Royong vs Oblena

In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 199, complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent
!riston J" Oblena, a member of the #hilippine $ar, with rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner described
therein" %pon re&uirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and
praying that he be not disbarred" On 'ebruary (, 199, this Court referred the case to the )olicitor *eneral for
investigation, report and recommendation"
On July 1+, 19,1, the )olicitor *eneral submitted his report on the case with the recommendation that the respondent -be
permanently removed from his office lawyer and his name be stric.en from the roll of attorneys-" /he pertinent part of the
report reads as follows0
/he complainant testified that after lunch on !ugust , 191, Cecilia !ngeles, her foster mother, left her alone in
their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs" !t about 10++ p"m", while she- 2complainant3 was
ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the respondent entered and read a newspaper at her bac."
)uddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and with the other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of
the house and forced her to lie down on the floor" )he did not shout for help because he threatened her and her
family with death" 4e ne5t undressed as she lay on the floor, then had se5ual intercourse with her after he
removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue her resistance" !fter the
se5ual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her foster parents, otherwise, he would .ill her and all the
members of her family" )he resumed ironing clothes after he left until 0++ o6cloc. that afternoon when she
7oined her foster mother on the first floor of the house" !s a result of the se5ual intercourse she became
pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 8, 199 2pp" 491, 81, 8(, 8,, 8:, t"s"n", hearing of !ug" , 1993"
)he admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighbors that she did not report
the outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that she still fre&uented the respondent6s
house after !ugust , 199, sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for him, coo.ed his coffee, and
received his mail for him" Once, on <ovember 14, 191, when respondent was sic. of influen=a, she was left
alone with him in his house while her aunt $riccia !ngeles left for >anila to buy medicine 2pp" 11, 14911, 84,
t"s"n", hearing of !ugust , 1993"
/he respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant 2p" (, t"s"n", hearing of >arch 8
19,+3" 4e testified that after lunch on !ugust , 191, he went to the Commission Of Civil )ervice to follow up
his appointment as technical assistant in the office of the mayor of >a.ati, Ri=al, and read the record of the
administrative case against $uenaventura #ere= 2pp" 8(, 84, (4, t"s"n", hearing of >arch 8, 19,+, ?5hs" 1 and
83"
/he respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant from January, 19: to
@ecember, 191, when their clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant6s foster parents, but to avoid
criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he limited himself to .issing and embracing her and suc.ing her
tongue before she completed her eighteenth birthday" /hey had their first se5ual intercourse on >ay 11, 191,
after she had reached eighteen, and the second one wee. later, on >ay 11" /he last intercourse too. place
before Christmas in @ecember, 191" In all, they had se5ual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house
and sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity" 4e intended to marry her when she could
legally contract marriage without her foster parents6 intervention, 6in case occasion will permit """ because we
cannot as. permission to marry, for her foster parents will ob7ect and even my common9law wife, will ob7ect"6
!fter the discovery of their relationship by the complainant6s foster parents, he confessed the affair to $riccia,
e5plaining that he wanted to have a child, something she 2$riccia3 could not give him" 2pp" 1491,, 1998, t"s"n",
hearing of >arch 8, 19,+3"
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'I<@I<*) !<@ CO>>?</
/here is no controversy that the respondent had carnal .nowledge of the complainant" /he complainant claims
she surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are convinced
that the se5ual intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly and with her consent" 'rom her behaviour
before and after the alleged rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage
involving her honor """"
$ut the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in conscience recommend
respondent6s e5oneration" /he respondent tempted $riccia !ngeles to live maritally with him not long after she
and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled because of him" 4is own
evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of adulterous relationship with her and on the
convenient e5cuse that she, $riccia !ngeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina !ndalis, then 1: or 11
years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 8, 199" /he seduction was
accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises of marriage which he .new he could
not fulfill without grievous in7ury to the woman who forsoo. her husband so that he, respondent, could have all
of her" 4e also too. advantage of his moral influence over her" 'rom childhood, Josefina !ndalis, treated him as
an uncle and called him 6tata6 2uncle3, undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother"
Considering her age 2she was 1: or 11 years old then3, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him"
/he evidence further shows that on July 88, 194, the respondent filed a sworn petition dated >ay 88, 194
alleging -that he is a person of good moral character- 2#ar" (3 and praying that the )upreme Court permit him
-to ta.e the bar e5aminations to be given on the first )aturday of !ugust, 194, or at any time as the Court may
fi5""-
$ut he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be" 'rom 1948 to the
