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Definitions of terrorism are imprecise and difficult. Forecasting would improve if we could provide a valid theoretical formulation. Violence and death wishes, which translate into fantasy war, are generally accepted characteristics.
Definitions of terrorism are imprecise and difficult. Forecasting would improve if we could provide a valid theoretical formulation. Violence and death wishes, which translate into fantasy war, are generally accepted characteristics.
Definitions of terrorism are imprecise and difficult. Forecasting would improve if we could provide a valid theoretical formulation. Violence and death wishes, which translate into fantasy war, are generally accepted characteristics.
Author(s): Franco Ferracuti Reviewed work(s): Source: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 463, International Terrorism (Sep., 1982), pp. 129-140 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of Political and Social Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1043617 . Accessed: 04/05/2012 14:40 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Sage Publications, Inc. and American Academy of Political and Social Science are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. http://www.jstor.org ANNALS, AAPSS, 463, September 1982 A Sociopsychiatric Interpretation of Terrorism By FRANCO FERRACUTI ABSTRACT: Definitions of terrorism are imprecise and difficult. Even the units of analysis are not uniform, and existing typologies are merely descriptive. Forecasting, however, particularly middle- and long-range, would improve if we could provide a valid theoreti- cal formulation. This would have to be interdisciplinary and should encompass both the idioverse of the terrorist and the universe of the terrorist events. Psychiatric contributions are few and they lack general validity. Violence and death wishes, which translate into fantasy war, are generally accepted characteristics. Four theories are briefly discussed: (1) frustration-aggression, (2) unbalance of the social system, (3) Olson's rational choice, and (4) Marxist theory. A subcultural approach would allow consideration of group and individual factors and would permit some valid policy choices. Franco Ferracuti has been professor of criminological medicine and forensic psychiatry, University of Rome, since 1973, and previously taught criminology, clinical psychology, and psychopathology there. Since 1977, he has been a consultant, Department of Social Services, government of Puerto Rico;from 1980-81, consultant, project on drugs and crime; and consultant on kidnapping in Sardinia, United Nations Social Defense Research Institute, Rome; from 1978-81, consultant, Italian Ministry of the Interior on antiterrorism. He has been visiting professor at various universities in the United States and was aformer staff member, UN Secretariat. He is a member of the American and International Societies of Criminology and was former chairman and member of the Criminological Scientific Council of the Council of Europe. 129 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY EFINITIONS of terrorism, as well as descriptive or histori- cal studies, are many and several attempts have been made to outline prescriptions for the prevention, control, and management of the phenomenon. Attempts to explain this emer- gence of terrorism at a group pheno- menon level, or the process of becoming a terrorist, are less com- mon. They range from individual, biographical accounts to sweeping sociopolitical or psychiatric gener- alizations. No single theory has emerged, and the various hypo- theses that have been proposed are still awaiting testing and confirma- tion. The attempt will be made to present an integrated, interdiscipli- nary theoretical approach, keeping in mind existing studies and the rather disappointing lessons that criminologists and psychiatrists have learned whenever they have tried to reach a scientifically accep- table level of theoretical exploration. Some preliminary definitions and/ or statements of approach are obviously needed. WHICH TERRORISM? Terrorism is not new. Its impact is, though, and it has forced itself into the limelight of international awareness. Many types of terror- isms coexist, and an objective defini- tion, in spite of the many attempts, is still debated. One obvious difficulty is the need to abstain from value judgments and personal involve- ments, a position that is practically impossible in relation to a pheno- menon in which we can all be partic- ipants, victims, or even actors. Moral and political judgments cloud the issue, and today's terrorist can be tomorrow's "freedom fighter," if his actions are successful. Pontara's definition is as good a starting point as any: "A terrorist act is any action carried out as part of a method of political struggle, aimed