MALACAANG

M a n i l a
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 543 August 21, 1974
AUTHORIZING THE DESIGNATION OF MUNICIPAL JUDGES AND LAWYERS IN
ANY BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE TO ACT AS COUNSEL DE
OFICIO FOR THE ACCUSED WHO ARE INDIGENT IN PLACES WHERE THERE
ARE NO AVAILABLE PRACTICING ATTORNEYS
WHEREAS, under existing law, Municipal Judges and other lawyers in the government service
are prohibited from practicing law;
WHEREAS, there are some places where there are no available legal practitioners, as a result of
which the trial of cases in court is delayed to the prejudice particularly of detention prisoners;
WHEREAS, for the protection of the rights of the accused who cannot afford to hire lawyers
from other places and to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is necessary that they be provided with
counsel;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers in me vested by the Constitution as commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, and General
Order No. 1, dated September 22, 1972, as amended, do hereby order and decree as follows:
Section 1. Designation of Municipal Judges and lawyers in any branch of the government
service, as counsel de oficio. In places where there are no available practicing lawyers, the
District Judge or Circuit Criminal Court Judge shall designate a municipal judge or a lawyer
employed in any branch, subdivision or instrumentality of the government within the province,
as counsel de oficio for an indigent person who is facing a criminal charge before his court, and
the services of such counsel de oficio shall be duly compensated by the Government in
accordance with Section thirty-two, Rule One Hundred Thirty Eight of the Rules of Court.
If the criminal case wherein the services of a counsel de oficio are needed is pending before a
City or municipal court, the city or municipal judge concerned shall immediately recommend to
the nearest District Judge the appointment of a counsel de oficio, and the District Judge shall
forthwith appoint one in accordance with the preceding paragraph.
For purposes of this Decree an indigent person is anyone who has no visible means of support or
whose income does not exceed P300 per month or whose income even in excess of P300 is
insufficient for the subsistence of his family, which fact shall be determined by the Judge in
whose court the case is pending, taking into account the number of the members of his family
dependent upon him for subsistence.
Section 2. Repealing Clause. All laws and decrees inconsistent with this Decree are hereby
repealed.
Section 3. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 21st day of August, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy-four.


TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [159 SCRA 70; G.R. NOS. L-72335-39; 21 MAR 1988]
Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally
filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the
Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974,
containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No.
3019 against then Secretary of Public Information
Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the
office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became
widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a
falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the
Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was
resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the
Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on
April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner
Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by
referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security
Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980,
the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan,
recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt
practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L.
Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-
affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by
the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985
that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five
criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on
June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1)
Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a
private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law,
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section
3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from
Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity
Trading Corporation as consideration for the release of a
check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing
services rendered for the Constitutional Convention
Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3)
counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and
Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A
motion to quash the information was made alleging that
the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and
of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed
against him. It was denied hence the appeal.


Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his
rights as an accused.


Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy
disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint
came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a
falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from
established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary
investigation, which require the submission of affidavits
and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the
respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred
the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for
finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911)
prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a
case under preliminary investigation by him from its
termination. While we agree with the respondent court that
this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the
other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored
completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to
three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable
in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at
bar.
Re: Request For Live Tv Of Trial Of Joseph Estrada
Re: Request For Live Tv Of Trial Of Joseph Estrada
360 SCRA 248
A.M. No 01-4-03-Sc
June 29, 2001

Facts: The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting the Court
to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed
against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the
public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The
request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and
Attorney Ricardo Romulo.

Issue: Whether or Not live media coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases
filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be permitted by the court.

Held: The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the
other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a
fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that
the right of the accused must be preferred to win.

Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in
a trial that is not lifted about its individual settings nor made an object of publics attention and
where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only be
evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded.

An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone
else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that
he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not
compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized
trial, it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the
available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.

The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public
information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and
comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public. Nevertheless, within the
courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due
process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.
In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of the Maguindanao
Massacre cases, the Court lays down the following guidelines toward addressing the concerns
mentioned in Aquino and Estrada:
(a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made both for
documentary purposes and for transmittal to live radio and television broadcasting.
(b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of application, manifesting that they
intend to broadcast the audio-visual recording of the proceedings and that they have the
necessary technological equipment and technical plan to carry out the same, with an undertaking
that they will faithfully comply with the guidelines and regulations and cover the entire
remaining proceedings until promulgation of judgment.
No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed. No media entity shall be allowed to broadcast
the proceedings without an application duly approved by the trial court.
(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom to
provide a single wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial court. No panning and zooming
shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The
camera and the necessary equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a duly designated
official or employee of the Supreme Court. The camera equipment should not produce or beam
any distracting sound or light rays. Signal lights or signs showing the equipment is operating
should not be visible. A limited number of microphones and the least installation of wiring, if
not wireless technology, must be unobtrusively located in places indicated by the trial court.
The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator shall coordinate and
assist the trial court on the physical set-up of the camera and equipment.
(d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to the media entities
shall be conducted in such a way that the least physical disturbance shall be ensured in keeping
with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings and the exclusivity of the access to the media
entities.
The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link with the camera equipment monitoring
the proceedings shall be for the account of the media entities, which should employ technology
that can (i) avoid the cumbersome snaking cables inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize the
unnecessary ingress or egress of technicians, and (iii) preclude undue commotion in case of
technical glitches.
If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the set-up of the media entities facilities,
the media entities shall access the audio-visual recording either via wireless technology
accessible even from outside the court premises or from one common web broadcasting platform
from which streaming can be accessed or derived to feed the images and sounds.
At all times, exclusive access by the media entities to the real-time audio-visual recording should
be protected or encrypted.
(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day must be continuous and in its
entirety, excepting such portions thereof where Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
[29][27]

