DIFFERENCE

Mark Currie
LONDON AND NEW YORK
-iii-
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Difference : Mark Currie.
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1
INTRODUCTION: IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE
The conce)t of difference is unusual amon! critical terms. 1hile others come and !o, difference has )ersisted.
1hile others are confined to some )articular critical )ers)ecti8e or a))roach, difference has found a))lications in
almost e8er* branch of literar* studies, and )erha)s more si!nificantl*, be*ond the domain of literar* studies. Bne
e>)lanation for this unusual sco)e mi!ht be that the term encom)asses some 8er* familiar, easil* a8ailable
meanin!s. 1hat could be more strai!htfor#ard than the idea of differenceC It is the o))osite of sameness.
Perha)s the t#o most con8enient and common)lace #a*s of e>)lainin! the meanin! of a #ord are to relate it to
other #ords meanin! the same thin! <s*non*ms=, as dictionaries do, and to relate it to #ords meanin! the
o))osite of it <anton*ms=, as I ha8e Dust done. Bften these t#o kinds of e>)lanation #ill amount to the same thin!.
The dictionar* definition of EdifferenceE offers EunlikenessE, #hich is a s*non*m b* 8irtue of the fact that it ne!ates
its anton*m.
B* relatin! the #ord EdifferenceE to its o))osite, the dictionar* and I ha8e !one some #a* to e>)lainin! its
meanin!, but #e ha8e also introduced the #a* that the #ord EdifferenceE mi!ht act as a )rinci)le for e>)lainin! ho#
#ords !et their meanin!s in !eneral. I ha8e e>)lained
-+-
EdifferenceE throu!h the conce)t of difference, in that I )ointed to the difference bet#een it and another #ord. Br I
defined it ne!ati8el*, in relation to its o))osite, as if the meanin! of its o))osite #ere !i8en in nature and could act
as a foundation for an* other #ord that related to it. In fact if I tried to e>)lain the meanin! of EsamenessE, I #ould
find it 8er* difficult to do it #ithout reference to the conce)t of difference, so that its solidit* as a foundation is
com)romised and m* definition becomes rather circular. M* definition of difference has no#here to rest, and I find
m*self reboundin! bet#een one #ord and the other indefinitel*.
This su!!ests that the meanin! of #ords inheres in their relations #ith each other, that #ords ha8e no foundations,
and meanin!s are not self-contained. This idea, that the meanin! of #ords is )roduced b* their relationshi)s #ith
each other, or their differences, and that there are no foundations, is often referred to as a ErelationalE account of
meanin!.
The relational 8ie# of meanin! is clearer if the #ords EsamenessE and EdifferenceE are left out of it for the moment,
since in the discussion so far, the* are both the obDects and the method of the anal*sis. If I had started from the
#ords Eni!htE and Eda*E, this #ould not ha8e arisen, because the )roblem that I am describin! in the desi!nation of
meanin! #ould not ha8e contaminated the 8er* #ords that I am usin! for the descri)tion. In another sense, the
#ords ni!ht and da* mi!ht ha8e been easier because the* are less abstract. It could be ar!ued that ni!ht and da*
are !i8en in nature. Their meanin!s seem less de)endent on each other, and more bound u) #ith their abilit* to
refer to somethin! outside of lan!ua!e. 1hat #e ha8e here is a dichotom* and a com)lication. The dichotom* is
bet#een a relational and a referential 8ie# of lin!uistic meanin!. The com)lication is that #e canEt !et outside of
lan!ua!e to describe ho# it #orks, because #e still ha8e to use #ords to describe the #a* that #ords #ork.
The )hiloso)hical, cultural and )olitical sco)e of this set of ar!uments ma* not be a))arent immediatel*, but
comes into focus #hen the #ord sameness is substituted b* the #ord Eidentit*E. As s*non*ms, EsamenessE and
Eidentit*E are both anton*ms of EdifferenceE. This translation hel)s to e>)lain the broad and interdisci)linar* career
of the term EdifferenceE #hich, in literar* studies at least, be!an life as an obscure and technical term in structural
lin!uistics. The o))osition of identit* and difference is sli!htl* more com)le> because identit* is s*non*mous #ith
both sameness
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and difference: the dictionar* defines identit* as both Eabsolute samenessE and Eindi8idualit*E or E)ersonalit*E. The
sli))a!e here deri8es from an ambi!uit* about the )oints of com)arison and antithesis that are in o)eration.
EIdentit*E can clearl* mean the )ro)ert* of absolute sameness bet#een se)arate entities, but it can also mean the
uniFue characteristics determinin! the )ersonalit* and difference of a sin!le entit*. In itself this )oints to a 8ie#
that is also reached throu!h a lab*rinth of lin!uistic and cultural theor*: that the identit* of thin!s, )eo)le, )laces,
!rou)s, nations and cultures is constituted b* the lo!ics of both sameness and difference.
There are t#o #a*s of makin! sense of this co-de)endence. The first is to )oint out that the sameness of one
identit* !rou) is often constructed throu!h a sense of difference from another, so that some common denominator
is )osited amon! .cots throu!h the sense of o))osition #ith the -n!lish, or amon! #omen throu!h difference from
men. The second is that e8en if <or )erha)s because= identit* relies on some e>ternal difference, there is also
internal difference. This is ob8iousl* true of the lar!est unities such as nations: that #e mi!ht momentaril* )osit
some common denominator amon! 5reeks, but at another le8el the unit* is com)rised of indi8iduals #ho all differ
from each other. But it is also true at the le8el of the indi8idual. If I think of m* o#n identit*, I do not encounter a
strai!htfor#ard, indi8isible sin!ularit*, but a )lethora of )laces, times, roles, functions, interests, o)inions and
)h*sical characteristics. I am a Emultifarious )olit* of deniGensE, as obert ,ouis .te8enson describes the
multi)licitous nature of a human bein! in !r "e#yll and $r %yde, to the )oint #here the #ords EmeE and EIE seem to
be under considerable strain. If I am uniFue, it is not because I am sin!ular and indi8isible. If an*thin! it #ould be
the o))osite, that I am differentiated internall* and in relation to others in man* different #a*s. Personal identit*,
like #ords, a))ears to ha8e an undeniable relational com)onent, and as #ith the relational account of lan!ua!e,
the relational account of )ersonal identit* comes #ith the com)lication that one cannot reall* stand outside it in
order to consider #hat it is.
These sorts of ar!uments indicate the imbrication, or the inse)arabilit*, of #ords #ith issues of identit* and
difference. It is ar!uable that e8er* noun is marked b* this kind of dialectic of identit* and difference, and that
e8er* )olitical or )hiloso)hical debate to some e>tent turns on the #a*s that this dialectic o)erates. A noun
effecti8el* does t#o thin!s
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e8er* time it is used. It asserts a difference at the same time as it denies a uni8erse of differences. If I sa* Edo!E, I
assert a difference because I )osit a common denominator bet#een do!s that distin!uishes them from cats but I
also do a terrible inDustice to the rich di8ersit* of do!s, effacin! the irreducible indi8idualit* of each member of the
set. In this sense e8er* noun is a cate!or*, or a !eneralisation, a )otential collecti8e identit* and a )otential
stereot*)e. Most nouns in8ol8e this double )rocess of samin! and differentiatin!, of )ositin! a common essence
bet#een members of the set and at the same time markin! the differences that !i8e the set its identit*.
The stakes of this double )rocess are clearl* not confined to )hiloso)h*. If the double lo!ic of samin! and
differentiatin! is inherent in most nouns, it clearl* has to be at #ork e8er*#here, e8er* time #e name an entit* or
an identit*. The im)ortance of this can be stated in t#o ste)s. The first is to )oint out that namin! has the
immense )o#er of bein! a )rocess that #e take com)letel* for !ranted. 1e use nouns automaticall*, re)eatedl*,
habituall*, #ithout reflectin! on the differences the* establish and re)eat. "ouns become an inde> of entities that
#e take for !ranted, in the sense that #e reassert their e>istence, their common denominators and their )oints of
difference. The more automaticall*, habituall* and un)roblematicall* nouns are used the more entrenched
becomes the frame#ork of differences the* im)ose on the #orld.
The second ste), then, is to ask the Fuestion of #hat it is that #e are automaticall* subscribin! to #hen #e use
nouns and names, and #hat can be done about it. Bne #a* of understandin! the im)ortance of the critical conce)t
of difference is to see it as a #a* of reflectin! on the tenacit* of certain )roblems in the #orld. And the basis of this
tenacit* is sim)l* that the #ords #e use to name the thin!s in the #orld are often mistakenl* assumed to be
)assi8e reflectors )ro8idin! an inde> of the entities that e>ist in the #orld, or a list of differences discernible
bet#een thin!s. It could be ar!ued, for e>am)le, that the difference bet#een men and #omen is taken com)letel*
for !ranted as an as)ect of the #orld because it is so dee)l* embedded in the lan!ua!e s*stem. Paul de Man
<+0+0-?2= describes this mistake as a confusion of lin!uistic and natural realit*, and uses it as the basis of a
definition of ideolo!*. This book #ill e>)lore this definition at se8eral )oints in later cha)ters: that is, the 8ie# that
to acce)t #ords automaticall*, to take them for !ranted, or to consider differences
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to be )ro)erties of nature is to subscribe to somethin! that mi!ht loosel* be called ideology. Ideolo!ical critiFue
often finds its startin! )oint in the o))osite 8ie#, namel* that #ords )roDect a s*stem of differences on to the
#orld: that differences are not )ro)erties of the obDecti8e #orld bein! described as much as the* are )ro)erties of
the lan!ua!e describin! the #orld. /sin! lan!ua!e, then, is not a )assi8e )rocess of describin! the #orld but an
acti8e )rocess of construction, or structuration, e8en #hen #e belie8e other#ise. ,an!ua!e makes us think of
constructed thin!s as if the* #ere natural, and this is #h* lin!uistic differences are ideolo!ical, but if so, ideolo!*
sim)l* becomes another condition to add to the list of conditions that #e cannot !et outside of.
FRO P!ILO"OP!Y TO LIN#UI"TIC"
The conce)t of difference, then, is a central )art of one of the fundamental )roblems in )hiloso)h*, and its full
!enealo!* reall* lies in the emer!ence of the )roblem of identit* in )hiloso)h* o8er se8eral centuries. And *et this
is not the im)ression that one #ould recei8e if oneEs readin! #ere confined to the realm of An!lo-American literar*
criticism and theor*, es)eciall* that bet#een +093 and +0?3. This #as a )eriod in #hich much of the intellectual
ener!* in criticism and theor* #as bein! dra#n from the disco8er* of structuralist models of anal*sis, models that
#ere formulated mostl* in (rance, but that #ere #idel* and insistentl* re)resented to an An!lo-American critical
communit* in the +0@&s and +0?&s. The im)ression !i8en b* these mediations of structuralism is that the term
EdifferenceE ori!inates in the #ork of (erdinand de .aussure, a .#iss Professor of ,in!uistics at the /ni8ersit* of
5ene8a #hose lectures #ere collected to!ether and )ublished )osthumousl* as Course in General Linguistics. It is
not m* intention here to den* the im)ortance of .aussureEs lin!uistics, nor the fact that he !a8e to the conce)t of
difference a )articular )hiloso)hical 8alence <#hich I #ill describe shortl*=, but there is somethin! 8er* stran!e,
and #orth anal*sin!, about the order of e8ents throu!h #hich EdifferenceE became established in the An!lo-
American critical le>icon. .aussureEs course of lectures #as deli8ered bet#een +0&9 and +0++, not )ublished in
(rench until +0+3, and not translated into -n!lish until +030. -8en then, it took some time for .aussureEs name to
find its #a* into critical and theoretical discussion in the An!lo-American
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#orld. (rom about +0@& it ha))ened like an a8alanche, #ith .aussureEs lin!uistics and the structuralist methods it
ins)ired bein! mediated to the -n!lish-s)eakin! #orld throu!h #orks such as (redric 7amesonEs The rison %ouse
of Language <+0@%=, 7onathan CullerEs &tructuralist oetics <+0@3= and obert .cholesEs &tructuralism in Literature
<+0@'=, a host of translations of the #ork of oland Barthes, 7ean Pia!et, -mile Ben8eniste, 5Hrard 5enette and
TG8etan Todoro8, and then a second #a8e of !uides to the structuralist anal*sis of Dust about e8er*thin!. In
Britain, for e>am)le, MethuenEs <no# outled!eEs= "e# Accents series )ublished a lon! list of titles #hose role in
the dissemination of structuralist anal*sis no# seems inestimable, includin! at least si> 8olumes )ublished before
+0?3 that root the conce)t of difference in .aussurean lin!uistics: Aa#kesEs &tructuralism and &emiotics <+0@@=,
(iske and Aartle*Es Reading Tele'ision <+0@?=, Aebdi!eEs &ubculture( the $eaning of &tyle <+0@0=, Belse*Es Critical
ractice <+0?&=, -lamEs The &emiotics of Theatre and !rama <+0?2= and 1au!hEs $etafiction <+0?'=. Bne of the
most strikin! thin!s about the "e# Accents series is the re)eated e>)osition of structural lin!uistics from 8olume
to 8olume as a #a* of establishin! the lin!uistic basis for the conce)t of difference.
There are some im)ortant and closel* related obser8ations to be made from this )ublishin! histor* about the
emer!ence of the critical conce)t of difference. The first is that the #orld of An!lo-American literar* studies #as
!i8en e8er* reason to see difference as a .aussurean, and as a structuralist in8ention, and 8er* little reason to
8ie# the .aussurean conce)tion of difference as a facet of an on!oin! )hiloso)hical )roblem. In Britain it is Fuite
understandable that .aussurean lin!uistics #as 8ie#ed in isolation from )hiloso)hical )roblems about identit* and
difference if onl* because the )hiloso)hical )ro8enance of difference is much easier to establish in relation to
Continental )hiloso)hers, such as 6ant, Ae!el, 6ierke!aard, "ietGsche, Ausserl and Aeide!!er, than in home-
!ro#n )hiloso)h*. But it is not Dust that the conte>t of Continental )hiloso)h* #as relati8el* absent in the
rece)tion of structuralism in Britain. It could be ar!ued that the )hiloso)hical conte>t as a #hole #as rather
ne!lected in the )rocess of establishin! difference as a critical term.
The ne>t im)ortant obser8ation is that, after this de-conte>tualisation of difference as a self-contained structuralist
in8ention, there came a rather confusin! e)isode for the "e# Accents !eneration of critics, namel* the
-9-
arri8al of poststructuralism. A!ain, there are )rofound oddities here, not least that in (rance there #as no
eFui8alent #ord until much later, and that the /nited .tates had e>)erienced little more than a brief encounter
#ith structuralism before #hat #e no# call )oststructuralism arri8ed on its shores. But the more im)ortant
confusion here lies in the fact that for those #ho 8ie#ed difference as a structuralist issue, there #as some sur)rise
that so-called )oststructuralist #orks in translation, like 7acFues DerridaEs )riting and !ifference <+0@?= and later
5illes DeleuGeEs !ifference and Repetition <+00'=, seemed onl* 8er* remotel* related to structural lin!uistics.
DerridaEs #ork, #here the conce)t of difference under!oes some of its most im)ortant transformations, in fact
makes 8er* little reference to .aussure. There is a much-cited section in *f Grammatology about the relationshi)
bet#een s)eech and #ritin! in .aussureEs Course, an e>tended discussion in the essa* EDifferanceE, and be*ond
that reall* onl* short references and allusions to the .aussurean account of difference. .imilarl*, in DeleuGeEs
maDor #ork, !ifference and Repetition, there is one brief reference to .aussure, and onl* occasional !estures
else#here, usuall* #ith the intent of distancin! himself from the field of lin!uistics in !eneral. .e8eral
commentators on DeleuGe, such as 7ean-7acFues ,ecercle and Brian Massumi, ha8e been at )ains to )oint out that
DeleuGeEs a))roach to lan!ua!e is more closel* deri8ed from the .toic )hiloso)hers than from .aussure. M* )oint
here is that difference is often misre)resented either as an entirel* structuralist issue, or more s)ecificall*, as a
.aussurean in8ention. But to re)resent difference in this #a* is to i!nore the much broader conte>t, and lon!er
histor*, from #hich it deri8es its unusuall* com)le> meanin!s and uses. There is e>tended discussion of DerridaEs
relationshi) #ith .aussure in cha)ters % and 2 belo#, but it is #orth sa*in! at the outset that DerridaEs a))roach to
.aussure is to 8ie# his conce)t of difference as merel* one e>am)le of an entire herita!e of #estern meta)h*sics,
a conce)t rather uncriticall* inherited from )hiloso)h* alon! #ith a lot of unreco!nised )resu))ositions and
assum)tions. The kind of ori!inar* im)ortance that the "e# Accents series sometimes ascribed to .aussure is in
fact a )rime tar!et for #hat came to be kno#n as deconstruction, and this #ill be discussed at some len!th in
cha)ter % in relation to DerridaEs neolo!ism differance.
I sa* all this as a kind of caution a!ainst a rather limited historical scheme #hich sees difference as a structuralist
in8ention subseFuentl*
-@-
modified b* )oststructuralist inter8entions. An*one #ho subscribes to this 8ie# #ill stru!!le to make sense of
man* )oststructuralist #ritin!s on difference, #here the coordinates are mainl* )re-.aussurean. In other #ords, if
it once seemed that )oststructuralism had !ro#n out of structuralism, or that the )oststructuralist a))roach to
)hiloso)h* rested on lin!uistic )remises - )ro)ositions about the nature of lan!ua!e and the basis of lin!uistic
meanin! - it no# looks as if the su))osed ori!ins of difference in .aussureEs Course #ere in fact not ori!ins at all,
and that #hat is often su))osed to ha8e come later <)oststructuralism= is in fact a demonstration of #hat )roduced
the su))osed ori!in in the first )lace. The )ersistent reader #ill disco8er that this is one of DerridaEs fa8ourite
!ames, that is, the critiFue, )erha)s deconstruction, of ori!ins accordin! to a lo!ic of supplementarity. The lo!ic of
su))lementarit*, #hich lies at the heart of deconstruction, can be crudel* summarised for the moment as follo#s:
that sometimes thin!s that come after#ards can be seen as conce)tuall* )rior to the ori!ins from #hich the*
su))osedl* follo#.
There is a tendenc* in )oststructuralist #ritin!, e>em)lifed in su))lementarit*, to#ards counter-intuiti8e lo!ical
com)le>it* of this kind, sometimes accom)anied b* o)aFue le8els of abstraction and an o8eruse of terminolo!*
that occasionall* descends into hollo# 8erbia!e. The em)hasis )laced on .aussure in the "e# Accents series #as
one #a* of ensurin! that it did not descend into this o)aFue theoretical lan!ua!e. The fact is that .aussureEs
Course is one of the clearest statements an*#here of a relational account of identit*, and not onl* that, but of the
)roblem that I described earlier as the imbrication of lan!ua!e in Fuestions of identit*. It is not then that
.aussureEs conce)t of difference is the source of all relational identit* thinkin!, but that it is a #onderfull* clear
account of #hat relational identit* means. There are t#o broad characteristics of t#entieth-centur* )hiloso)h* that
.aussure enca)sulates, the first bein! the 8ie# that )hiloso)h* under!oes a shift from an attention to thin!s in
themsel8es to an attention to the relationshi) bet#een thin!s, and the second bein! the 8ie# that )hiloso)hical
)roblems in the t#entieth centur* are in8ariabl* )roblems about lan!ua!e. A succinct e>)ression of both of these
)hiloso)hical tendencies can be found in .aussureEs )ro)osition, that Ein lan!ua!e there are onl* differences, and
no )ositi8e termsE <+0?2:++?=, #hich seems to su!!est not onl* that the relations bet#een #ords are all-
im)ortant, but also, if there are no )ositi8e terms,
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that these differences mi!ht actuall* constitute the )ositi8e content of that #ord. I #ill be takin! a close look at the
im)lications of this sentence in the ne>t cha)ter. (or no#, I #ould like to obser8e that it is #ithout doubt the most
cited )ro)osition in .aussureEs #ork. It is this )ro)osition that is usuall* laid do#n as the foundation stone for
those accounts of difference that use .aussure as an ori!in. A readin! of .aussure often )roduces a sur)rised
reaction to the Fuite technical use he makes of the #ord EdifferenceE, his )reference for the #ord E8alueE as an
account of the #a* in #hich meanin! is !enerated b* difference. Bne of .aussureEs basic mo8es is to 8ie# the
lin!uistic si!n <that is, the #ord=, as a t#o-sided entit*, but #here the t#o sides are inse)arable, or Doined to!ether
in the brain b* an associati8e bond. These t#o sides of the si!n are the signifier and the signified, #hich .aussure
defines as the sound and the conce)t res)ecti8el*. This is a more interestin! and contro8ersial claim than it
sounds, because if the si!nifier and the si!nified are inse)arable <.aussure describes them as analo!ous to the t#o
sides of a )iece of )a)er <+0?2:+++==, and the 8alue of a si!n is !enerated b* differences bet#een #ords, as
.aussure claims, it follo#s that the si!nified content of a si!n is not a thin! in the #orld but a lin!uistic relation. Br
to )ut it another #a*, this is an account of the si!n that does not start in realit*, does not anchor the si!n as a
nominalistic 8ie# of lan!ua!e #ould do, in the #orld of thin!s. It is e>actl* this )oint that man* of his structuralist
disci)les found a))ealin! in .aussureEs account: that there is no e>tralin!uistic realit* to !uarantee the meanin! of
#ords.
It is )ossible to see alread* the im)ortance of this account of the si!n for a relational theor* of identit*, but this
im)ortance becomes more trans)arent #hen another of .aussureEs ke* obser8ations is added in. The relationshi)
bet#een the si!nifier and the si!nified, he claims, is arbitrary. A!ain this claim seems uncom)licated at first si!ht,
and can be taken to mean that there is no reason to attach a )articular si!nifier to a )articular si!nified. There are
a fe# rare cases in #hich a reason mi!ht reasonabl* be ad8anced, such as the onomato)oeic si!n, in #hich the
si!nifier actuall* sounds like the si!nified, and is therefore Emoti8atedE rather than arbitrar* <such as Es)lashE=. But
in most cases the onl* thin! that bonds the si!nifier to the si!nified is lin!uistic con8ention, #hich re)eatedl* !lues
a )articular si!nifier to a )articular si!nified throu!h the )ure force of re)eatin! the association. 1e mi!ht Dust as
#ell use the si!nifier EbearE
-0-
to si!nif* a s)herical obDect and the si!nifier EballE to si!nif* a furr* Fuadru)ed, but con8ention decrees it the other
#a* around. But the arbitrar* nature of the si!n mi!ht be said to in8ol8e more than this. Man* structuralists also
sa# in .aussureEs Course the more )rofound su!!estion that if si!nifiers #ere Doined to si!nifieds in si!ns, and the
8alue of si!ns #as !enerated b* differences bet#een #ords rather than )re-e>istin! differences in the #orld, there
#as also somethin! arbitrar* about the #a* that a lan!ua!e s*stem di8ided the #orld u). There #as a re8ealin!
cultural relati8ist )oint to be made here about the #a* that different lan!ua!es could di8ide the #orld u)
differentl*, and thereb* )roduce in their lin!uistic subDects, b* #hich I mean the s)eakers of those lan!ua!es,
entirel* different #a*s of seein! the #orld. There is a little academic sub-industr*, not to mention a s)ecies of the
chatterin! classes, that roots itself intellectuall* in the obser8ation that the Inuit lan!ua!e has man* more #ords
for sno# than the -n!lish lan!ua!e. But ho#e8er much re)eated this obser8ation is, it does re)resent a
)hiloso)hical 8ie# that the discriminations bet#een entities that #e think of as the natural #orld are enabled b*
the 8ocabular* to name these differences.
LIN#UI"TIC DIFFERENCE AND CULTURAL
DIFFERENCE
Thou!h .aussure refers to a lar!e number of different lan!ua!es in the Course and de8otes a #hole section
to#ards the end to the !eo!ra)hical di8ersit* of lan!ua!es, the cultural relati8ist interested in lan!ua!e and
difference #ill find a more discriminatin! account in the #ork of American lin!uists -d#ard .a)ir <+??'-+020= and
BenDamin 1horf <+?0@-+0'+= than .aussureEs Course. .a)irEs #ork in )articular )resents a culturall* deterministic
8ie# that lin!uistic difference and cultural difference mi!ht actuall* be the same thin!:
The fact of the matter is that the Ereal #orldE is to a lar!e e>tent built u) on the lan!ua!e habits
of the !rou). "o t#o lan!ua!es are e8er sufficientl* similar to be considered as re)resentin! the
same social realit*. The #orlds in #hich different societies li8e are distinct #orlds, not merel* the
same #orld #ith different labels attached.
<+0'0:+9%=
-+&-
Difference, in .a)irEs account, is a culturall* relati8e #a* of makin! discriminations, and the s*stem of differences
in a lan!ua!e s*stem therefore becomes the realit* of that culture. I referred earlier to the automatic and
habitualised #a* in #hich )eo)le use lan!ua!e, and .a)ir has an eFui8alent 8ie#, that in s)eakin! oneEs o#n
lan!ua!e, one is often EanaesthetisedE to it, and therefore )rone to a slee)* assum)tion that its s*stem of
discriminations is a strai!htfor#ard reflection of an obDecti8e, rather than a social, realit*. It #as this kind of
account of the ideolo!ical function of lan!ua!e, of the relation bet#een lin!uistic and natural differences, that
man* )eo)le located in .aussureEs 8ie# of lan!ua!e as a s*stem of differences. Bf course there are ar!uments still
to be had, not onl* about #hether .aussure intended this meanin! of arbitrariness as the cultural contin!enc* of a
lin!uistic s*stem of differences, but also about #hether this is arbitrariness at all. It could Dust as easil* be ar!ued
that the e>am)le of the man* Inuit #ords for sno# is not some arbitrar* cultural difference but an im)ortant
difference of lin!uistic moti8ation bet#een those surrounded b* sno# and those #ho kno# it more distantl*. It
could easil* be said that Inuit culture has a set of inter)retati8e reFuirements that demand finer discriminations,
and therefore that these different reFuirements moti8ate the lin!uistic differences that #e find encoded in different
lan!ua!es. .imilarl*, #e could sa* that #ithin a culture #e find a considerable de!ree of internal 8ariation in
8ocabular* determined b* )articular inter)retati8e reFuirements. The skier #ith some basic a8alanche trainin!, for
e>am)le, mi!ht be closer to the Inuit realit* than to that of the IeneGuelan life!uard, in the same #a* that the
Customer .er8ices )ersonnel at a )aint manufacturer mi!ht ha8e the lin!uistic )o#er to distin!uish a multitude of
colour shades that the !eneral )o)ulation mi!ht be unable to see, let alone name. In other #ords, .aussureEs
conce)t of difference has some su!!esti8e cultural resonances #hich are o)ened u) b* the basic relati8ism and
relationalit* of his thesis about si!ns.
But if #e are lookin! for the le!ac* of .aussure in the anal*sis of cultural difference there is another stor* to tell. It
is a strikin! feature of .aussureEs teachin! that he lo8es to illustrate the nature of lan!ua!e b* analo!*. To
illustrate the im)ortance of the s*stem of differences in assi!nin! 8alue to a si!n, .aussure #ill often in8oke an
analo!ous Fuestion of identit*. Bne #ell-kno#n e>am)le of this is the analo!* of the train,
-++-
#hich features in the discussion of #hat he calls Es*nchronic identitiesE in cha)ter 2 of the Course. .aussure )oints
out that trains, like si!ns, are s*stems of differences #ithout )ositi8e terms in the sense that the identit* of the
?.'3 from 5ene8a to Paris is not substantial but relational. This is to sa* that the coaches and en!ines that make
u) the ?.'3 from 5ene8a mi!ht ne8er actuall* be the same units, but as lon! as the differential relations bet#een
the ?.'3 and, sa*, the @.'3 from 5ene8a are maintained, the identit* of the train is secured. The ?.'3 is in fact
)ercei8ed as the same train re!ardless of #hich da* of the #eek it de)arts:
1e assi!n identit*, for instance, to t#o trains <Ethe ?.'3 from 5ene8a to ParisE=, one of #hich
lea8es t#ent*-four hours after the other. 1e treat it as the Esame trainE, e8en thou!h )robabl*
the locomoti8e, the carria!es, the staff etc. are not the sameJthe train is identified b* its
de)arture time, its route, and an* other features #hich distin!uish it from other trains.
<+0?2:+&@=
Ae makes the same )oint of the chess board: that it is not necessar* for the )ieces on a chess board to conform to
an* )articular formal con8entions so lon! as the s*stem of differences bet#een )ieces is )reser8ed. In other
#ords, a bisho) does not need a mitre for the !ame to #ork as lon! as it remains distin!uishable from other
)ieces. Bnce a!ain, there is nothin! substantial about a chess )iece #hich !i8es it its identit*. ather that identit*
deri8es from the o8erall s*stem in #hich )ieces are differentiated in relation to one another <.aussure +0?2:+&?-
0=. It is eas* enou!h to )ress these analo!ies further into Fuestions of identit*. Do the substantial com)onents of a
human bein! constitute that )ersonEs identit*C Is it not true that man* cells and )articles of a human bod* are
c*clicall* re)roduced in much the same #a* as the rollin! stock of a train is alteredC The conseFuence of this kind
of analo!* mi!ht be to sa* that human identit* inheres much more ob8iousl* in the s*stem of social relations than
it does in the bod*. But #hether this is true or not, that )eo)le are merel* differences #ithout )ositi8e terms, the
)oint I #ant to hi!hli!ht is that there is somethin! in .aussureEs account of the lin!uistic si!n that actuall* militates
a!ainst difference. The real indi8idualit*, the concrete )articularit*, the uniFue substance of the train or the chess
)iece
-+%-
are effaced here b* the conce)t of difference. It could in fact be said that the conce)t of difference is no res)ecter
of difference in so far as it sees identit* entirel* in relational terms.
It can also be ar!ued that identit* in !eneral, )erha)s the identit* of a )erson, or that of a social !rou), are also
subDect to these )rinci)les. A theor* of subDecti8it*, or )ersonhood, for e>am)le, mi!ht locate identit* not in the
bod* of the indi8idual but in the relations bet#een that )erson and others. In other #ords a )erson mi!ht not be
defined b* inherent characteristics, but like .aussureEs train or chess )iece, be understood as an identit* onl*
because of the relationshi)s that )erson has #ith other )eo)le, in a s*stem of famil*, friendshi) and social
relations. This #ould be referred to as a relational 8ie# of )ersonal identit*. The same mi!ht be said of collecti8e
identities. It mi!ht be ar!ued, for e>am)le, that a national identit* is not one that is made u) of inherent Fualities
<of E)ositi8e termsE in .aussureEs lan!ua!e= but of relational ones concerned #ith ho# a nation distin!uishes itself
from other nations. .ome ha8e used these ideas of relational identit* to )oint to the im)ortance of a s*stem of
differences in an* !rou) identit*. 7onathan Culler, for e>am)le, has ar!ued 8er* )ersuasi8el* that Etra8ellersE define
themsel8es as a !rou) onl* in relation to, or more e>actl* in o))osition to, EtouristsE, and that the sense of
difference from tourists is a much more im)ortant factor in the identit* of a tra8eller than an* inherent
characteristics that the !rou) mi!ht )ossess <Culler +0??:+32-9@=. All these relational theories of identit*
effecti8el* den* difference in the same #a* as do .aussureEs e>am)les of the train and the chess )iece. (or this
reason there is somethin! Fuite )arado>ical about the term EdifferenceE because it can on one hand desi!nate
indi8idualit* and )articularit*, and on the other, desi!nate the )rinci)le of relational identit* that denies that
)articularit*. 1hat #e are encounterin! here is another 8ersion of the )arado>, encountered at the start of this
discussion, that identit* contains t#o a))arentl* o))osite meanin!s, namel* sameness and difference.
It is Fuite common to find the conce)t of difference described in critical and theoretical commentar* as a kind of
celebration of di8ersit*, of indi8idualit* and )articularit*, and *et it is clear that the o))osite is also true: that
EdifferenceE, is a critical conce)t that looks for the s*stematic <or s*stemic= basis for meanin!, and the relational
conte>t for identit*. There is #hat I #ould see as a kind of abuse of the term difference #hich
-+2-
in8okes it in defence of freedom and indi8idualit*, and a s*stem of 8alues associated #ith liberal )luralism and
tolerance. And *et, in the rece)tion histor* of the conce)t, there is also a consistent o))osition to the term and the
kind of anal*sis it im)lies on the basis that the structuralist conce)t of difference actuall* abstracts the entities it
anal*ses to the e>tent that the* are em)tied of all )articularit* and indi8idualit*. This is a char!e that #as le8elled
a!ainst literar* structuralism throu!hout the )eriod of its influence in the t#entieth centur*: that the rich di8ersit*
of literar* te>ts #ere reduced b* structuralism to an arid set of differences, of relationshi)s, and to an abstract
le8el at #hich some s*stemic common denominator could be )ercei8ed. This accusation #ill be considered more
full* in cha)ter +.
.imilarl*, the conce)t of difference as it is ada)ted to anthro)olo!ical anal*sis finds itself char!ed #ith an
eradication of difference for the same reason: that it does not consider thin!s in themsel8es, but rather the
relations bet#een thin!s. Claude ,H8i-.trauss, an anthro)olo!ist born in +0&?, is one #ho ada)ts the .aussurean
model of lan!ua!e to the anal*sis of social relations in such a #a* that the anal*sis *ields structural homolo!ies
across cultural difference. If #e #ish to celebrate the indi8idualit* and )articularit* of thin!s in the social #orld, #e
mi!ht sa*, for e>am)le, that no t#o families are the same, on the !rounds that the* are com)rised of uniFue
indi8iduals in uniFue combinations. But if #e look at ,H8i-.traussEs #ork on the subDect of the famil*, #e find him
talkin! of the famil* as the unit of #inship, in #hich a set of relations bet#een famil* members forms a global
system, a structure of correlati'e oppositionsheld in )lace b* the uni'ersal presence of incest taboo. -8er*oneEs
fa8ourite uncle, in ,H8i-.trauss, is abstracted into the a'unculate, #hich is a characteristic trait of an elementar*
structure of more com)le> s*stems of socialit*. .o incon!ruous is the relation bet#een structuralist anal*sis and
the obDect of stud* sometimes that it can be hard not to see it as an absurdist )arod* of social science, and *et it
#as e>actl* this kind of scientific !ra8it* that the .aussurean model im)orted into literar* studies in the mid-
t#entieth centur*. And this is not an em)hasis that is al#a*s understood in relation to the term difference: that
#hate8er it #as to become later, the term EdifferenceE started its life in literar* criticism in the most austere of
scientific conte>ts, less as a celebration of difference than as the a!ent of a )re)osterous eFui8alence bet#een
thin!s.
-+'-
A!ainst the back!round of this !lobal scientific )roDect, the )oststructuralist inter8ention in the career of the term
EdifferenceE is eas* to characterise. There #as a feelin!, in the #ork of man* thinkers after +093, that the
homo!enisin! forces of the structural lin!uistic model should be resisted. Difference had become a machine for
containin! difference, for reducin! it to similarit* or )acka!in! it neatl* in the closure of the binar* o))osition. In
cha)ter 2 belo#, I #ill be anal*sin! the critiFue of the structuralist model of difference in relation to DerridaEs
neolo!ism differance. (or no#, I #ould merel* )oint to the most basic characteristics of this critiFue, one of #hich
is identifiable in the )hrase irreducible difference. If structuralist anal*sis tended to look for an abstract le8el of
eFui8alence bet#een dis)arate )henomena <the sameness of all folk tales, the structural similarities bet#een
different #eddin!s, the eFui8alence of the m*ths of 7esus and Dion*sus, etc.= the )oststructuralist #ill often insist
on the irreducibilit* of differences to such abstract eFui8alences <each stor* is uniFue, each #eddin! is )articular=.
At one le8el, this insistence o)erates as I ha8e alread* described it, as an o)enin! u) of assumed unities, such as
#ords, into the multi)licities that the* contain. But the idea of irreducible difference can also be seen as a
fundamental chan!e in the #a* that )hiloso)hers and critics understand the relation bet#een lan!ua!e and the
theor* or metalan!ua!e that describes it.
This ar!ument can be made as follo#s. The assum)tion of much structuralist anal*sis is that structure is an
obDecti8e )ro)ert* of the obDect bein! anal*sed, namel* the s*stem of differences makin! meanin! )ossible. But
for man* )oststructuralists, this em)hasis on obDecti8e structural )ro)erties is a mistake, so that structural
homolo!ies bet#een one te>t and another, or one famil* and another are not to be understood as someho# !i8en
in nature. The* are, rather, similarities and eFui8alences actuall* )roduced b* the model of anal*sis, in the sense
that the structuralist sim)l* asks the same Fuestions about dis)arate obDects, and in so doin!, actuall* !enerates
the same ans#ers. If, for e>am)le, *ou ask a Fuestion about the chemistr* of a tree, *ou !et a chemical ans#er,
and similarl*, if *ou ask a structural Fuestion about a literar* te>t, *ou )roduce a structural ans#er: the obDect is
not sim)l* !i8en in nature, but re)resents the result of an anal*tical inter)retation that is determined b* the nature
of the Fuestion addressed b* the anal*sis. In other #ords, the structuralist is not so much disco8erin! some
)re8iousl* hidden similarit* bet#een
-+3-
thin!s. The structuralist is in8entin! that similarit*, !eneratin! it #ith the model of anal*sis, or acti8el* saming
thin!s that are in themsel8es neither similar nor different.
