showing widely divergent gures for the ethnic composition of the population of
Macedonia. According to the Bulgarian census gures, 52.3% of the population of
Macedonia were Bulgarians, and Turks with 22.1% were a distant second; according
to Greek gures the Greeks were in the majority with 37.8%, followed by Turks with
37%, and Bulgarians with 19.3%; in the Serbian census 71.3% of the population of
Macedonia were Serbs. The Ottoman census of 1905 showed that Muslims were in
the majority with 51.8%, followed by Bulgarians with 30.8%, and Greeks with
10.6%.
106
Looking at these gures, one is hard pressed to believe that they refer to
the same population or the same country. Macedonians are not mentioned in any of
these censuses.
Ultimately the actual ethnic make-up of the Macedonian population did not matter.
The Bulgarians claimed that Macedonians were Bulgarians, or hellenized Bulgars if
they spoke Greek, while the Greeks claimed that they were slavicized Greeks
(
and
annexed southern Macedonia
)
, while Serbia declared the northern section of Mace-
donia to have been the part of a medieval Serbian state and annexed most of the
northern section in 191213.
107
Only Bulgaria, as the loser in the Second Balkan
War in 1913, was deprived of its claim to a large part of Macedonia.
The number of Turkish speakers in Macedonia has uctuated considerably during
the second half of the twentieth century as indicated in Yugoslav censuses. Wide
uctuation in the number of Turkish speakers in Macedonia in the rst four post-war
Yugoslav censuses was inuenced by both internal and external events. After World
War II the loyalty of Turkish speakers in Macedonia was suspect. To escape
persecution, many Turkish speakers identied themselves as Albanians in the 1948
census. With the TitoAlbania split in 1953, the loyalty of Albanians in Macedonia
became suspect. This, combined with Titos decision to allow emigration of Muslims
to Turkey, led many Albanians and Macedonian-speaking Muslims to identify
themselves as Turks during the 1953 census. One indication of this is that of the
203,938 Turks in the 1953 census 32,392 gave Macedonian as their mother tongue
and 27,086 gave Albanian. The number of declared Albanians fell from 179,389 to
165,524 in 1953.
108
According to Yugoslav gures, between 1953 and 1966 some
80,000 Muslims, mostly ethnic Turks, emigrated to Turkey. The number of Turks in
Macedonia continued to fall in subsequent censuses. In the 1994 Macedonian census
82,976 Macedonians identied themselves as Turks, making up 4% of the population
of Macedonia.
109
Turkish speakers live throughout Macedonia but they are more numerous in
districts close to the Albanian and Kosovo borders. According to the 1994 Macedo-
nian census Turkish speakers made up over 30% of the population of the district of
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Brod, and over 25% of the district of Debar. The districts of Krushevo, Gostivar, and
Resen also have substantial Turkish populations.
110
Turkish speakers were a recognized nationality
(
narodnost
)
in former
Yugoslavia and were allowed full cultural and political rights. As De Jong notes,
Former Yugoslavia, and now Macedonia and truncated Yugoslavia are the only
countries in the Balkans where the Turkish minority has ourished.
111
After 1944,
for example, the educational opportunities of the Turkish community in Macedonia
were expanded. During the 19441945 school year, there were sixty primary
schools with 3,334 pupils, using Turkish as the language of instruction.
112
Over the
next decade additional schools opened and enrollments rose. By the 19501951
school year there were over 100 primary schools with more than 12,000 students and
staffed with 257 teachers. Enrollment in primary schools reached a peak during the
19531954 school year, when more than 15,000 students were enrolled in Turkish
primary schools. During the 1950s this trend was reversed as a result of increased
emigration of Turks to Turkey. The total number of Turkish schools in Macedonia
had dropped to 27 by the 19581959 school year26 primary schools and one
secondary school, with just over 6,000 pupils and 219 teachers. While the number
of primary schools had increased to fty-three by 1988, the number of pupils
remained more or less the same.
113
During the 19941995 school year there were
54 primary schools with 5,491 students and 274 teachers and four secondary schools
with 383 students and 67 teachers.
114
Turkish-language schools in Macedonia have
been instrumental in developing and maintaining a sense of Turkish identity among
Turkish speakers.
Even before the establishment of communist rule in Yugoslavia, Turkish and other
Muslims were allowed to practice their religion without government interference.
Prior to 1930 various Muslim groups in YugoslaviaAlbanian, Bosnian, Turkish
had their separate governing organizations. In 1930 these separate Muslim groups
were united under the authority of a single ulama, the Rais-ul Ulama, who enforced
Islamic religious and legal dogma and managed the affairs of the Islamic community.
