Art. I-II

Political Law Review Case Digests Dean Sedfrey Candelaria
Agdamag | Anderson |Aquino |De Guzman | Empaynado | Estremadura| Lopez| Macabagdal | Magtoto | Meer |Mercado| Militante |Pineda |Squillantini| Taruc
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ARTICLE I. The National Territory
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and
waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains,
including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines.

1. Magallona v Executive Secretary [Validity of RA 9255]
G.R. No. 187167 | August 16, 2011

Petitioners: Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, Prof. Harry Roque, UP Law studs, et al
Respondents: Hon. Eduardo Ermita, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al.
Ponente: Justice Antonio Carpio

Summary: Magallona, et al assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 (Baselines Law). SC
ruled that it is not unconstitutional for the ff reasons: (1) It did not enlarge or diminish
the territory but merely demarcated PH maritime zones and continental shelf pursuant
to UNCLOS; (2) Its configuration of the baselines merely followed the basepoints
mapped by RA 3046 and, it even increased PH maritime space (contrary to petitioners
contention that it was decreased); (3) Its use of framework of regime of islands over
the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal manifests its observance of its pacta sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS; and (4) As to alleged conversion of internal
waters to archipelagic waters PH still exercises sovereignty; no modern state can
absolutely forbid innocent passage since it is part of customary international law. The
enactment of UNCLOS-compliant baselines law for the PH archipelago and adjacent
areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally recognized delimitation of the
breadth of PH maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is a vital step in
safeguarding PH maritime zones, consistent with the Consti and our national interest.

Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed RA 3046 demarcating PH maritime baselines as
an archipelagic State. It was based on the 1958 Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone. It remained unchanged for nearly 5 decades
save for legislation passed in 1968 (RA5446) correcting typo errors and
reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the
statute now under scrutiny.
o The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant
with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.
Among others, UNCLOS prescribes the water-land ratio,
length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like
the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of
application for the extended continental shelf.
o Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one
baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the
Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories,
namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough
Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their
own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective
capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or legislators," as the case may be, assail
the constitutionality of RA 9522 on these grounds:
o That RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory and, logically, the
reach of its sovereign power in violation of Art 1 of 1987 Constitution.
o That RA 9522 opens the countrys waters to maritime passage by all
vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and
national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and
damaging marine resources.
o That RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only
results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

Issue 1: Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit.
Held: YES. As citizens. (not as taxpayers since no public funds involved)
Ratio: We recognize petitioners locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient
interest in the resolution of the case which raises issues of national significance. Owing
to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants
possessing a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit.

Issue 2: Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to
assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
Held: YES.
Ratio:
Respondents writs cannot issue absent any showing of GADALEJ in the
exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers
Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. However,
when this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, certiorari
and prohibition are proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of
statutes, and indeed, of acts of other branches of government.

Issue 3: Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
Held: NO.

RA 9522 is not unconstitutional. It is a statutory tool to demarcate the countrys
maritime zones and continental shelf under UNCLOS, not to delineate Philippine
territory
Petitioners argue that RA 9522 discards the pre-UNCLOS demarcation
provided by the Treaty of Paris which was embodied in the definition of
national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners
argue that from the Treaty of Paris technical description, PH sovereignty over
territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the archipelago,
embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.
Petitioners theory fails to persuade us. UNCLOS was the culmination of
decades-long negotiations among UN members to codify norms regulating
the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas, recognizing
coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over a limited span of
waters and submarine lands along their coasts.

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On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS
States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which
baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic
starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental
shelf. Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for States
to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental
shelves. This gives notice to the rest of the international community of the
scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties
exercise treaty-based rights.
UNCLOS and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition,
enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under IL, States
acquire or lose territory through occupation, accretion, cession & prescription,
not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or
enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones
and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside
UNCLOS, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law.

RA 9522s use of the framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime
zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal are not inconsistent with the
Philippines claim of sovereignty over these areas.
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows
that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for
at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of
basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with
UNCLOS limitation on the maximum length of baselines).
Petitioners assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of
territorial waters" under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law.
On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints,
increased the Philippines total maritime space (covering its internal waters,
territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical
miles. The reach of the EEZ drawn under RA 9522 now extends way beyond
the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris.
Petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside PH territory because the
baselines that RA9522 draws do not enclose KIG is negated by RA9522 itself
o Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines continued claim
of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal: The baselines in the following areas over which the
Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall
be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Art. 121 of the (UNCLOS): a) The
Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No.
1596 and b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as
part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued.
PH would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS.
o First, Article 47 (3) requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines
shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago."
o Second, Article 47 (2) requires that "the length of the baselines shall
not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the
total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.
The principal sponsor of RA 9522, Senator Defensor-Santiago, explained
The KIG/Spatlys & the Scarborough are outside our archipelagic baseline
because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating
IL: "The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating
baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands hindi natin masasabing malapit
sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as
our own. This is called contested islands outside our configuration
Baselines should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.
Hence, far from surrendering the PH claim over the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as
"Regime[s] of Islands is consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS. This
manifests our responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation
under UNCLOS. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS, any "naturally formed area of
land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," such as
portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of islands," whose
islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Statutory claim over Sabah under RA 5446 retained
Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize
the Philippines claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section
2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing
the baselines of Sabah:
o Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the
Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice
to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the
territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic
of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

UNCLOS and RA 9522 not incompatible with the Constitutions delineation of
internal waters
As their final argument, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally
"converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these
waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage. Petitioners extrapolate
that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to
nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution.
Whether referred to as PH "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution
or as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS (Article 49 [1]), the PH exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including
the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of
municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or
archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of
maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with
the international law principle of freedom of navigation.
Significantly, the right of innocent passage is customary international law,
thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of PH law. No modern State can
validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is
exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking
retaliatory measures from the international community.

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Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II
(Declaration of Principles and State Policies) must also fail.

RA 9522 and the Philippines Maritime Zones
The enactment of UNCLOS-compliant baselines law for the PH archipelago
and adjacent areas allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of
the breadth of the PH maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is
therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its
maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. SO ORDERED.

ARTICLE II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies

Preliminary Issue: Legal Value of Article II

1. BCDA v. COA
Petitioner: BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Respondent: COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Ponente: CARPIO, J . February 26, 2009

Summary: Read the facts below since I dont know how to make it shorter than it
already is. Issues: 1.) W/N full time consultants and BODs are entitled to YEB
because it is consistent with Sections 8 and 18 of Art. II? NO. Article II of the
Constitution is entitled Declaration of Principles and State Policies. Article II is a
statement of general ideological principles and policies. It is not a source of
enforceable rights. In Tondo Medical Center v. CA, the Court held that Sections 5 and
18, Article II are not self-executing provisions. 2.) W/N it violates the EPC? No. A
law passed enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. Petition failed to proved
otherwise. Persons are not automatically similarly situated thus, automatically
deserving of equal protection of the laws just because they both "have mouths to
feed and stomachs to fill." Otherwise, the existence of a substantial distinction would
become forever highly improbable.

Facts:
On 13 March 1992, Congress approved RA 7227 creating the BCDA. Section
9 states that the Board of Directors (Board) shall exercise the powers and
functions of the BCDA. Under Section 10, the functions of the Board
include the determination of the organizational structure and the
adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme at least equivalent to
that of the BSP.
o Accordingly, the Board adopted a compensation and benefit scheme
for its officials and employees.
On 20 December 1996, the Board adopted a new compensation and benefit
scheme which included a P10,000 year-end benefit (YEB) granted to each
contractual employee, regular permanent employee, and Board member. In a
memorandum

Board Chairman Basco recommended to President Ramos the
approval of the new compensation and benefit scheme.
o President Ramos approved it in a 1997 Memorandum.
In 1999, the BSP gave a P30,000 year-end benefit to its officials and
employees. In 2000, the BSP increased the year-end benefit from P30,000 to
P35,000.
o Pursuant to Section 10 (above) the Board increased the year-end
benefit of BCDA officials and employees from P10,000 to P30,000.
Thus in 2000 and 2001, BCDA officials and employees received a
P30,000 year-end benefit.
Aside from the contractual and regular employees, and Board members, the
full-time consultants of the BCDA also received the year-end benefit.
Subsequently, they were audited by COA. It then disallowed the grant of
year-end benefit to the Board members and full-time consultants.
The COAs Ruling (included since the Court used this din)
2.1 PERA, ADCOM, YEB and retirement benefits, are personnel benefits granted in
addition to salaries. As fringe benefits, these shall be paid only when the basic salary
is also paid. 2.2 Members of the Board of Directors of agencies are not salaried
officials of the government. As non-salaried officials they are not entitled to PERA,
ADCOM, YEB and retirement benefits unless expressly provided by law. 2.3
Department Secretaries, Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries who serve as Ex-
officio Members of the Board of Directors are not entitled to any remuneration in line
with the Supreme Court ruling that their services in the Board are already paid for and
covered by the remuneration attached to their office."
Clearly, the members and ex-officio members of the Board of Directors
are not entitled to YEB, they being not salaried officials of the
government. The same goes with full time consultants wherein no
employer-employee relationships exist between them and the BCDA.
Presumption of good faith may not apply to the members and ex-officio
members of the Board of Directors because despite the earlier clarification on
the matter by the DBM (telling them they couldnt order the increase) still, the
Board of Directors granted the YEB to the BCDA personnel including
themselves. Full time consultants, are also not entitled to such presumption
since they knew from the very beginning that they are only entitled to the
amount stipulated in their contracts as compensation for their services.
Hence, they should be made to refund the disallowed YEB.

Issue: W/N Board Members and full-time consultants are entitled to YEB? NO.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Commission on Audit
Decision No. 2007-020 dated 12 April 2007 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the Board members and full-time consultants of the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority are not required to refund the year-end benefits they have
already received.
Ratio:
The Boards power to adopt a compensation and benefit scheme is not
unlimited. Section 9 of RA No. 7227 states that Board members are entitled to
a per diem:
o Members of the Board shall receive a per diem of not more than
Five thousand pesos (P5,000) for every board meeting:
Provided, however, That the per diem collected per month does
not exceed the equivalent of four (4) meetings: Provided, further,
That the amount of per diem for every board meeting may be
increased by the President but such amount shall not be increased
within two (2) years after its last increase.
Section 9 limits the amount of per diem to not more than P5,000; and limits
the total amount of per diem for one month to not more than four meetings.
The specification of compensation and limitation of the amount of

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compensation in a statute indicate that Board members are entitled only
to the per diem authorized by law and no other.
o Baybay Water District: By specifying the compensation which a
director is entitled to receive and by limiting the amount he/she is
allowed to receive in a month, x x x the law quite clearly indicates
that directors x x x are authorized to receive only the per diem
authorized by law and no other compensation or allowance in
whatever form.
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o DBM Circular states that, "Members of the Board of Directors of
agencies are not salaried officials of the government. As non-
salaried officials they are not entitled to PERA, ADCOM, YEB
and retirement benefits unless expressly provided by law." RA
No. 7227 does not state that the Board members are entitled to a
year-end benefit.
o With regard to the full-time consultants, DBM Circular states that,
"YEB and retirement benefits, are personnel benefits granted in
addition to salaries. As fringe benefits, these shall be paid only
when the basic salary is also paid." The full-time consultants are
not part of the BCDA personnel and are not paid the basic salary.
MAIN:
Second, BCDA claims that the Board members and full-time consultants
should be granted the year-end benefit because the granting of year-end
benefit is consistent with Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution.
o Article II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of Principles and
State Policies. By its very title, Article II is a statement of general
ideological principles and policies. It is not a source of enforceable
rights. In Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the
Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In that case, the
Court held that "Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the
present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution
specifically, Sections 5 x x x and 18 the provisions of which the
Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing."
Third, the BCDA claims that the denial the equal protection clause. The
BCDA states that "there is here only a distinction, but no difference" because
both "have undeniably one common goal as humans, that is to keep body
and soul together" or, "both have mouths to feed and stomachs to fill."
o The Court is not impressed. Every presumption should be
indulged in favor of the constitutionality of RA No. 7227 and the
burden of proof is on the BCDA to show that there is a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
o ABAKADA: A law enacted enjoys the strong presumption of
constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
unequivocal one.
o Persons are not automatically similarly situated thus,
automatically deserving of equal protection of the laws just
because they both "have mouths to feed and stomachs to fill."
Otherwise, the existence of a substantial distinction would become
forever highly improbable.
Fourth, the BCDA claims that the Board can grant the year-end benefit to its
members and the full-time consultants because RA No. 7227 does not
expressly prohibit it from doing so.
o The Court is not impressed. A careful reading of Section 9 of RA No.
7227 reveals that the Board is prohibited from granting its members
other benefits by limiting the amount of per diem (P5,000).
o The specification that Board members shall receive a per diem of not
more than P5,000 for every meeting and the omission of a provision
allowing Board members to receive other benefits lead the Court to
the inference that Congress intended to limit the compensation of
Board members to the per diem authorized by law and no other. The
Court cannot, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a
statute or insert into a statute what Congress omitted, whether
intentionally or unintentionally.
With regard to the full-time consultants, DBM Circular Letter states that, "YEB
and retirement benefits, are personnel benefits granted in addition to
salaries. As fringe benefits, these shall be paid only when the basic
salary is also paid." The full-time consultants are not part of the BCDA
personnel and are not paid the basic salary. The full-time consultants
consultancy contracts expressly state that there is no employer-employee
relationship between BCDA and the consultants and that BCDA shall pay the
consultants a contract price. Since full-time consultants are not salaried
employees of the BCDA, they are not entitled to the year-end benefit which is
a "personnel benefit granted in addition to salaries" and which is "paid only
when the basic salary is also paid."
Fifth, the BCDA claims that the Board members and full-time consultants are
entitled to the year-end benefit because (1) President Ramos approved the
granting of the benefit to the Board members, and (2) they have been
receiving it since 1997.
o The State is not estopped from correcting a public officers
erroneous application of a statute, and an unlawful practice, no
matter how long, cannot give rise to any vested right.
HOWEVER, Court said that they dont have to refund the benefits they got since both
Board Members and consultants were in good faith because of 4 reasons:
o The Board members and consultants relied on (1) Section 10 of RA No. 7227
which authorized the Board to adopt a compensation and benefit scheme;
o the fact that RA No. 7227 does not expressly prohibit Board members from
receiving benefits other than the per diem authorized by law; and
o President Ramos approval of the new compensation and benefit scheme
which included the granting of a year-end benefit to each contractual
employee, regular permanent employee, and Board member.
o There is no proof that the Board members and full-time consultants knew that
their receipt of the year-end benefit was unlawful.

Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them.

2. ACCFA v. CUGCO [Government; functions; unincorporated]
GR. No. L-21484 | Nov. 29, 1969 | Makalintal

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Petitioner: Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA)
Respondents: ACCFA Supervisors Association, ACCFA Workers Association and
the CIR

Summary: A CBA was entered into between the Unions and ACCFA. The Unions filed
a complaint against ACCFA for ULP. During the pendency of the case, the President
signed into law the Agricultural Land Reform Code, which reorganized ACCFA and
changed its name to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA). Both Unions filed a
petition for certification election and both were certified as the exclusive bargaining
agents of their units. ACA challenged the jurisdiction of the CIR to entertain the petition
of the Unions for certification election on the ground that it is engaged in governmental
functions. The Unions contend that the ACA performs proprietary functions. I: W/N
ACCFA exercised governmental or proprietary functions - GOVERNMENTAL R: ACA
was established, among other governmental agencies,

to extend credit and similar
assistance to agriculture. The implementation of the land reform program of the
government is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function. The land
reform program contemplated is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to
translate into reality. Aside from the governmental objectives of the ACA, the law itself
declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans
and programs vested in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government
instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws. The Unions are
not entitled to the certification election sought. Such certification is admittedly for
purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees the terms and conditions of
employment, including the right to strike. The right to strike is not granted to
government employees.

