Intra-ONU Bandwidth Allocation Games

in Integrated EPON/WiMAX Networks

Hui-Tang Lin and Ying-You Lin
AbstractIntegrationof Ethernet passive optical network
(EPON) and WiMAX technologies is regarded as a promising
solution for next-generation broadband access networks. In
implementing such networks, efficient bandwidth allocation
schemes are essential to satisfy quality of service (QoS) and
fairness requirements of various traffic classes. Existing
proposals for solving the bandwidth allocation problem in
EPON/WiMAX networks neglect interactions between the
self-interested EPON and WiMAX service providers (WSPs).
Accordingly, this study proposes a two-stage game-theoretic
framework for the intra-ONU bandwidth allocation process
where the interactions between the EPON and WSPs are
taken into account. In the first stage of the proposed frame-
work, a fair and efficient sharing of the available upstream
bandwidth between the EPON and WiMAX networks is
determined using two market models (i.e., noncooperative
and cooperative). In the second stage, the bandwidth alloca-
tion obtained from the first stage is distributed among the
different traffic classes within the Ethernet and WiMAX net-
works in accordance with their QoS requirements by means
of a Nash bargaining game. Simulation results showthat the
proposed game-theoretic framework efficiently allocates
bandwidth under different market models while simultane-
ously ensuring proportional fairness among the various
traffic classes for the corresponding networks.
Index TermsAccess network; Differentiated services;
EPON; Game theory; Intra-ONU scheduling; WiMAX.
I. INTRODUCTION
E
thernet passive optical networks (EPONs) [1,2] have
emerged as a promising solution for resolving the
bandwidth bottleneck problem between end users and
the backbone network. However, EPONs cannot support
the access requirements of mobile users. Furthermore,
EPONs are cost prohibitive in areas with low subscriber
density [3]. To address this, integrated EPON/WiMAX net-
works have been proposed where infrastructure owned by
an EPON service provider (ESP) is used to provide back-
haul service to connect multiple dispersed WiMAX base
stations (BSs) operated by a WiMAX service provider
(WSP). Such networks offer the ESP many important ad-
vantages, including lower infrastructure expenditure and
long-termoperating cost [4]. For example, by using WiMAX
BSs to provide wireless access services, the ESP can
achieve a significant increase in the EPON coverage area.
Such an approach is particularly advantageous in low den-
sity suburban and rural areas, where it is more cost-
effective to provide shared access to the backbone network
rather than to dedicated connections. Moreover, use of
WiMAX BSs reduces trenching and cabling costs and as-
sists in meeting the requirements of green PON planning
[5]. In general, EPON/WiMAX networks offer many impor-
tant advantages, including high bandwidth, good commu-
nication reliability, good deployment flexibility, and low
deployment cost. As a result, such networks have been
identified as a promising means of improving the stability
and versatility of the communications services provided by
next-generation broadband access networks [3,6,7].
Recent literature contains many PON and integrated
EPON/WiMAX network proposals. For PONs, most pro-
posed two-stage bandwidth allocation algorithms support
quality of service (QoS). For example, the authors in [8]
developed a hybrid granting protocol to minimize packet
delay variation and to guarantee bandwidth for EPONs.
The delay variation guaranteed polling scheme in [9] pro-
vided absolute delay variation and bandwidth guarantees
in PONs. The authors in [10] presented a K-out-of-N pro-
tocol for dynamic bandwidth allocation (DBA) that adjusts
the trade-off between network efficiency and average la-
tency in next-generation PONs. However, these previous
studies [810] did not consider ESP-WSP interactions so
they may not be able to guarantee system performance
for practical scenarios with factors such as the profit maxi-
mizing tendencies of service providers [11,12]. For fiber-
wireless access networks, an energy-saving scheduling
algorithm having acceptable packet delay was discussed in
[13]. In [14], the authors considered dimensioning and site
planning to ensure long-term performance in a hybrid PON
and wireless cooperative network deployment. In [15] and
[16], the authors proposed various ONU selection schemes
to improve the survivability of EPON/WiMAX networks.
However, in implementing such networks, a central issue is
how to design a scheduling mechanism to ensure hetero-
geneous traffic flows within the two networks to obtain effi-
cient and fair sharing of the available upstream bandwidth.
To resolve this problem, various traffic scheduling algo-
rithms for integrated EPON/WiMAX networks have been
proposed. For example, the authors in [17] presented a
DBA scheme designed for smooth data transmission across
both networks and to provide end-to-end differentiated http://dx.doi.org/10.1364/JOCN.5.000609
Manuscript received November 26, 2012; revised March 4, 2013; ac-
cepted March 29, 2013; published May 30, 2013 (Doc. ID 180590).
H. T. Lin is with the Department of Electrical Engineering, National
Cheng Kung University, 1 University Road, Tainan 701, Taiwan (e-mail:
htlin@mail.ncku.edu.tw).
Y. Y. Lin is with the Institute of Computer and Communication Engi-
neering, National Cheng Kung University, 1 University Road, Tainan 701,
Taiwan.
Hui-Tang Lin and Ying-You Lin VOL. 5, NO. 6/JUNE 2013/J. OPT. COMMUN. NETW. 609
1943-0620/13/060609-12$15.00/0 2013 Optical Society of America
services to WiMAX subscribers with QoS requirements. In
[18], the authors developed a layer 2 virtual private net-
working framework consisting of bandwidth allocation and
admission control schemes to support the provision of dif-
ferentiated QoS over integrated EPON/WiMAX networks.
Meanwhile, in [19], the authors presented an integrated
QoS and management framework for bandwidth allocation
and admission control of specific service bundles with di-
verse QoS requirements in integrated EPON/WiMAX net-
works, though EPON user QoS requirements remain
unaddressed. Thus, the authors in [20] proposed a frame-
work for satisfying the QoS requirements of both WiMAX
and EPON subscribers. Overall the frameworks proposed
in [1720] focus on scheduling Ethernet and WiMAX traffic
in such a way as to satisfy QoS requirements and fairness
for the user. However, as described previously, these frame-
works do not account for interactions between the ESP and
WSPand so cannot guarantee network efficiency when ser-
vice providers use different market models to allocate
bandwidth [11,12].
Game theory has emerged as one of the most promising
information theoretic techniques for solving network re-
source scheduling [2123]. For example, the authors in [24]
applied game models to Internet pricing and showed that for
QoS support, a cooperative game provides a better solution
for both the Internet service provider and the user. In [25],
the authors employed a Stackelberg game to obtain the
optimal pricing solution for bandwidth sharing in an inte-
grated WiMAX/WiFi network. The authors in [26] applied
both symmetric and asymmetric bargaining games to solve
the resource sharing problem between network service pro-
viders in such a way as to satisfy specified QoS and fairness
requirements. In general, the studies described show game
theory provides a useful tool for capturing interactions
among Internet and network service providers to support
fair and efficient resource sharing for wired and wireless
networks. It is expected that such frameworks will yield
similar benefits for integrated optical-wireless networks.
As discussed above, most existing studies on scheduling
in EPON/WiMAX networks focus on the user. In contrast,
the present study investigates the intra-ONU bandwidth
allocation problem from the perspective of the ESP and
WSP (i.e., market-based model). The main contributions
of this study are problem formulation using game theory
and analysis of the interests and strategic interactions of
the ESP and WSP using a two-stage game-theoretical
framework. In the first stage, the interactions between the
two service providers for sharing the available upstream
bandwidth between the Ethernet and WiMAX traffic are
formulated as noncooperative and cooperative games. In
the former case, the ESP provides backhaul support to the
WSP and shares the upstream bandwidth with the WSP in
a competitive manner. Thus, a Stackelberg game (i.e., a
leaderfollower game) is used to model the interactions
of the ESP (leader) and the WSP (follower) with the aim
of maximizing ESP payoff. By contrast, in the latter case
a coalition game is used to model the interactions between
the ESPand WSP in such a way that both service providers
obtain fair revenue [27]. In the second stage of the game-
theoretic framework, the allocated bandwidth resulting
from the Stackelberg game or coalition game is further
distributed among the various traffic classes in the two
networks in such a way as to meet the QoS requirements of
each traffic class using the Nash bargaining game. The sim-
ulation results reveal various parameters that impact the
market relationships in the proposed framework, which pro-
vides better understanding of the bandwidth market of in-
tegrated EPON/WiMAX networks. Furthermore, the results
confirm that the proposed framework ensures proportional
fairness among the differentiated traffic classes in an inte-
grated EPON/WiMAX network. To the best of the authors
knowledge, this study is the first reported attempt to inves-
tigate the bandwidth allocation problem in integrated
EPON/WiMAX networks using different market models.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
This section introduces the EPON/WiMAX system con-
sidered in this study and describes the queue management
scheme implemented at each ONU [28].
A. Integrated EPON/WiMAX System
Figure 1 illustrates the basic architecture of an integrated
EPON/WiMAX access network where the EPON and
WiMAX networks are, respectively, operated by an ESP
and a WSP. As shown, the trunk fiber fans out to multiple
branches attached to individual ONUs located at different
curb positions (i.e., fiber-to-the-curb, FTTC). Furthermore,
each ONU is attached to its Ethernet end users and a
WiMAX BS cell via a twisted pair. The EPONprovides back-
haul service for both the original Ethernet customers and
the WiMAX BS cells and has a point-to-multipoint optical
