Newport, R.I.
By
Scott Minium
A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction
of the requirements of the Department of Strategy and Policy based on the following assigned
topic:
6. "The principle of aiming everything at the enemy's center of gravity admits of only one
exception-that is, when secondary operations look exceptionally rewarding." (Clausewitz, p.
618) What circumstances make opening a secondary theater exceptionally rewarding?
The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed
by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.
Signature:___________________
31 May 09
Seminar 6A Moderators:
Commander Peter Jannotta
Professor Colin Jackson
Considerations for Opening a Secondary Theater
they "look exceptionally rewarding." The circumstances under which a proposed secondary
operation may be considered exceptionally rewarding include, at a minimum: 1) the risk relative
to the primary operation is low, 2) the operation presents a direct way to attack the enemy or his
many factors to ensure the risk of the proposed operation can be kept acceptable. Above all else
there must be relative certainty that a failure of the secondary operation will not result in a loss of
the war proper. In the case of the Sicilian Expedition, the Athenians did not fully consider that
their forces could be lost, captured or unable (physically or mentally) to disengage. This
secondary operation, incurring the loss of so many men and ships, severely impacted the main
war effort by Athens. In contrast, the British Peninsula Campaign by Wellington posed little risk
to Britain's overall effort, and the failure of Napoleon's Ireland invasion was not a direct
Next, in order to maintain the secondary theater at a lower risk level, the allowable cost
must be coldly calculated such that when it becomes to costly it can be terminated. This is
difficult for all belligerents, democratic or otherwise, because the concept of a sunk cost does not
adequately factor in the passions of war after blood has been spilt. Unfortunately, once the
shooting has started belligerents tend to see all combat operations as the same, making little
distinction between primary and secondary theaters. Such behavior inflates the value of the
secondary theater, masking the higher the risk it poses to the primary theater and the main
objective. Thus, the value of the object must be very carefully appraised before opening the
second theater so that it does not become more valuable just because losses are incurred. As an
example, Britain could have persisted in its costly 1915 Gallipoli campaign, but unlike when
Athens fought to the bitter end in Sicily, Britain ultimately chose to abort Gallipoli even though
Lastly, secondary operations must not increase risk by expanding the scope of the war.
By definition, secondary operations are going to be in a location removed from the main event,
and that location may involve a new player. This should be carefully considered lest the
operation bring new enemies into the conflict. While the negatives of drawing third parties into
the war as new opponents should be obvious, the reaction of third parties has been overlooked or
poorly estimated from time to time. The German decision to use unrestricted submarine warfare
in World War I, which can be viewed as the opening of a secondary theater, is a good example. 1
By itself the use of submarines did not really impact the German war machine, making it low
risk to the war in Europe. For it to be effective, however, US shipping had to be targeted as well,
and this dramatically increased risk to Germany when the US entered the war.
In summary, when analyzing the risks of a secondary operation the analysis needs to be
worst case to ensure the risks posed cannot rise to a level that will threaten the primary operation.
such any secondary operation that is undertaken must have the same goal as the primary
operation: to break the enemy's capacity and will to fight. Thus, the more oblique this attack the
less impact it has. Vietnam(1965-1972) and Korea (1950-) are examples of secondary theaters
opened by the Soviet Union (and China) and answered by the US. As secondary theaters in the
Cold War they were aimed directly at the US in order to challenge the containment policy and
further the spread of communism. It is somewhat harder to see the US effort as directly aimed at
the Soviets.
opponent. Because the secondary is by definition on the periphery of the main effort, the
principal belligerent may choose not to engage. Wellington's efforts in the Peninsula Campaign
would have yielded much less impact had Napoleon not chosen to fully engage him. Had
Napoleon moved far enough away from Wellington's fleet support the increased risk would
likely have pushed him to end the campaign. Similarly, the German army did not have to hold
North Africa against Operation TORCH. A different sequence of events would have resulted
had the Germans simply withdrawn to Europe. From the Allied perspective, while TORCH had
The secondary operation must be able to directly affect the enemy. If the impact on the
enemy is not directly obvious, then it is a poor choice. Failure to make this link has resulted in
several secondary operations looking much more like new fronts or even new wars. This does
not mean that the gain need be combat victories over the enemy, only that the effect on the
enemy is not a second or third order effect. The Gallipoli campaign, in seeking a resupply route
to Russia as well as the taking of the Ottoman capitol, was direct and thus met this criteria. In
contrast, Napoleon's invasion of Egypt sought to disrupt British trade with India, something that
would have involved far more than just occupation and thus could not be a direct effect.
lest it simply expend resources for insufficient gain in pursuit of the primary object.