Facts:
A CBA was entered into by and between the Unions [ACCFA Supervisors'
Association (ASA) - supervisors and the ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA)
rank and file] and the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Administration (ACCFA). After a few months, the Unions started protesting
against alleged violations and non-implementation of the CBA. Finally, the
Unions declared a strike, which was ended when the strikers voluntarily
returned to work.
The Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in
Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the
CIR against the ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of ULP, namely:
violation of CBA to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of
their right to self-organization, discrimination against members in the matter of
promotions, and refusal to bargain.
o The ACCFA denied the charges and interposed as defenses lack of
jurisdiction of the CIR over the case and illegality of the bargaining
contract, among others.
During the pendency of the case, the President signed into law the
Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844), which required the reorganization
of the administrative machinery of ACCFA and changed its name to
Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA).
The ACCFA Supervisors' Association and the ACCFA Workers' Association
filed a petition for certification election praying that they be certified as the
exclusive bargaining agents for the supervisors and rank-and-file employees,
respectively, in the ACA.
o They were certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representatives of the said employees.
ACA challenges the jurisdiction of the CIR to entertain the petition of the
Unions for certification election on the ground that it is engaged in
governmental functions. The Unions contend that the ACA performs
proprietary functions.

Issue: W/N ACCFA exercised governmental or proprietary functions
GOVERNMENTAL. Therefore, CIR has no jurisdiction.

Ratio:
Under Sec 3 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, the ACA was established,
among other governmental agencies,

to extend credit and similar assistance
to agriculture. The implementation of the land reform program of the
government is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function.
o For that purpose, EO 75 has placed the ACA under the Land Reform
Project Administration together with the other member agencies, the
personnel complement of all of which are placed in one single pool
and made available for assignment from one agency to another,
subject only to Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, position
classification and wage structures.
o The appointing authority in respect of the officials and employees of
the ACA is the President of the Philippines.
When the Agricultural Reform Code was being considered, the nature of the
ACA was the subject of the following exposition on the Senate floor:
o Sen. Tolentino: "The ACA is not going to be a profit making
institution. It is supposed to be a public service of the government to
the lessees and farmer-owners of the lands that may be bought after
expropriation from owners. It is the government here that is the
lender.
These considerations militate quite strongly against the recognition of
collective bargaining powers in the Unions, and hence against the grant of
their basic petition for certification election as proper bargaining units.
The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not
proprietary functions. These functions may not be strictly what President
Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"):
o constituent: relating to the maintenance of peace and the
prevention of crime, regulating property and property rights, relating
to the administration of justice and the determination of political
duties of citizens, and relating to national defense and foreign
relations.
o Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are
exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to
promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people these
latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional
on the part of the government.
The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this
traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic. The
areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the
government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was
better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private

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individual or group of individuals," continue to lose their well-defined
boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must
undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times.
o The tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of
economic forces. This development was envisioned, indeed adopted
as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of
principle concerning the promotion of social justice.
It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted
and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its
purposes. There is no dispute that the land reform program contemplated is
beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality.
o It is a purely governmental function, no less than, say, the
establishment and maintenance of public schools and public
hospitals. And when, aside from the governmental objectives of the
ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the land reform
program of the State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a
government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and
programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case
of the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a
government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to
Civil Service laws.
We hold that the Unions are not entitled to the certification election sought.
Such certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the
employees the terms and conditions of employment, including the right to
strike. This is contrary to Sec. 11 of RA 875, which provides:
o SEC. 11. Prohibition Against Strike in the Government xxx
employees therein shall not strike for the purposes of securing
changes or modification in their terms and conditions of employment.
Such employees may belong to any labor organization which does
not impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided,
However, that this section shall apply only to employees employed in
governmental functions of the Government including but not limited
to governmental corporations.
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With the reorganization of the ACCFA and its conversion into the ACA under
the Land Reform Code and in view of our ruling as to the governmental
character of the functions of the ACA, the decision of the CIR in the unfair
labor practice case filed by the ACCFA has become moot and academic,
particularly insofar as the order to bargain collectively with the respondent
Unions is concerned.

3. Phil. Society v. COA [Quasi-public corp.; private but with public character; charter
test not applicable]
G.R. No. 169752 | September 25, 2007
Petitioner: PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO
ANIMALS
Respondent: COMMISSION ON AUDIT, DIR. RODULFO J. ARIESGA (in his official
capacity as Director
of the Commission on Audit), MS. MERLE M. VALENTIN and MS. SUSAN GUARDIAN
(in their official capacities as Team Leader and Team Member, respectively, of the
audit Team of the Commission on Audit)

Recit-Ready: Phil Society is a juridical entity established in 1905, composed of animal
aficionados and animal propagandists. It was initially imbued under its charter with the
power to apprehend violators of animal welfare laws. In addition, they were to share
one-half (1/2) of the fines imposed and collected through its efforts for violations of the
laws related thereto. However, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to
retain a portion of the fines collected for violation of animal-related laws were recalled
by virtue of Commonwealth Act 148. Thereafter, an audit team from Commission on
Audit (COA) visited the office of Phil Society to conduct an audit survey. Our issue in
this case is whether or not they are subject to COAs audit authority. NO. First, the
"charter test" cannot be applied. The underpinnings of the charter test had been
introduced by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, it follows that the test cannot apply
to Phil Society, which was incorporated in 1905. Settled is the rule that laws in general
have no retroactive effect. Second, The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed
with public interest does not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a public
corporation. This class of corporations may be considered quasi-public corporations,
which are private corporations that render public service. The true criterion is to
determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the totality of the
relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State as the
latters own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental
functions, then that corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private. Third, the
respondents argue that since the charter of Phil Society requires the latter to render
periodic reports to the Civil Governor, therefore they are a government instrumentality.
This contention is inconclusive. By virtue of the fiction that all corporations owe their
very existence and powers to the State, the reportorial requirement is applicable to all
corporations of whatever nature, whether they are public, quasi-public, or private
corporationsas creatures of the State, there is a reserved right in the legislature to
investigate the activities of a corporation to determine whether it acted within its
powers.

Facts:
Phil Society is a juridical entity established in 1905, composed of animal
aficionados and animal propagandists. Its objective as stated in Sec. 2 of its
charter, shall be to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or
the protection of animals in the Philippine Islands, and generally, to do and
perform all things which may tend in any way to alleviate the suffering of
animals and promote their welfare.
At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original Corporation Law,
Act No. 1459, was not yet in existence. Important to note is that the nature of
the petitioner as a corporate entity is distinguished from the sociedad
anonimas under the Spanish Code of Commerce.
Phil Society was initially imbued under its charter with the power to
apprehend violators of animal welfare laws. In addition, they were to share
one-half (1/2) of the fines imposed and collected through its efforts for
violations of the laws related thereto.
However, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion
of the fines collected for violation of animal-related laws were recalled by
virtue of Commonwealth Act 148.

7

o Sec. 2. The full amount of the fines collected for violation of the laws
against cruelty to animals and for the protection of animals, shall
accrue to the general fund of the Municipality where the offense was
committed.
Then Pres. Quezon issued EO No. 63 which provides that CA 148 was
enacted depriving the agents of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals of their power to arrest persons who have violated the laws
prohibiting cruelty to animals thereby correcting a serious defect in one of the
laws existing in our statute books. On the same law it was required that, every
Mayor of a chartered city, and every municipal president to detail and
organize special members of the police force, local, national, and the
Constabulary to watch, capture, and prosecute offenders against the laws
enacted to prevent cruelty to animals.
On December 1, 2003, an audit team from Commission on Audit (COA)
visited the office of Phil Society to conduct an audit survey. Phil Society
demurred on the ground that it was a private entity not under the jurisdiction
of COA, citing Section 2(1) of Article IX of the Constitution which specifies the
general jurisdiction of the COA:
o Section 1. General Jurisdiction. The Commission on Audit shall have
the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures
or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a)
constitutional bodies, commissions and officers that have been
granted fiscal autonomy under the Constitution; (b) autonomous
state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-
governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or
indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by law
or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of
subsidy or equity. x x x
Phil Society claims that (1) although they were created by special legislation,
this necessarily came about because in 1905 there was as yet neither a
Corporation Law or any other general law under which it may be organized
and incorporated, nor a Securities and Exchange Commission which would
have passed upon its organization and incorporation and (2) that EO 63,
effectively deprived its power to make arrests, and that they lost its
operational funding, underscore the fact that it exercises no governmental
function. In fine, the government itself, by its overt acts, confirmed petitioners
status as a private juridical entity.

Issue: Whether or not they are subject to COAs audit authority. NO

Ratio:
First, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the "charter test" cannot be
applied.
CHARTER TEST: The test to determine whether a corporation is government
owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own
charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the
general corporation law? Those with special charters are government
corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are compulsory members of
the Government Service Insurance System.
During the formulation of the 1935 Constitution, the Committee on Franchises
recommended the foregoing proscription to prevent the pressure of special
interests upon the lawmaking body in the creation of corporations or in the
regulation of the same. To permit the lawmaking body by special law to
provide for the organization, formation, or regulation of private corporations
would be in effect to offer to it the temptation in many cases to favor certain
groups, to the prejudice of others or to the prejudice of the interests of the
country.
o And since the underpinnings of the charter test had been introduced
by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, it follows that the test
cannot apply to Phil Society, which was incorporated in 1905.
Settled is the rule that laws in general have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided.
o There are a few exceptions: (1) when the law itself so expressly
provides; (2) in case of remedial statutes; (3) in case of curative
statutes; (4) in case of laws interpreting others; and (5) in case of
laws creating new rights.

None of the exceptions is present in the
instant case.
In a legal regime where the charter test doctrine cannot be applied, the mere
fact that a corporation has been created by virtue of a special law does not
necessarily qualify it as a public corporation.
The amendments introduced by C.A. No. 148 made it clear that the petitioner
was a private corporation and not an agency of the government. This was
evident in EO 63, declaring that the revocation of the powers of the petitioner
to appoint agents with powers of arrest "corrected a serious defect" in one of
the laws existing in the statute books. As a curative statute, and based on the
doctrines so far discussed, C.A. No. 148 has to be given retroactive effect,
thereby freeing all doubt as to which class of corporations the petitioner
belongs, that is, it is a quasi-public corporation, a kind of private domestic
corporation, which the Court will further elaborate on under the fourth point.
Second, a reading of Phil Societys charter shows that it is not subject to
control or supervision by any agency of the State, unlike government-owned
and -controlled corporations. No government representative sits on the board
of trustees of the petitioner. Like all private corporations, the successors of its
members are determined voluntarily and solely by the petitioner in
accordance with its by-laws, and may exercise those powers generally
accorded to private corporations, such as the powers to hold property, to sue
and be sued, to use a common seal, and so forth.
Third. The employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by the
Social Security System at the latters initiative, and not through the
Government Service Insurance System, which should be the case if the
employees are considered government employees. This is another indication
of its nature as a private entity.
Fourth. The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public interest
does not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a public corporation.
This class of corporations may be considered quasi-public corporations,
which are private corporations that render public service, supply public wants,

8

or pursue other eleemosynary objectives. While purposely organized for the
gain or benefit of its members, they are required by law to discharge functions
for the public benefit. Examples of these are utility, railroad, warehouse,
telegraph, telephone, water supply corporations and transportation
companies. It must be stressed that a quasi-public corporation is a
species of private corporations, but the qualifying factor is the type of
service the former renders to the public: if it performs a public service, then it
becomes a quasi-public corporation.
The true criterion is to determine whether a corporation is public or private is
found in the totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If the
corporation is created by the State as the latters own agency or
instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions, then that
corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private. Applying the above
test, provinces, chartered cities, and barangays can best exemplify public
corporations.
Fifth. The respondents argue that since the charter of Phil Society requires
the latter to render periodic reports to the Civil Governor, therefore they are a
government instrumentality.
This contention is inconclusive. By virtue of the fiction that all corporations
owe their very existence and powers to the State, the reportorial requirement
is applicable to all corporations of whatever nature, whether they are public,
quasi-public, or private corporationsas creatures of the State, there is a
reserved right in the legislature to investigate the activities of a corporation to
determine whether it acted within its powers. In other words, the reportorial
requirement is the principal means by which the State may see to it that its
creature acted according to the powers and functions conferred upon it.
o It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered
a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not, in the
exercise of sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had been
employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the
production of the corporate books and papers for that purpose. The
defense amounts to this, that an officer of the corporation which is
charged with a criminal violation of the statute may plead the
criminality of such corporation as a refusal to produce its books. To
state this proposition is to answer it. While an individual may lawfully
refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an
immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation vested with
special privileges and franchises may refuse to show its hand when
charged with an abuse of such privileges. (Wilson v. US).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner is DECLARED a private
domestic corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The respondents are ENJOINED from investigating,
examining and auditing the petitioner's fiscal and financial affairs.

4. Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh [Government; de facto]
75 Phil 113 || September 17, 1945
Ponente: Justice Feria
Petitioner: AM (alias CO KIM CHAM)
Respondent: EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First
Instance of Manila

Summary:
After landing in Leyte, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, proclaimed that all laws, regulations
and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines
free of enemy occupation and control. Pursuant to this, Judge Dizon refused to
continue hearing the case of Co Kim Cham on because he claimed that such judicial
proceedings have been nullified and without an enabling law, the court had no
jurisdiction.
The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines,
governments during the Japanese Occupation were de facto governments. They fall
under the 2
nd
kind of de facto government [That which is established and maintained
by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war,
and which is denominated a government of paramount force.] Therefore, the judicial
acts and proceedings of the courts, not of political complexion were good and valid.

PRELIMINARY Facts:
October 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte, General Douglas
MacArthur issued a proclamation to the People of the Philippines which declared:
o 1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to
the supreme authority of the Government of the United States, the sole and
only government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of
the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control;
o 2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full
force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and
o 3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the
Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without
legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control.
CASE:
Co Kim Chan initiated a civil case during the Japanese Occupation.
After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, the respondent
Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case. [Contention: the
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified
all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without
an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and
continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines (Government under the Japanese TAKE NOTE).]

Issues:
1. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines
under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of
the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces? YES. [MAIN
DOCTRINE]
2. Whether the 23 October 1944 proclamation of MacArthur had invalidated all
judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts? NO.
3. Whether the present courts of Philippines may continue those proceedings
pending in said courts if said judicial acts and proceedings have not been
invalidated by the subject proclamation? YES

9

Held:
Respondent Judge Dizon should take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the
proceedings of Co Kim Cham's civil case.

