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RALPH LEE WOODWARD, jr., j-7(j MIDDLE AMERICAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE TULANE UNIVERSITY NEW ORLEANS 1971 PUBLISHED with the AID of a GRANT from the FORD FOUNDATION. Few issues arose after independence that had not already been raised during the turbulent years from 1808 to 1823. The political struggle after 1823 may be viewed as an extension of Spanish politics from
RALPH LEE WOODWARD, jr., j-7(j MIDDLE AMERICAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE TULANE UNIVERSITY NEW ORLEANS 1971 PUBLISHED with the AID of a GRANT from the FORD FOUNDATION. Few issues arose after independence that had not already been raised during the turbulent years from 1808 to 1823. The political struggle after 1823 may be viewed as an extension of Spanish politics from
RALPH LEE WOODWARD, jr., j-7(j MIDDLE AMERICAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE TULANE UNIVERSITY NEW ORLEANS 1971 PUBLISHED with the AID of a GRANT from the FORD FOUNDATION. Few issues arose after independence that had not already been raised during the turbulent years from 1808 to 1823. The political struggle after 1823 may be viewed as an extension of Spanish politics from
RALPH LEE WOODWARD, JR. j-7(j MIDDLE AMERICAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE TULANE UNIVERSITY NEW ORLEANS 1971 PUBLISHED WITH THE AID OF A GRANT FROM THE FORD FOUNDATION MARGARET A. L. HARRISON ROBERT WAUCHOPE Editors Publication 23 APPLIED ENLIGHTENMENT: 19TH CENTURY LIBERALISM Number 3 SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN GUATEMALA THE CARRERA REVOLT RALPH LEE WOODWARD, JR. Issued in 1971 Coleccion Luis Lujan Munoz Universidad Francisco Marroquin www.ufm.edu - Guatemala Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from Universidad Francisco Marroquin http://www.archive.org/details/socialrevOOIeewguat C PARED A STRUGGLE FOR INDEPEN- dence, Central Americans engaged in heated debate and bloody strife throughout the early years of the 19th century over a variety of other issues. They came to blows over church-state relations, fiscal policies, of- ficeholding, economic planning, trade policy, and general philosophy of government, but few issues arose after independence that had not already been raised during the turbulent years from 1808 to 1823. 1 In fact, the Central American political struggle after 1823 may be viewed as an extension of Spanish politics from 1808 to 1826. The Conservatives pleaded for moderation, order and stability of tradi- tional, familiar institutions. The Liberals argued for continuation of the Enlightenment reforms already begun under the Spanish Bourbons. The latter sought to make Central America a modern, progressive state, casting off the burden of Iberian heritage, and to ab- sorb eagerly innovative republican ideas from France, England, and the United States. These Liberals gained the upper hand, adopted a Constitution in 1824 and elected a government in 1825. Their victory was by the barest of margins, yet they embarked on a bold revolutionary program that terrified their opponents and led to civil war within a year. Only after a destructive, three-year blood- letting did the Liberals once more gain con- trol of the governments of the State of Gua- temala and the Federation. Following their victory in 1829, the Lib- erals dealt vindictively with the vanquished. Principal Conservative leaders they impris- oned or exiled, and the Guatemalan legisla- ture granted the government extraordinary powers to deal with those who opposed the I. See Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., "Economic and Origins of the Guatemalan Political Parties (1773- 1823)," Hispanic American Historical Review, XLV (Nov., 1965), 556-66. government. 2 In the years following, Fed- eral President Francisco Morazan used the full powers of his officeand moreto at- tain order and stability in the Republic. In this he was generally a failure, as disturb- ances and anarchy continued in El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, while Costa Rica virtually ignored the federal establishment. In Guatemala, however, Governor Mariano Galvez approached the problem with more success through conciliation. His provisional predecessors in the executive office, Pedro Molina (1829-30) and Antonio Rivera Ca- bezas (1830-31), had dealt harshly with the hated serviles, but Galvez restored some mea- sure of harmony to Guatemalan society. 3 While he launched a program of radical economic and social reform, Galvez at the same time courted certain conservative groups in the capital, gaining him a broader base of support. 4 An ambitious program to increase 2. Lorenzo Montufar, Resena historica de Centro- America, 7 vols. (Guatemala, 1878-87), I, 153-60. 3. Ibid., 126-249; Alejandro Marure, Efemerides de los hechos notables acaecidos en la Republica de Centro-America desde el ano de 1821 hasta el de 1842, 2d ed. (Guatemala, 1895), pp. 50-84; Miguel Garcia Granados, Memorias del General Miguel Gar- cia Granados, 2 vols. (Guatemala, 1893), II, 95-114; Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Central America, 3 vols. (San Francisco, 1883-87), III, 97-117; Mary P. Holleran, Church and State in Guatemala (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), pp. 104-5; Adam Szaszdi, Nicolas Raoul y la Republica Federal de Centro-America (Madrid: Universidad de Madrid, Seminario de Estudios Americanistas, 1958), pp. 153-54. 4. Archivo General de Centro-America, Guatemala (hereinafter cited as AGCA), leg. 191, exp. 4137; leg. 3479, exp. 79472, fol. 4; Szaszdi, Raoul, pp. 141- 42; Holleran, Church and State, pp. 100-02; Robert Sidney Smith, "Financing the Central American Fed- eration, 1821-1838," Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIII (Nov., 1963), 490-507; Robert A. Naylor, "British Commercial Relations with Central America, 1821-1851" (unpublished doctoral disser- tation, Tulane University, New Orleans, 1958), p. 85, 154; Pedro Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, 2d ed. (Guatemala: Biblioteca de Cultura Popular, vol. 30, Ministerio de Education Publica, 1959), p. 48. 45 46 Social Revolution in Guatemala production, expand transportation, and col- onize the lowland areas of the Caribbean coast, for example, promised tangible benefits to the merchant class. 5 Although political passions still ran high, relative peace in the state and mild prosperity resulting from the expanding cochineal production contributed to a lessening of political tensions. In the well-to-do classesthe only ones who had par- ticipated in politics by 1834 there was once more social intercourse among those of dif- ferent political persuasions. Miguel Garcia Granados noted that at a grand ball given by the governor on Independence Day of that year, "for the first time since before 1829, all those belonging to 'the aristocracy' came together." An impartial observer, Garcia Gra- nados added, would have noticed the har- mony that reigned among the notables at the governor's house that night, and would have believed that a period of peace and prosperity lay ahead for the state. He would have held no suspicion that "we were on a volcano, and on the eve of entering a terrible crisis of im- mense consequence for our future." In retrospect, Galvez' first administration does appear as a calm before the storm. While the so-called "aristocrats" to which Garcia Granados referred might have reached a de- gree of concord, their congeniality did not reflect the society as a whole, and Guatemala was soon to be bathed once more in blood. Governing most aspects of Guatemalan life were the Europeanized residents of the ca- pital, a city of no more than 40,000 by 1835. 7 5. See, for example, AGCA, leg. 160, exp. 3375, fols. 17-19; leg. 168, exp. 3545, fols. 11-13; leg. 176, exp. 3765; leg. 177, exp. 3788, fol. 3; leg. 178, exp. 3790, fol. 11, and exp. 3809; leg. 182, exps. 3972, 3974; leg. 183, exp. 3989, fol. 15; leg. 1167, exps. 27731- 43; leg. 4126, exp. 92812; Boletin Oficial (Guate- mala), segunda parte, no. 34 (May 26, 1833), p. 375. 6. Garcia Granados, Memorias, II, 180. 7. Estimates of the Guatemalan population vary rather considerably for this period. For Guatemala as a whole, Juan Galindo's figures, quoted by Ephraim G. Squier in his Notes on Central America; Particularly the States of Honduras and San Salvador: Their Geography, Topography, Climate, Population, Resources, Production, etc., etc., and the proposed Honduras Inter-oceanic Railway (New York, 1855), p. 52, would appear to be reasonable, although Squier believed the number of whites to be less than Since the late 18th century, the extended fam- ily of the House of Aycinena had dominated the society. Creoles for the most part, it in- cluded a few Spaniards, among whom the most notable had been the first Marques de Aycinena. They had come to be known in the 19th century variously as "the nobles," "the aristocracy," or simply as "the family," although by strict European definitions the terms were inaccurate. 8 The political and economic disturbances that began during the administration of Captain-General Jose de Bustamante (1811-18), the decline of indigo exports, and the disintegration of the old Kingdom of Guatemala following indepen- dence all contributed to an erosion of the collective importance of this white elite. Con- trary to popular opinion, they were not united politically, leaders of both parties coming from their ranksalthough it is true that by the 1830s most were Conservatives. Less wealthy than these "aristocrats," but still part of the creole ruling class, was a larger group of people who, since the reforms inaugurated by the Cortes of Cadiz, had played an important role in the country's politics and economy. It was from this "mid- dle sector" (another inaccurate term, for they were really near the top) that many of the leaders of the Liberal Party and the Galvez administration came. The production and commerce of the state was in the hands of these two groups, and al- though there was considerable political gain to be made by branding individuals as "aris- tocrats" between 1821 and 1839, in all prob- ability the line between these classes was never clearly defined and became blurred with the political differences between Liberal and Conservative. Changing circumstances had reduced the favorable economic position that the Aycinena "family" had held at the Galindo indicated: 450,000 Indians, 100,000 whites, and 150,000 ladinos (mestizos). 8. Woodward, "Economic and Social," pp. 545-46. An excellent investigation of the Guatemalan elite in the Federation period is the work of Susan Emily Strobeck, "The Political Activities of Some Members of the Aristocratic Families of Guatemala, 1821- 1839" (unpublished master's thesis, Tulane Univer- sity, New Orleans, 1958). Social Revolution in Guatemala 47 close of the reign of Carlos IV, but this elite was still the most durable element of the Guatemalan upper class in the transition from colony to republic. A comparison of the ma- triculas of the merchant guild, comprised of the leading merchants and landholders of Guatemala, for the years 1799, 1823, and 1839, reveals 168 different family names, but only twelve of the names are common to all three lists. 9 This startling statistic suggests that ec- onomic survival during the forty years was difficult. Among the twelve families were im- portant participants on both the Liberal and Conservative sides, as well as several who took no active part in the political activity, but all were major houses. On the other hand, the high rate of attrition among other merchants and landholders illustrates that the period witnessed considerable dislocation. Many of the Spaniards left the country at the time of independence. There is a notable de- crease in the number of Basque names on the 1823 list. The civil disorders and wars of the 1820s and 1830s further disrupted the economy. Meanwhile, there was a small flow of newcomers to enlarge the European resident class in the capital. 10 9. Arrivillaga, Asturias, Aycinena, Barrundia, Batres, Cambronero, Najera, Pavon, Pinol, Tejada, Urruela, and Valdez. Six others namesBenitez, Gorris, Roma, Rubio, Taboada, and Vidaurre-appear on the 1799 and 1839 lists, but not on the 1823 list. Eighty-six individuals, representing 70 different family names, appeared on the 1799 list; 115 individuals, represent- ing 79 family names, appeared on the 1823 list; and 119 individuals, representing 81 family names, ap- peared on the 1839 list. Twenty-one of the family names appear on both the 1799 and 1823 lists, and 36 on both the 1829 and 1839 lists. There are 44 different family names that appear only on the 1799 lists; 34 appear only on the 1823 list; and 42 appear only on the 1839 list. AGCA, Lista de Comerciantes y Hacendados de esta Capital, June 12, 1799, leg. 6, exp. 110, fols. 8-9; Lista de los Yndividuos Comer- ciantes y Hazendados que componen el gremio con- sular, Dec. 22, 1823, leg. 1391, exp. 32111; Lista de los comerciantes y hacendados que a juicio de los que suscriben pueden ser nombrados por el Supremo Gobierno para efectuar la reorganization del Con- sulado Mercantil, Aug. 25, 1839, leg. 214, exp. 4941, fols. 200-06. 10. Robert Glasgow Dunlop, Travels in Central America, being a Journal of nearly Three Years' Resi- dence in the Country, together with a Sketch of the History of the Republic, and an Account of its Cli- mate, Production, Commerce, etc. (London, 1847). pp. 317, 334-35. This class of Europeans, born on either side of the Atlantic, dominated in the capital the politics of the era. The majority of the popula- tion had little voice. Although there was some class mobility, largely along economic-cul- tural lines, the remainder of the population in the 1830s can be divided into racial classes: first, the mestizos, or ladinos as they arc called in Guatemala, and second, the Indians. There were also some Negroes, mulattos, and zambos on the north coast and in the Amati- tlan region, but they were not a significant percentage of the total. The ladinos were the most volatile group in the society. As they were denied deep roots in either the European or Indian com- munities, their fortunes depended to a greater extent on their own initiative and abilities and they therefore often acted more aggressively than the class above or below them. Most numerous in the major towns and in the east- ern mountain region, they had been severely hurt by the economic disruption since in- dependence. The line between the more suc- cessful of this class and the lower echelons of the European community was not clearly drawn, and the ladino class was certainly one source of newcomers into the Creole class. 