Please Cite This Paper as Follows (Online Publication, Without Page #):
Communication, 20 (3&4).
E-mail: Min.Jiang@uncc.edu
Telephone: 1-704-687-2826
ii
Abstract
legitimacy rather than ideology. As such, a modern authoritarian government has to allow
for some forms of political discussion and participation from which popular consent to
authoritarian rule is derived. With 420 million Internet users, 200 million bloggers, and
277 million netizens able to access the Internet through their mobile phones (CNNIC,
2010), China presents an interesting case to examine public deliberation online. Adapting
online one, the article proposes four types of online spaces of authoritarian deliberation
extending from the core to the peripheries of authoritarian rule: central propaganda
implications for political participation in China and argues that democracy need not be a
“Without legitimacy, words are invalid; invalid words lead man to nowhere”
Internet users reached one million. Ten years later, China surpassed the United States as
the world’s largest Internet market. By July 2010, China had 420 million Internet users,
31.8% of its population. Among them, 200 million have blogs1 (China Internet Network
The exponential growth of the information sector helped China leapfrog into the
digital age and galvanized its economy. However, it also amplified voices of the masses,
much to the horror of the one-party state as the Editor-in-Chief of People’s Net said:
“What would it look like if everybody went into politics? … China has more than 100
million Internet users. If they were all free to speak their minds, we would have a very
serious situation” (quoted from Lagerkvist, 2006, p.9). It almost seems President Reagan
foresaw fear of this sort when he remarked in 1989 that “[t]he Goliath of totalitarianism
will be brought down by the David of the microchip,” (quoted from Kalathil & Boas,
2003, p.1). Yet despite the doom and gloom about the regime’s fate upon the arrival of
information technology, Chinese government has so far managed to weave and guard a
sophisticated authoritarian web through various means of censorship (Boas, 2006). So,
the state’s extensive Internet regulation runs against an impressive degree of Internet
activism (Yang, 2006) that has led the famed Hong Kong blogger Roland Song to believe
but highly policed and censored, there is actually considerable online public discussion of
2
social, political, and policy issues, albeit largely within the expanding boundaries
consented to by the state. Those who view the Chinese citizenry as an obedient and
deliberation promises to expand the public sphere and even elevate democratic practice in
the West (Gastil & Black, 2008), do they hold any potential for China, a society under the
watchful eye of a powerful government? What emergent spaces for public deliberation,
however limited, can help unlock China’s online public sphere (Lagerkvist, 2006)? In
what ways has public deliberation among Chinese Internet users challenged or supported
the state? And what implications does it have for social and political pluralism and
This article explores the spaces, dynamics, and implications of online public
deliberation in a rapidly changing Chinese society. First, I draw upon Western theories of
public sphere and public deliberation and discuss their relevance to Chinese online public
and content and increasing commercial influence in China’s online spaces, the paper
examine how China’s peculiar sociopolitical contexts shape its online deliberative spaces.
I propose four major types of spaces of authoritarian deliberation extending from the core
examine the dynamics of deliberation and state control in each and discuss, finally, the
Dryzek, 2006; Gastil & Black, 2008), have until recently excluded the experience of
deliberation in China (He, 2006a; Leib & He, 2006). I argue, however, the implicit
(He, 2006a & 2006b; Leib & He, 2006; Yang, 2003, 2006, 2008), but also inhibits
countries like China, especially in online settings. The very development of public
deliberative experiences and institutions, particularly at the grassroots levels, may help
Democratic Deliberation
agree on increasing the legitimacy and quality of decision making through informed and
popular discussions. “Public” indicates open scrutiny as opposed to private chat (Sennett,
the cornerstone of liberal representative democracy (Chambers, 2003; Fung & Wright,
2003). It is hoped that the very practice of public deliberation can approximate the public
sphere as a social space where private individuals are able to engage in rational debate to
So far, much of the literature on public deliberation has rested upon a rather
idealized notion of the public sphere and a normative view of collective discursive
deliberation. For instance, most recently, Gastil and Black (2008) define public
deliberation as the following: “When people deliberate, they carefully examine a problem
of diverse points of view” (p.2). Combining both analytical and social aspects, this
definition resonates with both Dewey’s (1910) conceptualization of problem solving and
Habermas’s writing on the public sphere. The Deweyan perspective on problem solving
is rational and analytical: creating a solid information base, prioritizing the key values,
identifying a broad range of solutions, weighing the pros, cons, and tradeoffs among the
solutions, and lastly choosing the best solution possible. The consideration of the social
aspects of public deliberation also bears the imprint of Habermasian notions of the public
This normative approach, however, is often criticized for its idealism and
instrumentalism. For instance, Fraser (1990), Mouffe (1996), and Young (1996) have on
various occasions critiqued the concept of the public sphere for its lack of attention to
interactivity is often juxtaposed to the danger of centralization, digital divide, and loss of
privacy (Harrison & Falvey, 2001). These dichotomies reflect the tension between
imperfect accounts of human experiences. But this rift can be understood in productive
ways. Dahlberg (2005) argues that the pursuit of the Habermasian ideal of the public
sphere does not mean reduction of coercion is not desirable or cannot possibly be
achieved. Instead, the very process of argumentation, justification, even when flawed, has
A number of approaches have been proposed to bridge the gap between reality
and idealized norms. For instance, Fishkin (1995) introduces the concept of
“incompleteness” to account for the less than optimal processes of public deliberation.