Exploiting an Advantage
The belligerent launching a secondary operation does so with the intent of bringing an
asymmetric advantage into play so that the battle can be fought on more favorable terms than
those offered in the primary theater. As always, the providing of forces to the secondary
operation must not significantly slow the primary effort. Thus, secondary operations should be
Amphibious mobility is one advantage that can be exploited when the land forces of one
side are unlikely to succeed in a direct action against the primary forces of the enemy. This is a
recurring problem when maritime powers engage with continental ones. The 'whale', not having
an army of sufficient size to meet the 'elephant' head-on, seeks a secondary theater where it can
bring its naval forces to bear as a counterweight or force multiplier. This has figured
prominently in amphibious operations through history. As the naval forces cannot serve in the
primary theater and the army is of insufficient size to fight in the main theater, a smaller joint
operation is a good choice. Pylos and Sphacteria, the Peninsula Campaign, and TORCH are
excellent examples. In each case the operations were chosen carefully in that: they exploited
amphibious mobility while limiting the mobility options of the enemy, they took on an enemy
force of appropriate capability, they targeted something the enemy wished to contest, and they
used forces that were not immediately needed for the primary effort.
A second possible case is when one side may have a capability that the other cannot
effectively counter, but that cannot be used in the primary theater. Submarines were used by
both sides in World War II as a way to take the fight to the enemy in a way that, at least initially,
could not be countered or avoided--a perfect choice for a secondary theater. In a similar manner,
strategic bombing can be seen as the opening of a secondary theater away from, and in this case
above, the front line. As the Allies had no front in Western Europe before June 1944, no air
support was needed for it and the bombers were perfectly available for use in a secondary
theater.
One can argue that the only exceptional reward a secondary theater can bring about is a
quicker end to the greater war. Clausewitz is trying to communicate that although estimates and
calculations may show the secondary theater to be of great value, they are probably incomplete.
This is crucial in decision making because states tend to enter much more readily into secondary
theaters of questionable value than primary theaters of critical value because the perceived
present cost is lower. Unwilling to go head-to-head, Athens and Sparta each persisted for years
in opening secondary theaters instead of figuring out how to directly fight each other. In World
War II Eisenhower voiced frequent concerns that TORCH was going to unnecessarily delay
Allied entry into France at the risk of losing Russia.2 In Vietnam and Korea the US elected to
engage in the Soviet's secondary theaters of choice, with mixed results of somewhat questionable
value. More than anything, secondary theaters tend to prolong war, which is very rarely a good
thing and something Clausewitz was definitely against. It seems that in many cases the
correctness of the secondary theater is evaluated not on conditions at the time, but on reflection
of history. Unfortunately this leads to the conclusion that it does not matter if you get it right for
the wrong reason; however, this line of reasoning poorly informs decisions in the present. Given
all the uncertainties, in almost every case blood and treasure would have been conserved had a
Secondary operations can indeed have the effect of extending the duration of a war. But
the purpose is not to delay the war but rather to engage the enemy with the means now available
until victory in a decisive match becomes possible. It is also possible that a decisive engagement
cannot be made to occur. In this case secondary operations offer the chance to impact the
enemy, force a change, and develop conditions that might bring about a decisive engagement.
Years of stalemate in World War I were not due to secondary operations, but rather the cause of
them. Another example is the Cold War, wherein both sides actively avoided a decisive battle
While calculations of the costs and benefits of a secondary operation may never provide
the best answer, it is often the case that it may be the best answer right now. Acts of war
demand a swift response by the public, and civilian and military leaders need to answer
aggression in the quickest manner available. As such, the leadership may not have the political
luxury of denying a ready secondary theater when the primary one is unavailable or risks certain
defeat.
It is undoubtedly sophistry to argue that a decision for secondary operations was good
based solely on historical perspective, but you likewise cannot argue against a secondary
operation now based simply on what you think will happen later. It may not have been the best
of all answers, but in 1942 Britain and the US had to hit Germany, and TORCH was a much
better option than OVERLORD at that time. Going back further in time, while it should not
have taken the Spartans thirty years to rent a Navy and interdict grain shipments, they
nevertheless decided to conduct secondary operations they saw as the best fit for their means at
the time.
Final Thoughts
First, it is interesting to note that a maritime power has most always been involved on one
side of the secondary theater. The reason is freedom of action. Command of the sea gives a
maritime power the ability to choose when and where to give battle. As reasoned above,
command of the air allows the same choices. For the continental power, all ground combat is on
a border, while secondary theaters allow maritime and air powers a way to attack the enemy at a
distance. On a cautionary note, advancements in conventional ballistic missiles may now offer a
way to dispute command of territory, air and sea in a wholly new manner.
initiative. Although it may be hard to estimate its value, initiative greatly affects the morale of
the military as well as the people at home. Well executed, taking the initiative will have many
hard to predict effects for both sides, but fortune favors the bold.
Lastly, while Clausewitz is right to urge caution in the conduct of secondary operations,
he is using a bit of hyperbole when he insists the conditions be exceptional. A carefully thought
out sequence of qualifying points, some of which have been discussed in this paper, is a better