11 The Indians, the majority of the population, were more isolated and generally less in- volved with the European community than were the ladinos. Many did not speak Span- ish. They continued in their traditional way of life, little aware of or interested in the pos- sibilities of modern economic and social ad- 11. Detailed information on this middle class for this period is scanty, but some useful descriptions and observations are found in: ibid., pp. 335-37; Ramon A. Salazar, Historia de veintiun anos (Guatemala: Tipografia Nacional, 1928); Henry Dunn, Guatimala, or, the Republic of Central America, in 1827-8; being Sketches and Memorandum made during a Twelve Months' Residence (London, 1829), pp. 219-20; Frederick Crowe, The Gosjiel in Central America; Containing a Sketch of the Country, Physical and GeographicalHistorical and PoliticalMoral and Re- ligious: A History of the Baptist Mission in British Honduras and of the Introduction of the Bible into the Spanish American Republic of Guatemala (Lon- don, 1850), pp. 252-53; see also Jacques Lambert, Latin America: Social Structures and Political Insti- tutions (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 81. 48 Social Revolution in Guatemala vance. Providing the labor force for rural Guatemala since before the Spanish Conquest, the Indians of Guatemala have still not been brought into the life of the nation, and, as a recent participant in the Guatemalan guer- rilla warfare has put it, "Barriers of distrust confront any proposal for change." 12 For the Indians and probably for many of the rural ladinos, Jacques Lambert's recent statement that "most Spaniards lived in the cities during the colonial period, while most of the Indians and mestizos lived in isolation in the country- side," would seem to apply to Guatemala as independence began. "Instead of being sub- jected to the authority of Spanish adminis- trators," Lambert continued, "they were con- trolled by their Creole masters or, in some cases, by their Indian chiefs." 13 The Galvez administration looked optimis- tically at its progress and the restoration of order in the state. The indigo decline that had begun around 1800 because of foreign competition had continued, but that was more of a problem for El Salvador than for Gua- temala, although the Guatemalan merchants were involved. Meanwhile, production of cochineal had grown steadily since its rein- troduction into the country in 1811. 14 The 12. Eduardo Galeano, Guatemala, Occupied Coun- try, trans, by Cedric Belfrage (New York and Lon- don: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 45. Anthro- pologists have dealt with various Indian communi- ties in Guatemala and with some aspects of the In- dian throughout the country, but there is a remark- able lack of writing on the Indians as a social class or force. Perhaps this is because of the difficulty in ascertaining that they played any role at all. Some interesting observations on the problems that the Galvez government faced in trying to westernize the Indians are presented by Miriam Williford, Las Luces y La Civilization: The Social Reforms of Mari- ano Galvez (New Orleans: Middle American Re- search Institute, Tulane University, 1969), pp. 35- 40. 13. Lambert, Latin America, p. 131. 14. Shirley Lucas McAfee, "A Study of Agricultural Labor in Guatemala, 1821-1871" (unpublished master's thesis, Tulane University, New Orleans, 1955), pp. 5-7, 23-24, 41, 55; Dunn, Guatimala, p. 212; Woodward, "Economic and Social," p. 559; Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., Class Privilege and Eco- nomic Development: The Consulado de Comercio of Guatemala, 1793-1871 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966), pp. 39-44; Gazeta de Guatemala, XV, no. 218 (May 16, 1811), 209-10. The report of the Real Consulado de Comercio very depressed state of the economy in the 1820s 15 had been mitigated by peace and growing trade, largely owing to the British promotion of Belize as the major entrepot for Central American exports of indigo, cochineal, and mahogany. 10 To protect the native textile industry higher tariffs had been adopted, 17 and although this had not restored prosper- ity to the weavers, it was a positive step in that direction. A serious debt, shortage of currency, and accompanying high interest rates still plagued the economy, 18 but there were signs of improvement. 10 Most signif- icantly, cochineal production and exports rose dramatically in the 1830's, providing a real sense of prosperity among producers in Ama- titlan, Antigua, and the Verapaz, as well as among merchants of the capital. 20 The Carrera revolt of 1837 shattered this delicate atmosphere of conciliation, prosper- ity, and calm. Unlike earlier civil wars, this one arose not from differences among the Creoles, but erupted among the peasants of the eastern mountains, the region in Guate- mala known as la montana. It was not an- other quarrel between Liberals and Conserva- tives for control of the government, but rather a popular rebellion engendered by a growing list of grievances against the Galvez govern- of Guatemala of Apr. 15, 1817, AGCA, leg. 51, exp. 1273, fols. 3-7, provides a detailed description of the causes of the decline of indigo and of the prob- lems facing the Guatemalan economy on the eve of independence. The best description of cochineal pro- duction is in Dunlop, Travels, pp. 123-35. 15. Rafael Heliodoro Valle, La anexion de Centro America a Mexico, 6 vols. (Mexico, 1924-36), II, 198; Valentin Solorzano Fernandez, Historia de la evolution economica de Guatemala (Mexico, 1947), pp. 220-30. 16. Naylor, "British Commercial." 17. Smith, "Financing," pp. 506-07. 18. Miguel Garcia Granados noted that as of about 1832, although there was much poverty in Guate- mala, the cost of living was relatively low, and that the only thing expensive was money, interest on which ranged from 2 per cent to 3 per cent monthly with good collateral. Memorias, II, 55. 19. Thomas L. Karnes, The Failure of Union: Cen- tral America, 1824-1860 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), p. 62. 20. Chester Lloyd Jones, Guatemala, Past and Pres- ent (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1940), p. 385; Semanario de Guatemala, no. 3 (May Social Revolution in Guatemala 49 ment and triggered by a catastrophic epid- emic of cholera. At the heart of the difficulty lay the Gal- vez reform program, the rational extension of changes inspired by Enlightenment philoso- phers, initiated by Bourbon ministers, ac- celerated by liberal Spaniards in Napoleonic times, and continued by Creoles after inde- pendence. The last group added a new di- mension, however, in their conscious effort to imitate the rapidly advancing English- speaking world. Direct contact with English and North American merchants and diplomats in Central America accounted for part of this, but probably more important were the read- ings and travels of Central Americans. Both Morazan and Galvez believed that Central America could become a modern, progressive republic through enlightened legislation. Con- vinced that Spanish colonialism was respons- ible for their nation's underdevelopment, they sought to destroy Hispanic institutions and to construct new institutions and laws based on the successful experience of Great Britain and the United States. 21 In practice, however, although Galvez made substantial headway in gaining acceptance of his program from the elite, he found the changes unwelcome among the lower classes of the country. From Gal- vez' point of view, he promoted a carefully planned program to improve the country's ec- onomy, its judicial system, bureaucracy, edu- cational opportunities, communications, and general welfare. But the Liberals displayed exceptional ineptitude in attracting the popu- lace to their program. In spite of all their stated good intentions, as a Conservative 21, 1836), p. 14; Ernesto Chinchilla Aguilar, His- toria y tradiciones de la Ciudad de Amatitldn (Guate- mala: Biblioteca Guatemalteca de Cultura Popular, vol. 47, Ministerio de Education Publica, 1961), p. 80. 21. Galvez said in 1830 that "Our civilization and prosperity depend on our drawing closer to the At- lantic." William J. Griffith, Empires in the Wilder- ness; Foreign Colonization and Development in Gua- temala, 1834-1844 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), pp. 8-9, citing Mariano Gal- vez, Informe que presento al Congreso Federal, el Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de Hacienda, al dar cuenta del negocio relativo a la apertura del canal de Nicaragua en la sesion publica ordinaria del sdbado 24 de fulio de 1830 ([Guatemala], n.d.), p. 5. Guatemalan historian has put it, "neither the Liberals, nor the aristocrats, nor the high clergy succeeded in interesting the people in the enterprise of their emancipation. The people were not," he added, "discontent un- der the Spanish regime, which was very pa- ternal, very benevolent." 22 Although Galvez' program claimed to pro- mote a prosperous economy, many remained understandably unconvinced. The dislocation occasioned by the shift to cochineal produc- tion could not easily be absorbed. Galvez' tariff policy was more favorable to native weavers, but heavy imports of British textiles had already substantially ruined them and they continued to be apprehensive of the Liberals' talk of economic freedom. Galvez' tariff adjustment was too little, too late. 23 More directly responsible for popular re- action was the establishment of a direct head tax, reminiscent of the tribute collected by the Spaniards and abolished immediately after independence. Wealthy citizens had been forced to supply loans to the new gov- ernment after 1829, but this was insufficient to provide for the ambitious program of the government. 24 Galvez established the tax at two pesos per capita, an amount sufficient to harass the Guatemalan peasant of the 1830s. 25 In El Salvador such a tax resulted in widespread popular rebellion, forcing sus- pension of the levy there, but Galvez main- tained the tax in Guatemala. 26 The Galvez plans for an extensive network of roads and ports resulted in heavy demands for peasant labor. The government frequent- ly reminded local officials of the obligation of all residents to work on the roads three days out of every month. One could evade 22. Manuel Cobos Batres, Carrera (Guatemala, n.d.), p. 81. 23. Naylor, "British Commercial," p. 154; Smith, "Financing," pp. 506-07; Tobar Cruz, Los mon- taneses, p. 48. 24. Strobeck, "Political Activities," pp. 85-86. 25. Clemente Marroquin Bojas, Francisco Morazan y Rafael Carrera (Guatemala, 1965), p. 116; Ignacio Solis, ed., Memorias del General Carrera, 1837 a 1840 (Guatemala, 1906), pp. 15, 24. 26. Marure, Efemerides, pp. 73-74; Garcia Grana- dos, Memorias, II, 93-95. 50 Social Revolution in Guatemala this labor by payment of the low daily wage, but for the masses it meant forced labor, which could not have been welcomed. The practice was not new with Galvez, but it was now enforced more rigorously than earlier. 27 Another aspect of the Liberal economic program contributing to rural unrest was the land policy of the government, which since 1825 had promoted private acquisition of pub- He land as a means of increasing production. After 1829 these efforts were accelerated. It seems likely that the real result of this re- form was to allow those with some capital to acquire Indian communal lands and to in- crease, rather than decrease, latifundism. In- dividual ownership did not have great appeal for the Indians. Galvez apparently believed it should be encouraged as a civilizing force, and in the end lands which were formerly used in common by local inhabitants may have passed into the hands of latifundistas. Also, a number of large grants to foreigners caused considerable unrest in eastern Guate- mala. 28 An integral part of Galvez' vision of a prosperous state was his program of foreign colonization in the more sparsely inhabited reaches as a means of bringing about their development and attracting a more indus- trious type of citizen into the state. Such plans date back to the 18th century, but the Galvez emphasis on northern European immigration was new. The growing com- mercial activity of the British from their set- tlement at Belize had intensified the tradi- tional suspicion of foreigners by many resi- dents. Spanish colonial administration had dealt harshly with foreign interlopers, but since independence the Liberal policy had 27. For example, see AGCA, leg. 1191, exps. 28983, 28991. 28. Robert A. Naylor, "Guatemala: Indian Attitudes toward Land Tenure," Journal of Inter-American Studies, IX (Oct., 1967), 626-29, 634; Manuel Pi- neda de Mont, comp., Recopilacion de las leues de Guatemala, 3 vols. (Guatemala, 1869-72), I, 658- 86; William J. Griffith, "Juan Galindo, Central American Chauvinist," Hispanic American Historical Review, XL (Feb., 1960), 28-31; Ignacio Solis, "La Casa de Moneda" (unpublished manuscript in the Biblioteca de la Sociedad de Geografia e Historia de Guatemala), p. 70. welcomed them, and this caused apprehen- sion among those who believed themselves to be the victims of foreign competition. For- eign influence was evident in many aspects of the Galvez program, but the concessions made to mahogany loggers and the projects to colonize the northern and eastern portions of the country with Englishmen particularly aroused the residents of those regions. They came to regard the Galvez government as more favorable to foreign than to national in- terests. In their eyes, Galvez was giving away what they believed to be their own resources. As the British hold on Belize, the Mosquito Coast, and the Bay Islands tightened, and as Anglo-American colonizers in Texas threw off Mexican rule, the wisdom of Galvez' coloni- zation plan became increasingly dubious to these people. 29 Between March and August, 1834, the Guatemalan government ceded nearly all its public land to foreign coloniza- tion companies, an area equal to nearly three- fourths of the total area of the state. 