This relationshi) bet#een the method of anal*sis and the thin! anal*sed is sometimes kno#n as the deducti8e
model of theor*, #hereb* the model itself comes first and subseFuentl* )roDects its o#n structures and
assum)tions on to the thin! it claims to be anal*sin! obDecti8el*. Accordin! to this model, the anal*sis )roduces
the obDect. Bne of the characteristic strate!ies of a )oststructuralist anal*sis is that it #ill do the o))osite, that is,
take an indi8idual literar* te>t and use it to destro* the model of anal*sis throu!h a demonstration that the te>t
itself #ill al#a*s e>ceed, or fail to be contained b*, the anal*tical model seekin! to reduce it. Br, to )ut it another
#a*, the irreducible difference of a te>t can al#a*s be used to resist the homo!enisin! forces of s*stematic
anal*sis, #hich seek to establish homolo!* across difference. In such a demonstration, the idea of irreducible
difference #orks accordin! to an inducti8e relationshi) bet#een theor* and te>t in the sense that theoretical
kno#led!e is e>tracted from an indi8idual te>t, and not )roDected on to it b* the method of anal*sis.
Poststructuralism deri8es Fuite a lot of its ener!* from e>actl* this kind of disru)tion of, and resistance to, the
scientific )retensions of structuralism. A much fa8oured )oststructuralist )lo*, for e>am)le, is to mock the
structuralist 8ie# of the binar* o))osition as the basic unit of difference. If difference, after all, is confined to
o))osition #e are dealin! onl* #ith #hat DeleuGe calls the ma>imum of difference, and ne!lectin! the man* minor
calibrations and nuances of the middle !round. DeleuGe is one of man* )oststructuralists #hose #ork can be seen
as a kind of o))osition to o))osition, or an attem)t to liberate thinkin! from the strictures of o))osition and o)en it
to multi)licit*. The o))osition and its closest relati8es <the contradiction, the dialectic= are abstract forms of
difference #hich re)resent a limited #a* of understandin! the true sco)e of multi)licit* and di8ersit*. This o)enin!
u) of o))osition in )oststructuralist thou!ht has to be taken alon!side a second characteristic strate!*, #hich is to
e>)ose the o))osition as a )o#er relation, in #hich one term dominates the other, and the deconstructi8e strate!*
in relation to such o))ositions, #hich entails the re8ersal of that hierarch*. These a))roaches to, and modifications
of, the conce)t of difference are e>amined in detail in the follo#in! cha)ters.
-+9-
It is no doubt a))arent that this 8ocabular* of difference, e8en #hen it emer!es from a formal lin!uistic s*stem, is
laden #ith social and )olitical si!nificance. It is undoubtedl* this social resonance that has ensured the )ersistence
of difference as a critical term be*ond its )hiloso)hical and lin!uistic )ro8enance. .o far, #e ha8e touched on
se8eral areas in #hich the lin!uistic conce)t of difference could be said to furnish some kind of social theor*.
<+= The structuralist 8ie# of the si!n aims to articulate an a))arentl* free-standin! term into the s*stem of
differences that is the basis of its intelli!ibilit*, and the basic meanin!-!eneratin! unit is the binar* o))osition. (or
the structuralist there is al#a*s an unconscious relation to an o))osite that !i8es a si!n its meanin!. It is, I think,
fairl* eas* to )ercei8e the social lo!ic im)licit in this account: that a social identit* is structured b* an unconscious
relation to an o))osite. ,ike a #ord, a social identit* has a hidden structural condition in the form of a relation to
an other. This basic structuralist insi!ht is no# #ides)read as a foundation for feminist and )ostcolonial accounts of
!ender and cultural difference.
<%= In structuralist theor*, the o))osition tends to be described as an innocent d*ad, or an anton*mic relation,
#ithout heed to Fuestions of )o#er or hierarch*. Poststructuralist a))roaches to o))osition tend to introduce the
notion that one term enDo*s some )ri8ile!ed or assumed su)eriorit* o8er the other, and it is a common
deconstructi8e strate!* to o8erturn such a hierarch*. This im)ortation of )o#er into the o))osition !i8es difference
a decidedl* )olitical inflection, or a structural lo!ic for the descri)tion of established hierarchies and their
re8olutions.
<2= The o))osition comes to be seen after structuralism as a reducti8e or o8ersim)lified )aradi!m for difference,
and it is )articularl* in the domain of social and )olitical critiFue that this reduction is e8ident. It ma* be that there
is still a )lace for the o))osition in )olitical thou!ht, but )ostmodern cultural theor* has sho#n a )reference for a
liberation of difference from the confines of o))osition, and for the multi)lication of difference into e8er more
com)le> confi!urations. Com)le> social totalities such as !enders, nations or indeed the #orld ha8e, in a sense,
follo#ed lin!uistic theor* into more multifarious and com)le> theories than the o))osition.
<'= The structuralist account of the si!n bears 8er* close affinities #ith other )hiloso)hies of relation. Bne such
affinit* can be seen in the
-+@-
(reudian tradition of )s*choanal*sis in #hich the notion of the EotherE has come to occu)* a )rominent )lace.
Ps*choanal*tic theor* has been a source of )articular )o#er for the descri)tion of social identit* and has been
ada)ted for sociolo!ical )ur)oses b* feminist, )ostcolonial and e8en Mar>ist critics, #ho ha8e found in it a
fundamentall* structuralist theor* of identit* and identification. The relation of )s*choanal*sis to )oststructuralism
#ill be the subDect of further discussion, but for the moment it ma* be #orth contem)latin! a sin!le issue related
to the to)ic of o))osition. (reudEs )hrase Ethe narcissism of minor differencesE is a )articularl* resonant one for the
anal*sis of social lo!ic. It refers to the narcissistic )rocess b* #hich indi8iduals or !rou)s tend to com)are
themsel8es to )eo)le onl* 8er* sli!htl* different from themsel8es, and subseFuentl* construe that nuance of
difference in o))ositional terms. .cottish identit*, for e>am)le, seems more closel* )redicated on a relation #ith
the -n!lish than it does on a relation #ith those, sa* the "orth 6oreans, #hose cultural difference mi!ht seem
more maDor. .ometimes, therefore, the other is not reall* an o))osite at all, and *et in structural terms, it remains
the hidden structural condition in #hich an identit* finds its basis.
<3= It has been clear in this discussion that the lo!ic of difference and the lo!ic of eFui8alence are themsel8es
structurall* connected, to the )oint at #hich one seems to transform into the other. This has been sho#n to be
true of the structuralist conce)t of difference, but mi!ht a))l* eFuall* to the lo!ic of !lobalisation. (or e>am)le, it
is clear that as the #orld contracts to#ards the condition of a 8illa!e under economic )ressures to#ards
standardisation, that differences b* no means disa))ear. This co-de)endence of standardisation and di8ersification
#ill fi!ure at len!th in the discussion of !lobalisation and difference in cha)ter 3.
It is not that the social theor* of difference sim)l* learnt e8er*thin! it kno#s from lin!uistics. But it is clear that
the conce)t of difference has a rather unusual )o#er to link the realms of social identit*, )hiloso)h*, )olitical
)o#er and the nature of lan!ua!e. It is the aim of this book to describe the lo!ical and associati8e links that !i8e
the conce)t of difference this )o#er, and therefore to offer an account of its durabilit*. The cha)ters that follo#
e>)lore the conce)t of difference as it de8elo)s from a Fuite s)ecific lin!uistic term into a ke* idea in cultural
criticism. Cha)ter
-+?-
% is concerned #ith the role of difference in the anal*sis of a sentence, and the #a* that the anal*sis of a sentence
acts as a model for the anal*sis of much lon!er discourses, such as literar* narrati8es. It is )articularl* concerned
#ith the #a* that difference resha)es the #a* that literar* critics think about the relationshi) bet#een fiction and
realit* b* Fuestionin! fundamental assum)tions about the relationshi) bet#een the form and content of a narrati8e
re)resentation. Cha)ter 2 summarises some com)le> critiFues of structuralist a))roaches to difference #hich are
de8elo)ed in the #ork of 7acFues Derrida and 5illes DeleuGe, t#o (rench )hiloso)hers #hose #ork has had a
considerable influence on the An!lo-American literar* critical tradition. The cha)ter aims to describe a kind of
rebellion a!ainst binar* o))ositions, #hich takes )lace after structuralism, and #hich leads to#ards a less ri!id,
static and scientific conce)t of difference. Cha)ter ' e>)lores the #a*s in #hich conce)ts of difference !uided
de8elo)ments in ne# historicist criticism from the +0@&s to the +00&s, and )articularl* the #a* that histor* has
been re#ritten, literar* canons re8ised, literar* te>ts reinter)reted and re8alued to accommodate cultural
differences. Cha)ter 3 is concerned #ith conce)ts associated #ith difference, such as Ealterit*E and EothernessE as
the* ha8e influenced feminist and other )oliticall* orientated critical a))roaches. It describes a sociolo!ical conte>t
for difference in a E!lobalisin!E #orld in #hich cultural differences become more 8isible a!ainst the threat of
EstandardisationE and looks at the #a* that 8arious )hiloso)hers and cultural theorists ha8e linked cultural
differences #ith the contem)orar* condition of the #orld kno#n as E)ostmodernit*E. (inall*, cha)ter 9 raises some
Fuestions about #hat has been lost as a result of the )rominence of difference as a critical and cultural
)ers)ecti8e. It ar!ues that the conce)t of difference has !i8en recent literar* criticism a )articularist character, in
the sense that it is more concerned #ith )articular details than theories and cate!ories, and )oints to some sources
of theor* that mi!ht allo# for the return of a kind of uni8ersalism in criticism. It is therefore a consideration of the
)ossibilit* that, after the recent histor* described throu!hout the book, the career of difference as a critical conce)t
mi!ht be comin! to some kind of an end.
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$
DIFFERENCE AND REFERENCE
1hat e>actl* did .aussure mean #hen he said that Ein lan!ua!e there are onl* differences, and no )ositi8e termsE
<+0?2:++?=C Bne 8ie# is that #ords do not reall* ha8e )ositi8e content: the meanin! of #ords is not onl*
!enerated b*, but actuall* constituted b* their relationshi)s #ith each other, and not b* their relationshi) #ith an
outside #orld. This mi!ht seem an e>treme or o8er-hast* inter)retation, but it does re)resent a #idel* held 8ie# of
the si!nificance of difference: that it )laces in Fuestion the #hole idea that lan!ua!e can refer to realit*. A more
considered conclusion mi!ht be that lan!ua!e does not sim)l* and un)roblematicall* refer to realit*, that reference
is not the onl* #a* to think about lan!ua!e, nor is it reall* se)arable from Fuestions about the formal s*stems of
lan!ua!e. It is the aim of this cha)ter to sho# that difference can be thou!ht of as a !eneral term for the 8arious
t*)es of relations bet#een #ords in8ol8ed in the )roduction of meanin!, but also that these t*)es of relations can
a))l* eFuall* to literar* te>ts. This cha)ter is therefore a descri)tion of the #a* that ideas about difference not
onl* )lace in Fuestion the idea that indi8idual #ords mi!ht refer, but also the idea that seFuences of #ords, such
as sentences, or no8els, or te>ts in !eneral, mi!ht eFuall* be seen as elaborate s*stems of differences and
relations and therefore not sim)l* as re)resentations of realit*.
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PARADI#ATIC AND "YNTA#ATIC RELATION"
A useful startin! )oint here is that there are t#o maDor cate!ories into #hich differences, or relations bet#een
#ords, can be di8ided. The first cate!or* is relations in praesentia, or relations bet#een an* #ord and the other
#ords #ith #hich it combines in a seFuence. The second cate!or* is relations in absentia, or relations bet#een
#ords that are )resent and those that are absent from a !i8en utterance. ,in!uistic meanin! is ob8iousl* dee)l*
bound u) #ith both of these cate!ories of relations. To !enerate a meanin!ful sentence, for e>am)le, one has to
be able to do t#o thin!s simultaneousl*: to combine #ords #ith each other in a chain, and to select the ri!ht #ords
from all the a8ailable )ossibilities for each )osition in the sentence. The factors that !o8ern these t#o )rinci)les, of
combination and selection, are e>tremel* com)le>. The meanin!ful combination of #ords in a seFuence, for
e>am)le, #ill in8ol8e a kind of !rammatical com)etence, or kno#led!e of the rules and )ractices that !o8ern the
order in #hich elements of a seFuence are arran!edK but other factors #ill be in )la*, such as the lo!ical linearit*
of the seFuence, or the need for em)hasis or ele!ance to ma>imise the effect of the seFuence. .imilarl*, the
)rinci)le of selection entails an e>tremel* com)le>, assimilated kno#led!e of the lan!ua!e s*stem as a #hole, an
abilit* not onl* to select the ri!ht kind of #ord for each )osition, but to understand its relations of similarit* and
difference, s*non*mit* and anton*mit*, #ith the other a8ailable )ossibilities. Bf course, this all ha))ens
automaticall*, and need not be calculated each time from first )rinci)les, but it is )artl* the automatic and
uncalculated abilit* to do somethin! so com)le> that is the interest for lin!uists, )hiloso)hers and critics. 1hen #e
tie a shoelace, #e hardl* notice the astoundin! com)le>it* of the knot or the incredible de>terit* reFuired to tie it,
and that )ales in com)arison to the creation of a com)le> sentence. In both cases, the fascination of the )rocess is
onl* accessible #hen it is de-automated, or defamiliarised, so that its nature can be !ras)ed ane#. At its best, this
is #hat the structuralist anal*sis of these t*)es of relations achie8es.
The cate!ories of combination and selection are in effect #a*s of defamiliarisin! the automatic and unobser8ed
)rocesses in8ol8ed in the )roduction of meanin!. In ET#o as)ects of lan!ua!e and t#o t*)es of a)hasic
disturbancesE, oman 7akobson <+?09-+0?%=, a ussian-American
-%%-
lin!uist, looked at cases in #hich a lin!uistic disorder makes 8isible the )rocesses of meanin! )roduction that #e
#ould normall* take for !ranted, namel* the abilit* to select and combine #ords. 7akobson is interested in the fact
that a)hasia takes one of t#o forms - that it is a disorder in the abilit* either to select or to combine #ords in
intelli!ible #a*s - and from this he e>tra)olates that the )roduction of meanin! takes )lace on t#o a>es: the a>is
of selection and the a>is of combination. These t#o a>es, #hich are essentiall* the ones described b* .aussure in
the Course, formed the basis of a #idel* de)lo*ed s*stem for the anal*sis of lin!uistic relations. (or 7akobson and
man* #ho follo#ed him, the t#o cate!ories of relations bet#een #ords #ere named as syntagmatic relations,
#hich )ertained to the a>is of combination, and paradigmatic relations, #hich )ertained to the a>is of selection. I
#ill return to the im)ortance of this s*stem for the conce)t of difference shortl*. (or the moment it is #orth
)ointin! out that this hi!hl* ordered a))roach to the stud* of lin!uistic relations #as not )lucked out of the air b*
structuralists in the mid-t#entieth centur*. It #as in fact a #ell-established )rinci)le, kno#n )articularl* #ell to the
classical rhetoricians. The im)ortance of this lies not onl* in the reco!nition that there is somethin! classical in the
structuralist a))roach to lan!ua!e. It also hel)s to define the im)ortance of difference to literature.
The stud* of rhetoric #as )rimaril* a science !o8ernin! the )roduction of eloFuent and effecti8e lan!ua!e. The
foundin! idea of rhetoric #as that the kinds of skills to be found in the discourses of the naturall* eloFuent s)eaker
could be s*stematised and learned b* those less naturall* !ifted. In a sense this is akin to the structuralist s*stem
#hich anal*ses and renders 8isible #hat is normall* intuiti8e, e>ce)t that rhetoric #as orientated to#ards the
)roduction of eloFuence rather than a !eneral science of lan!ua!e. It #as the commodification of a natural !ift, but
in the )rocess it #as also a kind of AladdinEs ca8e of lin!uistic descri)tions and )rinci)les. Classical rhetoricians
di8ided the art into fi8e sta!es - in'entio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria and actio - #hich can be crudel* translated
as thinkin! u) a to)ic, arran!in! it, addin! effects, memorisin! it, and actin! it out. It is the middle sta!e of this
classical s*stem, elocutio, that bears the closest resemblance to structuralist accounts of meanin!. +locutio #as the
sta!e in #hich )atterns and fi!ures #ere inte!rated into the )resentation in such a #a* that the discourse #ould
ha8e ma>imum )ersuasi8e im)act.
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These effects #ere in turn di8ided into t#o maDor families, #hich had se8eral different names in the histor* of
rhetoric, but #hich came to be kno#n most commonl* as schemes and tropes. -ffects that de)ended on the #a*s
in #hich #ords and sentences #ere combined to!ether in seFuence #ere named schemes, #hile effects deri8in!
from the )rinci)le of selection #ere named tro)esK or to return to 7akobsonEs terminolo!*, there are lan!ua!e
effects deri8in! from s*nta!amatic relations, and effects deri8in! from )aradi!matic relations.
There are al#a*s !oin! to be some difficulties #ith this kind of hard and fast cate!orisation, and the stor* !oes
that fierce ar!uments used to ra!e in the oman forum about #hether antitheses such as parado, and o,ymoron
#ere schemes or tro)es. The rhetorical )rehistor* is rele8ant to the structuralist account of lin!uistic relations in
t#o #a*s: first, it undermines the idea that structuralism #as some radical ne# de)arture in its a))roach to
lin!uistic )erformanceK and second, it )laces the a>es of selection and combination in a more direct relationshi)
#ith literar* lan!ua!e, since the )rehistor* of rhetorical schemes and tro)es effecti8el* )ro8ides structuralist
)oetics #ith a #a* of describin! s)ecificall* literar* effects.
This ou!ht not to be o8erstated. There #as al#a*s a sense in #hich the structuralist conce)t of difference #as
indifferent to the cultural 8alue of its obDect: it #as not anal*sin! beautiful or )ersuasi8e lan!ua!e, but aimin! to
describe the uni8ersal )rinci)les of lan!ua!e. 7akobson described )oetics <the stud* of literature= as a subset of the
!lobal science of lin!uistics, and defined the )oetic function of lan!ua!e as Ethe )roDection of the a>is of selection
into the a>is of combinationE. This is a )er)le>in! definition, but is )robabl* reducible to somethin! like this:
literar* lan!ua!e differs from ordinar* lan!ua!e in the de!ree to #hich it mi>es effects deri8ed from the )rinci)le
of selection #ith those deri8ed from the )rinci)le of combination. In structuralist )oetics there is al#a*s a sense of
incon!ruit* bet#een the dr* s*stems of lin!uistic descri)tion and the assumed 8alue of literature. Much of the
contro8ers* surroundin! structuralist dealin!s #ith literature is !enerated from this incon!ruit*. But in fact
structuralism #as merel* de8elo)in! a time-ser8ed a))roach to literature, and if an*thin! !i8in! it a broader
a))lication. It could be ar!ued that literar* structuralism #as no more an un#anted intrusion of science into the
realm of literature than the e>tension of rhetorical anal*sis
-%'-
out#ards to lan!ua!e in !eneral. The reci)rocit* here bet#een literar* anal*sis and lin!uistic science is reall* Dust
the result of the !eneralit* of the )rinci)les underl*in! the anal*tical cate!ories. Bne 8ie# #ould be that these are
sim)l* the cate!ories of time and s)ace, cate!ories as fundamental to dr* science as the* are to rhetoric or the
descri)tion of aesthetic beaut*, so that the terms #e ha8e been considerin! mi!ht be arran!ed thus:
Time .)ace
Combination .election
.*nta!matic Paradi!matic
-n praesentia -n absentia
.chemes Tro)es
It is certainl* clear that these are cate!ories that can be a))lied to the anal*sis of an*thin!. If I take m* life, for
e>am)le, I can freeGe it in time at an* moment and anal*se it as if s)atiall*, as a kind of e>istential moment in
#hich I could ha8e chosen, )aradi!maticall* as it #ere, to do other#ise. The nature of each moment can then be
understood in terms of the thin!s I decided not to do, the )laces I didnEt !o, the thin!s I didnEt sa*, and from that
)oint of 8ie# the meanin! of the moment is constituted b* the absent )ossibilities from #hich I chose. Alternati8el*
I can anal*se a moment in terms of its )lace in a chain, in a seFuence, so that the moment acFuires its si!nificance
in relation to )rior and subseFuent moments, b* its s*nta!matic relations #ith them. These )rinci)les can clearl*
a))l* to an*thin!, and are surel* onl* se)arable for anal*tical )ur)oses. The* are obser8able in the dichotom*
bet#een s*nchronic and diachronic histor*, the former freeGin! time #hile the latter narrates across time.
.ometimes one is )ri8ile!ed o8er the other, as in 7ean-Paul .artreEs e>istential )s*choanal*sis, #here li8es are
dia!nosed in relation to moments of crucial, life-determinin! choice #ithout much res)ect for the com)le>
seFuence of e8ents, of continuities and re)etitions, #hich )lace )eo)le in )articular situations and limit their
freedom to choose at !i8en moments.
In the case of literar* structuralism it is hard to kno# #hich )rinci)le #as more im)ortant. Bn the one hand the
maDor im)act of the conce)t of difference deri8ed from its )aradi!matic meanin!, of relations bet#een #ords in the
lan!ua!e s*stem, or relations in absentia, and the su!!estion
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that these relations #ere the basis of meanin!. And *et on the other hand, #hen it came to a literar* te>t, there
#as a limit to the 8alue of )ointin! to absent #ords or e)isodes as the basis of intelli!ibilit*, and attention #as
directed instead at the internal structural relations in a discourse. An account of the im)ortance of .aussurean
lin!uistics, for e>am)le, #ill almost al#a*s em)hasise the )rofound reco!nition that the relationshi) bet#een a
si!nifier and a si!nified is arbitrar*, and therefore that there is also somethin! arbitrar* about the #a* that
differences bet#een #ords determine the entities contained in the uni8erse. The em)hasis in this kind of account is
on the )aradi!matic meanin! of difference, since it refers to the relation bet#een a !i8en #ord and those other
#ords in the lan!ua!e s*stem that delimit its meanin!. But an* detailed a))lication of structuralist lin!uistics #ill
usuall* lea8e this )rinci)le behind and focus on the internal relations bet#een com)onents of a discourse.
.tructuralist narratolo!*, for e>am)le, is characteristicall* concerned #ith the s*nta!matic )ole of difference, and
focuses on Fuestions such as the meanin!-!eneratin! function of o))osition in a narrati8e seFuence, or the
tem)oral order and structure of narrati8e.
.hortl*, I #ill return to look at the #a* a structuralist anal*sis of narrati8e de)lo*s these )ers)ecti8es on
difference. (irst I #ant to look at the anal*sis of a sim)le sentence in terms of its s*nta!matic and )aradi!matic
relations. If I take the sentence EThe man ran do#n the roadE I can easil* )oint to the )rinci)les of combination and
selection at #ork in its construction, usin! a dia!ram.
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The s*nta!matic relations bet#een the #ords in the sim)le sentence in the dia!ram are those that can be read
horiGontall* alon! the a>is of combination, and so are the relations bet#een co-)resent #ords. The )aradi!matic
relations are those that can be read 8erticall*, and if #ritten out in full, #ould re)resent the entire set of #ords in
the lan!ua!e s*stem that could be )laced in that )articular )osition in the sentence, absent #ords that could be
substituted for those )resent. Bb8iousl* the )aradi!ms for the #ords EtheE and Edo#nE are small in number,
#hereas for the other #ords the ran!e of )ossible substitutes is enormous. (or ob8ious reasons then, the task of
describin! the s*nta!matic relations in this sentence is relati8el* sim)le, #hereas the task of describin!
)aradi!matic relations for the #ord EmanE is 8ast and has to be reduced to somethin! more mana!eable. Bne #a*
of doin! this is to limit the set of substitutable )aradi!ms to #hat mi!ht be called significant others, or #ords in
relation to #hich the )resent #ord most directl* deri8es its identit*. This is #here the binar* o))osition becomes
im)ortant for structural lin!uistics: that the meanin! of the #ord EmanE is abo8e all determined b* its o))ositional
relation to the #ord E#omanE. This is an ob8ious )oint, but there is a subtlet* here that needs to be e>)lored. In
)ointin! to the binar* o))osite as the si!nificant other, the structuralist is not reall* sa*in! that the #riter of the
sentence has consciousl* chosen the #ord EmanE o8er the #ord E#omanE. There is a sense in #hich the cate!or* of
choice, and therefore the )rinci)le of selection, is a bit misleadin! here. 1hat is im)ortant about the binar*
o))osite for the structuralist, is )recisel* that it is a hidden, assimilated and unconscious structural relation, and it
is e>actl* because a #riter or s)eaker does not choose consciousl* to e>clude the o))osite term that the
structuralist reconnects it #ith the hidden structural s*stem on #hich its meanin! de)ends. 1e mi!ht think of
#ords as free-standin!, but for the structuralist the* cannot be )ro)erl* understood unless the* are articulated
back into the s*stem of differences that underlie and enable their a))arentl* free-standin! si!nificance. I said
earlier that the classical science of rhetoric #as also a means of s*stematisin! somethin! that #as intuiti8e,
unconscious and natural. The subtlet* that I #ant to e>)lore here, ho#e8er, is that there is a kind of sli))a!e
bet#een the intentional and the unconscious, bet#een the )roduction and the anal*sis of lan!ua!e, or bet#een
8alue Dud!ement and neutral science.
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This sli))a!e is most a))arent #hen the rhetorical s*stem of schemes and tro)es is com)ared to the structuralist
s*stem of s*nta!matic and )aradi!matic relations, or #hen the im)licit 8alue Dud!ements of rhetorical anal*sis find
their #a* into the a))arentl* 8alue-free science of structuralism. hetorical anal*sis characteristicall* subdi8ides
the families of schemes and tro)es into 8arious cate!ories. .chemes, for e>am)le, are often subdi8ided into
cate!ories such as phonological schemes, morpho.logical schemes and phrase and clause schemes, #hich can be
defined as )atterns of combination concerned #ith sound, #ord structure and sentence structure res)ecti8el*.
Tro)es, on the other hand are usuall* di8ided into t#o distinct t*)es of selection or substitution, namel* metaphor
and metonymy, #here a meta)hor is based on the )rinci)le of com)arison, and meton*m* on the )rinci)le of
conti!uit*. Most of these can be illustrated in relation to the sentence in the dia!ram abo8e. There are sound
schemes for e>am)le in the re)etition of 8o#el sounds <man:ran= or initial sounds in #ords <ran:road= kno#n as
assonance and alliteration res)ecti8el*. The creation of a tro)e, on the other hand #ould de)end on the
substitution of other #ords such as EdarknessE, or )erha)s EsiGe +& bootsE, for the #ord EmanE, !eneratin! in the first
case a meta)hor based on a )ercei8ed similarit* bet#een the action of a man and the mo8ement of darkness, and
in the second, a form of meton*m* kno#n as synecdoche, in #hich a )art of somethin! is substituted for its #hole.
(or the rhetorician, )atterns and substitutions of this kind lie at the heart of creati8e and effecti8e lan!ua!e use.
The* are, in effect, 8erbal skills on #hich the )ersuasi8e im)act of lan!ua!e is based. (rom the )oint of 8ie# of
rhetorical anal*sis then, the identification of schemes and tro)es al#a*s carries #ith it an im)licit 8alue Dud!ement,
as a t*)olo!* of creati8e or )ersuasi8e moments in a discourse. This kind of t*)olo!* ob8iousl* has )articular
rele8ance to the anal*sis of literature, or at least of literariness, since it is in effect a s)ecies of e8aluati8e
st*listics: a kind of anal*sis that identifies cate!ories in #hich the enormous 8ariet* of creati8e, ins)irational and
brilliant acts of combination and selection can be !rou)ed. But this e8aluati8e dimension to the identification of
schemes and tro)es be!ins to look rather distant from the structuralist enter)rise. The structuralist is self-
fashioned as a scientist indifferent to the aesthetic 8alue of lan!ua!e. The structuralist, I ha8e alread* claimed, is
concerned to defamiliarise the unconscious and automated com)le>ities of lan!ua!e.
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But #hat I ha8e been describin! here seems to be more focused on acts of conscious artifice, on creati8e choice
and on artful )atternin!. I think it can be su!!ested that #ith rhetorical anal*sis as a )rehistor*, it #as al#a*s
difficult for literar* structuralism to rid its anal*tical descri)tions of this e8aluati8e dimension, or to mo8e
com)letel* a#a* from the assum)tion that )aradi!matic and s*nta!matic relations in lan!ua!e #ere )art of the
conscious and intentional le8el of artistic )roduction.
TRAN"PARENT AND OPA%UE LAN#UA#E
The Fuestions of 8alue Dud!ement, and of conscious intention, in literar* structuralism are )articularl* com)licated
ones, and #ill resurface at 8arious times in the discussion that follo#s. (or the moment it #ill be #orth reflectin!
on ho# these issues about s*nta!matic and )aradi!matic relations bear on Fuestions about the referentialit* of
lan!ua!e. A!ain here it is useful to think about the #a*s in #hich structuralist conce)tions of difference e>tended
)erce)tions about lan!ua!e that #ere #ell kno#n to rhetoricians into more radical )hiloso)hical claims. To be!in
#ith, traditional rhetorical anal*sis had al#a*s been familiar #ith the idea that lan!ua!e mi!ht at times be
)rimaril* about itself. hetorical and formalist anal*sis #ill often talk of mar#ed or foregrounded lan!ua!e to
describe lan!ua!e that is someho# 8isible in its o#n ri!ht. .chemes and tro)es are, in a sense, lin!uistic
)henomena of st*listic interest that stand out from the humdrum, the familiar and the automatic. Because )oetr*
is commonl* 8ie#ed as a !enre of discourse in #hich the incidence of schemes and tro)es is at its most dense, it is
also commonl* 8ie#ed as a kind of #ritin! in #hich what is said is subordinate to the way in which it is said. Prose,
on the other hand is thou!ht of as a kind of #ritin! in #hich the content of the discourse is not so much obscured
b*, or subordinated to, the #a* in #hich it is e>)ressed. This is #hat is meant b* the distinction bet#een o)aFue
and trans)arent lan!ua!e. B)aFue lan!ua!e is that #hich dra#s attention to lan!ua!e itself, to st*le, to 8erbal
form and to the #a* that somethin! is said, #hereas trans)arent lan!ua!e effaces itself, allo#s itself to be looked
throu!h, and )oints to#ards content. In the case of o)aFue lan!ua!e, such as )oetic diction, #e are likel* to ask
Fuestions about ima!es and )atterns, #hereas in the case of trans)arent lan!ua!e, such as )rose fiction, #e are
more likel* to ask Fuestions about content,
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or the #orld de)icted. Bf course these distinctions are crude. It is eas* to think of )oles of trans)arenc* and
o)acit* within )oetr* and fiction <ride and re/udice and Finnegan0s )a#e )erha)s=, or to re!ard the distinction as
merel* different kinds of st*le, or different orders of content. But the terms are useful for the descri)tion of the
im)act of difference on Fuestions of reference.
The use of terms such as Efore!roundedE or EmarkedE im)lies that some lan!ua!e stands out, and that it can be
distin!uished from other kinds of relati8el* in8isible lan!ua!e use. Bne of the thin!s that distin!uishes the
structural anal*sis of lan!ua!e is that, as a science of lan!ua!e in !eneral, it sho#s )articular interest in the
a))arentl* trans)arent, in8isible lan!ua!e that traditional literar* anal*sis ne!lects. In other #ords it aims to sho#
that all lan!ua!e #orks in the same #a*, and therefore to Fuestion the traditional 8ie# that some kinds of
lan!ua!e are more trans)arent than other kinds. This is #here the radical re)utation of structural lin!uistics and
literar* structuralism comes from: the )ro)osition that the trans)arenc* of e8er*da* or )rosaic lan!ua!e is Dust an
illusionK or that the lan!ua!e of )rose fiction is Dust as o)aFue, Dust as orientated to#ards form, as the lan!ua!e of
)oetr*. A #ord like Edo!E, for e>am)le is commonl* thou!ht of as a trans)arent si!nifier in the sense that #e look
throu!h the #ord and see the animal, or the conce)t of the animal, the si!nified. But for the structuralist, there is
somethin! in8isible !oin! on, #hich has to be made 8isible for lan!ua!e to be )ro)erl* understood. It #ould be
difficult to sa* #hat mental )ictures are conDured in the mind b* the #ord Edo!E, but eas* enou!h to sa* that the
)icture #ould ha8e to e>clude obDects that are )atentl* not do!s, such as cats. The structuralist is therefore sa*in!
that the referential function of the si!nifier Edo!E is an illusion #hich de)ends on the e>istence of other si!nifiers
from #hich it differs. These other si!nifiers are not ob8iousl* )resent, and *et it is their )resence in the lan!ua!e
s*stem on #hich the meanin!, the conce)t, or the )icture associated #ith the #ord Edo!E de)ends. In this sense,
the #ords that are not there, the )aradi!ms of the #ords Edo!E, in8isibl* inhabit the #ord that is there, and are the
structural conditions reFuired for Edo!E to refer. This de)endence that an* #ord has on the s*stem of differences in
#hich it o)erates makes it much less eas* to 8ie# a si!nifier as a trans)arent medium. ather than look throu!h it
to the thin! that it names in the #orld, #hat #e are doin! is belie8in! oursel8es to be lookin!
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throu!h it #hen in fact #e are lookin! at it, since it is constituted b* the trace of other si!nifiers that form its
s*stem of differences. This is re8olutionar*, because suddenl* do!s do not e>ist as natural obDects 8isible throu!h
their names, but become conce)ts b* 8irtue of the s*stem of differences bet#een si!nifiers. 1hat the structuralist
is sa*in!, then, is this: that if #e continue to belie8e that do!s are a natural cate!or* named b* the si!nifier Edo!E,
#e #ill fail to notice that a s*stem of differences bet#een si!nifiers is )roDectin! its structure on to our conce)ts.
1e must not look throu!h #ords. 1e must look at them, and side#a*s, to the absent others that are the basis of
an* si!nifierEs intelli!ibilit*.
This raises a com)lication, #hich is )robabl* one of the bi!!est areas of contro8ers* in structuralist theor*. It
means that o)acit* is not so much a )ro)ert* of a lin!uistic si!n )er se as a #a* of lookin! at it or anal*sin! it. It
is as if #e must resist the commonsensical 8ie# of lan!ua!e as a trans)arent and referential medium, resist the
)resence of #orldl* obDects in lan!ua!e and look instead at the #a* that the lan!ua!e s*stem manufactures those
obDects throu!h difference. It is as if this is a su)erior #a* of seein! ado)ted b* those initiated into the ar!uments
of structuralism, #hile the rest of the #orld continue to be du)ed b* the illusion of lin!uistic trans)arenc*. And this
is e>actl* the im)act of structuralism in uni8ersities: the dis)lacement of an e8er*da* intuition #ith a hi!hl*
counter-intuiti8e #a* of lookin! at lan!ua!e as ca)able of referrin! onl* to itself, to its o#n form and s*stem. It is
an unnatural, or denaturalised #a* of lookin!, #hich is reFuired in order to make 8isible the constructedness of
thin!s normall* assumed to be natural or !i8en. In the second half of this book, this kind of ar!ument is e>)lored
in its )olitical conte>t, #here the entities under discussion are more contro8ersial than do!s, and the im)erati8e to
look at, rather than throu!h, lan!ua!e, becomes a )olitical one.
POETIC"& "EIOLO#Y AND NARRATOLO#Y
This then is the recurrin! em)hasis of structuralism: to render 8isible the unconscious structures of lan!ua!e, and
to defamiliarise the automatic )rocesses of lin!uistic selection and combination. The term EdifferenceE in literar* and
social theor* therefore carries #ithin it a #hole set of ar!uments about the o)acit* of lan!ua!e, the illusion of
reference and the
-2+-
constructedness of realit*. But ho# does this actuall* #ork #hen it comes to the anal*sis of a literar* te>tC As #ith
the #ord, it is characteristic of structuralist literar* anal*sis to 8ie# a literar* te>t counter-intuiti8el*, as a s*stem
of si!ns #hich do not, as #e mi!ht assume, sim)l* )oint to or e8en sim)l* imitate the real #orld. This is
)articularl* ob8ious in relation to fiction, #here the 8ie# of literature as a mimetic medium is the most difficult to
dis)lace. $et critics such as 5Hrard 5enette and TG8etan Todoro8 succeed in treatin! fictions as o)aFue, non-
referential discourses b* scalin! u) !rammatical cate!ories and the )rinci)les of s*nta!matic and )aradi!matic
relations to describe the s*stem of a no8el e>actl* as if it #ere a sentence. Aence, for Todoro8, relations in
praesentia and in absentia are the basic cate!ories for discussin! the com)onents of a narrati8e seFuence, and he
de8elo)s a le>icon of lin!uistic terms for the descri)tion of these relations. In the #ork of 7akobson and oland
Barthes, the scientific and lin!uistic character of fictional anal*sis o)erates alon!side an e>)licit* theoretical
)olemic a!ainst the traditional idea of realism in the no8el. It is )robabl* these ar!uments about realism that ha8e
!i8en literar* structuralism its radical re)utation, and for man* the* seemed to e>tend the absurdl* e>a!!erated
8ie# of the lin!uistic si!n de8elo)ed in structural lin!uistics as a non-referential entit*. The e>a!!eration is that the
lin!uistic conditions that make reference )ossible - the s*stems of differences, con8entions and codes - are
ele8ated to the status of referents, so that meanin! is not onl* enabled but actuall* constituted b* difference.
(redric 7ameson, for e>am)le, ar!ues in The rison %ouse of Language that structuralist criticism came to 8ie# the
form and s*stem of narrati8e as its onl* content:
The most characteristic feature of structuralist criticism lies )recisel* in a kind of transformation
of form into content, in #hich the form of structuralist research <stories are or!anised like
sentences, like lin!uistic enunciations= turns into a )ro)osition about content: literar* #orks are
about lan!ua!e, take the )rocess of s)eech itself as their essential subDect matter.