Dahlberg (2007) contends at a more fundamental level that in order to fully account for
power that supports existing social and political systems, a radicalized public sphere
forms of public deliberation. Among Habermas’s various critics, Fraser (1990) argued
that strong publics, those whose discourse encompasses both opinion-formation and
Recently, Habermas (2005) also speaks of two types of political deliberation: “(a) among
citizens within the informal public sphere and (b) among politicians or representatives
6
within formal settings” (p. 388). The differentiation between strong and weak publics is
particularly useful for understanding online public deliberation in China. While rarely
conversations between netizens can approach weak publics that often challenge the status
collective decision making in more democratic societies, but this paper focuses on
dialogic deliberation and everyday political talk (Kim & Kim, 2008) among Chinese
netizens. Whether individuals are drawn to the like-minded, more likely to result in a
(Stromer-Galley, 2003), dialogic deliberation helps construct the concept of the self and
other, produce a sense of community, and render public reason possible (Kim & Kim,
the emphasis here is not the production of consensus through rational debate, but the very
act of informal and spontaneous discussions on various social, political, and policy issues
that could ultimately support deeper exercises of deliberative democracy down the road.
The author does not assume a fully capable Chinese citizenry for public deliberation or a
liberal democratic framework that guarantees such institutions as the rule of law, civil
Authoritarian Deliberation
unique contours of public discourse in China. For He, Chinese public deliberation is
authoritarian because decision making is dominated by leaders who are not competitively
7
elected. As a result, the party-state sanctions and prescribes the boundaries of political
discourses. However, the discourse is deliberative in the sense that local people employ
evidence is presented, solutions proposed and justified. This type of local participation is
naturally problematic given that authoritarian regimes, by definition, can never be fully
acknowledges the greater civic and political speech freedoms extant in an authoritarian
state that relaxes its grip over political discourse in exchange for its own legitimacy and
survival.
opinion formation and procedural decision making in face-to-face settings at the local
level, I adapt the concept to study public discussion and opinion formation on Chinese
Internet (2006a). This adaptation does not discount the importance of offline public
sharing, discussion, and even collective action on a wide range of public issues. In the
Chinese contexts, online public deliberation is authoritarian because the state actively
practices.
ideology. Three decades of Chinese reform and opening up have witnessed the erosion of
planned economy, rise of an impressive middle class, and demise of the communist
8
ideology (Zhou, 2008). In order to engender popular belief that existing political
institutions are the most appropriate for the society, in other words to maintain the
China has to allow for some forms of discussion, debate, and participation from which
government has implemented various input institutions “that people can use to apprise the
state of their concerns” (Nathan 2003, 14). Such institutions include: the Administrative
Litigation Act of 1989 that allows citizens to sue government agencies for alleged
grievances are addressed); and use of mass media as the people’s tribunes (Nathan 2003).
I argue that the advent of the Internet in China has extended and in some ways
transformed such practices by adding an online dimension to many of rights- and justice-
seeking activities.
Offline, for instance, Time Magazine reported the first deliberative poll conducted
in China in 2005. It took place in Zeguo township, Wenling City of Zhejiang Province.
257 residents, who were randomly selected to represent the town’s 240,000 population,
local officials and learning about these budgetary proposals, they chose environmental
projects over the flashier proposals of parks and bridges. The poll’s architect, James
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Fishkin was gleeful with hope, “The public is smart. Under the right conditions, it’s smart
in China just like it’s smart in Britain or smart in Bulgaria” (Jakes, 2005).
The Zeguo poll was not entirely unprecedented. Over the years, a variety of
indigenous deliberative practices for collective decision-making had been adopted at both
the local and national levels (He, 2006b): democratic discussion meetings (minzhu
track for people’s voices (minqing zhitongche); democratic political discussion day
hearings (minzhu tingzhenghui); residents’ forums (jumin luntan), and etc. Some
grassroots meetings also experiment with citizen evaluation of local leaders’ performance
(Kennedy, Rozelle, & Shi, 2004). At the national level, village elections and public
hearings have been approved by the central government (He, 2006b; Pei, 2006; Shi,
1997).