30 The Galvez government ignored or sup- pressed petitions against these contracts from residents of the region and the anti-foreign resentment spread. Galvez and his reformers considered ridiculous the idea that they were betraying their country to Europeans and they attributed entirely to the self-interest of native woodcutters the opposition from Chi- quimula and other eastern towns. A revolt 29. The most complete work on the Liberals' en- couragement of foreign colonization is Griffith, Em- pires. See also David Vela, Barrundia ante el espejo de su tiempo, 2 vols. (Guatemala: Editorial Uni- versitaria, 1956-57), I, 229; Naylor, "British Com- mercial," pp. 4-7, 13-15, 25, 90-96, 159-61, 183; Robert A. Naylor, "The British Role in Central America Prior to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850," Hispanic American Historical Review, XL (Aug., 1960), 364-67; John A. Burdon, ed., Archives of British Honduras, 3 vols. (London, 1931-35), II. 150, 179-80, 184-88, 209-14, 224, 239, 255, 259, 266-75, 282; Wayne M. Clegern, British Honduras, Colonial Dead End, 1859-1900 (Baton Rouge: Lou- isiana State University Press, 1967), pp. 7-9, 167- 68; Virgilio Rodriguez Beteta, La politico inglesa en Centroamerica durante el sigh XIX (Guatemala: Cen- tro Editorial "Jose de Pineda Ibarra," Ministerio dc Education Publica, 1963), pp. 15-18, 22, 48; George Alexander Thompson, Narrative of an Official Visit to Guatemala from Mexico (London, 1829), pp. 71- 72, 419-21; Szaszdi, Raoul, p. 54. 30. Griffith, Empires, pp. 32-52. Social Revolution in Guatemala 51 in Chiquimula in the fall of 1835, possibly linked to the uprising in El Salvador against Morazan's federal government, focused on the foreign issue, as anti-English propaganda in- flamed the residents of the eastern region. Government troops suppressed this rebellion, but the practice of imposing levies on the towns that had revolted to pay for the mili- tary's expenses could only have increased the resentment. 31 Concern over the popular re- action against the contracts caused the fed- eral government to pressure Galvez into issu- ing a conciliatory decree guaranteeing Guate- malan citizens full rights, but this failed to pacify the inhabitants. 32 The arrival of a shipload of British colonists in mid-1836 ag- gravated the resentment, which must be con- sidered a major factor in inflaming the popu- lace against the Galvez government. 33 Central to the Liberal program was the removal of the clergy from its traditional role in politics, economy, and education. As with other issues, the roots of this are in the Bour- bon reforms of the 18th century, but after independence the attack on clerical privilege accelerated. Anti-clericalism ran particularly high after the Church backed the Conserva- tive regime in 1826-29. Liberal victory in 1829 brought swift retaliation, as earlier re- forms were not implemented. Far from sepa- rating Church and State, the government in- stituted close control over the Church. The federal government, with President Morazan taking the lead, began a systematic removal of anti-Liberal clergymen, including the arch- bishop. 34 Following suppression of monastic orders, the exile of conservative leaders in the clergy, and establishment of religious lib- erty in the Republic, the federal government prevailed on state governments to continue the assault on clerical privilege. From 1829 to 1831 the Guatemalan government censored ecclesiastical correspondence, seized Church funds, and confiscated monastic property. 35 Governor Galvez went further. The govern- ment suppressed collection of the tithe in 1832, ended many religious holidays, confis- cated more Church property, decreed the right of the clergy to write their wills as they wished, and legitimized the inheritance of parents' property by children of the clergy. In 1837 the Guatemalan legislature author- ized civil marriage and legalized divorce. 36 Many priests did not take lightly such chal- lenges to the traditional authority of the Church, especially in the countryside, where their parishioners were already disenchanted with the Galvez government on other grounds. In the Indian and ladino villages, the priests were more than just spiritual leaders. As en- voy from the United States, John Lloyd Stephens described a typical representative of the rural clergy in 1839 : 37 Besides officiating in all the services of the church, visiting the sick, and burying the dead, my worthy host was looked up to by every Indian in the village as a counselor, friend, and father. The door of the convent was always open, and Indians were constant- ly resorting to him: A man who had quar- reled with his neighbor; a wife who had been badly treated by her husband; a father whose son had been carried off as a soldier; a young girl deserted by her lover
all who were in trouble or affliction came to him for advice and consolation, and none went away with- out it. And, besides this he was principal di- rector of all the public business of the town, the right hand of the alcalde. Given this position, village curates could in- flame their parishioners against a government that attacked their sacred institution, brought Protestant foreigners into the country, and threatened the very bases of society. These village priests were in the vanguard of the up- risings that rocked Guatemala in 1837. 38 31. Ibid., pp. 84-113. Belize merchant Marshall Bennett was most active in pursuing concessions to the extent of curtailing the rights and opportunities of Guatemalan citizens. 32. Ibid., pp. 114-19; AGCA, leg. 164, exp. 3428, fol. 6; Pineda de Mont, Recopilacion, I, 822-23. 33. Griffith, Empires, pp. 138-50. 34. Holleran, Church and State, pp. 74-96, 102. 35. Ibid., pp. 101-20; Mamie, Efemerides, pp. 60- 64, 70. 36. Marure, Efemerides, pp. 71, 80, 93; Boletin Oficial, no. 105 (Oct. 10, 1837), pp. 437-52. 37. Incidents of Travel in Central America, Chiapas, and Yucatan, edited with an introduction and notes by Richard L. Predmore, 2 vols. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1949), I, 134. 38. Garcia Granados, Memorias, II, 154-61, 177; Dunlop, Travels, pp. 185-86; Holleran, Church and State, pp. 121-27; Solis, Carrera, p. 16; Arlene Eisen, Social Revolution in Guatemala None of Galvez' reforms were closer to him than his plan to remove education from the traditionalist hands of the Church and to re- place it with secular schools open to all Gua- temalans. An ambitious program called for es- tablishment of public schools throughout the country, and a broad range of cultural promo- tions attempted to westernize the Guatemalan Indian. Trying to change long-established customs and prejudices naturally exposed the Galvez administration to bigoted criticism from the illiterate masses. 39 Probably no part of the Galvez program proved quite so objectionable to so many as his effort to revise the judicial system of the country. Thoroughly convinced that the Span- ish system of private fueros and multiple courts was unjust and out of step with en- lightened, 19th-century progress, the Lib- erals
owing chiefly to the endeavors of Jose Francisco Barrundia
adopted the Livingston Codes, which went into effect January 1, 1837. Written by Edward Livingston for the State of Louisiana in 1824, but never adopted, this Anglo-Saxon code suggested to Liberal Gua- temalans a modern replacement for the sys- tem they had been abolishing piecemeal. As the central feature of the new system was trial by jury, Barrundia praised it on the day it went into effect in these terms : "The justice of a nation is no longer abandoned solely to the discretion of a salaried judge and to the obscure labyrinth of cruel and bloody laws." 40 Almost immediately, however, problems arose in the countryside. In a country where il- literacy Was general and a class system was well established, trial by jury proved imprac- ticable, and anecdotes quickly circulated "The Indians in Colonial Spanish America," in Ma- gali Sarfatti, Spanish Bureaucratic-Patrimonialism in America (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1966), p. 104. 39. Galvez' educational program is explained in Mi- riam Williford, "The Educational Reforms of Dr. Ma- riano Galvez," Journal of Inter-American Studies, X (July, 1968), 461-73. See also her Las Luces, pp. 35-40; Marure, Efemerides, pp. 62, 65-66, 72-73, 87; and Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp. 4344. 40. Speech of J. F. Barrundia, Guatemala, January 1, 1837, in the Biblioteca Nacional de Guatemala, Collection of Hojas Sueltas, cited in Mario Rodriguez, The Livingston Codes in the Guatemalan Crisis of 1837-1838 (New Orleans: Middle American Research Institute, Tulane University, 1955), p. 14. ridiculing the decisions of Indian juries. The requirements of Livingston's penal code proved to be equally impracticable, as jails with separate cells for prisoners did not exist, and their construction with forced labor added to the resentment of the population, who identified the Codes much more with cen- tralized rule from Guatemala City, with for- eign influence, and with anti-clericalism, than with social justice. 41 Measures of enforcement took place that seemed to belie the Liberals' rhetoric about liberty and freedom. Reforms were intro- duced with brutality, with harshness, and in a totalitarian manner. Such tactics had been escalating in Guatemalan government ever since the strong-armed rule of Captain-Gen- eral Bustamante, 42 and the Liberals who came back into power in 1829 were vengeful against the Conservatives who had preceded them. Such methods, however, did little to ingratiate the Galvez government with the people. In October, 1832, Galvez divided the state into four comandancias, with a general in com- mand of each. 43 Thereafter, military govern- ment was a characteristic. Both the Morazan and Galvez governments were insensitive in their efforts to regulate the morality of the inhabitants, in suppressing criticism of their own policies, and in persecuting their enemies through exile and confiscation of property. One of the first acts of the Guatemalan leg- islature in 1829 was a decree ordering the re- payment of all salaries paid to public officials from October, 1826, through April, 1829, en- forced by confiscatory measures. The con- duct of government troops often inflamed the people in the country. The educational pro- gram, designed to insure education to all, 41. Many writers have dealt with the effect of the codes, nearly all agreeing that they were a major cause in turning the rural population against the Gal- vez government. Rodriguez' work (ibid.) offers the most perceptive account. 42. Woodward, "Economic and Social," pp. 557-60. 43. la-Departamento de Guatemala, General Carlos Salazar: 2a-Departamentos de Sacatepequez y Solola, General Juan Prem; 3a-Departamentos de Chiquimu- la y Verapaz, General Juan Jose Gorriz; 4-Departa- mento de Quezaltenango y Totonicapan, General Agustin Guzman. These military governments con- tinued until their suppression October 23, 1838, fol- lowing Galvez' resignation. Marure, Efemerides, p. 74. Social Revolution in Guatemala 53 provided that uneducated children might be taken from their parents and assigned to "Pro- tectors" who would provide for their educa- tion. In practice this often provided inex- pensive personal service for the elite, and the poorer classes viewed it unfavorably. The government also maintained an active pro- paganda campaign designed not only to pro- mote its own program, but to discredit the opposition. 44 The Liberals' good intentions, evidenced by adoption of the Livingston Codes, must have exceeded actual practice greatly, for Conservatives denounced those who claimed to be "partisans of progress and civilization" as guilty of "cruel inhumanity." 45 44. Bancroft, Central America, III, p. 102; Williford, Las Luces, pp. 35-39; Garcia Granados, Memorias, II, 92-93; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, p. 161; Grif- fith, Empires, p. 97. 45. A letter published in El Tiempo (Guatemala), no. 23 (Aug. 11, 1939), pp. 91-92; read: "Un movi- miento de horror, a que no puedo resistir, me obli- ga a suplicar a UU. se sirvan insertar en su periodico lo que he visto con mis ojos en el siglo 19, y en Guatemala cuando los que se dicen partidarios del progreso y de la civilization manejaban los negocios. Quiero denunciar el publico un rasgo de inhumanidad cruel. Y para aumentar el escandalo dire, que sus autores son los que ahora en sus escritos furibundos nos llaman retrogrados y obscurantistas. Pero que se comparen los hechos. "Hace pocos dias, que por curiosidad fui al Con- vento de Santo-Domingo. Los vestijios de destruc- cion y de ruina que presenta aquel edificio, no ex- citaron mi atencion por que asi estan todos los es- tablecimientos publicos, y ya me lo figuraba. Mi de- seo era conocer las carceles que se preparaban se- gun el sistema de Livingston; y creia ver realizadas las hermosas descripciones que habia leido de las pe- nitenciarias de Filadelfia y otros lugares de Norte America. Pero mi sorpresa fue indecible, cuando me vi en un cementerio. Si, aquellos calabozos son se- pulcros de vivos, donde los desventurados que hu- biesen entrado, debian morir entre la desesperacion, la hambre, y la dificultad de respirar. Entre en va- rios de aquellos horrorosos calabozos; y medi su largo que era como de dos varas y media: su ancho era de una vara larga; y a la altura de tres o cuatro varas, una ventanita redonda como de tres pulgadas de dia- metro que servia para comunicar una muy escasa luz, que venia de un callejon largo y obscuro. Estaban fa- bricadas sobre cincuenta; y delineadas mas de ciento. El que crea que falto a la verdad, que vaya al mo- menta a satisfacerse por si mismo, antes que las aca- ben de deshacer. "Esto hacen los que se han apropiado, como un titulo esclusivo, los dictados de filantropicos, ilustra- dos, filosofos y progresistas. Uno de los mas entu- siastas [Pedro Molina] recorriendo aauella horrible masmorra, se mostraba muy complacido y daba se- nates inequfvocas de su aprobacion. Yo quiero se me diga, si habrian hecho mas los tiranuelos de los tiempos feudales; o los inquisidores mas sanguinarios. Que mediten los pueblos sobre esos monumentos que Into this atmosphere of bitterness came the terrible scourge of cholera. The epidemic that hit Guatemala in 1837 was not unanti- cipated by the government. As early as De- cember, 1831, a Guatemalan newspaper had noted the severe cholera epidemic that was causing "terror" throughout Europe. 46 In 1833 it struck Mexico, and Galvez warned of the danger to his state as he established sanitary cordons, opened up new water supplies and sewage facilities, and prohibited burials in- side of churches. 47 In 1836 the danger became imminent, and, despite increased precautions, cholera penetrated the cordons late that year or early in 1837, probably via Belize. 48 In March and April, 1837, the government began to quarantine infected areas and to tighten the sanitary cordons. 