come to a point beyond which o"r division cannot !o. /"ch "nits of material objects, which they call 2atoms6 m"st be the "ltimate physical principles of the "niverse. &rom these 2atoms6 all else 0incl"din! minds1 have been derived. They are the only reals, self s"fficient, self existent and indivisible, and independent of the minds which ori!inate from them. This type of *ealism can be called Pl"ralistic Material *ealism or 2%tomic *ealism6. Indian Realism Indian *ealism can be classified into two broad divisions: 7rthodox *ealism and Heterodox *ealism. That school which believes in the ,edic Testinomy is called 7rthodox and that which does not re!ard the ,edic %"thority as valid is called Heterodox. (i) San&!a Sc&ool of Realism This school falls in the cate!ory of *ealism. It points o"t that there are two "ltimate entities vi+., P"r"sa and Pra$rti both of which are eternal and different from each other. P"r"sa is nothin! b"t conscio"sness 0citta1 while Pra$rti is "nconscio"s 0jada1.P"r"sa is spectator 0drastrsa$sin1 and enjoyer 0bho$ta1, while Pra$rti is what is seen and enjoyed 0drsya and bho!ya1. &rom this acco"nt it is evident that P"r"sa is conscio"sness or spirit, whereas Pra$rti is physical existence. Pra$rti is f"rther manifested into different forms. The /an$hya system believes in two realities which are independent of and different from each other. (ii) Raman'*a+s Realism %ccordin! to *aman"ja, the conscio"s s"bstance 0cittatva1 is $nower and is the s"bstrat"m of $nowled!e 0jnana1. #oth are eternal and inseparably connected to!ether. 'nowled!e is all pervadin!. It is immaterial 0ajada1 and of self(revealin! nat"re. It is capable of contraction and expansion 0san$oca and ,i$osa1. It ill"mines thin!s as well as itself. #"t it cannot $now itself. The physical s"bstance is divided into three $inds: 0i1 that which possesses imm"table existence 0sattva1 only, 0ii1 that which has all the three )"alities 0!"nas1 and 0iii1 that which does not possess any one of the three )"alities 0!"nas1. It is eternal. It is distinct from $nowled!e and is free from conscio"sness. It is s"bject to chan!e. (iii) P'r#a,Mimamsa sc&ools of Realism #oth the scholars vi+., #hatta and Prabha$ara, believe in two independent realities. #"t a close st"dy of the Mimamsa(/"tra in which it is indicated that $nowled!e is prod"ced when the sense(or!an comes in contact with the object, shows )"ite clearly that the writer believes in the separate and independent existence of $nowled!e from objects. It is ri!ht to say that both the schools of P"rva(Mimamsa are of realistic nat"re. (i#) N!a!a,-aisesia sc&ool of Realism It holds that spirit and matterare two independent s"bstances. It believes in seven cate!ories of reality. Matter which is an important factor in the concept of *ealism has been shows as eternal, non(momentary and co!ni+able thro"!h one or more means of valid co!nition. (#) .ain T&eor! of Realism %ll the philosophical problems are based "pon the conception of "niverse. .o school of tho"!ht denies the existence of "niverse b"t tries to prove it by its own point of view. Time is mentioned as a separate entity. This two( fold classification shows that there are two schools of tho"!ht in 8ainism. 7ne believed in the existence of five extensive s"bstances and the other conceived the "niverse as composed of six s"bstances. (#) -ai)&asia and So'tratia sc&ools of Realism %ccordin! to ,aibhasi$as, $nowled!e, conscio"sness or intellect is formless, while it has forms accordin! to /a"tranti$as. The former believes in the direct perceptibility of the o"tside world, while the latter holds it to be entirely inferential. The ,aibhasi$a system may be called 23irect Momentary *ealism6. The /a"tranti$a school may be named 2Indirect Momentary *ealism6. (#iii) /ar#aa Sc&ool of Realism %ccordin! to the -arva$, conscio"sness is not a separate reality. He holds that reality consists of the objective world which is constit"ted by the fo"r mahabh"tas 0Primary 5lements1, vi+., earth, water, fire and air. -onscio"sness is merely a by prod"ct of a pec"liar amal!amation of the above mentioned Mahabh"tas. %ltho"!h none of them possesses it separately. This school does not believe in anythin! which is neither a bh"ta nor bha"ti$a 0prod"ct of bh"tas1. This system of *ealism is p"rely materialistic.