Sanchez v.

Commission on Audit
Facts:
Congress passed R.A. 7180 (General Appropriations
Act of 1992, w/c provided an appropriation for the
DILG and set aside the amount of P75M for the
DILGs Capability Building Program.
Atty. Mendoza, Project Director of the Ad Hoc Task
Force for Inter-Agency Coordination to Implement
Local Autonomy, informed then Deputy Executive
Secretary de la Serna of the proposal to constitute
and implement a shamrock type task force to
implement local autonomy institutionalized under
the LGC. The stated purpose for the creation of the
task force was to design programs, strategize and
prepare modules for an effective program for local
autonomy.
The proposal was accepted by the Deputy Executive
Secretary and attested by then DILG Secretary Sarino,
who issued a memorandum for the transfer and
remittance to the Office of the President of the sum
of P300K for the operational expenses of the task
force. An additional cash advance of P300K was
requested. These amounts were taken from the
Fund.
2 cash advances both in the amount of P300K were
withdrawn from the Fund by the DILG and
transferred to the Cashier of the Office of the
President. The first cash advance was liquidated
(payroll, Office Rentals, etc.) although no receipts
were presented. There is no record of the liquidation
of the second cash advance.
However, upon post-audit conducted by the
Department auditor the amounts were disallowed
because: 1. No legal basis for the created Task Force
to claim payment thru DILG by way of cash advance;
2. Previous cash advance granted to accountable
officer has not yet been liquidated; 3. Expenditures
funded from capability building are subject to
restrictions/conditions embodied in the Special
Provisions of the DILG Appropriations of R.A. 7180
which should be met; 4. Estimate of expenses
covered by the cash advance not specified.
A Notice of Disallowance was then sent to Mr. Sarino,
et al. holding the latter jointly and severally liable for
the amount and directing them to immediately settle
the disallowance.
The COA affirmed the disallowance.

Issue: W/N there is legal basis for the transfer of funds of the
Capability Building Program Fund appropriated in the 1992
General Appropriation Act from the Department of Interior and
Local Government to the Office of the President.
Position of the COA:
- There is no legal basis because the Fund was meant
to be implemented by the Local Government
Academy. Further, transfer of funds under Sec. 25(5),
Art. VI of the Constitution may be made only by
the persons mentioned in the section and may not
be re-delegated being already a delegated authority.
- Additionally, the funds transferred must come only
from savings of the office in other items of its
appropriation and must be used for other items in
the appropriation of the same office. In this case,
there were no savings from which augmentation can
be taken because the releases of funds to the Office
of the President were made at the beginning of the
budget year 1992.
- Also, while the Fund is a regular appropriation, it
partakes the nature of a trust fund because it was
allocated for a specific purpose. Thus, it may be used
only for the specific purpose for which it was created
or the fund received. The COA concludes that
petitioners should be held civilly and criminally liable
for the disallowed expenditures.
Held:
SC upheld decision of the COA.
The COA is endowed with enough latitude to
determine, prevent and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It
has the power to ascertain whether public funds
were utilized for the purpose for which they had
been intended.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the
decisions of administrative authorities, especially one
which is constitutionally-created, not only on the
basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also
for their presumed expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce. It is only when the COA has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition
questioning its rulings.
The power to transfer savings under Sec. 25(5), Art. VI
of the 1987 Constitution pertains exclusively to the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions and no other. Parenthetically,
petitioners fail to point out to the Court the specific
law and provision thereof which authorizes the
transfer of funds in this case.
Here, the power and authority to transfer in this case
was exercised not by the President but only at the
instance of the Deputy Executive Secretary, not the
Executive Secretary himself. Even if the DILG
Secretary had corroborated the initiative of the
Deputy Executive Secretary, it does not even appear
that the matter was authorized by the President.
More fundamentally, even the President himself
could not have validly authorized the transfer under
the Constitution.
There are two essential requisites in order that a
transfer of appropriation with the corresponding
funds may legally be effected. First, there must be
savings in the programmed appropriation of the
transferring agency. Second, there must be an
existing item, project or activity with an
appropriation in the receiving agency to which the
savings will be transferred.
Actual savings is a sine qua non to a valid transfer of
funds from one government agency to another. The
word actual denotes that something is real or
substantial, or exists presently in fact as opposed to
something which is merely theoretical, possible,
potential or hypothetical. The President, Chief
Justice, Senate President, and the heads of
constitutional commissions need to first prove and
declare the existence of savings before transferring
fund.
By the nature of maintenance and operating
expenses, savings may generally be determined at
the end of the year, or earlier in case of completion,
discontinuance or abandonment of the work for
which the appropriation was authorized. In contrast,
savings from personal services may generally be
determined even at the opening of the fiscal year in
case of unpaid compensation pertaining to vacant
positions and leaves of absence without pay. It
should be emphasized that the 1992 GAA did not
provide an appropriation for personal services for the
Capability Building Program. Savings from vacant
positions which pertain to personal services,
therefore, may not be considered savings from the
Fund which may be transferred. There is no question
that there were no savings from the Fund at the time
of the transfer.
The fact that the audit was conducted by the DILG
Auditor and not by the Auditor of the Office of the
President is inconsequential because the findings and
conclusion of the DILG Auditor were passed upon and
upheld by the COA itself.
Thus, the responsible public officials are personally
liable for the disallowed disbursement by virtue of
their position as public officials held accountable for
public funds.