49 These measures were un- doubtedly justified, but they were poorly un- derstood and they did not succeed. The mas- ses, already alienated from the Galvez govern- ment, feared the vaccines, and they believed priests who told them that the medicine that the government's health officers put into the water was poison. Panic resulted and violence broke out, particularly in the hard-hit eastern region. 50 Irate over the government's reforms and with cholera settling over the land like a divine retribution (which the priests said it was!), uprisings of peasants occurred in nos han dejado los libres de nuestro pais y de nues- tros dias. "Dispensen, sefiores Editores, lo mal escrito de mi comunicado: no aspiro a ser tenido por gran escritor; pero si por un hombre sensible y amante de la hu- manidad.Un Curioso." 46. El Siglo de Lafayette (Guatemala), no. 9 (Dec. 15, 1831), p. 34. 47. Williford, Las Luces, p. 37; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, p. 54. 48. Griffith, Empires, pp. 153-54; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp. 56-57. 49. Boletin Oficial, no. 88 (Mar. 29, 1837), pp. 231-32: Boletin Oficial, segunda parte, no. 9 (Apr. 25, 1837), pp. 107-08; Boletin Oficial, tercera parte, no. 11 (Mar. 19, 1837), p. 42; no. 12 (Mar. 31, 1837), pp. 45-46; no. 13 (Apr. 4, 1837), pp. 47-48; no. 14 (Apr. 26, 1837), pp. 49-50; no. 15 (Apr. 29, 1837), pp. 51-52. 50. Mariano Galvez, "Mensaje del Gefe de Estado de Guatemala, Dr. Mariano Galvez, al abrir sus se- siones ordinarias la Asamblea Lejislativa en 1837," in Collection of Hojas Sueltas, Latin American Li- brary, Tulane University, New Orleans (hereinafter cited as L.A.L. ), p. 4; Montiifar, Besena historica, II, 348-54; Solis, Carrera, p. 16. 54 Social Revolution in Guatemala various places beginning in March, 1837. The greatest trouble was in the eastern montana zone, more ladino than Indian, and tradi- tionally more restless while at the same time more generally under the domination of par- ish priests. The first major insurgency took place at San Juan Ostuncalco, where natives rose up against officials charged with effecting the Livingston Codes. 51 Other uprisings fol- lowed and from the village of Mataquescuin- tla there arose a natural leader, Jose Rafael Carrera. Born in the run-down Candelaria section of Guatemala City in 1814, Carrera was twenty-two when the revolt reached Ma- taquescuintla. His biographers have differed over his racial stock, but he seems to have been of mixed Indian, Negro, and European blood, and was not purely an "Indian" as he was called by his enemies. His early life may have been fairly representative of lower-class 51. Marure, Efemerides, pp. 91-92; Dunlop, Travels, pp. 192-93, recounts what happened there: "On the 6th of March, a serious disturbance took place in the town of San Juan Ostuncalo [sic], the people, who were nearly all aborigines, being provoked at being compelled to work at the construction of prisons, and excited against the new laws, rose en masse, to attack the circuit judges, at that time holding their first court of justice in the town. They and the of- ficers accompanying them were compelled to save themselves from the popular indignation by a pre- cipitate flight. The magistrate of the district, es- corted by a troop of dragoons, proceeded to re- monstrate with the Indians; but he had no sooner begun to speak than they directed against him a shower of stones. An engagement then took place between the mob and the dragoons, when the former was dispersed with considerable loss after killing twenty-four of the dragoons. The Indians left behind them an idol and a jar filled with stones collected from the bed of a neighbouring river. It appears that they had been made to believe that the jar, if broken at the moment of the attack, would throw lightning upon the enemy, and by enchantment, a number of venomous snakes would rush out from a neighbouring wood and bite the soldiers;an event which was to be brought about by the assistance of ladinos of the period. Receiving no formal education, he drifted about working at various jobs. By the time he was fourteen he was a drummer boy in the Guatemalan army and fought on the losing side against the forces of Morazan. After the civil war he worked in Amatitlan for a while, but by 1834 he was driving hogs in the district of Mita and his fortunes began to improve. A favorable re- lationship with the village priest of Mataques- cuintla opened the door to marriage with Pe- trona Garcia Alvarez, the daughter of a fam- ily of modest means. Frequently wounded in battle, Carrera was a man of exceptional physi- cal courage and undaunted determination. He was capable of violent outbursts of passion and may have been intemperate in his per- sonal life but, through native intelligence and common sense, in 1837 he became revered or feared as a guerrilla leader. 52 the old gods of the country, which, though nominally discarded by the Indians, are always recurred to in times of necessity, as the Romish superstition is by those in Europe professing a purer creed. The idol was a monstrous figure of a man seated cross-legged, with the head reclining upon the back, and the arms, encompassing an enormous belly, hanging down from the throat, being doubtless one of the old idols which had been concealed from the careful search of the inquisition." 52. Max Leon Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera of Gua- temala: His Life and Times," (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1942), pp. iv-v, 9-16, 45-46; Cobos Batres, Carrera, pp. 7-43, 48; Antonio Batres Jauregui ; La America Cen- tral ante la historia, 3 vols. (Guatemala, 1916-49), III, 162-83; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp. 63-64; Soils, Carrera, pp. 17-19, 27; Stephens, Incidents. I, 177, 195-98; Bancroft, Central America, III, 125- 26; Dunlop, Travels, pp. 88-89, 195; Thomas Young, Narrative of a Residence on the Mosquito Shore, durinti the Years 1839. 1840, and 1841, ivith an Ac- count of Truxillo and the Adjacent Islands of Bonacca and Roatan (London, 1842), p. 144; Boletin Extra- ordinario (Guatemala), August 17, 1857, in AGCA, leg. 1109, exp. 24621, fol. 33; Garcia Granados. Memorias, II, 246. rpHE WAR OF LA MONTANA is one * more bloody chapter in Central American history. Popular uprisings against the Liberal reforms stretched from El Salvador to Quezal- tenango during the first half of 1837, but it was in the district of Mita where Rafael Ca- rrera was first involved and where the nucleus of the Revolution developed. On May 6 some 2000 peasants rioted against the district gov- ernor, Francisco Aqueche, who was trying to isolate the area in accordance with the gov- ernment's health regulations. Aqueche took refuge in the convent, where Carrera's friend of the same name, probably a relative of the governor, lived. The mob demanded that the governor be turned out of the convent so that they could kill him, but the priest sent young Rafael Carrera instead to talk to them. With difficulty, he succeeded in persuading them to disperse. The young swineherd dominated the village from this moment on. Soon after, a new health officer appointed Carrera to command a platoon of troops enforcing the health cordons denying passage into the dis- trict. Carrera accepted the position reluctant- ly. Meanwhile, two residents of nearby Santa Rosa, Jose Maria Zapeta and Teodoro Mejia, were going from village to village in the region preaching resistance to the govern- ment and plotting rebellion. When a detach- ment of government troops approached Santa Rosa to suppress this movement on June 8, the Santarrosenos sent word to Mataques- cuintla, calling for aid. Carrera led a small band and headed for the neighboring town, where he arrived late the next evening, find- ing not a fighting force but a mob of men, wo- men, and children expecting to meet the sixty government dragoons assembled on the plain of Ambelis. The battle went badly for the rebels at first, but then Carrera took the initi- ative from Mejia and with a daring charge put the government forces to rout. Mejia con- tinued to coordinate and propagandize the rebellion thereafter, but from that day forward there were few who did not know that Rafael Carrera was in command, and his peasant followers were soon calling him "Angel," "Son of God," and the "Lord." 53 Similar uprisings occurred in several towns and villages in El Salvador and they may not have been unrelated to events in eastern Gua- temala. To meet the threat there, on May 27 Morazan decreed martial law in the depart- ments of Cuscatlan and San Vicente, as well as in San Salvador where there were also disorders. 54 In Guatemala, Galvez responded to the violence with two decrees on June 12. He acknowledged that "many villages of the District of Mita have been incited to rebellion and that they are spreading terror and violence," and "that similar disorders have ap- peared in other districts, which have been made to believe that the pestilence which devastates the peoples is a poison in the wa- ter and in the medicines." Thus, to prevent the further spread of cholera and to restore order, Galvez decreed that all those parti- cipating in any Way in the uprisings would be tried by military courts as traitors, punishable by death. To enforce this, his second decree provided for immediate reorganization of re- serve militia forces. 55 Three days later, gov- ernment troops launched a vindictive attack on Santa Rosa and Mataquescuintla. Pri- soners taken at Mataquescuintla implicated Father Aqueche, Rafael Carrera, and others. The troops killed several peasants and de- stroyed much property. The rebels fled to the surrounding hills, from whence began a long 53. Marroquin Rojas, Morazan, pp. 112-19; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp. 62-65; Solis, Carrera, pp. 21-29; Marure, Efemerides, pp. 95-96; Young, Nar- rative, p. 144. 54. Boletin Oficial, segunda parte, no. 10 (June 26, 1837), pp. 120-22. 55. Ibid., tercera parte, no. 17 (June 12, 1837), pp. 55-58. 55 56 Social Revolution in Guatemala campaign of raiding and harassing govern- ment forces. 56 A special sesion of the Gua- temalan legislature convened on June 13 and began a stormy debate, as Liberal opposition rose up against the growing arbitrariness of Galvez. 57 There was genuine fear in both parties of the popular uprisings, and on June 18 the legislature authorized Galvez to raise the armed forces to whatever size necessary to suppress the revolt. Galvez signed the de- cree on the 20th and proceeded to use his dictatorial powers in an effort to restore peace. 58 While Galvez employed repressive mea- sures, he also offered pardon to those who would lay down their arms, first on June 22, excepting only those who had actually killed government forces, and then on August 24, to all the rebels. 59 He did not have forces suf- ficient to deal a fatal blow to the guerrillas. Short of volunteers and funds and unable to secure sufficient recruits through conscrip- tions, on July 17 he authorized arming of pri- soners, offering to commute the sentences, ex- cepting only robbers and assassins, of those who took up arms against the insurgents. 60 The high incidence of cholera in the jails of the capital provided further incentive for pri- soners to volunteer. 61 The disease was now serious in the capital, where the death toll had reached 819 by mid-July. 62 As the epidemic spread, the panic of the natives increased. This, combined with rising apprehension over foreign influence, seems to have been of greatest concern to the peasants of the eastern zone. Carrera's guerrillas in- creased in numbers and effectiveness, and he 56. Ibid., no. 19 (June 19, 1837), pp. 61-62; Ma- rure, Efemerides, p. 97; Montufar, Reseha historica, II, 355-61; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp. 55-57; Solis, Carrera, pp. 30-38. 57. Manure, Efemerides, p. 97. 58. Boletin Oficial, no. 98 (June 21, 1837), pp. 393- 95. 59. Ibid., tercera parte, no. 20 (June 23, 1837), pp. 63-64; no. 24 (July 27, 1837), p. 73; no. 25 (Aug. 24, 1837), pp. 75-76. 60. Boletin Oficial, no. 100 (July 17, 1837), pp. 403-04. 61. El Editor: Periodico de los Tribunales (Guate- mala), no. 15 (July 13, 1837), p. 62. 62. Ibid., Alcance al no. 15, July 20, 1837. The epidemic had also spread into the highlands of the west by this date. Quezaltenango recorded 161 deaths from the disease between April and July. No sta- tistics are available for the state as a whole. announced a program for the revolution in late June which included six points : ( 1 ) abolition of the Livingston Codes; (2) protec- tion of life and property; (3) return of the archbishop and reestablishment of the reli- gious orders; (4) abolition of the head tax; (5) amnesty for all persons exiled in 1829; and (6) respect for Carrera's orders as law under pain of death to violators. 63 The pace of fighting picked up and peasant distrust of the government grew as ill-paid and poorly supplied government troops looted and pil- laged as they searched out guerrillas. Among the atrocities committed was an attack on Carrera's wife by government soldiers. Roused to fury, Carrera vowed never to lay down his arms while an officer of Morazan remained in the state, and he took his vengeance on judges and government officials. Often de- feated, he evaded capture, always finding re- fuge among the peasants of the mountainous country where his legendary image grew daily. 64 In the face of popular rebellion, the Liberals in the capital fell to bickering among them- selves as to what course to follow. In a misguided search for unity, Galvez became more conciliatory toward the Conservatives, which alienated the more extreme of the Lib- erals headed by Barrundia and Pedro Molina. With increasing invective the Barrundia fac- tion criticized the government in the press and in the legislature, accusing Galvez of suppres- sing freedom throughout the Republic in order to quell a local rebellion. In December, Galvez appointed two moderates, Juan Jose Aycinena and Marcial Zebadua, to his key ministerial posts, temporarily gaining some conservative support but antagonizing even further the Barrundia forces. Confronted by a spreading peasant revolt and with growing dissension within the government in Guate- 63. Solis, Carrera, p. 24. 64. Stephens, Incidents, I, 178; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp. 67-73. Examples of the type of actions in which Carrera engaged during this period are in the- reports of government officers in the AGCA, leg. 2522: Copala, Aug. 11, 1837, exp. 57100; Cuajinalpa, Oct. 19, 1837, exp. 5104; Atiquizaya, Oct. 28, 1837, exp. 57056; Las Flores, Nov. 9, 1837, exp. 57059; and Santa Rosa, Nov. 14, 1837, exp. 57035. Social Revolution in Guatemala 57 mala City, Morazan began to have grave doubts about Galvez, and he failed to send the kind of assistance that might have saved the Guatemalan governor. 