network with no active components in the signal path be-
tween the source and destination. The data transmissions
in the EPON take place between a single OLT and multiple
ONUs. For convenience, the traffic from the OLT to the
ONUs is referred to as downstreamtraffic, while that from
the ONUs to the OLT is referred to as upstream traffic. In
the downstreamdirection, the data packets broadcast by the
OLT are received by their respective destination ONUs in
accordance with their media access control addresses.
Meanwhile, the upstream transmissions are performed us-
ing interleaved polling with adaptive cycle time (IPACT)
[29], which arbitrates the access requests of the individual
ONUs in such a way as to ensure a fair sharing of the
available bandwidth within the trunk fiber.
In modeling the integrated EPON/WiMAX network
shown in Fig. 1, it is assumed that each ONU provides
an autonomous access environment for small-to-medium
scale user groups, such as a residential community area,
university campus, or large-scale corporation distributed
over adjacent buildings. Furthermore, as described above,
each ONU serves both Ethernet end users and a WiMAX
BS located within the autonomous access area. In other
words, the EPON system provides broadband backhaul ac-
cess service to the WiMAX BSs deployed within the FTTC
infrastructure.
610 J. OPT. COMMUN. NETW./VOL. 5, NO. 6/JUNE 2013 Hui-Tang Lin and Ying-You Lin
B. Queue Management Scheme
To support the differing QoS requirements of the net-
work traffic originating from the Ethernet and WiMAX
users within the autonomous access area, this section
proposes a priority-based queuing scheme for implementa-
tion at each ONU within the EPON.
As in a conventional EPON, the Ethernet traffic from the
end users in an EPON/WiMAXnetwork is classified in accor-
dance with the Ethernet packet classifier into three different
priorities, namely, expedited forwarding (EF), assured for-
warding (AF), or best effort (BE) [30] [see Fig. 1(b)]. Typi-
cally, EF services support delay sensitive applications
such as voice-over-IP (VOIP) that require a bounded end-
to-end delay specification. Meanwhile, AF services are in-
tended for applications that are not delay sensitive but
require certain bandwidth guarantees. Finally, BE services
support applications that are neither delay sensitive nor
require a minimum guaranteed bandwidth. As shown in
Fig. 1(b), each ONU in the EPON/WiMAX network is
equipped with an Ethernet buffering space (S
E
) containing
three different queues (i.e., one queue for each class of traffic)
to satisfy the QoS requirements of these three traffic types.
In WiMAX networks, the traffic is assigned five different
service priorities, namely, unsolicited grant service (UGS),
extended real-time polling service (ertPS), real-time poll-
ing service (rtPS), non-real-time polling service (nrtPS),
and best effort (BE) [31]. To enable the use of a common
priority queue structure for EPON and WiMAX traffic at
each ONU and to achieve QoS consistency between the
EPON and WiMAX traffic, the WiMAX packet classifier
at each ONU must be equipped with a QoS mapping
mechanism to map the UGS traffic to EF priority traffic,
the ertPS and rtPS traffic to AF priority traffic, and the
nrtPS and BE traffic to BE priority traffic, respectively
[16]. As a result, each ONU contains two buffering spaces,
i.e., buffering space S
E
for Ethernet traffic and S
W
for
WiMAX BS traffic [see Fig. 1(b)], with each space contain-
ing three priority queues. The aim of the present study is
to derive a game-theoretic framework for intra-ONU
scheduling. Consequently, the problem of developing a QoS
mapping mechanism is not explicitly addressed. However,
in practice the mapping function can be implemented using
any of the existing QoS mapping mechanisms proposed in
the literature [7,1618].
III. STAGE I INTRA-ONU BANDWIDTH ALLOCATION
STRATEGIES WITH HETEROGENEOUS TRAFFIC
In the considered integrated EPON/WiMAX network
(Fig. 1), various schemes can be used for inter-ONU DBA.
For simplicity, the IPACT scheme is assumed. It enables
each ONU to request the OLT to allocate bandwidth in
accordance with the total buffer occupancy of S
E
and S
W
in every polling cycle. However, since newEthernet packets
or WiMAX frames continuously arrive at the ONU during
the interval between when the ONU sends its bandwidth
request to the OLT in polling cycle P and when it receives
the corresponding transmission grant in the next polling
cycle (P 1), the transmission window granted by the
OLT may be too small to satisfy the augmented bandwidth
requirements of the two buffers. (Note that this is referred to
hereafter as unexpected bandwidth demand.) In the event
that such a scenario occurs, S
E
and S
W
both seek to maxi-
mize their share of the bandwidth allocated by the OLT in
order to satisfy the QoS requirements of their respective
priority queues. Therefore, supporting QoS transmissions
in a heterogeneous EPON/WiMAX network requires a stage
I intra-ONU bandwidth allocation strategy capable of
distributing the bandwidth granted by the OLT between
the Ethernet and WiMAX buffer spaces in a fair manner.
The present study treats the unexpected bandwidth
demand problem in the intra-ONU bandwidth allocation
process as a bankruptcy problem. In economics, the term
bankruptcy describes the situation where a business
entity ceases trading as a result of financial difficulties
and has outstanding debts to one or more (N) creditors.
Typically, the sum of the claims from the creditors is larger
than the remaining assets of the corporation, and thus
the problem arises of how to allocate the available assets
Fig. 1. Integrated EPON/WiMAX system. (a) Integrated EPON/WiMAX architecture. (b) Queue management scheme at each ONU.
Hui-Tang Lin and Ying-You Lin VOL. 5, NO. 6/JUNE 2013/J. OPT. COMMUN. NETW. 611
among the creditors in the fairest manner possible. This
problem can be modeled as an N-person bankruptcy game,
in which the N players all seek to maximize their share of
the available assets. (Note that the bankruptcy game is de-
tailed in [32].) Most DBA approaches inherently have the
unexpected bandwidth demand problem. Thus, although
IPACT is chosen as the experimental environment in the
present study, the benefits of the proposed game-theoretic
framework are also expected to translate to other DBA
algorithms. However, some DBA algorithms specifically
exclude this condition. For example, the control theoretic
extensions of IPACT were proposed in [33,34] to estimate
the bandwidth demand of each ONU using refinement.
This ensures the grant bandwidth size is closer to the band-
width demand of the ONU. Thus, the proposed bankruptcy
game scheme is not suitable for these DBA approaches.
In the current context, the bandwidth allocation problem
arising as the result of an unexpected bandwidth demand
can be modeled as a bankruptcy game involving a finite set
of two different types of players, namely, ESP players (E,
corresponding to buffer space S
E
) and WSP players (W, cor-
responding to buffer space S
W
). In other words, = {E; W].
Let B
ONU
be a real positive number corresponding to the
amount of bandwidth granted to the ONU by the OLT,
and let R
[j|
ONU
be a non-negative number corresponding to
the amount of bandwidth required by player j (j ). (Note
that the number of players in the bankruptcy game is
not fixed and can be extended easily to more than two play-
ers.) The bankruptcy problem formulation is subject to the
condition
X
j
R
[j|
ONU
B
ONU
: (1)
In solving the bankruptcy problem (i.e., the bandwidth
allocation problem between ESP and WSP traffic), the fol-
lowing constraints are imposed:
The bandwidth granted by the OLT must be completely
distributed among the players.
Each player must obtain a non-negative bandwidth not
exceeding its bandwidth requirement.
Let B
[j|
ONU
represent the solution to the bankruptcy prob-
lem (i.e., the amount of bandwidth allocated to player j).
Then the rules of the bankruptcy game can be expressed
as follows:
0 B
[j|
ONU
R
[j|
ONU
; j P; (2)
and
X
j
B
[j|
ONU
= B
ONU
: (3)
The stage I intra-ONU bandwidth allocation problem
can be formally defined as the following game.
Definition 1 (Intra-ONU Bandwidth Allocation
Game, IBAG). Consider an integrated EPON/WiMAX net-
work. The stage I intra-ONU bandwidth allocation game is
defined as the following triplet:
(; (B
[j|
ONU
)
j
; (U
j
())
j
); (4)
where is a finite set of players and (B
[j|
ONU
)
j
represents
the set of pure strategies for player j constrained by
Eqs. (1)(3). By defining B =
Q
j
B
[j|
ONU
as the set of action
profiles, (U
j
())
j
denotes the set of utility functions where
U
j
(): B R is a function from the set of all action profiles B
to real numbers.
Several pertinent issues in the above formulated game
are 1) how to determine efficient bandwidth allocation
for network users considering their differing needs and
performance requirements, 2) implementing fairness be-
tween the players, and 3) maximizing the service providers
revenue under different market models while considering
1) and 2).
The following subsection presents the Stackelberg and
coalition games. These two game-theoretic approaches
respectively solve the aforementioned issues for nonco-
operative and cooperating service providers.
A. Bandwidth Allocation Strategy Using
Stackelberg Game
In the Stackelberg game, the leader can commit to a pric-
ing strategy before the other player(s) and, thus, the leader
can maximize earned revenue. When the ESP and WSP
operate in a competitive market model, they both seek
optimal strategies to allocate user bandwidth while maxi-
mizing their own revenue. The ESP serves as the leader
since it provides wired backhaul access to the WSP. The
ESP decides the amount of total bandwidth used by WiMAX
users (i.e., B
[S
W
|
ONU
) so as to maximize its own revenue. If the
ESP offers too much bandwidth by undercharging the WSP,
the ability of the ESP to provide wired access to its Ethernet
users will be degraded. At the same time, the ESPs revenue
is reduced if it charges more for bandwidth, lowering WSP
incentive to buy. Hence, the ESP selects an optimal price
strategy to maximize its revenue while covering costs.
For simplicity and efficiency, the utility functions of the
ESP and WSP in the Stackelberg game are defined by the
following linear functions [35,36]:
1) Utility function of ESP leader: The leader (ESP E)
aims to maximize the revenue received from the Ether-
net and WiMAX users with minimal infrastructure
cost. Note that the infrastructure cost C