applies, and where the trial court excludes, upon motion, prospective witnesses from the
courtroom, in instances where, inter alia, there are unresolved identification issues or there are
issues which involve the security of the witnesses and the integrity of their testimony (e.g., the
dovetailing of corroborative testimonies is material, minority of the witness).
The trial court may, with the consent of the parties, order only the pixelization of the image of
the witness or mute the audio output, or both.
(f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the proceedings, no commercial break or any
other gap shall be allowed until the days proceedings are adjourned, except during the period of
recess called by the trial court and during portions of the proceedings wherein the public is
ordered excluded.
(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output from the on-going proceedings, the
proceedings shall be broadcast without any voice-overs, except brief annotations of scenes
depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them at the start or at the end of the scene. Any
commentary shall observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court;
(h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be allowed until after the finality of
judgment, except brief footages and still images derived from or cartographic sketches of scenes
based on the recording, only for news purposes, which shall likewise observe the sub judice rule
and be subject to the contempt power of the court;
(i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in theNationalMuseumand the Records
Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
(j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and
control of the trial court which may issue supplementary directives, as the exigency requires,
including the suspension or revocation of the grant of application by the media entities.
(k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall forthwith study, design and
recommend appropriate arrangements, implementing regulations, and administrative matters
referred to it by the Court concerning the live broadcast of the proceedings pro hac vice, in
accordance with the above-outlined guidelines. The Special Committee shall also report and
recommend on the feasibility, availability and affordability of the latest technology that would
meet the herein requirements. It may conduct consultations with resource persons and experts in
the field of information and communication technology.
(l) All other present directives in the conduct of the proceedings of the trial court (i.e.,
prohibition on recording devices such as still cameras, tape recorders; and allowable number of
media practitioners inside the courtroom) shall be observed in addition to these guidelines.
Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances technology has to offer in distilling the
abstract discussion of key constitutional precepts into the workable context. Technology per se
has always been neutral. It is the use and regulation thereof that need fine-tuning. Law and
technology can work to the advantage and furtherance of the various rights herein involved,
within the contours of defined guidelines.



People v Agbayani 284 SCRA 315 (1998)
Posted by Evelyn
Facts: The appellant was charged for raping his 14-year old daughter and was found guilty of the crime
of rape. A motion for a new trial was filed before the court by the new counsel of the accused assailing
the irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused invoking the failure of the court to
inform the accused of his right to choose his own counsel and the violation of the appellants right for a 2
day preparation for trial.

Issue: Whether or not the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the
accused of the right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the judgment of conviction and to send
the case back for a new trial.




Held: It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the
accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the
trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and
trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the
contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved
that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused
was informed by the court of such right.


Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides that after a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled
to two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause grants him further time. It must be
pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. Only when so demanded does denial thereof
constitute reversible error and a ground for new trial. Further, such right may be waived, expressly or
impliedly. In the instant case, appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively
waived such right. It is untenable to believe that the counsel who represented the appellant was not
prepared during the trial as records showed he was able to cross-examine the complainant and there was
no ground to claim he is incompetent to represent the appellant in court. The SC thereby affirmed the
decision of the lower court.
AMATAN vs. JUDGE AUJERO
[Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-956] September 27, 1995
FACTS: The accused was charged with homicide. So obviously, he killed somebody. During the plea
bargaining, sabi ng accused, We would like to plead guilty to the lesser offense of attempted homicide
(2 degrees lower). The prosecutor and the widow agreed. So the court rendered a decision on
attempted. Nagalit ang pamilya ng namatay ang brother, anong klase ito?! The brother of the
deceased brought a letter to Chief Justice Narvasa at that time, questioning the judge, Pwede ba yan?
Of course, according to Judge Aujero, Teka muna, under the new Rules (citing the 1985 Rules) you can
plead guilty to a lesser offense whether or not included in the offense charged, and even you, you have
to consider that attempted homicide is related to homicide kaya lang two degrees lower. The law is
very clear.Ano sabi ng Supreme Court? The Supreme Court gave a lecture.