65 In response to criticism of his dictatorial manner, Galvez signed on September 11 the "Declaration of Rights and Guarantees per- taining to all Citizens and Inhabitants of the State of Guatemala," which the legislature had passed on August 18. 66 In the meantime, however, Galvez continued his campaign of repression against Carrera in the countryside and waged a relentless, but futile, propaganda war against Barrundia, accusing him both of being against the interests of property and civilization and of being the ally, or dupe, of Carrera. 67 65. There is considerable literature on the split among the Liberals in late 1837 and early 1838, but this subject will not be discussed here. Among the most useful works on the political intrigues in Gua- temala in the face of Carrera's revolt is Vela, Ba- rrundia, see especially, I, 210-51. See also Antonio Batres Jauregui, El Dr. Mariano Galvez y su epoca, 2d ed. (Guatemala: Biblioteca Guatemalteca de Cul- tura Popular, vol. 15, Editorial del Ministerio de Edu- cation Publica, 1957), pp. 75-76; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp. 73-87; Garcia Granados, Memorias, II, 183-89; Alberto Herrarte, La union de Centro- america (tragedia y esperanza); ensayo politico-social sobre la realidad de Centro America, 2d ed. (Gua- temala: Centro Editorial "Jose de Pineda Ibarra" del Ministerio de Education Publica, 1964), pp. 125-26; Charles DeWitt to John Forsyth, Guatemala City, Jan. 13, 1838, Doc. #793, William R. Manning, ed., Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, In- ter-American Affairs, 1831-1860, Volume Ill-Cen- tral America, 1831-1850 (Washington: Carnegie En- dowment for International Peace, 1933), pp. 145-46, 148; Marure, Efemerides, pp. 97-99; Rodriguez, Li- vingston Codes, pp. 3, 8, 20-22. 66. Boletin Oficial, no. 103 (Sept. 11, 1837), pp. 417-23. 67. A good example of this propaganda was a broad- side addressed to "Guafemaltecos" on Oct. 28, 1837. It read: "Mariana pretende la nueva aristocracia triun- far del pueblo, enganandolo y desacreditando a sus defensores; pero no triunfara sino el pueblo sobe- rano. "Alerta propietarios, comerciantes y hacendados, porque si los revolucionarios y su candillo Barrundia consiguen sus miras, pronto tendrein aqui a su pro- tejido Carrera aliviandoos de la carga de vuestros intereses y dinero como sucedio al patriota C. Juan de Dios Mayorga. [Dios Mayorga was killed by un- known assassins in September, 1837.] "Alerta artesanos, no os dejeis enganar de los que nunca se han acordado de vosotros, y vierten las mas atroces injurias contra vuestros compafieros Abarca y Alvaro, porque estan colocados en los destinos de election popular, donde no sufren verlos. "Alerta. militares defensores de la patria, con los Ayerdia, los Valenzuelas, los Arevalos y otros muchos de estos mismos revolucionarios que han representado Meanwhile, as the war raged on and went badly for the government, Galvez' reforms were one by one sacrificed for lack of funds
that had to be spent for the military. The state's budget put into effect on September 4, 1837, revealed that of a total of just under 300,000 pesos, 110,00 were appropriated for the Department of War, 57,000 for the De- partment of Justice, and only 12,000 for public education. 68 Having placed too much faith in advanced laws and too little in the sentiments of the people, Galvez was paying the price. With too few troops to occupy the entire country, Galvez sought to defeat and capture the caudillo, but the raiding and looting con- tinued and the war was becoming a race war, with Indians, mestizos, mulattos, and zambos joining together against the whites. 69 The state of the country was revealed in the ap- peal to the rural inhabitants made by Galvez' new ministers on December 16. Aycinena and Zebadua made an impassioned plea for the peasants to end the widespread violence and to stop following the caudillo, in order to end the bloodshed of their loved ones and to re- store the peace and tranquility of former times. 70 The countryside had become com- al gobierno, para que en premio de vuestros sacrifi- cios y de vuestra sangre derramada por la Patria, salgais manana fuera de la ciudad, privandoos de esta manera del derecho electoral que os dan las le- yes fundamentales de la Republica y del Estado, para quedarse ellos solos en los cantones, cuando en los peligros corren a los tabancos y salinas, y voso- tros poneis vuestros pechos al frente de las balas. "Hacendados, comerciantes, artesanos y militares, concurrid manana a sufragar por las personas de to- da vuestra confianza, pues que estos son los deseos de los Verdaderos Patriotas." Collection of Hojas Sueltas, L.A.L. 68. Boletin Oficial, no. 107 (Oct. 30, 1837), pp. 457-66. 69. A United States racist later observed that race was at the root of the problem. Ephraim G. Squier (Notes on Central America, p. 58) believed "that the only hope of Central America consists in ad- verting the numerical decline of its white population, and increasing that element in the composition of its people. If not brought about by a iudicious en- couragement of emigration or an intelligent system of colonization, the geographical position and re- sources of the country indicate that the end will be attained by those more violent means, which among men, as in the material world, often an- ticipate the slower operations of natural laws." 70. Marcial Zebadua and J. J. de Avcinena, "Los Secretarios del Gefe de Estado a los habitantes del campo," Guatemala, Dec. 16, 1837, in Collection of Hojas Sueltas, L.A.L. 58 Social Revolution in Guatemala pletely unsafe because of the guerrilla activity. Commerce and communication were at a standstill. In January, U. S. charge d'affaires, Charles DeWitt, informed his Secretary of State that "the roads leading from this capital have for the last six weeks been so infested by armed bands of highwaymen, that no prudent traveller, and least of all a foreigner, will venture to set out for any distant point." DeWitt said they were "under the chieftain- ship of an abandoned outlaw named Carrera, whose war cry is 'down with the Livingston Code and trial by jury!' and who scruples not in the pursuit of his nefarious designs to com- mit the most atrocious crimes .... So au- dacious has he of late grown and so good an understanding has he continued to cultivate with the Guatemalan troops," DeWitt con- tinued, "that a band of his most daring fol- lowers penetrated into the very environs of the City." 71 Galvez' days in office were now numbered. Barrundia determined to form an alliance with Carrera as a means of ousting Galvez, con- fident that he could dominate the supposedly illiterate guerrilla leader. In late 1837 a del- egation headed by Barrundia sought to nego- tiate with the rebels, but the hatred of the priests advising Carrera precluded agreement. On January 16, 1838, the Barrundia faction set up an opposition government in Antigua and several departments soon recognized it. Aycinena and Zebadua resigned on the 17th. Morazan failed to come to the aid of Galvez and he was left alone. The municipal govern- ment dissolved itself and anarchy reigned in the capital. 72 Yet he refused to surrender. On January 20 he called for the raising of an army of 2000, including 500 cavalry, within six weeks, and decreed a forced loan on the propertyholders of the capital to pay the cost until the leg- islature convened. 73 On the following day he bravely announced that government forces would attack all rebel troops within eight leagues of the capital. 74 It was a futile gesture, and there was general dissatisfaction with the government even within the capital. 75 Ba- rrundia traveled to San Salvador where he gained Morazan's permission to treat with Ca- rrera. In the meantime, the commander of Barrundia's Antigua forces, Manuel Carras- cosa, anticipated him by negotiating with Fa- ther Mariano Duran, a close adviser to Ca- rrera. Significantly, Carrascosa agreed to terms that would have been unacceptable to Barrundia. Specifically, in return for Ca- rrera's military alliance, he agreed to aboli- tion of the Livingston Codes, to relaxation of the anti-clericalism, and, most dangerous of all, to acceptance of Carrera as commander of all the insurgent forces. The accord suc- ceeded in bringing down Galvez, but it spelled eventual disaster for Barrundia's cause. 76 In the face of this unholy alliance, Galvez sent two envoys (the Vice-President of the Republic, Jose Gregorio Salazar, and the Sec- retary of Foreign Relations, Miguel Alvarez) to negotiate with Carrascosa, and they agreed to the Convention of Guarda Vieja on the afternoon of January 28. It was a compro- mise among the Liberals, hoping to avert a Carrera take-over. Galvez agreed to resign, his remaining forces pledging their allegiance to President Morazan. The capital would be occupied by Carrascosa's forces from Sacate- pequez, which would guarantee the lives and property of all. 77 Carrera would have nothing to do with this, however, and Carrascosa's force could not contest his horde, which on January 31 poured into the capital. Estimates of the size of the caudillo's ragtag army range as high as 12,000. John Lloyd Stephens re- lated the scene 78 as told him by a gentle- man who saw them "from the roof of his house, and who was familiar with all the 71. DeWitt to Forsyth, Guatemala, Jan. 13, 1838, Doc. #793, Manning, Central America, pp. 144-45. 72. Marure, Efemerides, p. 100; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp. 88-92; Batres Jauregui, America Central, III, 138-40. 73. Boletin Oficial, tercera parte, no. 34 (Jan. 20, 1838), pp. 106-07. 74. Ibid., no. 36 (Jan. 15 [sic, 25], 1838), p. 108. 75. On Jan. 26 the important Concordia Battalion in the capital pronounced against Galvez, demanding restoration of the Aycinena-Zebadua ministry. Ma- rure, Efemerides, pp. 100-01; Garcia Granados, Me- morias, II. 204-05. 76. Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera." p. 27; Sob's, Ca- rrera, p. 54; Montufar, Resena historica, II, 572-73; Garcia Granados, Memorias II, 192-93. 77. Bancroft, Central America, III, 128-29. 78. Stephens, Incidents, I, 183. Social Revolution in Guatemala scenes of terror which had taken place in that unhappy city": Choking up the streets, all with green bushes in their hats, they seemed to him at a distance like a moving forest. They were armed with rusty muskets, old pistols, fowl- ing pieces, some with locks and some with- out; they carried sticks formed into the shape of muskets, with tin-plate locks, and clubs, machetes, and knives tied to the ends of long poles. And swelling the multitude were two or three thousand women, with sacks and al- forjas for carrying away the plunder. Many, who had never left their villages before, looked wild at the sight of the houses and churches, and the magnificence of the city. They entered the plaza vociferating Viva la religion, y muerte a los estrangeros! Carrera, himself, amazed at the immense ball he had set in motion, was so embarrassed that he could not guide his horse. He afterward said that he was frightened at the difficulty of controlling this huge and disorderly mass. The traitor Barrundia, the leader of the op- position, the Catiline of this rebellion, rode by his side on this entry into the plaza. The U.S. charge d'affaires reported the anti- foreign sentiment of the rural forces: "The shouts of vengeance raised in the streets by Carrera's Indians were mostly directed against what are here called English foreigners." Among the conditions for peace, DeWitt noted, was "that English foreigners be de- stroyed, Spaniards excepted!" 79 In spite of some inevitable brutality and vengeance by the peasant force, order was quickly restored and Carrera gained the praise of Barrundia and others for his conduct. His forces gen- erally respected property and the principal commercial houses. Carrera himself was obe- dient to the new government and maintained his troops under command, evacuating most of them within a few days. He had succeeded in toppling the government, he had been as- sured that the Liberals' excesses would be discontinued, he could return to la montana with victory 80 and, according to some sources, with an $11,000 bribe for himself and his men. 81 The Barrundia-Molina faction appeared to have triumphed. Galvez had resigned in favor of his lieutenant governor, Pedro Valenzuela, more acceptable to Barrundia. Carrera, com- missioned a lieutenant colonel and given mil- itary command of his home district of Mita, was out of the capital with his dreaded peasant army. Pedro Molina was chosen as president of the legislature. 82 The real si- tuation was otherwise, however, for it was a delicate coalition that sustained the govern- ment, and all feared a return of the guerrilla caudillo. Although Galvez was out, he still had supporters in the legislature, and in ad- dition to the Barrundia faction, the Conser- vative-Clerical party now made an important resurgence, having gained first from their al- liance with Galvez and now from the pro- clerical attitude of Carrera. In the mean- time, the departments of Los Altos took ad- vantage of the situation and seceded from the state, declaring allegiance to Morazan, and weakening the position of Guatemala. 83 A series of actions by the Guatemalan gov- ernment reflect Carrera's presence and the government's desire to appease him. By Feb- ruary 20, the government was addressing Ca- rrera as "General" and processing with kid gloves complaints of hacendados regarding Carrera's peasants on their lands. 84 Pedro Mo- lina resigned as president of the legislature, which now restored the Church to its former position, removed the military governments, and called for a return to constitutional rule. Under the threat of a new mobilization by 79. DeWitt to Forsyth, Guatemala City, Feb. 10, 1838, Doc. #794, Manning, Central America, p. 148. For other accounts of Carrera's occupation of the capital, see Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera," pp. 27-29; Solis, Carrera, pp. 54-58; Tobar Cruz, Los monta- neses, pp. 94-99; and Bancroft, Central America, III, 130-32. 80. Garcia Granados, Memorias, II, 219-21. 81. Stephens, Incidents, I, 185. Bancroft {Central America, III, 132) cites Stephens, but also says, "The facts appear in the records of the asamblea." Pedro Valenzuela later claimed (AGCA, leg. 3600, exp. 82810, fol. 2) that Carrera demanded 500 pesos from him, the money to be divided among his troops. 82. Secretaria de la Asamblea del Estado de Guate- mala al Secretario del Gobierno, Guatemala, Feb. 4, 1838, Boletin Oficial, no. 110 (Feb. 30, 1838), pp. 470-71. 