<+0@%:+0?-0=
It #as common, before structuralism, to think of the content of a narrati8e fiction as a #orld of characters and
e8ents. The content of ride
-2%-
and re/udice, for e>am)le, is an assembla!e of )eo)le in interaction, a com)le> set of circumstances in #hich the
Bennet dau!hters seek husbands, and most centrall*, -liGabeth mo8es to#ards her union #ith Mr Darc*. But if, as
7ameson su!!ests, the Eessential subDect matterE of the literar* #ork is lan!ua!e and form, this kind of realistic
subDect matter, made u) of characters and e8ents, is dis)laced. The dis)lacement can be 8ie#ed in t#o #a*s. The
first 8ie# is that form and lan!ua!e are sim)l* more im)ortant kinds of content than characters and e8ents, so
that the structuralist critic sim)l* s#ee)s the latter aside, brackets it, in order to focus on more )ressin! as)ects of
the te>t. The second is that characters and e8ents are in fact com)rised of lan!ua!e and form, that -liGabeth
Bennet is no more than a concatenation of 8erbal si!ns or!anised in a narrati8e form, and that to think of her as a
)erson #ith a life is to misunderstand the true nature of te>tual content. Both of these 8ie#s of the relationshi) of
form and content are found in structuralist criticism, but it is fair to sa* that it is the second that underlies the
most influential acts of structuralist criticism. .aussure sa*s in the Course that the si!nifier <the sound= and the
si!nified <the conce)t= are like t#o sides of a sin!le sheet of )a)er, that one cannot cut throu!h one #ithout also
cuttin! throu!h the other. This is the 8ie# that is characteristicall* offered b* structuralists of the relation bet#een
lan!ua!e and its referential content in a narrati8e fiction: that one cannot cut throu!h the form and lan!ua!e of a
no8el #ithout also cuttin! throu!h its characters and e8ents.
If #e stick #ith the Fuestion of fictional character for a moment, the transition in criticism from realistic inferences
to descri)tions of semiolo!ical s*stems of differences is easil* charted. Perha)s the seminal #ork in this conte>t is
b* Iladimir Pro)), a ussian formalist critic #hose treatment of narrati8e is, in effect, )roto-structuralist, thou!h
not translated into -n!lish until the mid-t#entieth centur*. Particularl* im)ortant in this re!ard is Pro))Es
$orphology of the Fol#tale <+0%?= in #hich he ar!ues that fair* tales are, structurall* s)eakin!, basicall* the same
as each other. Pro)) makes this case in a number of #a*s, but the central mo8e is to ar!ue that characters in the
narrati8es fulfil a limited number of functions. In this mo8e, there is a clear de)arture from the assum)tion that a
character is a re)resentation of a )erson, to the 8ie# that the character is a function in a !rammatical s*stem, and
can be best understood as a kind of de8ice in the construction of a )lot. Aence, for Pro)), there #ere
-22-
certain bo>es into #hich characters could be cast - 8illain, donor, hel)er, )rincess, dis)atcher, hero and false hero -
#hich abstracted the indi8idualit* of that character into a !rammatical function. In +099, A. 7. 5reimas de8elo)ed
Pro))Es insi!hts into the )lot-functions of characters in &emantique &tructurale. This is a #ork )ro8idin! one of the
most robust statements of the )eriod of the im)ortance of difference, o))osition and ne!ation as fundamental
structures of thou!ht and lan!ua!e. 5reimas describes differences, for the most )art, as e>istents in the #orld #e
)ercei8e, and that #e subseFuentl* re!ister in our lan!ua!es, but there is also a sense in #hich differences
become the mechanism for makin! the #orld take sha)e, as an arran!ement of differences that he calls semes, or
units of meanin! that differ and form binar* o))ositions.
,ike Pro)), 5reimas sees a fictional character as a lin!uistic function and not a )erson, and he names this function
an actant. The s*stem he de8elo)s for the anal*sis of a stor*, the actantial model, is based on the 8ie# that the
o))ositional structure of a )lot is created b* the arran!ement of actants in a certain seFuence accordin! to a
limited set of )ossibilities. 5reimasEs basic aim #ith the actantial model is to sho# not onl* that all stories, #hen
abstracted in this #a*, enact the same dee) structure, but that stories are merel* an instance of structural rules
common to all sentences. A fictional )lot is, for 5reimas, !enerated from three sets of o))ositional differences:
subDect and obDect, sender and recei8er, and hel)er and o))onent. The cate!or* of subDect and obDect, for
e>am)le, allo#s for the anal*sis of desire narrati8es, such as ride and re/udice, to be em)tied of their s)ecific
content, and become a set of relations bet#een actantial roles, narrati8e )aradi!ms and s*nta!ms, chosen and
arran!ed in a manner analo!ous to the )rinci)les of sentence )roduction described abo8e. Accordin! to the
actantial model, then, there is to be no s)eculation on the subDect of #hether Mr Darc* lo8es -liGabeth. At best
there mi!ht be some disa!reement as to #hether -liGabeth is the subDect or the obDect of the actantial structure.
The actantial model is one e>am)le of the #a* that literar* strucuralism seeks !eneral rules and structural
homolo!ies <or lo!ical similarities= bet#een narrati8es, and mi!ht therefore be accused of destro*in! difference -
that is usin! the )rinci)le of difference to find abstract similarities bet#een narrati8es that are, in their
)articularit*, different from each other. It also re)resents clearl* the #a* that o))ositional semes can be
-2'-
both )aradi!matic and s*nta!matic features of a narrati8e. 1e mi!ht, for e>am)le, 8ie# the o))osition of a hero
and a 8illain as the basic d*ad from #hich narrati8e meanin! is !enerated, but #e mi!ht also see it, or other
o))ositions in a )lot, in tem)oral terms. .tructuralists #ill often 8ie# the be!innin! of a )lot and its endin! in the
terms of an o))ositional structure, so that a narrati8e can be seen to enact a )assa!e from one )ole to another,
from ha))* to sad, *oun! to old, sin!le to married, or ali8e to dead. This translation of tem)oral o))osition into
s)atial o))osition is at best a confirmation of the 7akobsonian formula, that literature )roDects the a>is of selection
into the a>is of combination, but is also an e>am)le of the kind of mo8e obDected to b* )oststructuralist critics,
namel* the s*nchroniGation of diachronic as)ects of lan!ua!e.
It is #orth obser8in! that 5reimasEs s*stem for the anal*sis of character is another e>am)le of a rather ambi!uous
mode of defamiliarisation. If realism is a mode that aims to make the de8ices of fiction in8isible, Pro)) and
5reimas are critics intent on the barin! of those de8ices. But Pro)), like his fello# ussian formalists, #orked #ith
a fairl* strai!htfor#ard distinction bet#een realism, #hich sou!ht to make the de8ices of lan!ua!e im)erce)tible,
and anti-realism, #hich sou!ht to call attention to those de8ices. It is more difficult #ith 5reimas to determine
#hether the acts of defamiliarisation, of alienation from lan!ua!e, of barin! the de8ices, or e>)osin! the hidden
conditions of meanin!, belon! to the #ork under anal*sis or the critical act itself. As I ha8e said, it #as the maDor
im)act of structuralist criticism to claim that trans)arent and o)aFue lan!ua!e #ere o)eratin! in the same
conditions, and therefore to !i8e the im)ression that the hidden conditions of lin!uistic structure could be conflated
#ith the content of a discourse. 1ith the actantial model of narrati8e, as #ith the structural account of the si!n, it
can be difficult to determine #hether the s*stem of differences enables, constitutes or )re8ents lin!uistic reference.
The actantial model, then, is a !ood e>am)le of #hat 7ameson means #hen he talks about the transformation of
form into content. It takes the traditional idea of character, con8entiall* understood as fictional content, and
translates it into a s*stem of differences to be understood as formal arran!ement in the te>t.
It is #orth reflectin! no# on #hat kind of critical a))roach to narrati8e is emer!in! from the conce)t of difference.
(irst, #e ha8e a belief that the model of s*nta!matic and )aradi!matic relations for the anal*sis of a
-23-
sentence mi!ht be e>tended into a theor* for the understandin! of a lon!er discourse. .econd, #e ha8e a
)ercei8ed similarit* bet#een these structuralist cate!ories and the )rece)ts of classical rhetoric. Third, there is a
tendenc*, as e>em)lified b* 5reimas, to 8ie# the or!anisation of narrati8es )rimaril* in terms of o))osition, and
)articularl* abstract o))osition, in the sense that the )articular content of a narrati8e, such as a character, is
em)tied of that )articularit* for the )roduction of structural homolo!ies bet#een different narrati8es. Taken
to!ether, these three tendencies )ro8ide a conte>t for oland BarthesEs influential manifesto, EIntroduction to the
structural anal*sis of narrati8esE. Be!innin! from structural lin!uistics, Barthes is concerned to outline a Esecond
lin!uisticsE ca)able of dealin! #ith units of meanin! lar!er than the sentence, but this )roDect #ill ha8e to be
distinct from classical rhetoric for the follo#in! reason:
Discourse has its units, its rules, its E!rammarE: be*ond the sentence, and thou!h consistin!
solel* of sentences, it must naturall* form the obDect of a second lin!uistics. (or a lon! time
indeed, such a lin!uistics of discourse bore a !lorious name, that of hetoric. As a result of a
com)le> historical mo8ement, ho#e8er, in #hich hetoric #ent o8er to belles-lettres and the
latter #as di8orced from the stud* of lan!ua!e, it has recentl* become necessar* to take u) the
)roblem afresh. The ne# lin!uistics of discourse has still to be de8elo)ed, but at least it is bein!
)ostulated, and b* the lin!uists themsel8es. This last fact is not #ithout si!nificance, for,
althou!h constitutin! an autonomous obDect, discourse must be studied from the basis of
lin!uistics. If a #orkin! h*)othesis is needed for an anal*sis #hose task is immense and #hose
materials infinite, then the most reasonable thin! is to )osit a homolo!ical relation bet#een
sentence and discourse insofar as it is likel* that a similar formal or!aniGation orders all semiotic
s*stems, #hate8er their substances and dimensions.
<Barthes +0@@:?2=
Aere #e ha8e a kind of abstract of the ar!ument so far in this cha)ter: that lin!uistics offers a basis for the
anal*sis of lon!er discourses, that a narrati8e is homolo!ous #ith a sentence, and that rhetorical anal*sis became
derailed alon! the #a* as a result of its o#n )reoocua)tion #ith
-29-
beaut* and ele!ance. It is also #orth notin! here that Barthes is referrin! to -mile Ben8eniste #hen he claims that
lin!uists themsel8es are )ostulatin! this ne#, second lin!uistics. But this is not an uncontro8ersial issue, as a
readin! of 5eoffre* .trickland on the subDect #ill re8eal <.trickland +0?+:+%@-''=. In fact it #as ne8er clear that
somethin! as com)le> as a no8el could be anal*sed on the same basis as a sentence, and Barthes clearl*
floundered in his o#n attem)ts. The model of )aradi!matic and s*nta!matic relations is relati8el* easil* de)lo*ed
in the anal*sis of a sentence, )artl* because the units of meanin! bein! selected and combined are easil*
identifiable. .aussure, for e>am)le, talks mainl* about selection and combination at three le8els of meanin!: the
)honeme, the mor)heme, and the #ord. But #hat do #e do #hen dealin! #ith an entire narrati8e discourseC 1hat
units of meanin! are there be*ond the le8el of a #ord that mi!ht allo# the narratolo!ist to de)lo* the model for
the anal*sis of narrati8e in !eneralC
These are Fuestions that ha8e been ans#ered in different #a*s b* different narratolo!ists. Todoro8, for e>am)le,
offers Fuite a sim)le account of the units of a narrati8e discourse b* reducin! a stor* to a set of abstract
)ro)ositions. In a manner similar to Pro)), a folk tale can be e>)ressed as a set of abstract )ro)ositions in the
follo#in! #a*:
L is a *oun! !irl
$ is a kin!
$ is LEs father
M is a dra!on
M abducts L
<Todoro8 +0?+:'0=
Aa8in! identified these minimal units in narrati8e, Todoro8 !oes on to describe 8arious as)ects of the narrati8e
)ro)osition. Ae be!ins #ith the distinction bet#een a!ents and )redicates. A!ents are more or less the same as
actants, in the sense that the* are roles to be filled b* bein!s, usuall* human, and are re)resented here b* L, $
and M. In these abstract )ro)ositions, therefore, names such as Mar* and 7ohn can be substituted for L and $, and
somethin! dra!on-like for M. Predicates, on the other hand are the stor*Es 8erbs <to be a *oun! !irl, to be a
dra!on, to abduct, etc.=. In this sim)le scheme there is alread* a com)le> set of )aradi!matic
-2@-
and s*nta!matic relations. Most ob8iousl*, the roles re)resented b* L and $ can be occu)ied b* a lar!e number of
)ossible bein!s, so that L and $ mi!ht be occu)ied b* Mar* and 7ohn, but eFuall* b* Aermione and Theobald. The
characteristics attached to characters in a fictional narrati8e are also selected, so that L and $ could 8ar* in moral
character, a))earance, or an*thin! else. Perha)s less ob8iousl*, each narrati8e )ro)osition is itself a )aradi!m, in
the sense that an entire )ro)osition can be substituted for another. In this schema, for e>am)le, EM abducts LE
mi!ht be chan!ed for an* number of alternati8es, such as EM abducts $E or EM kills LE.
-Fuall*, the anal*sis can identif* s*nta!matic as)ects of the narrati8e schema, concerned not #ith the selection of
a!ents, )redicates and )ro)ositions, but #ith the #a* in #hich the* are combined in a seFuence. Aere a!ain, the
Fuestion of ho# minimal units combine in a seFuence is a !ate#a* into an enormous narratolo!ical to)ic. Todoro8
describes the seFuence as Ea hi!her unitE, meanin! that it is not a narrati8e )ro)osition, but a lo!ic that links the
narrati8e )ro)ositions to!ether, and that can #ork in a number of #a*s. (or a more com)le> account of the
numerous narrati8e )ossibilities !o8ernin! the seFuence, Todoro8 )oints to the #ork of Boris Tomashe8ski and
Claude Bremond, both of #hom ha8e attem)ted to dra# u) schematic charts of the man* )ossibilities of
combination of narrati8e units. To !i8e a fla8our of the )ossibilities of combination, he describes the seFuence of
the ideal narrati8e as follo#s:
An ideal narrati8e be!ins #ith a stable situation that some force #ill )erturb. (rom #hich results
a state of diseFuilibriumK b* the action of a force directed in a con8erse direction, the eFuilibrium
is re-establishedK the second eFuilibrium is Fuite similar to the first, but the t#o are not identical.
<+0?+:3+=
This is one kind of abstract and structural anal*sis of #hich literar* criticism has been a#are for a lon! time: that a
narrati8e seFuence can be reduced to a basic scheme #hich be!ins #ith stabilit* and order #hich is then disru)ted
before a similar state of order is restored. Its 8alue to this discussion is that it su!!ests t#o cate!ories into #hich
narrati8e units mi!ht fall, namel* units describin! a state and those )erformin! a
-2?-
transition from one state to another. Thus, a unit such as E$ is LEs fatherE describes a state, #hereas EM abducts LE
transforms the stable state of their famil* relations into one of crisis and disorder. oland Barthes names these
cate!ories as indices and functions, and )oints out that man* indices in a narrati8e can be omitted for the )ur)oses
of describin! the seFuence of a narrati8e, ho#e8er im)ortant the* ma* be to the narrati8e as a #hole. It is clear
that, #hen describin! the s*nta!matic or seFuential as)ects of a narrati8e schema, it is the second t*)e of unit
that is most essential to the descri)tion of the seFuence because it is the )redicate of chan!e. If, for e>am)le, I
#anted to describe the seFuence of ride and re/udice in a hurr*, I #ould em)hasise the narrati8e units that
Barthes calls EfunctionsE, #hich ha8e a role in the transformation of one state to another, such as Darc*Es rudeness
at the "etherfield ball, 1ickhamEs elo)ement #ith ,*dia, or -liGabethEs tri) to Derb*shire #ith the 5ardiners.
If #e no# return to the Fuestion of the t*)e of critical )ractice that emer!es from the structuralist conce)t of
difference, it is clear at least that it )roduces a hi!hl* abstracted and formal kind of anal*sis. The structuralist
essentiall* em)ties a narrati8e of most of its details in order to identif* the dee) structural )rinci)les o)eratin!
beneath them, and so unco8er the s*stem of relations that or!anises those details. 1e mi!ht 8ei# this as a kind of
criticism addressin! itself less to the Fuestion E1hat does a narrati8e meanCE than to the Fuestion EAo# does it
meanCE Br to chan!e the #ordin! sli!htl*, this looks like a kind of criticism orientated to#ards the form rather than
the content of narrati8e. But is this reall* the caseC And ho# do #e !et from this mere critical orientation to
7amesonEs claim that structuralism actuall* transforms content into the essential subDect matter of a #orkC
.u))ose #e take another e>am)le of this kind of formal anal*sis at #ork, a case that I #ill borrro# from Terr*
-a!letonEs hi!hl* influential Literary Theory( an -ntroduction )ublished in +0?2. To illustrate the transformation of
form into content in structuralist anal*sis, -a!leton outlines a 8er* sim)le stor*:
.u))ose #e are anal*sin! a stor* in #hich a bo* lea8es home after Fuarrellin! #ith his father,
sets out on a #alk throu!h the forest in the heat of the da* and falls do#n a dee) )it. The father
comes out in search of his son, )eers do#n the )it, but is unable to see him because of the
darkness. At that moment the sun has risen to a )oint directl*
-20-
o8erhead, illuminates the )itEs de)ths #ith its ra*s and allo#s the father to rescue his child. After
a Do*ous reconciliation, the* return home to!ether.
<+0?2:03=
,ike Todoro8, Barthes and others, -a!letonEs concern here is to schematiGe the stor* into units of narrati8e, #hich
he does as follo#s:
The first unit of si!nification, Ebo* Fuarrels #ith fatherE, mi!ht be re#ritten as Elo# rebels a!ainst
hi!hE. The bo*Es #alk throu!h the forest is a mo8ement alon! the horiGontal a>is, in contrast to
the 8ertical a>is Elo#:hi!hE, and could be inde>ed as EmiddleE. The fall into the )it, a )lace belo#
!round, si!nifies Elo#E a!ain, and the Genith of the sun Ehi!hE. B* shinin! into the )it, the sun has
in a sense stoo)ed Elo#E, thus in8ertin! the narrati8eEs first si!nif*in! unit, #here Elo#E struck
a!ainst Ehi!hE. The reconciliation bet#een father and son restores an eFuilibrium bet#een Elo#E
and Ehi!hE, and the #alk back home to!ether, si!nif*in! EmiddleE, marks the achie8ement of a
suitabl* intermediate state.
<+0?2:03=
A tone of s)oofer* runs throu!h this illustration of the structuralist method, but as an illustration it dra#s attention
to some interestin! )roblems in the relationshi) bet#een form and content. The first obser8ation that -a!leton
makes about this method is that Eit brackets off the actual content of the stor* and concentrates entirel* on the
formE. This obser8ation is su))orted b* the claim that one could re)lace the ke* a!ents <father and son, )it and
sun= #ith entirel* different elements <mother and dau!hter, bird and mole= and still ha8e the same stor*: EAs lon!
as the structure of relations bet#een the units is )reser8ed, it does not matter #hich items *ou selectE <+0?2:03=.
A Fuestion arises immediatel* here #hich )laces in Fuestion the first claim that this method concentrates entirel*
on form: surel* the structural relation of Ehi!hE and Elo#E de)ends on the referential content of the #ords EsunE and
E)itEC 1e could !o on to sa* that to construe the relation of father to son as )art of the same hi!h:lo# o))osition
de)ends not onl* on the referential content of EfatherE and EsonE <the father bein! bi!!er than the son= but also on
the
-'&-
s*mbolic content of the relationshi) of father to son in terms of authorit*. 1hat -a!leton seems to mean b* form,
therefore, is sim)l* a schema based on content, but at a hi!her le8el of abstraction. The so)histicated structuralist
defense to this obDection #ould be that the #ords E)itE and EsunE onl* ha8e referential, or indeed s*mbolic, content
because of their s*stemic relations in the lan!ua!e s*stem: their com)le> relations #ith s*non*ms and anton*ms
delimit and act as the conditions for the )roduction of their referential content: in short that their content is
constituted b* their formal relations to other #ords in the lan!ua!e s*stem. But if this ar!ument is acce)ted, it
sim)l* means that it is inaccurate to sa* that structuralist method brackets off content and concentrates
e>clusi8el* on form. It #ould be more accurate to sa* that the method conflates content and form to the e>tent
that the* cannot be se)arated, and a formal schema in this kind of narratolo!* is merel* a content-based
abstraction.
Bf course this issue is not )assed o8er b* -a!leton, #ho remarks that Ethere is a sense in #hich the sun is hi!h and
)its are lo# an*#a*, and to that e>tent #hat is chosen as NcontentN does matterE <+0?2:09=. .o one of the thin!s
that the readin! illustrates is the characteristicall* contradictor* )osition of structuralist criticism on the Fuestion of
referential content. (irst he sa*s that content is i!nored, then that it actuall* determines the formal schema it #as
su))osed to ha8e dis)laced. This a))arent contradiction is )robabl* nothin! more than the collision of t#o
anal*tical frame#orks: an old one in #hich form and content are cate!oricall* se)arate and a more modern one in
#hich one cannot cut throu!h the form of lan!ua!e, or narrati8e, #ithout also cuttin! throu!h its content, as if
form and content #ere the t#o sides of a sheet of )a)er. It is on the basis of this second anal*tical frame#ork that
7ameson can claim that the most characteristic feature of structuralist criticism is a kind of transformation of form
into content. It also accounts for the Fuotation marks that the #ord EcontentE acFuires in -a!letonEs discussion, and
under)ins the conclusion of his illustration of structuralist method, #ith its echos of 7amesonEs obser8ation:
If the )articular contents of the te>t are re)laceable, there is a sense in #hich one can sa* that
the EcontentE of the narrati8e is its structure. This is eFui8alent to claimin! that the narrati8e is in
a #a* about itself:
-'+-
its EsubDectE is its o#n internal relations, its o#n modes of sense-makin!.
<+0?2:09=
A minor Fualification on this conclusion seems necessar*. The a8ailable re)lacements of )articular contents in a
narrati8e are )aradi!ms, and there is therefore a sense in #hich the* are not Einternal relationsE. The* are rather
relations bet#een #hat is there in a narrati8e te>t and #hat is not there but could be. And as #e ha8e alread*
seen, those )aradi!ms are limited to the kind of re)lacements that )reser8e the structure of the narrati8e on the
basis of their content. $ou can re)lace -a!letonEs Ebo*E #ith a EmoleE, but not #ith a E!iantE, or an*thin! hi!her than
its o))osite. 1e mi!ht then #ant to conclude instead that the subDect of a narrati8e is its o#n internal and
e>ternal, s*nta!matic and )aradi!matic relations, and that the anal*sis does not succeed in banishin! referential
content <ho#e8er it is understood= alto!ether.
1hat #e are facin! here is e>actl* the same ambi!uit* that )resides o8er the conce)t of difference as an account
of the lin!uistic si!n: do the s*nta!matic and )aradi!matic relations bet#een minimal units of a narrati8e merel*
enable, or actuall* constitute its contentC Man* a8ailable accounts of difference, of semiolo!* and of literar*
structuralism !i8e the im)ression, like 7ameson and -a!leton, that the #hole idea of content #as s#e)t aside b*
this kind of anal*sis. But the truth is a little more com)licatedK the Fuestion of referential meanin! #as ne8er reall*
settled, #ith the Fuestion of #hether it #as bracketed or dis)laced b* structuralist anal*sis remainin! unans#ered.
"e8ertheless this recastin! of meanin! in structural terms had an enormous im)act on literar* criticism in the
middle of the t#entieth centur*. In the )re8ious section of this cha)ter I claimed that the )oles of trans)arent and
o)aFue lan!ua!e #ere often used as the basis for a distinction bet#een )rose and )oetr*, since the lan!ua!e and
form of )oetr* is more 8isible, more bound u) #ith its content. I also claimed that the distinction could be used to
distin!uish )oetic t*)es of )rose from realist )rose, #hich is more trans)arent. But #hat structuralist anal*sis
sho#s is that e8en the content of the most trans)arent )rose is inse)arabl* bound to its form and structure, and
this com)letel* chan!es our frame#ork for understandin! the #a* that reference #orks. As -a!leton
-'%-
demonstrates, the structuralist method of readin! a te>t dis)laces the idea of referential content as somethin!
e>trate>tual, somethin! outside of the te>t, #ith one in #hich referential content is embedded in a s*stem or
relations. -8en if the status of the referent remained ambi!uous and unsettled, the 8er* dualistic frame#ork for
understandin! reference, in literature and in !eneral, in terms of form and content, or the inside and the outside of
lan!ua!e, *ielded to the more monistic 8ie# of form and content as cate!oricall* inse)arable as)ects of
si!nificance.
The conce)t of difference, elaborated as s*nta!matic and )aradi!matic relations, has deli8ered us to the !ate#a*
of #hat is no# called )oststructuralism. There #ere man* lin!uists, )hiloso)hers and literar* critics #ho realised
that there #as somethin! unsettled in structuralist theor* on the subDect of referential meanin!. In the #ork of
Paul de Man, for e>am)le, #e find the Fuestion of reference behind much of his criticism. Accordin! to de Man, the
structuralist semiolo!ists and the narratolo!ists had !one some #a* to#ards freein! literar* criticism from #hat he
calls the Edebilitatin! burden of )ara)hraseE <de Man +0@0:3=, but the* had not !one far enou!h. In other #ords,
the semiolo!ists had done a lot to mo8e criticism a#a* from the idea that the* had to re)resent #hat a te>t #as
about, to )ara)hrase its content, or to talk about it as if it re)resented a real #orld of )eo)le and e8ents. But if,
des)ite all the em)hasis on the formal s*stem of a narrati8e, the referential content has merel* been bracketed,
left aside or i!nored, there is a sense in #hich it is still ho8erin! o8er the anal*sis. De Man #ants to mo8e a#a*
from this to#ards a more radical critiFue of reference:
OtheP radical critiFue of referential meanin! ne8er im)lied that the referential function of
lan!ua!e could in an* #a* be a8oided, bracketed, or reduced to bein! Dust one contin!ent
)ro)ert* of lan!ua!e amon! others, as is )ostulated for e>am)le, in contem)orar* semiolo!*.
<+0@0:%&'=
This is one #a* of understandin! the nature of )oststructuralist criticism: that e8en if structuralism had conflated
the form and content, or the structure and the meanin! of discourse to the e>tent that the* could no lon!er be
se)arated, there #as a residual dualism, or a )ersistence of referential content, in their critical )ractice. It is, for
e>am)le, eas* to see
-'2-
that #hen a structuralist reduces a narrati8e to a series of )ro)ositions or minimal units, there is a kind of
)ara)hrase at #ork. If I reduce ride and re/udice to an abstract schema <A is a #omanK B is a manK B )ro)oses
to AK A declinesK A learns that her im)ression of B is falseK A and B marr*= I am, ho#e8er shoddil*, )ara)hrasin!
its content. The )articular contents <-liGabeth, Mr Darc*, etc.= are subtracted, but the idea of content has not been
alto!ether banished. In 1llegories of Reading de Man talks about this residual referential meanin! in 8er* ne!ati8e
terms, as a fiend that asserts itself Ein a 8ariet* of dis!uisesE, as a !erm that reFuires some E)re8entati8e
semiolo!ical h*!ieneE and as a fallac* that actuall* )re8ents the critic from seein! the literariness of literature:
EO.emiolo!*P demonstrated that the )erce)tion of the literar* dimension of lan!ua!e is lar!el* obscured if one
submits uncriticall* to the authorit* of referenceE <+0@0:3=. This )roDect to rid criticism once and for all of its
concern #ith referential meanin! is one #a* to understand the im)act of )oststructuralism, and leads to some
interestin! modifications of the conce)t of difference, #hich are discussed in the ne>t cha)ter. It also hel)s to
e>)lain #h*, in the course of the t#entieth centur*, critics #ent from #ritin! sentences like this: E1hen -liGabeth
encounters Mr Darc* at the "etherfield ball, she is a))alled at his characterE to sentences like this: EThe a)oria
bet#een )erfomati8e and constati8e lan!ua!e is merel* a 8ersion of the a)oria bet#een tro)e and )ersuasion that
both !enerates and )aral*ses rhetoric.E In other #ords, it hel)s to e>)lain ho# the conce)t of difference
contributed to the utter transformation of critical discourse, from a mode of )ara)hrase to a lin!uistic Dar!on
acti8el* hostile to the content of a literar* #ork.
-''-
'
DIFFERANCE
Differance, s)elled #ith an EaE, is a notoriousl* un)indo#nable conce)t, but in fact it means somethin! 8er* close to
Eun)indo#nabilit*E. If so far #e ha8e had difference as the o))osite of sameness, as the o))osite of identit*, the
o))osite of sin!ularit* and the o))osite of reference, no#, #ith the #ord EdifferanceE, #hich Derrida claims is
neither a #ord nor a conce)t at all, #e are dealin! #ith somethin! like the o))osite of )resence, or e8en the
o))osite of conce)thood. This cha)ter e>)lains the connection bet#een )resence and conce)thood, and #h*
Derrida sa# differance as their o))osite, but it also e>)lores some other )oststructuralist a))roaches to and
modifications of ideas about difference.
Most of the e>)osition in this cha)ter is theoretical and )hiloso)hical, and is based on the #ork of Derrida and
DeleuGe, t#o hi!hl* influential Parisian )hiloso)hers #hose #ork in the second half of the t#entieth centur*
transformed criticism. Both Derrida and DeleuGe are )hiloso)hers for #hom literature <and art in !eneral= has a
s)ecial )lace, and indeed both are disinclined to dra# a hard boundar* bet#een the discourses of )hiloso)h* and
literature. If literature is a distinct kind of discourse for these )hiloso)hers, it is so because its lan!ua!e is not that
of ri!id truth-tellin! anal*sis. ,iterature, unlike traditional )hiloso)h*, deals in un)indo#nabilit*, in fluidit* and
motion, and this elusi8e Fualit* in literar* lan!ua!e is somethin! that Derrida and DeleuGe, in different
-'3-
#a*s, ha8e sou!ht to incor)orate in their o#n )hiloso)hical #ritin!. There is a need in both #riters to abandon the
ri!ours of traditional )hiloso)hical st*le, the dominance of classical lo!ic as the !o8ernin! 8alue of )hiloso)hical
#ritin!, and the accom)an*in! )retence of obDecti8it*. In this sense, the* mi!ht be seen as literar* )hiloso)hers.
This blurrin! of the boundar* bet#een )hiloso)h* and literature is a maDor em)hasis of deconstruction, the kind of
literar* criticism most closel* associated #ith DerridaEs #ork, one of the characteristics of #hich is to issue serious
challen!es to the traditional relationshi) bet#een a literar* and a critical te>t.
An*one #ho has read a critical #ork, or been tau!ht a critical method, and felt that it is doin! 8iolence to the #ork
under anal*sis has, in a sense, felt the im)ulse that lies behind much deconstructi8e and )oststructuralist criticism.
Deconstruction as a kind of criticism can be rou!hl* di8ided into t#o t*)es. The first t*)e is a kind of criticism that
finds the most ri!id and anal*tical a))roaches to literature unsatisfactor*: too riddled #ith )resu))ositions, too
)artial in their use of e8idence, too )re)ared to translate literature into somethin! com)letel* different, too distant
from the nature of literature itself, and too sure of the truth of their o#n disco8eries. A common strate!* for this
first t*)e of deconstruction is to take a ri!id anal*tical model <)erha)s the search for unit* in a #ork, or the
ordered schematics of structuralist narratolo!*= and sho# its failure to account for the com)le>, sometimes
contradictor*, often untid* multi)licit* that is a literar* #ork. The second t*)e of deconstruction )robabl* has
similar aims, but sets about demonstratin! the un)indo#nable e>cess of a literar* #ork #ithout en!a!in! #ith a
ri!id anal*tical frame#ork at all. The first t*)e is an anal*tical a))roach to the destruction of anal*tical s*stems,
#hile the second t*)e is a )la*ful, celebrator* imitation of the literar* obDect at its most chaoticK the first is
ri!orous, the second is ludic. In either case the deconstructi8e readin! is intent on unra8ellin! )re8ious readin!s,
es)eciall* those con8e*in! a sense of the authorit* of their o#n inter)retation.
i!orous and ludic deconstruction share an im)ortant characteristic, #hich is that the* refuse the traditional
authorit* of a critical act #hereb* the anal*sis looks do#n on the literar* obDect from an Bl*m)ian hei!ht, or a
)osition of obDecti8e and scientific neutralit*. The deconstructi8e readin! al#a*s tries to locate itself inside its
obDect, as far as that is )ossible,
-'9-
to a8oid #hat Derrida calls the E)latitudes of a su))osed academic metalan!ua!eE, or the stu)idit* of thinkin! that
a critic can stand back and s)eak the truth about lan!ua!e. (or this reason - this refusal of anal*tical models, the
reDection of the 8alues of anal*tical distance - it is e>tremel* difficult to illustrate in !eneral terms #hat a
deconstructi8e readin! does to a literar* te>t. /nlike structuralist narratolo!*, deconstruction is not a method that
can be a))lied to a literar* te>t. And #hereas the structuralist conce)t of difference is a lin!uistic anal*tical model
that can be a))lied to almost an*thin!, )oststructuralist a))roaches to difference are mainl* concerned to sho#
that meanin! can ne8er be )inned do#n b* such ordered s*stems. But e8en if deconstruction is not a method that
can be a))lied, there are certain recurrent theoretical and lo!ical )roblems that it attem)ts to e>)ose and sub8ert
in its dealin!s #ith literature and criticism. It is the )ur)ose of this cha)ter to identif* these recurrent issues and
the kind of counter-strate!ies characteristicall* de)lo*ed in )oststructuralist a))roaches to readin!.
(or the structuralist, the conce)t of difference la* at the heart of a scientific enter)rise. It #as a kind of foundation
stone on to) of #hich a hi!hl* s*stematic account of meanin! #as assembled. And *et there #as al#a*s somethin!
about the conce)t of difference that militated a!ainst foundations, and therefore a!ainst the )ossibilit* of buildin!
stable structures on to) of them. This )arado> hel)s to characterise #hat ha8e, in the An!lo-American #orld, come
to be seen as )oststructuralist de8elo)ments in the conce)t of difference: de8elo)ments that #ere concerned to
)ull a#a* the foundation stone of structuralist science, and to #atch the achie8ements of a s*stematic structural
lin!uistics colla)se. Br )erha)s it #ould be more accurate to sa* that, for )oststructuralists, the conce)t of
difference )roduces insi!hts that )ull a#a* its o#n foundation stone. This idea, that difference is self-sub8ertin!, or
self-deconstructin!, reFuires some e>)lanation, but it is also im)ortant to sa* at the outset that this is not sim)l*
the end of the conce)t of differenceK if an*thin! it is the moment in the thinkin! throu!h of difference #here thin!s
!et interestin!. It ma* be a line of thou!ht that heralds the end of difference as the basis of a s*stematic science,
but it is also one that breathes ne# life into the conce)t of difference.
-'@-
DIFFERENCE (EYOND OPPO"ITION" ) DERRIDA
It #ill be clear from the last cha)ter, for e>am)le, that structuralism effecti8el* im)osed stabilit* on the anal*sis of
difference b* focusin! its attention on the sim)lest kind of difference: the binar* o))osition. But the binar*
o))osition can onl* be seen as a stable meanin!-!eneratin! unit #hen t#o anton*mic si!ns are seen as if in
isolation from the man* other differences and relations that could be introduced into the anal*sis. To o8ersim)lif*
the case for a moment, it could be said that the binar* o))osition #as for )eo)le #ho could onl* count to t#o. (or
e>am)le, the idea that the meanin! of the #ord Eda*E inhered entirel* in its relation to the #ord Eni!htE #as
some#hat reducti8e because it e>cluded consideration of the man* !radations bet#een ni!ht and da*, e>cluded
the difficult relations on the mar!in bet#een them, such as da#n and dusk. To relate a #ord such as Eda*E onl* to
its anton*m #as to reduce difference to a sin!le, determinable relation of the most sim)lified kind. Bne #a* of
lookin! at the )oststructuralist critiFue of structural lin!uistics is to see it as an o))osition to this kind of sim)listic
reduction, as an attem)t to ackno#led!e the com)le>it* of a #ordEs relations, or as a )roDect to liberate difference
from the closure of the binar* o))osition. The )oststructuralist #ill for e>am)le s)eak of irreducible difference as a
#a* of indicatin! the )o8ert* of the d*ad as the basic meanin!-!eneratin! unit. ather than accountin! for the
meanin! of a #ord such as Eda*E in relation to its o))osite, the )oststructuralist #ill characteristicall* focus on the
borderline bet#een the t#o si!ns, in the territor* in #hich the difference bet#een the t#o is less ob8iousl*
o))ositional and less clearl* determinable. After structuralism there is a ne# interest in borderline territor*, in
mar!ins, in Gones of contestation bet#een si!ns that def* the o))ositional lo!ic of the binar* o))osition.