Headquartered in Sarajevo, Yugoslavias Islamic community included about 3,000
religious leaders and 3,000 mosques in the 1980s. The only Islamic school of
theology in Europe was located in Sarajevo, and Islamic secondary schools operated
in Sarajevo, Skopje, and Pristina. A religious school for women, attached to the
Islamic secondary school in Sarajevo, had a capacity for 60.
115
According to Curtis, Relations of the postwar communist government with the
Islamic community were less troubled than those with the Orthodox or Roman
Catholic churches.
116
Communist Yugoslavia was the only country in the Balkans
which did not pursue an anti-Islamic policy and allowed complete religious freedom.
The recognized nationalities were given considerable autonomy in managing their
own cultural and religious affairs. Such autonomy and self-government contributed
greatly to the maintenance and strengthening of ethnic identities in former
Yugoslavia.
117
During the 1960s and 1970s, Tito used Yugoslavias Islamic com-
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munity to maintain friendly relations with oil-producing Arab countries because
Yugoslavia needed access to inexpensive oil.
118
After the Iranian revolution in 1979
the concerns of the government about destabilizing contacts between Yugoslav
Muslims and fundamentalist governments in the Middle East were put to rest until
the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991 as the ulama in Yugoslavia disavowed all
connection with pan-Islamic movements.
After the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, common Islamic leadership and
institutions for all Muslims living in successor states became impractical. Continuing
violent conicts in Bosnia and Kosovo also mitigated against such an arrangement.
Moreover, as each new successor state becomes strongly attached to its sovereignty
and guards it zealously, so too each ethnic community wants to assert its own
autonomy in exercising its cultural rights. What is emerging in the Republic of
Macedonia and other successor states of former Yugoslavia is the establishment of
ethnic-based cultural institutions and organizations.
Conclusions
Of the four countries discussed in this paper, in Bulgaria and Greece, to a much
greater degree than in Macedonia and Romania, identity construction among Turkish
speakers has has been a response to their treatment as the alien Other and to attempts
on the part of state authorities to deny or manipulate their identity.
The assimilation policies of the Zhivkov regime attempted to impose a Bulgarian
identity on ethnic Turks. These policies were reversed in late 1989. The rights of
Turks, Tatars, and other Muslims who had been targets of assimilation were restored.
The constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria adopted in 1991 recognizes the
existence of citizens of non-Bulgarian origin
(
but not national minorities
)
and
guarantees the right of these citizens to be educated in their mother tongue, to
develop their cultures in accordance with their ethnic self-identication, and to
practice their religion freely. Since 1989 considerable progress has been made in
translating these constitutional guarantees into action. Much still remains to be
accomplished. However, despite serious problems in the areas of education, politics,
religion, and the economy, most Turks and Tatars in Bulgaria today are more
condent about themselves and feel greater pride in who they are when compared
with the recent past. They have reclaimed most of their cultural and civil rights
without the violence that characterizes the relationships between ethnic groups in
many formerly communist states in Eastern Europe. However, the legal status of the
Turkish minority in Bulgaria is not entirely satisfactory. Bulgaria is the only country
in Eastern Europe whose postcommunist constitution and legal system does not
recognize the existence of national minorities or collective minority rights. This
maintains the ction that Bulgaria is a homogeneous, single-nation state.
While Bulgaria, Romania, and Macedonia have made real progress on minority
issues since 1989, Greece, a democratic country and an EU member, has made the
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least progress. The adage that in the Balkans truth and history are national consider-
ations, generated and reproduced by the academic establishment and church hier-
archy closely allied with government authorities, describes very aptly the discourse
on minority issues in Greece. Of the four countries discussed in this paper, Greece
is the only one where the government insists that there is no ethnic Turkish minority
or any other ethnic minority. Serious protests against government policies by Turkish
and other Muslims in Western Thrace in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the
heavy-handed response by the authorities to these protests brought the plight of the
Turkish minority to international attention. The Greek authorities responded by
easing some of the restrictions against members of the minority. However, serious
problems in minority education, government interference in Muslim religious affairs,
restrictions on freedom of expression, and so on remain. The status of some 60,000
ethnic Turks who were deprived of Greek citizenship under Article 19 is unresolved.
As long as the Greek government continues to deny the existence of an ethnic
Turkish minority a reconciliation between the Greek Orthodox and Muslim com-
munities is not possible.
In Romania the numbers of Tatars and Turks together are less than 55,000, about
0.2% of the total population. Although beginning in the 1960s Tatars and Turks
became targets of assimilation, these efforts were relatively benign when compared
with the policies of the Zhivkov regime in Bulgaria. Since 1989 all restrictions on
the Tatar and Turkish language and the practice of Islam have been lifted. Today the
desire of Tatars and Turks to speak their language and to practice their religion is not
seen as a threat to Romanian national security. Both groups have beneted from the
concessions to Romanias largest minority, the Hungarian minority.