83. The departments of Quezaltenango, Solola, and Totonicapan, although never particularly friendly to the Liberal cause, had resented domination by Gua- temala and accepted Morazan now as a means of gaining sovereignty in Quezaltenango. Montufar, Re- sena historica, III, 9-23; Marure, Efemerides, p. 101. 84. AGCA, leg. 1962, exp. 45282. 60 Social Revolution in Guatemala Carrera, the body repealed the Livingston Codes in March. These decrees reflected the popular will, as voiced by the guerrilla leader. The preamble of a decree of March 12, which terminated all nonelective officeholders, il- lustrated the attention the legislature gave to this will when it acknowledged that "a great majority of the populations of the State have armed themselves to resist the admin- istration that violated their guarantees and the fundamental pact," and justified the re- volution against Galvez, "directed to reestab- lishing law and liberty . . . and demanded by self-preservation against tyranny, [as] not only legitimate but consecrated by reason and justice." 85 The liberal language of this decree probably reflected the continuing influence of Barrundia, but the repeal of the Livingston Codes soon after revealed the shifting power. The decree suppressing these codes gave as the principal reason "the opinion of the peo- ple, unprepared for so important an enter- prise." 86 New demands for funds brought dis- satisfaction with the Valenzuela government and enabled the Conservatives to consolidate support, inevitably drawing them closer to Carrera. 87 Barrundia failed to recognize the growing Conservative strength and doubted the ability of Carrera to bring sufficient force against a united government. Carrera, on the other hand, dissatisfied with the government's pro- gress toward his demands, prodded by grow- ing antigovemment sentiment from rural pro- pertyholders, and convinced by the priests that he was being used by the Liberals, re- newed his campaign of guerrilla warfare. Va- lenzuela, urged on by Barrundia, responded with repression. 88 The election of a new Re- presentative Council, clearly reflecting the Conservative gains in public opinion and headed by Conservative Mariano Rivera Paz, 89 put Barrundia in an untenable position. Although he retained considerable influence in the legislature for some time longer, Con- servative strength was rising and was drifting into a natural alliance with the masses. In the end, Barrundia had to fall back on his liberal ally, Francisco Morazan, and the re- entry of the federal president with 1000 Sal- vadoran troops into the state in mid-March marked a new phase of the struggle. 85. Boletin Oficial, no. Ill (Mar. 17, 1838), pp. 474-77. 86. Ibid., no. 114 (Mar. 30, 1838), pp. 486-91. 87. Garcia Granados, Memorias, II, 236-37; Bole- tin Oficial, tercera parte, no. 38 (Mar. 7, 1838), pp. 112-14. 88. Vela, Barrundia, I, 231; Moorhead, "Rafael Ca- rrera," pp. 31-32; Boletin Oficial, tercera parte, no. 38 (Mar. 7, 1838), pp. 112-14; no. 39 (Mar. 10, 1838), pp. 115-16; no. 40 (Mar. 15, 1838), pp. 117-19. 89. Boletin Oficial, no. 113 (Mar. 23, 1838), pp. 482-83. A S EARLY AS February 9, 1838, the Gua- *"-temalan government had cautioned Mora- zan not to march into the state, as he would upset the recent understanding with Carrera, who had returned to Mita in peace. 90 Yet the resumption of warfare by Carrera in March forced the state to look to the federal govern- ment for help. After negotiators rejected Carrera's demands, Morazan launched a major campaign to crush the rebellion. 91 The guer- rillas responded with a new ferocity, parti- cularly, although not exclusively, against for- eign-owned properties. Often losing skirm- ishes but never decisively defeated, the guer- rillas harried the government in an ever-ex- tending area, stretching finally from the Ca- ribbean to the Pacific and westward into the Verapaz and Sacatepequez. Morazan in- creased his control over the machinery of the state government and, as Galvez had done be- fore, escalated the repression. 92 In the course of the war, Carrera's father-in-law was cap- tured and shot, a severity which in the opin- ion of one of Morazan's officers was "im- politic, serving only further to bathe the re- volution in blood." 93 With Morazan in control of the capital, the Liberals reinstituted some of their program which had been sacrificed earlier to appease Carrera. 94 In the meantime, however, the 90. AGCA, leg. 166, exp. 3470. 91. Solis, Carrera, p. 39; Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera," pp. 32-33; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp. 108-10; Montufar, Resena historica, III, 105-09. 92. George Washington Montgomery, Narrative of a Journey to Guatemala, in Central America, in 1838 (New York, 1839), p. 33, 148, 174; Garcia Grana- dos, Memorias, II, 249, 262-63, Griffith, Empires, pp. 152, 163; Marure, Efemerides, p. 103; Stephens, Incidents, I, 191; Manning, Central America, p. 151; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp. 111-12; Boletin Oficial, no. 116 (Apr. 23, 1838), pp. 495-96; no. 117 (Apr. 24, 1838), pp. 500-02; AGCA, leg. 1405, exp. 32888; leg. 3600, exp. 82790; leg. 3618, exp. 84635. 93. Garcia Granados, Memorias, II, 246. 94. See, for example, Montufar, Resena historica, III, federation over which he presided was be- coming a fiction, and on May 30 the Federal Congress, in San Salvador, allowed the states to go their separate ways. 95 When, on July 7, Congress went even further and declared the states to be "sovereign, free and inde- pendent political bodies," Morazan decided it was time to return to San Salvador and put his government in order. He believed, in- correctly, that he had greatly weakened the Carrera revolt in Guatemala. He would be equally ineffective in restoring the now shat- tered Central American union. 96 Following Morazan's departure, a growing liaison be- tween Conservatives and Carrera developed. Within a month the Conservatives had gained control of the government, supported by pop- ular demonstrations calling for action to fore- stall a new invasion of the capital from la montafia. On July 22 Valenzuela turned over the executive power to Rivera Paz. 97 The U.S. charge d'affaires reported the marked increase of popular support for Carrera: "Ow- ing to the nature of the country, the numeri- cal strength of the insurgents, and the en- couragement they receive from one of the political parties in this city, it has become as difficult to subdue them as the Seminoles in Florida. Besides," he wrote to Forsyth, "the Ladino farmers from fear or inclination are generally speaking in favour of Carrera, so that, except in the cities and large towns, Gen. Morazan is master of no more ground than he can cover with his troops." 98 On July 25 the legislature decreed a gen- eral amnesty for all political acts in the state 95. Boletin Oficial, no. 123 (July 16, 1838), pp. 533-34. 96. MoOrhead, "Rafael Carrera," pp. 36-37, citing Pineda de Mont, Recopilacion, I, 69. 97. Boletin Oficial, no. 124 (July 16, 1838), pp. 535-38; no. 125 (July 26, 1838), p. 544; Stephens, Incidents, I, 191; Marure, Efemerides, pp. 105-06; Montufar, Resena historica, HI, 181-91. 98. DeWitt to Forsyth, Guatemala City, July 24, 1838, Doc. #797, Manning, Central America, p. 153. 61 Social Revolution in Guatemala since 1821, welcomed back exiles and de- clared all civil rights and guarantees reestab- lished." There followed a stream of legisla- tion dismantling the Liberal program and be- ginning the restoration of the institutions of the colonial era. In rapid succession the leg- islature provided for State support of the Church, 100 formally declared State sovereign- ty, 101 reduced by half the direct head tax, 102 repealed civil marriage and divorce, 103 re- voked Galvez's municipal organization sys- tem, 104 and decreed other measures to reverse the direction of Guatemala's government. At the same time, the Rivera Paz government continued its military efforts to suppress the guerrillas, but with Morazan's troops gone Carrera made notable gains and by early September he had occupied Antigua and once more threatened the capital. 105 A sudden counter-offensive by the Liberal general, Car- los Salazar, however, dealt Carrera a stun- ning defeat at Villa Nueva on September 11, although Carrera escaped into the hills once more. In November, Morazan joined the chase. Although Carrera's situation was des- perate, he managed to continue the resist- ance. 100 Carrera bought time to reorganize his haggard forces, when, on December 23, 1838, he signed with General Agustin Guz- man, of the State of Los Altos, a treaty agree- ing to lay down his arms and recognize the government of Guatemala in return for his restoration as military commander of the Dis- trict of Mita. Rivera Paz and Morazan both agreed, and the country enjoyed a breath of peace. 107 The respite was short, however, for, en- 99. Boletin Oficial, no. 125 (July 26, 1838), pp. 539-41; Doc. #797, Manning, Central America, p. 153. 100. Ibid., pp. 542-43. 101. Ibid., no. 126 (July 28, 1838), pp. 547-50. 102. Ibid., p. 551. 103. Ibid., pp. 554-55. 104. Ibid., pp. 552-53; no. 127 (Aug. 5, 1838), pp. 559-60. 105. Montufar, Reseiia historica, III, 204; AGCA, leg. 1413, exp. 33009, fol. 2; leg. 3607, exp. 83853; leg. 3652, exp. 86106; Marure, Efemerides, pp. 107. 106. Bancroft, Central America, III, 135-37. 107. AGCA, leg. 1413, exp. 33009; leg. 153, exp. 3260, fol. 14; Solis, Carrera, pp. 86-87; Marure, Efemerides, p. Ill; Pedro Zamora Castellanos, Vida militar de Centro America (Guatemala, 1924), p. 167. couraged by the apparent collapse of the Ca- rrera movement, the Liberals attempted to recoup their position. On January 30, 1839, Morazan deposed Rivera Paz with General Salazar, the hero of Villa Nueva. 108 Mean- while, Conservatives gained power in Hon- duras and Nicaragua and joined forces against Liberals in El Salvador. Carrera was in league with those Conservative leaders as well as with those in Guatemala, and the new Liberal thrust by Morazan convinced him that there could be no peace until Morazan was defeated once and for all. 109 Morazan's term as President of the Federation expired on February 1, and his opponents now claimed that he was the true rebel, for he was in office illegally after that date. No suc- cessor had been elected. 110 The cause of the Conservatives and of Carrera had now be- come one: the elimination of Morazan. On March 24 Carrera issued a manifesto from Mataquescuintla. Defending his own action in taking up arms once more on the grounds of defense of his country, he accused Morazan of cruelty toward the clergy and others, of destroying commerce, of confiscating private property, and of spreading terror throughout Guatemala. Swearing before God Almighty, he promised to restore Rivera Paz and to join with the Conservatives of Honduras and Nica- ragua in ousting Morazan. 111 . Three weeks later, on April 13, he entered the capital unopposed at the head of a large and orderly army. Carrera rode directly to the house of Mariano Rivera Paz and restored his authority. The Conservatives had re- gained control almost to the day a decade 108. AGCA, leg. 2437, exp. ^51825; Victor Jerez, "General Don Carlos Salazar," San Salvador y sus hombres (San Salvador: Ministerio de Educacion, 1967), p. 98. . __ 109. Robert S. Chamberlain, Francisco Morazan, Champion of Central American Federation (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1950), p. 37; Tobar Cruz, Los montafieses, p. 125; Franklin D. Parker, The Central American Republics (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 184. 110. Chamberlain, Morazan, p. 37. Morazan also assumed the office of Governor of El Salvador, the only state remaining in the Federation. 111. Rafael Carrera, Pronunciamiento del General Rafael Carrera y del ejercito de la Constitucion del Estado de Guatemala (Mataquescuintla. March 24, 1839), in Collection of Hojas Sueltas, L.A.L. Social Revolution in Guatemala 63 after they had lost it to Morazan. 112 Carrera spent the remainder of the year mopping up Liberal resistance in Guatemala and support- ing Conservative forces in neighboring El Sal- vador and Honduras. 113 In January, 1840, he moved swiftly into Los Altos and crushed the Liberal stronghold in Quezaltenango, an event evidently welcomed by the majority there. 114 In a "Farewell Address" to the in- habitants there, he assured them of his con- tinued protection now that he had put that province back on the road to progress. Tangi- ble benefits were provided immediately. "Compatriots," he declared, "I leave you free of the head tax ( contribution ) ; and although you will pay the sales taxes (alcabalas) and other taxes to which you are accustomed, no longer will there be those that they have been collecting here, nor those that were collected in the time of Galvez in Guatemala: Those now established are more moderate on peo- ples who obey the government." 115 A showdown between Morazan and Carre- ra became inevitable as each continued to intervene in the other's state. Morazan, re- fusing to abandon the federation idea, even though since the fall of Los Altos he had only El Salvador, took the initiative and in- vaded Guatemala in mid-March. Success- fully outmaneuvering Carrera's forces, Mora- zan took the Guatemalan capital with little resistance on March 18. On the following day, however, Carrera's troops stormed into the city, completely routing the Liberal forces and ending Morazan's rule. 110 Morazan and 112. Montufar, Resena historica, III, 299-305; El Tiempo, no. 10 (June 12, 1839), p. 40; AGCA, leg. 2437, exp. 51825; "Disposition de Rafael Carrera, Comandante de los Pueblos de Mita, 13 de Abril de 1839," in Collection of Hojas Sueltas, L.A.L. 113. A running account of his activities and pro- clamations is given in El Tiempo, nos. 7-70 (May 14, 1839-Jan. 22, 1840), pp. 27-279. Extensive re- ports on his military operations are available in the AGCA, particularly in legs. 1141 and 2437. 114. El Tiempo, nos. 70-79 (Jan. 22-Feb. 25, 1840), pp. 279-313. 115. "Rafael Carrera a los pueblos de los departa- mentos de Los Altos," Quezaltenango. Feb. 9, 1840, El Tiempo, no. 79 (Feb. 25. 1840), p. 311. On Feb. 26 Los Altos was formally reincorporated into the State of Guatemala. El Tiempo, no. 81 (Mar. 4, 1840), p. 332. 116. A number of publications in the Collection of Hojas Sueltas in the Hemeroteca of the AGCA pro- vide detail on the events of March 17-19: "El a few of his officers escaped to Panama. 