is estimated as
C
E
= C
install
C
cabling
; (5)
where C
install
is the total OLT/ONU installation cost and
C
cabling
is the cabling costs of the feeder and distribution
fibers [4]. Hence, the utility function of ESP E is given by
U
E
(p
W
) = p
E
B
[S
E
|
ONU
p
W
B
[S
W
|
ONU
C
E
; (6)
where p
E
is the price charged by ESP E to the Ethernet
users and p
W
is the price charged by the ESP E to WSP
W. The bandwidth B
[S
W
|
ONU
allocated to buffer S
W
to
612 J. OPT. COMMUN. NETW./VOL. 5, NO. 6/JUNE 2013 Hui-Tang Lin and Ying-You Lin
transmit data from the WiMAX users can be modeled as
a bandwidth demand function d
W
(p
W;u
), i.e., the total
bandwidth demand of all the WiMAX users under price
p
W;u
charged by the WSP W. Therefore, B
[S
W
|
ONU
=
d
W
(p
W;u
). User bandwidth demand can be modeled re-
specting the complex relationships between queue
length, bandwidth price, and bandwidth requirements.
To make subsequent analysis tractable [37,38], the fol-
lowing positive linear function can be used to approxi-
mate user bandwidth demand:
d
W
(p
W;u
) = [q
W

W
p
W;u

W
R
W
|

; (7)
where q
W
is the queue length of S
W
and R
W
is the mini-
mum bandwidth requirement of all WiMAX users.
Furthermore, the function [x|