It is )robabl* immediatel* a))arent that #ords and )hrases like Emar!insE, EborderlinesE and EGones of contestationE
carr* im)lications of social and )olitical conflict, and such im)lications are an im)ortant )art of the influence of
)oststructuralist thou!ht. (rom the late +09&s on#ards, there #as a !ro#in! sus)icion of the structuralist )roDect
to )roduce a neutral science of lan!ua!e and discourse, and an increasin! im)erati8e to anal*se lan!ua!e in its
relation to )olitical histor* and )olitical )o#er. 1hile much )oststructuralist #ork does not e>)licitl*
-'?-
address Fuestions of histor* and )olitics, there is a clear mo8ement in that direction, #hich can be discerned in the
first )lace in terms su!!estin! a more )oliticall* en!a!ed s)ecies of lin!uistic anal*sis. Bne area in #hich this is
most a))arent is e>actl* in a ne# direction in the anal*sis of binar* o))osition, #hich is no lon!er seen as an
innocent structural relation but rather as a hierarch*. In DerridaEs #ork, and in that of man* literar* and cultural
critics #ho follo#ed his ideas, there is al#a*s a sense that an o))osition is no innocent structural relation but a
)o#er relation, in #hich one term dominates another. -8en in the case of an o))osition as a))arentl* rooted in
nature as ni!ht:da*, there is a hierarch* #hich ascribes )ri8ile!e, )riorit* and )ositi8e 8alue to one term at the
e>)ense of the other. Indeed the 8er* idea of otherness comes to si!nif* this )o#er relation, this secondar* and
deri8ati8e )osition that one si!n acFuires in relation to another. And this dimension of an o))osition is certainl* not
!i8en in nature, but is acti8el* )roduced in discourse, in the )rocess of si!nification, or the #a* that si!ns are
used. Bne need onl* think of the connotations of ni!ht and da*, of #hat Derrida refers to as chains of connotation
and associati8e links to reco!nise that da* has a kind of )riorit* o8er ni!ht, a )ri8ile!e and )riorit* that makes
their relation far from s*mmetrical and allo#s da* to be associated #ith life, kno#led!e, truth, )urit* and !oodness
#hile ni!ht connotes death, i!norance, corru)tion and e8il. It is 8er* often onl* b* e>)lorin! the )otential of si!ns
as ima!es, associations and su!!estions that a hierarch* bet#een the terms of a d*ad is )erce)tible, and this
)oints to an im)ortant de8elo)ment a#a* from the su))osedl* 8alue-free, scientific )roDect of structural lin!uistics.
Poststructuralist a))roaches to the binar* o))osition )roduce a kind of critiFue that unmasks )o#er relations, that
seeks to e>)ose hierarch*, that refuses to isolate the si!n from the discourse in #hich it o)erates, or for that
matter that refuses to isolate the o))osition from the more !eneral discursi8e conte>t in #hich its associati8e and
su!!esti8e )otential is formed. If #e take these t#o de8elo)ments to!ether, the liberation of difference from
o))osition on one hand, and a kind of critiFue that e>)oses hierarch* as it o)erates in discourse, #e ha8e a useful
)reliminar* account of the characteristics of #hat came to kno#n, in the +0@&s, as deconstruction.
In ositions <+0?+=, Derrida describes deconstructionEs a))roach to binar* o))osition as ha8in! three )hases. The
first )hase is the e>)osure
-'0-
of a hierarch*, of the assumed su)eriorit* of one term o8er the otherK the second )hase is the re8ersal of that
hierarch*, that is, the )romotion of the secondar* and deri8ati8e term to the )osition of su)eriorit* for strate!ic
reasonsK and the third )hase is the reinscri)tion of that o))osition, #hich in8ol8es the disru)tion or reconfi!uration
of the difference bet#een the t#o terms. There is nothin! that Derrida abhors more 8ehementl* than the idea that
deconstruction mi!ht become some kind of anal*tical )ro!ramme of easil* assimilable and a))licable techniFues,
and this is the closest he comes an*#here to a s*stematic account of the deconstructi8e a))roach to o))ositions.
-8en if #e res)ect DerridaEs reluctance to s*stematise deconstruction, this account of the three )hases of
deconstruction )ro8ides an illuminatin! descri)tion of #hat takes )lace #hen he reads a te>t.
A no# famous e>am)le of this strate!* of readin! comes from *f Grammatology, #here Derrida takes .aussureEs
treatment of the o))osition bet#een s)eech and #ritin! in the Course in General Linguistics. In a sense, this is an
e>treme e>am)le. .aussureEs te>t does not subtl* 8alorise s)eech o8er #ritin! throu!h associati8e or ima!istic
su!!esti8it*. ather he declares o)enl* that #ritin! is a secondar* and deri8ed kind of lan!ua!e, that it is merel*
the re)resentation of s)eech, and therefore that it is to be banished: the )ro)er obDect of lin!uistic stud*, sa*s
.aussure, is s)eech. There is therefore an e>)licit and unmistakable )ri8ile!e assi!ned to s)eech o8er #ritin!, and
because it is so e>)licit, it ser8es as a )articularl* clear e>am)le of the deconstructi8e strate!* that Derrida
describes in ositions. Derrida ar!ues that this )ri8ile!e is nothin! more than an inherited )reDudice that has its
basis in t#o )resu))ositions that .aussure recei8es uncriticall* from the tradition of thou!ht about the nature of
lan!ua!e. The first )resu))osition is that s)eech has a conce)tual )riorit* o8er #ritin! because it has tem)oral
)riorit* o8er #ritin!, #hich is to sa* that it comes first either in the histor* of lan!ua!e or in the acFuisition of
lan!ua!e in childhood. The second )resu))osition is closel* related to the first, namel* that s)eech is accorded this
conce)tual )riorit* not onl* b* 8irtue of comin! before #ritin! in time, but in bein! seen someho# as closer to the
)resence of meanin!. In *f Grammatology, Derrida dia!noses this assum)tion as an unscientific ascri)tion of 8alue
to s)eech on the basis of t#o different t*)es of )resence: the )resence of si!nif*in! intention and the )resence of
the referent. In other #ords,
-3&-
the s)oken si!n is said to stand in a closer relation to the mind of the )erson #ho utters it, or to the thin! or
conce)t in the )lace of #hich the si!n stands than the #ritten si!n. Indeed the #ritten si!n is con8entionall*
understood as a kind of technolo!* #hich #orks e>actl* b* allo#in! lan!ua!e to circulate #ithout the )erson or the
referent an* lon!er bein! )resent.
Aere, then, #e ha8e an e>treme case of an o))osition #orkin! as a conce)tual hierarch*, #here that hierarch* is
founded on unar!ued notions of )resence and the )riorit* that )resence !i8es to lan!ua!e in its so-called ori!inal
form o8er the secondar* and deri8ed technolo!* that records s)eech as #ritin!. This ar!ument corres)onds to the
first )hase of deconstruction in #hich a hierarchical o))osition is identified. The second )hase of the strate!* is to
in8ert this hierarch*, and to )romote the inferior term to the )osition of )ri8ile!e and dominance. In this case that
in8ol8es the )erha)s counter-intuiti8e su!!estion that #ritin! is in fact the truest nature of lan!ua!e. It should be
)ointed out that this )ara)hrase is somethin! of a heres* for t#o reasons. The first is that Derrida does not
!enerall* offer metalin!ual )ro)ositions of this kind in a #a* that allo#s their e>traction from the readin! of a
)articular te>t. Deconstruction in its strictest )hiloso)hical sense almost al#a*s in8ol8es the demonstration that a
te>t someho# contains a counter-su!!estion to its o#n )resu))ositions or its o#n declared )ositions: that it
sub8erts its o#n theses and beliefs. The second is that Derrida does not reall* claim that there is somethin! truer
about #ritin! than s)eech. Instead he sho#s that #hen .aussure tries to e>)lain the innermost #orkin!s of s)oken
lan!ua!e, he resorts to an analo!* #ith #ritten lan!ua!e, usin! the banished and secondar* term to e>)lain the
nature of the )ri8ile!ed and )rior term. The in8ersion of the hierarch* is therefore not )ro)osed b* Derrida from
the outside, but is located #ithin the ar!ument that e>actl* seeks to establish that hierarch*. In this #a*, Derrida
demonstrates that .aussureEs attem)t to reduce #ritin! to a secondar* status is sub8erted b* the fact that he also
resorts to the e>am)le of #ritin!, e>actl* for its abilit* to circulate in the absence of the referent and the si!nif*in!
intention, to illustrate the innermost #orkin!s of s)eech. As he teases out this counter-su!!estion from .aussureEs
te>t, his o#n establishes that #ritin! is Dust as ca)able of occu)*in! the dominant )osition in the hierarch*. This
leads us to the third )hase of deconstruction, the reinscri)tion of the
-3+-
o))osition, #hich in this case consists in the conflation of the terms Es)eechE and E#ritin!E as #hat Derrida calls
EArche-#ritin!E, or to )ut it another #a*, the tem)oral )riorit* of s)eech o8er #ritin! is reconfi!ured #ith #ritin! as
the ori!in, so that the 8er* o))osition of ori!in and su))lement breaks do#n.
1hat does this ha8e to do #ith the conce)t of differenceC The first ans#er to this Fuestion is that the binar*
o))osition, #hich for the structuralist #as a kind of unit of difference, is no# a rather unreliable basis for the
e>)lanation of ho# si!nificance is !enerated. In this kind of ar!ument the o))osition is somethin! closer to the
)roblem than the solution: the mask rather than the unmasker. But there is a second im)lication in this for the
conce)t of difference, #hich hel)s to e>)lain DerridaEs resistance to the structuralist conce)t of difference. In the
e>am)le of the o))osition of s)eech and #ritin!, s)eech is understood as that #hich comes first and #ritin! that
#hich follo#s from it, s)eech as the ori!in and #ritin! as the su))lement. This tem)oral difference, the tem)oral
dimension of an o))osition has a s)ecial )lace in DerridaEs thou!ht and is of )articular im)ortance for the
understandin! of DerridaEs critiFue of the notion of difference #hich is im)licit in his o#n modified 8ersion of the
term. Differance has become kno#n as DerridaEs little !ra)hic Doke. It is the modification of the conce)t of
difference #hich cannot be heard <since the #ords difference and differance sound the same, es)eciall* in the
ori!inal (rench=, #hich asserts the #ritten o8er the s)oken, and #hich carries #ithin it a critiFue of the atem)oral
nature of the structuralist conce)t of difference. DerridaEs line of ar!ument about s)eech and #ritin!, about the
)resu))osition of )resence in s)eech #here s)eech is the ori!in of #ritin!, is best understood in relation to the
term EdifferanceE.
Accordin! to Derrida, differance is neither a #ord nor a conce)t, #hich is to sa* that it is not a free-standin! notion
#hich can be e>tracted and a))lied to the anal*sis of te>ts in the #a* that difference )erha)s could be. ather it is
a term that names a )roblem in the former conce)t of difference. The ar!ument of the last cha)ter sho#s that the
structuralist conce)t of difference aimed to sho# that a #ord could ne8er be 8ie#ed as a free-standin! entit* but
rather has to be articulated into the s*stem of differences #hich underlie its meanin!. The term EdifferanceE mi!ht
be 8ie#ed as an attem)t to redouble this insi!ht into the de)endence of a
-3%-
#ord on different terms #hich are not )resent. But #hereas structuralism tended to freeGe the lan!ua!e s*stem
into a s*nchronic sna)shot, a s)atial structure, Derrida aims to )oint to a set of de)endencies or relations across
time. The term EdifferanceE therefore carries #ithin it not onl* the structural relations of a #ord to a stable lan!ua!e
s*stem, but the tem)oral relations of a #ord to those that )recede it and follo# it.
This is the main sense in #hich differance can be understood as a critiFue of difference: it functioned as a criticism
of the s*nchronic orientation of structuralist anal*sis. The .aussurean model of the si!n had dictated that meanin!
be anal*sed as a s)atial structure, #here the lan!ua!e s*stem is froGen in time and 8ie#ed as a structural #hole.
It #as a common )erce)tion that this banished time and histor* entirel* from structuralist anal*sis, and *et it
doesnEt take much e>)loration in, for e>am)le, #orks of structuralist narratolo!* to determine that the internal
tem)oralit* of a narrati8e - the order and freFuenc* of its e8ents - #as one of the maDor concerns of the
structuralists. "or #as it ahistorical in itself to take such a sna)shot of the lan!ua!e s*stem, since in theor* at
least, that mi!ht in8ol8e reconstructin! the s*stem of con8entions, o))ositions and codes as a kind of lin!uistic-
historical conte>t for an* !i8en utterance. In )ractice, ho#e8er, there #ere fe# structuralist lin!uists #ho #ould !o
to the trouble of reconstructin! the s*stem of anton*ms and s*non*ms that #ould !i8e a si!n its meanin! at the
time of its utterance or )oint out historical differences bet#een the s*stem at the time of the te>tEs )roduction and
the time of its anal*sis. In theor* there ma* ha8e been an interest in narrati8e time, but in )ractice the )otential
historical dimension of s*nchronic anal*sis #as !enerall* disre!arded. -8en the structuralist narratolo!istEs interest
in tem)oralit* #as some#hat misleadin! in that the internal, tem)oral seFuence of narrati8e #as seen as a s)atial
or structural or!anisation of narrati8e elements. In theor*, structuralist narratolo!* #as neither ahistorical nor
uninterested in the tem)oral or!anisation of narrati8e, but in )ractice an*thin! tem)oral #as Fuickl* translated
into s)atial relationshi)s or differences.
In this conte>t, the Derridean conce)t of differance, #ith its tem)oral and s)atial meanin!s, can be understood as
an attem)t to think about difference and time at the same time, and therefore to allo# a tem)oral dimension back
into the anal*sis of lan!ua!e. As the last cha)ter illustrated, the structural anal*sis of a sentence, or a narrati8e,
#ould look at
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s*nta!matic relations bet#een the com)onents of the seFuence, or the relationshi) bet#een an* si!n and the
sentence as a #hole, as if these #ere stable structural relations. The model of differance, on the other hand,
im)lied that the relationshi)s bet#een the elements of a sentence #ere al#a*s in motion, or that the meanin! of
an* si!n #as al#a*s Fualif*in! those )recedin! it in the seFuence or #aitin! to be Fualified b* those that follo#ed.
This is #hat Derrida referred to as the trace structure of the si!n: that an* si!n is embedded in a conte>t, and that
its meanin! bears the trace of the si!ns that surround it, that ha8e )receded it, and that follo# it. The si!n #as
seen b* the structuralist as an entit* that #as not com)lete in itself because it #as )artl* defined b* relations #ith
other si!ns in the lan!ua!e s*stem. 1hat is bein! said here is that this is also true of other si!ns in a sentence, or
seFuence of si!ns. But these other si!ns are not e>actl* co-)resent, as structuralism had seen it. The* are in the
)ast and still to come, so that the meanin! of an* si!n is )artl* com)rised b* elements of the )ast and the future.
The meanin! of a si!n is therefore not com)lete in itself, or is not )resent #ithin itself, but someho# s)read out
across all the others. "or is there an* limit to the dissemination of meanin! across other si!ns. Derrida talks of
meanin! as ha8in! no res)ite in the Eindefinite referral from si!nifier to si!nifierE <+0@?:%3= because the model of
differance )osits that neither the be!innin! nor ends of a sentence or a book can sto) this mo8ement.
A!ain, this is an a))arentl* sim)le obser8ation #hich Derrida mana!es to am)lif*, until the trace structure of the
si!n becomes the basis for the deconstruction of the conce)t of time itself:
The conce)ts of )resent, )ast and future, e8er*thin! in the conce)ts of time and histor* #hich
im)lies e8idence of them - the meta)h*sical conce)t of time in !eneral - cannot adeFuatel*
describe the structure of the trace. And deconstructin! the sim)licit* of )resence does not
amount to accountin! for the horiGons of )otential )resence, indeed of a dialectic of )rotension
and retension that one #ould install in the heart of the )resent instead of surroundin! it #ith it.
<+0@9:9@=
Much of DerridaEs thou!ht takes the )osition that lin!uistic meanin!, time and histor* are su!!esti8el* linked in
this #a*, and this )hrase - Ea
-3'-
dialectic of )rotension and retension that one #ould install in the heart of the )resentE - makes it clear #h*.
rotensions and retensions are sim)l* hints of the future and traces of the )ast #hich, he ar!ues, the )resent is
constituted b*. 1hen Derrida refers to the meta)h*sical conce)ts of meanin!, time or histor* he is dra#in!
attention to this foundational illusion of )resence, #hich is destro*ed b* these traces, that is, it is destro*ed b* the
fact that the )resent, or )resence itself, is a crossed structure of )rotensions and retensions, bearin! #ithin it the
s)ectres of its o#n )ast and future. If time and histor* are bein! readmitted here it is in an unreco!nisable form,
#hich destro*s the linear seFuence of )ast, )resent and future #ith the lo!ic of the trace and understands the
com)onents of an* seFuence as constituti8e of each other. As I said at the outset of the cha)ter, this is )erha)s
the sim)lest #a* of definin! differance: that it is the o))osite of )resence, or )erha)s that it is the name of the
non-e>istence of )resence.
It is difficult then to sa* that the conce)t of differance, #ith its tem)oral dimension, Dustified a strai!hfor#ard
return to historicism. Because literar* criticism, )articularl* in the /nited .tates, #as al#a*s )olarised and
)olemicised around the o))osition bet#een )olitical criticism <committed to historicism= and a de)oliticised
formalism, there #as some confusion about #hat this kind of ar!ument re)resented for critical )ractice. It seemed
to be disturbin! the sim)licities of formalism #ith the com)le>ities of time, #hich had been so strictl* e>cluded
from structuralism, and *et it also seemed to be disru)tin! the sim)licities of time #ith a formal ar!ument about
the relations bet#een the si!nifiers in an* chain. It remained unclear, ho#e8er, #hat a non-meta)h*sical a))roach
to time #ould look like, and e8en less clear ho# historical #ritin! could base itself on such an a))roach.
Derrida makes some attem)t to clarif* this issue in ositions, #hich #as enormousl* influential in the /nited
.tates. esistance to the meta)h*sical conce)t of histor*, he claims, #ould in8ol8e resistance to both Ehistor* in
!eneral and the !eneral conce)t of histor*E. In the case of the former, the resistance to Ehistor* in !eneralE mi!ht
in8ol8e subscribin! to somethin! like AlthusserEs critiFue of Ae!elEs conce)t of histor*, #hich Eaims to sho# that
there is not one sin!le histor*, but rather histories different in their t*)e, rh*thm, mode of inscri)tion - inter8allic,
differentiated historiesE <+0@2:3?=. It certainl* sounds as if this reDection of a
-33-
sin!le, !eneral histor* #as )oliticall* moti8ated, and #ould therefore offer deconstruction as a resource to those
)olitical critics for #hom historicisation #as a critical im)erati8e. Ao#e8er the reDection of the E!eneral conce)t of
histor*E #as less ob8iousl* so, and seemed to amount to little more than a 8ie# that histories differed from each
other, or that it #ould be a mistake to assume that there #as an* kernel, an* common denominator that mi!ht
link different histories to!ether. If such a common denominator had been assumed b* traditional historians, it is, in
DerridaEs account, the assum)tion of linearit*: the im)lication that one thin! leads to another, #hich su))orts Ean
entire s*stem of im)lications <teleolo!*, eschatolo!*, ele8atin! and interioriGin! accumulation of meanin!, a
certain t*)e of traditionalit*, a certain conce)t of continuit*, of truth, etc.=E <+0@2:3@=. 1hereas the first ar!ument
seems to encoura!e the #ritin! of more histories - the histories of those e>cluded b* histor* in !eneral for e>am)le
- the second seems to undermine com)letel* #hat #e think of as, and ho# #e mi!ht #rite, histor*. These issues
are of !reat im)ortance for literar* criticism because the* under)in ideas about the )luralism of histor* as #ell as
raise Fuestions about narrati8e linearit*, issues l*in! at the heart of criticism as #ell as fiction, drama and )oetr*,
#hich #ill be e>)lored more full* in cha)ter '.
The im)ortance of this ar!ument is the connection it established bet#een the linearit* of narrati8e and the
meta)h*sics of )resence, a!ainst #hich Derrida )itches the counter-strate!* of differance, that is, of time
understood as differance. Because for Derrida )resence is a s)atio-tem)oral cate!or* <in that it has both s)atial
and tem)oral meanin!s=, one #a* of e>)lainin! the tem)oralised meanin! of differance is throu!h the s)atial or
structural sense of difference that has alread* been discussed: the 8ie# of the si!n that attem)ts to e>clude or
re)ress its differences. (or Derrida, the si!n #as a structure of e>clusion. The #hole idea of the si!n as a carrier of
meanin! #as based on the )rinci)le that its meanin! could be fenced off from other meanin!s. .aussure ma* ha8e
ar!ued that it #as the differences bet#een si!ns that enabled them to si!nif*, but he did not !o as far as to sa*
that the meanin! of a si!n #as actuall* constituted b* those differences. -8en in the radical terms of structural
lin!uistics there is a sense that the meanin! of a si!n is )ure. The si!n is not internall* di8ided. It is surrounded b*
difference but not contaminated b* difference. DerridaEs account of the si!n can be summarised as
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an o))osition to this idea of the )ure self-identical si!n, to sho# that the si!n is al#a*s internall* di8ided, different
from itself.
As I said in Cha)ter +, a si!n then re)resses difference in t#o distinct #a*s. The first is that, like the #ord Ehistor*E,
the si!n al#a*s )osits some common denominator, some sameness bet#een the thin!s that it denominates, so
that the #ord Edo!E )osits a common essence bet#een do!s, #hich re)resses the differences bet#een do!s. The
second is that the si!n re)resses the differences bet#een do!s and cats, because e8er* time that Edo!E )resents
itself as an a))arentl* autonomous #ord, it hides or e>cludes the other #ords from #hich it differs, )retendin! that
its meanin! is constituted b* itself and not b* difference. 1e mi!ht no# add a third #a* in #hich the si!n
re)resses difference. It re)resses the tem)oral differences bet#een itself and the other si!ns in the seFuence in
#hich it is embedded.
M* aim here, and in the follo#in! cha)ter, is to sho# that these notions about the si!n as a structure of e>clusion
act as a kind of foundation for most of the )olitical criticism of the last decade, #hich characteristicall* ar!ues at
the le8el of discourse that #hat is not there in a discourse is constituti8e of #hat is. (or the moment I #ant to
di!ress for the sake of further illustration of the third kind of re)ression of difference. (or lin!uists, the #ord is the
Eminimum free formE, #hich means that it is the smallest lin!uistic unit that can be taken out of its conte>t, used in
another, and still mean the same thin!. This makes the #ord different from the )honeme, since the )honeme
doesnEt ha8e meanin! on its o#n. It must be combined #ith other )honemes into a #ord for meanin! to occur. In
other #ords, the meanin! of a )honeme is conte>t-bound #hereas the meanin! of a #ord is free. This is the
traditional 8ie# that DerridaEs differance challen!es. Bne of the man* Dokes contained in the #ord EdifferanceE is
that one little )honemic chan!e, a )honemic chan!e that cannot e8en be heard, can alter the meanin! of the #ord
EdifferenceE from a structural to a tem)oral relation. This tin* chan!e hi!hli!hts a )rinci)le #ith lar!e conseFuences
for narrati8e thou!ht in !eneral. "ot onl* are #ords internall* di8ided b* an alterable seFuence of letters #ith an
indi8idual )otential to disru)t meanin!. The meanin! of a #ord is also conte>t-bound in the sense that it bears the
trace of other #ords in the seFuence to #hich it belon!s. ,ike the )honeme it is onl* as )art of a combinati8e
seFuence that the
-3@-
#ord accrues meanin!, so that it is marked b* the tem)oral )rocess of the discourse it is )art of. And it is marked
b* the trace of #ords that are not )art of the discourse at hand, but that <like the )aradi!matic relations of
structuralism= are !hostl* absences inhabitin! the #ord. 1hat all these factors cons)ire to sho# is that a #ord is
not sim)l* a free form or the bearer of meanin! as )resence, since that )resence is al#a*s contaminated b*
absences, traces of conte>t, both immediate and distant.
A conce)t as a))arentl* innocent as the Eminimum free formE turns out to be a multidimensional re)ression of
difference, a structure of e>clusion, #hich seeks to establish hard and fast boundaries around its meanin! as if that
meanin! #ere not marked b* )rotensions and retensions of other si!ns in the discourse, and of former and future
discourses. 1hat ha))ens #hen this )rinci)le of the trace is scaled u) to the le8el of a sentence, a narrati8e
e)isode, or an entire discourseC Bne ans#er is that the attem)t to isolate an* lar!er discursi8e unit and re)ress
the trace of differences #ithin it !i8es the conce)ts of autonom*, )urit* and )resence a discernibl* )olitical
im)ortance, #here the assumed linearit* of a discourse can be seen as an a!ent of )articular ideolo!ical bent. T#o
e>am)les of the structure of e>clusion at this le8el, and the role of narrati8e linearit* in the re)ression of difference
are the critiFue of ori!ins and the critiFue of E)ositi8ist histor*E <best understood in this conte>t as histor*
dominated b* cause and effect, and therefore b* narrati8e linearit*=, both of #hich be!in to clarif* the link bet#een
these )urel* structural ar!uments about the constitution of a #ord, and the tem)oral 8ersion of the structure of
e>clusion.
Bne of the ob8ious conseFuences of this kind of ar!ument - that the #ord cannot be e>tracted from the process of
lan!ua!e, or that it is al#a*s marked b* the )ast and future - is that there can be no such thin! as a moment. A
moment, like a #ord, onl* comes into bein! as a structure of e>clusion or an undi8ided )resence. A moment can
onl* be )resent #hen it is not *et in the )ast and no lon!er in the future. But an* definition of #hat a moment is,
an* attem)t to cleanse the moment of the trace of )ast and future and see it as )ure )resence, #ill be forced to
im)ose arbitrar* boundaries to mark off the )resent from )ast and future. As #ith an* structure of e>clusion, the
moment then becomes an entit* in its o#n ri!ht but onl* b* 8irtue of the fact that it has arbitraril* e>cluded the
relations that constitute it. Bne is hard )ushed to e>)lain #hat one means
-3?-
b* Ea momentE #ithout reference to the )ast and the future because it is structured b* their e>clusion. Accordin! to
Derrida, the elusi8e nature of the moment is like the elusi8e nature of undi8ided )resence in !eneral. Its autonom*
or )urit* is m*thical. It is a desire rather than an actualit*. Bne reason that undi8ided )resence can be understood
as a desire is that it hel)s to brin! the e>)lanation of somethin! to rest on somethin! stable, somethin! no lon!er
in motion, no lon!er referrin! back#ards or #aitin! to be altered.
The desire for )resence hel)s to e>)lain #hat Derrida means #hen he talks about metaphysical histor*.
Meta)h*sics for Derrida is the meta)h*sics of )resence, an* science of )resence, so that meta)h*sical histor* is
an* histor* that sees the )assa!e of time as a seFuence of )resent moments, an* one of #hich can be isolated
from the seFuence and seen in terms of this m*thical )urit* and )resence. It also hel)s to e>)lain #h* Derrida
de8otes so much of his #ritin! to the deconstruction of ori!ins. An ori!in is the first moment in a historical
seFuence. It is, in a sense, an easier moment to m*tholo!ise as )resence because nothin! comes before it, and at
the time it occurs, it has not *et been marked b* subseFuent moments. This means that #hen *ou #ant to e>)lain
somethin!, its ori!in is a useful bedrock for the e>)lanation. An e>)lanation #ill often narrate the histor* of that
somethin! from the )oint of ori!inar* )urit* and self-)resence, often as a fall from that ori!inal state of )resence.
At one le8el the si!n itself is a fall from )resence, since it can be circulated, re)eated and used #ithout the thin! to
#hich it refers bein! )resent. Inter)retin! the si!n then becomes a )rocess of #orkin! back#ards to the ori!inar*
and m*thical moment #hen the si!n and the thin! #ere unified, #hen the meanin! of the si!n #as )resent.
1ritin! is also a fall from )resence since like the si!n it is e>terior to #hat it means, ca)able of si!nif*in! in the
absence of the #riter, creatin! a kind of nostal!ia for its ori!in, the moment #hen the mind that )roduced it #as
)resent, #hen it #as full #ith si!nif*in! intention, or #hen it #as s)eech. .)eech is also the ori!in of #ritin! in the
sense that it comes first, in childhood, or in the histor* of humankind, and this tem)oral )riorit* is often seen as a
kind of lo!ical or meta)h*sical )riorit*. To e>)lain #ritin!, it then becomes necessar* to trace it back to its ori!in in
s)eech, #here lan!ua!e can be seen in its )urest form. Dri8en b* desire for )resence, all such e>)lanations,
#hether about lan!ua!e or not, are tar!ets for deconstruction.
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1hether it is the desire to see meanin! as contained in a minimum free form, stabilised in structural terms,
!rounded in a )resent moment, under)inned b* an ori!in or )urified of difference, these are all strate!ies of
thou!ht that attem)t to )in meanin! do#n to somethin! determinable. And differance is a kind of force at #ork in
lan!ua!e, a state of motion or )rocess makin! it im)ossible to do so. It is in this sense that )resence, meanin! and
conce)thood are not onl* linked, but are all eFuall* un)indo#nable. 1e mi!ht sa* then that the un)indo#nabilit*
of an ori!in is e>actl* #hat su))lementarit* names, since su))lementarit* is a lo!ic in #hich the )rimac* of an
ori!in is sim)l* reDected: EThe stran!e structure of the su))lement a))ears here: b* dela*ed reaction, a )ossibilit*
)roduces that to #hich it is said to be added onE <Derrida +0@2:?0=. If differance is the unsto))abilit* of time and
the un)indo#nabilit* of meanin!, su))lementarit* mi!ht be thou!ht of as a subset or an e>am)le of differance, in
#hich the ori!in becomes contaminated b* )rotensions of the future.
1hat #e are lookin! at here, in the term EdifferanceE, or the lo!ic of su))lementarit*, is a cluster of )roblems that
transforms the structuralist a))roach to difference. As I ha8e su!!esed, some of these )roblems <the critiFue of
meta)h*sical time, the idea of narrati8e as a structure of e>clusion= are )articularl* im)ortant for de8elo)ments in
historicist criticism, and in man* #a*s under)in the critical )ractices of ne# historicism, cultural materialism,
feminism and )s*choanal*sis, thou!h b* no# it #ill be clear that Eunder)inE is not the most a))ro)riate meta)hor.
These connections #ill be de8elo)ed in the follo#in! cha)ters. (or the moment I #ant to look be*ond Derrida to
other )oststructuralist thinkers #hose treatment of the term EdifferenceE contributes to its e8olution a#a* from the
s*stematic and scientific orientation of structural lin!uistics.
DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION ) DELEU*E
It is no# )ossible to characterise a )oststructuralist conce)t of difference in a series of )ro)ositions: <+= a #ord is
constituted b* tem)oral as #ell as s)atial differencesK <%= a #ord is no more e>tractable from a seFuence than is a
)honemeK <2= a binar* o))osition is not flat but hierarchicalK <'= a hierarchical o))osition has a tem)oral
dimension #hich assi!ns )ri8ile!e to ori!ins or end)ointsK <3= the )resence of meanin! is an illu-
-9&-
sion constructed b* the e>clusion of s)atial and tem)oral differences. 1hat these )ro)ositions amount to is
somethin! Fuite unrul*. "o lon!er can a si!n be seen as an entit* in its o#n ri!ht, an entit* that is stable, or
belon!s in a stable structure that )ro8ides the basis of its intelli!ibilit*. Accordin! to the counter-lo!ic of differance,
lan!ua!e is in motion, and difference is at )la*. The sense in man* )oststructuralist conce)tions of difference is
that o))osition has al#a*s been a #a* of constrictin! difference to a sin!le relation, and therefore confinin!
difference and multi)licit* to )re8ent its )la*: EB))osition ceases its labour and difference be!ins its )la*E, as 5illes
DeleuGe )uts it in !ifference and Repetition.
DeleuGe is )erha)s the most substantial )hiloso)her of difference of the t#entieth centur*. ,ike Derrida, his
conce)t of difference is not one that be!ins #ith .aussure but is rooted in a lon!er tradition of )hiloso)hers of
difference such as 6ant, Ae!el, "ietGsche, Ber!son and Aeide!!er. It #ould be be*ond m* )o#ers of e>)osition to
summarise this tradition, but it is undoubtedl* #orth#hile to look at some of the #a*s in #hich DeleuGe formulates
the conce)t of difference and adds to its )o#er as a critical conce)t. The )ursuit for DeleuGe is #hat he calls a true
)hiloso)h* of difference, #hich entails findin! a #a* of thinkin! about difference that does not sim)l* dra# the
meanin! of difference from its o))osition #ith identit*. The )roblem here is that difference is easil* concei8ed as a
kind of di8ision of somethin! sin!ular and self-identical, as the identification of s)ecies #ithin a !enus, in such a
#a* that difference cannot be asserted #ithout at the same time im)l*in! the e>istence of identit*, of the
undi8ided. (or DeleuGe, difference is too often thou!ht of as the inferior member in an o))osition #ith the conce)t
of identit*. If Derrida understood the #hole )roDect of )hiloso)h* as a Fuest for foundational moments of )resence,
DeleuGe has a similar concern #ith the idea that )hiloso)h* can re)resent stable identities, or #ith the idea of the
re)resentation of conce)ts in !eneral. In !ifference and Repetition, first )ublished in Paris in +09?, he sets out the
ar!uments that o))ose difference to re)resentation in !eneral, on the !rounds that re)resentation is the lo!ic of
mediatin! identities as static entities. Most im)ortant in this set of ar!uments is the necessit* to u)turn the
established hierarch* bet#een identit* and difference, to see difference as the )rinci)le that underlies identit*, and
furthermore, to understand difference as a kind of e8er-shiftin! !round
-9+-
behind e8er*thin! rather than as the mere di8ision or multi)lication of identities:
The immediate, defined as Esub-re)resentati8eE, is therefore not attained b* multi)l*in!
re)resentations and )oints of 8ie#. Bn the contrar*, each com)osin! re)resentation must be
distorted, di8erted and torn from its centre. -ach )oint of 8ie# must itself be the obDect, or the
obDect must belon! to the )oint of 8ie#. The obDect must therefore in no #a* be identical, but
torn asunder in a difference in #hich the identit* of the obDect as seen b* a seein! subDect
8anishes. Difference must become the element, the ultimate unit*K it must therefore refer to
other differences #hich ne8er identif* it but rather differentiate it. -ach term in a series, bein!
alread* a difference, must be )ut into a 8ariable relation #ith other terms, thereb* constitutin!
other series de8oid of centre and con8er!ence. Di8er!ence and decenterin! must be affirmed in
the series itself. -8er* obDect, e8er* thin! must see its o#n identit* s#allo#ed u) in difference,
each bein! no more than a difference bet#een differences. Difference must be sho#n differin!.
<+00':39=
It is clear here that difference must ne8er be allo#ed to return to the conce)t of identit* as a source of stabilit* or
stasis. ather, the aim for )hiloso)h* is mo8ement. Philoso)h* must )oint to the unceasin! mo8ement of
difference, to the im)ossibilit* of arrestin! mo8ement in an* kind of stable centre. Perha)s the most interestin!
thin! about this )assa!e from !ifference and Repetition is that it hel)s to clarif* the #a*s in #hich )oststructuralist
conce)tions of difference mi!ht actuall* inform criticism or an understandin! of art and literature. Both before and
after this )assa!e, DeleuGe )oints to art as )laces #here this kind of unsto))able motion are e>)erienced. If
DerridaEs notion of differance #as a mo8e to#ards a rather chaotic conce)tion of the coe>istence of moments, this
is e>actl* DeleuGeEs moti8ation in introducin! mo8ement into )hiloso)h*:
Mo8ement, for its )art, im)lies a )luralit* of centres, a su)erim)osition of )ers)ecti8es, a tan!le
of )oints of 8ie#, a co-e>istence of moments
-9%-
#hich essentiall* distort re)resentation: )aintin!s or scul)tures are alread* such EdistortersE,
forcin! us to create mo8ement.
<+00':39=
And the )ara!ra)h concludes #ith an account of the role of art in introducin! mo8ement as a distortion of
re)resentation:
1e kno# that modern art tends to realise these conditions: in this sense it becomes a 8eritable
theatre of metamor)hoses and )ermutations. A theatre #here nothin! is fi>ed, a lab*rinth
#ithout a thread <Ariadne has hun! herself=. The #ork of art lea8es the domain of re)resentation
in order to become Ee>)erienceE, transcendental em)iricism or science of the sensible.
<+00':39=
Aere, DeleuGe does somethin! that can be thou!ht of as a characteristic )oststructuralist manoeu8re. Ae accords
to modern art an alread* established )hiloso)hical im)ort. In a mo8e that can be found re)eatedl* in the #ork of
Derrida and Paul de Man, he locates in art and literature a )hiloso)hical )otential to distort re)resentation, to
con8e* mo8ement, flu> and multi)licit* that cannot be found in traditional )hiloso)hical #ritin!. Accordin! to this
8ie#, the )ur)ose of )hiloso)h* and criticism #ould not be to mediate, re)resent, anal*se or e>)lain art and
literature but to ackno#led!e its su)eriorit* )recisel* as a )hiloso)h* of mo8ement, a transcendental em)iricism,
or a science of the sensible.