HELD: The fact of death of the victim cannot by simple logic and plain common sense be reconciled with
the plea of guilty to the lower offense of attempted homicide. (imagine, namatay, ngayon buhay na?
how can you reconcile these two?) The crime of homicide as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code necessarily produces death; attempted homicide does not.
However, the law is not entirely bereft of solutions in such cases. In instances where a literal application
of a provision of law would lead to injustice or to a result so directly in opposition with the dictates of
logic and everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code, particularly Article 10,
admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. (Meaning, when a judge decides, do
not look only at the letter of the law, you look at the logic of your decision, the sense of right and
justice.) In case of doubt the intent is to promote right and justice. Fiat justicia ruat coelum. Stated
differently, when a provision of law is silent or ambiguous, judges ought to invoke a solution responsive
to the vehement urge of conscience.
These are fundamental tenets of law. In the case at bench, the fact of the victim's death, a clear
negation of frustrated or attempted homicide, ought to have alerted the judge not only to a possibly
inconsistent result but to an injustice. (In other words, the charge is he died, I will convict him for
attempted homicide which assumes he did not die, how can you reconcile? Dapat pag-isipan mo yan,
look at the effects of your decision.) The failure to recognize such principles so cardinal to our body of
laws amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects respondent judge's lack of prudence, if not
competence, in the performance of his duties. While it is true, as respondent judge contends, that he
merely applied the rule to the letter, the palpably incongruous result ought to have been a red flag
alerting him of the possibility of injustice. The death of an identified individual, the gravamen of the
charge against the defendant in the criminal case, cannot and should not be ignored in favor of a more
expedient plea of either attempted or frustrated homicide. We have held before that
if the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. (Where the law is so basic and you do not know it or pretend not to know it, that is
gross ignorance of
the law.)
What happens now to Judge Aujero? Sinabon siya ng SC, Finally, every judge must be the embodiment
of competence, integrity and independence. A judge should not only be aware of the bare outlines of
the law but also its nuances and ramifications, otherwise, he would not be able to come up with
decisions which are intrinsically fair. (Wala namang malice. Di naman sinadya or bad faith that he was
paid to do it, so the SC said,) Nonetheless, the case at bench stands unique because of the potently
absurd result of respondent's application of the law.
I think he was just censured or fined a minimal amount. Di naman sinadya, kaya lang pangit ba. Iyan ang
sinasabi ko, how do you get quality judges? That is the big problem yung malawak ang pag-iisip. Yaan!

PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN [17 SCRA 1119; G.R. NO. L-26376; 31 AUG 1966]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in
the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon being arraigned, he entered
into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted y
counsel. At his counsel de officio, he was allowed to
present evidence and consequently testified that he
stabbed the deceased in self-defense. In addition, he
stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police
authorities. On the basis of the testimony of the accused,
he was acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed.


Issue: Whether or Not the appeal placed the accused in
double jeopardy.