present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with $riccia !ngeles whose husband is still alive, .nowing
that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage still subsists" /his fact permanently dis&ualified
him from ta.ing the bar e5aminations, and had it been .nown to the )upreme Court in 194, he would not have
been permitted to ta.e the bar e5aminations that year or thereafter, or to ta.e his oath of office as a lawyer" !s
he was then permanently dis&ualified from admission to the #hilippine $ar by reason of his adulterous relations
with a married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent
disbarment, unless we recogni=e a double standard of morality, one for membership to the #hilippine $ar and
another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer"
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R?CO>>?<@!/IO<
Aherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondent !riston J" Oblena be
permanently removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be stric.en from the roll of attorneys"
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape
nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the )olicitor *eneral formulated another complaint which he appended to
his report, charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is
a person of good moral character; of living adulterously with $riccia !ngeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations
with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of $riccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and
unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and praying that this Court render 7udgment ordering -the permanent
removal of the respondent """ from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys"-
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that -the complaint does not merit action-,
since the causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the original cause of action for rape and that
-the complaint lac.s the necessary formalities called for in )ec" 1, Rule 181 of the Rules of Court"- Respondent prayed
that after due notice and hearing for additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed"
On )eptember 1(, 19,1, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additional evidence" !ccordingly the
case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified" On )eptember 89, 19,1, respondent as.ed leave to
submit a memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 19,1 the same was filed, alleging the following0 13 /hat the
charge of rape has not been proven; 83 /hat no act of seduction was committed by the respondent; (3 /hat no act of
per7ury or fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for admission to the bar;
and 43 /hat the respondent is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar"
Aherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this 4onorable
Court, without pre7udice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts"
1wph1.t
!t the hearing on <ovember 1,, 19,1, respondent presented his common9law wife, $riccia !ngeles, who testified as
follows0
""" Respondent is her common9law husband 2t"s"n" 8(3" )he first met respondent on @ecember 1,, 1941 at
Cavinti, Baguna 2t"s"n" 8(3" )he and her sister Cecilia !ngeles9Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red
Cross 2t"s"n" 8(3" )he was already married 2to /eodoro !rines3 at the time 2t"s"n" 843" )he and !rines are from
Iriga, Camarines )ur 2t"s"n" 843" Respondent and one >r" 'lores registered them 2t"s"n" 843 as evacuees" Ahen
>r" 'lores as.ed her about her status she told him she was 6single6 2t"s"n" 83" )he and her sister, Cecilia, were
then told to stay at respondent6s house, respondent courted her 2t"s"n" 8,3" Respondent as.ed her if she was
married and she told him 6we will tal. about that later on6 2t"s"n" 8,3" )he told respondent she was married 2to
!rines3 when she and respondent were already living together as 6husband and wife6, in 19482 t"s"n" 8,3"
Respondent as.ed her to marry him, when they were living as husband and wife 2t"s"n" 8:3" 4er sister Cecilia
left Cavinti 8 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because she and respondent 6had
already a good understanding62se5ual relations3 Ct"s"n" 8:D" Bater, she left Cavinti and went to her hometown in
Iriga, Camarines )ur, because respondent was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for
her to go home to Iriga 2t"s"n" 83" !rriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband 2!rines3, who told her he had
already a wife, named Conching *uevara 2t"s"n" 819893" )he then went bac. to Cavinti 2in 194(3, with her
father, and lived with respondent 2t"s"n" 893" Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him 2t"s"n" (3; in
fact, she is still presently living with respondent 2t"s"n" (3 CReport of Court Investigators, >arch ,, 19,8, pp" 9
,D"-
/hereafter, respondent re&uested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which re&uest was also granted" /he
affidavit was filed on @ecember 1,, 19,1, the respondent averring, among others, the following0"
""" /hat he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, because the latter was born
on 'ebruary 19, 194+, and his first se5ual intercourse with her too. place on >ay 11, 191, when she was
already above 11 years of age; that he had been living with his common9law wife, $riccia !ngeles, for almost 8+
years, but from the time he began courting her, he 6had no intention to alienate6 her love for her husband,
!rines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he courted $riccia on October 1,, 1941, and was shortly
thereafter accepted by her; that on 'ebruary 81, 1948, he found $riccia alone in his house, who told him that
her sister, Cecilia, had gone to #agsan7an with the other evacuees; that from said date 2'ebruary 813, to the
present, he and $riccia had been living together as common9law husband and wife; that 8 or ( wee.s
thereafter, he as.ed $riccia to marry him, but she confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband
2!rines3 was still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive $riccia away, because she was a stranger in the
place, nor could he urge her to 7oin her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left #agsan7an; that in 194( she told
$riccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his
e5pectations, $riccia returned to Cavinti ( months thereafter; that $riccia strongly insisted to live with him again,
telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that $riccia6s father told him that
$riccia6s husband 2!rines3 had agreed not to molest them as in fact he 2!rines3 was already living with another
woman; that he had 6no choice but to live with her6 2$riccia3 again; that when he filed his petition to ta.e the bar
e5aminations in 194, he 6did not have the slightest intention to hide6 from this Court the fact of his 6open
cohabitation with a married woman6 2$riccia !ngeles3; that he did not state said fact in his petition, because he
did not see in the form of the petition being used in 194 that the fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he
thought and believed he was a man of good moral character, and it was only from the )olicitor *eneral that he
first learned he was not so; and that he did not commit per7ury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his
petition to ta.e the bar e5aminations in 194"- 2Report of the Court Investigators, pp" ,91, >arch ,, 19,83"
!fter hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that0 13 Respondent used his .nowledge of the law to
ta.e advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, .nowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts on her, he
was free from any criminal liability; and 83 Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a
married woman even after he became a lawyer in 19 to the present; and (3 /hat respondent falsified the truth as to his
moral character in his petition to ta.e the 194 bar e5aminations, being then immorally 2adulterously3 in cohabitation with
his common9law wife, $riccia !ngeles, a married woman" /he investigators also recommended that the respondent be
disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year"
%pon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his counsel of record, the case
was set for hearing before the Court on !pril (+, 19,8" Respondent as.ed leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral
argument" /his was granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed"
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had se5ual relations with the complainant several times, and
as a conse&uence she bore him a child on June 8, 199; and that he li.ewise continuously cohabited with $riccia
!ngeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1948 up to the present"
/he main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation
with $riccia !ngeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent6s disbarment"
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant
and his open cohabitation with $riccia !ngeles, a married woman, because he has not been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude" It is true that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this
count, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by
)ection 8, Rule 18: of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred" $ut it has already been held that this
enumeration is not e5clusive and that the power of the courts to e5clude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is
inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of 7ustice; it may be e5ercised without any special statutory
authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be e5ercised in any manner
that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard" 21 'rancisco, Rules of Court C191 ed"D
,91, citing In Re #elae=, 44 #hil" ,:3" !lthough it is a well settled rule that the legislature 2or the )upreme Court by virtue
of its rule9ma.ing power3 may provide that certain acts or conduct shall re&uire disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that
statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes 2or rules3 do not
restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other than
statutory grounds 2: C"J")" :(43" In the %nited )tates, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, -the continued
possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a re&uisite condition for the rightful
continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss re&uires suspension or disbarment even
though the statutes do not specify that as a ground of disbarment-" /he moral turpitude for which an attorney may be
disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or non9professional activities 2 !m" Jur" 41:3" /he
tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds" Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough
to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer 2In Re #elae=, 44 #hil" ,:3" In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the
respondent is most apparent" 4is pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from
having se5ual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared E and that he limited
himself merely to .issing and embracing her and suc.ing her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his
.nowledge of the law, he too. advantage of, for his lurid purpose"
>oreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his common9law wife and
that he en7oyed a moral ascendancy over her who loo.ed up to him as her uncle" !s the )olicitor *eneral observed0 -4e
also too. advantage of his moral influence over her" 'rom childhood, Josefina !ndalis 2Royong3, treated him as an uncle
and called him 6tata6 2uncle3, undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother" Considering her age 2she
was 1: or 11 years old then3, her ine5perience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could
not resist him"- 'urthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a
person who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability" 4e
has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity e5pected of a member of the bar"
/he respondent6s misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment" /his is a
principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court &uoted with approval the
following portion of the decision of the )upreme Court of Fansas in the case of #eyton6s !ppeal 218 Fan" (91, 4+43, to