at influencing, or conquering or defending the State power, imply- ing the use of extreme violence (inflicting death, or suffering or injuries) against innocent, non- combatant persons."1 This defini- tion includes both terrorism "from below" and terrorism "from above," by a state against its internal or external enemies. In the following discussion, only political terrorism will be consid- ered, and within this category, criminal or frankly psychopatholog- ical subjects will also be excluded. Although terrorist movements can use the criminal element, or merge with it, and although mentally imbalanced individuals, in the psy- chiatric range, can be used by ter- rorist groups, what is of greater interest is, of course, the "normal" terrorist, that is, the individual who is mentally sane, or only slightly altered, at most in the psychoneu- rotic or psychopathic range, and who is engaged in subrevolutionary or revolutionary activities. Criminal terrorists are using terror, but their goals and motivations remain crimi- nal, and they must be approached as such. Psychiatric terrorists and assassins of major political figures remain unpredictable, almost chance occurrences, and defy fore- casting and theoretical explana- tions.2 1. G. Pontara, "Violenza e Terrorismo: il Problema della Definizione e della Giustifi- cazione," in Dimensioni del Terrorismo Poli- tico, ed. L. Bonanate (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1979), pp. 25-98. 2. Many studies of political assassina- tions exist. Two recent examples are: M. C. Havens, C. Leiden, and K. M. Schmitt, The Politics of Assassination (Englewood Cliffs, 130 SOCIOPSYCHIATRIC INTERPRETATION The phenomenon of terrorism also merges with other forms of dis- sent and protest. The range of actions begins with legal and accepted forms of dissent, such as individual oral protests, petitions or grievances, and peaceful demon- strations; moves to illegal but often tolerated behavior, such as coercive demonstrations, violent demonstra- tions, seizures of property and van- dalism; and finally escalates to illegal and unacceptable behavior, such as sabotage, personal assault, bombing, kidnapping, and assassi- nation.3 The latter can take the for- mat of mass murder, and serious warnings have been voiced about the possibility of future chemical, bacteriological, or nuclear threats.4 The "war by proxy," which terror- ism is, goes on in spite of occasional, often temporary "victories" by coun- NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970); and J. F. Kirkham, S. Levy, and W. J. Crofty, Assassination and Political Violence, Vol. 8 of a report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969). 3. B. McClure, The Dynamics of Terror- ism (Washington, DC: International Associa- tion of Chiefs of Police, 1976). 4. Among the many studies of future ter- rorist strategy, the following are some of the most often quoted: B. M. Jenkins, "Interna- tional Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict," in International Terrorism and World Secur- ity, eds. 0. Carlton and C. Schaerf (New York: Halsted Press, 1975), pp. 13-49; B. M. Jenkins, High Technology Terrorism and Surrogate War: The Impact of New Technol- ogy on Low-Level Violence, P-5339 (Santa Monica: CA: The Rand Corporation, 1975); B. M. Jenkins, Terrorism: Trends and Poten- tialities (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corpo- ration, 1977); R. H. Kupperman and D. Trent, Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1979); National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Dis- orders and Terrorism (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1976); P. Wilkinson, Political Terrorism (London: Macmillan, 1974). terterrorists, perhaps because it is the only possible method of waging war left in a world where large-scale warfare has been rendered un- thinkable by the finality of global atomic destruction. As it will be seen later, this perception of low- level conflict, represented by terror- ism as war, may be essential to the terrorist mind set. In the final analysis, the relativity and the ex post facto nature of the concept of terrorism defy definition. Cynically, but perhaps truly, terror- ism could be defined as "what the other person does." What we, or the state, do is "anti- or counter- terrorism," but obviously the posi- tions can be reversed by shifting sides, or simply by the flow of history. THE UNITS OF ANALYSIS Leaving aside, at least momentar- ily, a general definition, we can try to satisfy our historically and statis- tically oriented colleagues and con- centrate on a description of a terrorist act as a unit of analysis. Again, serious difficulties arise. The scale of events, which has already been presented, ranges from very minor acts, some of them even quasi-legal or at least toler- ated, such as painting graffiti on a national