Sure, one can reasonably argue that such deliberative practices are often times
dominated by the state and marked by lack of equality and representation of different
interests. Whether online or offline, they are approved by the state to pacify the public
experiments acts of deliberative democracy will “let the Chinese government off too
aggregate public opinions. Deliberation in China may not but fully democratic, but it is
accountable for their actions. If the cultivation of public reason and consideration of
public opinion in policy making can foster what some scholars call governance-driven
The unprecedented adoption of the Internet, along with other recent adjustment of
relevant. First of all, three decades of economic and related social reforms have
transformed China in such a way that the state can no longer dictate or monopolize the
distribution of resources (Yang, 2004). Nor can it fully control public discourses. Not
only is there a swelling Chinese middle class with their faith in free enterprise and respect
for private property, there is an equally impressive civil rights movement aimed at
defending individual rights and free personal choices, including occupational, sexual,
allowing people to let off steam to avoid and contain social confrontation; b) channel
public discourses in ways to support the government’s policies and agendas; and c)
Paradoxically, while the digital revolution has enhanced the Party’s ability to control,
bolstered the permeation of commercial interests in the society, and in many ways
widened the digital divide (Zhao, 2007), it also has empowered individual voices and
11
group formation (Yang, 2007). Many Chinese are now able to: a) access greater
radio, and TV programs previously; b) “talk back” to official media on issues of their
concern; and c) engage with other societal members and overseas media through public
discourse. In this context, study of online authoritarian deliberation can provide insight
into the unique nature and potential of everyday political discourse among Chinese
netizens.
By the end of 2008, there were 2.878 million Chinese websites (CNNIC, 2009a).
Like elsewhere in the world, Chinese Internet teems with various applications ranging
from emails, news feeds, blogs, bulletin boards (BBSs), podcasts, videocasts, social
networking sites and so on. What sets China apart from others is the state’s insistence on
asserting its authority over a massive network of users and public discourses within its
Internet gateway infrastructure (Boas, 2004), filtering (Zittrain & Edelman, 2003),
2009), suppression of dissident use and discipline of cyber cafes (Chase & Mulvenon,
2002; Qiu, 2000), and most recently employment of web commentators to shape and alter
public debate (Bandurski, 2008). However, these tactics of control are not deployed
invariably across the board2, thus producing different types of constraints and
and patrolled by the government, severed from the rest of the world by the “Great
12
Firewall of China”3 (Qiu, 2000), I see it as a sphere composed of diverse yet connected
spaces where the influence of the state varies, thus creating disparate conditions for
public deliberation. I recognize in this paper four types of online spaces of authoritarian
deliberation extending from the core to the peripheries of authoritarian rule: central
Chinese society and/or international communities in each space. Moreover, these spaces
are not disjointed islands. Rather, they overlap, converge, and clash. In the following
section, I discuss the features of these spaces that are not only home to mundane public
conversations between Chinese netizens but are also groundswells of radical jingoism as
Central propaganda spaces are online spaces where the Chinese government
asserts its presence through government websites and other official online media. The
state’s control over these spaces is firm, if not complete. Examples of central propaganda
spaces include Chinese e-government websites as well as state media such as People’s
office automation, e-commerce, the state’s 1 trillion yuan investment (US$121 billion) in
government IT projects since early 1990s also built an extensive government network
(Yong, 2003, p.83). Provincial, city, and county governments feature government portals
at rates of 100%, 93%, and 69% respectively (CCID, 2006). Offline government
operations such as People’s Daily and Xinhua News Agency also have a significant
13
online presence through People’s Net and Xinhuanet respectively. State broadcast
heavyweights like China Central Television (CCTV) and China National Radio (CNR)
quickly adopted digital platforms. Similar to the government’s manipulation of print and
broadcast media for propaganda and mobilization of its citizens, the recent development
and management of the state’s online presence helps solidify the government’s technical,
easier to achieve given the state’s direct control over the infrastructure and dependent
institutions. Not only is online content in such spaces dominated by state “guidance of
compliance with official agenda in these central propaganda institutions is also buttressed
(2009) reveals a complicated picture of government networks that have grown adept at
setting public agenda, regulating public discourse, managing social order to maintain its
legitimacy. Aside from making more information available online, government networks
opened up spaces for public discourse: e-consultation functions such as Q&A with
government officials and e-petition; e-discussion features such as real-time “gov. chat”
between citizens and policy makers and policy discussion forums. Granted the state
intends these limited spaces to deflate social tension and re-establish Party legitimacy,
but when compared to the past, local citizens have more access to government
14
information, services, and means to articulate their rights and seek social justice. As a
result citizens are gaining access to local politics, and with it, political knowledge.