To the literar* critic, let us sa* a literar* critic, turnin! to DeleuGe for some enhanced kno#led!e of literature, this
mi!ht seem a rather un)romisin! direction. It seems to be sa*in! that #hen a #ork of art is still, such as scul)ture
or )aintin!, #e are forced to )ro8ide mo8ement, and #hen it is in mo8ement #e must reco!nise its su)eriorit* to
the stasis of traditional )hiloso)h*. In the relationshi) bet#een literature and criticism, criticism #ould then be
understood as a rather foolish attem)t to im)ose stabilit* on the theatre of metamor)hoses and )ermutations that
is literature. Criticism #ould indeed onl* be fulfillin! its function #hen it e>ists to tease out this kno#led!e of
multi)licit* and mo8ement from the te>ts it anal*ses. If this seems a ne!ati8e characterisation of the function of
criticism, it is certainl* not concei8ed as such b* DeleuGe,
-92-
#hose #ritin! constantl* turns to#ards the notion of the affirmation of difference. If #e think back to the
structuralist a))lication of the conce)t of difference to literature, #e #ill remember that the binar* o))osition #as
seen there as a fundamental lin!uistic unit as #ell as a structural )rinci)le for literar* te>ts. But in the #ork of
Derrida and DeleuGe, the reDection of the binar* o))osition is based in the 8ie# that the o))osition is not
somethin! o)eratin! in lan!ua!e and literature so much as somethin! brou!ht to it b* the anal*sis of lan!ua!e and
literature. The binar* o))osition is a limited frame#ork accordin! to #hich a literar* te>t is constructed b* the
critic, rather than a lo!ic !o8ernin! the )roduction of literature. Aere #e ha8e a si!nificant shift #hich
characterises much deconstructi8e thinkin! about literature. "o lon!er is structure seen as a strai!htfor#ardl*
obDecti8e )ro)ert* of a te>t under anal*sis, or indeed of the lan!ua!e s*stem at lar!e. .tructure is rather
somethin! that is )roDected on to the obDect b* the anal*sis itself. Critical anal*sis is therefore a )rocess of
in8ention rather than a disco8er* of inherent )ro)erties, an act of structuration rather than a science of structure.
This )oints to a hi!hl* si!nificant chan!e in the relationshi) bet#een the literar* and the critical te>t, #hich it is
)ossible, #ith DeleuGe, to 8ie# in the most )ositi8e terms. If structuralism tended to constrict the obDect of
anal*sis b* construin! it accordin! to the strictures of the binar* o))osition, )oststructuralism )refers to free it
a!ain b* demonstratin! the com)le> motion that such anal*ses attem)t to arrest. This is certainl* an em)hasis
t*)ical of deconstruction: that it !enerall* aims to untie some o8er-schematic s*stem for anal*sis b* celebratin!
the elusi8e motion of the obDect that it )ur)orts to anal*se.
(or DeleuGe, celebration is not an ina))ro)riate #ord, since he re!ards the em)hasis )laced on o))osition in a
metalan!ua!e such as lin!uistics as a )articularl* ne!ati8e mindset. B))osition, after all, locates si!ificance in a
relation bet#een an* !i8en term and its ne!ati8e, and #hen Edifference is read as o))osition, it is de)ri8ed of the
)eculiar thickness in #hich its )ositi8it* is affirmedE <+00':%&3=. And it is this reduction of difference to o))osition
that defines DeleuGeEs )osition not onl* in relation to structuralism, but also to Ae!elian dialectical thinkin!. 1h*,
he asks, Edoes .aussure, at the 8er* moment #hen he disco8ers that Nin lan!ua!e there are onl* differencesN add
that these differences are N#ithout )ositi8e termsN and Neternall* ne!ati8eNCE And eFuall* he claims that a Ae!elian
-9'-
<meanin! a )hiloso)her concerned #ith dialectics and contradictions, and therefore #ith binar* o))ositions= feels ill
at ease in a Ecom)le> or )er)le>ed differential mechanismJin the absence of the uniformit* of a lar!e contradictionE
<+00':%&'=. B))osition and contradiction are, accordin! to DeleuGe, eFuall* ne!ati8e #a*s of reducin! difference,
a!ainst #hich the notion of difference as a )ositi8e multi)licit* must be asserted:
It seems to us that )luralism is a more enticin! and dan!erous thou!ht: fra!mentation im)lies
o8erturnin!. The disco8er* in an* domain of a )luralit* of co-e>istin! o))ositions is inse)arable
from a more )rofound disco8er*, that of difference #hich denounces the ne!ati8e and o))osition
itself as no more than a))earances in relation to the )roblematic field of a )ositi8e multi)licit*.
Bne cannot )luralise o))osition #ithout lea8in! its domain and enterin! the ca8es of difference
#hich resonate a )ure )ositi8it* and reDect o))osition as no more than a shado# ca8ern seen
from #ithout.
<+00':%&'=
Bf course there ha8e been those, and I am thinkin! here mainl* of Alan Badiou <%&&&=, #ho mi!ht be thou!ht of
as one of DeleuGeEs )hiloso)hical o))onents in Paris, #ho ha8e )ointed out DeleuGeEs o#n de)endence on
anal*tical and hierarchical o))ositions such as inside and outside, sin!ular and )lural, acti8e and )assi8e, )ositi8e
and ne!ati8e and not least, o))osition and difference. It should be said in his defence that !ifference and
Repetition is his most schematic, manifesto-like statement of the )hiloso)h* of difference, #hich does la)se into a
kind of )erformati8e contradiction, of sa*in! one thin! #hile doin! another. -lse#here, and )articularl* in his
#ritin!s on literature and cinema, there is a !reater sense that his o#n #ritin! )ractice affirms difference #ithout
recourse to the kind of anal*tical o))osition that is clearl* at #ork in the )assa!e abo8e. In such cases, DeleuGeEs
#ork comes closer to DerridaEs careful a8oidance of the o))osition as a frame#ork for readin!, or to a critical
)ractice that constantl* affirms the contamination of )resence.
-93-
+
DIFFERENT !I"TORIE"
In the +0?&s and +00&s critics and theorists be!an to think about histor* in a different #a*, and at the same
time, critics and #riters actuall* be!an to re#rite histor* from man* different )oints of 8ie#. Bf course, the
understandin! of histor* had b* no means been stable u) to this )oint, and there is a sense in #hich histor* is
constantl* re#ritten from the )oint of 8ie# of the )resent. But for literar* criticism, this return to histor*, to ne#
and different histories, re)resented a si!nificant chan!e of direction: a#a* from the 8arious kinds of formalist
criticism that dominated in earlier decades of the t#entieth centur*. There are t#o different #a*s in #hich the
conce)t of difference contributed to these )rocesses. The first #as b* #ritin! histor* in a different #a*, on the
basis of a more com)le> 8ie# of time of the kind outlined in the )re8ious cha)ter in relation to )oststructuralist
ideas of difference. The second #as b* introducin! the idea of cultural difference, differences of class, race and
!ender, for e>am)le, or identities that had traditionall* been e>cluded from histor*. This cha)ter is about
the #a* that these t#o t*)es of difference can be considered to!ether, and the #a* that to!ether the* transformed
the #ritin! of histor*.
The )re8ious cha)ter focused on the introduction of time into difference, and much of its ar!ument is rele8ant to
the #a* that literar* critics dealt #ith the Fuestion of histor* in the +0?&s and +00&s. It is a #idel*
-9@-
held 8ie# that DerridaEs #ork re)resents a kind of assault on the )resu))ositions of historical kno#led!e, or that it
someho# )laces in Fuestion the 8er* )ossibilit* of historical kno#led!e. But this is not a sim)le issue. It can, for
e>am)le, be sur)risin! to re8isit critical Dournals in the /nited .tates in the earl* +0@&s for the e>tent to #hich
the* contradict this 8ie#. In these earl* da*s of the rece)tion of DerridaEs #ork in the /nited .tates, there is a
clear sense of )ossibilit* that Derrida mi!ht )ro8ide for the return of historicism in literar* criticism. It is eas* to
see #h*. American criticism had been )redominantl* formalist throu!h most of the t#entieth centur*, #ith
historicism rele!ated to a )osition of )olemical counter-ar!ument. In the +09&s, the some#hat ahistorical
tendencies of the "e# Criticism #ere comin! to share critical territor* #ith the more ri!orous and s*stematic
formalisms associated #ith "orthro) (r*e and the im)orted (rench structuralists. The conce)t of difference,
therefore, carried #ith it the threat of an increasin!l* anti-historicist inclination, under)inned as it #as b* the
s*nchronic <or Esna)shotE= method deri8ed from .aussurean lin!uistics. DerridaEs conce)t of differance, as I ha8e
sho#n, reintroduces a tem)oral dimension to the conce)t of difference, and therefore seemed to offer the
historicist critic a faint )ros)ect of esca)e from the sna)shot of s*nchronicit*.
In addition to the a))arent tem)oralit* of differance, there #as also the influence of ositions, DerridaEs collection
of )lain-s)eakin! inter8ie#s, in #hich he makes clear that it is onl* a meta)h*sical conce)t of histor* that is the
butt of his critiFue. In other #ords, #hile some historicist su))ositions - the 8ie# of histor* as a succession of
)resent moments, the idea of a sin!le !eneral histor*, the idea that there mi!ht be common denominators that link
different histories to!ether, the idea of continuit* in histor* - are )laced in Fuestion, the )ossibilit* of #ritin!
histor* in such a #a* that does not fall into such assum)tions remains o)en. It #as clear in the )re8ious cha)ter
that there are #a*s of )ri8ile!in!, or m*tholo!isin!, certain moments such as ori!ins and end)oints #hich #ill ha8e
im)lications for the #a* that histor* is #ritten. These )atterns, #hich mi!ht be called genetic <meanin! concerned
#ith be!innin!s= and teleological <meanin! concerned #ith end)oints= histories, are at odds #ith the lo!ic of
differance, or the lo!ic of su))lementarit*, #hich aim to do Dustice to the cross-contamination of moments in an*
tem)oral seFuence. Bne of the !eneral characteristics of )oststructuralist criticism is that it
-9?-
aims to #rite histor* differentl*, and )articularl* throu!h an a#areness of the cross-contamination bet#een the
)ast that is bein! described and the )resent moment from #hich it is bein! described. I ha8e ar!ued that the
)oststruturalist critiFue of lin!uistics conflated the lan!ua!e bein! described #ith the metalan!ua!e describin! it,
so that structures and differences are seen as )ro)erties of the subDect Dust as much as of the obDect of anal*sis.
The same kind of conflation of the subDect and obDect )resides o8er the critiFue of historicism. If the obDect of
historical kno#led!e is the )ast, the )oststructuralist critic seeks to em)hasise that the #ritin! of histor* is the
acti8e structuration of that )ast from the )resent: an act in #hich the )astness of the )ast is ine8itabl*
contaminated b* the )resent from #hich it is described. This mi!ht seem like a strai!htfor#ard )roblem, or one
#ell kno#n to e8er* student of histor*, but it can also be ar!ued that its full im)lications ha8e, onl* relati8el*
recentl*, been incor)orated into the )ractice of historicist #ritin! or adeFuatel* theorised in terms of subDect-obDect
relations. If, for e>am)le, Derrida has at times been misunderstood as an anti-historicist, or an a)olitical thinker,
there has been a more recent reco!nition, or re8i8al of the 8ie# that his #ork )resents ne# historicist and )olitical
)ossibilities. 6iernan *an, a commentator on and )ractitioner of the ne# historicisms, is one #ho !ets the
em)hasis ri!ht:
Bein! cast adrift fore8er on the shoreless seas of te>tualit* does ha8e its ad8anta!es, ho#e8er.
The em)irical materialit* of histor* ma* ha8e 8anished, but at least all the old meta)h*sical ideas
of histor* ha8e 8anished alon! #ith it, includin! the notion of histor* as Eback!roundE or as the
bedrock realit* that literature subseFuentl* mirrors or misre)resents.
<+009:'=
Catherine Belse* <+00?= is another #ho reco!nises the contribution that Derrida, alon!side Michel (oucault, makes
to Ea mode of histor* #hich is )rofoundl* )oliticalE. This cha)ter aims to illustrate, therefore, that the ideas
e>)ounded in the )re8ious cha)ter, of differance, structures of e>clusion, and the )oststructuralist critiFue of
meta)h*sical histor*, )ro8ide the ne# unstable !round on #hich a different kind of histor* is #ritten.
-90-
T!E CRO"")CONTAINATION OF "U(,ECT AND
O(,ECT IN !I"TORICAL KNOWLED#E
A sim)le a))roach to the )roblem of the cross-contamination of )ast and )resent, subDect and obDect, #ould be to
see the t#o )oles as a kind of contradiction or )arado>. Ao# can it be claimed at the same time that historicism
can kno# the )ast as )ast and *et 8ie# the )astness of the )ast as an in8ention in the )resentC Bne ans#er to this
#ould be that it is a bit of both, that the subDect and obDect, the )resent and )ast, e>ist onl* in a contradictor* and
dialectical relation #ith each other. It mi!ht then be )ossible to !o on #ritin! histor*, or bein! historicist, #hile
sustainin! an a#areness that the )ast is ine8itabl* tin!ed #ith the )resent, and bein! content to li8e #ith the
contradiction. DeleuGe ho#e8er is not content #ith this solution because, for him, difference is al#a*s more
com)le> than mere o))osition. This is the basis for much of DeleuGeEs disa!reement #ith Ae!el, #hose #ork he
sees as limited b* the idea that contradiction is Ethe absolute ma>imum of differenceE. Ae!el, claims DeleuGe,
criticises his )redecessors on the !rounds that Ethe* sto))ed at a )urel* relati8e ma>imum #ithout reachin! the
absolute ma>imum of difference, namel* contradictionK the* sto))ed before reachin! the infinite <as infinitel*
lar!e= of contradictionE <+00':''=. But accordin! to DeleuGe it is a mistake to determine the ma>imum of difference
b* the o))osition of e>tremes or contraries. Ae ar!ues that this idea of the infinite Eentails the identit* of
contrariesE, and therefore that the )o#er of difference remains contained b* o))osition, #ithin the orbit of the
conce)t of identit*. This line of critiFue is )art of a com)le> ar!ument that the im)ortance of the conce)t of
difference, its )o#er to disru)t the conce)t of identit*, is diminished b* the Ae!elian notion of contradiction, since
contradiction as the ma>imum of difference is a rather crude frame#ork in #hich to understand identit*. DeleuGe
infinitel* )refers #hat he sees as a ,eibniGian idea of Einfinitel* small differenceE, that is, in the )lace of the crude
o))osition he )refers a more subtle sense of fine !radations and minor nuances of difference. If #e return to the
Fuestion of the relation of )resent and )ast, therefore, it follo#s that the solution to the )arado> of )resent subDect
and )ast obDect cannot be )ro8ided, to DeleuGeEs satisfaction, b* the dialectical 8ie# that historical kno#led!e is
someho# com)rised of both thin!s. To do so is merel* to re)lace the
-@&-
identit* of the )ast #ith the identit* of t#o thin!s: the )ast and the )resent.
1hen DeleuGe turns his attention to the kno#abilit* of the )ast, then, #e find him lookin! for somethin! more
com)le> than contradiction, or somethin! more differentiated than mere o))osition. Ae finds ins)iration for this
more com)le> schema in the #ork of Aenri-,ouis Ber!son <+?30-+0'+=, #hose )arado>es about time )ro8ide
DeleuGe #ith a kind of matri> of )arado>es. There are, DeleuGe ar!ues, at least t#o )resents in8ol8ed in the notion
of the )ast: the )resent )resent in relation to #hich the )ast is )ast, and the former )resent, #hich is not the same
thin! as the )ast, since the )ast is onl* the element that #e no# focus on from the ne# )resent. The )ast then
cannot be seen as the same thin! as the former )resent, because in the former )resent it #asnEt *et )assed. EThe
)resent and former )resents are notE, he ar!ues, Elike t#o successi8e instants on the line of timeK rather the
)resent one necessaril* contains an e>tra dimension in #hich it re)resents the former and also re)resents itselfE
<+00':?&=. The first )arado> then results from this inesca)able doubleness:
It is futile to tr* to reconstitute the )ast from the )resents bet#een #hich it is tra))ed, either the
)resent #hich it #as or the one in relation to #hich it is no# )ast. In effect, #e are unable to
belie8e that the )ast is constituted after it has been )resent, or because a ne# )resent a))ears.
If a ne# )resent is reFuired for the )ast to be constituted as )ast, then the former )resent #ould
ne8er )ass and the ne# one #ould ne8er arri8e. "o )resent #ould e8er )ass #ere it not )ast Eat
the same timeE as it is )resentK no )ast #ould e8er be constituted unless it #ere first constituted
Eat the same timeE as it #as )resent. This is the first )arado>: the contem)oraneit* of the )ast
#ith the )resent that is was.
<DeleuGe +00':?+=
(or those #ho are un#illin! to count be*ond t#o, or #ho #ant to 8ie# the #orld dualisticall* in terms of subDect-
obDect relations, this is an un#anted com)lication, and *et it is also the onl* reason that time can be understood, in
the #a* of common sense, as a line of succession: E-8er* )resent )asses, in fa8our of a ne# )resent, because the
)ast is contem)oraneous #ith itself as )resentE <+00':?+=. But immediatel* one acce)ts
-@+-
that there are t#o )resents, one also has to acce)t that the* continue to multi)l*. This is the second )arado>,
#hich DeleuGe calls the )arado> of coe>istence: EIf each )ast is contem)oraneous #ith itself, then all of the )ast
coe>ists #ith the ne# )resent in relation to #hich it is no# )astE <+00':?+-%=. In other #ords, DeleuGe is a!reein!
#ith Ber!son here that each )resent )resent is Eonl* the entire )ast in its most contracted stateE. These t#o
)arado>es lead to a third, the )arado> of )re-e>istence, accordin! to #hich Ethe )ure element of the )ast in !eneral
)re-e>ists the )assin! )resentE <+00':?%=. 1hat #e ha8e here, then, is an account of cross-contamination of
moments on a su))osed line of time #hich endlessl* di8ides a moment bet#een somethin! that it #as in itself,
somethin! that in itself #as a condensation of former moments, and somethin! #hich is looked back u)on from
endlessl* multi)l*in! )ositions of retros)ect.
The basic conseFuence for this line of thou!ht is that the )ast cannot be described neutrall* from the )resent as if
the former obDect #ere cate!oricall* se)arable from the latter subDect. This basic )roblem is incor)orated in the
ne# historicist )ractices in 8arious #a*s. In IeeserEs #ell-kno#n list of )rece)ts that characterise the ne#
historicisms, this inse)arabilit* of subDect and obDect finds se8eral nuanced e>)ressions:
"e# Aistoricism reall* does assume: <+= that e8er* e>)ressi8e act is embedded in a net#ork of
material )racticesK <%= that e8er* act of unmaskin!, critiFue and o))osition uses tools that it
condemns and risks fallin! )re* to the )ractices it e>)osesK <2= that literar* and non-literar*
te>ts circulate inse)arabl*K <'= that no discourse, ima!initi8e or archi8al, !i8es access to the
unchan!in! truth or e>)resses unalterable human natureK and <3= that a critical method and a
lan!ua!e adeFuate to describe culture under ca)italism )artici)ate in the econom* the* describe.
<Ieeser +0?0:%=
In different #a*s e8er* one of these fi8e items describes the im)ossibilit* of critical distance, or of se)aratin! the
)resent from the )ast, literature from the #orld, of the subDect from the obDect of critiFue and of lan!ua!e from
culture. I #ill return to the Fuestion of the se)arabilit* of literar* and non-literar* te>ts belo#. But for no#, the
im)ortant obser8ation is
-@%-
that this sense of the inse)arabilit* of the obDect and the critiFue of culture means the )ast cannot be seen as an
unchan!in!, stable obDect. Bn the contrar*, most ne# historicist critiFues #ill 8ie# the )ast as somethin! that can
be construed in different #a*s at different times. This is to sa* that different construals of the )ast, #hether of a
literar* te>t or not, #ill in some de!ree constitute a histor* of the )resent in that the* #ill construe the )ast
accordin! to contem)orar* interests, e8en #hen the* maintain a )retence of neutralit*. It is )erha)s )articularl* in
British cultural materialism that this )otential for the )ast to be used to !enerate different meanin!s accordin! to
the interests of the )resent finds its most com)le> e>)ressions. The cultural materialist rereadin!s of .hakes)eare
<Dollimore and .infield +0?3K Drakakis +0?3=, for e>am)le, are concerned to di8ert critical attention a#a* from the
idea of .hakes)eareEs )la*s as timeless monuments to sho# ho# their inter)retations differ in terms of their
)olitical use, from the si>teenth centur* to the )resent da*.
It is no# )ossible to brin! into focus the idea of historical difference, the idea of uses and inter)retations of the
)ast chan!in! o8er time, and the idea of the inse)arabilit* of those different moments. (irst, #e mi!ht sa* that the
ne# historicisms differ from the old in )art b* 8irtue of their effort to sustain the difficult )hiloso)hical Fuestions
about the subDect and obDect of historical kno#led!e in the )ractice of historical #ritin!. .econd, it can be added
that these )ractices tend to sustain a contradiction bet#een on the one hand the difference bet#een the )resent
and )ast moments, and on the other hand, the inse)arabilit* and therefore unit* of the )resent and the )ast. Aere
is MarDorie ,e8insonEs account of the role of difference in historicismEs subDect-obDect relations in relation to
omantic studies:
1e #ant to articulate the literatures of the )ast in such a #a* as to accommodate the
contin!enc* of the )resent - the #ilfulness of our te>tual )olitics - and at the same time, to
confi!urate OsicP that freedom #ith the )articular )ast that is rete>tualiGed. 1e #ant a frame#ork
that #ill e>)lain the obDecti8e 8alue of a belated criticism, one #hich reads into the #ork
antici)ations that #ere not )resent in the te>tEs contem)orar* life, onl* in its )osthumous
e>istence, an e>istence that turns around and plants itself in the )ast. 1ithin such a frame#ork,
toda*Es criticism can assume its )ro)erl* acti8e, interested EsubDectE
-@2-
role and simultaneousl* fi!ure as )art of the obDecti8e field #hich includes the #ork: its ori!inal
)olitical )osition and its rece)tion histor*.
Bf course, to articulate this frame#ork means !i8in! u) our notion of time as somethin! different
from historiesJIt means concei8in! the e)ochal distincti8eness of omantic )oetr* not, chiefl*,
as a function of natural and therefore monolithic tem)oralit*, but as a result of determinate
differences obtainin! bet#een the )roducti8e formations of the earl* nineteenth centur* and the
late t#entieth centur*, of the different ideolo!ical tasks defined b* those formations, and finall*,
of the di8erse kinds or le8els of relatedness #hich those basic differences establish.
<,e8inson +009:%2=
The interest of this )assa!e is that it incor)orates three senses of difference #hich #ill interact throu!hout this
discussion: the idea of the )resent as differentiated, the sense of determinate historical differences bet#een the
)resent and the )ast, and the idea that a different histor* mi!ht be told accordin! to the different interests of a
te>tEs rece)tion histor*. In this m2lange, the subDect and the obDect are both held to!ether in an inse)arable
relation, and clea8ed a)art for their historical differences, like a kind of conce)tual suture.
DIFFERENT !I"TORIE" AND T!E PO"TODERN
NO-EL
The ob8ious Fuestion to )ose here is: ho# can this kind of com)licated )hiloso)hical ar!ument be incor)orated into
the )ractice of #ritin! histor*C I think there are man* a))roaches to this Fuestion that hel) to characterise the
im)act of the conce)t of difference on the ne# historicisms in literar* criticism. (or reasons that #ill become clear
shortl*, I #ould like to be!in #ith an e>am)le that does not come from criticism but from the no8el. ,ittle
ar!ument is reFuired to establish the im)ortance of time in fictional narration. etros)ection is the basis of
fiction, so that the no8el #ill al#a*s )roduce some kind of tension bet#een that #hich is
narrated and the 8oice or )osition from #hich it is narrated. (or e>am)le, in unreliable narration it is
common to encounter a narrator
-@'-
#hose recall is im)erfect, and #ho makes the reader a#are that some in8ention, some artistic licence is reFuired in
the reconstruction of e8ents. This can easil* be used for comic and ironic )ur)oses, as for e>am)le #hen Tristram
!ets stuck in the detail of e8ents )rior to his o#n birth at the be!innin! of .terneEs The Life and *pinions of
Tristram &handy <first )ublished from +@30-9@=. .imilarl* the third )erson narrator:bio!ra)her in 1oolfEs *rlando
<+0%?= can declare the com)lete lack of historical sources for a section of BrlandoEs life before narratin! that )eriod
in im)ossible, and therefore in8ented, detail. In such cases, fiction is hi!hli!htin! the artificialit* of retros)ection,
the im)ossibilit* of its fidelit* to the )astness of the )ast, or the cross-contamination of the subDect as )resent and
the obDect as )ast. These are comic e>am)les of a fundamental as)ect of fictional narrati8e, the necessar* and *et
naturalised com)onent of in8ention in the act of recall, or the necessit* and *et im)ossibilit* of third )erson
omniscience in a descri)tion of the )ast.
It ma* be that the )arado>es of omniscience and unreliable narration are fundamental to narrati8e, but the* also
)ro8ide the basis for a !reat deal of contem)orar* fictional e>)erimentation, and no#here more so than in the
resur!ence of the historical no8el in the )ostmodern )eriod. Postmodern fiction is self-consciousl*
)reoccu)ied, in !eneral terms, #ith Fuestions about the mechanisms of narrati8e. A
)ostmodern no8el #ill characteristicall* hi!hli!ht the normall* in8isible fictional de8ices that
create the illusion of reference, and in so doin!, #ill conDure a #orld and at the same time
)ro8ide a kind of critical commentar* on the #a* in #hich that #orld is conDured. (or this
reason, it is common to find the technical de8ices or indeed the fundamental )resu))ositions of the con8entional
no8el actuall* thematised #ithin a )ostmodern fiction. This kind of self-commentatin!, self-anal*sin!,
self-referential no8el is usuall* referred to as metafiction, that is, fiction that someho#
takes fiction itself as its )rimar* subDect. Bne of the most influential accounts of the nature of
)ostmodern fiction is that of ,inda Autcheon, a contem)orar* Canadian theorist #ho claims
that it is not merel* metafictionalit* that characterises the )ostmodern no8el, but
#hat she calls historio!ra)hical metafictionalit* <Autcheon +0??=, #hich is to sa* that it is the
combination of fictional self-consciousness and themes concerned #ith the kno#abilit* of histor*, that most
adeFuatel* characterise )ostmodern fiction.
-@3-
The notion of historio!ra)hical metafiction is a useful enca)sulation of the )ostmodern a))roach to histor* because
it illustrates t#o )rinci)les under)innin! the idea of different histories. The first )rinci)le is that histor* is
different from #hat it used to be because historio!ra)hical metafiction is self-consciousl*
a#are of the artificialit* of retros)ect, and of the im)ossibilit* of a neutral and obDecti8e
descri)tion of the )ast. The second )rinci)le is that histor* is different because, as a result of this
self-a#areness, the historio!ra)hical metafiction #rites the histor* of )eo)le normall*
e>cluded from histor*, that is, it tells a different stor* from the official, #ell-kno#n, #ell-
trodden accounts of the )ast. In other #ords, the self-conscious te>tualism and the
liberation of meanin! from structures of e>clusion that I ha8e described in the )re8ious cha)ter
as characteristics of the ne# historicisms, taken to!ether #ith the con8iction that the )resent #ill al#a*s bear the
traces of )ast and future, are e>actl* the )rinci)les that under)in the fictional )roduction of different histories in
historio!ra)hic metafiction. In fact man* ha8e ar!ued that this is not Dust a Fuestion of the no8el )ro8idin! a !ood
medium for the e>)ression of these )hiloso)hical and historio!ra)hical ideas. ather the no8el is uniFuel* ca)able
of dealin! #ith the ne# )hiloso)hical uncertainties about the )ast, uniFuel* ca)able of sta!in! the e)istemolo!ical
com)le>ities e>)lored in the )hiloso)h* of time, e>actl* because the no8el deals in the te>ture of li8ed e>)erience,
in the interaction of social and historical forces as the* #ork on indi8iduals. ,inda Autcheon, for e>am)le, is one of
man* critics #ho thinks that the contem)orar* rele8ance of the no8el lies e>actl* in this )o#er to sta!e
)hiloso)hical Fuestions about histor* in a #a* that traditional discursi8e )hiloso)h* cannot do. EPostmodern
no8elsE, she claims, Eraise a number of issues surroundin! the nature of identit* and subDecti8it*K the Fuestion of
reference and re)resentationK the interte>tual nature of the )astK and the ideolo!ical im)lications of #ritin! about
histor*E <+0??:++@=. The ne# historical no8el is hi!hl* ada)ted to these issues e>actl* because of its herita!e of
#hat some ha8e come to call, tautolo!icall*, Eself-refle>i8it*E. .)eakin! of the American no8elist obert Coo8er,
Autcheon describes the )o#er of refle>i8it* in these e)istemolo!ical terms:
This self-refle>i8it* does not #eaken, but on the contrar*, stren!thens and )oints to the direct
le8el of historical en!a!ement and reference of
-@9-
the te>t. ,ike man* )ostmodern no8els, this )ro8isionalit* and uncertaint* <and the #ilful and
o8ert construction of meanin! too= do not Ecast doubt u)on their seriousnessE, but rather define
the ne# )ostmodern seriousness that ackno#led!es the limits and )o#ers of re)ortin! or #ritin!
the )ast, recent or remote.
<+0??:++@=
This idea, that fiction, or )erha)s literature in !eneral, has an e)istemolo!ical rele8ance is b* no means ne#. (rom
Aristotle on#ards it is a recurrin! theme that literature offers access to a more !eneral kind of truth than histor*
)recisel* b* 8irtue of its abilit* to balance the uni8ersal and )articular )ro)erties of the obDects or e8ents it
describes. But #hat is bein! said here is a rather more s)ecialised 8ersion of that ar!ument, that fiction is
es)eciall* ada)ted to the enactment of the uncertaint*, or )ro8isionalit*, that characterises contem)orar* attitudes
to histor*. (or this reason it is also ar!uable that if fiction has acFuired a historio!ra)hical im)ortance, the
contem)orar* )ractice of #ritin! histor* is Dust as )reoccu)ied #ith historio!ra)hical and e)istemolo!ical Fuestions,
and that this )reoccu)ation is reflected in an increased literariness in historical #ritin!. EThe )rinci)al facult*
in8ol8edE, sa*s .te)hen 5reenblatt in his book $ar'elous ossessions, Eis not reason but ima!inationE <+0??:+@=. It
is certainl* a tendenc* o8er#helmin!l* in e8idence in the "e# Aistoricism of the last t#o decades that ima!ination
has su))lanted reason, and that the neutral tones of traditional historicism ha8e *ielded to a ram)antl*
tro)olo!ical lan!ua!e: lan!ua!e )er8aded b* meta)horical, analo!ical and associati8e modes of connection and
ar!umentation. If fiction has been a !ood medium to raise Fuestions about the uncertaint* of historical kno#led!e,
criticism has also de)lo*ed #hat Dominic ,aca)ra calls the E)aralo!icalE modes of reasonin! normall* considered
literar* to the same ends. Tro)olo!ical lan!ua!e ma* then be thou!ht of as an ima!inati8e resource for the #ritin!
of histor* that distin!uishes the "e# Aistoricisms from EobDecti8eE histories.
LITERARY CANON" AND DIFFERENCE
In his introduction to The 1rchaeology of 3nowledge <+0@%=, Michel (oucault outlines his )ro!ramme for a different
kind of historical #ritin!.
-@@-
(oucault describes the )ast as a multi)licit* of dis)arate forces in constant battle, #hich no traditional historical
#ritin! can do Dustice to. The EhistorianEs histor*E, as he calls it, attem)ts to trace a continuous line throu!h a
dis)arate )ast, and in so doin! )roduce an im)ression that e8ents took )lace in a causal chain. A!ainst this basic
scheme, (oucault formulates an archaeolo!ical histor* that attem)ts to reco8er the for!otten areas of human
thou!ht, #hich is to sa* those hu!e areas of the )ast that are su))ressed and consi!ned to obli8ion b* the
historianEs histor*. The linear histor* is, for (oucault, a structure of e>clusion because in the )rocess of
constructin! the im)ression of a seamless chain of e8ents, it re)resses all counter-e8idence that #ould contradict
the scheme. This mass of conflictin! forces in #hich e8ents take )lace, but #hich are su))ressed and e>cluded b*
traditional histor* to create the illusion of a free-standin! and continuous seFuence, is referred to b* (oucault as a
Ediscursi8e formationE. I ha8e alread* ar!ued that the idea of e>clusion #as, for (oucault, a kind of scalin! u) of the
structuralist account of the si!n, and this a))roach to the si!n as a s*stem-bound entit* that cannot be taken in
isolation can be read in the follo#in! account of an e8ent embedded in a discursi8e formation:
Is it not )ossible to make a structural anal*sis of discourses that #ould e8ade the fate of
commentar* b* su))osin! no remainder, nothin! in e>cess of #hat has been said, but onl* the
fact of its historical a))earanceC The facts of discourse #ould then ha8e to be treated not as
autonomous nuclei of multi)le si!nifications, but as e8ents and functional se!ments !raduall*
comin! to!ether to form a s*stem. The meanin! of a statement #ould be defined not b* the
treasure of intentions that it mi!ht contain, but b* the difference that articulates it u)on other
real or )ossible statements, #hich are contem)orar* to it or to #hich it is o))osed in the linear
series of time.
<(oucault +0@2: >8ii=
The )rinci)le of difference #orks for (oucault e>actl* as it #orks for the structural lin!uist e>ce)t that the
re)ressed conte>t for the historical e8ent is not a s*stem of differences bet#een #ords but a morass of other
e8ents and statements. As for the structuralist si!n, the historical e8ent cannot be taken in isolation either from
the s*nchronic formation in #hich it
-@?-
o)erates or the tem)oral seFuence of e8ents in #hich its s*nta!matic relations are established.
A 8er* clear e>am)le of the functionin! of this (oucauldian archaeolo!* can be found in literar* histor* in the idea
of the literar* canon. Bne of the maDor im)acts of the "e# Aistoricisms in literar* studies #as the bustin! of the
canon: the dem*tholo!isation of literar* 8alue, the breakin! of male An!lo-.a>on he!emon* in literar* studies, the
destruction of the boundar* bet#een hi!h and )o)ular culture. These #ere cam)ai!ns #a!ed b* leftist intellectuals
a!ainst the traditional 8alues of hi!h culture. The enem* in intellectual terms #as totalisation: the idea that the
histor* of literature in its entiret* could be re)resented b* such a tin* fra!ment of literature.The literar* canon #as
a grand narrati'e in the sense that it re)resented the histor* of literature as a #hole as a linear stor* constructed
b* s#ee)in! e>clusions. 1ith narrati8e e8ents the siGe of historical e)ochs, the canon could onl* o)erate in this
#a*, re)resentin! national literar* histor* as a seFuence of eras, #ith names like the enaissance, omanticism
and Modernism, #hich could be re)resented in shorthand b* a handful of h*)ercanonised te>ts. Man* of the
)olitical )roblems #ith the canon #ere associated #ith its national character. 1ithin a nation, the canon #as
understood as a kind of trickle-do#n economics, #here the 8alue and 8alues of !reat #orks, as arbitrated b* !reat
)eo)le #ith the discrimination to kno# the !ood from the bad, functioned as to)-do#n instruction. A kind of
narcissism )resided o8er the canon, translatin! the 8alues of a critical elite into the 8alue of !reat literature,
alle!in! the uni8ersalism of those 8alues. The* #ere 8alues to be ado)ted b* the e>cluded for edification.
Canon-bustin! can be understood in (oucauldian terms as a kind of archaeolo!* #hich sou!ht to dis)lace bo!us
notions of aesthetic 8alue, or uni8ersal human 8alues, and sho# instead that the 8er* canonicit* of a nationEs !reat
#orks is a kind of s*stematic e>clusion of other 8oices. 7ust as (oucault talked of unco8erin! the for!otten areas of
human thou!ht in The 1rchaeology of 3nowledge, so mi!ht literar* canon-bustin! be seen as an attem)t to
dislod!e the a))arentl* meton*mic relation bet#een a canonised te>t and its e)och, b* reinstatin! for!otten te>ts
in the re)resentation of an a!e. Accordin! to the structuralist orientation of (oucaultEs dream of a
s*stematic account of discourse, the canonicit* of a te>t is structurall* de)endent on the
e>clusions that it )eforms on others, so that
-@0-
the idea that !reat #orks stand on their o#n and !lo# in the luminosit* of their !reatness
becomes merel* another 8ersion of the illusion that #ords ha8e meanin! as free-standin!
entities. A different histor* in this case #ill entail e>actl* the hidden s*stem of differences,
or )erha)s )o#er relations, on #hich the 8alue of a te>t rests.
There is no doubt that literar* histor*, the canon and the characteristics of literar* e)ochs, #hich #ere inherited
from mid-t#entieth-centur* literar* criticism, ha8e been utterl* transformed b* criticism of the +0@&s on#ards.
Perha)s most notable in this transformation is the )resence of 8oices e>cluded from
the canon on !rounds of !ender, race, se>ualit* and nationalit*. (rom this )oint of
8ie#, the creation of a different canon has been a collecti8e )roDect, in the sense
that #e find the same kind of anti-canonical archaeolo!* takin! )lace in as di8erse
areas of criticism as Fueer theor*, feminism, )ostcolonialism and )ostmodernism.
It is )robabl* a))arent that t#o Fuite different conte>ts for the conce)t of difference are be!innin! to coo)erate in
this kind of strate!*. The first is the conte>t that has been most discussed so far, that is, the structuralist conte>t
of difference, and the structural lo!ic of a s*stem of differences and e>clusions at #ork in discursi8e formations,
#hether the* are the siGe of sentences, no8els or historical e)ochs. The second is the conte>t of cultural difference,
#hereb* the domination of one cultural identit* b* another is o))osed in the 8er* act of re#ritin! histor*. It #as
one of (oucaultEs man* achie8ements to articulate the first conte>t to the second, thou!h some #ill ar!ue that he
!re# out of his structuralist ideas in the +0@&s and be!an to focus on Fuestions of )o#er and ineFualit* in more
direct #a*s. Ao#e8er it is inter)reted, there is an interestin! con8er!ence in (oucaultEs #ritin! bet#een a
structural and a social im)erati8e to embrace difference, #hich, as I #ill be !oin! on to discuss, has characterised
not onl* dealin!s #ith difference, but contem)orar* criticism as a #hole, e8er since.
