Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives.

They brought this suit against

respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally
mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. rroyo announced that he was going to raise a !uestion on the
!uorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
"n the same day, the bill was signed by the #pea$er of the House of Representatives and the President
of the #enate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been
finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the #enate on %ovember &', '((). The enrolled
bill was signed into law by President *idel +. Ramos on %ovember &&, '(().

Issue: ,hether R.. %o. -&./ is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House0
,hether the certification of #pea$er 1e +enecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious0
,hether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House Rules0 and
,hether a certiorari2prohibition will be granted.

Held: fter considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress
committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.. %o. -&./. This case is therefore dismissed.

Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other
two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coe!ual
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thin$s the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to see$
a rematch in the 3udicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court
has not been invested with a roving commission to in!uire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
s$ullduggery. It would be acting in e4cess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its
discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here5
petitioners can see$ the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.. %o. -&./. In the
absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in
the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is
due the 3udgment of that body.

In view of what is essential
6erely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional re!uirements for the enactment
of a law, i.e., rt. +I, 77&)8&9 are +I":T;1.
*irst, in "sme<a v. Pendatun, it was held5 "t any rate, courts have declared that =the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are sub3ect to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them.= nd it has been said that =Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance,
the courts have no concern. Theymay be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.=
Conse!uently, =mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action >ta$en by a
deliberative body? when the re!uisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.="
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are sub3ect to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Conse!uently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act
taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.

In view of the Courts jurisdiction
This Court=s function is merely to chec$ whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its 3urisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of
a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac$ of 3urisdiction, there is no occasion for the
Court to e4ercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to loo$ into what it thin$s is apparent error. If,
then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself it follows that such a case does not present a
situation in which a branch of the government has !gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction!.

In view of House Rules
%o rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically re!uires that in cases such as
this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a
viva voce or nominal voting.
6r. T":;%TI%". The fact that nobody ob3ects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the
matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it
has been the procedure in this House that if somebody ob3ects, then a debate follows and after the
debate, then the voting comes in.
%or does the Constitution re!uire that the yeas and the nays of the 6embers be ta$en every time a
House has to vote, e4cept only in the following instances5 upon the last and third readings of a bill, at
the request of one"fifth of the #embers present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the
$resident.

In view of grave abuse
Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac$ or e4cess of 3urisdiction" has a settled
meaning in the 3urisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical e4ercise of 3udgment
by a tribunal e4ercising 3udicial or !uasi 3udicial power as to amount to lac$ of power.

In view of the enrolled bill doctrine
@nder the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. %o. 9'(- by the #pea$er of the House and the President
of the #enate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on
%ovember &', '(() are conclusive of its due enactment.
This Court !uoted from ,igmore on ;vidence the following e4cerpt which embodies good, if old8
fashioned democratic theory5 AInstead of trusting a faithful Budiciary to chec$ an inefficient :egislature,
they should turn to improve the :egislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors
by as$ing the Budiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution0 but to
represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the wor$ of whose hands on the
statute8roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.C

%In view of justiciability according to $&'( )*+
,ith due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non"justiciable. %or do I
agree that we will trivialiDe the principle of separation of power if we assume 3urisdiction over the case at
bar. ;ven in the @nited #tates, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable
impediment against the interposition of 3udicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.

The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. Eut within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House,
and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even
more 3ust.