Government online media have also resorted to softer societal control, relying on
more sophisticated methods of containing public dissent and setting agenda. Similar to
the use of investigative journalism in traditional broadcast media (Zhao, 2000), official
online media have both strategic and commercial imperatives to provide some spaces for
public deliberation. For instance, People’s Net has maintained a highly popular online
nationalistic “protest forum” against NATO’s 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in
former Yugoslavia (Yang, 2003). Riding the wave of zealous sentiments, the forum was
an important locus of rising nationalism. Later, it became a highly popular place for
revisiting China’s one child policy, improving food safety, increasing social equality and
so on. Many of the forum’s users consider the forum and the Internet in general a freer
space for public discussion of national affairs, expression of their opinions, concerns and
complaints (Yang, 2003). In a symbolic gesture of top Chinese leaders’ recognition of the
Internet’s power in shaping public opinion, Chinese President Hu Jingtao recently held a
dialogue with netizens on the forum. Some interpreted his appearance as proof that the
forum can influence government decision-making (People’s Net, 2008). Notably, with
the state’s strong financial backing, websites like People’s Net lead the way in adopting
the latest interactive features such as blog, podcast, videocast, social bookmarking, and
government directives. By the end of 2008, there were 552,898 .com Chinese websites,
19.2% of all websites in China (CNNIC, 2009a). By comparison, 77% of sites bear .cn
domain names, 3% use .net, and 0.7% register as .org (see Table 1). However, many
websites with .cn and .net domain names are commercial as well, such as Tianya
Users flock to commercial websites for a wide variety of activities. The six most
popular uses are music (83.7% Chinese Internet users), news (78.5%), instant messaging
(75%), search engine (68%), online video (67.7%), and gaming (62.8%), according to a
news, discursive and socializing spaces such as blogs, online forum/BBS, and social
networking sites (SNSs), are also very popular: 54.3% netizens reported having a blog,
35.2% updating their blogs, 30.7% publishing on forum/BBS, and 19.3% actively using
SNSs.
demographic: 35.6% are under the age of 20, 31.5% between ages 20 and 29, i.e. two-
16
thirds of Chinese Internet users, or 200 million, are under age 30 (CNNIC, 2009a). This
wired young generation, born digital or growing up digital like their Western counterparts,
defies tradition and embraces fads (Wang, 2008). They crave social bonding, information,
and entertainment (Bu, 2006). The famed Chinese Back Dorm Boys who rose to stardom
by lip syncing Back Street Boys songs and making them available on video sharing sites
such as YouTube are symbolic of a youth culture that yearns for self expression and
networking tools at their disposal. Blogs, online videos, BBS, and instant messaging
platforms can help bypass traditional media gatekeepers. It is not clear whether this
generation will take the initiative to improve social justice and create social change as
“digital renegades” or simply turning into happy “digital captives” of consumerism and
These commercial spaces are “open” in relative terms because the state still
defines and redefines the boundaries of political discourses. First, the government filters
“harmful” foreign web content through the Great Firewall by controlling key
international Internet gateways (Qiu, 2000). Second, both domestic and foreign Internet
companies have been asked to comply with state regulations. Notably, Baidu, Google,
Yahoo!, and Microsoft have agreed to censor their search engines in exchange for their
access to China’s swelling Internet market (MacKinnon, 2009). The recent dramatic spat
between Beijing and Google brought issues of censorship and cyber attacks to the
international forefront.
17
In addition, Internet content providers are ordered to follow state directives such
Administration of Internet Information Services Provisions (both issued in 2000) and the
(CNNIC 2009b). Moreover, the state can easily reach out to commercial websites to
assert its presence. For example, in 2005, Beijing People’s Political Consultative
Conference invited public input on policy topics such as energy conservation, healthcare,
and pension systems on Sina.com, one of the top three Chinese commercial portals (Sina,
2005).
