Hu Niu v Collector of Customs (G.R. No.

L-12379)
Widowed wife and children want to enter the Philippines. They argue that they
acquired merchant status upon the death of the husband as his merchant business was
left to them.
The assumption of the appellant is that the mere fact of the death of a merchant makes
his wife and children also merchants, as it leaves to them as heirs and next of kin a
mercantile business as a part of their inheritance. We do not believe that this
necessarily follows. But if it does, the fact remains that she is not a resident merchant.
She is still outside of the Philippine Islands and has never held the status of a resident
merchant. She must, therefore, establish her right to enter as a merchant in the first
instance. This she did not do. She did not present the section six certificate which is the
only evidence upon which her right to enter can be based.
AU: Status is a personal right extinguished upon death.
Limjoco v Estate of Fragante (G.R. No. L-770)
Pedro Fragante applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience to operate an ice plant.
He died but the commission granted the certificate to his estate. Petitioner now
questions the validity of such grant to the estate.
Xxx decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make
up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and
management of the executor or administrator, can not be exercised but by him in
representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any,
and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens to consist in the
prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public
convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but logical that
the legal representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the
right effective in that proceeding.
AU: SC cited the ROC to show that rights may be part of the estate and should be
managed by the executor or administrator. Lots of other contentions by petitioners but
this is the relevant portion.
Fule v Fule (G.R. No. 21859)
Saturnino Fule died intestate but he left no debts and his property has already been
partitioned among his children during his lifetime. Ciriaco Fule, an heir, petitioned the
court for the appointment of an administrator. The children of Saturnino opposed this.
The RTC eventually revoked the appointment and refused to appoint an administrator.
Was the RTC correct in refusing?
In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the
Civil Code, all of the property, real and personal, of a deceased person who dies intestate,
is transmitted immediately to his heirs. Xxx When the heirs are all of lawful age and
there are no debts there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the cost
and expenses of an administrator. The administrator has no right to intervene in any
way whatsoever in the division of the estate among the heirs when they are adults and
when there are no debts against the estate.
Malcolm and Ostrand Dissenting: It is asserted that the deceased left no debts, but it is
not unreasonable to suppose that a person with such large property interest may have
had dealings with others from which claims against the estate may arise, the existence
of which cannot be definitely ascertained until the publication of notice to claimants and
creditors has been made, pursuant to the provisions of section 687 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. In these circumstances it would seem to be to the interest of all parties
concerned to have the estate definitely settled and that can only be done properly
through administration proceedings.
AU: The main opinion cited a bevy of cases all pointing out the lack of reason for
appointing an administrator. Basically, the administrator is not necessary because there
is nothing left to administrate. All the property have been divided and transmitted to
the children. There is nothing left for the estate to pay or distribute.
The dissent says that the cases cited in the main opinion were all made after the lapse of
a long period where no creditors actually laid claim to a portion of the estate. In this
case, only a short period has passed and there was no opportunity for possible
unknown creditors to respond to a notice as required by the ROC.
Heirs of the late Domingo Nicolas v Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (G.R. No.
137548)
Spouses Nicolas owned 2 parcels of land upon which their residential house stood. The
husband died. A fire destroyed the records in the Register of Deeds in QC so the wife
had the records reconstituted. The new title was no longer in the name of both spouses
as conjugal property but only in the name of the wife Josefa. 7 years later, the children
discover that the mother had mortgaged the property to respondent, that the property
had been foreclosed with a title issued in the name of the respondent and that a writ of
possession was issued in favor of the respondent. The RTC and CA denied their petitions
to quash the writ of possession.
Here, petitioners as children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of spouses Nicolas,
acquired ownership of portions of the lots as their legitime upon the death of their
father or prior to the foreclosure of mortgage and the filing by the respondent of its
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. Consequently, petitioners are strangers
or third parties therein whose rights cannot be determined as they were not impleaded
by respondent. Verily, they should not be deprived of their legitime by the enforcement
of the writ of possession. Clearly, therefore, the writ of possession should not include
parts of the two lots pertaining to petitioners.
AU: The court considered the circumstances in this case and their ruling in Rivero de
Ortega v. Natividad: The general rule is that after a sale has been made under a decree
in a foreclosure suit, the court has the power to give possession to the purchaser, and
the latter will not be driven to an action in law to obtain possession. Xxx But where a
party in possession was not a party to the foreclosure, and did not acquire his possession
from a person who was bound by the decree, but who is a mere stranger and who entered
into possession before the suit was begun, the court has no power to deprive him of
possession by enforcing the decree.
DKC Holdings Corp. v CA (G.R. No. 118248)
DKC holdings entered into a contract of lease with the option to purchase the property
of Encarnacion Bartolome. The option was limited to a 2 year period with 3000 peso
monthly consideration exclusive of the rent. Encarnacion died and Victor was the sole
heir of all her properties. Victor refused to accept the 3000 monthly reservation as well
as the rent. DKC sent by registered mail a notice that it was exercising their option to
purchase the leased property. Victor refused. Is the contract entered into by
Encarnacion binding upon Victor?
The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are
not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law. In the case
at bar, there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the rights and
obligations under the contract intransmissible. More importantly, the nature of the
rights and obligations therein are, by their nature, transmissible. Xxx In the case at bar,
there is no personal act required from the late Encarnacion Bartolome. Rather, the
obligation of Encarnacion in the contract to deliver possession of the subject property to
petitioner upon the exercise by the latter of its option to lease the same may very well
be performed by her heir Victor. He only succeeds to what rights his mother had and
what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against him.
Heirs of Ypon v Gaudioso Ponteras a.k.a. Gaudioso Ypon (G.R. No. 198680)
Magdaleno Ypon died intestate and according to the petitioners, childless. They sought
to have the TCT issued in the name of Gaudioso (respondent) annulled. The respondent
alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno and caused the transfer of the latters
properties to him as compulsory heir.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the
action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that
the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason
that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Xxx Thus, concordant
with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an
ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case
No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC
erred in ruling on Gaudiosos heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed
out and determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing
pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
AU: Not a total loss for petitioners. They will now proceed to determine through a
special proceeding the legitimate heirs.