wit0"
/he nature of the office, the trust relation which e5ists between attorney and client, as well as between court
and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the &ualifications of attorneys, uniformly re&uire that an attorney
be a person of good moral character" If that qualification is a conition precedent to a license or privilege to
enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be e&ually essential during the continuance of the practice
and the e5ercise of the privilege" )o it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which
shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon
him" 2?mphasis supplied3"
Respondent6s conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless
rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer" Ae cannot give sanction to his acts" 'or us to do so would
be E as the )olicitor *eneral puts it E recogni=ing -a double standard of morality, one for membership to the #hilippine
$ar, and another for disbarment from the office of the lawyer"- If we concede that respondent6s adulterous relations and
his simultaneous seduction of his paramour6s niece did not and do not dis&ualify him from continuing with his office of
lawyer, this Court would in effect be re&uiring moral integrity as an essential prere&uisite for admission to the bar, only to
later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar"
/he decisions relied upon by the respondent in 7ustifying his stand that even if he admittedly committed fornication, this is
no ground for disbarment, are not controlling" 'ornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as have proven in this case, as to shoc. common sense of decency, certainly may 7ustify positive action by the Court in
protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law" /he reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his
adulterous relations with $riccia !ngeles, in that she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his -sense of
propriety and Christian charity- did not allow him to abandon her after his admission to the bar after almost 1( years of
cohabitation, are hardly an e5cuse for his moral dereliction" /he means he employed, as he stated, in order to e5tricate
himself from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and maintaining se5ual relations with her
ma.es his conduct more revolting" !n immoral act cannot 7ustify another immoral act" /he noblest means he could have
employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free to do so" $ut to continue maintaining adulterous
relations with a married woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter6s niece is moral
perversion that can not be condoned" Respondent6s conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of
the legal profession" !s good character is an essential &ualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he may be
removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character 2: C"J")" :(3"
/he respondent further maintains that the )olicitor *eneral e5ceeded his authority in filing the present complaint against
him for seduction, adultery and per7ury, as it charges an offense or offenses different from those originally charged in the
complaint of January 14, 199 for rape, and cites as authority )ections 4 and of Rule 181 of the Rules of Court, which
state0"
)?C" 4" Repo!t of the "olicito! #ene!al"E $ased upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the )olicitor
*eneral finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to the )upreme
Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be e5onerated unless the
court orders differently"
)?C" " $o%plaint of the "olicito! #ene!al. &nswe! of the !esponent" E If the )olicitor *eneral finds sufficient
ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with all the
evidence introduced in his investigation, with the )upreme Court, and the respondent shall be served by the
cler. of the )upreme Court with a copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen days"
/he contention is devoid of merit" <othing in the language of the foregoing rules re&uires the )olicitor *eneral to charge in
his complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed by the complainant for disbarment" #recisely, the
law provides that should the )olicitor *eneral find sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the
corresponding complaint, accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation" /he )olicitor *eneral therefore is
at liberty to file any case against the respondent he may be 7ustified by the evidence adduced during the investigation""
/he respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to ta.e the bar e5aminations in 194 since according to
his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral character" /his contention is clearly
erroneous" One6s own appro5imation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character" >oral character is not a sub7ective
term, but one which corresponds to ob7ective reality" >oral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other
people thin. he is" !s former Chief Justice >oran observed0 !n applicant for license to practice law is re&uired to show
good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is .nown" !s has been said, ante
the standard of personal and professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to practice law is not
satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law" *ood moral character includes
at least common honesty 2( >oran, Comments on the Rules of Court, C19: ed"D ,8,, citing In Re Aeinstein, 48 #" C8dD
:44 $"B"@", Cooper v" *reeley" 1 @en" C<"G"D (44:; In Re @el Rosario, 8 #hil" (99; and #eople v" >acauley, 18 <"?"
,183" Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar" 4e
lived an adulterous life with $riccia !ngeles, and the fact that people who .new him seemed to have ac&uiesced to his
status, did not render him a person of good moral character" It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then
or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar"
A4?R?'OR?, 7udgment is hereby entered stri.ing the name of herein respondent, !riston J" Oblena, from the roll of
attorneys"