Ratio:
1. The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic
of the Philippines were de facto governments. Thus, the judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of
a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known
principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good
and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
American and Filipino.
It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of
the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are
good and valid.
KINDS OF DE FACTO GOVERNMENT
1. Government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets
possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the
rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter
2. That which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and
occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a
government of paramount force.
o Distinguishing characteristics:
(1), that its existence is maintained by active military power with the
territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful
government; and
(2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private
citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such
force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though
not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.
They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may
be administered, also, civil authority, supported more or less directly by
military force.
These were cases of temporary possessions of territory by lawfull and
regular governments at war with the country of which the territory so
possessed was part."
o Powers and duties:
Section III of the Hague Conventions of 1907: "the authority of the
legislative power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant,
the latter shall take steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far
as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country."
[NON POLITICAL COMPLEXION] As the belligerent occupant has the
right and is burdened with the duty to insure public order and safety
during his military occupation, he possesses all the powers of a de
facto government, and he can suspended the old laws and promulgate
new ones and make such changes in the old as he may see fit, but he is
enjoined to respect, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances
prevailing in the occupied territory, the municipal laws in force in the
country, that is, those laws which enforce public order and regulate
social and commercial life of the country.
[POLITICAL COMPLEXION] On the other hand, laws of a political
nature or affecting political relations, such as, among others, the right of
assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right
to travel freely in the territory occupied, are considered as suspended or
in abeyance during the military occupation.
3. That established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country
who rise in insurrection against the parent state.
The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were
civil governments established by the military forces of occupation and therefore
a de facto government of the second kind.
o United States in Tampico: "The government established over an enemy's
territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by
the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all
restrictions which that code imposes.
o The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a
military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals,
is of no consequence.
Not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of
a political complexion, are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory
occupied by a belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation, which
declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the governments
established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it would not
have been necessary for said proclamation to abrogate them if they were
invalid ab initio.
2. The proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944 has not
invalidated the judicial acts and proceedings, which are not a political
complexion, of the courts of justice in the Philippines. The judicial acts and
proceedings were good and valid before and now good and valid after the
reoccupation of liberation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino
forces.
From the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944
referring to processes of any other government, does it have effect of annulling
all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines?
o According to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and
judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de
facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and
valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into
the power of the titular sovereign. Thus, it should be presumed that it was not,
and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in
using the phrase "processes of any other government" in said proclamation,
to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.
Executive Order No. 37, which has the force of law, issued by the President of the
Philippines on March 10, 1945 abolished the Court of Appeals, and provided "that
all case which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall
be transmitted to the Supreme Court final decision."
o This provision impliedly recognizes that the judgments and proceedings of the
courts during the Japanese military occupation have not been invalidated.
o The said Order does not say or refer to cases which have been duly appealed
to said court prior to the Japanese occupation, but to cases which had

10

therefore, that is, up to March 10, 1945, been duly appealed to the Court
of Appeals;
o It is to be presumed that almost all, if not all, appealed cases pending in the
Court of Appeals prior to the Japanese military occupation of Manila on
January 2, 1942, had been disposed of by the latter before the restoration of
the Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost all, if not all, appealed
cases pending on March 10, 1945, in the Court of Appeals were from
judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance during the Japanese
regime.
3. The present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final judgment, the
proceedings in cases, not of political complexion, pending therein at the
time of the restoration of the Commonwealth Government.
Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial
administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation
takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of
justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to
administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely
prevented, to respect.
Military occupation is essentially provisional and does not serve to transfer the
sovereignty over the occupied territory to the occupant.

5. Letter of Associate Justice Puno [Government; revolution]
A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA (SC Resolution)
June 29, 1992

SUMMARY: Puno wrote to the SC asking for the correction of his seniority rank in the
CA. He argues that he was supposed to be ranked 5
th
and not 26
th
contrary to the
appointment of Aquino at the time of the signing. This is because of the rule under
EO33 which amended BP129 (court reorg) which gave precedence/seniority
depending on the date of appointment (appointment of Puno was in 1983). SC granted
the correction but was met with an MR from two affected Associate Justices. Issue
now is whether the CA is a continuation of the previous court (under 1973 Constitution)
or a new court. SC held that it was a new entity. Aquino came to power because of a
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people. The Aquino government is said to
be revolutionary because it came into existence in defiance to existing legal processes
and that it was instituted by the direct action of the people and in opposition to the
authoritarian values and practices of the Marcos government. The Filipinos only
exercised their right to revolution. It is also a new entity because the Aquino govt was
established in violation of the 1973 Constitution and Aquino by appointing new officials
and revamping the Judiciary and Military signalled the end of the Marcos regime. And
even if the CA is not a new entity, Aquinos decision not to follow the
precedence/seniority rule in the amendment to BP129(EO33) shall prevail because at
that time she was exercising both executive and legislative power making her
decisions supreme and the court opted not to question the non-application of the
amendment to Puno.

FACTS:
Petitioner is CA Associate Justice (AJ) Reynato S. Puno who wrote a letter to
the SC seeking the correction of his seniority rank in the CA. From the
records, Puno was appointed Associate Justice in June 1980 but only took his
oath on November 1982 after serving as Assistant SolGen since 1974.
January 1983, the CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate
Appellate Court (BP 129) and Puno was then appointed as Appellate
Justice in of the IAC. In November 1984, Puno accepted an appointment as
Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Justice thus he ceased to be a member of
the Judiciary.
After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was government reorganization and to
effect the reorganization in the IAC and other lower courts, a Screening
Committee was created. President Corazon C. Aquino exercised
legislative powers by virtue of the revolution, issued EO No. 33 for the
reorganization.
The Screening Committee recommended the return of Puno as AJ of CA and
assigned him the rank of number 11 in the roster of appellate court justices
but was later changed to 26 when President Aquino signed the appointments.
Puno alleges that the change in his seniority ranking could be attributed
to inadvertence because it would contradict Sec. 2 of EO 33 (amending
BP129) which stated that there will be 50 Associate Justices to be appointed
by the President and would have precedence/seniority depending on their
dates of appointment.
Puno referred to the case of Judge Victoriano who was transferred from the
CA to the Ministry of Justice and back to the CA and these transfers did not
affect his seniority ranking in the CA.
SC RESOLUTION (1990): Granted Punos request since the same was not
opposed.
After the resolution was issued two AJs (Campos and Javellana) filed an MR
because they were affected by the correction arguing that Puno could not
claim reappointment because the court he was returning to already ceased to
exist.
Puno argued that EO 33 granted him the rank of number 5. Even though
President Aquino rose to power by virtue of a revolution, she had pledged
at the issuance of Freedom Constitution that no right granted under the
1973 Constitution shall be absent in the Freedom Constitution. Puno
added that the power of appointment is executive in nature and cannot be
usurped by any other branch of the Government and regulated by the
Constitution.
The two opposing AJs argued that the letter should be addressed to the
President and not the SC thus the non-approval of the Office of the President
should be respected by the SC because of the separation of powers and
presumed knowledge in the law they are enforcing.

ISSUE: Whether the CA is a new court that would negate any claim of seniority
enjoyed by Puno as member of the CA and IAC prior to EO No 33 or is the CA a
continuation of the CA/IAC that existed prior to EO 33.

HELD: (NEW COURT BUT AQUINO CHOSE TO OVERLOOK PRECEDENCE IN
PUNOS CASE)
Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and the seniority rankings of
members of the Court of Appeals, including that of the petitioner, at the time the
appointments were made by the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.

RATIO:

11

SC held that CA is a new entity which is different and distinct the CA/IAC
existing prior to EO 33 because it was created in the wake of the
massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of
Corazon C. Aquino in the aftermath of the people power (EDSA) revolution
in 1986.
REVOLUTION: the complete overthrow of the established government in
any country or state by those who were previously subject to it or as a
sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political
system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence.
o Definition in Kelsens book: that which occurs whenever the legal
order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order, a way
not prescribed by the first order itself.
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been
defined as an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change
their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government or
institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and
constitutional methods of making such change have proved inadequate or are
so obstructed as to be unavailable.
It has been said that the locus of positive law-making power lies with the
people of the state and from there is derived the right of the people to abolish,
to reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard to the
existing constitution.
REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT (Focus here)
There were three clauses in the Freedom Constitution which basically states
that the Aquino governments power is a direct exercise of the power of the
Filipino people.
The Aquino government is said to be revolutionary because that it came
into existence in defiance to existing legal processes and that it was a
revolutionary government instituted by the direct action of the people
and in opposition to the authoritarian values and practices of the
overthrown government
LEGAL ORDER / NON-CONTINUITY OF THE GOVERNMENT
A legal order is the authoritative code of a polity. Such code consists of all the
rules found in the enactments of the organs of the polity especially if it
operates under a written constitution.
It is assumed that the legal order remains as a culture system of the polity as
long as the latter endures BUT, where the legal system ceases to be
operative as a whole if it is no longer obeyed by the population
nor enforced by the officials.
Aquinos rise to power was not due to constitutional processes but in violation
of the 1973 Constitution because Marcos was the winner of the 1986
presidential election.
Mrs. Aquinos government was met by little resistance and she obtained
control of government by appointing officers, cabinet members and a revamp
of the Judiciary and Military. This signalled the end of the legal system (of
Marcos) ceased to exist.
PHASE OUT OF CA/IAC
SC held that the CA/IAC existing prior EO33 phased out as part of the
legal system abolished by the revolution and that the CA established under
EO33 was an entirely new court with appointments having no relation to
earlier appointments to the abolished courts, and that the reference to
precedence in rank contained in the last sentence of Sec. 2, BP 129 as
amended by EO33 refers to prospective situations
But even if EO33 did not abolish the preceding seniority ranking, it is believed
that President Aquino as head of the then revolutionary government,
could disregard or set aside seniority in ranking when she made her
appointments to the reorganized CA in 1986.
It is to be noted that, at the time of the issuance of EO33, President
Aquino was still exercising the powers of a revolutionary
government, encompassing both executive and legislative powers,
such that if she desired, amend, modify or repeal any part of B.P. Blg.
129 or her own EO33.
President Aquino, at the time of the issuance of the 1986 appointments,
modified or disregarded the rule embodied in BP129 amended by EO33,
on precedence or seniority in the case of the petitioner, for reasons
known only to her. Since the appointment extended by the President to the
petitioner in 1986 for membership in the new Court of Appeals with its implicit
ranking in the roster of justices, was a valid appointment anchored
on the Presidents exercise of her then revolutionary powers, it is
not for the Court to question or correct that exercise.

6. Republic v. Sandiganbayan [Rights during interregnum]
G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondents: Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth
Dimaano, respondents.

Summary: Upon President Corazon Aquinos assumption to office, she issued EO 1,
which created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). PCGG was
mandated to recover the ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and associates. An investigation was conducted, and a
case was filed against respondent Major General Ramas. A search warrant was
subsequently issued, but the items obtained were alleged to be illegally seized, as they
were not in the warrant. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint against Ramas
and Dimaano on the ground that the search and seizure conducted was illegal. The
Supreme Court ruled affirming the Sandiganbayans decision stating that articles and
things seized from the house of Dimaano were illegally seized. Though the Bill of
Rights under 1973 Constitution was inoperative during the interregnum, the protection
accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) were still in effect.

FACTS:
President Corazon C. Aquino issued EO No. 1 creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the
PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. The PCGG,
through its then Chairman Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP
Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices by AFP personnel, one of whom was respondent Major General
Ramas.

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The AFP Board found a prima facie case against Ramas for ill-gotten and
unexplained wealth in the amount of PHP2,974,134.00 and USD50,000.00
both of which were confiscated from a certain Elizabeth Dimaanos premises.
It also recommended that Ramas be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA
3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379 or the Act for
the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property.
The PCGG filed a case against Ramas under RA 1379, with Dimaano as his
co-defendant. (Dimaano was alleged to be the mistress of Ramas, based on
affidavits of military personnel).
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General
of the Philippine Army until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a
confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, assigned as a clerk-typist at
the office of Ramas. It further alleged that Ramas acquired funds, assets
and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer
and his other income from legitimately acquired property by taking undue
advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence
as such officer of the AFP and as a subordinate and close associate of the
deposed President Marcos.
Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential house at La
Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of
proportion to his salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of
any mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment and
other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
Dimaano admitted her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas
only. She claimed ownership of the monies, communications equipment,
jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary
raiding team.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for
over a year mainly because of its many postponements. The Sandiganbayan
ordered petitioner to prepare for presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
Petitioner again and again admitted its inability to present further evidence.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v.
Migrino which held that PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without a showing
that they are subordinates of former President Marcos.
Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint and ordered the confiscated sum of
money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles to be returned to
Elizabeth Dimaano.

ISSUES:
1) Whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a
forfeiture petition NO
2) Whether Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence NO
3) Whether Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from
Dimaanos house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence NO
(main)

RATIO:
1) PCGG has no jurisdiction over the case.
The PCGG can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices
of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories: (1) AFP
personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of
former President Marcos by being the latters subordinate or close
associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers,
influence; or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption
provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.
Ramas does not fall under (2); hence, he must fall under (1) as a subordinate.
However, his position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army
with the rank of Major General does not suffice to make him a subordinate.

2) Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence
The Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, it kept
on delaying such presentation by filing numerous motions for postponements
and extensions. The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioners delays and yet
petitioner ended the long-string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended
Complaint.

3) The warrant did not include the articles and things seized from the house of
Dimaano; hence, they were illegally seized.
The Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search
warrant captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition. Dimaano was not present during the raid but Dimaanos
cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the
seizure receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team
conducted the search and seizure on March 3, 1986 or five days after the
successful EDSA revolution.

Petitioner argues that a revolutionary
government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1
announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were taking
power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people.

Petitioner asserts
that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the
1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal
search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the
1987 Constitution.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986 which was done
in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution. The resulting
government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no
constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary
government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not
operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection
accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the interregnum.
With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution,
there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not

13

invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither
a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
In Bataan Shipyard vs. PCGG,

the Court ruled that the Freedom
Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the
validity of sequestration orders. The Provisional or Freedom Constitution
recognizes the power and duty of the President to enact measures to
achieve the mandate of the people to recover ill-gotten properties amassed
by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest
of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or
accounts.
The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were
fully aware that the sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of
Rights. Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the
amendment excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the
Constitutional Commission still adopted the amendment as Section 26,

Article
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to
enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found
in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The revolutionary government
did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. As
the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape
responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations
under international law.
Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights

recognized in the present Covenant. Under Article 17(1) of the
Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that [n]o one
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence.
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its
Article 17(2) that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
property. Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a
legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted
the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international
law and binding on the State.

The directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as
these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary
government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the
Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did
not repudiate it.
The warrant is valid with respect to the items specifically described in the
warrant but the seizure of items not described is void.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in
Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such
appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability
of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

7. People v. Gozo [auto-limitation]
G.R. No. L-36409 October 26, 1973
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Loreta Gozo
Ponente: J. Fernando

Nature of the case: Gozo seeks to set aside a judgment of the CFI of Zambales,
convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit
from the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any
modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof.

Summary:
Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the US Naval Reservation within the
territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayors
Office and some neighbors, she demolished the house without acquiring the necessary
permits and then later on erected another house. She was then charged by the City
Engineers Office for violating Mun. Ord No. 14 Series of 1964 which requires her to
secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was
convicted. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no
administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a
foreign country.

The SC held that the municipal ordinance is enforceable within the US naval base. The
Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed
therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or
preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government
retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the
United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of
(Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State
through the City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located
within the US Naval Base. What only happened was the existence of the principle of
auto-limitation wherein any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a
restriction of its sovereign rights. But they retain their status as native soil. Its
jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear.

FACTS:
Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the US Naval Reservation within
the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City.
o She demolished the house and built another one in its place, without
a building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City, because she
was told by one Ernesto Evalle, an assistant in the City Mayor's
office, as well as by her neighborsthat such building permit was not
necessary for the construction of the house.
Juan Malones, a building and lot inspector of the City Engineer's Office,
Olongapo City, together with Patrolman Ramon Macahilas of the Olongapo
City police force apprehended 4 carpenters working on the house and
brought them to the Olongapo City police headquarters for interrogation.
After due investigation, Gozo was charged with violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 14, S. of 1964 with the City Fiscal's Office."
City Court of Olongapo City:

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guilty of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1964
sentenced her to an imprisonment of 1 month as well as to pay the cost
CFI Zambales:
guilty but sentence her merely to pay a fine of P200 and to demolish the
house erected
CA:
Gozo put in issue the validity of such an ordinance on constitutional ground or
at the very least its applicability to her in view of the location of her dwelling
within the naval base.
The CA noting the constitutional question raised, certified the case to the SC

Issue 1: WON LGUs are devoid of authority to require building permits. [topic about
police power]
Held: NO.
Ratio:
Switzer v. Municipality of Cebu: the questioned ordinance may be predicated
under the general welfare clause ... ." Its scope is wide, well-nigh all
embracing, covering every aspect of public health, public morals, public
safety, and the well being and good order of the community.
Such power has limitations. If its exercise is violative of any constitutional
right, then its validity could be impugned, or at the very least, its applicability
to the person adversely affected could be questioned.
People v. Fajardo is NOT applicable to the instant case:
o the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur passed an ordinance that
any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should,
before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the
Municipal Mayor. If said building destroys the view of the Public
Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the
expense of the owner of the building or house.
o Fajardo and Babilonia (son-in-law) filed a written request with the
municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their
gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name,
located along the national highway and separated from the public
plaza by a creek. The request was denied because the proposed
building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza.
o They proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit
because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former
house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had
been living on leased property.
o Clearly then, the application of such an ordinance to Fajardo was
oppressive.