monument to the Bologna Railroad Station massacre, at the 100 casualties level. Obviously, the two events cannot be counted as equal. Also, the valence of the event must be assessed against the general climate of the country, or even the area of the country, in a given histor- ical and political moment. To burn a police car in Central America or in Northern Ireland has a different value and impact than the same event, undoubtly illegal and claimed as terrorist, in Switzerland or in 131 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY Norway. The level of reporting will also vary, according to the fre- quency of events and the public per- ception of them. Criminologists have been faced with the problem of indexing crimes, and the Sellin- Wolfgang index has marked a major progress in the attempt to refine our measurements.5 Not only does it allow for the weighting of events but it also takes into account the relativ- ity and the temporal variations of the weights. So far, such an index is missing in the study of chronologies of terrorist events and is obviously a required tool before adequate com- puterization can be attempted6 or before statistical tests, such as the Poisson model,7 can be applied to series of incidents. The rarity of events makes statistical tests ques- tionable and unreliable. More refined measures-or entirely dif- ferent areas, such as the public per- ception or fear of terrorism, or public concern-may have to be tapped if we are to make our mea- surements meaningful.8 5. T. Sellin and M. E. Wolfgang, The Measurement of Delinquency (New York: John Wiley, 1964). 6. See, for a concise discussion, D. A. Waterman and B. M. Jenkins, "Heuristic Modeling Using Rule-Based Computer Sys- tems," in Terrorism, eds. R. H. Kupperman and D. Trent, pp. 285-330; and W. W. Fowler, An Agenda for Quantitative Research on Ter- rorism (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corpo- ration, 1980). 7. J. M. Gleason, "A Poisson Model of Incidents of International Terrorism in the United States," Terrorism, 4(1-4):259-65 (1980). 8. For an example of a public opinion study, see S. G. Levy, "Special Research Report: Attitudes Toward Political Vio- lence," in Assassination and Political Vio- lence, eds. J. F. Kirkham, S. Levy, and W. J. Crofty, 1969. Examples of Italian studies, unpublished, are reported in F. Bruno and F. Ferracuti, "Aggression in Perspective: Italy," in Global Perspectives on Aggression, eds. A. P. Goldstein and M. Segall (New York: Pergamon Press, forthcoming). Typologies are also of questiona- ble value. To be useful, they must be at least descriptive, inclusive, dis- crete, endowed with forecasting or prognostic value, policy-generating, possibly etiological, and theoreti- cally grounded. No such taxonomy exists for terrorism, and available typologies of revolution or destabili- zation do not fare better. McClure's types by cause are of some help in identifying the main motives, but they stop at a very superficial level of ideological commitment and fall short of any other criterion of valid- ity.9 He lists five major types by "cause": -resistance to colonial rule, for example, Algeria or Cyprus, the only type fading into histor- ical oblivion ater victory and international global support; -separatism, for example, the Basques or the Puerto Ricans, allied to colonial resistance, but ethnically based and politically varied; -internal-political, for example, early Mao or early Castro, in- volving an attempt to seize power within a country which may have different political connotations and may even change political affiliations; -ideological, for example, Tupa- maros, the Red Brigade, Baader Meinhof, or Weather Under- ground; this is the most danger- ous and the one that attracts theoretical attention; the goal is the destruction of the system without a viable and coherent alternative in view; -supporting external takeover, for example, Vietnam in the 9. B. McClure, The Dynamics of Terror- ism, 1976. 132 SOCIOPSYCHIATRIC INTERPRETATION sixties, which may be a covert operation, and is generally of limited interest. The five types may merge, and the identification of the terrorist group may attempt to encompass more than one type, such as the unsuccessful attempt by the Red Brigade to establish a Sardinian branch, labeled "Barbagia Rossa," exploiting deep-rooted feelings of independence. Bonanate10 presents a concise typology, based on the double dichotomy of tactical/strategical and instrumental/goal-oriented ter- rorism. This is oriented primarily toward the modus operandi and car- ries little explanatory power. A sociopsychiatric theory will have, at present, to concentrate on ideological, goal-oriented terrorism. Many descriptive works exist on the individual and group characteris- tics of other types, such as the well- documented study by A. R. Molnar," but their transferability to the "pure," ideologically commit- ted, full-time enemy of the state is limited. Thus the heuristic value of existing typologies remains limited. THEORY AS PREDICTION A sociopsychiatric theory of ter- rorism, like any theory of deviant behavior, or in general, any theory at all, is a logically integrated set of propositions about the relations of meaningful variables. The requi- 10. L. Bonanate, ed., Dimensioni del Ter- rorismo Politico (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1979); and L. Bonanate, "Realta e Miti di un Fenomeno a Piu Varianti," Politica Interna- zionale, 11-12:59-67 (1981). 