SOLAR ENTERTAINMENT vs. JUDGE HOW
FACTS: The City Prosecutor of Paraaque filed an
information for estafa against Ma. Fe Barreiro based on the
complaint filed by Solar Team Entertainment, Inc.The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-536 entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Ma. Fe F. Barreiro before the Regional Trial
Court of Paraaque City, Branch 257, presided by public
respondent Judge Rolando G. How. Before the scheduled
arraignment of private respondent could take place,
respondent court issued an order resetting the arraignment of
private respondent on the ground that private respondent had
filed an appeal with the Department of Justice. Private
respondent manifested in the same Order that she would
submit a certification from the DOJ granting due course to her
appeal on or before the second scheduled arraignment. On
September 24, 1999, respondent court issued an Order
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order
that previously reset the arraignment of private
respondent. Said order further rescheduled the arraignment
of private respondent. Private respondent filed another
Motion to Defer Arraignment, before the scheduled date of
the arraignment of private respondent and before the date set
for the hearing of private respondents Motion to Defer
Arraignment, respondent court issued an Order further
deferring the arraignment of private respondent until such
time that the appeal with the said office (SOJ) is resolved.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order was
denied by respondent court on November 22, 1999. Petitioner
bewails the fact that six months have elapsed since private
respondent appeared or submitted herself to the jurisdiction
of respondent court and up to now she still has to be
arraigned. Respondent court allegedly violated due process
when it issued the assailed order before petitioner received a
copy of the Motion to Defer Arraignment of private
respondent and before the hearing for the same motion could
be conducted. Petitioner points out that despite the order of
respondent court dated September 26, 1999 which stated that
the arraignment of private respondent on November 18, 1999
is intransferable, respondent court, in utter disregard of its
own order, issued the now assailed order indefinitely
suspending the arraignment of private respondent.
Petitioner is convinced that the twin orders further
delaying the arraignment of private respondent and denying
the motion for reconsideration of petitioner violate Section 7,
of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (RA 8493) and Section 12, Rule
116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court can indefinitely suspend
the arraignment of the accused until the petition for review
with the Secretary of Justice has been resolved, without
violating RA 8493, otherwise known as The Speedy Trial Act
of 1998.
HELD: No, The power of the Secretary of Justice to review
resolutions of his subordinates even after the information has
already been filed in court is well-settled. Procedurally
speaking, after the filing of the information, the court is in
complete control of the case and any disposition therein is
subject to its sound discretion. The decision to suspend
arraignment to await the resolution of an appeal with the
Secretary of Justice is an exercise of such discretion. Thus,
public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when it suspended arraignment to await the resolution of her
petition for review with the Secretary of Justice. The SC
stressed that the court is not bound to adopt the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice since the court is mandated to
independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case, and
may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice. The authority of the Secretary of Justice to
review resolutions of his subordinates even after information
has already been filed in court does not present an
irreconcilable conflict with the Speedy Trial Act. Section 7 of
the Act prescribing the 30-day period for the arraignment of
the accused is not absolute. In fact, Section 10 of the law
enumerates periods of delay that shall be excluded in
computing the time within which trial must commence. The
exceptions provided in the Act reflect the fundamentally
recognized principle that the concept of speedy trial is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept. Recently, the DOJ issued Memorandum Order No. 12
dated July 3, 2000 mandating that the period for the
disposition of appeals/petition for review shall be 75 days. In
view of this memorandum, the indefinite suspension of
proceedings in the trial court because of a pending petition for
review with the Secretary of Justice is now unlikely to happen.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
(JBC)
G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010.
FACTS:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the
controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven
days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009,
Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the
JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process
for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be
commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en
banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have
unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon
the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the
JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or
recommendation, and published for that purpose its
announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the
Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC
resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names
of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their
sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not
later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun
the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno
in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on
when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the
position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved.
The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of
intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass
the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or
that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a
midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the
parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of
Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as
Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24,
Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the
Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15,
Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the
power to appoint to judicial positions during the period
therein fixed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.
2. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe
for judicial determination.
3. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the
next Chief Justice.
4. Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to
compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the
JBC.
HELD:
1.Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for
this case was waived by the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar
concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are
not brought by parties who have been personally injured by
the operation of a law or any other government act but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the
public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners
are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide
discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so
remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the
serious constitutional questions raised.