Held: The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the
existence of plea is an essential requisite to double
jeopardy. The accused had first entered a plea of guilty but
however testified that he acted in complete self-defense.
Said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty
and the court a quo should have required him to plead a
new charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty
be entered for him. This was not done. Therefore, there
has been no standing of plea during the judgment of
acquittal, so there can be no double jeopardy with respect
to the appeal herein.
G.R. No. L-22032
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
CAMOLO DIGORO alias PANONDIONGAN, defendant and appellant.
Mamintal Tamano for the defendant and appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for the plaintiff and appellee.
, J .:
An information charging Counterfeiting of Treasury and Bank Notes under Article 166 of the
Revised Penal Code was filed in the Court of First Instance of Lanao on June 3, 1959 against
Camolo Digoro alias Panondiongan, Hadji Solaiman Digoro and Macasasab Dalomangcob.
Amended informations charging the same offense were filed on June 5, 1959 and August 13,
1959. On August 14, 1959, upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, on March 20, 1961, the case was provisionally dismissed, upon the Provincial
Fiscals motion, in regard to the accused Hadji Solaiman Digoro and Macasasab Dalomangcob.
On that date, however, an amended information was filed against Camolo Digoro alias
Panondiongan. It was captioned For: Illegal Possession of Counterfeit Treasury and Bank
Notes.
As follows is the body of said amended information:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses CAMOLO DIGORO alias PANONDIONGAN of the
crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF COUNTERFEIT TREASURY AND BANK NOTES,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1959 and for sometime prior thereto, in the Municipal
District of Taraka, Province of Lanao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to possess, have in his possession, custody and control, 100-peso bill, 20-peso bill, 10-peso
bill, 5-peso bill, 2-peso bill and 1-Peso bill denominations in resemblance or similitude to a
genuine treasury or bank notes issued by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, to
wit:
1. 26 pieces 20-peso bill with serial No. AC 665154
2. 3 pieces 1-peso bill half face
3. 5 pieces 2-peso bill half face
4. 6 pieces 5-peso bill one half face
5. 5 pieces 10-peso bill one half face
6. 24 pieces 20-peso bill one half face
7. 4 pieces 20-peso bill one half face
8. 1 piece 1-peso bill with serial No. DUI76494
9. 2 pieces 100-peso bill with serial No. F00933623
10. 2 pieces 10-peso bill reverse bill with VICTORY printed
11. 1 piece 20-peso bill with serial No. AD828751
12. 1 piece 20-peso bill with serial No. 66 SN FO2555823
13. 6 pieces 20-peso bill with serial No. SN AC 665154
14. 5 pieces 1-peso bill one half face
15. 1 piece 20-peso bill with serial No. F02555823
16. 1 piece 20-peso bill one half face
17. 8 pieces 20-peso bill with serial No. SN BA910645
18. 1 piece 10-peso bill
19. 68 pieces 20-peso bill
20. 83 pieces 20-peso bill with serial No. AC665154
21. 1 piece 20-peso bill with serial No. V 177393
Contrary to and in violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code.
A plea of not guilty was entered thereto by the accused, with the assistance of counsel, on the
same day. A decision was thereupon rendered sentencing the accused to suffer imprisonment of
not more than ten (10) years and one (1) day and not less than six (6) years and one (1) day, and
to pay the costs.
From said judgment the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, on the ground that the
amended information to which he pleaded guilty, does not charge an offense. Said appeal was
thereafter certified to this Court, by resolution of the Court of Appeals dated September 11,
1963, as involving questions purely of law.
Possession of false treasury or bank notes alone without anything more, is not a criminal offense.
For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code the possession must
be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes. From the provision of the law the
foregoing is clear:
ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of
credit.-Unless the act be one of those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding
articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent to use any of
the false or falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed in said articles.
It follows that an information, as in this case, alleging possession of false treasury and bank notes
without alleging intent to use the same but only intent to possess them, charges no offense. A
plea of guilty to such an information, therefore, does not warrant conviction of the accused. It is
well recognized that a plea of guilty is an admission only of the material allegations of the
information but not that the facts thus alleged constitute an offense (People vs. Fortuno, 73 Phil.
407).
From the allegations in the information to which the accused pleaded guilty, intent to use cannot
be clearly inferred. It is true it was stated that the accused possessed the false treasury and bank
notes unlawfully and feloniously Contrary to and in violation of Article 168 of the Revised
Penal Code. Such statements, however, are not allegations of facts but mere conclusions that the
facts alleged constitute the offense sought to be charged. Furthermore, the information alleged
intent to possess instead of intent to use. Such allegation precludes clear inference of intent to
use, in the absence of express allegation of the latter, since intent to use entails intent to part with
the possession.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed is hereby set aside and the case is remanded for new
prosecution under an appropriate and valid information. Costs de oficio. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LORETO ARCONADO, ET AL., defendants. LORETO ARCONADO, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Santiago Ranada for defendant-appellant.
Labrador, J .:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Delfin B.
Flores, presiding, denying a petition of the accused-appellant Loreto Arconado for the reopening
of the case, to give said appellant opportunity to prove the mitigating circumstance of incomplete
self-defense.
The facts leading to the appeal are correctly presented in the brief of the government as follows:
In the afternoon of November 11, 1958, at about five oclock, the defendant-appellant, Loreto
Arconado, stabbed and killed one, Leoncio Recacho in Gabu Sur, Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Charged
with the crime of homicide, the said Arconado, at first, pleaded not guilty but decided to change
it to that of guilty when the date of his trial arrived with the request, however, that he be allowed