= max(0; x),
W
is the re-
duction in bandwidth demand per unit price increase
p
W;u
, and
W
is a tuning factor used to give the WSP flex-
ibility in deciding the amount of additional resources
to allocate to the WiMAX traffic above the minimum
bandwidth requirement. A higher value of
W
indicates
a lower bandwidth demand from the WiMAX users.
Conversely, a higher
W
value implies the importance
of ensuring that the minimum bandwidth guarantee
is increased, and thus the bandwidth demand of the
WiMAX users is raised.
In the IBAGproblem, ESP E offers bandwidth to WSP W
in exchange for revenue, which can be formulated as an
optimization problem for the leader-level game as follows:
max
{p
W
]
U
E
(p
W
) = p
E
B
[S
E
|
ONU
p
W
d
W
(p
W;u
) C
E
s:t:
p
E
; p
W
0: (8)
2) Utility function of WSP follower: The WSP W can
be regarded as a buyer whose aim is to earn sufficient
revenue from its WiMAX users to cover its forwarding
costs while simultaneously gaining as much additional
profit as possible. The WSPs utility function can, thus,
be expressed as
U
W
(p
W;u
) = p
W;u
d
W
(p
W;u
) C
W
; (9)
where C
W
= p
W
d
W
(p
W;u
) is the forwarding cost (i.e.,
the cost paid to the ESP for backbone services). The
optimization problem for the follower-level game is
formulated as follows:
max
{p
W
]
U
W
(p
W;u
) = p
W;u
d
W
(p
W;u
) p
W
d
W
(p
W;u
)
s:t:
p
W
; p
W;u
0: (10)
The optimal price p
+
W;u
is dependent on both total band-
width demand of the WiMAX users and the price p
W
charged by the ESP. If the WSP sets too high a price,
WiMAX user bandwidth demand will fall and then the
WSPs revenue will fall. Conversely, if the WSP sets too
low a price, the revenue obtained in Eq. (9) will be unnec-
essarily low. Specifically, if the price is set far below the
optimal price (i.e., p
+
W;u
), the resulting utility of ESP E
can be negative, i.e., U
+
E
() < 0. As a consequence, WSP
W will not be granted any bandwidth since ESP E cannot
cover its basic costs.
In the following discussions, the optimal strategies
for both the ESP and the WSP exist in the form of a
Stackelberg equilibrium. Note that the Stackelberg equi-
librium is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Stackelberg Equilibrium). [39] A strategy
profile (p
+
W
; p
+
W;u
) represents Stackelberg equilibrium if p
+
W
maximizes the utility of the leader (ESP) and p
+
W;u
is the best
response of the WSP to the ESP.
In general, the optimal strategy profile can be derived
by backward induction [35]. By taking the derivative of
U
W
(p
W;u
) in Eq. (9) with respect to p
W;u
, the optimal price
p
+
W;u
for the WSP is then given as
p
+
W;u
=
q
W

W
R
W

W
p
W
2
W
: (11)
Substituting Eq. (11) into Eq. (6), the optimal price p
+
W
charged by the ESP can be derived as follows:
p
+
W
=
q
W

W
R
W

W
p
E
2
W
: (12)
Property 1. The utility function U
W
(p
W;u
) of the WSP is
jointly concave in p
W;u
with p
W;u
0.
Pf: By taking the second-order derivatives of the WSPs
utility U
W
(p
W;u
), the result is readily derived and is less
than 0. Thus, U
W
(p
W;u
) is strictly concave for any value
of p
W;u
.
From Property 1, p
+
W;u
in Eq. (11) is the global optimum
value that maximizes the WSPs utility U
W
(p
W;u
). Thus,
p
+
W;u
represents the Stackelberg equilibrium since it satis-
fies Definition 2.
Property 2. The ESP utility function U
E
(p
W
) is concave in
its own price p
W
when the price charged by the WSP is the
optimized purchase price determined from Eq. (11).
Pf: As the proof of Property 1, the proof of Property 2 is
readily derived.

The utility functions can be proven to have a concave
property due to Properties 1 and 2. Thus, the following
theorem can be obtained.
Theorem1. The pair of p
+
W;u
in Eq. (11) and p
+
W
in Eq. (12)
represents the Stackelberg equilibrium that satisfies Defini-
tion 2.
The Stackelberg equilibriumis found when the ESP (i.e.,
leader) and WSP (i.e., follower) have optimal strategies
that lead to an optimal bandwidth demand/allocation for
Ethernet and WiMAX users. In other words, the ESP and
WSP can maximize their utilities and decide the allocated
bandwidth for Ethernet and WiMAX users (i.e., B
[S
E
|
ONU
and
B
[S
W
|
ONU
). Note that the allocated bandwidth B
[S
E
|
ONU
and B
[S
W
|
ONU
can be computed from Eq. (3) based on the results derived
from substituting Eqs. (11) and (12) into Eq. (7).
Hui-Tang Lin and Ying-You Lin VOL. 5, NO. 6/JUNE 2013/J. OPT. COMMUN. NETW. 613
For the Stackelberg game, the WSP selects a strategy
after the ESP sets a price. The WSP may opt for nonpar-
ticipation when it cannot gain any revenue. When this
happens, the WiMAX users are excluded from sharing the
bandwidth of the backhaul network (i.e., EPON). To avoid
this extreme condition, the parameters of the Stackelberg
game need to be set properly. Thus, the following proposi-
tion is asserted to adjust the related parameters
W
,
W
,
and p
E
when considering the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proposition 1. When condition q
W

W
R
W
>
W
p
E
is
satisfied, the WSP has positive revenue and, therefore,
accepts the price set by the ESP.
Pf: Regarding Eq. (10), the WSP has positive revenue if the
utility of the WSP is greater than zero (i.e., U
W
(p
W;u
) > 0).
In this case, the necessary conditions d
W
(p
W;u
) > 0 and
(p
W;u
p
W
) > 0 must be satisfied. Since d
W
(p
W;u
) is a non-
negative function, only d
W
(p
W;u
) 0 needs consideration.
Substituting Eqs. (11) and (12) into condition d
W
(p
W;u
)
0 allows q
W

W
R
W

W
p
E
to be derived. Similarly,
condition q
W

W
R
W
>
W
p
E
can be proved by substitu-
tion of Eqs. (11) and (12) into (p
W;u
p
W
) > 0. It is trivial
to determine that the WSP has positive revenue and, thus,
accepts the price set by the ESP.

B. Bandwidth Allocation Strategy Using Coalition
Game
In the previous section, the IBAG problem is formulated
as a Stackelberg game in which the ESP and WSP deter-
mine their strategies in turn and the optimal bandwidth
allocation strategy maximizes the ESPs profits. In prac-
tice, however, the ESP and WSP may not have a strict hier-
archical relationship. For example, the ESP and WSP may
have a close relationship or the EPON and WiMAX net-
works may even belong to the same service provider. In
such a scenario, the ESP and WSP may share the available
bandwidth in a cooperative manner so that both parties
obtain an efficient and fair bandwidth allocation. Thus, this
subsection solves the IBAG problem with simultaneous
play using a coalition game approach.
1. Coalition Game Formulation: An N-person coalition
game can be defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Coalition Game). [39] A coalition C is de-
fined as a subset of the total set of players = {0; ; N] (i.e.,
C ). The members of the coalition willingly cooperate
with one another. The coalition of an N-person game is given
by the pair (, f ), where f is a characteristic function (i.e.,
value function) of the game. The value f (C) is the co-
operation for coalition C and has two important properties:
f () = 0.
Superadditivity: if C and S are disjoint coalitions
(CS = ), then f (C) f (S) f (CS).
In an EPON-based system, the bandwidth requirements
of the ONUs are determined in accordance with buffer
occupancy status. Consequently, the required bandwidth
for buffering space j (i.e., player j) is obtained as
R
[j|
ONU
= S
[j|
ONU
; (13)
where S
[j|
ONU
is the current occupied buffer size of buffering
space j. In accordance with the two properties described in
Definition 3, the characteristic function can be defined as
follows [40]:
f (C) = max