2. There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the petitions
set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced
the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be
included in a short list to be submitted to the President for
consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno
as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet
vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination
pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to
decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the
incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes
the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next
steps are the public interview of the candidates, the
preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview
of constitutional experts, as may be needed. The resolution of
the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging
questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the
process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading
the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.
3.Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to
other appointments to the judiciary. The records of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the
framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and
arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that
the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the
Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the
framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and
manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain.
As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive
Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by
the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of
appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the
Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written
the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII.
4.Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus
shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed
is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer.
Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment
or discretion in a particular way. For mandamus to lie, the
following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff
has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the
duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is
mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the
performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be
performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR# 183591, October
14, 2008
Carpio-Morales, J:
Facts:
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001
(MOA) is assailed on its constitutionality. This document
prepared by the joint efforts of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a
codification of consensus points reached between both parties
and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro
homeland.

Issue:
When the Executive Department pronounced to abandon the
MOA, is the issue of its constitutionality merely moot and
academic and therefore no longer justiciable by the Court?

Held:
Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not
at all come into effect. The MOA will forever remain a draft
that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a
piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot
be the source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The
instant Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the
MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer present an
actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this
Court.

An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of
legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can
be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A
justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a
definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy
admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in
character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law
would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions
at bar just because of the great public interest these cases
have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and not of
public opinion. The power of judicial review of this Court is for
settling real and existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears or
addressing public clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by
other branches of government, the Court must be careful that
it is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental
principles of constitutional law.

Malaria Employees & Workers Assn. of the Phils., Inc., et al.
v. The Hon. Exec. Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 160093, July 31,
2007
The President must exercise good faith in carrying out the
reorganization of any branch or agency of the executive
department. Reorganization is effected in good faith if it is for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. R.A. No. 6656 provides for the circumstances which
may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of
civil service employees made as a result of reorganization, to
wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in the number of
positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or
agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and
another performing substantially the same functions is
created; (c) where incumbents are replaced by those less
qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and
merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the
department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices
perform substantially the same functions as the original
offices; and (e) where the removal violates the order of
separation.

League of Provinces of the Philippines v. DENR
G.R. No. 175368. April 11, 2013
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, praying that this Court order the following: ( 1)
declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government
Code of 1991 and Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076,
otherwise known as the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of
1991; (2) prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control
over provinces; and (3) declare as illegal the respondent
Secretary of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources'
(DENR) nullification, voiding and cancellation of the Small-
Scale Mining permits issued by the Provincial Governor of
Bulacan.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 17(B)(3)(III) of R.A. No. 7160 and
Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 are unconstitutional for providing
for executive control and infringing upon the local autonomy
of provinces.
(2) Whether or not, the act of respondent in nullifying, voiding
and cancelling the small-scale mining permits amounts to
executive control, not merely supervision and usurps the
devolved powers of all provinces.
HELD:
(1) No. In this case, respondent DENR Secretary has the authority
to nullify the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the
Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR Secretary has
control over the PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-
Scale Mining Program is subject to control by respondent
DENR. Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution provides that "the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State." Under said provision, the DENR
has the duty to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of the country's
natural resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale
mining law in the provinces is made subject to the supervision,
control and review of the DENR under the Local Government
Code of 1991, while the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of
1991 provides that the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program is
to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with
other concerned local government agencies. The Court has
clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in
the Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative
autonomy of local government units or the decentralization of
government authority. It does not make local governments
sovereign within the State. The Local Government Code did
not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining
law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject
to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in
charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization of the country's natural
resources.

Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-
equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it bears
emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-
honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid. This
presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers
which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the
Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. This
Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof,
unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, leaving no doubt or
hesitation in the mind of the Court.
(2) No. The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary
was rendered in accordance with the power of review granted
to the DENR Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is
provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No. 707651 and Section 22 of
its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The decision of the
DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration
Permit of AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and
canceling the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the
Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of review
granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DENR Secretary's
power to review and decide the issue on the validity of the
issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial
Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial
function, which involves the determination of what the law is,
and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with
respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof
and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective
rights. The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function
under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes,
conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-
judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated
with "substitution of judgment" of the Provincial Governor in
issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said
act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the
rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.