quite difficult. Although commercial Internet firms have taken a “voluntary pledge” to
keep a watchful eye over users (Wired, 2002), the finer details of how to interpret and
variations among blog hosting companies operating in China. Much of the variation is
Adding to the difficulty of regulation is the fact that Chinese netizens have grown
adept at critiquing the regime while avoiding harsh repression (Esarey, 2008). It is one
thing to ban patently sensitive topics such as Tibet and Falun Gong, but quite another to
detect and delete farce, coded criticism, and political satire (Esarey & Xiao, 2008). For
instance, when websites are shut down by authorities, netizens openly refer to it as being
“harmony” in Chinese society. After that phrase became blocked, Chinese netizens
started to post pictures of river crabs wearing three watches: river crabs sound like
“harmonize” in Chinese and three watches are a pun on “the three represents.”4
To shape and sway public opinion in these spaces, the “50 cent party” approach
became popular. Started in 2005 in Nanjing University, web commentators are reputedly
paid 50 cents (or $0.07) for each positive comment made on popular Chinese websites
and message boards (Bandurski, 2008). Backed by State Council Information Office and
funded by commercial websites, these web commentators focus on current affairs forums
and major national and provincial portals, both official and commercial. Thus, “larger
Web sites must find a happy medium between pleasing the authorities and going about
their business” (Bandurski, 2008) in the face of increasing civic desire for free expression
thrives. Emergent civic spaces here refer to online spaces where NGOs, civic groups and
organizations deliberate and coordinate collective actions around shared interests and
values, relatively independent of the state and the market. The latest CCNIC survey
(2009a) indicates civic spaces are a weak sector of Chinese Internet, with 21,005
websites registering with .ORG domain names, constituting only 0.7% of all Chinese
websites. Many officially sanctioned national civic organizations use the Internet to
coordinate their efforts: China Red Cross, China International Almsdeed Institute, and
China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF). CYDF manages the widely popular
Project Hope, building elementary schools in rural areas and improving poor students’
19
access to education. Recently, a few celebrity charities such as One Foundation (started
by Chinese Kong Fu movie star Jet Li), and Yumi Love Fund (pioneered by Chinese pop
star Li Yuchun) garnered a lot of media attention and a large online following.
The types of civic spaces are as varied as the types of civic organizations. Yang
organizations, such as religious and cultural ones, also maintain an online presence.
According to the National Bureau of Civil Affairs (2007), there were 212,000 voluntary
not exist entirely separate from the state. Civic organizations are expected to complement
convey social concerns, and maintain social order (Wang & Zhang, 2007). The growth of
Chinese civil organizations is positive in the sense that they improve people’s experience
However, in a society teemed with governmental “mommies and nannies” (Zhai, 2009),
Chinese civic organizations are not only required to register but also to be affiliated with
Much like their offline counterparts, non-commercial websites have been asked to
register online. Under Ministry of Industry and Information Technology’s (MIIT) 2005
must register with the MIIT and provide contact information or will face a significant
financial penalty. This regulation applies to all personal websites and blogs hosted in
20
China that are accessible through an independent domain name. Blogs hosted through an
Internet service provider like Sina Blogs, for instance, need not register. This regulation
and bloggers.
Yet despite interference from the government, civic spaces are expanding.
Through a process of what Yang (2003) calls “the co-evolution of the Internet and civil
society in China,” the Web offers new avenues for citizen participation. China’s incipient
civil society, in turn, expands the Internet by providing the social basis for
communication.
When Beijing initially embraced the Internet for economic development, the Web
was not seen as inherently liberating but rather something that can be configured and
controlled (Jiang, 2009). As China’s information sector boomed, the state ability to police
it has also grown broader and more sophisticated. Meanwhile Internet adoption has
significantly increased the opportunities for Chinese people to access information, assert
their voices, and connect with fellow netizens. If civil society is “the arena of uncoerced
collective action around shared interests, purposes and values” (Center for Civil Society,
2004), the spaces of spontaneous civic actions have expanded in absolute terms.
identities and interests. Yang’s study of Huaxia Zhiqing Net (2003), for instance,
demonstrates how the educated youth generation uses online forums to build a virtual
community based on their shared experience during the Cultural Revolution. Independent
bloggers and podcasters may also create communities of readers and fellow writers.
21
Don’t Think, a blog created in May 2006 by Beijing Sanlian Lifeweek journalist Wang
Xiaofeng saw more than 30 million visits as of April 2008 and is now available offline
through China’s online bookstores. The blog, connected with dozens of other
In 2005, Antiwave won the Deutsche Welle’s Best Podcasting Site for its sarcastic
parodies of the establishment. The site’s name, Antiwave, communicates its creators’
podcasting emphasizes critical thinking and public discussion where the Great Talk of the
People (Renmin Dahuitan) replaces the Great Hall of the People5 (Renmin Dahuitang).
China are not excluded from their podcasting. These sites are examples of an alternative
online deliberation also supports collective action on civic and policy issues. 1kg.org, for
donated books and other school supplies for children in remote areas. Moreover, the
collapsing as citizens move between them online. Collective Internet incidents (Wangluo
Qunti Shijian), also known as massive online incidents, cyber activism, or cyber
contentions are emblematic of this trend (Cai 2008; Yang 2008). Massive online
petitions, protests, and Internet vigilantism (or the “human flesh search”) constitute
22
“radical, claims-making communicative action[s]” (Yang 2008, p.126) that often involve
A particularly powerful example was the death of Sun Zhigang. Sun was a
college graduate who worked for a graphic design company in Guangzhou. He was
detained for not having proper identification papers and died three days later in police
custody. Sun’s death triggered a public outcry online. The online protests eventually
resulted in the abolishment of the “Custody and Repatriation” system (China Net, 2003).