to present evidence showing the presence of several mitigating circumstances which attended the
killing (tsn, pp. 2-5, Aug. 17, 1959). This request was granted by the trial court and appellant
was able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court the mitigating circumstances of minority,
voluntary surrender in addition to his plea of guilty (tsn, pp. 5, 8-10, 33-34, Aug. 17, 1959). But
when appellant further requested to prove the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation
on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act, the prosecution objected, and the
former had to withdraw his request (tsn, pp. 31-33, Aug. 17, 1959.) The lower court then
sentenced appellant to an indeterminate sentence of not less than FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY of arresto mayor nor more than FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision
correctional, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P6,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency not to exceed one third (1/3) of the principal penalty and to
pay the costs (p. 46, Rec.). Thereafter, appellant filed an Urgent Motion For Reconsideration and
later on, a Motion For Reconsideration And For Reopening both praying that the trial court allow
him to prove either the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense or sufficient
provocation (pp. 52-57, Rec.). The court denied both motions on the ground that it would be
tantamount to making appellants plea of guilt conditional to allow him to prove the mitigating
circumstances aforesaid (pp. 58-59, Rec.). Hence, the present appeal. (pp. 1-3, Brief for the
plaintiff appellee).
In order to understand the merits of the appeal, the facts and circumstances leading to the
prosecution of the accused-appellant Loreto Arconado may be briefly stated as follows: On the
11th day of November, 1958, between five oclock and six oclock in the afternoon, eight
individuals were talking together on a place west of the house of one Francisco Ragasa, barrio
No. 35, Gabu Sur, Laoag, Ilocos Norte. While they were together and talking to each other,
Leoncio Racacho, came to the group saying in Ilocano words meaning Vulva of your mother,
all of you. (Vulva de su madre, in Spanish). He continued repeating these indecent words at the
group and one of them, Manuel Ramos, thought that Racacho was just joking, but Racacho went
further than that; he approached one by the name of Aning who tried to evade him. Racacho then
hit Manuel Ramos with his fist and then assaulted still another, Juan Ragat. When Pedro Rabur
noticed that Racacho was assaulting Juan Ragat he pulled Racacho away, but as Rabur went back
to get his fighting cock Racacho approached Luis Arconado, father of the accused-appellant,
throwing sand at Luis.
It so happened that the accused-appellant Loreto Arconado had come to call for his father Luis
Arconado; but as soon as he reached his fathers place he was embraced by Racacho. The
appellant objected saying that he was not to blame for anything and a fight ensued between
Racacho and appellant, as a result of which Racacho later was stabbed by the appellant.
The above incidents are contained in the affidavits attached to the complaint. The persons who
subscribed to the affidavit were among those actually present and witnessed the coming of
Racacho to the group and his assault on many of them.
As indicated in the statement of the Solicitor General above-quoted, when appellant asked that
he be allowed to plead guilty, his counsel expressed his intention of proving certain mitigating
circumstance; but as soon as he had finished proving the mitigating circumstances of minority
and voluntary surrender, and as he started proving the mitigating circumstance of unlawful
aggression or in complete self-defense, the judge ordered him to stop. Out of respect for the
judge he desisted from continuing and waited until the judge rendered its judgment.
On the day following the decision, attorney for the accused-appellant filed his motion praying
the court that his order prohibiting the further presentation of evidence of mitigating
circumstances be reconsidered and that accused-appellant be given the opportunity to establish
the additional mitigating circumstance either of incomplete self-defense or sufficient provocation
or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act. The motion was
opposed by the fiscal and the court thereupon issued the order denying the petition for
opportunity of accused-appellant to introduce the evidence of the additional mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense. The court reasoned out that the plea of guilty entered
by the accused-appellant relieved the prosecution from proving the allegations of the
information; that if the accused-appellant were allowed to prove self-defense or sufficient
provocation or threat on the part of the deceased such case would no longer be consistent with
the plea of guilty entered by the accused-appellant.
It is true that the discretion is lodged with the trial court to permit or not submission of evidence
of mitigating circumstances, after a plea of guilty has been entered. But such discretion must be
exercised in accordance with the facts and circumstances of the case and said discretion should
not be used to prevent the disclosure of circumstances that would mitigate in any manner the
responsibility of the accused who has pleaded guilty. In the case at bar the records show that
some of the mitigating circumstances composing that of incomplete self-defense, attended the
commission of the crime and the aims of justice would not be subserved by the denial of the
motion to submit evidence of the said mitigating circumstances. The rules of procedure were not
designed to curtail the disclosure of the real facts especially of mitigating circumstances, that the
criminal law may be applied with justice and fairness both to the prosecution and to the accused.
Were we to make the discretion of the judge in matters like the case at bar absolute, no accused
would be induced to enter a plea of guilty and thereby abbreviate in a way the proceedings and
especially the trial of the case. When, as in the case at bar, the facts and circumstances, as
appearing in the record itself, justify the claim of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
defense, we believe it was error for the trial court to deny the privilege to submit evidence
thereof.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the court
below for the admission of the proferred evidence of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete
self-defense, in accordance with this opinion. Without costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and
De Leon, JJ., concur.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARNEL ALCALDE y PASCASIO,
accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