T!E U"E" OF DIFFERENCE IN !I"TORICI"T
CRITICI"
There is clearl* a stron! continuit* bet#een the structuralist attitude to a lin!uistic s*stem and (oucaultEs account
of a discursi8e formation, since neither the si!n nor the historical e8ent can be understood e>ce)t in the
-?&-
conte>t of a lar!er formation of relations. .tructuralism and historicism ma* ha8e been considered )olemical
o))onents throu!hout the so-called theor* #ars of the +0@&s and +0?&s, but there is somethin! methodolo!icall*
Fuite com)atible about critical a))roaches that are, at least at an abstract le8el, united in their insistence on
conte>t, relation and s*stem. If DerridaEs rece)tion in "orth America attests to a hi!h de!ree of confusion in the
factional debate bet#een historicism and formalism, this mi!ht act as a more !eneral #arnin! that the ideas of
structuralism are b* no means sim)l* o))osed b* historicist criticism. "or is (oucault alone in ha8in! linked
structuralist and cultural meanin!s of difference, and it is )ossible to find the trace of structuralist ideas in the #ork
of some of the most influential fi!ures of historicist and cultural criticism, such as Clifford 5eertG, Pierre Bourdieu
and Michel de Certeau. The close relationshi) bet#een structural lin!uistics and anthro)olo!* in the #ork of ,H8i-
.trauss is one )ath alon! #hich structuralist conce)tions of difference found their #a*, 8ia ethno!ra)h* and
sociolo!*, to#ards historicist modes of criticism. This relationshi) bet#een lin!uistic and cultural difference
recei8es more attention in the ne>t cha)ter. But it mi!ht be #orth considerin! for a moment an e>am)le of #here
these t#o t*)es of difference are not successful accom)lices.
In the discussion of Derridean differance, it became clear that far more is at stake than the mere multi)lication of
histories. It is true that Derrida e>)ressed o))osition to notions of a sin!le or !eneral histor*, and that there #as
some e>)licit lobb*in! for the idea of differentiated and multi)le histories. But the conce)t of differance itself is
more bound u) #ith the )ossibilit* of a non-meta)h*sical histor*, and therefore less #ith the idea that histories
should be man* in number than the idea that the* should be #ritten in a #a* that sustains resistance to
foundational )resences, and the entire s*stem of 8alues that these )resences su))ort. It is not enou!h sim)l* to
#rite more histories. If one does so one has, as the British )hiloso)her Da8id 1oods )uts it in The !econstruction
of Time, Emerel* multi)lied the heads of the monster, and not slain it, or e8en tamed itE <+0?0:2@2=. Different,
)luralised histories ma* be more democratic, ma* !i8e 8oice to the silenced, but do nothin! to address #hat man*
ha8e taken to be the more )ernicious acti8ities of histor* in re)roducin! the meta)h*sical assum)tions embedded
in the conce)t of time.
-?+-
The "e# Aistoricisms in literar* studies ha8e therefore taken both )roDects to!ether, and follo#ed the double
im)erati8e to #rite different histories and to #rite histor* differentl*. In the case of the literar* critic, #ho is not
)rimaril* a #riter of histor*, this reall* means #ritin! about literar* te>ts in #a*s that are historical and *et
different from the traditional historicisms of literar* studies. I ha8e alread* anal*sed the )rocess b* #hich criticism
actuall* becomes more literar*, more creati8e and more a#are of the subDecti8it* of historical )ers)ecti8e. But
there #ere also discernible chan!es in the #a* that criticism thou!ht about the historical conte>t of a #ork of
literature, #hich are often based in (oucaultEs sense of the connection bet#een the insi!hts of structuralism and
Fuestions of )olitics. In traditional historical criticism, for e>am)le, it mi!ht ha8e been thou!ht hel)ful for the critic
to research into as)ects of historical conte>t that #ould hel) shed li!ht on the e8ents and )redicaments
re)resented in fiction. .ome kno#led!e of -liGabethen ,ondon mi!ht be reFuired for the student of .hakes)eare,
or of the Industrial e8olution to inform the reader of -liGabeth 5askell.
(oucaultEs ar!uments introduced a less ob8ious 8ersion of this kind of historicisation. ather than re)resentin!
conte>tual information that is manifestl* rele8ant to the content of a literar* #ork, (oucaultEs archaeolo!ical
)ers)ecti8es offered the )ossibilit* of lookin! for conte>tual information #hich a))eared irrele8ant, or )er8ersel*
o))osite to that content. There had al#a*s been some of this in criticism. It had often been said of 7ane Austen,
for e>am)le, that she left a lot of thin!s out of her no8els, the ob8ious e>am)les bein! almost e8er*one beneath
the mercantile le8el of social class and the small issue of the "a)oleonic #ars. .he #as, as she declared herself,
#orkin! on a tin* )iece of i8or*, and therefore had to e>clude almost e8er*thin! that took )lace outside a fe#
)ro8incial dra#in! rooms.
Man* of (oucaultEs follo#ers took the basic idea here, that there mi!ht be some s*stematic e>clusion of certain
as)ects of the #orld, and a))lied it much more !enerall* to historical re)resentations. The re)resentation of life in
a )ro8incial 8illa!e, after all, is structurall* de)endent on the e>clusion of somethin! else, so that the full
e>)lanation of #hat it de)icts in8ol8es the reco8er* of #hat it has e>cluded. This is a basic im)erati8e of much ne#
historicism: that the descri)tion of a))arentl* un)olitical thin!s like marria!e or the beaut* of nature necessaril*
bear the traces of,
-?%-
sa*, )ro)ert* and land o#nershi), but that the )olitical as)ects of these subDects are often )ushed out,
s*stematicall* e>cluded, and become a kind of )olitical unconscious.
This is an e>citin! idea for literar* criticism if onl* because it o)ens u) so man* ne# )ossibilities for critical
inter)retation. In theor* there is almost no limit to the )olitical unconscious, or to the historical conte>ts that
literar* re)resentations ha8e re)ressed, Dust as there is almost no limit to )aradi!matic relations that structuralists
sa# as the unconscious e>clusions of lan!ua!e in !eneral. It is nothin! less than a licence to #rite about #hat is
not there in a literar* te>t, to endlessl* !raft ne# historical conte>ts on to literar* #orks and in the )rocess
!enerate endlessl* different readin!s. There are some limitations, for e>am)le, for the formalist or the intrinsic
critic, to #hat can be said about AnneEs )ro!ress to#ards marria!e #ith Ca)tain 1ent#orth <ersuasion=, but for
the conte>tualist for #hom #hat is there de)ends structurall* on #hat is not, there is a colonial histor* of Ce*lon
and an anal*sis of the su!ar trade in the nineteenth centur* #aitin! in the mar!ins e8er* time someone in an
-n!lish 8illa!e s#eetens their tea. .ometimes then the e>)loration of historical conte>t mi!ht seem to be !oin!
a!ainst the !rain of the te>t under discussion, mi!ht seem to be remindin! it of re)ressed historical and )olitical
to)ics or as)ects of the #orld in #hich it has itself sho#n no interest. And this is e>actl* the )oint of )oliticall*
moti8ated historicism of this kind.
Bne e>am)le is the #ork of a*mond 1illiams <+0%+-??=, #hich has ins)ired an on!oin! tradition of cultural
materialist criticism in Britain committed to this kind of conte>tualism. 1illiamsEs #ork on the social histor* of the
countr*side, for e>am)le, is an e>traordinaril* )atient )olitical debunkin! of the )astoral mode in literature, its
aestheticisation and m*tholo!isation of the )ast. More recentl*, -d#ard .aidEs #ork has ar!ued that it is the
res)onsibilit* of criticism to be contrapuntal, a term he borro#s from the descri)tion of a musical harmon* #hich
#orks a!ainst the melod* to describe the #a* that a historical conte>t can be used as a counter)oint to the
Emelod*E of a literar* te>t. In Culture and -mperialism <+00'=, these conte>ts are historical )ers)ecti8es on the
!lobal s*stem in #hich a))arentl* free-standin! !eo)olitical localities - cultural differences - find their structural
conditions.
Different histories can therefore also be understood as a ran!e of different inter)retations of literar* te>ts,
)articularl* #here these conte>ts
-?2-
seem to #ork, contra)untall*, a!ainst the !rain of the te>ts themsel8es. But #e mi!ht also, finall*, connect this
)oint, this notion of contra)untal readin!s, #ith the transformation that the ne# historicisms ha8e brou!ht about in
literar* canons and therefore in literar* histor*. In the discussion of canon-bustin!, I said that the rein8ention of
literar* e)ochs consisted lar!el* in resurrectin! and re-e8aluatin! for!otten te>ts, often b* sociall* mar!inalised
#riters, as a kind of )olitical commitment to difference. But this is not the onl* im)act of cultural histor* on the
understandin! of literar* histor*. 7ameson has ar!ued, for e>am)le, that the tendenc* to#ards formal
fra!mentation in the modernist no8el cannot be understood in the aesthetic and formalist terms that ha8e
dominated the account of the modernist )eriod. Traditionall* the fra!mentation of the no8el is seen either as
!ratuitous aesthetic e>)eriment or as )art of a more !eneral shift in fiction a#a* from the concern to re)resent
e>ternal realit* to#ards a concern #ith interiorit* and subDecti8e e>)erience. (or 7ameson, ho#e8er, the a!e of
em)ire has turned histor* into #hat he calls an Eun!ras)able totalit*E <+00&=. It is no lon!er )ossible to enca)sulate
societ* in an -n!lish )ro8incial 8illa!e because societ* has been transformed into an enormous !lobal com)le>it*,
so that #hat is de)icted in an -n!lish 8illa!e is a mere fra!ment of the #hole )icture, the un!ras)able totalit* of
the !lobal s*stem. The relationshi) bet#een the bour!eoisie and the )roletariat, for e>am)le, is no lon!er
obser8able in a sin!le localit* because, in the a!e of em)ire, the )roletariat is increasin!l* se)arated
!eo!ra)hicall* from the bour!eoisie, so that the !lobal )icture can be e>)erienced in an* one )lace onl* in
fra!ments. Indi8idual te>ts, in other #ords, )resent fra!ments of a much lar!er )icture, #hich can be brou!ht to
bear on their inter)retations. The #hole assumed character of modernist fra!mentation as aesthetic e>)eriment is
brou!ht into Fuestion b* the conte>t of im)erialism #hen an a))arentl* formal as)ect of literature is itself
historicised. 1hat these ar!uments )oint to most directl* is the increasin! im)ortance of !lobal conte>ts for a
consideration of difference, not onl* in relation to !rand theories of cultural identit*, but also in the )ractices of
te>tual inter)retation.
-?'-
.
CULTURAL DIFFERENCE
1e li8e in a #orld of difference, a #orld in #hich )eo)le and )laces differ from each other. This means that, thou!h
there is a com)licated )hiloso)hical and lin!uistic back!round for the term EdifferenceE, there is also a 8er* familiar
meanin! #hich describes the di8ersit* of the #orld. This cha)ter aims to illustrate that one of the most
characteristic and sur)risin! attributes of the term EdifferenceE is the e>tent to #hich it has mana!ed to combine
eas*, readil* understandable meanin!s #ith those deri8ed from a more com)le> theoretical back!round. As a
critical conce)t, cultural difference often has this doubleness about it: on the one hand the most strai!htfor#ardl*
dull obser8ation that the #orld is not a sin!ularit*, and on the other, the articulation of that obser8ation to a
com)le> theoretical frame#ork.
DIFFERENCE& OT!ERNE"" AND ALTERITY
If #e assume for a moment that difference finds its most modern ins)iration in the structuralist mo8ement, it can
be recalled that there are t#o basic assum)tions. The first is that lan!ua!e is not merel* a nomenclature for
entities that e>ist in the #orld, but that lan!ua!e has a role in the )roduction of those entities. The second is that
the basic unit of meanin! for the structuralist is the binar* o))osition, so that oneEs sense of the
-?3-
entities e>istin! in the #orld is a )roduct of the o))ositions #hose structures #e use to inter)ret realit*. This is
clearl* a #a* of understandin! the structuration of social realit*: that a social identit* is al#a*s embedded in a
s*stem of differences, and defined in )articular a!ainst its o))osite. But the #ord Eo))ositeE can be misleadin!.
In cha)ter + of this book, I )ointed out that sometimes minor differences seem sociall* more si!nificant than maDor
ones, accordin! to the lo!ic of (reudEs Enarcissism of minor differencesE. It certainl* seems true of )ersonal identit*
that one is more likel* to abhor )eo)le 8er* similar to oneself than those 8er* different, )erha)s on the !rounds
that oneEs indi8idualit* is more threatened b* similarit* than difference. 1e mi!ht also be tem)ted to des)ise in
others the Fualities that #e most fear in oursel8es, creatin! them as our o))osite #hen the* are amon! our closest
relations. This confusion, of minor difference #ith o))osition, seems to o)erate as a structural )rinci)le as much in
the famil* unit as in international relations.
Bne #a* around the confusion is to substitute the #ord EBtherE for Eo))ositeE. 1hereas Eo))ositeE carries #ith it an
im)lication that an anton*mic relation ma* be rooted in some ma>imal difference !i8en in nature, EBtherE indicates
that the si!nificant relation is not #ith a natural o))osite, but rather the term a!ainst #hich an* )articular identit*
consciousl* or unconsciousl* defines itself ne!ati8el*. EBtherE is in fact a natural com)lement to EdifferenceE. It has
a rou!hl* eFui8alent #ei!ht of ba!!a!e from broadl* similar traditions. Thus it #ould be )ossible to find ori!ins for
the notion of the Bther in nineteenth-centur* )hiloso)h*, for e>am)le in the #ork of Ae!el and 6ierke!aard, or
certainl* in the earl* t#entieth centur* in Ausserl and Aeide!!er. But as #ith difference, the conce)t of otherness
can be seen as a matri> of structuralist, )s*choanal*tic, anthro)olo!ical and )hiloso)hical ar!uments, the se)arate
theoretical )ers)ecti8es of #hich can be im)ossible to disentan!le. The notion of the Bther ma* ha8e some roots in
nineteenth-centur* )hiloso)h*, but it is better understood as a structuralist and )s*choanal*tic name for the
inferior member of a hierarchical Fuasi-o))osition. The condition of otherness is not a lo!ical relation as much as a
)o#er relation, and for this reason the notion of otherness usuall* carries #ith it the entire )oststructuralist critiFue
of the structuralist account of o))osition, that is, the critiFue of the innocence of o))ositions as outlined in
-?9-
cha)ter 2. The critiFue of o))osition has t#o maDor critical conseFuences for the anal*sis of difference, #hich this
cha)ter aims to illustrate. The first is that the o))osition is seen as a basic unit of cultural difference, and the
criticEs interest lies either in the anal*sis of the #a* that o))osition #orks to )roduce identit*, or in the 8oicin! of
otherness that is consi!ned to silence and ineffabilit*, that is to sa*, actuall* !i8in! 8oice to unre)resented )oints
of 8ie# and identities normall* e>cluded from re)resentation. The second is to liberate the multi)licit* of forces and
differences that the o))osition reduces to a mere d*ad: to do a#a* #ith the o))osition and understand difference
in more com)le> and multifarious #a*s. These conseFuences can be illustrated in relation to !ender difference, and
ideas about the )roliferation of differences in relation to the )rocess of !lobalisation.
"E/UAL DIFFERENCE& OPPO"ITION AND
ALTERITY
It #ill be clear from the discussion so far that the histor* of the conce)t of difference is 8er* closel* bound u) #ith
the histor* of feminism and feminist criticism. (eminism is in fact one of the areas of thou!ht #here the theoretical
and non-theoretical meanin!s of difference find their most )roducti8e o8erla)s. 1ell before the im)act of
structuralist theor*, feminism #as debatin! ideas of sameness and difference as alternati8e strate!ies for the
)ursuit of eFualit* #ith men. The strate!* of sameness #ould !enerall* entail a con8iction of the common
humanit* bet#een men and #omen, and )ursue eFualit* on the )rinci)le that no discrimination should be made
bet#een men and #omen. The strate!* of difference, on the other hand, #ould in8ol8e the reco!nition of #omenEs
)articularit*, usuall* #ith reference to the maternal role, and )ursue eFualit* throu!h the reco!nition of this se>ual
difference. Carol Ann Bacchi, a feminist #riter at the /ni8ersit* of Adelaide, describes this in &ame !ifference
<+00&=:
The first clear di8ision of the #omenEs mo8ement into EsamenessE and EdifferenceE cam)s occurred
in the )eriod bet#een the t#o #orld #ars. It #as the result of the conflict )roduced #hen some
#omen reDected their traditional role as E!uardians of the hearthE, and sou!ht to en!a!e in free
market com)etition alon!side men. Most of theseJ#anted
-?@-
#omen to )ursue their indi8idual self-interest. The* s)oke in terms of #omenEs EsamenessE to
men . . . The maDorit* of those #ho em)hasised #omenEs differences considered traditional se>
roles the onl* means to )romote communit* #ell-bein! . . . In the main the* did not a))ro8e of
married #omen #orkin! outside the home and tried to find #a*s to increase #omenEs economic
inde)endence and status #ithin it.
<Bacchi +00&: >iii=
There is clearl* no lin!uistic theor* underl*in! the meanin!s of sameness and difference here. These are strate!ic
alternati8es based in se>ual difference and !ender roles. Bacchi !oes on to sho# that these are 8er* limitin!
)ositions, and a limited #a* of understandin! the alternati8es for the #omenEs mo8ement. There is a dan!er that,
in choosin! bet#een the strate!ies of sameness and difference, no challen!e #ill be issued to the se>-s)ecific
characteristics of men, and furthermore, that the #hole issue of ineFualit* mi!ht be for!otten:
Talkin! about EsamenessesE and EdifferencesE also di8erts attention from the )roblem of
hierarch* . . . If #omen are in fact EdifferentE, the Fuestion becomes: #h* has this EdifferenceE
been constructed as disad8anta!eC If #omen are in fact the EsameE, the )roblem of their relati8e
disad8anta!e and lack of )o#er remains unresol8ed. There is a need therefore to shift the focus
of anal*sis from the EdifferenceE to the structures #hich con8ert this EdifferenceE into
disad8anta!e.
<Bacchi +00&: >8ii=
In the first )lace then, the term EdifferenceE in feminist discourse carries this Fuite
strai!htfor#ard meanin! of se>ual difference, and of the strate!* that asserts that
difference in )ursuit of eFualit* #ith men or a critiFue of )atriarch*.
In the +0@&s and +0?&s, this )rimar* meanin! of EdifferenceE in feminism be!ins to
mer!e #ith the more lin!uistic conce)t of difference that I ha8e been describin! in
)re8ious cha)ters. In an essa* )ublished in +0?0, Michele Barrett identifies three different meanin!s of the
#ord EdifferenceE in recent feminist theor*. !ifference - is #hat she calls Estrai!htfor#ard se>ual
differenceE and corres)onds rou!hl* to the dichotom* )resented abo8e. !ifference
-- is .aussurean difference in #hich Emeanin!
-??-
is constructed throu!h lin!uistic o))osition rather than throu!h absolute referenceE
<+0?0:'+=. And !ifference --- is Eeffecti8el* a reco!nition of di8ersit*E <+0?0:''=. The
ad8anta!e of the second kind of meanin! of EdifferenceE <!ifference --= to feminism is that it )resents a challen!e
to #hat Barrett calls the Ee)istemolo!ical certainties of much 1estern social thou!htE <+0?0:'+=. More s)ecificall*,
it dis)laces essentialism: the belief that essential and unchan!eable characteristics determine social roles, in this
case that a #omanEs social role is under)inned b* biolo!*. Much feminist theor* takes essentialism as its enem*,
and structuralist lin!uistics <.aussurean difference= offers a theoretical )ers)ecti8e #ith #hich to dis)lace an
essentialist 8ie# of social realit*. As it has been ar!ued earlier in this book, a central thesis of structural lin!uistics
is that differences are not !i8en in nature, but constructed b* a lan!ua!e that )roDects its s*stem of differences on
to the #orld. The 8alue of .aussurean difference to feminism therefore is that it can hel) to dis)lace essentialism
and unmask the structurin! )rinci)les that du)e us into thinkin! that differences are !i8en in nature.
-arlier, I said that the theoretical and the non-theoretical meanin!s of EdifferenceE find their most )roducti8e
relationshi) in feminism. BarrettEs conclusion about the three different meanin!s of EdifferenceE is rather more
ne!ati8e:
I #ould #ant to stress that there are not merel* differences bet#een these three de)lo*ments of
the conce)t, there are disa!reements and outri!ht contradictions. Difference I em)hasiGes
difference bet#een men and #omen, #hile Differences II and III em)hasiGe difference E#ithinE
the cate!or* of #omen. Difference II reDects the human subDect on #hich Difference III is
)redicated. Difference III is also )redicated u)on the a))rehension of an un)roblematic
ontolo!ical realit* - the historical and institutional or!aniGation of social di8ision - that is e>)licitl*
refused b* Difference II. Differences I and III incline to#ards essentialismK Difference II is
deconstructi8e in its a))roach to !endered subDecti8it*.
<+0?0:'9=
Barrett is undoubtedl* ri!ht here, that the conce)t of difference in much social theor* is a Dumble of incom)atible
meanin!s. But there are also
-?0-
)laces, es)eciall* #here the conce)t is deri8ed closel* from one )articular theoretical source, #here lin!uistic
theories of difference ha8e enhanced social theories such as feminism.
In (rance, critics and theorists such as 7ulia 6riste8a, AHlQne Ci>ous and ,uce Iri!ara* can be seen as hi!hl*
)oliticised #riters #ho emer!e from, and contribute to, the structuralist and )oststructuralist accounts of
difference. In si!nificantl* different #a*s, Ci>ous, 6riste8a and Iri!ara* de8elo) an account of the relationshi)
bet#een lin!uistic and se>ual difference that dra#s on the critiFue of meta)h*sical o))osition as de8elo)ed in the
#ork of Derrida, (oucault and ,*otard. Ci>ousEs #ork, for e>am)le, re)eatedl* returns to the Fuestion of o))osition
as an e>am)le of a kind of misfit bet#een #ords and the #orld, #here the #orld e>ists in a more fluid and
multi)licitous condition than the ri!id terms of lin!uistic o))osition can res)ect. (or Mora! .hiach, for e>am)le,
Ci>ousEs #ork oscillates bet#een critical and creati8e, factual and fictional modes because of her Eunease about the
ca)acit* of #ords to hold out a!ainst the )o#er of o))ositionE <+00+:22=. But accordin! to .hiach, this )roduces a
dilemma for Ci>ous:
.he feels the )ressure to )roduce formulae and solutions #hich are more do!matic, more ri!id,
than her understandin! of the Emo8ementE of se>ual difference allo#s. .he contem)lates the
)ossibilit* of !i8in! u) alto!ether on the )roDect of tr*in! to talk about se>ual difference, about
#omen and the econom* of the feminine, since the )ressure #ithin this )roDect to re)roduce the
dominant fi!ures of the EfeminineE is so intense.
<.hiach +00+:22=
This is a dilemma faced b* man* of the )oststructuralist critics of o))osition, namel* that the o))osition seems to
reduce a com)le> realit* to somethin! ri!id and confinin!, and *et, for )ractical or )olitical reasons it is necessar*
to continue to use that o))osition as a frame#ork for oneEs thou!ht. Ci>ous is therefore carr*in! somethin! of
DerridaEs strate!ic adherence to o))ositions in the )rocess of deconstruction into the field of se>ual difference. 7ust
as Derrida and others ha8e found it necessar* to dis)lace the meta)h*sical o))ositions of )hiloso)h* throu!h
creati8e, )erformati8e and neolo!istic lin!uistic strate!ies of their o#n, so too
-0&-
Ci>ous <as 6riste8a #ould do later= often esca)es the strictures of critical discourse for the freedom of drama or
)oetr*.
This reliance on literar* lan!au!e )roduces an interestin! 8ariant of #hat I described, in the )re8ious cha)ter, as a
con8er!ence of literar* and theoretical discourse, since for Ci>ous, this becomes a )olitical im)erati8e. This is ho#
7uliet (lo#er Macannel describes the alliance of the )olitical and literar*:
Ci>ousEs commitment to the )roblematic of difference is linked to her more or less absolute
commitment to literary lan!ua!e. It is a commitment that has clearl* sha)ed her institutional
)racticesJIt has also sha)ed her theories of feminine #ritin! <ecriture feminine= and sha)ed her
literar* criticism into a uniFuel* )oetic )rose. It is crucial to note that her )rocedure as critic,
#riter and reader is to force se>ual difference to the surface of #ritin! - be it theoretical,
dramatic, )olitical or )oetic in nature - so that the #ritin! at last comes to mirror the schism of
lan!ua!e, the internal limit that each Ese>E )oses to the other #ithin the EsameE lan!ua!e.
<Macannel %&&%:29@=
T#o im)ortant obser8ations emer!e from this link bet#een the )olitical and the literar*. The first is that it
establishes a firm relationshi) bet#een the lan!ua!e of a te>t and the bio!ra)hical, if not the biolo!ical, identit* of
its author as a kind of conte>t. The second is that it offers the )ossibilit* of an account of feminine #ritin!, that is,
of a different kind of #ritin!, #hich she de8elo)s e>tensi8el* throu!hout her cor)us. This idea of the relationshi)
bet#een difference and #ritin!, that it mi!ht be )ossible to define feminine #ritin! not onl* in relation to the se> of
an author, but in Fualitati8e or st*listic terms, has been #idel* dismissed from both #ithin and outside feminist
criticism. But it has also been hi!hl* influential for the e>tent to #hich it )laces lan!ua!e, and )articularl* literar*
lan!ua!e at the forefront of )olitical debate. This makes Ci>ous a )ro)onent of the 8ie#, #hich has recurred
throu!hout this discussion, that onl* b* attendin! to lan!ua!e can one dis)lace the most entrenched assum)tions
and )reDudices about nature and culture, that is, those that reif* lan!ua!e, or confuse lin!uistic #ith natural
realit*.
Ci>ousEs #ritin! is one of the )laces in #hich theories of lin!uistic difference can be seen at #ork in the anal*sis of
cultural difference and
li8ed o))osition. In The 4ewly Born )oman <+0?9=, the role of hierarchical o))osition in thou!ht is clearl*
identified #ith male )o#er:
1e see that E8ictor*E al#a*s comes do#n to the same thin!: thin!s !et hierarchical. Br!aniGation
b* hierarch* makes all conce)tual or!aniGation subDect to man. Male )ri8ile!e, sho#n in the
o))osition bet#een acti'ity and passi'ity, #hich he uses to sustain himself. Traditionall*, the
Fuestion of se>ual difference is treated b* cou)lin! it #ith the o))osition, acti8it*:)assi8it*.
<Ci>ous and Clement +0?9:9'=
Man* of the difficulties of Ci>ousEs #ork, from the )oint of 8ie# of her critics, re8ol8e around the undefined but
much relied u)on cate!or* of E#omanE, #hich has been 8ie#ed #ithin (rench feminism as a kind of betra*al of
)olitical )roDects that do#n)la* or den* the im)ortance of se>ual difference, or that seek a !enuine esca)e from
binar* o))osition man:#oman. It is )robabl* fair to sa* that Ci>ousEs use of EdifferenceE is at times theoreticall*
Fuite thin, and therefore most in dan!er of sim)l* colla)sin! into the most common)lace and literal meanin!s of
the #ord EdifferenceE.
A more substantial theoretical elaboration of difference for feminism can be found in the #ork of ,uce Iri!ara*,
#hose career )ro8ides a stron! set of continuities from the earl* structuralist meanin! of the term. Iri!ara* is
)articularl* influenced b* the Derridean critiFue of difference, its correcti8e em)hasis on tem)oralit*, and the
account of lin!uistic o))osition as rooted in hierarch*. But #hereas Derrida !i8es the im)ression of bein! )rimaril*
concerned #ith meta)h*sical roots for ethical and )olitical issues, Iri!ara*Es thou!ht, es)eciall* in her later career,
is closel* influenced b* the #ritin!s of -mmanuel ,e8inas <+0&9-00=, a (rench )hiloso)her #hose #ork centres on
the attem)t to describe ethical res)onsibilit* throu!h the idea of otherness. ,e8inasEs thou!ht is im)ortant for the
)hiloso)h* of difference because it establishes the face-to-face encounter #ith Ethe BtherE as the site of ethical
res)onsibilit*. The sense of otherness that #e find in structuralism, in #hich the other is a kind of unconscious,
unackno#led!ed o))osite, therefore finds an ethical and )olitical dimension in ,e8inasEs thou!ht. This continuit*,
from structuralism to )oststructuralism and a ,e8inasian ethics mi!ht be sim)l*
-0%-
-0+-
re)resented in the follo#in! summar*. Accordin! to the structuralist account of difference, the identit* of
somethin! al#a*s resides in )art some#here else, and )erha)s most ob8iousl* in its ne!ati8e or o))osite. An
identit* is ne8er com)lete in itself, and therefore an* e>)loration that seeks to define an identit* #ill falter, for t#o
reasons. The first is that it #ill encounter a constituent element of the Bther in that identit*, and the second is that
the identit* #ill also belon! to a !rou), such as a !ender. But this alterit* <or otherness= in an identit* is also a
kind of )o#er relation, in that its a))rehension is a))ro)riati8e, in so far as it #ill seek to dominate and absorb the
otherness a!ainst #hich it is defined. 1hen Iri!ara* talks of a Edisa))ro)riati8eE relation to the Bther, she is
therefore in8okin! this relational model of the subDect, in #hich identities are incom)lete, and addin! to it a
deconstructi8e strate!* in #hich an identit* is )artl* constituted b* a ne!ati8e, and in #hich the Bther is not to be
dominated but res)ected, as if it #ere )art of oneself. It is common in recent feminist theor* in the /nited .tates
to hear this em)hasis described as a mo8e a#a* from the notion of a difference between to#ards a difference
within.
Much of Iri!ara*Es theor* is based on the ethical )hiloso)h* of ,e8inas, the basic commitment of #hich #as that an
ethical act in8ol8es the res)ect of alterit* or otherness. But the em)hasis on se>ual difference offers a set of
further )ossibilities, #hich !i8e Iri!ara*Es #ork an interestin! influence on accounts of culture at lar!e. It is im)licit
in the summar* abo8e that a !ender is one of those identit* )ositions #hich is inhabited b* alterit*, and therefore
that its e>)loration entails an ethical res)ect for the ne!ati8e, or o))osite term that )artl* constitutes it. But
Iri!ara* also makes this claim the other #a* around. In se8eral of her later #orks, in #hich the ,e8inasian
influence is most a))arent, she makes the claim that se>ual difference is somethin! like a fundamental )arameter
of the socio-cultural order, and not onl* that, but a uni8ersal condition. .he ar!ues that, as a result of this cultural
centralit*, the culture of se>ual difference has a s)ecial rele8ance for other issues of cultural difference, indeed for
all cultural difference: that se>ual difference is a kind of trainin! for the ethical res)ect for alterit* of all kinds, and
that it therefore fosters ethical action concei8ed, in 6riste8aEs )hrase, as a ne!ati8iGin! of narcissism. If this idea,
that se>ual difference fosters ethical action b* rehearsin! res)ect for otherness, seems 8a!ue, it is )robabl*
because Iri!ara* ne8er !i8es it
-02-
an* e>act formulation. "o#here is this more clear than in 1n +thics of &e,ual !ifference <+002=, #here she makes
much of the idea that se>ual difference does not *et e>ist, e>ce)t as some notional future )ossibilit*. If se>ual
difference does not *et e>ist, in the sense that it has not *et been a))rehended accordin! to this lo!ic of ne!ati8it*
and disa))ro)riation, Iri!ara*Es ethical scheme re)roduces another im)ortant dimension of ,e8inasEs ethics.
,e8inas has a similar sense that the res)onsibilit* to#ards the Bther encounters !ra8e difficulties, #hich can be
met onl* b* stri8in! to#ards forms of contact #ith the Bther that ha8e not *et come into focus from the future. $et
#ithout the m*ster* that such 8a!ueness borro#s from the future, there is a feelin! that the entire theoretical
a))aratus of ethical res)ect amounts to little more than the edict that one should do as one #ould be done b*.
The )o#erful thin! about Iri!ara*Es #ork, then, is its abilit* to link ideas of difference, es)eciall* as the* are
de8elo)ed in (rench )oststructuralism, #ith Fuestions in cultural )olitics. Aere a!ain, #e see the stren!th and the
#eakness of the coe>istence of difficult theoretical and eas* common)lace meanin!s of the #ord EdifferenceE. Bn
the one hand the career of the term EdifferenceE seems to furnish )olitical and cultural theor* #ith a so)histicated
theoretical tradition, and on the other its ethical insi!hts can seem to amount to 8er* little, in terms of a concrete
)ro!ramme for action, in the e*es of the #orld. This is an accusation that has been le8elled re)eatedl* at 7ean-
(ranRois ,*otardEs conce)t of the differend, #hich similarl* attem)ts to elaborate an ethics based on
)oststructuralist a))roaches to difference. $et ,*otard remains most con8incin! #hen the meanin! of difference is
at its most mundane, and least con8incin! #hen it dra#s su!!esti8el* on its man* theoretical conte>ts.
T!E DIFFEREND
1hen cultural critics from different theoretical stand)oints talk of alterit*, it usuall* means more or less the same
thin!: the !eneral )ro)ert* of otherness as the secondar* identit* in relation to #hich a dominant identit* is
structured. But there is another im)ortant as)ect of alterit* and otherness, #hich is im)ortant to identif* for the
discussion of cultural difference. Alterit* often refers to a kind of other-#orldliness, to an
-0'-
un!ras)able or ineffable Fualit* of the Bther. This is )articularl* e8ident in )ostcolonial studies, #here racial
otherness is often understood as e>actl* this incom)rehensibilit* and hence unre)resentabilit* of the nati8e b* a
#estern coloniser, tourist or #riter. The notion of the ineffabilit* of the Bther can also be found in the #ork of
,e8inas and his man* disci)les, #ho ha8e taken the idea of alterit* not as an issue concerned #ith the structurin!
of identit*, but as a site of e>chan!e or encounter #ith another )erson, and therefore as the basis of ethical action.
It is #orth rememberin! that the conce)t of the Bther has three im)ortant characteristics, #hich find e>)ression in
these 8er* different conte>ts: the sense of Fuasi-o))ositionalit*, the sense of im)licit inferiorit* or secondariness,
and the sense of unkno#abilit* or ineffabilit*. These characteristics are in effect accounts of identit* as a kind of
relation or e>chan!e #ith the Bther, and ha8e been #idel* used to describe cultural interaction either, #ith
,e8inas, on a model of face-to-face inter)ersonal relations, or, in a more )s*choanal*tic conte>t, as an unconsious
s*mbolic relation #ith an o))osite or Fuasi-o))osite. (rom this combination of structuralist, )s*choanal*tic and
)hiloso)hical issues it is )ossible to sketch an ethical and )olitical set of meanin!s for the conce)t of difference,
and one of the most direct #a*s of doin! so is throu!h an e>amination of ,*otardEs term EdifferendE. ,*otard be!ins
his #ork The !ifferend #ith the follo#in! account:
As distin!uished from a liti!ation, a differend #ould be a case of conflict, bet#een <at least t#o=
)arties, that cannot be eFuitabl* resol8ed for the lack of a rule of Dud!ement a))licable to both
ar!uments. Bne sideEs le!itimac* does not im)l* the otherEs lack of le!itimac*. Ao#e8er,
a))l*in! a sin!le rule of Dud!ement to both in order to settle their differend as thou!h it #ere
merel* a liti!ation #ould #ron! <at least= one of them <and both of them if neither side admits
the rule=.
<+0??: >i=
A differend therefore is an actual and unsol8able dis)ute #hich is in a sense !enerated b* unbrid!eable cultural
difference. The im)ossibilit* of le!islation in the e8ent of a differend is the result of there bein! no shared 8alues
on #hich the conflict mi!ht be resol8ed, so that the differend is
-03-
e>actl* the name of the unsol8abilit* of a dis)ute across cultural difference. Bne of the interestin! thin!s about this
use of, or ada)tation of the term EdifferenceE is that it dra#s to!ether some 8er* different strands of the discussion
of difference so far. The first of these is the idea dealt #ith in cha)ter + and cha)ter %, that the structuralist
conce)t of difference in8ol8ed a sus)ension, if not a critiFue, of the idea of lin!uistic reference. ,*otardEs account of
the incommensurabilit* of different social !rou)s and the unsol8abilit* of conflicts is e>)ressed throu!hout The
!ifferend in 8er* metalin!ual terms, #hich is to sa* that social and )olitical conflicts are described throu!hout as if
the* #ere )roblems in discourse. In truth, ,*otardEs st*le is a stran!e mi> of le!alese <of )laintiffs and 8ictims,
Duries and liti!ation= and the 8ocabular* of the lin!uist <of )hrases and discourses, !enre and !rammar=. The
salient idea from structuralism at #ork here is that there can be no a))eal to a sub-lin!uistic realit* as the basis
for liti!ation in a dis)ute, so that actual conflicts in the #orld are often cast in this #a*:
ealit* is not #hat is E!i8enE to this or that EsubDectE, it is a state of the referent <that about #hich
one s)eaks= #hich results from the effectuation of established )rocedures defined b* a
unanimousl* a!reed u)on )rotocol, and from the )ossibilit* offered to an*one to recommence
this effectuation as often as he #ants.