11. A. R. Molnar, Human Factors Con- siderations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (Washington, DC: Special Operations Research Office, The American University, 1 December 1965). sites of a theory have been the object of serious scrutiny by social and behavioral scientists. For Talcott Parsons the principal criteria of good theory are conceptual clarity, precision, and logical integration.12 The clearest statement of criteria is probably that made by Clarence Schrag for criminological theory.s1 For him, before theory can be used in predictions and explanations, it must be given an empirical inter- pretation by operational definitions. The requisites also include the fol- lowing: -logical adequacy; -generality; -comprehensiveness (number and relevance of variables ac- counted for); -informative content; -fertility (adaptability to math- ematical and logical operation and, of course, heuristic fer- tility for "better" theories); -parsimony (the elimination of redundancy); -credibility (congruence between claims and observed evidence); -significance (capacity for solv- ing problems); and -predictability (will the claims hold for future observations?). For Gunnar Myrdal, theory is a priori to the empirical observation of facts, but in science, facts are sov- 12. T. Parsons, "Comment" to L. Gross, "Preface to a Metatheoretical Framework," American Journal of Sociology, 67:136-40 (Sept. 1961). 13. C. Schrag, "Some Notes on Crimino- logical Theory," in Conference on Research Planning on Crime and Deliquency, ed. R. Larson (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Youth Studies Center, 1962), p. 2. 133 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY ereign.14 Given the paucity, the limited validity, and the relativity of "facts" about terrorism, a theoreti- cal statement may well be premature. Yet forecasting requires theory, to get out of actuarial straitjackets and to allow planning. In terrorism, two kinds of forecasting obviously coexist. On one side, limited, short-range forecasting, which does not tamper with major variables but only with predictable terrorists' and other "actors"' activities and behaviors, essentially a police or criminalistic operation, is better solved by such tested tools as simulation games, association charting, and profiles or psychobiographies. On the other hand, middle- and long-range forecasting imply a dif- ferent set of operations to be con- ducted using the full array of the social planner's and policymaker's tools, from Delphi methods to mathematical modeling to systems analysis. Admittedly, the difference between short-, middle-, and long- range forecasting is not simply an issue of temporal extension, and the variables to be included in the analy- sis may extend beyond generational limits, thus raising the interesting question of our right to make policy choices for future generations.16 14. G. Myrdal, Value and Social Theory: A Selection of Essays on Methodology, ed. P. Streeten (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), p. 236. 15. On forecasting, many methodological issues have been raised. For a discussion of pertinent aspects, see G. Marbach, Previsioni di Lungo Periodo: Analisi esplorative (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1980); G. Marbach, "Condi- tions and Problems of the Scientific Study of the Future," Economic Notes, 10 (1981); and W. W. Deutsch, "Some Prospects for the Future," Journal of International Affairs, 31(2):315-26 (1977). Another problem in forecasting is the difference between (1) the pre- diction of future actions by individu- als, or the identification of prospective terrorists, their entry into the groups, their "careers," and the forced or spontaneous termina- tion of their activities compared with (2) the analysis of future behav- ior of groups, or the forecasting of destabilization. Forecasting individuals' behav- ior is a clinically oriented activity where psychiatrists and criminolo- gists have not fared too well. The idioverse of the individual terrorist, in spite of various in-depth analyses and biographies,16 remains largely unknown except for a few unrelated facts. The risk of overgeneralization and overprediction remains large. Forecasting group behavior has