PIMENTEL vs ERMITA
Political Law Ad Interim Appointments
While Congress was in session, GMA appointed Arthur Yap et
al as secretaries of their respective departments. They were
appointed in acting capacities only. Pimentel together w/ 7
other senators filed a complaint against the appointment of
Yap et al. During pendency, Congress adjourned and GMA re-
issued ad interim appointments re-appointing those previously
appointed in acting capacity. Pimentel argues that GMA should
not have appointed Yap et al as acting secretaries because in
case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an
Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary.
Pimentel further asserts that while Congress is in session,
there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a
vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the CoA,
without first having obtained its consent; GMA cannot issue
appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries
while Congress is in session because the law does not give the
President such power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is
valid.
HELD: Ermita, in behalf of the other respondents, argued that
GMA is allowed under Sec. 16, Art 7 of the Constitution to
make such appointments. Pursuant to the Constitution, the
President shall have the power to make appointments during
the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory,
but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval
by the CoA or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Ermita also pointed out EO 292 which allows such an
appointment with the exception that such temporary
designation shall not exceed one year. Sec 17, Chap 5, Title I,
Book III of EO 292 states that *t+he President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or any
other competent person to perform the functions of an office
in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even
appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the
government service, as long as the President deems that
person competent. Also, Congress, through a law, cannot
impose on the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.
An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a
position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise
of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the
President who her alter ego should be.
What Bernas Says
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from
appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective
upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended
only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments
may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-
interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily
filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way
of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments.
** The SC finds no abuse in what GMA did. The absence of
abuse is readily apparent from GMAs issuance of ad interim
appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of
Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

Samuel B. Ong vs. Office of the President, et al., G.R. No.
184219. January 30, 2012
Public officers; temporary and coterminous employees. No
officer or employee in the Civil Service can be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law. However, this
admits of exceptions, as it is likewise settled that the right to
security of tenure is not available to those employees whose
appointments are temporary and coterminous in nature. Here,
petitioners appointment was temporary as he did not have
the required career executive service eligibility. An appointee
without such eligibility cannot hold the position in a
permanent capacity. A temporary appointee can be removed
even without cause and at a moments notice. As to those with
eligibilities, their right to security of tenure pertain to their
rank but not to the position to which they were appointed.
Petitioner never alleged that, at any time during which he held
the position in question, he had acquired the requisite
eligibility. Petitioners temporary appointment was also
coterminous, or one that is co-existent with the tenure of the
appointing authority or at the latters pleasure. As such, his
replacement was not a removal but rather an expiration of
term and no prior notice, due hearing or cause were necessary
to effect the same. The acceptance of a temporary
appointment divests an appointee of the right to security of
tenure against removal without cause. One who holds a
temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his
employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the
appointing authority, there being no need to show that the
termination is for cause.

buklod ng kawaning eiib vs executive secretary
360 SCRA 718 Law on Public Officers Security of Tenure in a
Public Office No Vested Right to a Public Office Power to
Create and Destroy Public Office
During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she created the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to
primarily conduct anti-smuggling operations in areas outside
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In the year 2000,
President Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He
subsequently ordered the employees of EIIB to be separated
from the service. Thereafter, he created the Presidential Anti-
Smuggling Task Force Aduana, which EIIB employees claim
to be essentially the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB,
through the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme
Courts power of judicial review in questioning the said orders.
EIIB employees maintained that the president has no power to
abolish a public office, as that is a power solely lodged in the
legislature; and that the abolition violates their constitutional
right to security of tenure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has merit.
HELD: No. It is a general rule that the power to abolish a public
office is lodged with the legislature. The exception is when it
comes to agencies, bureaus, and other offices under the
executive department, the president may deactivate them
pursuant to control power over such offices, unless such office
is created by the Constitution. This is also germane to the
presidents power to reorganize the Office of the President.
Basis of such power also has its roots in two laws i.e., PD 1772
and PD 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of
the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the
national government, which includes the power to group,
consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to
transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services
and activities and to standardize salaries and materials.
Also, it cannot be said that there is bad faith in the abolition of
EIIB. EIIB allocations has always exceeded P100 million per
year. To save the government some money, it needed to
abolish it and replace it with TF Aduana which has for its
allocation just P50 million. Further, TYF Aduana is invested
more power that EIIB never had, i.e., search and seizure and
arrest.
Lastly, EEIB employees right to security of tenure is not
violated. Since there is no bad faith in the abolition of EIIB,
such abolition is not infirm. Valid abolition of offices is neither
removal nor separation of the incumbents. If the public office
ceases to exist, there is no separation or dismissal to speak of.
Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold
office. Except constitutional offices which provide for special
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to
have any vested right in an office or its salary.