The status of the Turkish-speaking minority in Macedonia today remains quite
favorable. They are free to organize their lives according to their cultural preferences
unhindered by the state. In addition to having their own schools, they have their
own newspapers, periodicals, radio and television programmes, schools and a
variety of cultural organizations.
119
However, the ethnic-based politics of recent
years in Macedonia puts small minorities such as Turks in a perilous situation. Since
these minorities lack the numerical strength to form their own political parties and
to elect their own candidates to political ofce, their ability to maintain their cultural
institutions will depend on the goodwill of the two major groups, the Macedonians
and the Albanians, among whom they live.
The presence of sizeable Turkish and other Muslim minorities in the Balkans
remains a source of tension in the region. Fear, suspicion, and dislike of Turkish and
other Muslims among Balkan peoples, a residue of several centuries of Ottoman rule,
remain. The negative image of Islam and Muslims is perpetuated by history
textbooks, literature, folklore, and the mass media. Most Balkan historiography
continues to frame the Ottoman conquerors, and by extension all Muslims, as
bloodthirsty barbarians, cruel tormentors and oppressors, who brought only ruin in
their wake; ve centuries of the Turkish yoke in the Bulgarian formulation.
158
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Although these fears had diminished over the years, recent events in Bosnia and
Kosovo have been used by ethnic nationalists to resurrect these fears to mobilize
anti-Turkish and anti-Islamic sentiment for political purposes. One result is height-
ened and often violent conict, as we are witnessing in Kosovo today. However, all
is not dark and gloomy. Developments in Bulgaria since 1989 offer hope that
reconciliation between different ethnic, linguistic, and religious communities is
possible; that history can be demythologized; that the nation state can be reimagined
with room for diversity.
NOTES
1. Loring Danforth, Nationalism in Eastern Europe: Nations, States, and Minorities, Cultural
Survival, 1995, Vol. 19, No. 2, p. 3.
2. Refers to an area south of the Danube delta from Tulcea in Romania to Varna in Bulgaria.
Among the various spellingsDobruja, Dobrugea, Dobrudzha, and Dobruca among
othersIve chosen the last, the Turkish spelling. In this spelling the letter c is pronounced
as j in the word jam.
3. Hugh Poulton, Islam, Ethnicity and State in the Contemporary Balkans, in Hugh Poulton
and Suha Taji-Farouki, eds, Muslim Identity and the Balkan State
(
New York: New York
University Press, 1997
)
, p. 15.
4. Some Turkish speakers may have begun to settle in the Balkans long before the beginning
of Ottoman conquests in the region, perhaps as early as the middle of the eleventh century.
See H. T. Norris, Islam in the Balkans: Religion and Society between Europe and the Arab
World
(
Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1993
)
, pp. 146155. One such
group is the Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians, the Gagauz. The origins of the Gagauz
are disputed. Over the years they have been regarded as the descendants of Greek, Bulgarian,
Albanian, or Wallachian Christians who had maintained their religion but had been Turkied
during the Ottoman period. A more popular traditional view held that they are of Anatolian
Turkish origin. The researches of T. Kowalski, Les Turcs et la Langue Turque de la Bulgarie
du Nord-Est
(
Krakow: Commission Orientaliste de lAcademie de Cracovie, 1933
)
and Les
elements ethniques turcs de la Dobrudja, Rocznik Orientalistyczny, Vol. 14, 1938, pp. 6680,
in Dobruca established a close connection between the Turkish spoken by the Gagauz and
Anatolian Turkish. The researches of Paul Wittek, Yazicioghly Ali on the Christian Turks
of Dobruja, BSOAS, Vol. 14, 1952, pp. 639668 and Les Gagaouzesles gens de
Kaykaus, Rocznik Orientalistyczny, Vol. 12, 1952, pp. 1224; Wlodzimierz Zajaczkowski,
Gagauz, Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. 2
(
Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1965
)
, pp. 971
972, and K etnogenezu Gagauzov, Folia Orientalia, Vol. 15, 1974, pp. 7786
)
; Kemal
Karpat, Gagauzlarin tarihi mensei uzerine kisa bir bakis, I. Uluslararasi Turk Folklor
Kongresi Bildirileri, Vol. 1, 1976, pp. 163177, and others support this hypothesis. However,
more recent analysis of historical and linguistic evidence indicates that the Gagauz are a
synthetic population, formed from the melding of Pechenegs, Uz, Cumans, and Anatolian
Turks. See Harun Gungor and Mustafa Argunshah, Gagauz Turkleri: Tarih-Dil-Folklor ve
Halk Edebiyati
(
Ankara: Kultur Bakanligi Yayinlari, 1991
)
, and Dunden Bugune Gagauzlar
(
Ankara: Elektronik Iletisim Ajansi Yayinlari, 1993
)
. There are an estimated 12,000 Gagauz
in Bulgaria, about 30,000 each in Greece and Romania. Most of the Gagauz today live in
Moldova and the Ukraine.