seen a relatively large body of stu- dies, particularly by political scient- ists searching for the correlates and predictors of destabilization.17 The 16. See, for example, F. J. Hacker, Cru- saders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Ter- rorism in Our Time (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976); F. J. Hacker, "Terror and Ter- rorism: Modern Growth Industry and Mass Entertainment," Terrorism, 4(1):163-69 (1980). See also K. Kellen, Terrorists-What Are They Like? How Some Terrorists Des- cribe Their World and Actions (Santa Mon- ica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1979). For a recent autobiography, see Giorgio, Memorie dalla Clandestinita: un Terrorista Non Pen- tito Si Racconta (Milan: Savelli, 1981). 17. The correlates of destabilization and revolution have been analyzed by many authors; few large-scale studies, however, exist. See the following: S. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Doubleday, 1960); J. C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociologi- cal Review, 27:5-19 (1962); C. Johnson, Revo- lutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968); T. R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970); T. R. Gurr, "The Revolution- 134 SOCIOPSYCHIATRIC INTERPRETATION instability of political systems neither automatically generates ter- rorism nor ensures its vitality. Whatever theory emerges, it should admittedly be interdiscipli- nary and should attempt to encom- pass both the idioverse of the terrorist and the universe of his or her social systems. Of course, forecasting could be futile. To quote Ortega y Gasset in a 1951 speech on the occasion of his Ad Honorem Doctorate at the Uni- versity of Glasgow: "Man is at all times projected over the frightening emptiness which future is."18 But according to Ortega, the future is empty because it is the problematic dimension of our life: For him, prophets were useless: With the noon-bright clarity which Greek minds enjoyed, already Oeschilus says to the first prophetess, Cassandra, that to prophetize is the most useless operation of all, because it leads to two alternatives only: if to prophetize a future disaster could be useful, men would avoid it, and the prophecy, being unfulfilled, would not be valid. If, how- ever, the prophecy would anyhow be fulfilled, it would mean that to forecast the negative future would have been useless. Thus Apollus gave Cassandra the gifts to "see" the future, on the one condition that nobody would pay her any attention. Social Change Nexus: Some Old Theories and New Hypotheses," Comparative Politics, Apr. 1973, 359-92; J. C. Davies, "Aggres- sion, Violence, Revolution and War," ch. 9 in Handbook of Political Psychology, ed. J. N. Knutsen (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973), pp. 234-60; E. N. Muller, Aggressive Political Participation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 1979); D. J. Monti, "The Rela- tion Between Terrorism and Domestic Civil Disorders," Terrorism, 4(1-4):123-61 (1980). 18. J. Ortega y Gasset, "Sobre la Rebelion de las Masas," Apendice 11 in La Rebelion de las Masas (Madrid: Revista de Occidente en Alianza Editorial, 1980). Forecasting terrorist activities, in spite of Ortega's pessimism, is a needed art. In a way, terrorists are somewhat helpful. Their need for an audience and, in most instances, their highly politicized behavioral patterns make some forecasting feasible. AVAILABLE FACTS A. C. Hazelip has tried to deter- mine the unity in the principles of terrorists, and their adherence to the same principles, through an analysis of the statements of promi- nent terrorist leaders, ranging from Bakunin to Marighella.19 The 12 principles are the following: (1) Vio- lence is necessary to overthrow oppression. (2) There is no limit to the extent of violence justified. (3) Actions should clearly convey their purpose. (4) Reprisal killings are counterproductive. (5) Ruthlessness and extraordinary violence are essential to terrorist success. (6) Government failures can be used to gain popular support. (7) Terrorism exposes the repressive side of government. (8) Terrorists aim to incapacitate government directly or indirectly. (9) Secrecy is important to terrorist operations. (10) Syste- matic planning and execution are critical to terrorist success. (11) Small-scale, persistent attacks are most effective. (12) Terrorists are dedicated to destruction for the sake of their cause. From a behavioral science pers- pective, the most important ele- ments appear to be the commitment to violence and the operational flexi- bility, a contrast to the rigidity of the 19. A. C. Hazelip, Twelve Tenets of Ter- rorism An Assessment of Theory and Prac- tice (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1980). 