As momentous as the response to Sun’s death was, it was not an isolated incident. In
2007, a Chongqin homeowner stared down powerful developers to defend her property
rights. In 2008, Weng’an police building and vehicles were torched during a riot over the
cover-up over a girl’s death. Also in 2008, Chinese college students created a website to
counter perceived distortions in the Western media’s coverage of the 2008 Tibetan unrest
these actions, large numbers of individuals use the Internet, as well as offline sources, to
identify a specific person or facts. “Human flesh searches” have targeted both major and
minor issues, from exposing corrupt officials to publicly shaming individuals for
undesirable, yet admittedly minor, activity (Yu & Shan 2009; Zuckerman 2009). In their
public deliberation and action reflect the development of a more pluralized, stratified, and
liberal society.
International deliberative spaces bridge China and the outside world and mediate public
numerous such deliberative spaces. Chinese public opinion is closely observed and
monitored by various actors with backgrounds in culture, politics, business, academia and
etc.
actors. Foreign content deemed undesirable is blocked by the Great Firewall of China
(Zittrain & Edelman, 2003). Although such filtering may not be perfect, it is effective
enough to maintain societal stability (Boas, 2004). Beijing has also been aggressively
building its international PR operations to counter foreign influences such as BBC and
Voice of America. Among the government’s international efforts are English versions of
“cross” borders and traverse otherwise disconnected online communities. Websites and
blogs openly critical of the Chinese government and its practices are selectively censored.
Websites like MITBBS, highly popular among overseas students and immigrant
General publishing and social networking sites such as Blogger, YouTube, and
Twitter are inaccessible from China. The blocking of general information sources like
Wikipedia, BBC, and New York Times often depends upon the sociopolitical situation of
the moment. During a March 31, 2009 press conference, a reporter questioned the
spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the government’s blocking
YouTube. The spokesperson responded, “The Internet in China is fully open and the
Chinese Government manages the Internet according to the law. As for what you can and
cannot watch, watch what you can watch, and don’t watch what you cannot watch”
Other bridge bloggers operate from within China without being blocked. Many
choose some degree of self-censorship. The Chinese Economist Translating Team does
exactly that to balance its existence and compliance with the government (Baio, 2009). A
group of dedicated fans of the Economist newsmagazine have been translating each issue
knowledge and improving their own English skills. On touchy topics, the team puts the
articles in a protected forum that blocks access to search engines and non-members.
“There’s one general rule: If the article involves any sensitive topics, if you’re not sure
whether it’s permitted or not, please don’t risk any chance by publishing it” (Baio, 2009).
be accessible to Chinese netizens. The official view tends to support projects like anti-
CNN that collects and distributes biased Western media coverage of China among
25
netizens to cultivate a sense of nationalism. Although the intent to expose Western media
bias is completely legitimate and the founders of anti-CNN vow to seek truth, it is quite
ironic that the website largely fails to do the same with Chinese mainstream media.
However, despite online censorship, Chinese people do have more freedoms than before
and there is a growing interest in the access and understanding of foreign media content.
The Internet may have a positive impact on assisting Chinese knowledge seekers to
Discussion
to 420 million Internet users and 200 million bloggers (CNNIC, 2010). Modern
authoritarianism, resorting less to sheer military might and downright oppression, instead
compliance. More refined and strategic use of economic resources and state apparatuses
helps the Party maintain social order and stability. Realizing that economic growth is the
regime’s ultimate raison d’être, the Chinese government tries to leverage information
technology to maintain growth while limiting people’s use of the Internet for political
activities. The combination of marketization and political closure translates into the
Party’s continued monopoly of political power while granting a measure of economic and
cultural freedoms to individuals, groups, and regions (Yang, 2003). This opens up spaces
Public deliberation holds potential for an authoritarian society like China. The
pursuit of better policy and governance is not limited to Western societies. Although
authoritarianism can never be democratic, and China has yet to develop democratic
26
institutions such as rule of law and protection for civil rights, it is both possible and
transitional countries. Societies need not choose between radical and incremental change
to facilitate citizens’ participation in local, regional, and national affairs. The concept of
authoritarian deliberation (He, 2005) is a useful theoretical construct that recognizes both
the reality of deliberative experiences in China and the troubling limitations of such
practices. Indeed, a variety of deliberative spaces, confined as they are, exist on the
Chinese Internet with different dynamics of state regulation and citizen participation.
Announcing the demise of the propaganda state (Lynch, 1999) is perhaps a bit too early.