<,*otard +0??:'=
It is )robabl* clear that ,*otardEs ethics emer!e from a discursi8e account of )olitical realit* #hich shares
somethin! of -d#ard .a)irEs sense of social realit*, bein! determined in lan!ua!e, and therefore somethin! of
(oucaultEs discursi8e 8ie# of histor*. As I ar!ued in cha)ter +, ,*otard is also one of those )hiloso)hical thinkers
#ho find the roots of a )olitical )hiloso)h* of difference much more ob8iousl* articulated in 6ant and Ae!el than in
.aussure and his structuralist follo#ers. 1hereas the )hiloso)h* of 6ant and Ae!el re)resents for ,*otard the
)ossibilit* of truth and Dustice as the outcome of )hiloso)hical inFuir*, ,*otard turns to 1itt!enstein, and his 8ision
of a multi)licit* of lan!ua!e !ames for a less teleolo!ical, and indeed less ho)eful, account of the d*namics of
difference. Christo)her "orris describes this )roDect, in The *,ford Companion to hilosophy, as Ea m2lange of
1itt!ensteinian, )ost-
-09-
structuralist and kindred ideas )resented in an oracular st*le that raises bafflement to a hi!h )oint of )rinci)leE
<+003=. Althou!h this is Fuite adeFuate as a summar* of ,*otardian ethics, it is #orth d#ellin! a little on the idea
of bafflement as a hi!h )oint of )rinci)le. It #as obser8ed a moment a!o that alterit* carried amon! its man*
meanin!s that of unre)resentabilit* or ineffabilit*, and #e can obser8e the im)ortance of this kind of otherness to
,*otardEs account of the differend throu!hout his discussion:
The differend is the unstable state and instant of lan!ua!e #herein somethin! #hich must be
able to be )ut into )hrases cannot *et be. This state includes silence, #hich is a ne!ati8e )hrase,
but it also calls u)on )hrases #hich are in )rinci)le )ossible. This state is si!nalled b* #hat one
ordinaril* calls a feelin!: EBne cannot find #ordsE, etc. A lot of searchin! must be done to find
ne# rules for formin! and linkin! )hrases that are able to e>)ress the differend disclosed b* the
feelin!, unless one #ants this differend to be smothered ri!ht a#a* in a liti!ation and for the
alarm sounded b* the feelin! to ha8e been useless. 1hat is at stake in a literature, in a
)hiloso)h*, in a )olitics )erha)s, is to bear #itness to differends b* findin! idioms for them.
<+0??:+2=
1hat he seems to be ar!uin! here is that the differend, in addition to bein! an irresol8able conflict, is also the not
*et sa*able, the so far ineffable, and that it is the )roDect of literature, )hiloso)h* and )olitics no less, to tr* to
brin! it into the domain of re)resentation. This is an ar!ument #ith a stron! tradition and )rehistor* in the
t#entieth centur*. In modernist literature, for e>am)le, there is a recurrent interest in thin!s that are
ine>)ressible, thin!s that lan!ua!e cannot e>)ress, areas of e>)erience to #hich lin!uistic e>)ression is sim)l*
inadeFuate. This is often referred to as a Ecrisis in lan!ua!eE, and is )articularl* associated #ith modernismEs
interest in the relati8el* unchartered, interior and subDecti8e e>)eriences of the human mind. The em)hasis )laced
on unsa*abilit*, ine>)ressibilit* and ineffabilit* in ,*otard mi!ht therefore be seen as a kind of modernist crisis of
lan!ua!e findin! its #a* throu!h Barthes and others into )hiloso)h*, and therefore back into literar* criticism.
-0@-
DerridaEs account of lo!ocentrism, #hich ar!ues that the meta)h*sics of )resence is someho# in-built in lan!ua!e,
!i8es the idea of neolo!ism a ne# authorit* in much )oststructuralism, and as I ha8e mentioned, ,e8inas adds an
ethical dimension to the ineffabilit* of the Bther. ,*otardEs understandin! of this seems to dra# simultaneousl* on
somethin! like the critiFue of foundations that #e ha8e follo#ed in DerridaEs account of differance, but there is
clearl* also somethin! disa))ointin!l* familiar about the core idea: feelin!s #hich esca)e #ords. In this sense, the
differend mi!ht be seen as an e>am)le of the uneas* relationshi) bet#een the theoretical and the familiar that
inhabits the conce)t of difference in !eneral.
1here ,*otardEs #ritin! is more hel)ful in relation to difference is in the better-kno#n material addressed to the
Fuestion of )ostmodernit*. The ostmodern Condition is similarl* influenced b* the 1itt!ensteinian notion of
lan!ua!e !ames and a )oststructuralist em)hasis on the discursi8it* of social life, but it also )ro8ides a sociolo!ical
account of a certain kind of loss, namel* the loss of belief in metanarrati8es. As ,*otard describes it, this loss is
)rimaril* the breakdo#n of belief in the idea of histor* as )ro!ress, #hether it be scientific )ro!ress, the )ro!ress
of meta)h*sics to#ards truth or the )ro!ression to#ards sal8ation and Dustice that he sees in Mar>. These !rand
narrati8es, as he describes them, ha8e s)lintered in the )ostmodern a!e into petits recits, or smaller, more
localised stories less concerned #ith the !rand s#ee) of histor* or the )ossibilit* of uni8ersal truth. The s)linterin!
described b* ,*otard is therefore also a loss of unit*, and a loss of the 8er* )ossibilit* of consensus. Aere for
e>am)le is the short 8ersion of ,*otardEs obDection to the #ork of 7Sr!en Aabermas, the leadin! (rankfurt .chool
social critic, and his rather o)timistic em)hasis on the )ossibilities of communication and consensus:
Is le!itimac* to be found in consensus obtained throu!h discussion, as 7Sr!en Aabermas thinksC
.uch consensus does 8iolence to the hetero!eneit* of lan!ua!e !ames. And in8ention is al#a*s
born of dissention. Postmodern kno#led!e is not sim)l* a tool of the authoritiesK it refines our
sensiti8it* to differences and reinforces our abilit* to tolerate the incommensurable.
<,*otard +0?2:3=
-0?-
It is a #idel* held 8ie# of the contem)orar* #orld that it is characterised b* )roliferatin! differences and )erha)s
therefore b* an increased sensiti8it* to difference and toleration of otherness. 1hether this 8ie# is defensible or
not, ,*otard does certainl* a))ear to be ri!ht that communication cannot sim)l* be 8ie#ed as a means to !enerate
consensus, and that it mi!ht be more accurate to sa* that communication actuall* !enerates incommensurabilit* in
the act of brin!in! differences into contact #ith each other.
FRA#ENTATION& PO"TODERNITY AND
COERCE
If #e look a#a*, for a moment, from the disci)lines of literar* studies and )hiloso)h*, to#ards sociolo!*, cultural
!eo!ra)h* and media studies, it is eas* to find these com)le> relations of cultural unit* and difference at #ork.
Man* cultural !eo!ra)hers and theorists ha8e taken as a fundamental )rece)t of )ostmodernit* the idea that
increased communication mi!ht actuall* !enerate difference. The )rocess of !lobalisation is usuall* understood, in
this li!ht, as a )arado>. 5lobalisation is, at one le8el a )rocess of unification, of comin! to!ether, of increased
communication as described, for e>am)le, b* A))adurai <+009=. It is common also to find commentators
describin! )ostmodernit* as a condition of fra!mentation, of s)linterin!, and as a )rocess of de8olution into e8er
smaller and more local identities. The em)hasis on small units, )articularities and localit* in !lobalisation can be
found eFuall* in academic conte>ts, as the discussion of literar* canons in the )re8ious cha)ter illustrates, and in
the cor)orate #orld of business. There is, for e>am)le, a mo8e a#a* from the (ordist 8alues of mass )roduction
and economies of scale to#ards #hat has recentl* been called Edo#nsiGin!E, that is, the contraction of the scale of
)roduction, and di8ersification, #hich is often concei8ed as a )articularisation of )roduction. This is fundamentall* a
8ie# of !lobalisation as )roliferation of difference, and it )ro8ides a basis for the difference bet#een modernit* and
)ostmodernit* that differs from dominant sociolo!ical accounts. .ociolo!* has until recentl* understood the
)rocess of !lobalisation as standardisation. Man* cultural critics ha8e ar!ued that this is abo8e all a )rocess of
Americanisation, #here the )olitical and economic dominance of the /nited .tates is felt across the
-00-
!lobe. Americanisation #as a )articularl* modernist idea, in the sense that it #as seen in terms of a !rand
narrati8e )ro!ressin! to#ards !lobal homo!eneit* )ercei8ed as modernisation and )erfectibilit*. But in the a!e of
s)ace-time com)ression, as Da8id Aar8e* names the contraction of the #orld <+0?0=, !lobalisation is no lon!er
understood as a linear narrati8e of )ro!ress to#ards homo!enisation, so that )ostmodernit* is often characterised
in ,*otardian terms as the conFuest of difference o8er standardisation:
If one of the characteristics associated #ith )ostmodernism is the loss of a sense of common
historical )ast and the flattenin! and s)atialiGation out of lon! established s*mbolic hierarchies,
then the )rocess of !lobaliGation, the emer!ence of the sense that the #orld is a sin!le )lace,
ma* ha8e directl* contributed to this )ers)ecti8e throu!h brin!in! about a !reater interchan!e
and clashin! of different ima!es of !lobal order and historical narrati8es. The )erce)tion of
histor* as an unendin! linear )rocess of the unification of the #orld #ith -uro)e at the centre in
the nineteenth centur* and the /nited .tates at the centre in the t#entieth centur*, has become
harder to sustain #ith the be!innin!s of a shift in the !lobal balance of )o#er a#a* from the
1est.
<(eatherstone +002:+@+=
(eatherstone seems to ackno#led!e here that the fra!mentar* character of )ostmodernit* ma* be no more than a
transition from one form of domination to another. .ome ha8e seen the )rocess as no more than the di8ersification
of ca)ital, #here the )rocess of standardisation masFuerades as di8ersit* b* commodif*in! all cultural difference.
The im)ortance of this kind of ar!ument is that it )resents a challen!e to the 8ie# that )ostmodernit* is sim)l* a
cultural condition characterised b* fra!mentation and difference #ith the contention that it is a t#o-sided condition
in #hich fra!mentation and difference are actuall* )roduced b* o))osite )rocesses of unification and
standardisation. If it is a recei8ed 8ie# that modernit* is someho# characterised b* the (ordist 8alues of
standardisation, and )ostmodernit* b* the 8alues of difference, the dialectical 8ie# offers an account in #hich the
forces of standardisation and di8ersification actuall* coe>ist in the contem)orar* #orld, as if
-+&&-
modernit* and )ostmodernit* e>ist in a necessar* relationshi). There are some #ell-kno#n buGG #ords in media
and cultural studies and in marketin!, #hose function seems to be, abo8e all, to im)l* the 8ictor* of difference.
The idea of niche mar#eting is an e>am)le from the +0?&s of a )ercei8ed shift a#a* from the catch.all ad8ertisin!
cam)ai!ns of )re8ious decades. "iche marketin! can be understood in t#o #a*s: either as the increasin!l* focused
tar!etin! of a marketin! strate!* to#ards a narro# sector of the )o)ulation, or as the increasin!l* s)ecialised
function of retail outlets. In either case, there seems to be a lo!ic of difference, of res)ondin! to and !eneratin!
difference in the market, at #ork in the ser8ice of commercial aims. 1e mi!ht 8ie# in the same li!ht the shift a#a*
from the outri!ht commitment to standardisation at #ork in a cor)oration such as McDonalds, #hose earl* !lobal
ad8entures #ere )redicated on the absolute standardisation of food menus, and #ho ha8e since *ielded to the
di8ersification of menus as a !esture to#ards the mountin! )rotest a!ainst its disre!ard of cultural difference.
In media studies, the analo!ous transition is the shift from broadcastin! to narrowcasting, in #hich national
tele8ision and radio e8ents of the +09&s and +0@&s #ith audiences lar!er than an* no# attained, ha8e been
fra!mented b* the )roliferation of s)ecialised tele8ision channels and )ro!rammes. But narro#castin!, like the
di8ersification of McDonaldsEs menus and niche retail outlets on the Ai!h .treet, is somethin! of a sham in the
sense that the fra!mentation of broadcastin! seems to be sim)l* a commercial strate!*K it )roduces difference in
order to rene# and e>)and markets that #ere once flattened b* the as)irations to#ards uni8ersalit* im)licit in
broadcastin!. It is clear that broadcastin! is not onl* still #ith us, but that its scale has e>)anded from a national
to a !lobal arena. It is difficult to ar!ue that narro#castin! is a definin! characteristic of the contem)orar* media
#orld and at the same time heed the rise of C"" or the e>)ansion of Time 1arner in the entertainment sector. In
these conte>ts, difference is a strai!htfor#ard commercial )rinci)le #hich seeks to dis!uise the !lobal domination
of cor)orate ca)ital as indi8idualit* and difference.
5i8en the indi8idualist and commercial lo!ic of difference in the market)lace, it is unsur)risin! to find that the
leftist 8ie# of cultural difference comes under considerable ideolo!ical stress, )articularl* #here )olitical-
!o8ernmental and commercial meanin!s of standardisation
-+&+-
and unification collude. The Conser8ati8e !o8ernment in Britain in the +0?&s, for e>am)le, 8ie#ed the idea of the
unification of -uro)e as a threat to the indi8idualit* and freedom of the nation state. The dichotomies of lar!e and
small seemed to be under ideolo!ical stress in this )eriod because de8olution into e8er-decreasin! units of identit*
seemed to defend the )olitical ri!ht #in!, its traditional nationalist stance, its em)hasis on indi8idualit*, and the
idea of so8erei!nt*. .ociet* #as seen as a socialist or e8en .o8iet conce)t, a conce)t #ithout a referent in the
then Prime Minister Mar!aret ThatcherEs much Fuoted 8ie#. $et the -uro)ean Communit*, es)eciall* as it #as
concei8ed in the +0?&s, #as nothin! more than an enormous free trade Gone, a ca)italist monolith under#ritten b*
the 8alues of the free flo# of ca)ital. "obod* #ould e>)ect the )oles of lar!e and small to corres)ond in an* #a* to
)olitical )ositions, but there is sometimes a sur)risin! sli))a!e in cultural theoretical ar!ument, no less than in
)art* )olitics, bet#een the lar!e and small and the )olitical left and ri!ht. It is common, for e>am)le, to find ideas
of difference and )articularit*, re!ion and localit*, in8oked in the name of a leftism that the left does not su))ort
)er se. This tension bet#een difference as a counter-)olitics and difference as a commerciall* based indi8idualism
mi!ht also be bound u) #ith the )roblem at the 8er* heart of the critical conce)t of difference. I ha8e ar!ued that
the structuralist and )oststructuralist conce)tions of difference #ere al#a*s courted b* an ambi!uit*, a mutual
contamination bet#een subDect and obDect. The clearest illustration of this ambi!uit* has been the structuralist
uncertaint* about #hether lin!uistic differences are )ro)erties of the #orld subseFuentl* re!istered in the lan!ua!e
s*stem, or differences )roDected on to the #orld b* that s*stem. Accordin! to the first 8ie#, differences are
disco8ered b* lan!ua!e, and accordin! to the second, the* are in8ented b* lan!ua!e. The same mi!ht be said of
differences in the t#o domains of )roduction and consum)tion in the market)lace. The consumer is inclined to
belie8e that the )roliferation of different )roducts in the su)ermarket, Ai!h .treet or on tele8ision reflects the rich
di8ersit* of indi8idual customers. But to 8ie# differences bet#een customers as )re-e>istin! and obDecti8e is to
den*, and *ield to, the acti8e in8ention of those differences b* the on!oin! )rocess of )roduct differentiation. Bne
of the dan!ers of the coe>istence of com)le> critical meanin!s and familiar meanin!s in the #ord EdifferenceE is
e>actl* this
-+&%-
dan!er of the sli))a!e bet#een the bour!eois indi8idualism of the consumer and the )edi!ree of difference as a
form of ideolo!ical critiFue, as the #ides)read use of DeleuGe and 5uattariEs ideas b* ad8ertisin! a!encies
confirms.
-+&2-
0
DIFFERENCE AND E%UI-ALENCE
In cha)ter + and cha)ter % it #as a))arent that the structuralist conce)t of difference contained a )arado>. It ma*
be that the foundin! insi!ht of structural lin!uistics #as that meanin! #as !enerated b* difference bet#een #ords,
but there #as also a sense in #hich difference #as effaced b* structuralist anal*sis. The structuralist anthro)olo!ist
#as intent on findin! eFui8alence bet#een different kinshi) s*stems, different #eddin! ceremonies and different
m*ths. .imilarl*, the structuralist literar* critic #ould establish a kind of eFui8alence bet#een literar* te>ts, findin!
dee) structures in literar* narrati8es that #ould re)resent a common denominator in them, and in the )rocess
dissol8in! their indi8idualit* into a kind of abstract al!ebra. This )henomenon #as a function of the scientific
em)hasis of the structuralist )roDect. 1hen #e follo# the )ro!ress of difference throu!h the )oststructuralist notion
of irreducible difference and into the 8arious formulations of cultural difference in social theor*, #e find a more
!enuinel* indi8iduatin! s)ecies of anal*sis emer!in!, in #hich the )articularit*, historical s)ecificit* and uniFue
te>ture of a literar* #ork, an identit* or a culture finds its )lace. And *et it should also be a))arent that the )ole of
eFui8alence has ne8er Fuite disa))eared in this discussion. The deconstructi8e readin!, for e>am)le, is often
-+&3-
focused on the resistance an indi8idual te>t )uts u) to a model of anal*sis that seeks to assimilate it to others, and
*et deconstructi8e readin!s ha8e also been accused of !eneratin! the same obDect re)eatedl*: of )roducin! literar*
te>ts re)eatedl* as alle!ories of the elusi8eness of meanin!. In the discussion of )ostmodernit* and !lobalisation it
#as clear that cultural difference is )articularl* in e8idence #hen it e>ists alon!side cutural standardisation, or
e8en that difference is !enerated b* sameness in cultural terms, as a defensi8e strate!*. -8en the "e#
Aistoricisms and )ostcolonial criticisms ha8e had their fair share of the accusation that the* )roduce similarit* or
homo!eneit* amon! their obDects of anal*sis. It #ould a))ear, then, that the )ole of eFui8alence continues to
haunt the conce)t of difference no matter ho# much that conce)t seeks )ri8ile!e or autonom*. In more recent
*ears, at the end of the t#entieth centur* and at the start of the ne>t, there has been a more concerted mo8e, a
distin!uishable trend to reco8er the idea of eFui8alence. There has been a feelin!, )articularl* in left )olitical
thou!ht, that #e ha8e d#elled for too lon! on Fuestions of difference, or that #e ha8e become o8er-,*otardian in
our belief that cultures are someho# incommensurable, inca)able of communication, ne!otiation, or common
!round. .ince the mid-+00&s it is )ossible to trace a )ronounced shift in the other direction, in an attem)t to
em)hasise not difference but similarit*, eFui8alence, e8en to retrie8e the notion of uni8ersalit*.
The idea of uni8ersalit* is, once a!ain, one of the thorn* Fuestions of )hiloso)h* in the anal*tical and Continental
traditions. /ni8ersalit* has also been one of the most celebrated casualties of the e)och of difference, in that the
continuous honin! of the conce)t of difference in the t#entieth centur* #as also a )rocess of refinin! the critiFue of
traditional accounts of uni8ersalit*. ,*otardEs declaration of the end of !rand narrati8es is one e>am)le, and the
notion of the differend is a direct declaration of the death of an*thin! that mi!ht be considered as a uni8ersal
8alue. But it ma* be the !ross e>a!!eration at the heart of )ostmodern theor*, the e>a!!eration that claims the
trium)h of difference at the e>)ense of uni8ersalit* that has been res)onsible for this resur!ence. It is as if #e
ha8e li8ed throu!h a )eriod of re)ression, in #hich the )ole of eFui8alence lurks in the unconscious of our most
fa8oured conce)ts, and the 8alues of uni8ersalit* ha8e continued, unackno#led!ed, to inhabit the lo!ic of our
ram)ant )articularism. In this cha)ter #e shall e>)lore a contem)orar*
-+&9-
debate about the refurbishment of the uni8ersal, and look at t#o formulations of the ne# uni8ersal as the* relate
to the conce)t of difference.
CONCRETE UNI-ER"ALITY AND ETAP!OR
It has been ar!ued at 8arious )oints in this discussion that the conce)t of difference o8erla)s si!nificantl* #ith the
8alues of )articularism. It is im)ortant, ho#e8er, to distin!uish t#o closel* related t*)es of )articularism as the*
are to be found in literar* studies. The first is an identit* )articularism, #hereb* the lar!est totalities such as
humankind, or e)ochal totalities such as romanticism or modernism, are dismantled to re8eal a multitude of
)re8iousl* effaced differences of race, class, and !ender. The second is a )articularism of method moti8ated b*
historical s)ecificit*, #hereb* the literar* critic focuses attention on increasin!l* small units of cultural meanin!,
such as obDects or e8ents that carr* #ithin them an e>)lanation of somethin! much lar!er than themsel8es. In
criticism, this second t*)e of )articularism is e8ident in the demise of !rand critical )roDects. Bne no lon!er !oes to
conferences to hear )a)ers about s)eech-act theories of literar* discourse, or )rinci)les of unit* in 5lysses. There
is a mo8e to#ards e>)lorations of the cultural meta)horicit* of atomic details, such as the histor* of the t*)e#riter,
tele!ra)h* and tele)ath*, the ci!arette in modernism, late nineteenth-centur* refuse collection, the !as lam) in
Iictorian ,ondon, skin as a cultural meta)hor, or rats in literature.
The climate of )articularism in criticism is also dee)l* bound u) #ith the demise of literar* theor*. Durin! its )eriod
of !reatest influence, literar* theor* functioned in criticism as a kind of court of arbitration in #hich the methods
and truth claims of criticism sou!ht the basis of their 8alidit*. If literar* theor* #as a )lace for the e8aluation of
truth claims, the formulation of !eneral la#s and the s)onsorshi) of lin!uistic science, this kind of )articularism
flourished )recisel* throu!h its o))osition to these )retensions. In the cultural historical #ritin!s of literar* critics,
for e>am)le, )articularism meant a com)lete de)arture from the abstractions of theor*, and an anchora!e of
criticism in the material s)ecificities of cultural conte>t. And *et, as I ha8e alread* su!!ested, this )articularism
#as ne8er as thorou!h!oin! as it mi!ht be e>actl* because the atomic cultural detail seiGed u)on b* the cultural
historical critic is ne8er merel*
-+&@-
somethin! in itself, somethin! entirel* concrete or material. Almost in8ariabl*, the meanin! of a detail in this kind
of ne# historicism is dis)laced, or )roDected out#ards to the more !eneral claims that mi!ht ha8e once been
8entured b* theoretical discourse, but that no# find e>)ression onl* in im)licit and meta)horical modes.
Meta)hor is, after all, the tro)e of similarit*, the tro)e of eFui8alence, a kind of crossin! )oint bet#een the lo!ic of
difference and the lo!ic of eFui8alence. A meta)hor is both somethin! in itself, and a relation to somethin! else, a
thin! and a similarit*. 1hen literar* critics, for e>am)le, turn their hand to the cultural histor* of 8entriloFu*, or
tele!ra)h*, as the* ha8e done, there is a clear sense that these are theoretical meta)hors, ca)able of e8okin! an
elaborate thematics about 8oice, communication, distance and res)onsibilit*. 1hen a literar* critic s)ecialises in
Iictorian se#a!e s*stems it is commonl* a )art of a lar!er interest in the ima!er* of #ater, of )urit* and
contamination, and therefore #ith a kind of cultural histor* that can be told throu!h the stor* of meta)hors. The
most )rominent of the American "e# Aistoricists such as .te)hen 5reenblatt are )rone to find in some small detail
a microcosm of the functionin! of state )o#er. In other #ords, in each case, a )articularit* is not reall* a
)articularit* at all, but a detail ca)able, meta)horicall* or meton*micall*, of resonatin! a theoretical and a
uni8ersal si!nificance. This kind of criticism is both )articularist <a))arentl* committed to the irreducible difference
of its obDects=, and uni8ersalist <committed to the !eneral econom* in #hich these details circulate=, at the same
time. These uni8ersalisin! habits of mind ma* be )articularl* #ell-de8elo)ed in the ne# literar* historicisms
because literar* critics are )articularl* a#are of, and e>)ert in the inter)retation of, meta)hor. Aistor* )ro8ides a
forum for the demonstration of skills in the meta)horical, analo!ical and alle!orical inter)retation of details. In this
kind of critical #ritin!, miscellaneous cultural fra!ments #ill often a!!re!ate into collecti8es or turn out#ards
to#ards )ortentous uni8ersals.
These as)ects of the "e# Aistoricisms ha8e not )assed unnoticed. The American deconstructionist critic Aillis
Miller, for e>am)le, sees the )articularism of contem)orar* criticism as a )roblem that he refers to as Ebiolo!ical
s*necdocheE, a kind of ar!ument in #hich a small detail is seen to bear #ithin it the )attern of a com)le> #hole,
throu!h a relation of a))arentl* biolo!ical necessit*. .imilarl* Dominic ,a Ca)ra cautions
-+&?-
a!ainst #hat he calls #orld-in-a-!rain-of-sand ar!uments in the "e# Aistoricisms, and their incumbent )aralo!ical
methods im)l*in! uni8ersals b* analo!* and association, and com)lains that the 8alue of lo!ic in critical ar!ument
is bein! steadil* re)laced b* the im)ortance of bein! interestin!. The obDection to biolo!ical s*necdoche, or the
#orld in a !rain of sand, is )artl* then an obDection to a ne# lo!ical sli))eriness, b* #hich com)le> totalities once
deemed unre)resentable or un!ras)able b* s)eculati8e reason, are reh*)othesised in a mode of ner8ous
insinuationK the* can then retreat to the alibis of )articularit* and historical s)ecificit* if that h*)othesis is
Fuestioned. These ne# )articulars are, in short, meta)hors masFueradin! as microcosms.
1hat is bein! said here is that the )articulars of criticism are ca)able of bein! uni8ersal at the same time, and so
of doin! the #ork once )erformed b* literar* theor*. But if meta)hor is the su!!esti8e mode of this )articularist
uni8ersalit*, it looks as if criticism is imitatin! the strate!ies of literature. If contem)orar* criticism is characterised
b* an unusual de!ree of )articularit* combined #ith an unusual abilit* to im)l* uni8ersalit*, if meta)hor and
s*necdoche are the means b* #hich criticism can )roDect the meanin! of details be*ond their )articularit*, it be!ins
to look as if criticism is the re)rise of its o#n critical obDect. It is, after all, about the most )ersistent critical 8ie#
from Aristotle on#ards, that literature is distin!uished from histor* and )hiloso)h* on the basis of its eFuilibrium
bet#een )articular and uni8ersal si!nificance. The )ioneerin! American "e# Critic 1illiam 1imsatt ar!ues this in
The 6erbal -con:
#hether or not one belie8es in uni8ersals, one ma* see the )ersistence in literar* criticism of a
theor* that )oetr* )resents the concrete and the uni8ersal, or the indi8idual and the uni8ersal, or
an obDect #hich in a m*sterious and s)ecial #a* is both hi!hl* !eneral and hi!hl* )articular.
<+0@&:@%=
1imsatt is follo#in! se8eral earl* t#entieth-centur* "e# Critics, )articularl* 7ohn Cro#e ansom and Allen Tate, in
borro#in! from Ae!elEs account of the #ork of art as a kind of concrete uni8ersal:
In com)arison #ith the sho# or semblance of immediate sensuous e>istence or of historical
narrati8e, the artistic semblance has the
-+&0-
ad8anta!e that in itself it )oints be*ond self, and refers us a#a* from itself to somethin! s)iritual
#hich it is meant to brin! before the mindEs e*eJThe hard rind of nature and the common #orld
!i8e the mind more trouble in breakin! throu!h to the idea than do the )roducts of art.
<1imsatt +0@&:@%=
This idea, that art and )oetr* can sho# obDects that )oint be*ond themsel8es, #as hi!hl* influential in the
nineteenth centur*, and underla* much of the #ritin! of -n!lish omantic )oets. .imilarl*, the )hiloso)her, critic
and #riter 7ohn uskin <+?+0-+0&&=, #ell kno#n for his 5od-in-a-blade-of-!rass ar!uments, thou!ht that natural
obDects mi!ht ha8e the structure of the concrete uni8ersal on their o#n account, remarkin! in $odern ainters that
)oetr* is not distin!uished from histor* either b* the omission or addition of details: EThere must be somethin!
either in the nature of the details themsel8es, or the method of usin! them, #hich in8ests them #ith )oetical
)o#er.E It is this ambi!uit*, I think, bet#een #hether )articular details are containers of an e>tended si!nificance
in themsel8es, or ha8e that si!nificance in8ested in them b* the )ossessor of )oetical )o#er, that animates the
ne# )articularisms of contem)orar* literar* criticism. If a meta)hor is a fi!ure constituti8el* s)lit bet#een its
)articularit* and its eFui8alence to somethin! else, it is the tro)e allo#in! the ne# cultural historicisms
simultaneousl* to a))rehend the )ast as )ast, in its )articularit*, and to si!nif* be*ond itself to somethin! that
transcends that )articularit*, such as the )resent.
It ma* be that ne# )articularisms ha8e somethin! in common #ith )oetic )o#er concei8ed as the concrete
uni8ersal, and it is certainl* common to find the ne# cultural historians themsel8es establishin! this link bet#een
creati8it* and criticism. Bne e>am)le is Terr* -a!leton describin! 1alter BenDaminEs st*le of microsco)ic sociolo!*:
In this kind of microanal*sis, the indi8idual )henomenon is !ras)ed in all of its o8erdetermined
com)le>it* as a kind of cr*)tic code or riddlin! rebus to be deci)hered, a drasticall* abbre8iated
ima!e of social )rocesses #hich the discernin! e*e #ill )ersuade it to *ield u).
<+00&:2%0=
-++&-
E1hat this method then deli8ersE, he sa*s a little later Eis a kind of )oetic or no8elistic sociolo!* in #hich the #hole
seems to consist of nothin! but a dense tessellation of !ra)hic ima!esK and to this e>tent it re)resents an
aestheticised model of social enFuir*E <+00&:2%0-2&=. -a!leton also e>)licitl* links this #ith 7ames 7o*ceEs use of
m*th in 5lysses, #hich he describes as a return of the omantic s*mbol, a rein8ention of the Ae!elian Econcrete
uni8ersalE in #hich Ee8er* )henomenon is secretl* inscribed b* a uni8ersal la#, and an* time, )lace or identit*
)re!nant #ith the burden of the cosmic #holeE <+00&:2+0=.
1hat is most strikin! about this 8ie# of criticism as on the one hand a kind of micro-anal*sis and on the other a
kind of no8elistic sociolo!*, is that it dra#s to!ether t#o maDor themes of this discussion. In cha)ters %-' the
relationshi) bet#een literature and criticism #as described in 8arious #a*s in terms of a cross-contamination, from
the historio!ra)hical role of the no8el to the creati8e and in8enti8e )ro)erties of criticism and histor*. It is
undeniable that #e ha8e recentl* li8ed throu!h an a!e in #hich literature and criticism ha8e been on con8er!ent
)aths. Bn the side of criticism, aestheticisation has been under)inned b* a set of theoretical )ositions that declares
that a critic does not describe a literar* te>t obDecti8el*, or from a )osition of neutralit*, but rather creates it,
in8ents it, or )erforms it. (undamentall* this 8ie# is based in a constituti8e account of lan!ua!e: that lan!ua!e
does not describe or reflect realit*, it constitutes realit*. A much fa8oured terminolo!* is that lan!ua!e is
)erformati8e, not constati8e, in that it brin!s a state of affairs into e>istence rather than describes a state of affairs
in a #a* that could beadDud!ed true or false. It is from this )oint of 8ie# that Barthes can declare that there are no
more critics, onl* #riters, in other #ords no neutral descri)tions of literar* obDects, but onl* creati8e in8entions of
them. Bn the other side of the boundar*, the corollar* of aestheticised criticism is literature #hich is increasin!l*
critical or theoretical, in the sense that it assimilates and incor)orates critical and theoretical )ers)ecti8es into its
discourse as self-kno#led!e. The most ob8ious e>am)le of this is metafiction, self-conscious fiction that reflects
criticall* u)on itself or on the nature of no8els in !eneral, that is, self-referential, self-kno#in! fiction, or critical
fiction. But it is no# )ossible to link this !eneral )icture of creati8e criticism and critical literature to the dialectical
lo!ic of sameness and difference, )articularism and uni8ersalism, described in cha)ters ' and 3.
-+++-
PARTICULARI" AND #LO(ALI"ATION
1e ha8e alread* su!!ested that )articularism in criticism mi!ht be thou!ht of first as a re)lication of the
microsco)ic sciences, and second as a re)lication of the concrete uni8ersalit* of literature. 1e must no# consider a
third )ossibilit*, that the increasin! inter)enetration of )articulars and uni8ersals mi!ht reflect, or be )roduced b*,
the )rocess of !lobalisation, so that the concrete uni8ersal mi!ht actuall* be seen to belon! to the cultural lo!ic of
standardisation and difference discussed in the )re8ious cha)ter. ecent social theor* of !lobalisation has a
com)le> tro)olo!* that ima!ines the #orld as an increasin!l* small )lace, a !lobal 8illa!e, a tin* unit* b*
com)arison #ith the 8ast com)le>it* that it used to be. Bne 8ersion of this ar!ument is #hat Da8id Aar8e* calls
Etime-s)ace com)ressionE: the idea that as tra8el s)eeds ha8e increased from the horse to Det a8iation, the #orld
has contracted. .imilarl* the ima!er* describin! telecommunications and the internet is often that of the increased
sin!ularit* and 8isibilit* of the !lobe. The lar!est totalit* therefore becomes more 8isible, both because the #orld
can be seen as a sin!le )lace, a small )articularit* <the 8ie# of earth from outer s)ace=, and because trade and
tourism )roduce microcosms of the earth as a #hole, e>em)lified in the su)ermarket, or Disne* 1orld, as sites of
the semiotic consum)tion of cultural difference. Ao#e8er, as the )re8ious cha)ter ar!ues, the kink in this 8ie# is
that the social theor* of !lobalisation has shifted in recent decades a#a* from the traditional understandin! of
!lobalisation as standardisation. If !lobalisation is, as man* ha8e ar!ued, )rimaril* a )rocess of Americanisation,
this standardisation entails a loss of cultural di8ersit* as American cultural forms and influences s)read across the
#orld. Accordin! to this 8ie#, !lobalisation threatens cultural difference, threatens to homo!enise di8ersit* in the
name of modernisation. It is #hen cultural theor* reco!nises that cultural difference is not in retreat, that in fact
the )rocess of !lobalisation mi!ht actuall* !enerate difference, that the threat of standardisation comes to be seen
as the source of a counter-)olitics of the local. Most cultural theorists since Aeide!!er ha8e reco!nised that if
!lobalisation is concei8ed as a )rocess of com)ression and unification, it is at the same time a )rocess of
di8ersification, of an increasin! a#areness of di8ersit* or an increasin! indi8iduation of cultures on the !lobal
sta!e. There is an idea that resistance is local, and
-++%-
cor)orate ca)italism is !lobal. The dichotom* of the uni8ersal and the )articular, the cosmo)olitan and the
)arochial, is therefore sometimes thou!ht of as a dichotom* of )o#er and its resistance. The )roliferation of
difference and the standardisation of the #orld seem to !o hand in hand, so that !lobalisation is both con8er!ence
and dissemination. 1hat this necessitates, then, is an account of the inter)enetration of the uni8ersal and the
)articular that finds its )hiloso)hical e>)ression in Ae!el and Aeide!!er and its )olitical realit* in the com)licit* of
homo!enisation and di8ersification.
The sociolo!ist oland obertson, for e>am)le, describes recent histor* as follo#s:
In recent #orld histor*, the uni8ersalism-)articularism issue has come to constitute somethin!
like a !lobal-cultural form, a maDor a>is of the structuration of the #orld as a #hole. ather than
sim)l* 8ie#in! the theme of uni8ersalism as ha8in! to do #ith )rinci)les that can and should be
a))lied to all, and that of )articularism as referrin! to that #hich can and should be a))lied onl*
locall*, I su!!est that the t#o ha8e become tied to!ether as )art of a !lobe#ide ne>us.
<+00%:+&%=
As if in homa!e to #hat Aar8e* calls Ethe increasin! inter)enetration of o))osite tendencies in ca)italism as a
#holeE <+0?0:22?-'%=, the social theor* of !lobalisation has come to reco!nise that it is no lon!er )ossible to
concei8e the )articular and the uni8ersal as mutuall* e>clusi8e )oles. "o#here is the need to reformulate the
uni8ersal felt more stron!l* than in the corner into #hich left )olitics has been dri8en, that is, the corner in #hich
the left is constrained to a counter-)olitics of the local.
UNI-ER"ALITY AND !E#EONY
The need to break out from the limited s)ace of difference, of )articularit* and of the local is no doubt res)onsible
for the return of uni8ersalit* in the social theor* of the left. "o#here is this more a))arent than in the recent #ork
of -rnesto ,aclau, .la8oD TiUek and 7udith Butler #ho are each, in different #a*s, rereadin! and re#ritin! Ae!elEs
conce)t of concrete uni8ersalit*. The central theme of this rereadin! is that the im)ossibilit* of an abstract
uni8ersal is e>)osed #hene8er that abstraction
-++2-
is re)resented, since the 8er* act of re)resentation entails a concrete embodiment #hich #ill s)ecif* an entit* that
is b* definition not s)ecific. TiUek, for e>am)le, describes the Ae!elian concrete uni8ersal as Ea )rocess of )articular
attem)ts that do not sim)l* e>em)lif* the neutral uni8ersal notion but stru!!le #ith it, !i8e a s)ecific t#ist to itE
and therefore Edecide the fate of the uni8ersal notion itself E:
/ni8ersalit* is concrete, structured as a te>ture of )articular fi!urations, )recisel* because it is
fore8er )re8ented from acFuirin! a fi!ure that #ould be adeFuate to its notion. This is #h* - as
Ae!el )uts it - the /ni8ersal is al#a*s one of its o#n s)ecies: there is uni8ersalit* onl* in so far
as there is a !a), a hole, in the midst of the )articular content of the uni8ersalit* in Fuestion,
that is in so far as, amon! the s)ecies of a !enus, there is al#a*s one s)ecies missin!: namel*,
the s)ecies that #ould adeFuatel* embod* the !enus itself.