135 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY political credo. Another common element in ideological terrorism is, as A. Koestler indicated, the urge to dedicate oneself to a cause, a leader, an ideology.20 This can be a needed replacement for anomie or for an existential vacuum, which may drive other individuals to drifting or to entering the drug culture. Thus, to engage in terrorism may be an adoptive response, and this may explain its appeal for affluent or middle-class youth faced with value conflicts.21 Alternative explanations are Davies's2 gap between rising expectations and need satisfaction, and Gurr's23 model, already implied in Marx,24 which introduces the discrepancy between "value expec- tations" and "value capabilities" of youth's environment. Aggression and violent action, as F. Fanon25 stated, increase self- esteem, thus generating Sorel's "sentiment of glory."26 A "blockade" hypothesis has been formulated by Bonanate, somewhat in line with the earlier frustration- aggression hypotheses.27 Available facts, at least in Europe, contradict the "blocks," unless they are seen as 20. A. Koestler, quoted by J. C. Davies, "Aggression, Violence, Revolution and War." 21. F. Ferracuti and F. Bruno, "Psychiat- ric Aspects of Terrorism in Italy," in The Mad, the Bad and the Different, eds. I. L. Barak-Glantz and C. R. Huff (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1981). 22. J. C. Davies, "Aggression, Violence, Revolution and War." 23. T. R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel; and T. R. Gurr, "The Revolution-Social Change Nexus." 24. K. Marx, "Wage, Labor and Capital," in K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works in Two Volumes (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1949) 1. 25. F. Fanon, quoted by J. C. Davies, "Aggression, Violence, Revolution and War," p. 245. 26. Sorel, quoted, ibid., p. 245. 27. L. Bonante, Dimensioni del Terro- rismo Politico. internal, perceived obstacles, not related to social realities. In line with a more psychiatric approach, patricidal impulses, rig- idity, and death wishes have been invoked as explanations. They all fall short of predictive power and general applicability. The relationship with death is an interesting, dynamic element of the terrorist's personality. The biologi- cal instinct to survive, for the indi- vidual and society, is the authority that vetoes the acceptance of death. Man escapes from death using every available mechanism, but particu- larly through a specific psychologi- cal attitude, defined as "the delusion of immortality," through which man lives day by day as if death either did not exist or did not concern him. This defense mechanism is a remo- val and denial of reality, an escape from reality. Death per se cannot be accepted at the experiential level and must therefore be rationalized, attributed to chance or to natural processes, made into a symbol of an exceptional event, or denied and lived simply as a religious transition from life on earth to eternal life. The only condition under which this attitude toward death is drasti- cally changed and the survival instinct appears not to operate, is war. In a war situation man appears ready to kill and be killed, the most aberrant forms of aggression are carried out by highly civilized cul- tures, and every soldier can engage in murder. War permits the rule of death over life and the legitimiza- tion of terror. The "normal" terror- ist is therefore like a soldier outside of time and space, living in a reality of war that exists only in his or her fantasy. This is widely reflected in terrorists' writings and in their pos- ture, when captured, of claiming "prisoner of war" status. 136 SOCIOPSYCHIATRIC INTERPRETATION At this point, to understand the differences among terrorists, "nor- mal" citizens, and criminals, it may be useful to analyze the elements that allow one to live in a fantasy state of war within a reality of peace and democracy, and to compare and contrast real war with the terrorist's fantasy war.28 Real war is a complex pheno- menon involving the subversion of norms, values, and habits in the lives of two or more societies trying to solve through strength a conflict based on opposite interests. A status of real war can take place only if some conditions exist. The first is the need for two or more clearly dis- tinguishable groups or societies, each with a clear and discrete social identity. War is a collective and organized phenomenon. One neces- sary and irreplaceable prerequisite for a collective event is the existence of a collectivity. To modify itself through a state of war, it must pos- sess a certain degree of organization and sovereignty. The organization is needed in order to maintain a viable social structure, and sovereignty ensures the independence of power from the structure. A second condition for a real war to take place is the existence of a crisis involving two or