5. L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453
(
New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1958
)
,
p. 98; O
mer Barkan, Research on the Ottoman Fiscal Surveys, in M. A. Cook, ed., Studies in the
Economic History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to the Present Day
(
London:
Oxford University Press, 1970
)
, p. 170.
7. Maria Todorova, The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans, in Carl L. Brown, ed., Imperial
Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East
(
New York: Columbia
University Press, 1996
)
, pp. 6263.
8. Ibid., p. 64.
9. For a discussion of demographic changes in Bulgarian towns following the Russo-Turkish
War of 18771878, see Richard Crampton, The Turks in Bulgaria, 18781944, in Kemal
Karpat, ed., The Turks of Bulgaria: The History, Culture, and Political Fate of a Minority
(
Istanbul: Isis Press, 1990
)
, pp. 4378.
10. R. R. King, Minorities under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension among
Balkan Communist States
(
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973
)
, p. 91.
11. See Victor Friedman, Observing the Observed: Language, Ethnicity, and Power in the 1994
Macedonian Census and Beyond, in Barrett R. Rubin, ed., Toward Comprehensive Peace in
Southeast Europe: Conict Prevention in the Balkans
(
New York: Twentieth Century Fund
Press, 1996
)
, pp. 81105, 119128.
12. King, Minorities under Communism, p. 92.
13. Kemal Karpat, Ottoman Urbanism: The Crimean Tatar Emigration to Dobruca and the
Founding of Mecidiye, 18561878, International Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 3,
19841985, p. 3.
14. Mark Pinson, Russian Policy and the Emigration of Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire,
Part I, Guneydogu Avrupa Arastirmalari Dergisi, Vol. 1, 1972, pp. 4243.
15. Ibid., p. 44.
16. Ibid.
17. Karpat, Ottoman Urbanism, p. 7.
18. Ibid., p. 8. See also Kemal Karpat, Population Movements in the Ottoman State in the
Nineteenth Century: An Outline, Collection Turcica, 1983, pp. 385428, and The Crimean
Emigration of 18561862 and the Settlement and Urban Development of Dobruca, in Ch.
Remercier-Quelquejay et al., eds, Turco-Tatar Past, Soviet Present: Studies Presented to
Alexandre Bennigsen
(
Paris: Editions Peeters, 1986
)
.
19. Karpat, Ottoman Urbanism, p. 1.
20. Ibid., pp. 1112.
21. Nikolai Todorov, The Balkan Town in the Second Half of the 19th Century, Etudes
Balkaniques, Vol. 2, 1969, p. 38.
22. Ibid., p. 33.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 39
25. John Georgeoff, Ethnic Minorities in Bulgaria, in George Klein and Milan J. Reban, eds,
The Politics of Ethnicity in Eastern Europe
(
New York: Columbia University Press, 1981
)
,
p. 71.
26. The Russo-Turkish war of 18771878 was fought mostly on Bulgarian soil. Tatars, nursing
a hatred toward Russians who had forced them out of their homes in Crimea less than a
quarter century before, fought ferociously and mercilessly against the Russians and the
Bulgarians who supported the Russian war effort, taking no prisoners. Remaining in Bulgaria
after the war would have exposed the Tatars and their families to certain death at the hands
of the Russians and the Bulgarians. Most chose to leave with the retreating Ottoman armies.
160
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27. The most comprehensive description of the rich cultural life of Turkish and Tatar communi-
ties in Romanian Dobruca remains U
lkusal, Dobruca ve Turkler, pp. 105125, 155163, 231239, provides a wealth of infor-
mation on Turkish educational institutions and organizations, the Turkish press, and Turkish
cultural associations in Romania prior to World War II as well as information about the
impact of communist rule on these institutions.
35. De Jong, Turks and Tatars in Romania, pp. 178179.
36. Anuarul Statistic al Ramaniei, pp. 274277.
37. For a more detailed discussion of Islam in Romania prior to World War II, see U
lkusal,
Dobruca ve Turkler, pp. 129145.
38. De Jong, The Turks and Tatars in Romania, p. 169.
39. Frederick De Jong, Muslim Minorities in the Balkans on the Eve of the Collapse of
Communism, Islamic Studies, Vol. 36, 1997, p. 416.
40. For example, according to U