<%&&&:+&2=
In the midst of e8er* !enus, then, #hich )resumabl* means e8er* noun, collecti8e or other#ise, there is a hole,
#hich TiUek calls the absent centre of )olitical ontolo!*. The e>act sense in #hich this absent centre is a hole
reFuires a little further reflection. (or Ae!el, one ima!e of the conce)t is a !enus that s)ecifies itself in its s)ecies.
In other #ords, the conce)t is embodied in its o#n s)ecies, but not adeFuatel* embodied. The hole in the midst of
a !enus is therefore not an absence so much as an inadeFuate )resence: the )lace #here the conce)t as a #hole is
embodied contin!entl* <#hich is to sa* that somethin! else mi!ht also embod* it=, and )artiall* <since the actual
#hole is necessaril* bi!!er than an* fi!ure re)resentin! it=. The )artial and inadeFuate re)resentation of a totalit*
therefore !i8es that totalit* a )articular set of characteristics, and in this sense, !i8es a )articular t#ist to, rather
than sim)l* e>em)lifies, the uni8ersal.
1e #ill return in a moment to the idea of the internal !a) because it sheds useful li!ht on the inter)enetration of
o))osite tendencies that #e are obser8in! here. But it #ill be #orth considerin! first the much clearer formulation
of the )articular:uni8ersal relation that ,aclau offers in +mancipation7s8. (or ,aclau, the em)tiness of a uni8ersal is
not seen as an internal !a) #here it fails to find )articular re)resentation. The uni8ersal is Ean em)t* but
ineradicable )laceE, #hich is al#a*s at some remo8e from
-++'-
an* )articular attem)t to re)resent it. As for TiUek, )articular contents of the uni8ersal !enus com)ete #ith each
other to fill this em)t* )lace, to embod* it and re)resent it. (or ,aclau there are t#o maDor conseFuences of this.
The first is that the relationshi) bet#een a )articular and a uni8ersal is a he!emonic relationshi), #hich is to sa*
that the unre)resentable totalit* is contin!entl* re)resented b* )articular contents: the em)t* s)ace is filled b*
)articular characteristics and interests #hich stake a claim to be the most adeFuate a8ailable embodiment of the
totalit*, #here the !a) bet#een the embodiment and the uni8ersal bod* remains unbrid!eable. The second
conseFuence is that an* )articular content attem)tin! to re)resent the uni8ersal cannot then be thou!ht of as
)urel* )articular, since it is in )art constituted b* its relationshi) to the uni8ersal. This is fundamentall* a
structuralist obser8ation, not onl* because the 8er* idea of )articularit* is inhabited b* its o))osite, but also
because an* )articularit* is, like a lin!uistic si!n, secretl* under)inned b* the s*stemic relationshi)s that are the
basis of its intelli!ibilit* or identit*. Thus, for ,aclau, a )articularit* is a unit* constituti8el* s)lit bet#een its
)articular content and its s*stemic com)onent, or bet#een itself and its relationshi) to the #hole. The ne>t ste) in
the ar!ument is that if each )articular is constituti8el* s)lit bet#een its o#n )articularit* and an element of
uni8ersalit*, it follo#s that all the )articularities com)etin! for the he!emonic role of re)resentin! the uni8ersal
ha8e somethin! in common #ith each other, namel* a s*stemic or a uni8ersal com)onent. This is #hat ,aclau
refers to as the Echain of eFui8alenceE <+009=: that )rinci)le, so much ne!lected in the a!e of difference, #hich
dictates that, ho#e8er much )articularities ma* differ from each other, in the 8er* act of differin!, the* ha8e
somethin! in common. The chain of eFui8alence runnin! bet#een )articular contents com)etin! for the he!emonic
role de)ends u)on a shared com)onent, #hich is constituti8e of each )articularit*. In other #ords, a )articularit* is
a )oint of intersection bet#een the lo!ic of identit* and the lo!ic of eFui8alence. There are t#o si!nificant
deductions that mi!ht be made from this scheme. The first is e>)ressed best in 7udith ButlerEs summar* of the
)olitical )otential of ,aclauEs scheme:
1hen the chain of eFui8alence is o)erationaliGed as a )olitical cate!or*, it reFuires that )articular
identities ackno#led!e that the* share #ith
-++3-
other such identities the situation of a necessaril* incom)lete determination. The* are
fundamentall* the set of differences from #hich the* emer!e, and this set of differences
constitutes the structural features of the domain of )olitical socialit*. If an* such )articular
identit* seeks to uni8ersaliGe its o#n situation #ithout reco!niGin! that other identities are in an
identical structural situation, it #ill fail to achie8e an alliance #ith the other emer!in! identities,
and #ill mistakenl* identif* the meanin! and the )lace of uni8ersalit* itself. The uni8ersaliGation
of the )articular seeks to ele8ate a s)ecific content to a !lobal condition, makin! an em)ire of its
local meanin!.
<Butler et al. %&&&:2+=
The chain of eFui8alence therefore locates uni8ersalit* not onl* in the em)t* but ineradicable )lace abo8e all
)articularit*, but as an em)tiness #ithin each differential identit* on the basis of #hich )olitical alliance is )ossible.
The second obser8ation is that this intersection of the lo!ic of identit* #ith the lo!ic of eFui8alence is a time-
honoured account of meta)hor. 1imsatt, for e>am)le, describes this connection in his discussion of concrete
uni8ersalit*:
-8en the sim)lest form of meta)hor or simile <EM* lo8e is like a red, red roseE= )resents us #ith a
s)ecial and creati8e, in fact a concrete, kind of abstraction different from that of science. (or
behind a meta)hor lies a resemblance bet#een t#o classes, and hence a more !eneral third
class. This class is unnamed and most likel* remains unnamed and is a))rehended onl* throu!h
the meta)hor.
<1imsatt +0@&:@0=
In fact the meta)hor has al#a*s been, and remains concei8ed as e>actl* the intersection bet#een the lo!ic of
eFui8alence and the lo!ic of identit*, or as the fi!ure constituti8el* s)lit bet#een bein! itself and bein! somethin!
else. This is #hat 5. B. Madison describes as the is:is-not character of meta)horical statements. EThe meanin! of a
meta)horE, he ar!ues,
is not like the meanin! of a strai!htfor#ard referential )ro)osition or a constati8e utteranceK it is
not #hat is a))arentl* said, but is, rather,
-++9-
#hat the utterance sho#s in transcendin! itself to#ards #hat is not said in the sa*in!, and it is
#hat the utterance does #hen it leads another )erson to recreate for himself a meanin!
analo!ous to that intended b* the maker of the meta)hor.
<+00&:+'0=
This similarit*, this structural homolo!*, bet#een )olitical socialit* and meta)hor <and, as I ha8e ar!ued,
meton*m*= )ro8ides contem)orar* criticism #ith man* su!!esti8e modes of connection bet#een details and
totalities. It su!!ests that there mi!ht be somethin! inherentl* )olitical about meta)hors and meton*mies, since
the* are en!a!ed in a he!emonic stru!!le #ith other similar si!ns to re)resent a totalit*. Bn the basis of this
su!!estion, the creati8e modes of criticism and their uni8ersalisin! tendencies can be understood themsel8es as
stru!!les a!ainst #ell-established #a*s of re)resentin! totalities, #hether those totalities are literar* te>ts, literar*
historical e)ochs, or societies as a #hole.
This kind of thinkin! about he!emon* and uni8ersalit* sees the relationshi) bet#een difference and sameness, or
)articulars and uni8ersals, dialecticall*. This is to sa* that the )articular and the uni8ersal are not o))osite and
mutuall* e>clusi8e )oles. The* are elements, )erha)s dimensions, of a si!n or an identit* that ha8e to be thou!ht
about to!ether. If the classical account of literature is of a discourse unusuall* ca)able of )articularit* and
uni8ersalit* at the same time, it is eas* to see #h* critical and )hiloso)hical lan!ua!e mi!ht sometimes also as)ire
to literariness, and make use of the su!!esti8e modes of connection bet#een )articular details and the uni8ersal
la#s the* re)resent. But it is also #orth bearin! in mind the reser8ations #e e>)lored in cha)ter ' about dialectics
and o))ositions, for e>am)le DeleuGeEs unease about the dialectic as Ethe ma>imum of differenceE. These ne#,
dialectical accounts of the )articular and the uni8ersal mi!ht be relati8el* fle>ible and so)histicated #a*s of dealin!
#ith the )oles of sameness and difference, but the* mi!ht also be thou!ht of as failin! to think throu!h the more
minor callibrations of difference that e>ist bet#een )oles. If ,aclau, Butler and TiUek are contem)orar* thinkers
refinin! the dialectical thou!ht of Ae!el, there is a )arallel, often anti-Ae!elian, a))roach to multi)licit* #hich can
be found in other )hiloso)hical traditions. In the ne>t section, the discussion e>)lores some of these other
)hiloso)hical
-++@-
traditions and the conce)tions of multi)licit* and difference on #hich the* de)end.
DIFFERENCE& "ET T!EORY AND FU**Y LO#IC
In the tradition of anal*tical )hiloso)h* there has al#a*s been a close relation bet#een the )hiloso)hical )roblem
of difference and mathematical dealin!s #ith Fuestions of number and multi)licit*. Bertrand ussell is an ob8ious
fi!ure in this re!ard, for his #ork on set theor* and its relationshi) to lo!ic, both of #hich are rele8ant to the
conce)t of difference. ussellEs contribution ma* ha8e been o8erlooked because the conce)t of difference emer!ed
from the Continental )hiloso)hical tradition and not out of Cambrid!e )hiloso)h*, and *et e8en in the former
tradition, the mathematics of sets has ne8er been far a#a* from the concerns of )hiloso)h*. But there are si!ns
no# that conce)ts associated #ith difference are comin! to encounter Fuestions of set theor* more directl* than
the* ha8e done before. Bne )lace #here this encounter has taken )lace has been in the disa!reement bet#een the
(rench )hiloso)her Alain Badiou and DeleuGe. The follo#in! Fuotation comes from BadiouEs first translated #ork,
and )resents a sur)risin! reminder for An!lo-American theor* of the )ertinence of sets:
JDeleuGe could not understand m* choosin! set theor* as the !uide for an ontolo!ical thou!ht of
the )ure multi)le. As tem)oral actualities, #ithout an* o)enin! onto the 8irtual, sets #ere, for
him, numbers, and fell #ithin the )ro8ince of the state of affairs, science and sim)le reference.
Plead as I mi!ht that e8er* fi!ure of the t*)e EfoldE, Einter8alE, EenlacementE, EserrationE, EfractalE,
or e8en EchaosE had a corres)ondin! schema in a certain famil* of sets and #as e8en e>ceeded,
#hen thou!ht of as a )articular case of an immense s)read of set confi!urations e>haustin! its
multi)le meanin!, m* )leas #ere to no a8ailJfor me, multi)licities E#ereE sets, for him the* E#ere
notE.
<%&&&:'9-@=
DeleuGeEs re)orted reluctance to think of multi)licities as sets is clearl* rooted in a notion that there is a difference
bet#een numerical multi)licit* and 8erbal or discursi8e multi)licit*. BadiouEs claim here is clearl*
-++?-
that set theor* has a )o#er to describe not onl* the sim)le multi)licities that #e mi!ht commonl* take #ords to
be, but also the com)licated multi)licities in #hich sets form Ean immense s)read of confi!urationsE. This claim is
im)ortant to an* consideration of difference and an* account of uni8ersals, since in )hiloso)h* the #ord Euni8ersalE
need not onl* si!nif* the lar!est totalit*, the set of all sets, but also the smaller unities and multi)licities that are
#ords. As the *,ford Companion to hilosophy has it, in lo!ic and meta)h*sics uni8ersals are Ethe su))osed
referents of !eneral terms like NredN, NtableN and NtreeNE <,o#e +003=. And therefore a uni8ersal truth is not onl*,
as it is commonl* assumed to be, a )ro)osition that is true for e8er*bod* in the #orld, but rather a )ro)osition
that is true for e8er* member of a set. Aere a!ain, there is some sli))a!e bet#een common and technical uses of
the #ord, but the im)ortance of the distinction for this discussion lies in the idea that difference a))lies to
uni8ersals on both scales. That is to sa*, difference names the disunit* of a limited set, such as a sim)le noun, in
e>actl* the same #a* that it names the di8ersit* of the lar!est )ossible set, namel* the uni8erse. It is not onl* the
bi! #ords like EmodernismE, but e8er* noun, that has become a little uni8erse of differences, a multi)licit*, a site of
contestation. A noun is a little uni8ersal. It is, in DeleuGeEs o#n #ords, Ea machine for containin! differenceE and Ean
absolute sur8e* tra8ersed at infinite s)eedE. It sounds, from these meta)hors, as if DeleuGe mi!ht acce)t the idea
of a #ord as a set but reDect the idea that more com)le> confi!urations could find a theoretical descri)tion in
mathematics. As his translator, ,ouise Burchill, )oints out, BadiouEs basic ar!ument about DeleuGe is that he has
borro#ed the idea of multi)licit* from Ber!son, but left behind the mathematics from #hich it deri8es. (or Badiou,
mathematics, and those branches of )hiloso)h* that ha8e heeded it, )ossesses a more de8elo)ed and e>act
descri)tion of multi)licit* than has been dreamed of in )oststructuralist )hiloso)h*.
DeleuGe ma* ha8e reDected the idea that mathematical set theor* could )ossibl* describe the most com)le>
multi)licities on the !rounds that this com)le>it* far e>ceeded an* )ossible numerical descri)tion. But it does seem
)ossible that set theor* mi!ht shed li!ht on the most common and strai!htfor#ard lo!ical difficulties associated
#ith !enus and s)ecies. There are t#o )ossible routes that #e mi!ht look do#n here, in #hich set theor* thro#s
li!ht on the lo!ical )roblems of s)ecies and !enus, and
-++0-
of difference and eFui8alence, both of #hich can be described in relation to the )hiloso)h* of Bertrand ussell. The
first is #hat has come to be kno#n as a fuGG* set, another mathematical notion that has come to occu)* a central
)lace in so-called EfuGG* lo!icE. The fuGG* set could be said to ori!inate in Charles Pierce and Bertrand ussellEs
notion of lo!ical 8a!ueness, #hich the* used to describe lo!ical )ro)ositions in #hich the )redicates #ere difficult
to define, and in #hich the truth 8alue of the )ro)osition #as uncertain. A )ro)osition such as E7ohn is thinE is more
difficult to assi!n truth 8alue to than E7ohn is si> feet in hei!htE, because the former rests on the 8a!uenes of the
term EthinE. This sim)le idea found its #a* into scientific lo!ic, in the #ork of Ma> Black #ho, in +02@, translated
the idea of 8a!ueness into mathematical s*mbols in a )a)er called EIa!ueness: an e>ercise in lo!ical anal*sisE. The
term EfuGG*E #as in8ented much later b* ,otfi Madeh, a )rofessor of electrical en!ineerin! at the /ni8ersit* of
California at Berkele*, #ho )ublished an article in -nformation and Control in +093. As Madeh concei8ed it, the
fuGG* set re)resented man* of the lo!ical as)ects of the thou!ht of difference, but mana!ed to )roduce
mathematical and s*mbolic al!ebraic s*stems for their e>)ression. The fuGG* set is one in #hich the membershi) of
that set is e>)ressed as a matter of de!ree, and the de!ree to #hich a member belon!s to a set #ill also determine
the de!ree to #hich it is also a member of other sets, such as the o))osite set. ,ike the notion of difference, fuGG*
lo!ic therefore allo#s for a lo!ical 8ie# of sets in #hich )articular thin!s both are and are not members of a !enus,
and is e>em)lified in the formula EA and not AE: the contradictor* lo!ic that #as at #ork in structuralist accounts of
#ords, and that #e ha8e been tracin! in the notion of identit* more !enerall*. The ad8anta!e of the fuGG* set is
that it re)resents a kind of )ra!matist attitude to the )roblems of set membershi), #hich admits no crisis in the
face of the idea that no member of a set fulfills the criteria of membershi) b* +&& )er cent. The fuGG* set sim)l*
acce)ts this as a characteristic of sets, #ithout the sense of a)ocal*)se that TiUek makes of Ae!elEs dealin!s #ith
this )roblem, and #ithout the melodrama that brin!s ,aclau to describe the uni8ersal as an em)t* but ineradicable
)lace.
(or Madeh, the fuGG* set is one #hich a))ro>imates much more closel* than the cate!ories of classical lo!ic could
to the actual acti8ities of cate!orisation and reco!nition takin! )lace in the human mind and in
-+%&-
lan!ua!e. The claims of fuGG* lo!ic can at times become rather ludicrous and )hiloso)hicall* illiterate, but there is
no doubt that fuGG* sets actuall* #ork in #a*s that traditional lo!ic does not. Com)uters, for e>am)le, ha8e
#orked traditionall* #ith binar* lo!ic, but ha8e al#a*s been limited as a result to numerical calculations. In those
areas in #hich com)uter s*stems ha8e been least successful, such as lan!ua!e acFuisition or ima!e reco!nition,
fuGG* lo!ic has achie8ed its !reatest successes. There are some interestin! im)lications in this for DeleuGeEs
an>iet* about set theor*, not least that the idea of set membershi) as a series of !radations and fine callibrations
seems lo!icall* 8er* close to his critiFue of lin!uistic o))osition, #hile the su)eriorit* in some domains of fuGG*
lo!ic to binar* lo!ic is broadl* analo!ous to DeleuGeEs sus)icion of d*ads, contradictions and dialectics as a limited
set of horiGons for the thinkin! of difference. -8en the association of sets #ith number seems mis)laced in the
#orld of fuGG* lo!ic, #hich is inclined to 8ie# numbers in the same #a* as #ords, as relational and 8a!ue sets.
The relation bet#een set theor* and lo!ic is hard to dis)lace, and one of the most interestin! cases is the #a* that
set theor* a))roaches the issue of self-referentialit* #hich #e sa#, in cha)ter %, to be one of the most e>treme
conseFuences of the conce)t of difference in structuralism. In .te)hen Aa#kin!Es 1 Brief %istory of Time there is
an account of the dan!er from the !ra8itational )ull of a black holeK it mi!ht become so stron! that it #ould suck
the entire uni8erse into it. As such, the black hole is an e>cellent meta)hor for #hat mi!ht be called the )roblem of
a)oretic self-reference. TiUek sees the !enus, or uni8ersal, as somethin! #ith a hole in it #here its o#n self-
re)resentation is missin!. But there are also cases in #hich )ro)ositions can cause lo!ical difficulties e>actl*
because the* )ro)ose a set that includes itself amon!st the members of its o#n !enus. A #ell-kno#n e>am)le is
the )ro)osition EAll !eneralisations are false, includin! this oneE, #hich e>)resses a contradiction or a )arado>K the
)arado> emer!es because the )ro)osition refers not onl* to the set of all !eneralisations, but also, as a
!eneralisation, it includes itself in the )ro)osition. Br to )ut it another #a*, the )articular )ro)osition renders itself
false in the act of offerin! itself as a truth. These sorts of )arado> are #ell kno#n in )hiloso)h*, and ha8e troubled
lo!icians since antiFuit*. The ancient liar )arado>es, referred to 8ariousl* as the Cretan ,iar )arado> or
-)imenidesE )arado>, and most sim)l* e>)ressed in the sentence
-+%+-
EI am l*in!E, are s*llo!isms that sim)l* do not #ork because the truth 8alue of a sentence cannot be determined
#hen that sentence is im)licated in its o#n claim. Aence, the sentence EThis sentence is falseE is contradictor*
because if it is true, then it is false, but if it is false, then its )ro)osition a))ears to be true, in #hich case it
a))ears to be both true and false, or neither, or either.
Bertrand ussellEs #ork on set theor* thro#s u) a more com)licated e>am)le, kno#n sim)l* as ussellEs )arado>,
#hich is )articularl* rele8ant to the Fuestion of uni8ersals. Clearl* some sets, such as the set of all sets, are
members of themsel8esK but #hat if *ou take the set of all sets that are not members of themsel8esC If it is a
member of itself, then it is b* definition one of the sets that is not a member of itself, and therefore cannot be a
member of itself. If on the other hand it is not a member of itself, this clearl* means that it is one of those sets
that are not members of themsel8es, and therefore it is a member of itself. In this )arado>, it #ould seem that the
set of all sets that are not members of themsel8es both is and is not a member of itself. <A )o)ular, and )ossibl*
more intelli!ible, 8ersion of this )arado> is that of the barber #ho sha8es all the men in the 8illa!e #ho do not
sha8e themsel8es. In #hich case, #ho sha8es the barberC= If a uni8ersal claim is one that #ill be true for all the
members of a set, these e>am)les sho# that #hen the set is self-conscious, or self-referential, a lo!ical difficult*
#ill ensue. The self-referentialit* of a )ro)osition or a set in these cases means that there is one )articular member
of the set, namel* itself, #hich !o8erns the identit* of the set as a #hole. In TiUekEs formulation, the concrete
uni8ersal is the im)ossibilit* of a !enus includin! itself amon! its s)ecies, #hereas in these e>am)les, the !enus
includes itself in its s)ecies as a black hole, or to use DerridaEs #ords, as an internal )ocket that is lar!er than the
#hole.
These lo!ical difficulties ha8e been )resent in )hiloso)h* from its be!innin!s, and are )articularl* relished in
deconstruction and )oststructuralism more !enerall*. DerridaEs #ritin!, for e>am)le, is )articularl* concerned #ith
such a)orias, and the ha8oc that the* cause #hene8er thou!ht tries to establish some ultimate totalit*, or
#hene8er the lo!ical )roblems of self-reference are sideste))ed. But )erha)s #hat is most startlin! about this line
of thou!ht is the #a* that a)oria and contradiction ha8e come to be seen as an essential dimension not onl* of
abstruse lo!ical )roblems, but of more familiar, and directl* )olitical
-+%%-
thinkin! about a #orld of cultural difference. The )hrase E)erformati8e contradictionE, for e>am)le, has been used
se8eral times in the course of this discussion of difference to describe discourses #hich, like the liar )arado>es,
seem to claim one thin! #hile someho# )erformin! its o))osite. EPerformati8e contradictionE #as ori!inall* a
)hrase used in an accusation le8elled at Derrida b* Aabermas, #hen he com)lained that Derrida could not use
reason to destro* reason #ithout im)licatin! himself in a contradiction. $et this formula, of usin! reason to destro*
reason, or lan!ua!e to undermine the reliabilit* of lan!ua!e, is e>actl* #hat this ne# lo!ical )ractice is: a form of
immanent critiFue for #hich the self-referential set )ro8ides a kind of theor*. Aence, 7udith Butler finds
)erformati8e contradiction in an* account of uni8ersal human ri!hts, such as the American constitution:
"ot onl* does a racist s)eech contradict the uni8ersalist )remise of the constitution, but an*
s)eech that acti8el* contests the foundin! )remise of the constitution ou!ht not for that reason
be defended b* the constitution. To )rotect such a s)eech #ould be to en!a!e in a )erformati8e
contradiction. Im)licit to this ar!ument is the claim that the onl* s)eech that ou!ht to be
)rotected b* the constitution is s)eech !rounded in its uni8ersalist )remises.
<+00@:??=
1hat #e ha8e here is a basic )roblem for )olitics, namel* that if a )rinci)le, such as a ri!ht )rotected b* the
constitution, is !eneralised to the )oint of bein! ca)able of encom)assin! e8er*thin!, it #ill also encom)ass #hat it
does not seek to )rotect. There is an ob8ious sense in #hich this contradiction has somethin! in common #ith both
TiUekEs interest in the Ae!elian concrete uni8ersal and ,aclauEs account of the uni8ersal as a he!emonic structure:
it offers a contradiction bet#een the )articular and the uni8ersal, or bet#een the irreducible difference of the
members of a set, and the eFui8alence that is the basis of their membershi). In each case, it is onl* #hen these
t#o a))arentl* incom)atible relations can be thou!ht about to!ether, sustained in balance #ith each other, that
)olitics is )ossible. As ,aclau reminds us in +mancipation7s8, Ea )olitics of )ure difference #ould be self-defeatin!E
accordin! to the follo#in! ar!ument:
-+%2-
To assert oneEs o#n differential identit* in8ol8esJthe inclusion in that identit* of the other, as
that from #hich one delimits oneself. But it is eas* to see that a full* achie8ed differential
identit* #ould in8ol8e the sanctionin! of the e>istin! status quo in the relation bet#een !rou)s.
(or an identit* #hich is )urel* differential 'is.9.'is other !rou)s has to assert the identit* of the
other at the same time as its o#n and, as a result, cannot ha8e identit* claims in relation to
those other !rou)s. ,et us su))ose that a !rou) has such claims - for instance the demand for
eFual o))ortunities in em)lo*ment and educationJIn so far as these are claims )resented as
ri!hts that I share as a member of the communit* #ith all other !rou)s, the* )resu))ose that I
am not sim)l* different from the other but, in some fundamental res)ects, eFual to them. If it is
asserted that all )articular !rou)s ha8e the ri!ht to res)ect of their o#n )articularit*, this means
that the* are eFual to each other in some #a*s. Bnl* in a situation in #hich all !rou)s #ere
different from each other, and in #hich none of them #anted to be an*thin! other than #hat
the* are, #ould the )ure lo!ic of difference e>clusi8el* !o8ern the relations bet#een !rou)s. In
all other scenarios the lo!ic of difference #ill be interru)ted b* a lo!ic of eFui8alence and
eFualit*.
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This ar!ument mi!ht, for man*, be statin! the ob8ious: that one cannot assert the )ure difference and )articularit*
of oneEs identit* at the same time as one a))eals to a !eneral )rinci)le of Eri!htE #ithout contradiction. 1hat it
illustrates 8er* clearl* is the e>tent to #hich )olitical thinkin! has s#un! to#ards the )ole of )ure and irreducible
difference, and therefore to#ards the need to state the ob8ious: that one cannot think about difference #ithout
embracin! its contradictor* other, the )rinci)le of eFui8alence.
NEW UNI-ER"AL" AND LITERARY CRITICI"
But #hat is at stake here for literar* criticismC If the structuralist conce)t of difference transformed the stud* of
literature at a methodolo!ical le8el, focusin! attention on the relations that !enerated meanin!, and the
)oststructuralist conce)t of difference led into a criticism de8oted to the re)resentation and formation of identities,
to mar!inalit* and the
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reinscri)tion of hierarchies, #hat does this a))arent return to the )ole of eFui8alence mean for the )ractice
of literar* criticismC The ans#er to this Fuestion ine8itabl* in8ol8es some s)eculation about the future of
criticism, and this s)eculation mi!ht root itself in the obser8ation that, in the last t#o decades of the
t#entieth centur*, the fortunes of literar* t*)olo!*, of cate!orisin! literar* #orks accordin! to common
characteristics, or of !enre ha8e been in decline. The )erformati8e contradiction, the internal )ocket lar!er
than the #hole, the idea of irreducible difference, the inadeFuate he!emonic re)resentation of a !enus b*
one of its s)ecies and the a)orias !enerated #hen a !enus includes itself in the membershi) are all, in
effect, )roblems in the lo!ic of eFui8alence, and seem to militate a!ainst the 8er* )ossibilit* of a famil* or
set. Ao#e8er it mi!ht also be said that these deconstructi8e strate!ies are missin! somethin! about the
lo!ic of eFui8alence. It is onl* in the most ri!id lo!ical terms that #e reall* face an* difficult* in talkin!
about sets, or the resemblance bet#een their members. 1itt!enstein, as al#a*s, has a 8er* sim)le solution
to the lo!ic of set membershi) #hich discards the o8er-ri!id notions of identit* and difference and re)laces
them #ith the notion of famil* resemblance. Accordin! to this 8ie#, the common denominator linkin! the
members of a set is not strictl* definable or reducible to an* s)ecific shared characteristic. The common
denominator lies some#here bet#een identit* <concei8ed as self-sameness= and difference <as irreducible=,
since resemblance, like eFui8alence, reFuires that the members of a set are neither e>actl* alike nor
com)letel* unalike. The de8elo)ment of fuGG* lo!ic, most commonl* associated #ith the lo!ical )rocesses
of com)uters, ad8ances a similar account of set membershi), calculatin! the de!ree to #hich an indi8idual
member conforms to an ideal e>am)le as a )ercenta!e, #here the ideal is ne8er attainable. It has been
clear from the earliest failures of artificial intelli!ence that a com)uter cannot think #ith an* so)histication
in o))ositional or dialectical terms, but onl* in !radations of the middle !round. It #ould seem that it is
onl* in the ri!id terms of s*mbolic lo!ic that )roblems arise, indicatin! that some )rinci)le of disorder is at
#ork in the difference bet#een a difference in kind and a difference in de!ree.
If the ne# uni8ersal is one that embraces contradiction, em)tiness and the idea of he!emonic stru!!le,
mi!ht #e not also resurrect the literar* !enreC It #as, after all, as a deconstruction of !enre in EThe la# of
!enreE
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that DerridaEs counter-lo!ic of the Einternal )ocket lar!er than the #holeE emer!es. In fact DerridaEs critiFue of the
idea of !enre is Dust a recent e>am)le of a lon! tradition that reDects the idea of literar* kinds, or artistic cate!ories
alto!ether. A #ell-kno#n e>am)le of this can be found in the Italian )hiloso)her Benedetto CroceEs essa* ECriticism
of the theor* of artistic and literar* kindsE, first )ublished in +0&%, ar!uin! the case that the cate!or* is a kind of
crime a!ainst the indi8idualit* of artistic e>)ression:
The human mind can )ass from the aesthetic to the lo!ical, Dust because the former is the first
ste) in res)ect to the latter. It can destro* e>)ression, that is, the thou!ht of the indi8idual, b*
thinkin! of the uni8ersal. It can !ather u) e>)ressi8e facts into lo!ical relations. 1e ha8e alread*
sho#n that this o)eration becomes in its turn concrete in an e>)ression, but this does not mean
that the first e>)ressions ha8e been destro*ed.
<Croce %&&&:%9=
It is a #idel* e>)ressed 8ie# of the relation bet#een the )articular and the uni8ersal that the latter entails the
destruction of all )articularit*. But Croce also makes it clear that a literar* kind, like an* uni8ersal, sur8i8es so lon!
as the cate!orist resists the tem)tation to im)ose definition on the cate!or*:
To em)lo* #ords and )hrases is not to establish la#s or definitions. The mistake onl* arises
#hen the #ei!ht of a scientific definition is !i8en to a #ordJThe books in a librar* must be
arran!ed in one #a* or another. This used !enerall* to be done b* a rou!h classification of
subDectsJK the* are no# !enerall* arran!ed b* siGes or b* )ublishers. 1ho can den* the
necessit* and the utilit* of such arran!ementsC But #hat should #e sa* if someone be!an
seriousl* to seek out the literar* la#s of miscellanies and of eccentricities, of the Aldines or
Bodonis, or shelf A or shelf B, that is to sa*, of those alto!ether arbitrar* !rou)in!s #hose sole
obDect #as their )ractical utilit*C $et should an*one attem)t such an undertakin!, he #ould be
doin! neither more nor less than those do #ho seek out the aesthetic la#s #hich must in their
belief control literar* and artistic kinds.
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There are t#o em)hases in this )assa!e #orth* of remark because of the #a* that the* indicate a )ossible
res)onse to the deconstruction of literar* !enre. The first is the em)hasis on the )ractical utilit* of cate!ories such
as #ords, !enres or literar* kinds. ,ike DeleuGe, Croce is content to 8ie# the #ord as a machine for containin!
difference, in #hich referents are sur8e*ed rather than unified. The second is that Croce, like 1illiams, 6ermode
and 7ameson amon! man* others, is not inclined to ask for the scientific definition of a #ord, but rather for its
histor*. Do not ask for the meanin! of the #ord EmodernismE, but for its histor*, 6ermode tells us, thereb*
sideste))in! a #hole arm* of )roblems about the difficult* of e>act definition. If the !enre is understood as a loose
assembla!e established historicall* for )ractical )ur)oses, it need not necessaril* be seen as the crime a!ainst
difference that it is usuall* taken for in contem)orar* criticism. A !enre, like a name or a noun more !enerall*,
mi!ht also be 8ie#ed less lo!icall*, as a contradictor* and unre)resentable entit*.
In other #ords, the ne# uni8ersal mi!ht )ro8ide some theoretical basis on #hich to reconstruct, or 8ie#
)ra!maticall*, the man* #holes and unities that ha8e been so relentlessl* dismantled in the a!e of deconstruction
and the "e# Aistoricisms. But there is another direction in #hich this attem)t to reclaim the uni8ersal mi!ht )oint.
If the a!e of )articularism is an a!e in #hich the abstractions of theor* #ere consi!ned to the dustbin alon! #ith
the com)licit abstractions of formalist and structuralist anal*sis, the meta)horicit* of our )articulars has ke)t ali8e,
as the basic intellectual 8alue of criticism, the disco8er* of !eneral rules and of eFui8alences. If ,aclauEs #ork is
commendable for its reminder that there can be no )olitics of )ure difference, then the same is true of academic
thou!ht in !eneral, that the lo!ic of difference not onl* cannot but should not o)erate #ithout the com)lementar*
lo!ic of eFui8alence. The formation of !eneral la#s about fiction for e>am)le is not sim)l* a #a* of obliteratin!
differences bet#een indi8idual fictions, but a #a* of understandin! that the* are ne8er isolated, and not onl* that,
that there ma* be lo!ical o)erations in8ol8ed in the t*)olo!* of fiction that #e ha8e not *et described. The ne#
uni8ersals mi!ht amount not onl* to somethin! like the refurbishment of sets in our descri)ti8e a))aratus, but also
the formulation and reformulation of abstract lo!ics. This #ould allo# us to sa*, for e>am)le, that unreliable
narrations are com)le> instances of the classical liar )arado>, or that historio!ra)hical metafiction
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is definable as the fleshin! out of ussellEs )arado>. Metafictions, after all, are the most elaborate e>am)les of the
a)oretic self-referentialit* that occurs #hen a set attem)ts to include itself, or e>clude itself, from its o#n
membershi). The le!ac* of the term EdifferenceE mi!ht be seen in this #a* as a histor* in three )hases, the first of
#hich seemed to ad8ance a )re)osterous eFui8alence bet#een different thin!s, the second destro*ed the 8alues of
eFui8alence, and the third reinstates the academic 8alues of eFui8alence, formalism and abstraction but on the
basis of much more de8iant and contradictor* lo!ical )ractices.
Alain Badiou, for e>am)le, finds in the notion of an ethics based on the res)ect for differences, a contradiction 8er*
similar to that identified b* Butler in the American consitution:
The )roblem is that the Eres)ect for differencesE and the ethics of human ri!hts do seem to define
an identityV And that as a result, the res)ect for differences a))lies onl* to those differences that
are reasonabl* consistent #ith this identit* <#hich, after all, is nothin! other than the identit* of
the #ealth* - albeit 8isibl* declinin! E1estE=. -8en immi!rants in this countr* O(ranceP, as seen b*
the )artisans of ethics, are acce)tabl* different onl* #hen the* are Einte!ratedE, onl* if the* seek
inte!ration <#hich seems to mean, if *ou think about it: onl* if the* #ant to suppress their
difference=. It mi!ht #ell be that ethical ideolo!*, detached from the reli!ious teachin!s #hich at
least conferred u)on it the fullness of a Ere8ealedE identit*, is sim)l* the final im)erati8e of a
conFuerin! ci8iliGation: EBecome like me and I #ill res)ect *our difference.E
<Badiou %&&+:%'-3=
As one of the most )o#erful contem)orar* ad8ocates of a refurbished notion of uni8ersal truth, based on an
abstract and set theoretical account of the nature of multi)licities, BadiouEs #ork is one of the )roliferatin! )laces
in #hich the conce)t of difference, the )hiloso)h* and literar* criticism of difference, the ethics of alterit* and the
conce)tion of the Bther is bein! seriousl* challen!ed. And it is not onl* that the res)ect for difference is
contradictor* and h*)ocritical. In the name of truth, Badiou ar!ues, the contem)orar* ethics of difference should
not be mistaken for !enuine thou!ht:
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Contem)orar* ethics kicks u) a bi! fuss about EculturalE differences. Its conce)tion of the EotherE
is informed mainl* b* this kind of difference. Its !reat ideal is the )eaceful co-e>istence of
cultural, reli!ious, and national EcommunitiesE, the refusal of Ee>clusionE.
But #hat #e must reco!nise is that these differences hold no interest for thou!ht, that the*
amount to nothin! more than the self-e8ident multi)licit* of human kindJA!ainst these triflin!
descri)tionsJ !enuine thou!ht should affirm the follo#in! )rinci)le: since differences are #hat
there is, and since e8er* truth is the comin!-to-be of that #hich is not *et, so differences are
then )recisel* #hat truths de)ose, or render insi!nificant. "o li!ht is shed on an* concrete
situation b* the notion of the Ereco!nition of the otherE.
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(or Badiou, this is e>actl* #hat set theor* offers in a #orld #hich has come to be dominated b* the conce)t of
difference. If difference dictates that #e think about bein!s, set theor* offers a lan!ua!e in #hich to think not
about beings but about being, a lan!ua!e that can be achie8ed onl* b* subtractin! <or abstractin!= all the
)articularit* and difference )ossessed b* the members of a set. To think about bein!, therefore, it becomes
necessar* to de)ose differences. It ma* be #ith this crude, but )ersuasi8e, ar!ument that the conce)t of difference
is knocked off its )erch, and that the a!e of difference is brou!ht to an end.
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