Issue 2: WON the State can exercise administrative jurisdiction within the US naval
base in Olongapo City (leased by the Philippines to the US armed forces). [main]
Held: YES.
Ratio:
People v. Acierto: By the Agreement, the Philippine Government merely
consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was
given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency. Philippine
Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of
the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over
offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United
States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of
such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights
not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the US Military authorities for
reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is implied
from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the
express provisions of the treaty."
Reagan v. CIR: The Philippines being independent and sovereign, its
authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion
thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its
commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it
applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both
territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it
were not thus, there is a diminution of sovereignty."
o Principle of auto-limitation: It is to be admitted any state may, by
its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise
is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as
auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the
property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of
legal self-determination and self-restriction." A state then, if it
chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is
illimitable competence."
It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the
exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it
does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an
alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to
its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not
disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces
by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be
foreign territory."
The administrative jurisdiction of a municipal corporation: Within the limits of
its territory, whatever statutory powers are vested upon it may be validly
exercised. Any residual authority and therein conferred, whether expressly or
impliedly, belongs to the national government, not to an alien country.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed insofar as it found the
accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 14, series of 1964 and sentencing her to pay a fine of P200.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and modified insofar as she is required
to demolish the house that is the subject matter of the case, she being given a period
of 30 days from the finality of this decision within which to obtain the required permit.
Only upon her failure to do so will that portion of the appealed decision requiring
demolition be enforced.

Sec. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with
all nations.


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8. Taada v. Angara [GATT-WTO]
G.R. No. 118295 | May 2, 1997
Petitioners: Wigberto Tanada, et al.
Respondents: Edgardo Angara, et al.

Summary: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Philippines acceding to the
World Trade Organization for being violative of provisions which are supposed to give
preference to Filipino workers and economy and on the ground that it infringes
legislative and judicial power. The WTO, through it provisions on most favored nation
and national treatment, require that nationals and other member countries are placed
in the same footing in terms of products and services. However, the Court brushed off
these contentions and ruled that the WTO is constitutional. Sections 10 and 12 of
Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) should be read in relation to Sections 1
and 13 (promoting the general welfare). Also, Section 10 is self-executing only to
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony but not
every aspect of trade and commerce. There are balancing provisions in the
Constitution allowing the Senate to ratify the WTO agreement. Also, the Constitution
doesnt rule out foreign competition. States waive certain amount of sovereignty when
entering into treaties.

Facts:
This case questions the constitutionality of the Philippines being part of the
World Trade Organization, particularly when President Fidel Ramos signed
the Instrument of Ratification and the Senate concurring in the said treaty.
Following World War 2, global financial leaders held a conference in Bretton
Woods to discuss global economy. This led to the establishment of three
great institutions: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(World Bank), International Monetary Fund and International Trade
Organization.
However, the ITO failed to materialized. Instead, there was the General
Agreement on Trades and Tariffs. It was on the Uruguay Round of the GATT
that the WTO was then established.
The WTO is an institution regulating trade among nations, including the
reduction of tariff and barriers.
Petitioners filed a case assailing the WTO Agreement for violating the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, to give preference to
qualified Filipinos and to promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods.
It is petitioners position that the national treatment and parity provisions of
the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on
the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the
Filipino First policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless
the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Issue 1: Does the petition present a justiciable controversy? YES!
In seeking to nullify the Senates act as being unconstitutional, the petition no doubt
raises a justiciable controversy. It becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute

Issue 2: Do the provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene Section 19, Article II
and Section 10 & 12, Artilce XII of the 1987 Constitution? NO!

Petitioners Contentions:
Petitioners argue that the letter, spirit and intent of the Constitution
mandating economic nationalism are violated by the so-called parity
provisions and national treatment clauses scattered in parts of WTO
Agreement
o This is in view of the most-favored nation clause (MFN) of the
TRIMS (trade-related investment measures), TRIPS (Trade Related
aspects of intellectual property rights), Trade in Services, and par. 4
of Article III of GATT 1994.
o shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to
like products of national origin
Sec. 19, Art II:The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Sec. 10, Art XII: Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by
Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.
Sec. 12, Art XII: The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that
help make them competitive.

Ruling:
These provisions are not self-executing
o Merely guides in the exercise of judicial review and in making laws.
Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII should be read and understood in relation to the
other sections in said article, especially Sec. 1 and 13:
o A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
o A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
o An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life
The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-
executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough
balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
o Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto
powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on
the basis of sovereign equality, with each members vote equal in
weight.
Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries
o Tariff reduction developed countries must reduce at rate of 36% in
6 years, developing 24% in 10 years
o Domestic subsidy developed countries must reduce 20% over six
(6) years, developing countries at 13% in 10 years
o Export subsidy developed countries, 36% in 6 years; developing
countries, 3/4ths of 36% in 10 years
Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition

16

o Encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and
foreign markets
The Court will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade
liberalization as an economic policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty
of determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion

Issue 3: Does the text of the WTO and its Annexes limit, restrict or impair the exercise
of legislative power by Congress? NO!
A portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-
encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and
limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a
member of the family of nations.
The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be
considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: limitations
imposed by the nature of membership in the family of nations & limitations
imposed by treaty stipulations.

9. Deutsche Bank v. CIR [Tax treaty]
G.R. No. 188550 August 19, 2013
Petitioner: DEUTSCHE BANK AG MANILA BRANCH
Respondent: COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
Ponente: Sereno

Emergency: Deutsche Bank accidentally paid the BIR P67m as branch profit
remittance tax based on the 15% provided by the Tax Code. It then realized the
overpayment since it was only required to pay 10% BPRT under the RP-Germany Tax
Treaty. The CTA denied the Banks claim stating that the Bank failed to apply for a tax
treaty relief with the Intl Tax Affairs Division of the BIR prior to the payment of the
BPRT, pursuant to RMO 1-2000. SC - By virtue of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, we are
bound to extend to a branch in the Philippines, remitting to its head office in Germany,
the benefit of a preferential rate equivalent to 10% BPRT. The denial of the availment
of tax relief for the failure of a taxpayer to apply within the prescribed period under the
administrative issuance would impair the value of the tax treaty. At most, the
application for a tax treaty relief from the BIR should merely operate to confirm the
entitlement of the taxpayer to the relief. Long story short, an RMO cannot add a
requirement that would deprive a party of a benefit granted by a tax treaty. Tax Treaty
> RMO.

Facts:
1. In accordance with Section 28(A)(5) of the NIRC, Deutsche Bank withheld
and remitted to CIR on 21 Oct 2003 PHP 67,688,553.51, which represented
the 15% branch profit remittance tax (BPRT) on its regular banking unit (RBU)
net income remitted to Deutsche Bank Germany for 2002 and prior taxable
years.
2. Believing that it made an overpayment of the BPRT, petitioner filed with the
BIR on 4 Oct 2005 a refund or issuance of its tax credit certificate for PHP
22,562,851.17.
3. On the same date, Deutsche Bank requested from the International Tax
Affairs Division (ITAD) a confirmation of its entitlement to the preferential tax
rate of 10% under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
4. Alleging the inaction of the BIR, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the
CTA.
5. CTA 2
nd
div- The claim was denied on the ground that the application for a tax
treaty relief was not filed with ITAD prior to the payment by the former of its
BPRT and actual remittance of its branch profits to DB Germany, or prior to
its availment of the preferential rate of ten percent (10%) under the RP-
Germany Tax Treaty provision. The court a quo held that petitioner violated
the 15 day period mandated under RMO No. 1-2000, which requires that any
availment of the tax treaty relief must be preceded by an application with
ITAD at least 15 days before the transaction.
6. The CTA relied on a CTA case (Mirant v. CIR) where the CTA En Banc ruled
that before the benefits of the tax treaty may be extended to a foreign
corporation wishing to avail itself thereof, the latter should first invoke the
provisions of the tax treaty and prove that they indeed apply to the
corporation.
7. The CTA En Banc affirmed the CTA 2
nd
div - a ruling from the ITAD of the BIR
must be secured prior to the availment of a preferential tax rate under a tax
treaty. The CTA En Banc took into consideration that this Court had denied
the Petition in G.R. No. 168531 filed by Mirant for failure to sufficiently show
any reversible error in the assailed judgment.

Issue: Whether the failure to strictly comply with RMO No. 1-2000 will deprive persons
or corporations of the benefit of a tax treaty. NO

Under Section 28(A)(5) of the NIRC, any profit remitted to its head office shall be
subject to a tax of 15% based on the total profits applied for or earmarked for
remittance without any deduction of the tax component. However, petitioner invoke par
6, Art 10 of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, which provides that where a resident of
Germany has a branch in the Philippines, this branch may be subjected to the branch
profits remittance tax withheld at source in accordance with Philippine law but shall not
exceed 10% of the gross amount of the profits remitted.

By virtue of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, we are bound to extend to a branch in the
Philippines, remitting to its head office in Germany, the benefit of a preferential rate
equivalent to 10% BPRT. The denial of the availment of tax relief for the failure of a
taxpayer to apply within the prescribed period under the administrative issuance would
impair the value of the tax treaty. At most, the application for a tax treaty relief from the
BIR should merely operate to confirm the entitlement of the taxpayer to the relief.

Mirant case is not binding since a minute resolution is not a binding precedent
The effect of a minute resolutions in Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. Case. -

With
respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning the same parties,
it constitutes res judicata. However, if other parties or another subject matter (even
with the same parties and issues) is involved, the minute resolution is not binding
precedent.

Tax Treaty (also known as double tax treaty or double tax agreements) vs. RMO No.
1-2000

17

1. Our Constitution provides for adherence to the general principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. The time-honored international
principle of pacta sunt servanda demands the performance in good faith of
treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into the agreement.
2. Tax treaties are entered into "to reconcile the national fiscal legislations of the
contracting parties and, in turn, help the taxpayer avoid simultaneous
taxations in two different jurisdictions."

In other words, to avoid double
taxation and encourage the free flow of goods and services.
3. "A state that has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in
its legislations those modifications that may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken." Thus, laws and issuances must
ensure that the reliefs granted under tax treaties are accorded to the parties
entitled thereto. The BIR must not impose additional requirements that would
negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international
agreements. More so, when the RP-Germany Tax Treaty does not provide for
any pre-requisite for the availment of the benefits under said agreement.
4. Likewise, it must be stressed that there is nothing in RMO No. 1-2000 which
would indicate a deprivation of entitlement to a tax treaty relief for failure to
comply with the 15-day period. We recognize the clear intention of the BIR in
implementing RMO No. 1-2000, but the CTAs outright denial of a tax treaty
relief for failure to strictly comply with the prescribed period is not in harmony
with the objectives of the contracting state to ensure that the benefits granted
under tax treaties are enjoyed by duly entitled persons or corporations.
Logically, noncompliance with tax treaties has negative implications on
international relations, and unduly discourages foreign investors. While the
consequences sought to be prevented by RMO No. 1-2000 involve an
administrative procedure, these may be remedied through other system
management processes, e.g., the imposition of a fine or penalty.

Prior Application vs. Claim for Refund
As earlier discussed, noncompliance with the 15-day period for prior application should
not operate to automatically divest entitlement to the tax treaty relief especially in
claims for refund. On the other hand, the underlying principle of prior application with
the BIR becomes moot in refund cases, such as the present case, where the very
basis of the claim is erroneous or there is excessive payment arising from non-
availment of a tax treaty relief at the first instance. In this case, petitioner should not be
faulted for not complying with RMO No. 1-2000 prior to the transaction. It could not
have applied for a tax treaty relief within the period prescribed, precisely because it
erroneously paid the BPRT.

It is significant to emphasize that petitioner applied though belatedly for a tax treaty
relief, in substantial compliance with RMO No. 1-2000. Likewise, both the
administrative and the judicial actions were filed within the two-year prescriptive period
pursuant to Section 229 of the NIRC.
24

Petitioner is liable to pay only the amount of PHP 45,125,702.34. Thus, it is proper to
grant petitioner a refund of PHP 22,562,851.17.

10. Pharmaceutical v. DOH [soft law]
G.R. No. 173034 October 9, 2007
Petitioners: PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Respondents: HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III; HEALTH
UNDER SECRETARIES DR. ETHELYN P. NIETO,
DR. MARGARITA M. GALON, ATTY. ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, & DR. JADE F. DEL
MUNDO; and ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DR. MARIO C. VILLAVERDE, DR. DAVID
J. LOZADA, AND DR. NEMESIO T. GAKO
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

SUMMARY:
EO 52 (The Milk Code) was issued by President Cory Aquino to give effect to Art. 11 of
ICMBS, adopted by World Health Assembly (WHA). WHA adopted several resolutions
including which is a ban on breastmilk substitutes. A petition for certiorari was filed by
petitioner who represented manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes. They assailed the
Milk Code and RIRR that was implemented by DOH. The issue is whether or not
international agreements entered into by the Philippines are part of the law of the land
and may be implemented by DOH through RIRR and if they are, were they in
accordance with international agreements. SC ruled that some parts of the RIRR are
invalid. On the issue related to PIL it was stated that the ICMBS was not a treaty but
has been transformed into local law through the Milk Code. Thus, the Milk Code is the
one binding and not the ICMBS. ICMBS was prohibiting advertising of breastmilk
substitutes but this was not adopted by the Milk Code but only provided for regulation
of the ads by IAC. Also, the case adds that WHA Resolution is just recommendatory
and generally not binding on the land. The Resolutions are in the nature of a soft law
or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. For an
international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such
rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such
rules (opinio juris). Thus, only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of
subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the DOH through the
subject RIRR.

FACTS:
October 28, 1986: Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by
President Corazon Aquino under the Freedom Constitution to give effect to
Article 11of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes
(ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.
WHA adopted several Resolutions that said breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition
and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
1990: Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the
Child, Article 24 of which said that State Parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments
of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of
breastfeeding.
May 15, 2006: DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on
July 7, 2006.
June 28, 2006: Petitioner, representing its members that are manufacturers
of breastmilk substitutes, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

18

Main Issue by Petitioners: Whether the officers of the DOH acted with
GADALEJ and in violation of the provisions of the Constitution in
promulgating the RIRR.
On August 15, 2006, Court issued a Resolution granting a TRO enjoining
respondents from implementing the questioned RIRR. Court set the case for
oral arguments.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner is a real party-in-interest- YES
2. Whether Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 or the Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is
not constitutional- YES.
2.1 Whether the RIRR is in accord with the provisions of Executive Order No. 51 (Milk
Code);
2.2 Whether pertinent international agreements
1
entered into by the Philippines are
part of the law of the land and may be implemented by the DOH through the RIRR; If in
the affirmative, whether the RIRR is in accord with the international agreements;
2.3 Whether Sections 4, 5(w), 22, 32, 47, and 52 of the RIRR violate the due process
clause and are in restraint of trade; and
2.4 Whether Section 13 of the RIRR on Total Effect provides sufficient standards.

RATIO:
First Issue: On the issue of petitioner's standing
Court adopts the view enunciated in Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals
that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This
view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An
association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of
direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization
has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.

SECOND ISSUE: On the constitutionality of the provisions of the RIRR
(Court first determined the applicability of international instruments adverted to
by respondents and if they part of the law of the land.)
The instruments used by DOH do not contain specific provisions regarding
the use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes. The international instruments
that do have specific provisions regarding breastmilk substitutes are the
ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions.