more collec- tivities due to a reciprocal conflict of interests. In other words, for war to happen, the concerned groups or nations must experience the need for the appropriation of something- a physical object or an instrumental asset-whose property is contested and which is considered indivisible. The third condition is the transi- tion from a state of peace to a state of war, with the acceptance of new values, new goals, and new behav- 28. F. Bruno and F. Ferracuti, "Aggres- sion in Perspective: Italy." ioral patterns, which must be func- tional to the new lifestyle. The last condition is the need for the use of strength and all the sophisticated technological aids man has created to multiply his limited physical power for the pur- pose of inflicting harm. The process that precedes enter- ing a state of war involves the identi- fication by the participating societies of the "enemy" as such and therefore of the latter's transforma- tion into something alien and hos- tile. Implied is a projection of one's own dramatic anxieties over the loss or destruction of the contested object; also implied is the decision to destroy the enemy in order to pre- vent the appropriation or destruc- tion of the object. Together and parallel with the process of alienation of the enemy, there is a maniacal feeling of increasing power and invulnerabil- ity in the parties involved. All these mechanisms produce what the Latin expression identifies as the animus belli, the will to wage war that is psychologically domi- nant in at least one of the contending groups. The opposite group, in order to survive, must assume a similar posture. Terrorism, however, is fantasy war, real only in the mind of the terrorist. Fantasy war, of course, is only partial war, real for only one of the contestants who then adopts war values, norms, and behaviors against another, generally larger group, trying to solve through strength a conflict based on legitimate or illeg- itimate grievances. A fantasy war is neither accepted nor acknowledged by the other group who, in effect, tends to deny it. Fantasy war is therefore an ongoing phenomenon, in a continuously unstable balance between two possible stabilizing 137 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY processes: real war or diffuse terror. Fantasy war becomes real only if acknowledged by the "enemy," and becomes terrorism when, unable to compel the enemy to accept a state of war, it must limit itself to harassing and destabilizing the enemy through the utilization and diffusion of fear. The operational conditions of fan- tasy war are similar to those of real war, but are in part artificially pro- duced so as to mimic reality. For example, even fantasy war needs the existence of at least two groups, dis- tinct and organized. Within the same society, since sovereignty can only be attributed to one group, that to which it is denied tries to achieve it, carrying out the symbolic duties and privileges of the other, dominat- ing group and rejecting existing laws and prevailing values. Thus the terrorist group claims power of life and death over citizens, engages in criminal activities while claiming their lawfulness, establishes courts of law, and promulgates sentences, applying new laws. A crisis is neces- sary (if none is taking place, it must be generated); solutions to the crisis are rejected ("reforms delay the revolution"); and the existence of a love object, perceived as in danger, is also necessary. This object is not contested by the other group, but it is threatened in its structure and functions. The process of singling out and alienating the enemy is iden- tical to what takes place in real war, but it can assume much more serious pathological connotations because it is less subject to reality testing and criticism. Lastly, fantasy war, as real war, is carried out by executing projects of destruction, but the chain reac- tion, not being completely main- tained by counteractions by the other group, must be self-sustained through an escalation of terror that does not permit the participants to abstain from action or even to lower the level of conflict. As already stated, two possible scenarios exist in fantasy war: either it changes into real war, and thus ends with the defeat of one con- testant; or it stabilizes itself into ter- ror, and in this case it can only enter into a new crisis, thus removing the threat to the object and making it accessible to both contestants, or it can change the system, reducing or abolishing the prerequisites of war. At this point, it can be hypothes- ized that terrorists differ from "nor- mal" citizens and from criminals first of all because they perceive themselves as different and alien vis-a-vis the ruling society; because they belong to a group characterized by a strong ideological, cultural, and political identity; and also because they feel that their love object is threatened by the rest of society, which they identify as an enemy and therefore try to destroy. To achieve this goal, which is love and not hate, they choose violence, which they use to generate terror, this being the only option, in their perception, open to them. AVAILABLE THEORIES Salert has summarized the four main theories.29 Briefly, they are as follows: 1. Olson30 Theory, or Revolution as a Rational Choice. Revolution is the best alternative, given the pre- vailing social circumstances. Game theory and cost-benefit analysis 29. B. Salert, Revolutions and Revolution- aries: Four Theories (New York: Elsevier, 1976). 