The Chinese state has successfully utilized information technology for political control.
and government legitimacy through both e-government networks and official government
online media. At the same time, however, central propaganda spaces are also infused by
political discussions and general debate. Many government websites now provide citizens
with more access to national and local politics. Citizens, on the other hand, are
such state-controlled deliberation begs the question of how effective the government’s
Whereas mass media used to be part of the state structure, the commercialization
of the Chinese Internet has undoubtedly helped establish a platform for public discourse.
This is not to evoke technological determinism or overstate the participatory nature of the
Web, but rather to acknowledge that citizens have used the available self-publishing tools
27
and social media for business, entertainment, social and civic purposes. Bulletin boards,
online forums, blogs, and social networking sites aid adventures of all kinds. Although
individuals are not allowed to publish newspapers in China, personal blogs have become
private papers for many Chinese bloggers. Citizens have grown accustomed to using both
emotionality (qing) and rationality (li) in public spaces to defend their rights and seek
social justice. As a result, those spaces heavily influenced by state and commercial
interests are also the very spaces where private lives and the larger political world are
Limited as they are, emergent civic spaces on Chinese Internet reflect the slow
liberalization. Zhou (2008) dubs the grassroots movements for increased civil liberties
“China’s long march towards freedom.” Growing pluralism has led to diverse group
formations both offline and online. Social groups, often from the margins of the society,
can gain access to public discourse, articulate their problems and opinions and, in some
cases, even drive public debates. Although the state apparatus reacts to monitor and
control these groups, the nearly unlimited possibilities of group formation afforded by
network technologies and driven by diverse social interests are not likely to wither away.
Instead, widening social inequalities are likely to instigate civic discourses and collective
actions to challenge the regime’s legitimacy. Exposure of corruption and violations of the
between China and the outside world and as the population of sophisticated Chinese
Internet users continues to grow, censorship becomes harder for the state, not easier.
In these various spaces, the state is both repressive and adaptive at the same time.
The state’s methods of monitoring and controlling discourse vary depending on the
relationship between the civic space and Beijing. The regime must adapt as the civic
space shifts further from center of authoritarian control (the central propaganda spaces) to
the periphery (international forums). While technical infrastructures such as the Great
Firewall and censored domestic search engines help the state filter Internet content,
different kinds of legal and personnel resources are also devoted to regulating online
spaces. State employed Internet police delete content directly. Commercial websites self
censor. Both civic and commercial sites are required to register with the government.
predictable. Debate in spaces such as the Strengthening the Nation Forum (Qiangguo
Luntan) is sometimes more lively and robust than other commercial and civic spaces
where government presence is less palpable. While some online activities on Qiangguo
active and genuine (Yang 2003). Known for policy debate, Qiangguo Luntan regularly
attracts citizens who share strong nationalistic sentiments or deep concerns for social
issues, encouraging them to petition the government. It is a space where participants feel
they have an audience and what they say matters. Some even feel top Chinese leaders
take notice of people’s plight and perhaps, in some cases, can even take action.
29
Such online dynamics speak to a number of constraints for civic and political
participation in Chinese society: a) the dominance of a strong state over a weak civil
sector; b) a paternalistic political culture; and c) the lack of institutional and legal means
to resolve social injustices, forcing citizens to appeal to higher authorities outside the
justice system (Minzner 2006). It is, thus, not surprising that these online instances of
demand- and complaint-making are often brought by individuals rather than groups.
Groups are more threatening to the regime. Many complaints often target lower-level
officials rather than the party-state in general (Nathan 2003). This kind of resistance
against men, not principles, argued O’Brien and Li, is paradoxically more system-
The unique pressures on public online discourse in China forces Chinese Internet
users to structure their discourse in other ways. Many civic-minded Chinese users employ
sarcasm, parody, and humor when criticizing the government. A fine balance between
government officials and isolated incidents rather than directing their criticisms at the
central government or national policies beyond the state’s tolerance (Esarey 2008). This
tendency has grown more common as people realized that edgier commercial and
emergent civic websites like Bullog and Fatianxia (Legal World) were ordered to close
their business operations or move their servers overseas (Liu 2008; Ramzy 2009). To
continue their operations, many websites and individual bloggers have toned down their
criticism. However, they persistently test and push back against restrictions, motivated by
the optimistic conviction that “history is on their side” (MacKinnon 2007, 46).
Conclusion
30
support government policies and agendas, the Chinese government has consciously
allowed for a limited sphere of public discussion and deliberation on economic, social,
and political affairs. At the same time, with expanding economic and cultural freedoms,
Chinese citizens are actively seeking greater political freedom in order to secure other
forms of liberty. Such demands have increasingly made their way into Chinese
cyberspace. Although many citizens may not demand democracy or elections, more and
more are willing to use every means possible to defend their personal rights and property
against institutional abuse (Benney 2007). These defenses serve as the foundation of
citizens’ quests for civic and political participation online. Individual citizens and civic
groups have increasingly learned to effectively garner social attention and mobilize
public opinion.
between “democratic” and “non democratic” or “free” and “not free” is too simplistic. In
fact, many countries occupy a place on a continuum between the two. I believe it is more
there are degrees of economic, cultural, and even political freedoms within the system
while, at the same time, the state expects and ensures the consent of its citizenry. The
Online discourses are important for precisely this reason; it is where the state’s claim to
power is contested.