117 Two years later he returned to Central Amer- ica for the last time, briefly usurping power in Costa Rica. Another popular uprising cut short his aspirations of reunification, and he died before a firing squad in San Jose on September 15, 1842. 118 Much of Carrera's time in the years follow- ing Morazan's defeat was spent consolidating Conservative rule in Guatemala and its neigh- bors. The Conservatives soon found, how- ever, that they could not control the caudillo, and the years from 1840 to 1844 were a peri- od of political adjustment to caudillismo. Although conservative in tone, it was unlike earlier elite governments, for Carrera's will Coronel V. Cruz a los Guatemaltecos," Guatemala, Mar. 17, 1840; "Lista de los individuos actuados, que estaban presentes el 17 de marzo en estas car- celes, y fueron sacados por la tropa de Morazan," [Guatemala, Mar. 17, 1840]; Juaquin Duran, Se- cretario del Despacho de Gobernacion, "Parte Ofi- cial," Guatemala, Mar. 19, 1840; Rafael Carrera, "Parte circunstanciado de la accion de los dias 18 y 19 de marzo, que ha sido dirigido al Gobierno por el General en Gefe del Estado," Guatemala, Mar. 23, 1840; "Coleccion de algunos de los interesantes documentos que se encontraron en los equipajes to- rnados en la accion de los dias 18 y 19 de marzo," (Guatemala, n.d.). See also Solis, Carrera, pp. 88-90; Montufar, Resena historica. III, 455-71; Chamberlain, Morazan, p. 40; Stephens, Incidents, II, 89-95; Rancroft, Central America, III, 141-42; Tobar Cruz, Los montaneses, pp. 137-39. 117. Marure, Efemerides, p. 124; Montufar, Resena historica, III, 600-01; Morazan to Esteban Travieso, David, N.G., Aug. 14, 1840, Doc. #54(29), Mora- zan Papers, L.A.L. 118. Marure, Efemerides, pp. 132-33; Arturo Hum- berto Montes, Morazan y la federacion centroameri- cana (Mexico: Libro Mex Editores, 1958), pp. 281- 324; Arturo Mejia Nieto, Morazan, Presidente de la desaparecida Republica Centroamericana (Ruenos Ai- res: Editorial Nova, 1947), pp. 167-89; Rodrigo Fa- cio, Traijectoria y crisis de la federacion centroameri- cana, con tin acdpite sohre el proceso de la separa- cion de Costa Rica de la Republica Federal y de su constitucion como republica soberana, libre e indepen- diente (San Jose de Costa Rica: Imprenta Nacional, 1949), p. 84; Marroquin Rojas, Morazan, pp. 228-40; see also, in the Collection of Hojas Sueltas in the He- meroteca of the AGCA, the proclamation of General Antonio Pinto on Morazan's execution, San Jose, Sept. 16, 1842, and of Mariano Rivera Paz, congratulating the inhabitants of Costa Rica on the act, Guatemala, Oct. 21, 1842, and a separate proclamation of Rivera Paz of the same date to the people of Guatemala, in which he thanked Divine Providence for coming to their defense. "Morazan," he said, "el enemigo obse- cada del orden, de la propiedad y de la libertad de los pueblos, ya no existe: termino su carrera de un modo desastroso en Costa-Rica, en la Ciudad de San Jose el 15 de Septiembre, aniversario glorioso de nuestra independencia." 64 Social Revolution in Guatemala was law, and he insisted from time to time on the priority of peasant interests. At the same time, his own interests gradually shifted to the more traditional conservatism of the oligarchy. The growth of his own estate probably contributed to this. Begin- ning with his wife's property, his holdings in- creased with his military fortunes, and by the time he became President in 1844 he and his family had amassed a considerable amount. 119 There is at least one good example of the relation between Carrera's acquisition of property and a departure from the views he had held as a peasant caudillo. His anti- foreign feelings were well known, and the English colonization project of the Galvez government had been one of the major causes of the revolt. Carrera kept closely in touch with the government on the question of a concession of the District of Santo Tomas on the Caribbean coast to a Belgian colonization company. On February 16, 1842, Santos Ca- rrera informed the government that Rafael warned against making any concession to the Belgians at Santo Tomas. Such a concession, he said, "would be prejudicial to the State and even to the entire Republic, for the peo- ple, upon seeing a new foreign colony founded, would believe it to be the first link [in the chain of their] enslavement." 120 Al- though many of the Conservatives had shared the distrust of the English company, there was considerable support among them for the less objectionable Belgian plan. Without Ca- rrera's support the contract seemed likely to fail in the legislature. Yet in mid-April, 1842, Carrera reversed his position and declared his support of the project. After sharp debate 119. Carrera's wife played a major role in the man- agement of Carrera's personal financial affairs. See, for example, AGCA, leg. 2437, exp. 51828, fols. 1-3. Dunlop (Travels, p. 88) said that "by extortions and confiscations, he has amassed some hundred thousand dollars, in cash, lands, and houses; and it is conse- quently his interest to maintain a settled govern- ment and give protection to property." See also Ste- phens, Incidents, I, 197-98; AGCA, leg. 214, exp. 4941, fol. 242; and Rafael Carrera to Secretario del Supremo Gobierno, Guatemala, July 15, 1839, El Tiempo, no. 17 (July 19, 1839), p. 67. 120. Santos Carrera to Ministro de Relaciones, Gua- temala, Feb. 16, 1842, AGCA, leg. 1395, exp. 32354, fol. 5. the Guatemalan legislature approved the con- tract on May 4. That there may have been bribery by Belgian agents is strongly indi- cated. 121 As for Carrera, it is impossible to overlook the fact that on April 25 the govern- ment requested that he be granted 100 caba- llerias of land in the vicinity of the Port of Santo Tomas and on May 6 the legislature complied. 122 The legislation following Carrera's revolt makes it clear that a very substantial reaction took place, as the Conservatives restored much of the institutional structure of the co- lonial period. For this they paid a price. For the first time in Guatemalan history, Indians, and more especially ladinos, began to play a part in Guatemalan political life. The hold of the white elite over government was clear- ly broken, even if their social dominance had been restored. But it was a restoration with- out the remainder of the colonial kingdom of Guatemala. The Federation had ceased to exist, and although lip service was often paid to it thereafter, strong regional loyalties outweighed any spirit of unification. The new legislature installed in Guatemala on May 29, 1839, dismantled the remains of the Galvez program. Rivera Paz outlined the conditions and needs of the state in a mes- sage to the body on May 31. He noted the depleted condition of the treasury and the generally depressed state of the country ow- ing to the incessant warfare. Urging the leg- islature to pursue practical measures to pro- mote agriculture, industry, and commerce, he proposed restoration of Hispanic institu- tions such as the merchant guild. In conclud- ing, he left little doubt as to who was really in command or what direction the govern- would take. "The characteristics that dis- tinguished General Rafael Carrera," said Ri- vera Paz, "his dedication and effort to estab- 121. Griffith, Empires, pp. 135-45; William J. Grif- fith, Santo Tomas, anhelado emporio del comercio en el Atldntico (Guatemala, 1959), pp. 33-36; Pineda cle Mont, Recopilacion, I, 824-38. 122. The official reason given for the grant was as a gesture of gratitude for Carrera's recent military victories against El Salvador and for the zeal that he had shown in maintaining the rights of the State and the integrity of its territory. AGCA, leg. 212, exp. 4815; leg. 218, exp. 4990. Social Revolution in Guatemala 65 lish a regime of justice in the state; his love of order, and above all his impartiality and modesty cannot escape your attention. The nation owes him great service. He has been the restorer of authority, and he is today the strongest supporter of the rights and in- dependence of the State. I recommend him to the Assembly." 123 A few days later the gen- eral himself addressed the Assembly, charg- ing them to do his bidding. He reiterated his opposition to the Galvez reforms and his dedication to tradition and religion; he prom- ised to support all efforts along these lines. 124 The Assembly moved expeditiously, begin- ning with restoration of the religious orders 125 and an invitation for the return of the exiled archbishop, Ramon Casaus. 126 It confirmed a slate of appointments acceptable to the Conservatives, including Carrera as Com- manding General of the Army, 127 began a process of consolidating the customs service, and put the treasury in order. 128 Municipal elections in July gave the Conservatives con- trol of the capital. 129 In August the legisla- 123. Mariano Rivera Paz, Memoria que presento a la Asamblea Constituyente, en su primera sesion, el Con- sejero Gefe del Estado de Guatemala, por medio del Secretario del Despacho de Relaciones (Guatemala, 1839). 124. "Felicitation del General de Brigada Rafael Ca- rrera a la Asamblea Constituyente del Estado," El Tiempo, no. 11 (June 14, 1839), p. 41. See also the article praising the peace and tranquility of the His- panic period in no. 47 (Nov. 9, 1939), pp. 187-88. A quotation from Francois Mignet at the head of each issue of El Tiempo reflected the philosophy of the government toward "reform": "Cuando una re- forma se ha hecho necesaria, y ha llegado el mo- menta de establecerla, nada la impide, y todo la secunda." See also Stephens, Incidents, I, 160. 125. El Tiempo, no. 12 (June 21, 1839), p. 45; no. 14 (July 15, 1839), p. 54; Pineda de Mont, Recopilacion, I, 273. 126. El Tiempo, no. 13 (June 28, 1839), p. 50; "Rafael Carrera, General de Brigada de las armas del Estado, a los pueblos que lo componen," El Tiempo, no. 16 (July 18, 1839), p. 62; Pineda de Mont, Recopilacion, I, 242-43. 127. El Tiempo, no. 13 (June 28, 1839), supple- ment. Supreme Court justices were named in Dec- ember. See El Tiempo, no. 56 (Dec. 7, 1839), p. 223 128'. El Tiempo, no. 15 (July 10, 1839), p. 58. See also the editorial, "Credito Publico," in no. 23 (Aug. 11, 1839), p. 89, calling for Hamiltonian measures and annual budgeting to restore the public credit, policies generally followed during the Carrera years. 129. Those elected, all by easy margins over numer- ous other candidates, were: Damaso Angulo, Alcalde 1; Pedro Aycinena, Alcalde 2; Manuel Rubio, Al- ture reestablished the national mint and the merchant guild, with a substantial road and port development program under the latter's supervision. 130 Later, it revived the office of corregidor, reflecting the re-centralization of control over the country, 131 reestablished edu- cation under Church auspices, 132 established a national bank, 133 and revived the residencia examination for all public officials in the state. 134 The legislators closed their first session with more decrees designed to restore the His- panic tradition. They reduced taxes on food- stuffs in another response to popular opin- ion, 135 and reinstituted the former alcoholic beverages controls. 136 They abolished the head tax altogether. 137 They restored the tithe tax and enforced its collection. 138 They decreed a new Declaration of the Rights of the State and its Inhabitants, which, although maintaining in print many civil liberties, clearly turned the direction of the State to- ward authoritarianism. 139 Roman Catholi- cism once more became the official religion and regained its fuero and cabildo eclesids- tico. uo The session adjourned, having defi- calde 3; Felipe Prado, Rejidor 8; Jose Najera, Rejidor 9; Alejo Vaca, Rejidor 10; and Jose Maria Palomo, Sindico. El Tiempo, no. 18 (July 22, 1839), p. 72. 130. Ibid., no. 24 (Aug. 15, 1839), p. 95; no. 26 (Aug. 24, 1839), p. 102; Woodward, Class Privilege, pp. xvi-xvii, 55-104, 122, 126-27. Regarding prob- lems of currency, see also Manuel F. Pavon, "Informe del Consulado sobre las monedas del Sur en circula- tion," Guatemala, June 20, 1840, El Tiempo, no. 108 (June 28, 1840), pp. 430-31; and El Tiempo, no. 148 (Dec. 5, 1840), p. 592. 131. Pineda de Mont, Recopilacion, I, 504-11; see also the comunique from the Jefe Politico de Chi- maltenango to the State Government, Oct. 7, 1839, El Tiempo, no. 39 (Oct. 11, 1839), p. 153, in which he reveals that an uncooperative local alcalde has been removed from office in Tecpan, permitting the town to progress. 132. El Tiempo, no. 39 (Oct. 11, 1839), p. 154. 133. Ibid., no. 45 (Nov. 3, 1839), pp. 178-79. 134. Ibid., no. 48 (Nov. 14, 1839), p. 189. 135. AGCA, leg. 214, exp. 4941, fol. 607; Gaceta Oficial (Guatemala), I, no. 44 (June 10, 1842), 191. 136. El Tiempo, no. 57 (Dec. 11, 1839), pp. 225-26. 137. Pineda de Mont, Recopilacion, II, 263. 138. Gaceta Extraordinaria (Guatemala), Aug. 14, 1841, t>. 1. 139. El Tiempo, no. 60 (Dec. 21, 1839), pp. 237-39; Pineda de Mont, Recopilacion, I, pp. 230-35. 140. Montiifar, Resena historica, III, 381-82; El Tiempo, no. 146 (Nov. 26, 1840), p. 582. Social Revolution in Guatemala nitively terminated the Liberal revolution. 141 In 1840 the reaction continued. The gov- ernment, in an effort to balance the budget in the face of Carrera's continued military expenditures and a sizable debt, slashed sub- stantially the salaries of public and military officials. 142 Reestablishment of the tobacco monopoly increased government revenues. 143 With Carrera's cooperation, the government sought to end military abuses against local populations. 144 It tried to develop the econ- omy through promotion of new crops and subsidies and reestablished the Sociedad Economica to aid such promotions. 145 Ca- rrera himself proposed protective tariffs for local industries and division of lands by mu- nicipalities to promote production of cochi- neal and silkworms. 146 Meanwhile, the Church regained more of its confiscated property, although Carrera refused to sanc- tion restoration of all it had lost. 147 The Con- servatives restored the colonial land institu- tions that the Liberals had sought to destroy. In so doing, they tied the Guatemalan econ- omy to a relatively small group of wealthy landowners and merchants and established a major obstacle to movement toward a gen- erally more dynamic prosperity. 148 The res- toration of the University of San Carlos, with Father Juan Aycinena as rector until 1854, represented well the aristocratic, pro-clerical, and reactionary philosophy that was regain- ing control. 149 Such decrees had the effect of restoring the stability and order of the Spanish regime. They were accompanied by the distrust of non-Spanish foreigners that characterized the 141. See El Tiempo, no. 56 (Dec. 7, 1839), pp. 221-22, for a review of the accomplishments of this legislature. 