0; B
ONU

X
jC
R
[j|
ONU

; (14)
for all possible C.
Many methods are available for solving the IBAG bank-
ruptcy game using a coalition game approach, including
the Shapley value method, the kernel method, and the nu-
cleolus method [41]. Of these various methods, the Shapley
value method not only induces global Nash equilibria but
also yields solutions that are both unique and fair [41]. As a
result, it represents an ideal solution for the bandwidth
allocation problem in the present study.
2. Shapley Value: The Shapley value [41] is a game-
theoretic concept for cooperative games. The aim of the
Shapley value method is to obtain a fair solution for a
player acting in coalition with one or more collaborative
players. The Shapley value (f ) is defined as the worth
or value of player j in a game with a characteristic
function and determines a unique distribution for
the coalition of all players. Therefore, the Shapley value
assigns a vector of real numbers corresponding to each
player [i.e., (f ) = (
1
(f ); ;
j
(f ); ;
N
(f ))] and can be
computed by

j
(f ) = B
[j|
ONU
=
X
Cj
[C[!(N [C[ 1)!
N!
(f (C{j]) f (C)):
(15)
The operational complexity of the conventional Shapley
value method is lower than that of the kernel method or the
nucleolus method. However, its time complexity increases
exponentially with an increasing number of players since
the Shapley value calculation requires every possible coali-
tion C to be evaluated. However, this problem is largely re-
solved by the bilateral Shapley value (BSV) method having
complexity of O(N
3
1
log N
1
) [42]. (Note that the BSV
method is detailed in [42] and omitted here.)
IV. STAGE II INTRA-ONU ALLOCATION
STRATEGY WITH QOS SUPPORT
Once the stage I IBAG solutions (i.e., B
[j=S
E
|
ONU
and B
[j=S
W
|
ONU
)
are obtained using the Stackelberg or coalition game for-
mulations, the bandwidths allocated to S
E
and S
W
for each
ONU must be further distributed among the individual
priority queues. In other words, each ONUrequires a band-
width partitioning scheme that ensures the different prior-
ity queues within the two buffering spaces receive a fair
share of the allocated bandwidth B
[j|
ONU
while continuing
to satisfy the QoS commitments. Accordingly, this study
applies a bargaining game approach to make bandwidth
614 J. OPT. COMMUN. NETW./VOL. 5, NO. 6/JUNE 2013 Hui-Tang Lin and Ying-You Lin
partition decisions in accordance with a sigmoid utility
function.
A. Bargaining Game Formulation
Most bargaining theories take root from Nashs seminal
study [43]. Generally speaking, an N-person bargaining
problem describes a scenario in which N players attempt
to reach agreement on trading a limited resource. These
N individuals have a choice to bargain so that all of them
can gain most benefit as a result of cooperative play.
1) Bargaining Game for S
E
: Consider the bandwidth
allocation problem for S
E
, where the allocated
bandwidth B
[S
E
|
ONU
, obtained from the stage I intra-ONU
bandwidth allocation game, is distributed among three
players k = {EF; AF; BE]. The non-negative number R
[k|
S
E
represents the bandwidth demand of player k. When sell-
ing bandwidth, the ESP must consider fairness for player
BE even though BE traffic is not delay sensitive. As a re-
sult, the ESP needs to reserve minimum bandwidth
B
[BE;min|
S
E
to ensure fairness for Ethernet users. In general,
B
[BE;min|
S
E
is much less than that required by the average
amount of BEtraffic in S
E
. On the other hand, the EF prior-
ity queue in S
E
contains the highest priority traffic. There-
fore, the remaining bandwidth B
[S
E
;rem|
ONU
available for
allocation to players AF and BE once the requisite alloca-
tion of bandwidth to players EF and BE has been made is
given by
B
[S
E
;rem|
ONU
= B
[S
E
|
ONU
B
[EF|
S
E
B
[BE;min|
S
E
; (16)
where B
[EF|
S
E
= R
[EF|
S
E
.
To define the utility (i.e., QoS level) received by individ-
ual players in the bargaining game, a sigmoid function is
used to quantitatively estimate the relative satisfaction
of the AF and BE priority queues having bandwidths
B
[AF|
S
E
and B
[BE|
S
E
allocated. The utility function is defined
as follows:
U(B
[l|
S
E
) =
1
1 exp(
[l|
(B
[l|
S
E
g
[l|
E
))
; l {AF; BE];
(17)
where indicates the sensitivity of the performance factor,
g
[l|
E
denotes the minimum bandwidth requirement of player
l, and g
[BE|
E
= 0. Hence, the utility for player l is represented
by U(B
[l|
S
E
) with the condition
0 U(B
[l|
S
E
) 1; (18)
where U(B
[l|
S
E
) D and D is the set of all possible feasible
results. In order to prevent player l fromdisputing any QoS
differentiation decision (i.e., any possible payoff result), a
disagreement point of U
min
(B
[l|
S
E
) = 0 is imposed so that
any uncooperative player is penalized and loses the right
to compete for bandwidth in the current polling cycle. Thus,
the bargaining game problem and solution can be defined
as (D, U
min
(B
[l|
S
E
)) and F(D; U
min
(B
[l|
S
E
)) D, respectively.
The Pareto optimal solution defines an agreement such
that one player cannot increase utility without decreasing
the utilities of any other players. An approach for obtaining
a fair bargaining solution is to apply the four axioms pro-
posed by Nash [44]. According to the player utility func-
tions, the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) of players AF
and BE can be obtained as
(B
[AF|+
S
E
; B
[BE|+
S
E
) = arg max
B
[AF|
S
E
;B
[BE|
S
E
{(U(B
[AF|
S
E
) U
min
(B
[AF|
S
E
))
(U(B
[BE|
S
E
) U
min
(B
[BE|
S
E
))]; (19)
where B
[AF|+
S
E
and B
[BE|+
S
E
are the respective bandwidths allo-
cated to the AF and BE priority queues. The solution of
Eq. (19) can be obtained by means of a local search method
[45]. Note that distinct bargaining solutions for an inte-
grated EPON/WiMAX network are available in a previous
work by the authors of this paper in [28].
2) Bargaining Game for S
W
: As in the S
E
bargaining
game, the S
W
bargaining game also has three players
k {EF; AF; BE], an allocated bandwidth B
[S
W
|
ONU
, and a non-
negative bandwidth demand R
[k|
S
W
for each player k in buffer
space S
W
. Unlike the allocation process for S
E
, the mini-
mum bandwidth requirement for BE is not guaranteed.
Intuitively, the remaining resource (i.e., bandwidth) avail-
able for allocation to players AF and BE is given by
B
[S
W
|
ONU;R
= B
[S
W
|
ONU
B
[EF|
S
W
; (20)
where B
[EF|
S
W
= R
[EF|
S
W
. Note the available bandwidth is
shared between AF and BE in S
W
using the NBS method
similar to that used for players AF and BE in buffer
space S
E
.
Computational Complexity of Intra-ONU Band-
width Allocation Game: In the stage I intra-ONU band-
width allocation, the Stackelberg game solution can be
directly derived using the backward induction approach
with complexity of O(1). The complexity of the coalition
game is O(N
3
1
log N
1
) obtained via the BSV method [42]
where N
1
is the number of players in the stage I game. Sub-
sequently, for cases I and II of stage II, the N
2
priority
queues bandwidth allocation (i.e., N
2
players) requires
the NBS to be calculated by using a local search algorithm
[45] with the complexity of O(N
2
2
W
MAX
log W
MAX
N
4
2
).
W
MAX
is the maximum window size for each ONU. Thus,
the total computational complexity of the proposed scheme
is O(N
3
1
log N
1
N
2
2
W
MAX
log W
MAX
N
4
2
).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
To evaluate the performance of the proposed game-
theoretic-based intra-ONU scheduling scheme, a simula-
tion model was constructed comprising an integrated
Hui-Tang Lin and Ying-You Lin VOL. 5, NO. 6/JUNE 2013/J. OPT. COMMUN. NETW. 615
EPON/WiMAX access network with 16 ONUs and a single
OLT. The maximum upstream bandwidth was set as
1 Gbps, and the guard time between successive ONUtrans-
missions was 5 s. The round-trip time between the ONUs
and the OLT was randomly generated with a uniform
distribution of U[100, 200 s] corresponding to a physical
distance of 15 30 km [46]. Ethernet traffic arriving at
each ONU from end users is assumed to fit in a single
Ethernet buffer, while all WiMAX packets awaiting trans-
mission at the ONU are assumed to be stored in a single
WiMAX buffer. The Ethernet and WiMAX buffer size main-
tained at each ONU is 10 Mbytes. In simulating the IPACT
algorithm, the limited service scheme proposed in [29]
was used where the OLT was assumed to grant the ONUs
no more than the maximum window size, W
MAX
(i.e.,
15,000 bytes).
For the Ethernet traffic model, an extensive study shows
that most network traffic (i.e., http, ftp, video applications,
etc.) are characterized by self-similarity and long-range
dependence [47]. Hence, this traffic model was applied to
generate highly burstyAF and BE traffic. For both traffic
classes, the packet size was uniformly distributed in the
range of 64 1518 bytes. In simulating the high-priority
Ethernet traffic (e.g., voice application data), the EF traffic
was modeled using a Poisson distribution with a constant
packet size of 70 bytes [47]. To reflect the nature of WiMAX
traffic, the UGS traffic class was generated using the con-
stant bit rate traffic model with a fixed packet size of
64 bytes. In addition, the ertPS and rtPS traffic classes
were generated using the variable bit rate traffic model.
The nrtPS and BE traffic classes were generated using
the same self-similar traffic model of the AFand BE Ether-
net traffic. The packet sizes of the ertPS, rtPS, nrtPS, and
BE WiMAX traffic classes were all assumed to followa uni-
form distribution with a range of 64 1518 bytes. The
guarantee flow rate of the Ethernet and WiMAX AF traffic
classes were assumed to be 4 Mbps. Meanwhile, the guar-
antee rate of each flow in the WiMAX BE traffic class was
assumed to be 2 Mbps [18,48]. The systemparameters were
specified as follows:
W
= 0.1,
W
= 0.03,
[AF|
= 0.0001,