31
China for both theoretical and practical reasons. While some studies tend to view the
Chinese Internet from the standpoint of censorship and control (Boas 2006; Chase &
Mulvenon 2002; Qiu 2000), others emphasize the Internet’s potential to foster civil
society (Yang 2003, 2006, 2007). And in certain cases, a somewhat uncritical use of
concepts like public sphere and deliberative democracy renders China’s unique political
and social contexts almost irrelevant (Zhou, Chan & Peng 2008). These different foci and
assumptions about the Chinese Internet tend to assert certain characteristics or potentials
of the Web at the sacrifice of others. As a result, different programs, agendas, and
policies are proposed or implemented without enough attention to how they may affect or
The contexts of public discourse and opinion formation online are critical to
reject a one-dimensional view of the Chinese Internet. It is not a uniform environment but
In the case of China, the spaces for public deliberation are often factional,
nationalistic, and incoherent. There are several factors that likely encouraged these
characteristics and point to some implications for future research in online public
deliberation.
First, while there are clearer distinctions between the government, business, and
civil society in more mature democratic societies, those lines are less distinct in China
due to the government’s permeating influence on the fabric of political, economic, and
32
social life. Engaging the government to change its institutional behavior, policy, and
believes “it is impossible to develop any form of deliberation without backing from
bureaucrats and elites in order to push social justice agendas forward. Perhaps, as Leib
governing simply were more in touch with the reality that the democratization project
Second, state monitoring and control over expansion of an emergent civil society
stymies the potential growth of the civil sector. Under the government’s restrictions,
public deliberation has not been able to organize or institutionalize itself in order to
broaden its audience and be more effective. Instead, current online public deliberation
carefully guards against the formation of large groups based on political and ideological
agendas, it is perhaps worthwhile, for the short term, to nurture the development of
acquire the experience and skills of civic action. The social morale and social capital
generated in the aftermath of the 2008 earthquake, for instance, is a great resource to be
tapped into. Exchanges with nonprofit institutions across borders may provide more
actions. Of particular interest is the explication of how massive sharing of news and
information and everyday online political talk coalesce into Internet collective incidents
that press demands for reforms at the institutional level. Furthermore, one may ask in
what ways the availability of networking tools has helped or deterred citizens to share,
connect, and act together, and similarly what specific social, cultural, and political factors
may have mediated the ways Chinese citizens utilize such technologies.
Fourth, the fact that two thirds of Chinese Internet users are people under the age
population may choose to ride along the “entertainment superhighway” for entertainment
and consumerism rather than engaging in public affairs and social justice issues (CNNIC
2007; Morozov 2008). Finding ways to engage Chinese youths to nurture the growth of
Chinese civil society may be crucial to China’s political future in the long term.
online protests reduced rampant corruption, but can an authoritarian state learn to
discipline itself? What mechanisms can be built (online or offline) to discipline the abuse
of political power and restore a degree of social justice? How long can the central
government keep faulting local, low-level officials for corruption while maintaining
public confidence in the top leadership? And as the regime uses the Internet to win
34
popular support, fend off criticism and social antagonism, and give the people a way to
let off steam, to what extent will the government’s political PR and theatrical
performance of “openness” appease forces of significant social and political change? Are
the Chinese people gradually losing their fear of the state as its reliance on patriotism and
legitimacy appears quite fragile at times of mounting economic and social problems?
maintain power, the regime has implemented various measures to include citizens in local
this process. At the same time, however, online public deliberation may improve civil
If there are different routes to improve governance, solve social problems, and promote
civic and political participation in a complex society like China, democracy may not be a
society, may flourish as a viable route to better governance and democracy in China.
35
Notes:
1
The latest Chinese Internet national survey reports 35.3% of blog owners update their blogs every six
months.
2
For instance, Rebecca Mackinnon (2009) examined how censorship is decentralized among Chinese blog
monitor and block foreign Internet content deemed harmful to the Chinese society.
4
The Three Represents is a set of ideological principles introduced by former Chinese president Jiang
Zemin in 2001 which then became the guiding ideology of the Chinese Communist Party at the 16 th Party
Congress in 2002. It stipulates that the CCP must represent the most advanced social productive forces and
culture in China as well as the interest of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people.
5
The Great Hall of the People is used for legislative and ceremonial activities by the Chinese government.
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