How International Law Becomes Part of the Land:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere
of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.
o The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation.
o The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law.
The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of the Senate as
However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed
into domestic law through local legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk
Code that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se.
The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but it is well
to emphasize at this point that the Code did not adopt the provision in the
ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms of promotion to the
general public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk
Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing
materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved
by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).

Are the WHA Resolutions Part of the Land? No.
Under the 1946 WHO Constitution, it is the WHA which determines the
policies of the WHO, and has the power to adopt regulations concerning
"advertising and labeling of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products
moving in international commerce," and to "make recommendations to
members with respect to any matter within the competence of the
Organization." The legal effect of its regulations, as opposed to
recommendations, is quite different.
Regulations, along with conventions and agreements, duly adopted by
the WHA bind member states (found in Article 19, 20, 21 and 22 of WHOs
Constitution, did not include them but most significant are Articles 19 and 22
which states that regulations adopted by the Health Assembly and the
conventions and agreement shall become effective upon notice/acceptance.
On the other hand, under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not
come into force for members, in the same way that conventions or
agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into
force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads: Under Art. 23. They can only
make recommendations. The absence of a provision in Article 23 of any
mechanism by which the recommendation would come into force for member
states is conspicuous.
Former Senior Legal Officer of WHO, Sami Shubber: WHA
recommendations are generally not binding, but they "carry moral and
political weight, as they constitute the judgment on a health issue of the
collective membership of the highest international body in the field of health."
The ICMBS itself was adopted as a mere recommendation since the
resolution it stated it is adopted in the sense of Article 23 of the
Constitution.
The Introduction to the ICMBS also reads that it would adopt the code in
the form of a recommendation rather than a regulation.
Apparently, the WHA Resolution adopting the ICMBS and subsequent WHA
Resolutions urging member states to implement the ICMBS are merely
recommendatory and legally non-binding. Thus, unlike what has been done
with the ICMBS whereby the legislature enacted most of the provisions
into law which is the Milk Code, the subsequent WHA Resolutions,
specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months,
continued breastfeeding up to 24 months, and absolutely prohibiting
advertisements and promotions of breastmilk substitutes, have not
been adopted as a domestic law.

What is the Nature of the WHA Resolution? A Soft Law.

19

WHA Resolutions may constitute "soft law" or non-binding norms, principles
and practices that influence state behavior.
Soft law" does not fall into any of the categories of international law set forth
in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the ICJ.
It is, however, an expression of non-binding norms, principles, and practices
that influence state behavior.
International lawyers typically distinguish binding rules of international law-
"hard law"-from non-binding norms, principles, and practices that influence
state behavior-"soft law."
Certain declarations and resolutions of the UN General Assembly fall under
this category. The most notable is the UN Declaration of Human Rights,
which this Court has enforced in various cases, (Govt. of Hongkong v. Olalia,
Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,Mijares v. Raada)
The World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] also resorts to soft law
as a means of norm creation, in order "to reflect and respond to the changing
needs and demands of its constituents."

This was most evident at the time of
the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Avian flu outbreaks.
(also the International Labor Organization and the Food and Agriculture
Organization.)
This duty to follow soft law is neither binding nor enforceable, but with great
political influence.

As Applied in the case at bar WHA is not binding on the country
As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered as
customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed
by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules
(opinio juris).
Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA
Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact
enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states; neither
have respondents proven that any compliance by member states with said
WHA Resolutions was obligatory in nature.
Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA
Resolutions are customary international law that may be deemed part of the
law of the land.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA
Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions
cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be
implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted
by the legislature.
The national policy of protection, promotion and support of breastfeeding
cannot automatically be equated with a total ban on advertising for breastmilk
substitutes.
In view of the enactment of the Milk Code which does not contain a total ban
on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes, but instead,
specifically creates an IAC which will regulate said advertising and
promotion, it follows that a total ban policy could be implemented only
pursuant to a law amending the Milk Code passed by the constitutionally
authorized branch of government, the legislature.
Thus, only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent
WHA Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the DOH through the
subject RIRR.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Sections 4(f), 11 and
46 of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and
VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are
PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions. The Temporary Restraining Order
issued on August 15, 2006 is LIFTED insofar as the rest of the provisions of
Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 is concerned.
Sec. 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces
of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the
sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

11. IBP v. Zamora [deployment of marines]
G.R. No. 141284 | August 15, 2000 | Kapunan
Petitioner: IBP
Respondents: Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora, Panfilo M. Lacson, Gen. Edgar B. Aglipay and
Gen. Angelo Reyes

Emergency Recit: Erap issued a verbal directive ordering the PNP and Marines to
conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression.
Pursuant thereto, the PNP Chief issued a Letter of Instruction (LOI) detailing the
manner by which the patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, shall be conducted. The
leader of the Task Force was the PNP Chief. Petitioners now posit that the LOI
violated the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution. Court ruled no. The LOI itself
provides that it is the PNP, a civilian entity, that shall be in charge of the visibility
patrols. The Marines are only called upon to assist. Military authority, therefore, did not
insidiously incurse upon the sphere of civilian authority.

Facts:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like
robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President (Erap), in a verbal
directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols
for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression.
o The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (the AFP), the Chief of the PNP and the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to
execute and implement the said order.
o In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through
Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of
Instruction 02/2000 (the LOI) which detailed the manner by which
the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be
conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of
the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the
deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000,
addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief.
The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle,
North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall,

20

Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic
Airport.
On 17 January 2000, the IBP filed the instant petition to annul the LOI and to
declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and
unconstitutional.

Issues/Held:
1. Whether or not petitioner has legal standing. NO, but the constitutional
issues raised are so important that the Court must relax the rules on
standing.
2. Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review; NO.
3. Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy
over the military and the civilian character of the PNP. NO.

Re: Standing
The IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold
the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the
IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation
by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case.
However, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. It, therefore, behooves the
Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than
later.

Re: Presidents Factual Determination
[The IBP posits that the power involved is the calling out power of the
President under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. It argues that no
emergency exists to warrant the exercise of the calling out power.]
The Court is of the view that the power involved may be no more than the
maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the general welfare. Wide
discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of
peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency
specified in the commander-in-chief provision.
o Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the
Presidents power to call out the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, the resolution of the
controversy will reach a similar result.
On the issue of whether the factual determination of the President is subject
to judicial review:
o It is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the
President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full
discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is
necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the
exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the Presidents
exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this
Court.
o The President has already determined the necessity and factual
basis for calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he
categorically asserted that, [V]iolent crimes like bank/store
robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur
in Metro Manila... We do not doubt the veracity of the Presidents
assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present
developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent
bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls,
public utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas
of deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these
facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call
for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this
constitutional power.

Re: Civilian Supremacy
Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the
calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that by the deployment of the Marines,
the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Section 3,
Article II of the Constitution.
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of
the civilian supremacy clause. The participation of the Marines in the conduct
of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited
participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which
sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines authority. It is
noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro
Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint
visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient
the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and
manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide
the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these
soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military
authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the
Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the
police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military
in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the
Constitution.
In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff
of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been
virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited
provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is
lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the
military. Such being the case, it does not matter whether the AFP Chief
actually participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not exercise
any authority or control over the same. Since none of the Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the
Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of
the PNP.
It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed
forces are deployed, the military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril

21

our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded. The
power to call the armed forces is just that - calling out the armed
forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it has not, that in the
deployment of the Marines, the President has violated the fundamental law,
exceeded his authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of the people, this
Court is not inclined to overrule the Presidents determination of the factual
basis for the calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January,
2000, not a single citizen has complained that his political or civil rights have
been violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It was precisely to
safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of the people that the joint
visibility patrol was conceived. Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom
only when people feel secure in their homes and in the streets, not when the
shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO
ORDERED.

Sec. 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment
thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render
personal, military or civil service.

Sec. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy.

Sec. 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Sec. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other
states, the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity,
national interest, and the right to self-determination.

12. Lim v. Exec. Secretary [supra, Sec. 2)
Petitioners: Arthur D. Lim and Paulino R. Erasando
Respondents: Hon. Executive Secretary as alter ego of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and
Hon. Angelo Reyes in his capacity as Secretary of National Defense
Date: April 11, 2002

Summary: Beginning 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States
started arriving in Mindanao, to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in
Balikatan 02-1. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to
the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the
Philippines and the United States in 1951. On Feb. 2002, Petitioners filed this petition
for certiorari and prohibition, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding
with the so-called Balikatan 02-1, praying that judgment be rendered issuing a
permanent writ of injuction and/or prohibition against the deployment of US troops in
Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution. Petitioners
contend that the RP and the US signed the MDT to provide mutual military assistance
in accordance with the constitutional processes of each country only in the case of a
armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country, against one of them.
They further argued that it cannot be said that the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan constitutes an
external aggressor to warrant US military assistance in accordance with MDT of 1951.
Another contention was that the VFA of 1999 does not authorize American soldiers to
engage in combat operations in Philippine territory. I: Whether or not the Balikatan 02-
1 activities are covered by the VFA. H : Petition is dismissed. The VFA itself permits
US personnel to engage on an impermanent basis, in activities, the exact meaning of
which is left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in
the negative, in that the US personnel must abstain from any activity inconsistent with
the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity. Under these
auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical
to assume that Balikatan 02-1 a mutual anti terrorism advising assisting and training
exercise falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of
the agreement. Both the history and intent of MDT and the VFA support the conclusion
that combat-related activities as opposed to combat itself such as the one subject
of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.

FACTS:
1. Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the
US started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine
military, in "Balikatan 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the
largest combined training operations involving Filipino and American troops.
They are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual
Defense Treaty (MDT),

a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the
Philippines and the US in 1951.
2. Prior to 2002, the last "Balikatan" was held in 1995. This was due to the
paucity of any formal agreement relative to the treatment of United States
personnel visiting the Philippines. The lack of consensus was eventually
cured when the two nations concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
in 1999.
3. The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the
international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush
in reaction to the tragic events that occurred on September 11, 2001.
On February 71 2002 the Senate conducted a hearing on the "Balikatan"
exercise wherein Vice-President Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., who is
concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs, presented the Draft Terms of
Reference (TOR).

(basically provided for the policies of the training
exercises). Approved 5 days later.

ISSUES:
1. W/N Petitioners have Locus Standi? YES
a. Transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must, technicalities of procedure
2. W/N the Balikatan is covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement? YES

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition and the petition-in-intervention are
hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient in form
and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court.


22

Petitioners contention:
1. THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES SIGNED THE MDT in 1951
TO PROVIDE MUTUAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE 'CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES' OF EACH COUNTRY ONLY IN THE
CASE OF AN ARMED ATTACK BY AN EXTERNAL AGGRESSOR,
MEANING A THIRD COUNTRY AGAINST ONE OF THEM. BY NO
STRETCH OF THE IMAGINATION CAN IT BE SAID THAT THE ABU
SAYYAF BANDITS IN BASILAN CONSTITUTE AN EXTERNAL ARMED
FORCE THAT HAS SUBJECT THE PHILIPPINES TO AN ARMED
EXTERNAL ATTACK TO WARRANT U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE UNDER
THE MDT OF 1951.
2. NEITHER DOES THE VFA OF 1999 AUTHORIZE AMERICAN SOLDIERS
TO ENGAGE IN COMBAT OPERATIONS IN PHILIPPINE TERRITORY, NOT
EVEN TO FIRE BACK "IF FIRED UPON".

Ratio:
1. The VFA provides the regulatory mechanism by which US military and
civilian personnel may visit temporarily in the Philippines in connection with
activities approved by the Philippine Government. It contains provisions
relative to entry and departure of American personnel, driving and vehicle
registration, criminal jurisdiction, claims, importation and exportation,
movement of vessels and aircraft, as well as the duration of the agreement
and its termination. It is the VFA which gives continued relevance to the MDT
despite the passage of years.
2. The VFA permits the US personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in
activities, the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The expression is
ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject only to the
approval of the Philippine government. The sole encumbrance placed on its
definition is couched in the negative, in that US personnel must abstain from
any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular,
from any political activity.
3. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provide that the cardinal rule
of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to
verbalize the parties intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may
be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers as the
context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account
alongside the aforesaid context.
4. It appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the
word activities arose from accident. In our view, it was deliberately made
that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner,
visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than
military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new
techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nations marine resources,
sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief
operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses,
medical and humanitarian missions, and the like.
5. The VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical
to assume that Balikatan 0201, a mutual anti-terrorism advising, assisting
and training exercise, falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable
activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the
MDT and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities as
opposed to combat itself such as the one subject of the instant petition, are
indeed authorized.
6. Granted that Balikatan 02-1 is permitted under the terms of the VFA, what
may US forces legitimately do in furtherance of their aim to provide advice,
assistance and training in the global effort against terrorism? Par. 8 of Sec. I
stipulates that US exercise participants may not engage in combat except
in self-defense.
7. In our considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops
to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. We bear in mind the
salutary proscription in the Charter of the UN, to wit:
Article 2: The Organization and its Members, in
pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act
in accordance with the following Principles.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the UN.
8. In the same manner, both the MDT and the VFA, as in all other treaties and
international agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in
the context of the 1987 Constitution. In particular, the MDT was concluded
way before the present Charter, though it nevertheless remains in effect as a
valid source of international obligation. (Take note of Sections 2, 7, and 8)
The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the Chief
Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate."
9. A rather recent formulation of the relation of international law vis-a-
vis municipal law was expressed in Philip Morris, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, to wit:
xxx Withal, the fact that international law has been
made part of the law of the land does not by any
means imply the primacy of international law over
national law in the municipal sphere. Under the
doctrine of incorporation as applied in most
countries, rules of international law are given a
standing equal, not superior, to national
legislation.
10. From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over
municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith."

Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."
11. Our Constitution espouses the opposing view. Witness our jurisdiction as I
stated in section 5 of Article VIII:
The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and order of
lower courts in:

23

(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
a. The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are
prohibited / from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory.
12. Are American troops actively engaged in combat alongside Filipino soldiers
under the guise of an alleged training and assistance exercise?
a. Contrary to what petitioners would have us do, we cannot take
judicial notice of the events transpiring down south, as reported from
the saturation coverage of the media. As a rule, we do not take
cognizance of newspaper or electronic reports per se, not because
of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the
simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the
rules of evidence.
b. It is all too apparent that the determination thereof involves basically
a question of fact. On this point, we must concur with the Solicitor
General that the present subject matter is not a fit topic for a special
civil action for certiorari. We have held in too many instances that
questions of fact are not entertained in such a remedy. The Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts.
13. From the facts obtaining, we find that the holding of "Balikatan 02-1" joint
military exercise has not intruded into that penumbra of error that would
otherwise call for correction on our part. In other words, respondents in the
case at bar have not committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.

Sec. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a
policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.

Sec. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the
prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through
policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising
standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.

Sec. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights.

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

13. Wisconsin v. Yoder [compulsory education; note that this pertains to a statute;
read with the policy on compulsory elementary education A14, sec. 2 (2)]
Petitioner: State of Wisconsin
Respondents: Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, Adlin Yutzy
May 15, 1972

ER: Yoder et. al are Amish. They stopped sending their kids to school after grade 8,
despite a law requiring them to do so til their kids reach 16yrs. Held: The interest of
the State do not outweigh that of the parents to freely exercise their religion. Only
those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion, but where nothing more than the
general interest is involved, the State acts "reasonably" in requiring education to age
16.
Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller are members of the Old Order Amish religion, and
Adin Yutzy is a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church. They are
residents of Green County, Wisconsin.
Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law required them to send their
children to public or private school until age 16 but they declined to send their
children, ages 14 and 15, to public school after 8
th
grade.
The children were not enrolled in any private school, or within any recognized
exception to the law,

and they are conceded to be subject to the Wisconsin
statute.
Yoder et. al were convicted of violating the compulsory-attendance law. They
argued that the law violated their 1
st
and 14
th
Amendment rights.
Testimony showed that Yoder et al believed, in accordance with the tenets of Old
Order Amish communities, that their children's attendance at high school was
contrary to the Amish religion and way of life. The State stipulated that their
religious beliefs were sincere.