Canonizado v. Aguirre
323 SCRA 312
FACTS: Petitioners were incumbent commissioners of the
National Police Commission when Republic Act. No. 8851,
otherwise known as the PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of
1998, took effect. Section 8 of Republic Act. No. 8851
provided that the terms of office of the incumbent
commissioners were deemed expired. Petitioners claimed
that this violated their security of tenure.
HELD: Petitioners are members of the civil service. Republic
Act No. 8551 did not expressly abolish the positions of
petitioners. Under RA No. 6975, the National Police
Commission was under the Department of Interior and Local
Government, while under Republic Act. No. 8551 it is made an
agency attached to the Department of Interior and Local
Government. The organizational structure and the
composition of the National Police Commission remain
essentially the same except for the addition of the Chief of
PNP as ex-officio member. The powers and duties of the
National Police Commission remain basically
unchanged. No bona fide reorganization of the NPC having
been mandated by Congress and insofar as RA 8851 declares
the office of the petitioner as expired resulting in their
separation from office, it is tantamount to removing civil
service employees from office without legal cause therefore, it
must be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.

AMPATUAN v. PUNO
October 26, 2012 Leave a comment
June 7, 2011 (G.R. No. 190259)
PARTIES:
Petitioners: DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN
ADIONG, REGIE SAHALI-GENERALE
Respondents : HON. RONALDO PUNO, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
FACTS:
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre
of 57 men and women, then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of
Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato
under a state of emergency. She directed the AFP and the
PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the
Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents
of lawless violence in the named places. Under AO 273, she
also delegated to the DILG the supervision of the ARMM.
The petitioners claimed that the Presidents issuances
encroached the ARMMs autonomy, that it constitutes an
invalid exercise of emergency powers, and that the President
had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency,
especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of
Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. They
want Proc. 1946 and AO 273 be declared unconstitutional.
The respondents, however, said that its purpose was not to
deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and
order in subject places. It is pursuant to her calling out
power as Commander-in-Chief. The determination of the need
to exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom.
The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over
the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any
way. The delegation was necessary to facilitate the
investigation of the mass killings

ISSUE:
WON President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers
when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and
suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
HELD: NO. The President did not proclaim a national
emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted
by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary
powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a
congressional authority to exercise the same.
ISSUE (2): WON there is factual basis on the calling out of the
Armed Forces.
HELD: Yes. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in
her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is
true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the
Presidents exercise of the above power, unless it is shown
that such determination was attended by grave abuse of
discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents
judgment.

Lacson vs. Sec. Perez
Equal Protection KBG Cases Before the Sandiganbayan
On 18 May 1995, alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng
Gang were shot to death. The incident was later
sensationalized as a rub out. This implicated Lacson among
others as guilty for multiple murder. The case was raised
before the Sandiganbayan. In 1996, Lacson et al filed separate
motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall
within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Sec 2 (par a and
c) of RA 7975 An Act To Strengthen The Functional And
Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For
That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended. They
contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the principal
accused are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or
higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent
(Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal
accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a
Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
In 1997, RA 8249 was passed which basically expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The law was authored by
Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed the law as it
was introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was
made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioners cases
were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction
thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due
process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for
nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving
the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the
passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such
resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the
exercise of petitioners vested rights under the old
Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975).
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to equal protection by Lacson
et al has been violated with the passage of RA 8249.
HELD: The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not violate the right of
Lacson et al to equal protection. No concrete evidence and
convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration
of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the
highest officer of the co-equal executive department as
unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed
reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must
present proof of arbitrariness. It is an established precept in
constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of
the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary
when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class
The classification between those pending cases involving the
concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced
and whose cases could have been affected by the
amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A.
8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as
of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that
makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against
them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties
had already submitted their respective proofs, examined
witness and presented documents. Since it is within the power
of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the
constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated that
an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect
pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in
the form of a transitory provision. Thus, Lacson et al cannot
claim that Secs 4 and 7 placed them under a different category
from those similarly situated as them.
Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases
involving certain public officials and, under the transitory
provision in Sec 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary
to petitioner and intervenors arguments, the law is not
particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The
transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the
Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just happened that
the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the
law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are
not affected by the transitory provision under Sec 7 of the new
law (R.A. 8249).

IBP VS ZAMORA
Posted by kaye lee on 11:27 PM
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian
supremacy clause]
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art.
VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive,
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate
with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a
temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
law enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity
of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the
Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the
existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the
lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a
breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the
Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct
and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise,
their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines
and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the
foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority
is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment
of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an
insidious incursion of the military in the task of law
enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the
Constitution.