30. J. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, rev. ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 1971). 138 SOCIOPSYCHIATRIC INTERPRETATION should permit verification, given its inherent rationality. No role is envisaged for individual motives. 2. A Psychological Theory.31 This is mostly based on frustration- aggression, and on the already-cited Davies reformulation.32 This moves the problem from the social universe to the idioverse, and motives and countermotives are superficially handled. Also, the theory is at least partially tautological and does not account for those who abstain from terrorism, although frustrated, or for "repented" terrorists. 3. A Theory of the Unbalance of the Social System. Proposed by C. Johnson, this is a homeostatic, "sys- tem" approach, essentially based on the validity of the selection of variables-increase of ideological activity, armed forces, general and political criminality, and suicide- as an index of anomie.33 Again, the individual idioverse component is overlooked. 4. Marxist Theory.34 This is the most difficult to synthesize because of its long history and its various interpretations. Its elaborations have followed different paths, although not necessarily incompati- ble, such as the scientific- positivistic on one side, based on the social and economic aspects, con- trasted with the Hegelian, individu- alistic, praxis-oriented aspect, as in Marcuse.35 The transfer from "class 31. T. R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel; and T. R. Gurr, "The Revolution-Social Change Nexus." 32. J. C. Davies, "Aggression, Violence, Revolution and War." 33. C. Johnson, Revolutionary Change. 34. K. Marx, "A Contribution to the Cri- tique of Political Economy," in The Marx- Engels Reader, ed. R. C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1972), pp. 4-5. 35. H. Marcuse, Ragione e Rivoluzione: Hegel e il Sorgere della "Teoria Sociale" (Bologna: II Mulino, 1965). consciousness" to "revolutionary consciousness" remains historically unproved, and further conceptual elaborations are in progress, as in Negri.36 It is important to acknowl- edge the official rejection of revolu- tionary terrorist violence by classic Marxism. None of the four theories ana- lyzed by Salert fulfills the criteria of sound theory or provides adequate basis for forecasting and planning. New efforts are needed, particu- larly if the attempt is going to be made to cover universe and idio- verse. Terrorists live in cultures and try to establish their own value sys- tems and subcultures, both to justify themselves and to proselytize. A subcultural approach37 would fall within an established form of refer- ence for the analysis of violent behavior, of which political violence would be a specific subcategory. The learning process, implied in the subcultural theory, would explain indoctrination and terrorist careers. At the same time, individ- ual differences in life experience would find proper placement in the process of entering the subculture. Moreover, the psychological dynamics would permit psychiatric handling in terms of value changes. Co-option, for example, would be a more valid policy than military con- trol. In addition, dispersal of the subculture, for example, in the pri- son environment, could be a useful indication for short-term policy. Of course, verification is for the future, and constitutes the task facing the behavioral scientist approaching the subject of terrorism. 36. A. Negri, II Communismo e la Guerra (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1980). 37. M. E. Wolfgang and F. Ferracuti, The Subculture of Violence (London: Tavistock, 1967). 139 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY In closing, a statement by Henry David Thoreau, dated 1849, in Civil Disobedience should guide the search for understanding: "All men recognize the right of revolution; that is the right to refuse allegiance to and to resist the government, when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable." Terrorists are not aliens; they are our youth. We cannot dismiss them as enemies, except in a short-range approach. In the long range, if we want to stop terrorism, we must understand terrorists. 140