[BE|
= 0.00003, and p
E
= 0.382. For both the Ethernet
and the WiMAX traffic, the loads of the different traffic pri-
orities stored in the corresponding EF, AF, and BE priority
queues were specified as 20%, 30%, and 50% of the total
Ethernet (or WiMAX) traffic load, respectively. Finally,
each simulation was run for a total of 30 s.
A. Stage I Intra-ONU Bandwidth Allocation
Figure 2 shows the optimal prices charged by the ESP to
the WSP and the WSP to the WiMAX users, respectively.
Meanwhile, Fig. 3 shows the throughputs of buffer spaces
S
E
and S
W
under Stackelberg equilibrium. In both figures,
the results are a function of the network offered load and
the Ethernet-to-WiMAX traffic load ratio. In general,
Figs. 2 and 3 show both the optimal price and achieved
throughput increase with increasing network offered load.
In Fig. 2, it is seen that the optimal price P
W;u
charged
by the WSP to its WiMAX users is always higher than
the optimal price P
W
charged by the ESP to the WSP. This
is because the WSP compensates for the forwarding cost
while gaining additional revenue from its WiMAX users.
In Fig. 3, the bandwidth allocated to WiMAX traffic first
increases and then decreases as network offered load in-
creases. This is reasonable since the ESP can increase rev-
enue by allocating more bandwidth to WiMAX traffic under
nonsaturated network loads but needs to guarantee a cer-
tain QoS for its Ethernet users when the network offered
load is saturated and, therefore, reduces the amount of
bandwidth offered to the WSP. Figures 2 and 3 also show
that the optimal prices and achieved throughput of the
Ethernet and WiMAX traffic are both strongly affected
by the Ethernet-to-WiMAX traffic load composition.
Figure 4 shows the revenues earned by the ESPand WSP
for various network offered loads and Ethernet-to-WiMAX
Fig. 2. Prices p
w;u
and p
w
under Stackelberg equilibrium condi-
tions for various network-offered loads and Ethernet-to-WiMAX
traffic load ratios.
Fig. 3. Achieved throughput of ESP and WSP under Stackelberg
equilibrium conditions for various network offered loads and
Ethernet-to-WiMAX traffic load ratios.
Fig. 4. Utilities of S
E
and S
W
under Stackelberg equilibrium con-
ditions for various network-offered loads and Ethernet-to-WiMAX
traffic load ratios.
616 J. OPT. COMMUN. NETW./VOL. 5, NO. 6/JUNE 2013 Hui-Tang Lin and Ying-You Lin
traffic load compositions. For both service providers, the rev-
enue increases with increasing network offered load. For all
values of network offered load, ESP revenue is maximized.
In other words, the results represent the Stackelberg equi-
librium for the stage I intra-ONU bandwidth allocation
game. Note the utilities of the other prices (i.e., non-
Stackelberg equilibriumprices) are not shown in Fig. 4 since
the Stackelberg equilibrium of the formulated game has
been proven to be the maximum revenue of the ESP.
Overall, the results presented in Figs. 24 confirm that
the Stackelberg game provides a viable means of sharing
bandwidth between Ethernet and WiMAX traffic in accor-
dance with the network conditions and the need of the ESP
to maximize its revenue by selling its surplus bandwidth.
In response, the WSP makes bandwidth demands accord-
ing to the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Figure 5 shows the throughput performance of S
E
and
S
W
in the coalition game with increasing network-offered
loads under different Ethernet (E):WiMAX (W) traffic
load compositions. In contrast to Figs. 24, results are
not presented for an Ethernet-to-WiMAX traffic load ratio
of 21 since the results are complementary to those for an
Ethernet-to-WiMAX traffic ratio of 12. The throughput
performance of both traffic classes increases as the
network-offered load increases. Also, the S
E
and S
W
throughputs rely strongly on the Ethernet-to-WiMAX traf-
fic load ratio. This is to be expected since the formulated
Shapley value distribution in the coalition game depends
on the bandwidth demand (i.e., queue length) of the buffer
and provides fairness for S
E
and S
W
according to the four
Nash axioms. The results show the coalition game results
in a fair sharing of the upstream bandwidth between the
two networks since the ESP and WSP act as peers in
divvying up bandwidth.
B. Stage II Intra-ONU Bandwidth Allocation
The performance of the two proposed game schemes
(i.e., Stackelberg NBS and coalition NBS) is compared with
that of the baseline DBA scheme for hybrid ONU BSs
known as VOB DBA [16] specifically designed for WiMAX
traffic. Therefore, the bandwidth allocation issue between
Ethernet and WiMAX traffic is not considered. As a result,
in comparing the performance of the three schemes, it is
assumed that the stage I bandwidth allocation process
for the VOB scheme is performed using a coalition game.
The resulting scheme is designated as the Co-VoB scheme.
Figures 6 and 7, respectively, compare the mean queuing
delays of the different priority queues within S
E
and S
W
,
given various network offered loads and the use of the three
allocation schemes (i.e., Stackelberg NBS, coalition NBS,
and coalition VOB). Note the Ethernet-to-WiMAX traffic
load ratio is 11 in both cases. For both traffic types, the
Stackelberg NBS and coalition NBS schemes yield better
delay performance for AF and BE traffic than the
coalition-VOB scheme for all values of network offered
load. The poor delay performance of coalition VOB for
AF and BE traffic arises due to a strict-priority-based
approach in bandwidth allocation of the different priority
queues. In other words, the bandwidth requirements of the
AF and BE traffic are sacrificed to meet EF traffic require-
ments. In addition, Stackelberg NBS yields better delay
performance than coalition NBS for all classes of Ethernet
traffic. This finding is to be expected since the ESP is the
leader in the Stackelberg game from the stage I allocation
process, and, thus, Ethernet traffic receives more band-
width than WiMAXtraffic under saturated load conditions.
However, by adopting this approach, WiMAX traffic delay
under Stackelberg NBS is inevitably higher than that ob-
tained under coalition NBS, as shown in Fig. 7.
Figures 8 and 9 compare the mean queuing delay perfor-
mance of the three schemes for the S
E
and S
W
traffic, re-
spectively, given a higher Ethernet-to-WiMAX traffic load
ratio of 12. For both Ethernet and WiMAX traffic, the EF
Fig. 5. Achieved throughput of ESP and WSP using the coalition
game approach for various network-offered loads and Ethernet-
to-WiMAX traffic load ratios.