Issue: W/n the States interest in education overrides the defendants' rights under the
free exercise clause. NO.
There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for
education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and
duration of basic education. Even this paramount responsibility was, in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, made to yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent
education in a privately operated system.
There the Court held that Oregon's statute compelling attendance in a public
school from age 8- 16 unreasonably interfered with the interest of parents in
rearing of their offspring in church-operated schools.
A State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally
free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights, such as
those protected by the Free Exercise Clause, and the traditional interest of
parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children.
For Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond 8
th
grade, it must appear
either that the State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its
requirement, or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the
interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.
Long before there was general acknowledgment of the need for universal formal
education, the Religion Clauses had firmly fixed the right to free exercise of
religious beliefs, and buttressing this fundamental right was an equally firm
prohibition against the establishment of any religion by government.
In Bernas: Only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise
served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.
However strong the State's interest in universal compulsory education, it is

24

by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other
interests.

The law violates parents and kids rights to the free exercise of the religion:
We must determine whether the Amish religious faith and their mode of life are
inseparable and interdependent.
A way of life, however virtuous, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable
state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations; to
have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious
belief.
The traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal
preference, but one of deep religious conviction.
Acc. To the expert witnesses, the Old Order Amish religion pervades and
determines virtually their entire way of life.
If compulsory education were confined to 8 grades of elementary education
imparted in a nearby rural schoolhouse, with a large proportion of students of the
Amish faith, the Old Order Amish had little basis to fear that school attendance
would expose their children to the worldly influence. The Amish agree that their
children must have basic skills in the 3 R's" in order to read the Bible, to be good
farmers and citizens, and to be able to deal with non-Amish people when
necessary in the course of daily affairs.
But modern compulsory secondary education in rural areas is largely carried on in
a school remote from the student's home. The values and programs of the high
school are in sharp conflict with the Amish religion.
Secondary schooling, by exposing Amish children to worldly influences, and by
substantially interfering with the religious development of the child and his
integration into the way of life of the Amish community at the crucial adolescent
stage of development, contravenes the religious tenets and practice of the Amish,
both as to the parent and the child.
The impact on Yoder et als religious practice is not only severe, but inescapable,
for the law compels them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts at
odds with their religious beliefs.
Thus, they must either abandon belief or be forced to migrate to a more tolerant
region, precisely the kind of danger sought to be prevented.

Religiously grounded conduct can be protected by the Free Exercise Clause:
Wisconsin concedes that under the Religion Clauses beliefs are absolutely free
from the State's control, but it argues that "actions," even though religiously
grounded, are outside its protection.
It is true that activities, even if religiously based, are often subject to regulation by
the States in the exercise of police power. But some areas of conduct are
protected by the Free Exercise Clause
Neither can this case be disposed of on the grounds that Wisconsin's requirement
applies uniformly to all its citizens and does not discriminate against a particular
religion, or that it is motivated by legitimate secular concerns. A regulation neutral
on its face may, in its application, offend the constitutional requirement for
governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.

Not only do the Amish accept the necessity for formal schooling through the 8
th
grade,
but continue to provide what has been characterized as an "ideal" vocational education
for their children in the adolescent years.
The State argues that: (1) some education is necessary to prepare citizens to
participate effectively and intelligently in our political system; (2) education
prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient
SC: True. However, the evidence shows that high school instead of their long-
established program of informal vocational education would do little to serve those
interests.
Yoder et als experts testified that the value of all education must be assessed in
terms of its capacity to prepare the child for life. Compulsory education may be
necessary to prepare the child for life in modern society, but not to prepare him for
life in Amish community.
The Amish community has been a highly successful social unit. Its members are
productive and very law-abiding; they reject public welfare. Congress itself
recognized their self-sufficiency by authorizing exemption of the Amish from
paying social security taxes.
The Amish are not opposed to education beyond the 8
th
grade. They are opposed
to conventional formal education because it comes at the child's crucial
adolescent period of religious development.
Dr. Erickson testified that their system of learning-by-doing was an "ideal system"
of education for preparing Amish children for life as adults in the Amish
community,
States argument: If some children leave the Amish community, they will be ill-
equipped for life.
SC: this is highly speculative. There is no evidence that Amish children would
become burdens on society
This argument rests on the mistaken assumption that the Amish do not provide
any education for their children beyond the 8
th
grade,
The Amish alternative to formal secondary education has enabled them to function
effectively under self-imposed limitations, and to survive and prosper for more
than 200 years.

We cannot accept a parens patriae as that urged by the State:
State argument based on Prince
1
: exempting Amish fails to recognize the
substantive right of the Amish child to secondary education, and the States power
as parens patriae to extend the benefit of secondary education to children
regardless of the wishes of their parents.
Prince is not comparable to this case. The Court carefully confined Prince stating:
the Court rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental
regulation of certain acts prompted by religious beliefs, for even when the action is
in accord with religious convictions, it is not totally free from legislative restrictions.
The conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat
to public safety, peace or order.
Here, no harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety,
peace, order, or welfare was demonstrated or inferred.

1
The case doesnt say anything more about Prince.

25

Even more than in Prince, this case involves the fundamental interest of parents,
as contrasted with that of the State, to guide the religious future and education of
their children.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters: Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. Rights
guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State. The child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations."
The duty to prepare the child for "additional obligations," includes the inculcation
of moral standards, religious beliefs, and good citizenship.
Pierce recognized that where nothing more than the general interest of the
parent in the nurture and education of his children is involved, the State acts
"reasonably" and constitutionally in requiring education to age 16 in some
public or private school meeting the standards prescribed by the State.
When the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim,
more than merely a "reasonable relation to some purpose within the
competency of the State" is required to sustain the validity of the State's
requirement under the 1
st
Amendment.
The power of the parent, even with a free exercise claim, may be limited
under Prince if that parental decision will jeopardize the childs health or safety, or
have a potential for significant social burdens.
Here, the religious objections of the Amish will not impair the physical or mental
health of the child, or the ability to be self-supporting.
Nothing we hold is intended to limit the power of the State to promulgate
reasonable standards that, while not impairing the free exercise of religion,
provide for continuing agricultural vocational education under parental and church
guidance by the Old Order Amish or others. Reasonable standards can be
established concerning the content of the vocational education of Amish children
under parental guidance.
Extra: The dissent argues that a child who wants to attend public high school in
conflict with his parents should not be prevented.
o Since the parents are being prosecuted, it is their right of free exercise, that
must determine Wisconsin's power to impose penalties on them. There is no
reason for the Court to consider that point since it is not an issue in the case.

Sec. 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It
shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs.

Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.

14. Imbong v. Ochoa [supra Art II. Sec. 12)
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
Petitioner: JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and
in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE
CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC.,
Respondent: HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government

SUMMARY
Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
o The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the
petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the
implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives,
in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees
protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.
o The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection
against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law
provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to
one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.

1-The Right to Life (SECTION 12)
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance,
and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the
undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new
human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is,
upon fertilization.The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987
Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the
Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the
Court cannot interpret it otherwise. The RH Law mandates that protection must be
afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits
not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion
and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. This
notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any
product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from
the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to
be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise,
cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since
the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or
supply will be used.

2-The Right to Health (SECTION 15)
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health.

26

These provisions are self-executing. The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH
Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. With R.A. No.
4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only
contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. In the distribution by the
DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No.
4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall
be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. Consequently, the Court finds that, at
this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various
kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as
expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself. At this point, the Court
is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and
intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9
that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the
mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested,
evaluated, and approved by the FDA.

MENDOZA, J .:
Despite calls to withhold support thereto Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, the Court now
faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2)
petitions- in-intervention.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
o The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the
petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the
implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives,
in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees
protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.
o The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection
against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law
provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to
one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.
o The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners
contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting
religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of
contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes
that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the
constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.
o The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary
servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical
practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the
PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours
of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal
prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.
o The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed
that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes them the
primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive
use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health
among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that
would effectively reduce the number of the poor.
o The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment
and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the
type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.
o The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to
explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his
right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The
petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned
and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their
patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or
procedure.
o The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected
by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for
mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their
constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.
o The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of
legislative authority. The petitioners question the delegation by Congress
to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-
abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).
o The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under
Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.
o The RH Law violates Natural Law.
o The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government
Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM).
It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health
measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon
the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local
Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.

ISSUES
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy. YES
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional. ONLY SOME
PROVISIONS.
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family

27

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

RATIO:
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review
over the controversy.
Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency
of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.
The power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue
of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

Actual Case or Controversy
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that
the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out
the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy.

Facial Challenge
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights
mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has
authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law
can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny.

Locus Standi - Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter
of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest."

Declaratory Relief
Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court
may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
121

One Subject-One Title
The manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in
the country. It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and
post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination
of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective,
legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and
supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life (SECTION 12)
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the
unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation
allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.

The Court's Position
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when
life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this
stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it
was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own
views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the
particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous
with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm.
142
On the other side of
the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of
the fertilized ovum in the uterus.
143

Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. The traditional meaning of the
word "conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable
sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming
pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity
capable of developing into a being like its parents.
145

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the
fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life
capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.
146

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,
147
it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first
before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than
the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must
protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases
in the original]

Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the
Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the

28

Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of
"fertilization."
From the deliberations, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution
emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and
the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or
upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum.
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum
should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives
that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those
that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and
thus, constitutionally permissible.
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. SC cited
Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary, and The Textbook of
Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics) both saying the same thing.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human
development begins after the union of male and female gametes or germ cells
during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of
events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary
oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the
sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This
fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or
primordium, of a human being."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a
"Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)",
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical
parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the
Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and
that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined
moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in
protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature
from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court
cannot interpret it otherwise.
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the
Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized
ovum.

The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting
abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of
a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the
moment of fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only
drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and
those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an
abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon
determination of the FDA.

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law
that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a
certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the
condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The
FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be
used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance
when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-
abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section
9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the
FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it cannot
be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under
the second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any
means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used
for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely
abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum
to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern
family planning method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that
prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a
fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved
indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and
recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well
taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section
3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that
these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the definition
of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy

29

against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in
the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the
primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the
same way.

2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it
requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables
and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion
of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all
national hospitals.
Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of
developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral
contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out that
the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued.
Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is
associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold
increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of
myocardial infarction.
Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections
4(p) and (w) of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only
seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not
self-executory, it being a mere statement of the administration's principle and
policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities
refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.

The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard,
the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to
health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII, and Section 9, Article XVI also specifically provide for the
States' duty to provide for the health of the people.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing.
Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation
to implement these self-executing provisions.
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do
not question contraception and contraceptives per se. In fact, ALFI prays that the
status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of
contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a
duly licensed physician - be maintained.
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave
intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists
adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe
are made available to the public.

In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law
which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall
procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the
whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies
to plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and
budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels and projections
of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their
children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring
program consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the
DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must
consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that
the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by
Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the
government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held
accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their
use.
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been
submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its
determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being
the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are
safe for public consumption.
Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this
ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be
measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be
determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that
hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient.
The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as
operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA.
The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular
hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The
provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or
removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this
construction.

3 -Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
The Church and The State
The constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.

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The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any
religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict
neutrality in affairs among religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or
prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom
guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside
manifestations of one's belief and faith.

The Cou rt's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether
the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem
reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the
same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has
declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts."
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only
in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands
without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution,
it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the
guarantee of religious freedom.
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of
contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using
contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent
neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health
manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment
Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23
and 24 thereof.
The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to
immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to
another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections
based on religious or ethical beliefs.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law
violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the
medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on
modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his
conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act
against his beliefs.

The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health
officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by
virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions
of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The
conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the religious belief
of public health officers.
After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective
robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires
employment in the government.

Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in
defense of the subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling
state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to
render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the
law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in
vain.
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free
exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the
prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails
to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.

Exception: Life Threatening Cases
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is
morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the
resulting death to one should not be deliberate.

Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 as a condition for the issuance
of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of
police power by the government.
A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the
petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to
attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant
nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be
included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial.

4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is
the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the
family.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth,
contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It
bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making
process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of
their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or
had suffered a miscarriage.

Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:

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(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any
person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following
persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of
disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail.
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation
and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should require mutual consent and
decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related
to the founding of a family.
Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the
"right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The
right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them " is equally recognized.
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.

The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor,
who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether
natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern
methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s
except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the
decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is
not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is
a need to tame population growth.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government."

First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the
second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse under
Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation
between access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and
access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning
methods themselves, on the other.
Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional
objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the
exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take
proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child.

Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-
threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In such
cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the
spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be
emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care
urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.

5 - Academic Freedom
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH
Law is premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to
formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only
speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to
educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the
petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature
of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.

6 - Due Process
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion
in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.

7-Equal Protection
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive
health care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is
pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct
necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be
given priority in addressing the health development of the people.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized
couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There
is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the
poor to reduce their number.
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may
have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children.
While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with
the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a
deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply
provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to
promote basic reproductive health care.

8-Involuntary Servitude
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with
public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare. A reading of the assailed provision,
however, reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive
healthcare service providers to render pro bono service.

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the
power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and

32

methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and
highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall
under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as
"health products."

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the
establishment of health care facilities, the hiring of skilled health professionals, or the
training of barangay health workers, it will be the national government that will provide
for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national
government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the
local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.

The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can
be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy.

11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,
276
suffice it to say
that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a
law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated
from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute,
executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court
declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a
miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from
their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the
consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same
facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5
.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of
a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering
of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious
objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
"primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and,
therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its
Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No.
10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

15. Oposa v. Factoran [inter-generational justice and responsibility]
G.R. No. 101083 | July 30, 1993
Petioners: 42 minors represented by their parents & Philippine Ecological Network
Respondents: DENR Sec. Fulgencio Factoran
Ponente: Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.

Summary: Because of the grave environmental damages being suffered by mother
Earth, petitioners, all minors, represented & joined by their parents sought for the
cancellation of existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and an cease
& desist order enjoining the DENR to issue new TLAs. I: W/N this is a class suit. YES,
common and general interest to all Filipinos. Personality of minors to sue in behalf of
the future generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility. W/N
there is a cause of action. YES! The right to a healthful ecology is now recognized
under the Const, and this carries a correlative duty not to impair the environment. It is
within the DENRs mandate to advance this right. W/N the issue raises a political
question. NO! It is within the SCs expanded power under 1987 Const. W/N revoking
the TLA is violative of the non-impairment clause NO! All licenses may be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. A TLA is not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.