For automatic reviewi[1] is the Consolidated Judgmentii[2] of 30 April 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28, Santa Cruz, Laguna, in Criminal Cases Nos. SC-6651 to SC-6654, convicting
accused-appellant Arnel Alcalde y Pascasio (hereafter ARNEL) of two counts of parricide
committed against his wife WENDY and his 11-month-old son ARWIN and two counts of
frustrated parricide committed against his two daughters BERNALYN and ERICA.
On 24 September 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna filed before the trial
court two informations for parricide and two informations for frustrated parricide.
Upon his arraignment on 22 October 1997,iii[3] ARNEL, who was assisted by a counsel de parte,
refused to speak. Pursuant to Section 1(c) of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the trial court
entered for him a plea of not guilty in each of the cases. On the same occasion, the defense
waived pre-trial. The cases were then consolidated and jointly tried.
The witnesses initially presented by the prosecution were SPO2 Nicanor Avendao, Dr. Nilo
Pempengco, Dr. June Mendoza, and Salud Suillan.
SPO2 Nicanor Avendao testified that upon his arrival at the house of ARNEL in Barangay
Bubukal, Santa Cruz, Laguna, at about 1:00 p.m. of 29 August 1997, he found the house in
disarray. He saw a naked woman lying dead on a wooden bed with both hands and feet tied from
behind, as well as a dead child on a crib. The dead woman was WENDY, and the dead child was
ARWIN. Some clothes and a puppy were also burned. Avendao and his team recovered a
piece of steel near WENDYs face and empty bottles of gin and Royal Tru-Orange on top of the
cabinet. They took pictures of the dead bodies and caused the entry of the incident in the police
blotter. He learned later that ARNEL's two daughters, BERNALYN and ERICA, had been
rushed to the provincial hospital for treatment before he and his team arrived at the crime
scene.iv[4]
Dr. Nilo Pempengco, the physician who conducted an examination of the dead bodies of
WENDY and ARWIN, testified that the cause of their death was cardio-respiratory arrest due to
severe traumatic head injury and multiple contusion hematoma.v[5] The injuries could have been
caused by any hard and blunt object like a piece of metal, piece of wood, or even a hand.
Dr. June Mendoza, a physician-surgeon of the Laguna Provincial Hospital, testified that he
treated BERNALYN and ERIKA on 29 August 1997. He found in BERNALYN multiple
contusion hematoma,vi[6] which could have been inflicted by a blunt and hard object and by a
rope but which would not have caused immediate death even if not properly treated.vii[7] He
found in ERIKA contusions and lacerated and incised wounds,viii[8] which would not have
caused death even if no immediate medical attention had been given.ix[9]
Salud Suillan, WENDYs mother, declared that WENDY and ARNEL lived with her at her
residence in Banca-Banca, Victoria, Laguna, for nine months after their marriage and that during
their sojourn at her house she noticed ARNELs uncontrollable jealousy. ARNEL used drugs,
which frequently caused his tantrums.x[10] When asked whether she knew who killed WENDY
and ARWIN, Salud answered that according to Jose Alcalde, ARNEL was the killer.xi[11] On
cross-examination, she admitted that ARNEL had been continuously treated at the University of
Sto. Tomas Hospital in Manila from 1993 up to 1997. However, she did not know whether he
was treated for a mental illness.xii[12]
After the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its exhibits, the defense filed a motion
for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence,xiii[13] which was granted. On 27 April 1998,
the defense, through counsel de parte Atty. Renato B. Vasquez, Sr., filed a demurrer to
evidencexiv[14] based on the following grounds:
(a) The accused has not been adequately informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him during the arraignment;
(b) Not an iota of incriminatory evidence, direct or circumstantial, has been adduced and
presented by the prosecution during the trial; and
(c) The constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused has not been overcome by any
evidence or contrary presumption.
In support thereof, the defense alleged that ARNEL was afflicted with psychosis and could not
comprehend, and that despite his strange behavior characterized by his deafening silence,
motionless appearance, and single direction blank stare the trial court insisted on his
arraignment. Thus, ARNEL was not adequately apprised of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Moreover, no concrete evidence pointing to ARNEL as the culprit was
presented by the prosecution. Hence, the constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused
prevails.
In its Order of 22 May 1998,xv[15] the trial court denied the demurrer to evidence and set the
dates for the presentation of the evidence for the defense. However, in a Manifestation dated 4
June 1998,xvi[16] Atty. Vasquez informed the court that the defense opted not to present evidence
for ARNELs defense, as the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On 16 July 1998, the prosecution filed its Commentxvii[17] on the manifestation and prayed for
the re-opening of the presentation of prosecutions evidence for the purpose of proving that
ARNEL was at the scene of the crime. In its Order of 21 August 1998,xviii[18] the trial court
allowed the prosecution to present additional evidence. The defense questioned the propriety of
the said order before the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari.
In its resolution of 17 December 1998,xix[19] the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
non-compliance with Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court, and for the further reason that the order
sought to be set aside was interlocutory in character and could not, therefore, be the subject of a
petition for certiorari; and that even granting that the exception applied, the trial court
committed no capriciousness in issuing the assailed order.
The prosecution thereafter presented SPO1 Neptali de la Cruz and Jose Alcalde as additional
witnesses.
SPO1 Neptali dela Cruz, testified that at around 1:30 p.m. of 29 August 1997, while he was on
duty at the Police Assistance Center Base, Barangay Bubukal, Santa Cruz, Laguna, he received a
report of a killing incident at the house of ARNEL. He proceeded to the place with SPO2
Edilberto Apuada. There, he saw ARNEL seated outside the house while being held by two
persons. He and Apuada entered the house and saw the dead bodies of WENDY and ARWIN.
He noticed that ARNEL was motionless and silent when the dead bodies were being brought out
of their house.xx[20]
Jose Alcalde, father of ARNEL, testified that at 1:30 p.m. of 29 August 1997 he heard the news
that ARNELs house was burning. Along with one Martin, his carpenter, Jose proceeded to