Fig. 7. Mean queuing delay of S
W
using the Stackelberg NBS
scheme, coalition NBS scheme, and Co-VoB scheme for various
network offered loads. Note that the Ethernet traffic and WiMAX
traffic have a 11 load ratio.
Fig. 6. Mean queuing delay of S
E
using Stackelberg NBS scheme,
coalition NBS scheme, and Co-VoB scheme for various network-
offered loads. Note that the Ethernet traffic and WiMAX traffic
have a 11 load ratio.
Hui-Tang Lin and Ying-You Lin VOL. 5, NO. 6/JUNE 2013/J. OPT. COMMUN. NETW. 617
delays of all schemes are comparable in all network offered
loads. However, the AF delay performance of the two pro-
posed schemes is much better than that of coalition VOB
under saturated loads. Also, Stackelberg NBS yields better
AF delay performance for WiMAX traffic than coalition
NBS. This result arises because when WiMAX traffic ac-
counts for a larger proportion of the total traffic, the band-
width requirement of Ethernet traffic is correspondingly
reduced, and thus, Stackelberg NBS allocates a greater
amount of bandwidth to WiMAX traffic in the stage I allo-
cation process in order to increase the revenue earned from
the WSP.
The results in this section show the proposed two-stage
game-theoretic framework not only accurately captures the
various interactions in the noncooperative and cooperative
bandwidth markets between the ESP and WSP but also
provides good QoS support for Ethernet and WiMAX
traffic with different priorities. Also, a noncooperative
market is more beneficial to the backhaul provider (i.e.,
ESP) compared to the cooperative market. In addition,
the cooperative market provides proportional fairness for
the Ethernet and WiMAX users according to their QoS
requirements.
VI. CONCLUSION
This study presents a two-stage game-theoretic frame-
work for modeling market interactions between Ethernet
and WSPs for how best to share upstream bandwidth at
each ONU in an integrated EPON/WiMAX network. In
the first stage, the intra-ONU bandwidth allocation prob-
lem is formulated as a bankruptcy problem to distribute
the bandwidth granted fromthe OLT between the Ethernet
and WiMAX buffer regions of the ONU. Two different
games are proposed to solve this bankruptcy problem,
namely, a Stackelberg game (noncooperative market) and
a coalition game (cooperative market). The simulation re-
sults show both schemes yield fair and efficient sharing of
upstream bandwidth under various network dynamics. In
the second stage, the bandwidth allocated to the Ethernet
traffic and WiMAX traffic at the ONU buffer is further dis-
tributed among the different traffic classes within each
buffer by a Nash bargaining game to satisfy the QoS re-
quirements specified for each class of traffic by the respec-
tive Ethernet end users and WiMAX cell. The simulation
results confirm the Stackelberg NBS and coalition NBS
schemes both ensure efficient and fair distribution of the
bandwidth among the different traffic classes under differ-
ent market models. The results also showthat the proposed
schemes provide better QoS support than the VOB DBA
scheme [17].
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported by the National Science Council
of Taiwan under Grant NSC 100-2218-E-006-030-MY3.
The authors thank Chi-You Wang for assisting in collecting
data.
REFERENCES
[1] G. Kramer and G. Pesavento, Ethernet passive optical network
(EPON): Building a next-generation optical access network,
IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 6673, Feb. 2002.
[2] IEEE802.3ah, Ethernet in the First Mile Task Force. [Online]
Available: http://www.ieee802.org/3/efm/.
[3] C. Ranaweera, E. Wong, C. Lim, and A. Nirmalathas, Next
generation optical-wireless converged network architectures,
IEEE Network, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 2227, Mar./Apr. 2012.
[4] N. Ghazisaidi and M. Maier, Techno-economic analysis
of EPON and WiMAX for future fiber-wireless (FiWi)
networks, Comput. Netw., vol. 54, no. 15, pp. 26402650,
Oct. 2010.
[5] J. Li and G. Shen, Cost minimization planning for greenfield
passive optical networks, J. Opt. Commun. Netw., vol. 1,
no. 1, pp. 1729, June 2009.
[6] N. Ghazisaidi, M. Maier, and C. M. Assi, Fiber-wireless
(FiWi) access networks: A survey, IEEE Commun. Mag.,
vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 160167, Feb. 2009.
[7] G. Shen, R. S. Tucker, and C.-J. Chae, Fixed mobile conver-
gence architectures for broadband access: Integration of
EPON and WiMAX, IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 45, no. 8,
pp. 4450, Aug. 2007.
[8] A. Shami, X. Bai, C. M. Assi, and N. Ghani, Jitter perfor-
mance in Ethernet passive optical networks, J. Lightwave
Technol., vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 17451753, Apr. 2005.
[9] T. Berisa, Z. Ilic, and A. Bazant, Absolute delay variation
guarantees in passive optical networks, J. Lightwave Tech-
nol., vol. 29, no. 9, pp. 13831393, May 2011.
[10] T. Das, A. Gumaste, A. Lodha, A. Mathew, and N. Ghani,
Generalized framework and analysis for bandwidth
Fig. 8. Mean queuing delay of S
E
using the Stackelberg NBS
scheme, coalition NBS scheme, and Co-VoB scheme for various
network-offered loads. Note that the Ethernet traffic and WiMAX
traffic have a 12 load ratio.
Fig. 9. Mean queuing delay of S
W
using the Stackelberg NBS
scheme, coalition NBS scheme, and Co-VoB scheme for various
network-offered loads. Note that the Ethernet traffic and WiMAX
traffic have a 12 load ratio.
618 J. OPT. COMMUN. NETW./VOL. 5, NO. 6/JUNE 2013 Hui-Tang Lin and Ying-You Lin
scheduling in GPONs and NGPONsthe K-out-of-N
approach, J. Lightwave Technol., vol. 29, no. 19, pp. 2875
2892, Oct. 2011.
[11] A. Fiat, Why study the price of anarchy?: Technical perspec-
tive, Commun. ACM, vol. 55, no. 7, p. 115, July 2012.
[12] Z. Han, D. Niyato, W. Saad, T. Basar, and A. Hjorungnes,
Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks:
Theory, Models, and Applications. Cambridge University,
2011.
[13] G. Schtz and N. Correia, Design of QoS-aware energy-
efficient fiberwireless access networks, J. Opt. Commun.
Netw., vol. 4, no. 8, pp. 586594, Aug. 2012.
[14] B. Lin, J. Tapolcai, and P.-H. Ho, Dimensioning and site plan-
ning of integrated PONand wireless cooperative networks for
fixed mobile convergence, IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 60,
no. 9, pp. 45284538, Nov. 2011.
[15] N. Ghazisaidi, M. Scheutzow, and M. Maier, Survivability
analysis of next-generation passive optical networks and
fiber-wireless access networks, IEEE Trans. Reliab., vol. 60,