Facts:
Petitioners, all minors, are represented & joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.,
a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corp organized for the purpose of,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment
and natural resources. The original defendant was then DENR Sec. Fulgencio

33

Factoran, Jr.. He is susbtituted by the new Secretary, the Hon. Angel Alcala.
The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit.
Petitioners argue that 25 yrs ago, PH had 16M hectares of rainforests, but
satellite images in 1987 saw that only about 1.2M hectares remained. Also, a
mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2 of the
entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares
of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
Public records reveal that the defendant's predecessors have granted timber
license agreements ('TLA's') to various corps to cut the aggregate area of
3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes. The continued
allowance by DENR of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest
stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs, especially
the minors and their successors, who may never see, use, benefit from and
enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's
generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As
a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated are already being
felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults. 11 were
enumerated. Here are some:
o water shortages resulting from drying up of the "aquifer," as well as
of rivers, brooks and streams; recurring spells of drought
o massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility
o endangering and extinction of PH unique and rare flora & fauna
o disturbance and dislocation of indigenous cultural communities,
o increasing velocity of typhoons, coz of absence of windbreakers
o reduction of earth's capacity to process CO2 gases, catastrophic
climatic changes such as phenomenon of global warming
Thus, petitioners sought for:
o Cancellation of existing timber license agreements in the country
o Cease and desist order from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

Issue: W/N this is a class suit. YES!!!
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just
to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Since the parties are so
numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of
them before the court. The Petitioners therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. They can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
o Such a right considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature
means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations.
o Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes also the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right
for the generations to come

Issue: W/N the said petitioners have a cause of action seek the cancellation of the
TLAs and prevent further processing thereof.
Petitioners It has proven its cause of action as its complaint contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on
Arts. 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of E.O.
No. 192 creating the DENR, Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable
right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law.
Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Sec. 4
of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
Factoran They have no cause of action against him. Petitioners failed to
allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the Secretary for
which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but
vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its
capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, do not reveal a valid cause of
action. Plus, the question of whether logging should be permitted in the
country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the
executive or legislative branches of Government.

Held: Yes. Petitioners have adequate CoA, showing violation of their rights
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right: the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in Sec. 16, Art. II (read).
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil
and political rights enumerated in the latter.
o Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation.
o Mandating the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health as state policies by the Constitution itself, highlights their
continuing importance and imposes upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second.
Or else, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not
only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said right

34

implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests.
EO 192: mandates that the DENR "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use
of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically licensing
and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order
to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of
the present and future generations of Filipinos." The policy is restated in the
Admin. Code of 1987. It stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." There are other laws paying special attention to the
environmental right: PD1151 (PH Envtl Policy) and PD1152 (PH Envtl Code)
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and
by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.

Issue: W/N the issue on the TLAs raises a political question. NO!!!
The political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to
the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The new
provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the SC, the power to rule upon
even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to
declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

Issue: W/N the prayer sought is violative of the non-impairment (of contracts) clause
Petitioners It does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts.
They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the
said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when
the public interest so requires.
Factoran the same cannot be done by the State without due process of
law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time, usually
for 25 years. During its effectivity, it can neither be revised nor cancelled
unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have
violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws & regulations

Held: NO, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. A
Timber License Agreement is not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Factoran would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Govt by providing
undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license
holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly
respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of
changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare.
Sec. 20 of the Forestry Reform Code must be read in every TLA: That when
the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of
privilege granted herein
All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is
not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process
clause of the Constitution.
o A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn if dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case.
o A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would
be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested
right; nor is it taxation. Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights.
Assuming TLAs are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even
an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing
TLAs. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Further, even if it was a law, etc, it could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and
enhancing the general welfare. The non-impairment clause must yield to the
police power of the state.
It is difficult to imagine how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin DENR from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with
respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

Sec. 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts,
culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and
promote total human liberation and development.

Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare.

Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.

16. Garcia v. BOI [independent policy]
Petitioner: CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan)
Respondents: THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE
AND INDUSTRY, LUZON PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION, and PILIPINAS
SHELL CORP.
Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., J . November 9, 1990

Summary: Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical
Corporation, formed by a group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI to
have its plant site for the products naphta cracker and naphta to based in Bataan.

35

One year after the BPC began its production, the corporation applied to the BOI to
have its plant site transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite opposition from
petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI granted private respondent BPCs
application, stating that the investors have the final choice as to where to have their
plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for the project. W/N the investor
has a right of final choice under the Constitiution and the Omnibus Investments
Code. NO A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. The
petrochemical industry is essential to the national interest. In other ASEAN countries
like Indonesia and Malaysia, the government superintends the industry by controlling
the upstream or cracker facility. The BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in
approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and
authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the
main reason that the final say is in the investor all other circumstances to the contrary
notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to the government has been shown by this
transfer. This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed
in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems best for
the national interest

FACTS:
This petition is a sequel to the petition "Congressman Enrique T. Garcia v. the
Board of Investments", September 7, 1989, where this Court issued a
decision, ordering the BOI to set for hearing the petitioner's opposition to the
amended application in order that he may present at such hearing all the
evidence in his possession in support of his opposition to the transfer of the
site of the BPC petrochemical plant to Batangas province.
Under P.D. No. 1803, 576 hectares of the public domain located in Lamao,
Limay, Bataan were reserved for the Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the
administration, management, and ownership of the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC).
o The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a wholly government
owned corporation, located at Bataan. It produces 60% of the
national output of naphtha.
Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan
Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a
new domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its application specified Bataan as
the plant site. One of the terms and conditions for registration of the project
was the use of "naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its
petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant was to be a joint venture with
PNOC. BPC was issued a certificate of registration on February 24, 1988 by
BOI.
BPC was given pioneer status and accorded fiscal and other incentives by
BOI, like: (1) exemption from taxes on raw materials, (2) repatriation of the
entire proceeds of liquidation investments in currency originally made and at
the exchange rate obtaining at the time of repatriation; and (3) remittance of
earnings on investments. The House of Representatives approved a bill
introduced by the petitioner eliminating the 48% ad valorem tax on naphtha if
and when it is used as raw materials in the petrochemical plant.
However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East
Corporation, the major investor in BPC, personally delivered to Trade
Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter advising him of BPC's desire to amend
the original registration certification of its project by changing the job site from
Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. The reason adduced for the transfer was the
insurgency and unstable labor situation, and the presence in Batangas of a
LPG depot owned by the Philippine Shell Corp.
The petitioner vigorously opposed the proposal and no less than President
Aquino expressed her preference that the plant be established in Bataan.
Despite speeches in the Senate and House opposing the Transfer of the
project to Batangas, BPC filed its request for approval of the amendments. Its
application is as follows: "(l) increasing the investment amount from US $220
million to US $320 million; (2) increasing the production capacity (3) changing
the feedstock from naphtha only to "naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas;"
and (4) transferring the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas.
BOI approved the revision of the registration of BPC's petrochemical project
saying that the BOI or the government for that matter could only recomend as
to where the project should be located. The BOI recognizes and respect the
principle that the final choice is still with the proponent who would in the final
analysis provide the funding or risk capital for the project. (When Vice-
Chairman of the BOI testified before the Committee on Ways and Means)

Issue: W/N the investor has a right of final choice under the Constitiution and the
Omnibus Investments Code. NO
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision of the respondent
Board of Investments approving the amendment of the certificate of registration of the
Luzon Petrochemical Corporation on May 23, 1989 under its Resolution No. 193,
Series of 1989, (Annex F to the Petition) is SET ASIDE as NULL and VOID. The
original certificate of registration of BPC' (now LPC) of February 24, 1988 with Bataan
as the plant site and naphtha as the feedstock is, therefore, ordered maintained.

Ratio:
Read Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
We rule that the Court has a constitutional duty to step into this controversy
and determine the paramount issue.
First, Bataan was the original choice as the plant site of the BOI to which the BPC
agreed. That is why it organized itself into a corporation bearing the name Bataan.
There is available 576 hectares of public land precisely reserved as the petrochemical
zone in Limay, Bataan under P.D. No. 1803. There is no need to buy expensive real
estate for the site unlike in the proposed transfer to Batangas. The site is the result of
careful study long before any covetous interests intruded into the choice. The site is
ideal. It is not unduly constricted and allows for expansion. The respondents have not
shown nor reiterated that the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan or unstable
labor situation warrant a transfer of the plant site to Batangas.
Second, the BRC, a government owned Filipino corporation, located in Bataan
produces 60% of the national output of naphtha which can be used as feedstock for
the plant in Bataan. It can provide the feedstock requirement of the plant. On the other
hand, the country is short of LPG and there is need to import the same for use of the
plant in Batangas. The local production thereof by Shell can hardly supply the needs of
the consumers for cooking purposes. Scarce dollars will be diverted, unnecessarily,
from vitally essential projects in order to feed the furnaces of the transferred
petrochemical plant.
Third, naphtha as feedstock has been exempted by law from the ad valorem tax by
President Aquino but excluding LPG from exemption. The law was enacted specifically
for the petrochemical industry. The policy determination by both Congress and the

36

President is clear. Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should disregard or contravene
expressed policy by shifting the feedstock from naphtha to LPG.
Fourth, under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, it is the duty of the State
to "regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities." The development
of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos is
mandated in Section 19, Article II of the Constitution. In Article 2 of the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987 "the sound development of the national economy in
consonance with the principles and objectives of economic nationalism" is the set goal
of government.
Fifth, with the admitted fact that the investor is raising the greater portion of the capital
for the project from local sources by way of loan which led to the so-called "petroscam
scandal", the capital requirements would be greatly minimized if LPC does not have to
buy the land for the project and its feedstock shall be limited to naphtha which is
certainly more economical, more readily available than LPG, and does not have to be
imported.
Sixth, if the plant site is maintained in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner in the
venture to the great benefit and advantage of the government which shall have a
participation in the management of the project instead of a firm which is a huge
multinational corporation.
In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant's remaining in
Bataan, practically nothing is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except
a near-absolute discretion given by BOI to investors not only to freely choose
the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons which remain
murky to say the least.

MAIN: Read: Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution.
A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. It should
not be treated like a garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-making venture, or
even an assembler of cars or manufacturer of computer chips, where the BOI
reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and credit. The petrochemical industry
is essential to the national interest. In other ASEAN countries like Indonesia
and Malaysia, the government superintends the industry by controlling the
upstream or cracker facility.
In this particular BPC venture, not only has the Government given
unprecedented favors, among them:
o For an initial authorized capital of only P20 million, the Central Bank gave
an eligible relending credit or relending facility worth US $50 million and a
debt to swap arrangement for US $30 million or a total accommodation of
US $80 million which at current exchange rates is around P2080 million.
o Tax exemptions and privileges were given as part of its 'preferred pioneer
status.'
o Loan applications of other Philippine firms will be crowded out of the
Asian Development Bank portfolio because of the petrochemical firm's
massive loan request. (Taken from the proceedings before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee).
Through its regulatory agency, the BOI, it surrenders even the power to make
a company abide by its initial choice, a choice free from any suspicion of
unscrupulous machinations and a choice which is undoubtedly in the best
interests of the Filipino people.
The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI committed a grave abuse
of discretion in approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan
to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to
naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the investor all
other circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to
the government has been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiation of the
independent policy of the government expressed in numerous laws and the
Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems best for the national
interest.
o One can but remember the words of a great Filipino leader who in
part said he would not mind having a government run like hell by
Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation. In this case, it is
not even a foreign government but an ordinary investor whom the
BOI allows to dictate what we shall do with our heritage.

Sec. 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages
private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.

Sec. 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian
reform.

Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity and development.

Sec. 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral
organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.
Sec. 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in
nation-building.

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

17. Pamatong v. COMELEC
GR No. 161872 | Apr. 13, 2004 | Tinga
Petitioner: Rev. Elly Chavez Pamatong
Respondent: COMELEC

Summary: Pamatong filed his certificate of candidacy for President. COMELEC
refused to give it due course and declared Pamatong as a nuisance candidate.
Pamatong file a petition for writ of certiorari arguing that COMELEC indirectly amended
he constitutional provisions on the electoral process. I: W/N equal access to
opportunities for public office is a judicially enforceable Constitutional right? NO. R:
Sec 26, Art II neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. The provision merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action. Its disregard does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. The
privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises
are rational, objective, and orderly. As long as the limitations apply to everybody

37

equally without discrimination, the equal access clause is not violated. The question of
whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis
of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for
the reception of further evidence is in order to determine the question on whether
Pamatong is a nuisance candidate.

Facts:
Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President.
COMELEC refused to give due course to his Certificate of Candidacy.
Pamatong moved for reconsideration. The COMELEC, acting on Pamatongs
MR and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective
positions, denied the same.
o The COMELEC declared Pamatong and 35 others nuisance
candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
registered political party with a national constituency.
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, Pamatong seeks to reverse the
resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal
access to opportunities for public service" under Sec 26, Art II of the
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who
can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political
parties.
o He argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional
provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the
sovereign people to choose their leaders.
o That COMELEC erred in disqualifying him since he is the most
qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all
the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the
president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has
numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has
the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has
practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of
government.

Issue: W/N equal access to opportunities for public office is a judicially enforceable
Constitutional right? NO.

Ratio:
NOT A JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
Implicit in the Pamatongs invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring
"equal access to opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a
constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case,
to seek the presidency. There is none.
o What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. Sec 26, Art II neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.
The "equal access" provision is part of the "Declaration of Principles and
State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not
self-executing. Like the rest of the policies in Art II, the provision does not
contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a
guideline for legislative or executive action.
o The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of
action before the courts.

INTENT OF THE FRAMERS
Intent of the framers: not self-executory. The original wording used the
broaden the opportunities. Commissioner (now CJ) Hilario Davide, Jr.
changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access because
what is important would be equal access to the opportunity.
o If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government
would be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to
accommodate as many people as are also possible.
o The provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive
measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into
public office. This indicates the design of the framers to cast the
provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not
reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.
Moreover, the provision is difficult to interpret because its effective means and
reach are not properly defined. It is broadly written. Thus, the words and
phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are
susceptible to countless interpretations.

MAY BE SUBJECTED TO LIMITATIONS
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be
subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to
seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 outlining the
instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course
to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
o As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is
not sacrificed as long as the limitations are applicable to anyone who
intends to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is
no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the
burdens, which they create. Therefore, Pamatongs reliance on the
equal access clause is misplaced.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to
run for office is the States compelling interest to ensure that its electoral
exercises are rational, objective, and orderly.
o There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the
case of candidates for national positions because the election
process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage
a national campaign are allowed to run.
o Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly
election, the State could exclude nuisance candidates.
The COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the administration of
elections and empowered to adopt means and methods that will ensure the
promotion of free, orderly and honest elections. Moreover, the Constitution
guarantees that only bona fide candidates for public office shall be free from
any form of harassment and discrimination.

38

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both
legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this
Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in
order to determine the question on whether Pamatong is a nuisance
candidate as contemplated in the Omnibus Election Code.

Sec. 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.

18. Phil. Savings Bank and Pascual M. Garcia, III v. Senate Impeachment Court
G.R. No. 200238, Nov. 20, 2012
Petitioner: PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK (PSBANK) and PASCUAL M. GARCIA III,
as representative of Philippine Savings Bank and in his personal capacity
Respondent: SENATE IMPEACHMENT COURT

Note: I searched the net and kahit sa lex libris but resolution lang lumalabas, so here it
is. Pero I found a digest of the en banc case plus all the separate opinions so I edited it
and included it here, feel ko kasi andun ang doctrine!

Recit-Ready: This is the case regarding the impeachment of former Chief Justice
Corona. PSBank and its President, Pascual M. Garcia III, filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition seeking to nullity and set aside the Resolution

of the Senate
(Impeachment Court), which granted the prosecution's requests for subpoena duces
tecum ad testificandum to PSBank and/or its representatives requiring them to testify
and produce before the Impeachment Court documents relative to the foreign currency
accounts that were alleged to belong to then SC Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. The
SC issued a resolution stating that the said issue has been overtaken by events. The
supervening conviction of CJ Corona as well as his execution of a waiver against the
confidentiality of all his bank accounts, whether in peso or foreign currency, has
rendered the present petition moot and academic. However, in the en banc decision
release earlier, with dissents of Justices Carpio and Sereno and a concurring opinion
from Justice Brion, the majority ruled that in issuing the TRO, a clear right to maintain
the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits of the CJ is provided under Section
8 of RA 6426, the Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines. This law
establishes the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits, which provides a
single exception: disclosure is allowed only upon the written permission of the
depositor.