ARNELs house. Upon entering the house, he saw ARNEL with raging eyes, holding a kitchen
knife and a hammer. Jose tried to pacify and convince ARNEL to surrender his weapons to him.
Joses effort proved futile. It was only upon the intervention of ARNELs two brothers that
ARNEL was successfully disarmed. Jose left ARNEL to the care of his brothers because he had
to bring to the hospital the almost lifeless bodies of BERNALYN and ERIKA.xxi[21]
After the prosecution finally rested its case, the trial court set on 8 October 1998 the presentation
of the evidence for the defense. However, on 7 October 1998, counsel for ARNEL, Atty.
Vasquez Sr., informed the trial court of his inability to communicate with ARNEL because of
ARNELs out of touch of the world behavior. Atty. Vasquez manifested that the defense was
constrained to submit the case for decision.xxii[22]
In its decision of 30 April 1999,xxiii[23] the trial court found that the prosecutions evidence has
duly established a succession of circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion
that ARNEL committed the crimes charged. It gave due credence to the testimony of Jose
Alcalde. It found significant the fact that right from the start of the investigation of the incident
up to the time the cases were submitted for decision, no other person was suspected of having
anything to do with the gruesome family massacre. The trial court added that ARNELs
culpability was further bolstered by his failure to offer any evidence for his defense despite
ample opportunity to do so.
In determining the appropriate penalty in Criminal Case Nos. SC-6651 and SC-6654 for the
killing of WENDY and ARWIN, the trial court applied Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Section 5, R.A. No. 7659, which reads:
ART. 246. Parricide. -- Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty
of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Taking into account the two aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior
strength, it imposed the death penalty in both cases.
As for Criminal Cases Nos. SC-6652 and SC-6653, the trial court found ARNEL guilty of the
crime of frustrated parricide after considering the severity of the wounds suffered by his
daughters BERNALYN and ERIKA, which clearly showed his intent to kill them.
In the Appellants Brief, the defense, through a new counsel, Atty. Eduardo A. Cagandahan,
states that the trial court committed the following errors:
1. in proceeding with the case against the accused who had not been duly informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him during the arraignment or trial.
2. when it failed to have the accused medically examined to ascertain whether he was in
possession of his mental faculties when he allegedly committed the acts imputed to him, or that
he was suffering from mental aberration at the time the crime was committed, and when he
entered the plea and during the trial on the merits despite the observation of the court a quo, as
contained in the order dated August 21, 1998.
In support thereof, the defense assails the validity of ARNELs arraignment, and asserts that with
ARNELs questionable mental state he could not have understood the proceedings. It then cites
the trial courts Order dated 21 August 1998, wherein the trial court made its own observation
regarding ARNELs strange behavior at the time of arraignment. The Order reads in part:
Finally, it is worthwhile to recall that when the accused was arraigned in all the four cases, the
Court was constrained to enter for him a PLEA OF NOT GUILTY in all said cases as the
accused acted strangely in a manner as if he [was] out of touch with the world and would not
utter any word. But since the defense opted not to present any evidence, no defense whatsoever
could be entertained for the accused.
Furthermore, the defense calls our attention to the Medical Certificatexxiv[24] issued by Dr.
Ramon S. Javier, M.D., FPPA, FPNA, of Sto. Tomas University Hospital, stating that ARNEL
was first brought to his clinic on 3 December 1993, and was confined at the psychiatric ward
several times for bipolar mood disorder (manic-depressive psychosis). His last confinement in
that hospital was from 12 to 24 February 1997, or six months before the family massacre. The
medical abstractxxv[25] issued by Dr. Ma. Corazon S. Alvarez, which was also submitted by the
defense, likewise shows the several hospitalizations of ARNEL while in detention at the Bureau
of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, and the finding that ARNEL was suffering from bipolar mood
disorder with psychotic features. The defense then prays for ARNELs acquittal or, in the
alternative, the remand of the case to the lower court for further proceedings and for the
determination of ARNELs mental state.
In the Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that under
Section 11, paragraph (a), Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, suspension of
arraignment on the ground that accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
condition, which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to
plead intelligently thereto, may be granted upon motion by the party. In these cases neither
accused nor his counsel de parte asked for the suspension of the arraignment on that ground.
Such failure was tantamount to an admission that ARNEL was not suffering from any mental
disorder or to a waiver of the right to move for suspension of arraignment. Besides, for the
defense of insanity to prosper, it must be proved that the accused was insane at the very moment
when the crime was committed. The trial court was not duty-bound to initiate the determination
of ARNELs alleged mental incapacity.
Finally, the OSG agrees with the trial court that the chain of circumstances in these cases proved
beyond reasonable doubt that ARNEL committed the crimes charged. It, however, submits that
ARNEL should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua only, instead of death, in Criminal
Cases Nos. SC-6651 and SC-6654 because the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse
of superior strength cannot be appreciated against ARNEL. It agreed with the trial court insofar
as Criminal Cases Nos. SC-6652 and SC-6653 are concerned.
After a painstaking scrutiny of the records of these cases, we rule for ARNEL.
We cannot subscribe to the claim of the OSG that the failure of ARNELs counsel de parte to
ask for the suspension of his arraignment on the ground that ARNEL was suffering from an
unsound mental health amounted to a waiver of such right. It must be recalled that ARNELs
arraignment was on 22 October 1997. At the time, what was applicable was Section 12(a) of
Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment. The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time
thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto.
In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for
such purpose.