no. 2, pp. 479492, June 2011.
[16] Y. Liu, L. Guo, and X. Wei, Optimizing backup optical-
network-units selection and backup fibers deployment in sur-
vivable hybrid wireless-optical broadband access networks,
J. Lightwave Technol., vol. 30, no. 10, pp. 15091523,
May 2012.
[17] K. Yang, S. Ou, G. Ken, and H.-H. Chen, Convergence of
Ethernet PON and IEEE 802.16 broadband access networks
and its QoS-aware dynamic bandwidth allocation scheme,
IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 101116,
Feb. 2009.
[18] A. R. Dhaini, P.-H. Ho, and X. Jiang, WiMAX-VPON: A
framework of layer-2 VPNs for next-generation access net-
works, J. Opt. Commun. Netw., vol. 2, no. 7, pp. 400414,
July 2010.
[19] A. R. Dhaini, P. H. Ho, and X. H. Jiang, QoS control for guar-
anteed service bundles over fiber-wireless (FiWi) broadband
access networks, J. Lightwave Technol., vol. 29, no. 10,
pp. 15001513, May 2011.
[20] B. O. Obele, M. Iftikhar, S. Manipornsut, and M. Kang,
Analysis of the behavior of self-similar traffic in a QoS-aware
architecture for integrating WiMAX and GEPON, J. Opt.
Commun. Netw., vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 259273, Sept. 2009.
[21] H. Yache, R. R. Mazumdar, and C. Rosenber, A game theo-
retic framework for bandwidth allocation and pricing in
broadband networks, IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., vol. 8,
no. 5, pp. 667678, Oct. 2000.
[22] E. Altman, T. Boulogne, R. El-Azouzi, T. Jimnez, and L.
Wynter, A survey on networking games in telecommunica-
tions, Comput. Oper. Res., vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 286311,
Feb. 2006.
[23] Z. Ji and K. J. R. Liu, Dynamic spectrum sharing: A game
theoretical overview, IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 45, no. 5,
pp. 8894, 2007.
[24] X.-R. Cao, H.-X. Shen, R. Milito, and P. Wirth, Internet pric-
ing with a game theoretical approach: Concepts and exam-
ples, IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 208216,
Apr. 2002.
[25] D. Niyato and E. Hossain, Wireless broadband access
WiMAX and beyondintegration of WiMAX and WiFi: Opti-
mal pricing for bandwidth sharing, IEEE Commun. Mag.,
vol. 45, no. 5, pp. 140146, May 2007.
[26] S.-L. Hew and L. B. White, Cooperative resource allocation
games in shared networks: Symmetric and asymmetric fair
bargaining models, IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 7,
no. 11, pp. 41664175, Nov. 2008.
[27] Z. Han and H. V. Poor, Coalition games with cooperative
transmission: Acure for the curse of boundary nodes in selfish
packet-forwarding wireless networks, IEEE Trans. Com-
mun., vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 203213, Jan. 2009.
[28] H.-T. Lin, Y.-Y. Lin, W.-R. Chang, and S.-M. Chen, A game-
theoretic framework for intra-ONU scheduling in integrated
EPON/WiMAX networks, in Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM,
2009.
[29] G. Kramer, B. Mukherjee, and G. Pesavento, IPACT: A
dynamic protocol for an Ethernet PON (EPON), IEEE Com-
mun. Mag., vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 7480, Feb. 2002.
[30] S. Blake, D. Black, M. Carlson, E. Davies, Z. Wang, and W.
Weiss, An architecture for differentiated services, Internet
Engineering Task Force RFC 2475, Dec. 1998.
[31] IEEE Standard 802.16 Working Group, IEEE 802.16e-2005
Standard for Local, and Metropolitan Area Networks: Air
interface for fixed broadband wireless access systems-
amendment for physical, and medium access control layers
for combined fixed, and mobile operation in licensed bands,
Dec. 2005.
[32] B. ONeill, A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud,
Math. Social Sci., vol. 2, pp. 345371, 1982.
[33] H.-J. Byun, J.-M. Nho, and J.-T. Lim, Dynamic
bandwidth allocation algorithm in Ethernet passive optical
networks, Electron. Lett., vol. 39, no. 13, pp. 10011002,
June 2003.
[34] S. De, V. Singh, H. M. Gupta, N. Saxena, and A. Roy, A new
predictive dynamic priority scheduling in Ethernet passive
optical networks (EPONs), Opt. Switch. Netw., vol. 7,
no. 4, pp. 215223 Dec. 2010.
[35] P. Marbach and R. Berry, Downlink resource allocation and
pricing for wireless networks, in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM,
2002, pp. 14701479.
[36] Y. Chen and K. J. Ray Liu, Understanding microeconomic
behaviors in social networking, IEEE Signal Process.
Mag., vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 5364, Mar. 2012.
[37] L. He and J. Walrand, Pricing and revenue sharing strate-
gies for Internet service providers, IEEE J. Sel. Areas
Commun., vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 942951, May 2006.
[38] D. Niyato and E. Hossain, Competitive pricing for
spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks: Dynamic
game, inefficiency of Nash equilibrium, and collusion,
IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 192202,
Jan. 2008.
[39] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory. Cambridge, MA:
MIT, 1991.
[40] M. Pulido, J. S. Soriano, and N. Llorca, Game theory tech-
niques for university management: An extended bankruptcy
model, Oper. Res., vol. 109, pp. 129142, 2002.
[41] R. B. Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University, 1991.
[42] S. P. Ketchpel, Coalition formation among autonomous
agents, in Proc. of MAAMAW, 1993.
[43] J. Nash, The bargaining problem, Econometrica, vol. 18,
no. 2, pp. 155162, 1950.
[44] H. Raiffa, Arbitration schemes for generalized two-person
games in Contributions to the Theory of Game II. Princeton
University, 1953, pp. 361388.
[45] Z. Han, Z. Ji, and K. J. Liu, Fair multiuser channel allocation
for OFDMA networks using Nash bargaining solutions
Hui-Tang Lin and Ying-You Lin VOL. 5, NO. 6/JUNE 2013/J. OPT. COMMUN. NETW. 619
and coalitions, IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 53, no. 8,
pp. 13661376, Aug. 2005.
[46] M. P. McGarry, M. Reisslein, and M. Maier, WDM Ethernet
passive optical networks, IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 44,
no. 2, pp. 1522, Feb. 2006.
[47] W. Willinger, M. S. Taqqu, and A. Erramilli, A biblio-
graphical guide to self-similar traffic and performance
modeling for modern high-speed networks, in Stochastic
Networks. Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 1996,
pp. 339366.
[48] A. R. Dhaini, C. M. Assi, M. Maier, and A. Shami, Per-stream
and admission control in Ethernet passive optical networks
(EPONs), J. Lightwave Technol., vol. 25, no. 7,
pp. 16591669, July 2007.
620 J. OPT. COMMUN. NETW./VOL. 5, NO. 6/JUNE 2013 Hui-Tang Lin and Ying-You Lin