142. Ibid., no. 65 (Jan. 4, 1840), p. 260. 143. Gaceta Oficial, I, no. 55 (Aug. 9, 1842), 235- 144. El Tiempo, no. 70 (Jan. 22, 1840), p. 279. 145. Marure, Efemerides, pp. 125-26; Pineda de Mont, Recopilacion, I, 808; AGCA, leg. 213, exp. 4868; leg. 225, exp. 5084, fol. 13. 146. Sept. 16, 1840. AGCA, leg. 3600, exp. 82802. 147. AGCA, leg. 858, exp. 20678; Dunlop, Travels, p. 214. 148. Facio, Trayectoria, p. 83. 149. Holleran, Church and State, p. 131; Marure, Efemerides, p. 73. colonial period. The return to Hispanic tra- ditions stopped short of actual return to im- perial status, as happened briefly in the Do- minican Republic, but in 1851 Carrera re- turned the Spanish colors to the Guatemalan national flag, where they remained symbolic- ally for twenty years. 150 The white elite thus attempted to restore their former position by alliance with Carrera and the peasants. Certainly, by 1842 they had achieved much success. Although some Liberals continued to serve in the govern- ment for several years, and Carrera often played off Liberals against Conservatives to hold his own position, the Conservative doc- trines predominated. The Conservatives real- ized that only through subservience to the caudillo could they recoup the losses of the Liberal period. As before, the families con- nected with the Aycinenas, most notably the Pavons, Pinoles, and Urruelas, set the stand- ards in politics and society, and as before there were those who objected to the "aristo- cratic" domination of society. 151 A small olig- archy came to dominate policy and society, although a number of Spanish immigrants had much to do with commerce. In 1846, according to a British resident, Robert Dun- lop, the principal trade was ,in the hands of five Spanish firms, which had correspond- ents in England, France, and Spain. 152 The small group of other foreigners made few in- roads. In 1842 U.S. Special Agent W. S. Murphy reported that the principal division in the state's politics was between the native inhabitants, led by General Carrera, and pro- English interests, which still had some 150. Maria Albertina Galvez, Emblemas nacionales (Guatemala: Editorial del Ministro de Educacion Publica, 1958), pp. 153-55. Red and gold were add- ed to the blue and white adopted in 1825. 151. Cobos Batres (Carrera, pp. 116-19) discusses the principal figures of the Guatemalan government of the 1840s and notes that there were a number of Liberals who continued to hold office in this period. But it is clear that the most prominent officers were Conservatives. See also Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera," pp. 46-47; Stephens, Incidents, I, 244; and the "Proposition" of Jorge de Viteri, Guatemala, July 17, 1840, in Collection of Hojas Sueltas in the Hemero- teca of the AGCA. 152. Travels, p. 317. Social Revolution in Guatemala 67 strength in the legislature. 153 Actually, there were few English residents in Central Ameri- ca, although from Belize British merchants continued to control much of Guatemala's overseas trade. 154 Growth of Conservative strength was nat- ural as Carrera lost no opportunity to attack the Liberals. He condemned the Liberal economic and political philosophy as being prejudicial to the people's interests and at- tacked the Liberals for failing properly to provide for the people's needs. Threatening the Liberals with death in popular slogans, he made it clear that their residence in Guate- mala depended on their abstenance from politics. The caudillo remained in contact with the peasants, and during the first years of his rule their interests received some at- tention. A combination of patriotic oratory, successful military campaigns against Guate- mala's neighbors, and tangible actions on their behalf kept the masses loyal to the caudillo and thus served as a check against the Con- servatives during the early years of his regime. 155 Carrera's concern for the peasants inevit- ably caused the elite to distrust him. His guerrilla warfare had been aimed at the wealthy and he had abstained generally from attacking the persons or property of the poorer classes. As he allied with the Guate- malan elite, his attitudes perhaps changed somewhat, but it was several years before the wealthy felt secure. 156 Athough his concern for the poor may have waned as his own 153. Murphy to Daniel Webster, Guatemala City, Feb. 4, 1842, Doc. #805, Manning, Central America, p. 173. 154. Naylor, "British Role," p. 367. 155. See, for example, "Rafael Carrera, General de Brigada de las armas del Estado, a los pueblos que lo componen," El Tiempo, no. 16 (July 18, 1839), p. 62; "El Brigadier y Comandante General de las Armas del Estado: a los pueblos," El Tiempo, no. 18 (July 22, 1839), pp. 71-72; "El General Rafael Carrera a los habitantes del Estado," El Tiempo, no. 42 (Oct. 24, 1839), p. 167; "Proclama del General Carrera a sus soldados," El Tiempo, no. 57 (Dec. 11, 1839), p. 227; "Proclama del General R. Carrera a sus conciudadanos de los otros estados," El Tiempo, no. 73 (Jan. 31, 1840), p. 292; "Rafael Carrera a los pueblos de los departamentos de Los Altos," El Tiem- po, no. 79 (Feb. 25, 1840), p. 311; and Stephens, Incidents, I, 247. 156. Montgomery, Narrative, p. 147; Bancroft, Cen- tral America, III, 265. riches increased, there is little doubt that the government he dominated provided through charity and paternalism a better life for the masses than had the progressivism of the Galvez Liberals. 157 On the other hand, the Carrera government provided for a status quo situation, whereas the Liberals had claimed that general prosperity would be the inevi- table, if long-term, result of their programs. The new government's attitude toward the Indians is testimony to its reactionary phil- osophy of looking back to the Hispanic peri- od. On August 16, 1839, the Guatemalan legislature, recognizing that Indians were a majority of the state's population, and that it was "an object of public interest, not only to protect this numerous class of the society, but also to develop and improve its customs and civilization," decreed a code for dealing with this class. Noting that the Liberal pro- gram had mistreated and exploited the Indian under a system that operated under the pre- text of their equality, the comittee reporting the bill said that the system of the colonial era was really better. That system "com- pelled them to work, to provide public serv- ice on certain projects and to pay taxes; but it also gave them protection against the in- fluential and the powerful in their land claims." It provided for their care and wel- fare and for their self-respect, the committee added. The system of the Liberals abolished all that, and the Indians had lost their respect for authority and good order. The new code clearly reversed Galvez' idea of incorporating the Indian into western civilization. It even called for reestablishment of the office of In- dian interpreter and charged the department- al officials to have the decree translated into the indigenous languages. Galvez' program aimed at assimilating the Indians. The Con- servatives claimed this meant exploitation, with the danger of rebellion and violence. Instead, they offered paternalism and pro- tection. 158 157. See Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera," p. 148. 158. The "Dictamen a la Comision de organization provisional sobre establecer un regimen ^de protec- tion y fomento en favor de los indios," is in El Tiempo, no. 21 (Aug. 2, 1839), p. 81. The decree Social Revolution in Guatemala Carrera frequently communicated with both Church and State regarding the welfare of the Indians, as for example in July, 1840, when he notified the government that the Indians of Atiquizaya and other villages had informed him that the Vicar General of the Archdiocese had not attended to their com- plaints or answered their questions. 159 And the caudillo took an active interest in restora- tion of ejidos to Indian communities, him- self mediating land disputes in some Guate- malan villages. 160 Such interest dropped off sharply, however, after he assumed the office of president in 1844, and peasant support for him declined correspondingly. He now rode about in a fine European carriage, had be- come wealthy, and identified himself with the white elite. Ironically, it was a popular peas- ant uprising in the District of Mita that be- gan the revolt that forced him from office in 1848. 161 He was able to return the following of Aug. 16 is in no. 27 (Aug. 30, 1839), pp. 105-06. Another comparison of the Liberal and Conservative approach to the Indian in Guatemala is found in Ro- driguez, Livingston Codes, p. 30. 159. AGCA, leg. 3594, exp. 82514. 160. Ibid., leg. 1419, exps. 33274, 33305, 33326, 33356. 161. Ibid., leg. 3601, exp. 82899; Dunlop, Travels, p. 90; Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera," pp. 66-68. year and in 1852 became president for life, an office which he held until 1865, but the attachment to the people of his youth was not regained. The white elite never succeeded in regain- ing full control of the country, however, for, if Carrera achieved nothing else, his great contribution was the permanent entry of the ladino class into affairs of state. His army had few white soldiers, and he did not want white officers. 162 Carrera's relatives and asso- ciates, all ladinos, occupied important posi- tions. Moreover, Indians made up a consid- erable portion of the army and were able to gain petty government offices as well. Thus, while the legislature still remained largely white, their monopoly over government was broken, never to be regained, and the same was true of landholding. 163 There was a genuine, conservative reaction against the Liberalism of Morazan, Barrundia, and Gal- vez, but it rested on popular support and therefore had to share political victory with the lower classes. It is in this sense, more than in any other, that Carrera's revolt may be termed a social revolution. 162. Stephens, Incidents, II, 90. 163. Moorhead, "Rafael Carrera," pp. 64-65. rpHE CARRERA REVOLT was an example * of Karl Marx's 1848 maximum that "the lower widdle class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not re- volutionary, but conservative. Nay more: they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheels of history." 164 These elements put forth a powerful reaction in Guatemala in 1837 against ideas and reforms foreign to their traditions and experience. In 1838 the Guatemalan government com- missioned the historian Alejandro Marure to compare the Carrera revolt with the revolu- tion in the Vendee in 1793, where peasants in defense of Church and tradition took up arms against the republican government. The similarities were notable. 165 Most other rural revolts against intellectual-dominated reform movements, within and beyond Latin Ameri- ca, follow a similar pattern, probably not ex- cluding the widespread support for George Wallace in the 1968 U.S. presidential election. Liberal reform movements which fail to capture support from a rural majority sel- dom survive, particularly when they are 164. "The Communist Manifesto," section 1, in Karl Marx, Capital, The Communist Manifesto and Other Writings, ed. by Max Eastman (New York: The Modern Library, 1932), p. 332. 165. AGCA, leg. 3618, exp. 84635; Vela, Barrundia, I, 213; Batres Jauregui, Mariano Gdlvez, pp. 76-77; Marure's study was entitled "Memoria sobre la in- surrection de Santa Rosa y Mataquescuintla, en Cen- troamerica, comparada con la que estallo en Francia, en 1790, en los departamentos de la Vendee." For recent accounts and analyses of the Vendee revolt see Charles Tilly, The Vendee (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964); Paul Bois, Paysans de Vouest; Des structures economiques et sociales aux options politiques depuis Vepoque revolutionnaire dans la Sarthe (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1960); and Marcel Faucheux, L'insurrection vendeene de 1793: aspects economiques et sociaux (Paris: Comision d'histoire economique et sociale de la Revolution, Imprimerie Nationale, 1964). identified with foreign ideologies. As Jacques Lambert has indicated: "The elites who had assumed power were drawn to the ideologies prevailing in countries far more advanced than the Iberian countries, namely France, England, and the United States. ... No de- veloping country can resist the compulsion to imitate advanced countries. . . . But the Latin American countries more than other countries, were irresistibly driven in this direction be- cause of the alienation of their elites. Al- though these elites were living in an econom- ically and socially backward environment without having the slightest intention of for- saking the advantages it gave them, they were intellectually part of North Atlantic so- ciety." 166 The Carrera revolt ended that phase of Central American history. What Crane Brinton has written for Europe at the turn of the 19th century applied equally to Guatemala a third of a century later: "The ideas of the Enlightenment," wrote Brinton, "whether they sprang from the head or the heart, or from both working hard together, were clearly corrosive of existing institu- tions. . . . After the French Revolution had come to shock the civilized world with its violence, it became fashionable in conserva- tive circles, and even in popular circles, to blame the philosophers of the eighteenth century for destroying the old regime with their criticism and leaving nothing in its place. Into this nothing came the passions and im- perfections of the real human beings the eighteenth-century philosophers had neglect- ed in their preoccupation with the rights of abstract man." 167 The Utopia envisioned by Galvez had ignored the realities of Central America in 166. Lambert, Latin America, p. 121. 167. Crane Brinton, Ideas and Men, The Story of Western Thought, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Pren- tice-Hall, 1963), p. 312. 70 Social Revolution in Guatemala the 1830s, and the peasants served as the rock be it called Liberal or Conservative and on which Liberal idealism was broken. De- destroyed what they believed threatened their manding not rapid change but traditional se- way of life. In the process they brought curity, responding to the instinct of survival about a real social revolution by ending the and banding around a charismatic caudillo, dominance of the white classes over politics, they lashed out against the establishment land, and society.
John Stephen Larkin v. Patrick Savage, John Doe, John Rittenhouse, Charles Campisi, Anthony Cartusciello, and P.O. Lodyzinski, 318 F.3d 138, 2d Cir. (2003)