Nowhere in that Section was it required that a motion by the accused be filed for the suspension
of arraignment. Hence, the absence of such motion could not be considered a waiver of the right
to a suspension of arraignment. True, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which was invoked by the OSG, requires a motion by the proper party, thus:
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. -- Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall
be suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto.
In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for
such purpose. [Emphasis supplied].
This new requirement of motion by the proper party could not be applied to these cases
because the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which prescribes such requirement, took
effect only on 1 December 2000.
Besides, a waiver must be knowingly and intelligently made by the person possessing such
right.xxvi[26] Unfortunately, ARNEL was apparently deprived of such mental faculties. Thus, no
waiver, impliedly or expressly, could have been made by ARNEL at the time of his arraignment
by reason of his mental condition.xxvii[27]
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently in a
present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter. If
it be found that by reason of such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make
a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to
a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered.xxviii[28] Moreover, the
aforementioned Section 12(a) of Rule 116 mandates the suspension of the arraignment and the
mental examination of the accused should it appear that he is of unsound mind.
In these cases, the trial court should have ascertained ARNELs mental state instead of
proceeding with his arraignment and its subsequent proceedings. The following were enough for
the trial court to take seriously the issue of whether ARNEL was in full possession of his mental
faculties at the time of the arraignment and trial:
(a) At his arraignment, the trial court observed that ARNEL acted strangely in a manner as if
he [was] out of touch with the world and would not utter any word.xxix[29]
(b) In its Motion and Waiver of Presence [of the Accused] During the Trial,xxx[30] the defense
expressed its apprehension that ARNEL might explode into another violence while in transit to
attend his trial or while in the courtroom.
(c) ARNELs continued strange behavior characterized by his deafening silence, motionless
behavior and blank stares was raised as an issue by the defense in its demurrer to
evidence.xxxi[31]
(d) The persistent out of touch with the world behavior of ARNEL, which prevented his
counsel from effectively communicating with him for his defense was pointed out in the
Manifestation and Motion submitted by the defense.xxxii[32]
(e) ARNELs questionable mental state was reiterated by the defense in its
memorandum.xxxiii[33]
The physical and outward manifestations of ARNEL at the time of his arraignment, which were
brought to the attention of the trial court, indicated substantial demonstration of a mental
disorder that rendered ARNEL unfit to be arraigned or tried in the four criminal cases at bar.
The trial court failed to exercise utmost circumspection in assuming that ARNEL was in full
possession of his mental faculties and understood the proceedings against him.
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
under the Bill of Rightsxxxiv[34] carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to
the accused the information to enable him to effectively prepare for his defense.xxxv[35] At the
bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental
deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings, the
trial court must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the
law secures or gives.xxxvi[36] Under the circumstances in these cases, the trial court gravely
failed in this regard.
While at first glance, the remarkable enthusiasm by which the trial court adjudicated these cases
should earn emulation, it however cannot be countenanced considering its disregard of the
constitutional rights of ARNEL. Courts should be mindful of their responsibility to see to it that
the paramount interests of justice are not sacrificed for the sake of speed and efficiency.xxxvii[37]
It is also worthy to mention Atty. Vasquezs apparent lackadaisical attitude in these cases which
amounted to disregard of the strict demands of fidelity to his oath as a lawyer, duty to his client,
and responsibility as an officer of the court.xxxviii[38] He knew, or ought to know, from the very
beginning that ARNEL was hospitalized for mental disorder. The latters strange appearance at
his arraignment was enough reason for a counsel to ask for the deferment of arraignment and for
leave of court to have ARNEL subjected to psychological examination and psychiatric
evaluation. Then, too, he should have, at the very least, presented the doctor who treated
ARNEL in the University of Santo Tomas Hospital for his recurring mental illness. Irrefutably,
Atty. Vasquezs behavior in the defense of ARNEL fell short of the demanding duty to present
every defense that the law permits to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty but
by due process of law.xxxix[39]
Even if Atty. Vasquezs zeal for ARNELs cause fell short of that required of him, that is, for
him to have asked the court to suspend the arraignment of ARNEL on the ground of the latters
unsound mental health, the greater demand of due process overwhelms such inadequate zeal.
Solemn and inflexible is the constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law. Absolute heedfulness of this constitutional injunction is
most pronounced in criminal cases where the accused is in the gravest jeopardy of losing his life.
It constantly behooves every court to proceed with utmost care in each of such cases before it,
and nothing can be more demanding of judges in that respect than when the possible punishment
would be in its severest form like death -- a penalty that, once carried out, is irreversible and
irreparable.xl[40]
In light of the foregoing fatal infirmities committed by the trial court, as well as by the defense
counsel, we have no other alternative except to set aside the joint decision in question and
remand the cases to the trial court for further proceedings to allow the defense to present
evidence to prove that ARNEL was either unfit for arraignment and trial or was insane at the
time the crimes charged were committed.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Consolidated Judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Santa Cruz, Laguna, in Criminal Cases Nos. SC-6651 to SC-
6654 promulgated on 30 April 1999 is hereby SET ASIDE. These cases are ordered
REMANDED to the trial court for further and appropriate proceedings in accordance with the
foregoing observations.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.