SUMMARY OF THE RESOLUTION (ito yun pinakahuling inissue ng court)

Philippine Savings Bank and Pascual M. Garcia III, as President of PSBank,
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to nullity and set aside
the Resolution

of the Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court, which granted
the prosecution's requests for subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to
PSBank and/or its representatives requiring them to testify and produce
before the Impeachment Court documents relative to the foreign currency
accounts that were alleged to belong to then SC Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona.
During the pendency of this petition, PSbank filed a Motion with Leave of
Court to Withdraw the Petition

due to the termination of the impeachment
proceedings against Corona, making them no longer faced with the dilemma
of either violating RA 6426 or being held in contempt of court for refusing to
disclose the details of the subject foreign currency deposits.
It is well-settled that courts will not determine questions that have become
moot and academic because there is no longer any justiciable controversy to
speak of. The judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any
practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced.
Indeed, the main issue of whether the Impeachment Court acted arbitrarily
when it issued the assailed subpoena to obtain information concerning the
subject foreign currency deposits notwithstanding the confidentiality of such
deposits under RA 6426 has been overtaken by events. The supervening
conviction of Chief Justice Corona on May 29, 2012, as well as his execution
of a waiver against the confidentiality of all his bank accounts, whether in
peso or foreign currency, has rendered the present petition moot and
academic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for having become moot and
academic and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on
February 9, 2012 is LIFTED.
THE EN BANC CASE
Facts:
On February 9, 2012, the Court, voting 8-5-2, issued a TRO enjoining the
impeachment court from further implementing the subpoena with respect to
the foreign currency denominated accounts of CJ Corona.

Issue: Whether or not the Impeachment Court may subpoena the representatives of
the PS Bank? NO

Ratio:
In issuing the TRO, the Court majority held that a clear right to maintain the
confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits of the Chief Justice is provided
under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, the Foreign Currency Deposit Act
of the Philippines. This law establishes the absolute confidentiality of foreign
currency deposits[.] There is only a single exception to the secrecy of foreign
currency deposits, according to the majority, and that is, disclosure is allowed
only upon the written permission of the depositor.
In this case, neither the prosecution nor the Impeachment Court has
presented any such written waiver by the alleged depositor, Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona. Also, while impeachment may be an exception to the
secrecy of bank deposits under RA 1405, it is not an exemption to the
absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits under RA 6426. Thus, the
Court issued a TRO against the impeachment court.

I decided to include the separate opinions because this is where the FULL PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE (as stated in the syllabus) is found.

The dissent of J ustice Carpio

39

He opined that the foreign currency accounts of Corona are not covered by
Sec. 8 of RA No. 6426. Because of this, petitioners PS Bank and its
President, Pascual M. Garcia III, will not suffer grave and irreparable injury by
the implementation of the subpoenas issued by the impeachment court. Thus,
the prayer for TRO must be denied.
Under Section 2 of RA No. 1405, all deposits of whatever nature with banks
xxx may be examined, inquired or looked into xxx in cases of
impeachment. Thus, there is no question that the impeachment court can pry
open the foreign currency accounts of impeachable officers.
He also what he calls an even a more compelling legal ground why the
foreign currency accounts in question are not confidential, thus: Section 8 of
RA No. 6713, as amended, mandates the disclosure of the assets of
government officials and employees who have an obligation to disclose their
assets. Moreover, Section 8 expressly states that the public has the right to
know the assets of government officials and employees.
Thus, government officials and employees have the obligation to disclose
their assets to the public, and the public has the right to know the assets of
government officials and employees. This obligation of government officials
and employees to disclose all their assets is absolute and has no exception.
The right of the public to know the assets of government officials and
employees is also absolute and has no exception.

The dissent of J ustice Sereno
She held that in the present case, PSBank failed to show an actual existing
right that is violated or threatened with violation, a condition for the issuance
of a TRO.
Since anyone has yet to claim ownership of the subject 5 foreign currency
deposits, PSBank. The confidential nature of the FCDs is extended only in
favor of the owner of the account. It is only the depositor who may invoke the
confidentiality privilege and the exception thereto. In the present case, the
prosecution alleges that the FCD accounts are owned by the Chief Justice,
while the defense denies his ownership of the same. Thus, until the
ownership of these FCDs is established, the confidentiality privilege under
R.A. 6426 is yet to attach. And until there is a clear claim by Corona of
ownership of the 5 FCDs, the Court has to consider that there exists an
implied denial of ownership of any bank account containing money beyond
what is disclosed in the Chief Justices SALN.
Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, he is constitutionally and
statutorily mandated to perform a positive duty to disclose all of his assets
and liabilities. This already operates as the consent required by law. When a
public officer affixes his signature on his Oath of Office, he embraces all his
constitutional and statutory duties as a public officer, one of which is the
positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. Thus, for all public
officers, what is absolute is not the confidentiality privilege, but the obligation
of disclosure.
Public interest must be held paramount over private or economic concerns.
In the end, this Courts Resolution results in an iniquitous situation, where the
supreme interest of the public to maintain accountability among public officers
is relegated to the sidelines in favor of a statutory privilege that arose purely
out of economic considerations.

The concurring opinion of J ustice Brion
RA No. 6426, by its plain terms, is clear that all foreign currency deposits are
considered to be absolutely confidential. The law expressly refers to deposits
not to the identity, nationality, or residence of the depositors. Thus, to claim
that the depositors must be considered is misplaced. Also, to so claim is to
read into the clear words of the law exemptions that its literal wording does
not support. To so claim may even amount to judicial legislation.
Legislative intent is to be determined from the language employed, and
where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction.
In the absence of ambiguity, the Court may not construe a laws provisions by
taking into account questions of expediency, good faith, practical utility and
other similar reasons so as to relax non-compliance therewith.
He noted that the Court had previously ruled that bank accounts laws are not
covered by the right to information under Art. III, Sec. 7 and the requirement
of full public disclosure under Article II, Section 28 of the Constitution, which
is statutorily implemented through the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees). The Constitution in fact declares that the
publics right to information is subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law. The implied repeal of inconsistent laws that RA 6713 mandates
cannot be interpreted as a repeal of the express substantive right granted to
confidentiality under Section 8 of RA No. 6426, even if the latter was enacted
earlier. Implied repeals are not favored; the presumption is against
inconsistency or repugnance and, accordingly, against implied repeals.

The ruling in Republic v. Eugenio, to my mind, reflects the prevailing view
under our jurisprudence pointing towards the retention and dominance of the
absolute confidential nature of bank deposits. In the recent case of BSB
Group, Inc. v. Go (a 2010 case), the Court reiterated the importance of
financial privacy. As observed by Tajan, despite the multiplication of the
exceptions to bank secrecy, the Court declared that bank secrecy, which falls
within the legally-recognized zones of privacy, remains the general rule and
that the present legal order is obliged to conserve the absolutely confidential
nature of bank deposits. The Court found disfavor in construing the
exceptions in a manner that authorizes unwarranted and unbridled inquiry into
bank accounts.

19. In Re: Production of Court Records
In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the
Attendance of Court officials and employees as witnesses under the subpoenas
of February 10, 2012 and the various letters for the Impeachment Prosecution
Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012.
FEBRUARY 14, 2012

Summary:
Letters to the Court requesting for rollo of cases and subpoenas of Court personnels
and documents are brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. In deciding whether
to allow the requests for such documents and information, the Court held that,
Philippine law, rules and jurisprudence prohibit the disclosure of confidential or
privileged information under well-defined rules. At the most basic level and subject to
the principle of comity, Members of the Court, and Court officials and employees may

40

not be compelled to testify on matters that are part of the internal deliberations and
actions of the Court in the exercise of their adjudicatory functions and duties, while
testimony on matters external to their adjudicatory functions and duties may be
compelled by compulsory processes.

FACTS:
During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the
Prosecution Panel manifested in a COMPLIANCE that it would present about 100
witnesses and almost a thousand documents, to be secured from both private and
public offices. The list of proposed witnesses included Justices of the Supreme
Court, and Court officials and employees who will testify on matters, many of
which are, internal to the Court.
o It was at about this time that the letters, now before us, were sent.
The following letters were sent along with the specific requests.
1. LETTER dated January 19, 2012 of Hon. Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, requesting
access of Public Prosecutors to the rollo of Flight Attendants and Stewards
Association of the Philippines (FASAP) v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), et al. and
certified true copies of the Agenda and Minutes of the Deliberations of the same
case.
access of Public Prosecutors to the rollo of Navarro v. Ermit.
3. LETTER dated January 25, 2012 of Hon. Irvin M. Alcala for Hon. Joseph Emilio A.
Abaya, requesting access of Public Prosecutors to the rollo of the case of Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
et al.,
access of Public Prosecutors to the rollo of League of Cities v. COMELEC.
The Hon. Impeachment Court directed the attendance of witnesses Clerk of Court
Enriqueta E. Vidal and Deputy Clerk of Court Felipa Anama, and the production of
documents per the subpoena ad testificandum et duces tecum dated February 9,
2012 in the case of FASAP v. PAL.
Another subpoena ad testificandum dated February 10, 2012 was directed
towards the Clerk of Court Vidal, in the case of former President Gloria
Macapagal- Arroyo and former First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo.
The House Impeachment Panel requested the Impeachment Court issued
subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum for the production of records of
cases, and the attendance of Justices, officials and employees of the Supreme
Court, to testify on these records and on the various cases mentioned above.
o NOTE: This request was denied by the Hon. Presiding Senator- Judge Juan
Ponce Enrile. Thus, the attendance of Supreme Court Justices under
compulsory process now appears to be moot and academic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court should grant the requests for the rollo of the case
and the subpoena directed towards court officials? NO

HELD:
Therefore, all the requested documents cannot be produced as discussed.

RATIO:
Independence of the Judiciary as the Basis of Protection of Privileged and
Confidential Information.
The doctrine of separation of powers is an essential component of our democratic
and republican system of government that constitutes the bedrock of our system
of checks and balances in government.
It divides the government into three branches, each with welldefined powers: the
legislature enacts the law, the executive implements it, and the judiciary interprets
it.
Each branch is considered separate, co-equal, coordinate and supreme within its
own sphere, under the legal and political reality of one overarching Constitution
that governs one government and one nation for whose benefit all the three
separate branches must act with unity.
A lesser known but no less important aspect of the principle of separation of
powers is the principle of comity or the practice of voluntarily observing inter-
departmental courtesy in undertaking their assigned constitutional duties for the
harmonious working of government.
o The Judiciary applies the principle of comity at the first instance in its
interpretation and application of laws. In appreciating the areas wholly
assigned to a particular branch for its sole and supreme exercise of discretion
(i.e., on political questions where the courts can intervene only when the
assigned branch acts with grave abuse of discretion).
o The two other branches, for their part, may also observe the principle of
comity by voluntarily and temporarily refraining from continuing with the acts
questioned before the courts.
A case in point is on the matter of impeachment whose trial has been specifically
assigned by the Constitution to the Senate.
o Where doubt exists in an impeachment case, a standard that should not be
forgotten is the need to preserve the structure of a democratic and republican
government, particularly the check and balance that should prevail.

Access to court records: general rule a policy of transparency
Underlying every request for information is the constitutional right to information (a
right granted to the people) that Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution.
The right to information, by its very nature and by the Constitutions own terms, is
not absolute.
In line with the publics constitutional right to information, the Court has adopted a
policy of transparency with respect to documents in its possession or custody,
necessary to maintain the integrity of its sworn duty to adjudicate justiciable
disputes.
o Section 11, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court: Certified copies.The clerk shall
prepare, for any person demanding the same, a copy certified under the seal
of the court of any paper, record, order, judgment, or entry in his office, proper
to be certified, for the fees prescribed by these rules. [emphases ours]
o The rule grants access to court records to any person, subject to payment of
fees and compliance with rules; it is not necessary that the request be made
by a party to the case.
It is subject to the limitations the laws and the Courts own rules provide.

When Court Records are considered Confidential
In the Judiciary, privileges against disclosure of official records create a hierarchy
of rights that protect certain confidential relationships over and above the publics
evidentiary need or right to every mans evidence.

41

Thus, certain informations contained in the records of cases before the Supreme
Court are considered confidential and are exempt from disclosure.
Specifically, the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) prohibits the
disclosure of:
o (1) the result of the raffle of cases, (2) the actions taken by the Court on each
case included in the agenda of the Courts session, and (3) the deliberations
of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending before it.
o Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC10 declares that the results of the raffle of cases
shall only be available to the parties and their counsels, unless the cases
involve bar matters, administrative cases and criminal cases involving the
penalty of life imprisonment, which are treated with strict confidentiality and
where the raffle results are not disclosed even to the parties themselves.
o Rule 10, Section 2 of the IRSC provides that the actions taken in each case in
the Courts agenda, which are noted by the Chief Justice or the Division
Chairman, are also to be treated with strict confidentiality.
o Only after the official release of the resolution embodying the Court action
may that action be made available to the public.
Court deliberations are traditionally recognized as privileged communication.
o Section 2. Confidentiality of court sessions. Court sessions are executive in
character, with only the Members of the Court present. Court deliberations
are confidential and shall not be disclosed to outside parties, except as may
be provided herein or as authorized by the Court. [emphasis ours]
Justice Abad in Arroyo v. De Lima13 (TRO on Watch List Order case), stated that
the rules on confidentiality will enable the Members of the Court to freely discuss
the issues without fear of criticism for holding unpopular positions or fear of
humiliation for ones comments.
o This is known as deliberative process privilege, involving as it does the
deliberative process of reaching a decision.
The privilege is not exclusive to the Judiciary.
The rule extends to documents and other communications which are part of or are
related to the deliberative process.
o The deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure documents
reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations that are
component parts of the process for formulating governmental decisions and
policies. This privilege may also be claimed by other court officials and
employees when asked to act on these documents and other
communications.
To qualify for protection under the deliberative process privilege, the agency must
show that the document is both (1) predecisional and (2) deliberative.
o Communications are considered predecisional if they were made in the
attempt to reach a final conclusion.
o A material is deliberative, if it reflects the give and take of the consultative
process. If the disclosure of the information would expose the governments
decision making process in a way that discourages candid discussion among
the decision-makers (thereby undermining the courts ability to perform their
functions), the information is deemed privileged.
Two other grounds for denying access to court records, as well as preventing
members of the bench, from being subjected to compulsory process: (1) the
disqualification by reason of privileged communication and (2) the
pendency of an action or matter.
As far as the Court is concerned, its Members and officials involved in all
proceedings are duty-bound to observe the privileged communication and
confidentiality rules if the integrity of the administration of justice were to be
preserved i.e., not even Members of the Court, on their own and without the
consent of the Supreme Court, can testify on matters covered by the prohibitions
and exclusions, particularly with respect to matters pending resolution before the
Supreme Court.

JUST A SUMMARY: What are privileged documents or communications that are
not subject to disclosure.
(1) Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases and the actions taken by the
Court on each case included in the agenda of the Courts session on acts done
material to pending cases, except where a party litigant requests information on the
result of the raffle of the case, pursuant to Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC;
(2) Court deliberations or the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases
and matters pending before the Court;
(3) Court records which are predecisional and deliberative in nature, in particular,
documents and other communications which are part of or related to the deliberative
process, i.e., notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda,
records of internal deliberations, and similar papers.
(4) Confidential Information secured by justices, judges, court officials and employees
in the course of their official functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above, are privileged
even after their term of office.
(5) Records of cases that are still pending for decision are privileged materials that
cannot be disclosed, except only for pleadings, orders and resolutions that have been
made available by the court to the general public.
(6) The principle of comity or inter-departmental courtesy demands that the highest
officials of each department be exempt from the compulsory processes of the other
departments.
(7) These privileges belong to the Supreme Court as an institution, not to any justice or
judge in his or her individual capacity. Since the Court is higher than the individual
justices or judges, no sitting or retired justice or judge, not even the Chief Justice, may
claim exception without the consent of the Court.

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Political Law Review Case Digests Dean Sedfrey Candelaria

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